Carlos Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader. Volume One: The Years 1914-1960 by John W. F.

Dulles
Review by: Bernardo Kucinski
Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Oct., 1992), pp. 698-699
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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698

Reviews

polity. Whether or not Brazilian traditions are sufficiently flexible to provide the
basis of long-term democratic change rather than the palliatives of 'conciliafao'
remains a moot point, both for Dr Schneider and this reviewer.
FRANK

University of Southampton

COLSON

John W. F. Dulles, Carlos Lacerda,Brazilian Crusader.Volume One: The Years

1i94-i960
$40.00.

(Austin,

Texas: University

of Texas Press, 1991), pp. xvi+495,

A frustrated politician, a frustrated playwright and, to his many enemies, an

altogether frustrated man, Carlos Lacerda nevertheless performed the main
supporting role in the drama of Brazil's populism in the fifties. This first volume
of Dulles' biography deals extensively with the atmosphere of Lacerda's
childhood, in particular the activities of his father Mauricio de Lacerda, a political
leader in his own right, whom Carlos came to reject. It was an era of increasing
influence of communism among Brazil's intellectuals and artists, including his
father. Although many of the details of this part of the narrative may appear
naive, they help to convey the atmosphere of a rural society changing at
accelerated pace, under the double tensions of the 'tenentismo' at home and the
confrontation between communism and rising fascism abroad.
Dulles' biography suggests that Lacerda turned from being a fellow traveller
to become Brazil's fiercest anti-communist not when he was 'expelled' by
the party in 1939, for the famous anti-Comintern article written for Observador
Econdmicoas part of Gettilio's dictatorship anniversary, but much later, in 1945,
when the communist leader Prestes, from his gaol, called Gettilio 'a patriot' to
be supported by all Brazilians.
One problem with the subsequent sections of the biography is that, although
from 1947 on the fight against communism in Brazil was certainly part of a global
Cold War, Dulles keeps strictly to the Brazilian scale and sources, such as
testimonies and Lacerda's papers - as opposed to what he did in the biographies
of Castello Branco and of Vargas, when he used extensively State Department and
President Lyndon B. Johnson's papers.
By revealing that the August 1954 attempt on his life was organised by the
head of the Presidential Guard, Lacerda fuelled the conservatives' press campaign
that led to the setting up of the military-run tribunal 'Reptiblica do Galeao', and
to Vargas' suicide. Almost twenty years before Watergate, this press campaign
was paradigmatic of the power of the press in a political confrontation staged
within a public space. The crisis of populism in Brazil was also the crisis of this
public space and of democracy itself. It marked the decline of a specific kind of
public space constituted by a variety of prestigious dailies deeply committed to
party politics. Some of them, such as O Estado de S. Paulo, were not mere
disseminators of an ideology: they produced it. Lacerda was the main operator
of this process, combining the techniques of investigative journalism with a
remarkable rhetoric and political activism.
Vargas appreciated the importance of newspapers in his confrontation with the
anti-populist elite, to the extent of helping Samuel Wainer to set up Ultima Hora,
as the only nationwide and mass reading daily in Brazil ever to align with the

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Reviews 699
populist/nationalist camp. Ultima Hora revolutionised Brazil's press, and at its
peak sold 700,000 copies in five state capitals - a distribution level never reached
before or since. This is why Lacerda unleashed a massive attack on Wainer,
exposing the use of government-favoured loans in the setting up of the paper.
Dulles might give some readers the erroneous impression that Lacerda's Tribuna
da Imprensawas more influential than Ultima Hora. The 1964 military coup, in
which, again, Lacerda played a decisive role, can be seen also as the press barons'
backlash against Ultima Hora which, indeed, was invaded and destroyed.
It would be difficult for an historian who has so extensively researched and
written about this period in Brazil to repeat all the contextualisation he has
already offered, for instance, in his Vargas biography. This is, however, what one
feels missing in the last sections of the book, when Lacerda deals with public
affairs whose wider scope one would have to find in Dulles' previous books, in
particular; the social and economic dimensions of the Kubitschek administration,
the building of Brasilia, the 'fifty years in five' development plans criticised by
Lacerda, and the subsequent inflationary crisis that paved the way for the outsider
Janio Quadros, frustrating Lacerda's presidential ambitions.
Institute of Latin American Studies,

B E RN A R DO KUCINSKI

London

Robert J. Alexander, Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil,

(Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, Swallow
Press, I99I), pp. xiii+ 429, $25.00,

pb.

Professor Robert Alexander sees Brazil under the presidency of Juscelino

Kubitschek (1956-6I) as enjoying a golden age of development, confidence and
democracy. Kubitschek came to power when Brazil was in crisis politically and
economically. Many contemporary observers doubted that he would survive in
office. Kubitschek not only survived but led Brazil to one of its most dynamic
periods of economic growth and prosperity. During his five years in power,
Brazil enjoyed enormous infrastructure growth and witnessed the development
of new intermediate and capital goods industries. Kubitschek's most recognisable
achievement, of course, was the development of a new capital, Brasilia, deep in
the interior of the nation. When he came to power, Brazilians were pessimistic
about their future. By the latter part of his term, Brazilians looked positively at
the nation's potential. Moreover, Kubitschek presided over 'the most democratic
period in the nation's history' (p. 12).
Professor Alexander's basic characterisation of Kubitschek's central role in
Brazil's stability and dynamic growth of late I95os is not problematic. What is
questionable, however, is his view that Kubitschek had a realistic long-range
plan for Brazil. Alexander suggests that Kubitschek would have effectively
handled the social and economic problems he was unable to tackle during his
presidency if he had achieved his planned second term.
Contrary to Alexander's view, Kubitschek seemed to have given very little
attention to programmes designed to deal with the plight of the urban and rural
workers and viewed labour militancy with alarm. It appears that his vision was
that the 'social question' would be resolved by development and modernisation.

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