G.R. No.

180045

November 17, 2010

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), DIONISIO BANLASAN,
ALFREDO T. TAFALLA, TELESFORO D. RUBIA, ROGELIO A. ALVAREZ, DOMINADOR
A. ESCOBAL, and ROSAURO PANIS,Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 and the Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
September 7, 2006 and September 27, 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 50450.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondents Dionisio Banlasan, Alfredo T. Tafalla, Telesforo D. Rubia, Rogelio A. Alvarez,
Dominador A. Escobal, and Rosauro Panis were employed as security guards by DNL
Security Agency (DNL Security). By virtue of the service contract entered into by DNL
Security and petitioner Government Service Insurance System on May 1, 1978,
respondents were assigned to petitioners Tacloban City office, each receiving a monthly
income ofP1,400.00. Sometime in July 1989, petitioner voluntarily increased respondents
monthly salary to P3,000.00.3
In February 1993, DNL Security informed respondents that its service contract with
petitioner was terminated. This notwithstanding, DNL Security instructed respondents to
continue reporting for work to petitioner. Respondents worked as instructed until April 20,
1993, but without receiving their wages; after which, they were terminated from
employment.4
On June 15, 1995, respondents filed with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VIII, Tacloban City, a complaint against DNL
Security and petitioner for illegal dismissal, separation pay, salary differential, 13th month
pay, and payment of unpaid salary.
On September 30, 1997, Labor Arbiter (LA) Benjamin S. Guimoc rendered a
decision5 against DNL Security and petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in this manner[,] to wit:
1. Finding no illegal dismissal of complainants;
2. Ordering respondent DNL Security Agency only to pay complainants the
amount of P176,130.00 representing separation pay; the amount of P42,666.40
representing wages of complainants from February 1993 to April 20, 1993;

3. Ordering as joint and solidary liability by the respondents DNL Security Agency
and GSIS the amount ofP48,385.87 representing salary differential[;] the amount
of P55,564.92 as 13th month pay; all in the aggregate sum of THREE HUNDRED
TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN & 19/100
(P322,747.19) to be paid by both or either of the said respondent within ten (10)
days from receipt of this decision and to be deposited with the cashier of this
office for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.6
The LA found that respondents were not illegally terminated from employment because the
employment of security guards is dependent on the service contract between the security
agency and its client. However, considering that respondents had been out of work for a
long period, and consonant with the principle of social justice, the LA awarded respondents
with separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service, to be paid
by DNL Security. Because DNL Security instructed respondents to continue working for
petitioner from February 1993 to April 20, 1993, DNL Security was also made to pay
respondents wages for the period. The LA further granted respondents claim of salary
differential, as they were paid wages below the minimum wage, as well as 13th month pay.
For these monetary awards, petitioner was made solidarily liable with DNL Security, as the
indirect employer of respondents.7
DNL Security filed a motion for reconsideration, while petitioner appealed to the NLRC. 8
In a resolution9 dated December 9, 1997, the NLRC treated DNL Securitys motion for
reconsideration as an appeal, but dismissed the same, as it was not legally perfected. It
likewise dismissed petitioners appeal, having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
before the CA. On September 7, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed Decision10 affirming
the NLRC ruling. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA on
September 27, 2007.
Hence, the present petition raising the following errors:
The Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in finding that the public respondent
NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in dismissing the appeal of the petitioner GSIS, considering that:
1. The Court of Appeals disregarded the facts and circumstances evidencing the
timeliness of the petitioner GSIS appeal before the NLRC and sacrificed
substantial justice in the altar of dubious technicalities; and
2. The Court of Appeals misapplied the law and mistakenly affirmed the public
respondent NLRCs decision that the petitioner GSIS is jointly and severally liable
with DNL Security Agency for payment of the unsubstantiated amounts of Salary
Differentials and the 13th Month Pay to the private respondent security guards. 11

Petitioner insists that its appeal before the NLRC was filed on time, having been filed
through registered mail on October 27, 1997, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 34581
countersigned by the postmaster. It adds that, even assuming that the appeal was indeed
filed one day late, the NLRC should not have strictly applied the Rules in order to effect
substantial justice. Petitioner also claims that although the body of the LA decision made
DNL Security solely liable for respondents wages from February 1993 to April 20, 1993,
and for their separation pay, the dispositive portion thereof made petitioner solidarily liable
for said awards. Petitioner further questions the award of monetary benefits for lack of
evidence to substantiate said claims. Lastly, petitioner argues that the enforcement of the
decision is impossible, considering that petitioners charter unequivocally exempts it from
execution.12
We partly grant the petition.
The resolution of the petition before us involves the appreciation and determination of
factual matters, mainly on the issue of whether petitioners appeal was seasonably filed
before the NLRC.
Timeliness of an appeal is a factual issue. It requires a review or evaluation of the
evidence which would show when the appeal was actually mailed to and received by the
NLRC.13 In this case, to prove that it mailed the notice of appeal and appeal memorandum
on October 27, 1997, instead of October 28, 1997, as shown by the stamped date on the
envelope, petitioner presented Registry Receipt No. 34581 bearing the earlier date.
Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, where the filing of pleadings, appearances,
motions, notices, orders, judgments, and all other papers with the court/tribunal is made by
registered mail, the date of mailing, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or
the registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of filing. 14
Thus, the date of filing is determinable from two sources: from the post office stamp on the
envelope or from the registry receipt, either of which may suffice to prove the timeliness of
the filing of the pleadings. If the date stamped on one is earlier than the other, the former
may be accepted as the date of filing. This presupposes, however, that the envelope or
registry receipt and the dates appearing thereon are duly authenticated before the tribunal
where they are presented.15
In any case, even if the appeal was filed one day late, the same should have been
entertained by the NLRC. Indeed, the appeal must be perfected within the statutory or
reglementary period. This is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. Failure to perfect
the appeal on time renders the assailed decision final and executory and deprives the
appellate court or body of the legal authority to alter the final judgment, much less entertain
the appeal. However, this Court has, time and again, ruled that, in exceptional cases, a
belated appeal may be given due course if greater injustice will be visited upon the party
should the appeal be denied. The Court has allowed this extraordinary measure even at
the expense of sacrificing order and efficiency if only to serve the greater principles of
substantial justice and equity.16

rules are not binding in labor cases and are not to be applied strictly if the result would be
detrimental to the working man.17
The Court notes, however, that while the CA affirmed the dismissal by the NLRC of
petitioners appeal for being filed out of time, it nonetheless delved into the merits of the
case. This notwithstanding, we do not entirely agree with the appellate courts conclusion
affirming in toto the LA decision.
In this case, the LAs discussion of the issues appears to be in conflict with his final
conclusion. This would have required a measure of clarification. But instead of looking into
the errors allegedly committed by the LA, the NLRC dismissed the appeal on a mere
technicality. The CA likewise failed to correct the apparent mistake in the LA decision.
Thus, we are constrained to review the merits of the case.
We need not discuss DNL Securitys responsibility as respondents direct employer
because DNL Securitys failure to interpose an appeal from the LA decision has resulted in
the finality of the LA decision. The only issue that we should resolve is the matter of
petitioners liability as indirect employer.
The fact that there is no actual and direct employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and respondents does not absolve the former from liability for the latters
monetary claims. When petitioner contracted DNL Securitys services, petitioner became
an indirect employer of respondents, pursuant to Article 107 of the Labor Code, which
reads:
ART. 107. Indirect employer. The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall
likewise apply to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an
employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work, task,
job or project.
After DNL Security failed to pay respondents the correct wages and other monetary
benefits, petitioner, as principal, became jointly and severally liable, as provided in Articles
106 and 109 of the Labor Code, which state:
ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. Whenever an employer enters into a contract with
another person for the performance of the formers work, the employees of the contractor
and of the latters subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of
this Code.
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in
accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his
contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under
the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly
employed by him. x x x.
xxxx

Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely
resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. We have consistently held that technical

ART. 109. Solidary liability. The provisions of existing laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, every employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his
contractor or subcontractor for any violation of any provision of this Code. For purposes of
determining the extent of their civil liability under this Chapter, they shall be considered as
direct employers.
This statutory scheme is designed to give the workers ample protection, consonant with
labor and social justice provisions of the 1987 Constitution. 18
This Courts pronouncement in Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. NLRC 19 is noteworthy:
The joint and several liability of the employer or principal was enacted to ensure
compliance with the provisions of the Code, principally those on statutory minimum wage.
The contractor or subcontractor is made liable by virtue of his or her status as a direct
employer, and the principal as the indirect employer of the contractors employees. This
liability facilitates, if not guarantees, payment of the workers compensation, thus, giving
the workers ample protection as mandated by the 1987 Constitution. This is not unduly
burdensome to the employer. Should the indirect employer be constrained to pay the
workers, it can recover whatever amount it had paid in accordance with the terms of the
service contract between itself and the contractor.20
Petitioners liability covers the payment of respondents salary differential and 13th month
pay during the time they worked for petitioner. In addition, petitioner is solidarily liable with
DNL Security for respondents unpaid wages from February 1993 until April 20, 1993.
While it is true that respondents continued working for petitioner after the expiration of their
contract, based on the instruction of DNL Security, petitioner did not object to such
assignment and allowed respondents to render service. Thus, petitioner impliedly
approved the extension of respondents services. Accordingly, petitioner is bound by the
provisions of the Labor Code on indirect employment. Petitioner cannot be allowed to deny
its obligation to respondents after it had benefited from their services. So long as the work,
task, job, or project has been performed for petitioners benefit or on its behalf, the liability
accrues for such services.21 The principal is made liable to its indirect employees because,
after all, it can protect itself from irresponsible contractors by withholding payment of such
sums that are due the employees and by paying the employees directly, or by requiring a
bond from the contractor or subcontractor for this purpose. 22
Petitioners liability, however, cannot extend to the payment of separation pay. An order to
pay separation pay is invested with a punitive character, such that an indirect employer
should not be made liable without a finding that it had conspired in the illegal dismissal of
the employees.23
It should be understood, though, that the solidary liability of petitioner does not preclude
the application of Article 1217 of the Civil Code on the right of reimbursement from its codebtor, viz.:24
Art. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two
or more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept.

He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share which
corresponds to each, with the interest for the payment already made. If the payment is
made before the debt is due, no interest for the intervening period may be demanded.
When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share
to the debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in
proportion to the debt of each.1avvphi1
Lastly, we do not agree with petitioner that the enforcement of the decision is impossible
because its charter unequivocally exempts it from execution. As held in Government
Service Insurance System v. Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71, 25 citing Rubia v.
GSIS: 26
The processual exemption of the GSIS funds and properties under Section 39 of the GSIS
Charter, in our view, should be read consistently with its avowed principal purpose: to
maintain actuarial solvency of the GSIS in the protection of assets which are to be used to
finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of its members. Clearly, the
exemption should be limited to the purposes and objects covered. Any interpretation that
would give it an expansive construction to exempt all GSIS assets from legal processes
absolutely would be unwarranted.
Furthermore, the declared policy of the State in Section 39 of the GSIS Charter granting
GSIS an exemption from tax, lien, attachment, levy, execution, and other legal processes
should be read together with the grant of power to the GSIS to invest its "excess funds"
under Section 36 of the same Act. Under Section 36, the GSIS is granted the ancillary
power to invest in business and other ventures for the benefit of the employees, by using
its excess funds for investment purposes. In the exercise of such function and power, the
GSIS is allowed to assume a character similar to a private corporation. Thus, it may sue
and be sued, as also, explicitly granted by its charter x x x.27
To be sure, petitioners charter should not be used to evade its liabilities to its employees,
even to its indirect employees, as mandated by the Labor Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution dated
September 7, 2006 and September 27, 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 50450, are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Government Service Insurance System is
declared solidarily liable with DNL Security to PAY respondents their wage differentials,
thirteenth month pay, and unpaid wages from February 1993 to April 20, 1993, but is
EXONERATED from the payment of respondents separation pay.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 144134

November 11, 2003

MARIVELES SHIPYARD CORP., Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS REGONDOLA, MANUELIT GATALAN, ORESCA
AGAPITO, NOEL ALBADBAD, ROGELIO PINTUAN, DANILO CRISOSTOMO, ROMULO
MACALINAO, NESTOR FERER, RICKY CUESTA, ROLLY ANDRADA, LARRY
ROGOLA, FRANCISCO LENOGON, AUGUSTO QUINTO, ARFE BERAMO, BONIFACIO
TRINIDAD, ALFREDO ASCARRAGA, ERNESTO MAGNO, HONORARIO HORTECIO,
NELBERT PINEDA, GLEN ESTIPULAR, FRANCISCO COMPUESTO, ISABELITO
CORTEZ, MATURAN ROSAURO, SAMSON CANAS, FEBIEN ISIP, JESUS RIPARIP,
ALFREDO SIENES, ADOLAR ALBERT, HONESTO CABANILLAS, AMPING CASTILLO
and ELWIN REVILLA, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Resolution,1 dated December 29, 1999, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55416, which dismissed outright the petition for certiorari of
Mariveles Shipyard Corp., due to a defective certificate of non-forum shopping and nonsubmission of the required documents to accompany said petition. Mariveles Shipyard
Corp., had filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to nullify the
resolution2 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated April 22, 1999, in
NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-005440-96-A, which affirmed the Labor Arbiters
decision,3 dated May 22, 1998, holding petitioner jointly and severally liable with Longest
Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc., for the underpayment of wages and
overtime pay due to the private respondents. Likewise challenged in the instant petition is
the resolution4 of the Court of Appeals, dated July 12, 2000, denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The facts, as culled from records, are as follows:
Sometime on October 1993, petitioner Mariveles Shipyard Corporation engaged the
services of Longest Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. (hereinafter, "Longest
Force") to render security services at its premises. Pursuant to their agreement, Longest
Force deployed its security guards, the private respondents herein, at the petitioners
shipyard in Mariveles, Bataan.
According to petitioner, it religiously complied with the terms of the security contract with
Longest Force, promptly paying its bills and the contract rates of the latter. However, it
found the services being rendered by the assigned guards unsatisfactory and inadequate,
causing it to terminate its contract with Longest Force on April 1995. 5Longest Force, in
turn, terminated the employment of the security guards it had deployed at petitioners
shipyard.
On September 2, 1996, private respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of wages pursuant to the PNPSOSIA-PADPAO rates, non-payment of
overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, 13th
month pay and attorneys fees, against both Longest Force and petitioner, before the Labor

Arbiter. Docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-005440-96-A, the case sought the
guards reinstatement with full backwages and without loss of seniority rights.
For its part, Longest Force filed a cross-claim 6 against the petitioner. Longest Force
admitted that it employed private respondents and assigned them as security guards at the
premises of petitioner from October 16, 1993 to April 30, 1995, rendering a 12 hours duty
per shift for the said period. It likewise admitted its liability as to the non-payment of the
alleged wage differential in the total amount of P2,618,025 but passed on the liability to
petitioner alleging that the service fee paid by the latter to it was way below the PNPSOSIA
and PADPAO rate, thus, "contrary to the mandatory and prohibitive laws because the right
to proper compensation and benefits provided under the existing labor laws cannot be
waived nor compromised."
The petitioner denied any liability on account of the alleged illegal dismissal, stressing that
no employer-employee relationship existed between it and the security guards. It further
pointed out that it would be the height of injustice to make it liable again for monetary
claims which it had already paid. Anent the cross-claim filed by Longest Force against it,
petitioner prayed that it be dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner averred that Longest
Force had benefited from the contract, it was now estopped from questioning said
agreement on the ground that it had made a bad deal.
On May 22, 1998, the Labor Arbiter decided NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-005440-96-A, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, conformably with the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
respondents as follows:
1. DECLARING respondents Longest Force Investigation & Security Agency,
Inc.1wphi1 and Mariveles Shipyard Corporation jointly and severally liable to pay the
money claims of complainants representing underpayment of wages and overtime pay in
the total amount of P2,700,623.40 based on the PADPAO rates of pay covering the period
from October 16, 1993 up to April 29, 1995 broken down as follows:

TOTAL UNDERPAYMENTS - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

P23,792.70

TOTAL OVERTIME - - - - - - - - -

GRAND TOTAL

P63,324.20

P 2,700,623.90

2. DECLARING both respondents liable to pay complainants attorneys fees

equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total award recovered or the sum
of P270,062.34.

3. ORDERING respondent Longest Force Investigation & Security Agency, Inc. to

reinstate all the herein complainants to their former or equivalent positions
without loss of seniority rights and privileges with full backwages which as
computed as of the date of this decision are as follows:

2. .IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS OF

LAW.

Backwages:
GRAND TOTAL

P3,927,216.40

3. .IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION THAT "LONGEST FORCE" AND PETITIONER ARE JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR PAYMENT OF WAGES AND OVERTIME PAY
DESPITE THE CLEAR SHOWING THAT PETITIONER HAVE ALREADY PAID
THE SECURITY SERVICES THAT WAS RENDERED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
4. WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE THAT ONLY "LONGEST FORCE" SHOULD BE
SOLELY AND ULTIMATELY LIABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE.13

4. ORDERING said Longest Force Investigation & Security Agency, Inc. to pay
attorneys fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total award recovered
representing backwages in the amount of P392,721.64.10
5. DISMISSING all other claims for lack of legal basis.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner appealed the foregoing to the NLRC in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-005440-96A. The labor tribunal, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the NLRC.
The petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari assailing the NLRC judgment for
having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion with the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 55416. The Court of Appeals, however, denied due course to the
petition and dismissed it outright for the following reasons:
1. The verification and certification on non-forum shopping is signed not by duly
authorized officer of petitioner corporation, but by counsel (Section 1, Rule 65,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
2. The petition is unaccompanied by copies of relevant and pertinent documents,
particularly the motion for reconsideration filed before the NLRC (Section 1, Rule
65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).12
The petitioner then moved for reconsideration of the order of dismissal. The appellate court
denied the motion, pointing out that under prevailing case law subsequent compliance with
formal requirements for filing a petition as prescribed by the Rules, does not ipso facto
warrant a reconsideration. In any event, it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the NLRC to grant the writ of certiorari.
Hence, this present petition before us. Petitioner submits that THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED:
1. .IN DISMISSING THE PETITION AND DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONER
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 1,
RULE 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

We find the issues for our resolution to be: (1) Was it error for the Court of Appeals to
sustain its order of dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari, notwithstanding
subsequent compliance with the requirements under the Rules of Court by the petitioner?
(2) Did the appellate court err in not holding that petitioner was denied due process of law
by the NLRC? and (3) Did the appellate court grievously err in finding petitioner jointly and
severally liable with Longest Force for the payment of wage differentials and overtime pay
owing to the private respondents?
On the first issue, the Court of Appeals in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 55416 observed
that: (1) the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was not signed by any duly
authorized officer of petitioner but merely by petitioners counsel; and (2) the petition was
not accompanied by a copy of motion for reconsideration filed before the NLRC, thus
violating Section 1,14 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Hence, a dismissal was proper under
Section 3,15 Rule 46 of the Rules.
In assailing the appellate courts ruling, the petitioner appeals to our sense of compassion
and kind consideration. It submits that the certification signed by its counsel and attached
to its petition filed with the Court of Appeals is substantial compliance with the requirement.
Moreover, petitioner calls our attention to the fact that when it filed its motion for
reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, a joint verification and certification of nonforum shopping duly signed by its Personnel Manager16 and a copy of the Motion for
Reconsideration17 filed before the NLRC were attached therein. Thus, petitioner prays that
we take a liberal stance to promote the ends of justice.
Petitioners plea for liberality, however, cannot be granted by the Court for reasons herein
elucidated.
It is settled that the requirement in the Rules that the certification of non-forum shopping
should be executed and signed by the plaintiff or the principal means that counsel cannot
sign said certification unless clothed with special authority to do so. 18 The reason for this is
that the plaintiff or principal knows better than anyone else whether a petition has
previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the same issues. Hence, a
certification signed by counsel alone is defective and constitutes a valid cause for
dismissal of the petition.19 In the case of natural persons, the Rule requires the parties
themselves to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping. However, in the case of the
corporations, the physical act of signing may be performed, on behalf of the corporate
entity, only by specifically authorized individuals for the simple reason that corporations, as
artificial persons, cannot personally do the task themselves. 20 In this case, not only was the
originally appended certification signed by counsel, but in its motion for reconsideration,

still petitioner utterly failed to show that Ms. Rosanna Ignacio, its Personnel Manager who
signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto, was duly
authorized for this purpose. It cannot be gainsaid that obedience to the requirements of
procedural rule is needed if we are to expect fair results therefrom. Utter disregard of the
rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. 21

In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in
accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his
contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under
the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly
employed by him.

Thus, on this point, no error could be validly attributed to respondent Court of Appeals. It
did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the requirements governing
the certification of non-forum shopping.

xxx

Anent the second issue, petitioner avers that there was denial of due process of law when
the Labor Arbiter failed to have the case tried on the merits. Petitioner adds that the Arbiter
did not observe the mandatory language of the then Sec. 5(b) Rule V (now Section 11, per
amendment in Resolution No. 01-02, Series of 2002) of the NLRC New Rules of Procedure
which provided that:
If the Labor Arbiter finds no necessity of further hearing after the parties have submitted
their position papers and supporting documents, he shall issue an Order to that effect and
shall inform the parties, stating the reasons therefor. 22
Petitioners contention, in our view, lacks sufficient basis. Well settled is the rule that the
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.23 Not all cases require a trial-type
hearing. The requirement of due process in labor cases before a Labor Arbiter is satisfied
when the parties are given the opportunity to submit their position papers to which they are
supposed to attach all the supporting documents or documentary evidence that would
prove their respective claims, in the event the Labor Arbiter determines that no formal
hearing would be conducted or that such hearing was not necessary.24 In any event, as
found by the NLRC, petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its side in several
hearings conducted before the Labor Arbiter and in the position papers and other
supporting documents that it had submitted. We find that such opportunity more than
satisfies the requirement of due process in labor cases.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that it should not be held jointly and severally liable
with Longest Force for underpayment of wages and overtime pay because it had been
religiously and promptly paying the bills for the security services sent by Longest Force
and that these are in accordance with the statutory minimum wage. Also, petitioner
contends that it should not be held liable for overtime pay as private respondents failed to
present proof that overtime work was actually performed. Lastly, petitioner claims that the
Court of Appeals failed to render a decision that finally disposed of the case because it did
not specifically rule on the immediate recourse of private respondents, that is, the matter of
reimbursement between petitioner and Longest Force in accordance with Eagle Security
Agency Inc. v. NLRC,25 and Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. NLRC.26
Petitioners liability is joint and several with that of Longest Force, pursuant to Articles 106,
107 and 109 of the Labor Code which provide as follows:
ART. 106. CONTRACTOR OR SUBCONTRACTOR Whenever an employer enters into a
contract with another person for the performance of the formers work, the employees of
the contractor and of the latters subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the
provisions of this Code.

ART. 107. INDIRECT EMPLOYER. The provisions of the immediately preceding Article
shall likewise apply to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being
an employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work,
task, job or project.
ART. 109. SOLIDARY LIABILITY. The provisions of existing laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, every employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his
contractor or subcontractor for any violation of any provision of this Code. For purposes of
determining the extent of their civil liability under this Chapter, they shall be considered as
direct employers.
In this case, when petitioner contracted for security services with Longest Force as the
security agency that hired private respondents to work as guards for the shipyard
corporation, petitioner became an indirect employer of private respondents pursuant to
Article 107 abovecited. Following Article 106, when the agency as contractor failed to pay
the guards, the corporation as principal becomes jointly and severally liable for the guards
wages. This is mandated by the Labor Code to ensure compliance with its provisions,
including payment of statutory minimum wage. The security agency is held liable by virtue
of its status as direct employer, while the corporation is deemed the indirect employer of
the guards for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of failure of the agency to
pay them. This statutory scheme gives the workers the ample protection consonant with
labor and social justice provisions of the 1987 Constitution. 27
Petitioner cannot evade its liability by claiming that it had religiously paid the compensation
of guards as stipulated under the contract with the security agency. Labor standards are
enacted by the legislature to alleviate the plight of workers whose wages barely meet the
spiraling costs of their basic needs. Labor laws are considered written in every contract.
Stipulations in violation thereof are considered null. Similarly, legislated wage increases
are deemed amendments to the contract. Thus, employers cannot hide behind their
contracts in order to evade their (or their contractors or subcontractors) liability for
noncompliance with the statutory minimum wage.28
However, we must emphasize that the solidary liability of petitioner with that of Longest
Force does not preclude the application of the Civil Code provision on the right of
reimbursement from his co-debtor by the one who paid.29As held in Del Rosario & Sons
Logging Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC,30 the joint and several liability imposed on petitioner is
without prejudice to a claim for reimbursement by petitioner against the security agency for
such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to complainants, the private respondents
herein. The security agency may not seek exculpation by claiming that the principals
payments to it were inadequate for the guards lawful compensation. As an employer, the
security agency is charged with knowledge of labor laws; and the adequacy of the
compensation that it demands for contractual services is its principal concern and not any
others.31

On the issue of the propriety of the award of overtime pay despite the alleged lack of proof
thereof, suffice it to state that such involves a determination and evaluation of facts which
cannot be done in a petition for review. Well established is the rule that in an appeal via
certiorari, only questions of law may be reviewed. 32
One final point. Upon review of the award of backwages and attorneys fees, we
discovered certain errors that happened in the addition of the amount of individual
backwages that resulted in the erroneous total amount of backwages and attorneys fees.
These errors ought to be properly rectified now. Thus, the correct sum of individual
backwages should be P126,648.40 instead of P126,684.40, while the correct sum of total
backwages awarded and attorneys fees should be P3,926,100.40 and P392,610.04,
instead of P3,927,216.40 andP392,721.64, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55416 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner and Longest Force are held liable jointly and
severally for underpayment of wages and overtime pay of the security guards, without
prejudice to petitioners right of reimbursement from Longest Force Investigation and
Security Agency, Inc. The amounts payable to complaining security guards, herein private
respondents, by way of total backwages and attorneys fees are hereby set
at P3,926,100.40 and P392,610.04, respectively. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED

G.R. Nos. L-58674-77 July 11, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DOMINGO PANIS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Zambales & Olongapo City, Branch III and SERAPIO
ABUG, respondents.

Denied at first, the motion was reconsidered and finally granted in the
Orders of the trial court dated June 24 and September 17, 1981. The
prosecution is now before us on certiorari. 3
The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being
prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code;
hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the first two cited
articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without proper
authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of
the definition of recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.

CRUZ, J:
The basic issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of
P.D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, reading as follows:
(b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally
or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First
Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug,
private respondent herein, "without first securing a license from the
Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging
employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
operate a private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and
expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four
separate individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to
Article 39 of the Labor Code. 1
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not
charge an offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only
one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article
13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two
or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment
for a fee. " 2

The view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and

placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings
with two or mre persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other
hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons
is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer
or promise of employment to such persons and always in consideration
of a fee. The other acts mentioned in the body of the article may involve
even only one person and are not necessarily for profit.
Neither interpretation is acceptable. We fail to see why the proviso should
speak only of an offer or promise of employment if the purpose was to
apply the requirement of two or more persons to all the acts mentioned in
the basic rule. For its part, the petitioner does not explain why dealings
with two or more persons are needed where the recruitment and
placement consists of an offer or promise of employment but not when it
is done through "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring (of) workers.
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on
the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a
presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged
in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or
more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of
employment is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers. "
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act
of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in
the basic rule in Article 13(b) win constitute recruitment and placement
even if only one prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays

down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a

promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the
individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in
the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed"
create that presumption.
This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, for example, regarding the failure of a public officer to produce
upon lawful demand funds or property entrusted to his custody. Such
failure shall beprima facie evidence that he has put them to personal use;
in other words, he shall be deemed to have malversed such funds or
property. In the instant case, the word "shall be deemed" should by the
same token be given the force of a disputable presumption or of prima
facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and placement. (Klepp vs. Odin
Tp., McHenry County 40 ND N.W. 313, 314.)
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the
questioned provision for lack of records of debates and deliberations that
would otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had been
enacted as a statute rather than a presidential decree. The trouble with
presidential decrees is that they could be, and sometimes were, issued
without previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator
heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty
pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are rejection, intentional or
not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the instant case,
certain esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background
facts usually reported in the legislative journals.
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the
campaign against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized
many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing
hard- earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream,
only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of
theirown countrymen.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981,
are set aside and the four informations against the private respondent
reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 133563 March 4, 1999

BRIDGET BONENG Y BAGAWILI, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

consisting of Exhibits "A" to "G", the prosecution made a formal offer of

evidence and rested its case.
On April 7, 1994, after the prosecution had rested, the accused (now
petitioner) presented a demurrer to evidence and manifested that she
was waiving the right to adduce evidence for the defense, and was
submitting the case for decision on the basis of the evidence on record.
On May 5, 1994, the trial court came out with its Decision, finding
petitioner guilty of the offense charged and sentencing her thus:

PURISIMA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals 2 dated March 31, 1998 in CA G.R. CR No. 17133, affirming
in its entirety the judgment of conviction handed down by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, finding the petitioner herein guilty beyond
reasonable of Illegal Recruitment and sentencing her to a prison term of four
(4) years, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
Petitioner Bridget Boneng y Bagawili was indicated for a violation of
Article 38 (a), in relation to Articles 13 (b), 16, 34 and 39 (b) of
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1920, in Criminal Case No. 12104 before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 6, Baguio City, under an Information, alleging:
That on or about the 24th day of September 1993, in the
City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then private person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously engage in the following illegal recruitment
activities to wit: by promising, for profit to complainant
MA. TERESA GARCIA employment abroad under false
pretenses and fraudulent acts, without any license or
authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, Department of Labor and Employment,
Manila, in violation of the aforecited provision of law.
On December 9, 1993, with the assistance of counsel, she was arraigned
thereunder and pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to the crime charged. Trial
ensued, and after presenting the witnesses, SPO3 Jesus Nevado, SPO3
Romeo Dulay and Maria Teresa Garcia, and documentary evidence

Wherefore, the Court Finds (sic), accused Bridget Boneng

guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offense of
Violation of Article 38(a) in relation to Article 13(b), 16, 34
and 39(c) of PD 442 as amended by PD 1920 (Illegal
Recruitment) and sentences her, applying the
indeterminate sentence law, to an imprisonment ranging
from FOUR (4) YEARS as Minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS
as Maximum and to pay the costs.
Not satisfied with the verdict below, petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals, contending that the testimony of the complainant, Ma. Teresa
Garcia, is perjured, hearsay, uncorroborated and tainted with material
inconsistencies and she (petitioner) should have been acquitted because
the documentary evidence taken from her office was seized in violation of
her constitutional right against illegal search and seizure.
On March 31, 1998, the Court of Appeals decided as follows:
In sum appellant was correctly found to be liable for
violation of Art. 38(a) in relation to Articles 13(b), 16, 34
and 39 (c) of P.D. 442, as amended.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of appellant in
conformity with the law and evidence, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

Without resorting first to a motion for reconsideration, the petitioner came

to this Court via the present petition, placing reliance practically on the
same grounds she invoked and relied upon, before the Court of Appeals.
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the judgment convicting
petitioner for illegal recruitment? This is the crucial issue at bar.
Petitioner theorizes that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the
non-existence and non-admissibility of the documents upon which the
trial court based her conviction. According to her, the prosecution should
have established that other than Ma. Teresa Garcia, there were other
applicants for overseas employment in the office of petitioner where she
was allegedly conducting her recruitment business and activities. In the
absence of sworn statements from the other applicants, petitioner
maintains that the motive of the prosecution witnesses, whose
testimonies she branded as inconsistent with their affidavits, in carrying
out the entrapment, was to "fleece money" from her.
Petitioner, in effect, is asking this Court to review the factual findings by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to examine subject documents,
and evaluate and assign the probative value of the evidence, the same
evidence looked into below, and determine once again the credibility of
the witnesses.
To begin with, this Court is not a trier of facts. It is not its function to
examine and determine the weight of the evidence supporting the
assailed, decision. In Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 3 the
Court held that factual findings of the Court of Appeals which are supported
by substantial evidence are binding, final and conclusive upon the Supreme
Court. So also, well-established is the rule that "factual findings of the Court
of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when
the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court." 4 Moreover, well
entrenched is the prevailing jurisprudence that only errors of law and not of
facts are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, which applies with greater force to the
Petition under consideration because the factual findings by the Court of
Appeals are in full agreement with what the trial court found.
It bears stressing that by opting not to present any controverting evidence
during the trial, petitioner waived her right to come forward with evidence

for the defense and "foreclosed her right to interpose any objection to the
prosecution's evidence upon appeal . . . . 5
Similarly untenable is petitioner's stance that she is not an illegal
recruiter, arguing that the documents introduced to substantiate her
recruitment activities were neither identified nor marked by the
prosecution.
In People vs. Benemerito, 264 SCRA 677, 691, the Court enumerated the
elements of illegal recruitment to be as follows:
(1) the person charged with the crime must have
undertaken recruitment activities (or any of the activities
enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code, as
amended); and
(2) the said person does not have a license or authority to
do so.
In affirming the findings arrived at by the court a quo, the Court of
Appeals ratiocinated:
The prosecution's evidence shows that appellant is a nonlicensee or non-holder of authority as required by law.
Proof of this is a certification (Exh. "C") dated 18 August
1993 issued by the POEA-REU, Baguio City, which reads:
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that the name
BRIDGETTE BUNEG (sic) per existing
and available records from this Office is
not licensed nor authorized to recruit
workers for overseas employment in the
City of Baguio or any part of the region.
When the trial prosecutor was about to present the signatory of the above
document, the defense readily admitted its authenticity, (TSN, 03 March
1994, p. 17). Appellant expressly waived her right to rebut this allegation
and in effect judicially admitted she was not a licensee or holder of
authority. Consequently, such evidence can be validly taken against her.

In this context, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority has been

defined in People vs. Diaz, (supra) 6 as:
. . . any person, corporation or entity which has not been
issued a valid license or authority to engage in
recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor or
whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked
or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary . . . .
Anent the second element, Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended,
states:
Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines "recruitment and
placement as any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contact services,
promising or advertising abroad, whether for profit or not;
provided that any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.
The evidence shows that appellant promised Garcia employment abroad
for fee. Garcia testified:
Q: After the secretary has introduced Mrs.
Boneng to you to be her boss, what did
you do?
A: I asked from Bridget Boneng the rules
and what country can I apply, sir.

A: I asked Mrs. Bridget Boneng how much

will I spend in applying for Hongkong and
she told me that it was around P30,000.00
and she told me also to submit my birth
certificate and for the passport, she will
(sic) take charge of it but I will (sic) add a
little amount for the processing of my
papers.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did Mrs. Boneng tell you when
you told her that you have (sic) P2,000.00
and if possible, she would work first for
your passport and your medical
examination?
A: Bridget Boneng told me to at least
solicit the amount of P10,000.00 as down
payment because there is an on going
interview in Manila the following Sunday.
Q: What happen after that?
A: She accepted the amount of P2,000.00
and I told her that I will (sic) add more.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Was there a receipt given by Bridget
Boneng to you when you delivered the
P2,000.00?

Q: Did Mrs. Boneng answer you?

A: Yes, sir, she told me in Hongkong.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: . . . what things did you talk about with
Mrs. Boneng?

A: He (sic) does not issue a receipt, she

told me that.
Q: To whom did you personally deliver the
P2,000.00?
A: To Mrs. Boneng.

(TSN., 24 February 1994, pp. 18-21).

From the aforecited testimony, it is decisively clear that aside from the
promise to deploy complainant Ma. Teresa Garcia in Hongkong, the
petitioner accepted a part of the P30,000.00 fee she was collecting for
her recruitment work.
Neither do we discern any tenability in petitioner's contention that the
prosecution should have secured sworn statements from the applicants
to prove her (petitioner's) recruitment activities. In People vs. Pabalan,
262 SCRA 574, it was succinctly ruled that "the testimony of a single
prosecution witness, where credible and positive, is sufficient to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. There is no law which
requires that the testimony of a single witness has to be corroborated,
except where expressly mandated in determining the value and credibility
of evidence. Witnesses are to weighed, not numbered." In People
vs. Panis, 142 SCRA 665, the Court also held that "any of the acts
mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13 (b) will constitute recruitment and
placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. 7
Petitioner complains that the Court of Appeals ignored "an avalanche of
material inconsistencies" 8 tainting the testimony of complainant Ma. Teresa
Garcia. Records disclose, however, that the said court did pass upon such
aspect of the case but adjudged the same trivial and minor inconsistencies.
Ratiocinated the Court of Appeals:
. . . In this connection appellant has referred to
inconsistencies as to the narration of events that
transpired on 24 September 1994. But these are trivial
and minor points. In People vs. Trilles, 254 SCRA 633,
the Supreme Court held:
Trivial inconsequential inconsistencies in
the testimony of witnesses do not merit
consideration and cannot destroy the
credibility of said witnesses in the face of
the positive and categorical identification
of the accused as the perpetrator(s) of the
crime. 9

Petitioner also questions the legality and validity of her arrest sans a
warrant. On this score, the Court of Appeals erred not in affirming the
ruling by the trial court of origin that the present case falls under Section
5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised of Court, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest Without Warrant; when lawful A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
The Court of Appeals rationalized:
And in the case at bar, it can be said that when Garcia
filled up the application forms for work aboard and paid
P2,000.00 to Boneng as partial payment or advance
payment of the placement fees required and was
promised she could work in Hongkong by Boneng, the
latter was actually engaged in illegal recruitment as she
had no license to recruit admittedly.
Hence, at that precise time Boneng was, already
committing an offense of illegal recruitment in the
presence of Garcia. Garcia could have very well arrested
her on the spot but she did not as she explained civilian
agents are cautioned not to effect arrest by the CIS
authorities.
And when Garcia left and went downstairs to tell her CIS
team that she already gave the P2,000.00 marked money
to Boneng after posing as an applicant for work abroad
and describing Boneng as a short fat lady wearing pants
and white T-shirt and forthwith Nevado and Dulay 10 went
up to the second floor to apprehend Boneng and recover the
marked money of P2,000.00 and the documents pertaining
to the recruitment activity of Boneng has just committed an
offense and the effects thereof are still visible in her office,

the marked money and documents of recruitment being

there, when Nevado and Dulay of the CIS, both peace
officers, went up to effect her arrest.

xxx xxx xxx

The arrest therefore was legal as an exception under
warrantless arrest under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court . . .
All things studiedly considered and the probative weight of the evidence
on record taken into account, the irresistible conclusion is that petitioner
Bridget Boneng is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 17133 AFFIRMED in
toto. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185277

March 18, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RODOLFO GALLO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 31 January 2008 of the Court
of Appeals, affirming, with modification, the Judgment2 of conviction for
the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 34.
Appellant Rodolfo Gallo (Gallo), together with Pilar Manta (Manta) and
Fides Pacardo (Pacardo), was originally charged with illegal recruitment
in large scale and thirty four (34) counts of estafa in thirty five (35)
separate informations3 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 34.

When arraigned, all three accused pleaded not guilty to the charges.4
In the course of the trial of the cases, some of the private complainants,
one after another, moved for the withdrawal of their respective
complaints5 while others failed to appear during the scheduled hearings
despite due notice.6 Hence, the public prosecutor moved for the
provisional dismissal7 of their cases until only three private complainants
remained.
The remaining private complainants, Reynaldo Panlilio (Panlilio), Ian
Fernandez (Fernandez) and Zenaida Filomeno (Filomeno), testified for
the prosecution.
Fernandez narrated that at around 9:00 a.m. on 5 June 2001, he was at
the MPM International Recruitment Agency (MPM) with his friend
Reynaldo Panlilio applying for a job overseas.8 He recounted that he was
able to talk first with accused Gallo, then with the owner of MPM,
Mardeolyn Martir (Martir).9 Gallo informed him that if he paysP45,000.00,
he would be able to leave for Korea in two to three months time.10 Thus,
he returned the following day with P45,000.00 and gave the amount to
Martir.11 Gallo issued a receipt covering the amount but this was later on
replaced with a promissory note.12
Panlilio narrated that on 5 June 2001, he went to the offices of MPM in
Ermita, Manila, to apply for a job as a factory worker in Korea.13 He
testified that he talked to Martir who told him to come back the next day
withP45,000.00 for the processing of his application.14 Upon arriving the
following day (6 June 2001), he was met by accused Gallo and upon the
instruction of Martir, Panlilio gave the money to Gallo.15 Unable to leave
for Korea despite the lapse of several months, Panlilio demanded the
return of his money.16 The agency, however, requested a month within
which to refund the money17 and the receipt issued for the P45,000.00 he
paid was replaced with a promissory note.18
While in the province, he learned that the agency had closed, so he went
back to Manila to verify this information.19 He found out that the agency
had transferred its offices to the Prudential Bank Building in Sta. Cruz,
Manila.20 There, he and about 30 to 40 other victims of the agency
arrested the three accused by virtue of a citizens arrest. 21 The accused
were first brought to the Sta. Cruz Police Station, then to the National

Bureau of Investigation (NBI), where a formal complaint was filed against

them.22
Private complainant Filomeno testified that she learned from a friend that
MPM is accepting applicants for work in Korea.23 She went to the agency
sometime in May 2001 and was initially met by accused Manta who
instructed her to talk to Martir.24 Inside the latters office, she found Gallo
and Martir accepting applicants for overseas employment. 25 She narrated
that she initially paid P15,000.00 as processing fee to Gallo and Martir
who both counted the money in front of her.26 She later on paid
another P5,000.00, both of which amounts were covered by a
receipt.27 Gallo and Martir told her that in September 2001, she would be
able to leave for Korea where she would be working as a factory worker
with a monthly salary of US$500.00 plus overtime pay.28 Because she
failed to leave as promised, she called the agency on at least four
occasions to follow up her application, but she was unable to talk to
either accused Gallo or Martir.29 When she went to the agency to
personally inquire about the status of her application, she found out that
the accused had been arrested so she proceeded to the NBI to file a
complaint.30
The prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of
the promissory notes and official receipts issued by the agency to the
private complainants.31 Also presented was a certification dated 23
August 2002, issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency,
stating that according to its records, the New Filipino Manpower
Development and Services, Inc. had an expired license and that its
application for the re-issuance of a new license was denied.32 It appears
that MPM had earlier applied for a license but its application was not
granted; hence, it changed its name to New Filipino Manpower
Development and Services, Inc.33
For his defense, appellant Gallo alleged that he was not an employee of
MPM but was himself an applicant for overseas work.34 According to him,
someone from their province informed him that MPM was recruiting
applicants to be employed as factory workers in Korea, so he applied
sometime in November 2000.35 He further testified that he
paid P20,000.00 for the processing of his visa but was not issued a
receipt; his payment was merely recorded in the agencys
logbook.36 When his visa was issued, the agency asked for an additional
payment of P40,000.00 for his plane fare, but he was unable to produce

the amount, so another person was sent abroad in his stead.37He was
advised by Martir to wait because the visa issued to him earlier will be
replaced by a trainee visa.38 As a result, he was often seen at the office of
Martir because he would often go there to follow up his application.39 He
denied having received money from or having issued any receipt to
private complainants.40
Appellant, however, admitted having executed a Kontra Salaysay and a
Rejoinder Affidavit wherein it was stated that he is merely a utility worker
of New Filipino Manpower Development and Services, Inc., and, as such,
his only duties therein consist of repair, janitorial and messengerial
jobs.41 He explained the conflict in his statements by claiming that the
aforesaid documents were prepared by a lawyer from the NBI and he
signed them without reading their contents.42 He, nevertheless, disclosed
during his testimony that the personal circumstances stated in the
documents were gathered by the NBI from him.43
Finding that the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently established the
criminal liability of appellant, the trial court rendered a decision on 10
April 2003 convicting him of the crimes charged. Accused Manta and
Pacardo were acquitted for insufficiency of the evidence presented
against them.44 The dispositive portion of the decision, in part, reads:
In Criminal Case No. 02-200788:
Finding Rodolfo Gallo to have participated in illegally recruiting the three
complainants, Ian Fernandez, Reynaldo Panlilio and Zenaida Filomeno,
he is hereby found GUILTY of the crime of Illegal Recruitment without any
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance attendant to its commission and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of P500,000.00.
In Criminal Case No. 02-200803:
Finding Rodolfo Gallo having conspired and confederated with another
person not charged in this Information in defrauding Ian Fernandez, he is
hereby found Guilty of the crime of Estafa without any mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance attendant to its commission, granting him the
benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law he is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term ranging from four (4) years two (2)
months of prision correccional to ten (10) years of prision mayor. He is

hereby ordered to indemnify Ian Fernandez the sum ofP45,000.00

representing the amount embezzled.
In Criminal Case No. 02-200810:
Finding Rodolfo Gallo having conspired and confederated with another
person not charged in this Information in defrauding Zenaida Filomeno,
he is hereby found Guilty of the crime of Estafa without any mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance attendant to its commission, granting the
accused the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of ranging from four (4)
years two (2) months of prision correccional to eight (8) years of prision
mayor. He is hereby ordered to indemnify the victim Zenaida Filomeno
the sum of P20,000.00 representing the amount embezzled.
In Criminal Case No. 02-200812:
Finding Rodolfo Gallo having conspired and confederated with another
person not charged in this Information in defrauding Reynaldo Panlilio he
is hereby found Guilty of the crime of Estafa without any mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance attendant to its commission, granting him the
benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law he is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term ranging from four (4) years two (2)
months ofprision correccional to ten (10) years of prision mayor. He is
hereby ordered to indemnify Reynaldo Panlilio the sum of P45,000.00
representing the amount of money embezzled.45
In view of the penalty imposed, the case was elevated to this Court on
automatic review. In accordance with our ruling in People v. Mateo,46 the
Court resolved to transfer the cases to the Court of Appeals for
intermediate review.
On 31 January 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision now
subject of this review. The dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. The judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 02-200788 finding
the accused-appellant Rodolfo Gallo guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale and sentencing him to life imprisonment, as well as to pay a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos is AFFIRMED.

The judgments in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-200803 and 02-200812

sentencing the accused-appellant to suffer an indeterminate prison term
of four (4) years, two (2) months of prision correccional to ten (10) years
of prision mayor is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION:
In additional to the P45,000.00 each to be paid by the accused-appellant
to Ian Fernandez and Reynaldo Panlilio as actual damages; the
accussed-appellant is also ordered to pay legal interest on the said
amount of P45,000.00 from the time of the filing of the Information until
fully paid.
II. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 02-200810 finding the accusedappellant guilty of estafa is MODIFIED, and the accused-appellant is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and [eleven] (11)
days of prision correccional maximum. The accused-appellant shall pay
Zenaida Filomeno P20,000.00 by way of actual damages. In addition, the
accused-appellant shall also pay legal interest on the said amount
ofP20,000.00 from the time of filing of the Information until fully paid.
In all four cases, the accused-appellant Rodolfo Gallo shall be credited
with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29
of the Revised Penal Code. Costs against accused-appellant.47
Hence, the instant petition.
On 21 January 2009, the Court resolved to require the parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within thirty (30) days
from notice.48 Appellant filed a Manifestation dated 18 March 2009 stating
that he will no longer file a supplemental brief and is adopting his
Appellants Brief as his Supplemental Brief.49 The Office of the Solicitor
General likewise manifested that it would no longer file a supplemental
brief.50
In his Brief, appellant assigns the following as errors committed by the
trial court:
I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT AND

CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THREE COUNTS OF ESTAFA NOTWITHSTANDING
THE PATENT ABSENCE OF CRIMINAL INTENT ON THE PART OF THE
LATTER.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.51
Appellant, in essence, claims that the prosecution failed to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Moreover, there is no showing that the private complainants were

impelled by any ill motive that could have affected their credibility. Where
there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations
on the witness stand, under the solemnity of an oath, deserve full faith
and credence.55
Appellant professes lack of criminal intent to escape liability for estafa.
He maintains that, like the private complainants, he is also an applicant
trying his luck at finding work overseas; that he would usually help out in
office work on occasions that he would visit the agency as an applicant
which explains why complainants could have indeed seen and conversed
with him about their applications.
These implausible arguments fail to persuade us.
As with the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, this Court is
likewise convinced that the prosecution was able to prove, beyond
reasonable doubt, appellants guilt for estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). x x x

The appeal must fail. We find no valid grounds to reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming the lower courts judgment of conviction.
Well-settled is the rule that the issue of credibility is the domain of the trial
court which had the opportunity to observe the deportment and manner
of the witnesses as they testified.52 The findings of facts of a trial court,
arrived at only after a hearing and evaluation of the testimonies of
witnesses, certainly deserve respect by an appellate court. 53 Unless it
plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if
considered, may affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not
disturb the findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of
witnesses, it being in a better position to decide the question, having
heard and observed the witnesses themselves.54
We find no exceptional circumstances in this case that would justify a
deviation from the general rule. The trial courts findings and conclusions
are duly supported by the evidence on record; thus, there is no reason to
disturb them.

xxxx
1. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a)By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
Under the above-quoted provision, there are three (3) ways of
committing estafa: (1) by using a fictitious name; (2) by falsely pretending
to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; and (3) by means of other similar
deceits.56 To convict for this type of crime, it is essential that the false
statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the
only motive which induces the complainant to part with the thing of
value.57

In the case before us, appellant and Martir led the private complainants
to believe that they possessed the power, qualifications and means to
provide work in Korea. During the trial of these cases, it was clearly
shown that, together with Martir, appellant discussed with private
complainants the fact of their being deployed abroad for a job if they pay
the processing fee, and that he actually received payments from private
complainants. Thus, it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that the
three private complainants were deceived into believing that there were
jobs waiting for them in a factory in Korea when in fact there were none.
Because of the assurances of appellant, each of the private complainants
parted with their money and suffered damages as a result of their being
unable to leave for Korea. The elements of estafa deceit and damage
are thus indisputably present, making the conviction
for estafa appropriate.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a

group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one
another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a group. x x x.

Appellants defense that he is also an applicant is unavailing given the

complete absence of any attempt on his part to seek a refund of the
money he allegedly paid to the agency when the job promised him failed
to materialize. He did not complain at all, at the very least, but, instead,
even "helped out" at the office whenever he went there to follow up his
application. As aptly put by the Court of Appeals, "[s]uch a story is highly
improbable, incompatible with human behavior and contrary to ordinary
experience."58

Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as

"any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring
or procuring workers; and includes referrals, contract services, promising
or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not." In the simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons
who, without authority from the government, give the impression that they
have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes.61

Likewise, we find that the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly
found appellant guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale
under Republic Act No. 8042,59 the pertinent provision of which provides:
Sec. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall
mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not,
when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority
contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines:
Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons
shall be deemed so engaged. x x x.
xxxx

To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three elements must

concur: (a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law
to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of
workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the
meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13(b) of the Labor
Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of
the same Code (now Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042); and, (c) the
offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group.60

We are persuaded that all three elements of illegal recruitment in large

scale were proven in this case.
First, appellant had no valid license or authority to engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers. This is established by
the Karagdagang Salaysay executed by Pacardo on 8 March 2002,
paragraph 6 of which states that while MPM applied for a license, it was
never issued one, for which reason, it changed its name to New Filipino
Manpower Development and Services, Inc.62
Second, despite not having such authority, appellant nevertheless
engaged in recruitment activities, offering and promising jobs to private
complainants and collecting from them various amounts as placement
fees. This is substantiated by the respective testimonies of the three
private complainants.
Fernandez narrated that it was appellant who assured him that if he
pays P45,000.00, he would be able to leave for Korea within two to three

months. Both Fernandez and Panlilio affirmed that they gave the money
to appellant who issued a receipt therefore. Filomeno testified that when
she went to the office of Martir, the latter and appellant were in the
process of accepting applicants for work overseas. They told her that as
a factory worker in Korea, she would have a monthly salary of
US$500.00 with overtime pay. Relying on their misrepresentations, she
paid the placement fee to appellant and Martir.
Thus, the mere denials of appellant cannot stand against the clear,
positive and straightforward testimonies of private complainants who
positively identified appellant as one of two persons who undertook to
recruit them for a supposed employment in Korea. As already previously
mentioned, absent any evidence that the prosecution witnesses were
motivated by improper motives, the trial courts assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January
2008 in CAG.R. CR H.C. No. 01663, affirming with modification the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34, finding
appellant Rodolfo Gallo guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and
three (3) counts of estafa is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182232

October 6, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NENITA B. HU, accused-appellant.
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by accused-appellant
Nenita B. Hu (Hu) seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals dated 9 October 2007 in CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02243,
affirming with modification the Decision2 dated 4 January 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, in Criminal Case
No. 03-356. The RTC in its Decision found Hu guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined and
penalized under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042,3 and accordingly,
sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay the fine
of P500,000.00, and to indemnify private complainants Paul Abril (Abril),
Joel Panguelo (Panguelo) and Evangeline Garcia (Garcia) in the
amounts of P44,000.00, P50,000 and P50,000, respectively. The decretal
part of the assailed Court of Appeals Decision reads:
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 66, in Criminal
Case No. 03-856, finding appellant Nenita B. Hu, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION.
As modified, the award of actual damages in the amount
of P50,000 in favor of Evangeline Garcia, isDELETED.4
The antecedent facts are as follows:
An Information5 for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale was filed against
Hu and Ethel V. Genoves (Genoves) which reads:

The undersigned Prosecutor accuses Ethel V. Genoves a.k.a.

Merry Ann Genoves and Nenita B. Hu, of the crime of Violation of
Section 6 penalized under Section 7(b) of RA 80426 (Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale) committed as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of October 2001, in the City of
Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and both of them helping and aiding one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit, promise
employment/job placement abroad for an overseas employment
and collect fees from the following persons to wit:

NOEL P. DELAYUN

JOEY F. SILAO

JOEL U. PANGUELO

PAUL C. ABRIL

EVANGELINE E. GARCIA

ERIC V. ORILLANO

thus in large scale amounting to economic sabotage without any

license or authorized by the POEA of the Department of Labor
and Employment to recruit workers for an overseas employment.
Upon arraignment, Hu assisted by counsel entered a plea of not guilty
while Genoves remained at large.7Subsequently, trial on the merits
ensued. While the Information for illegal recruitment named several
persons as having been promised jobs by Hu and Genoves, only four of
them - Panguelo, Garcia, Abril and Orillano -- testified.
Hu was the President of Brighturn International Services, Inc. (Brighturn),
a land-based recruitment agency duly licensed by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) to engage in the business of
recruitment and placement of workers abroad, with principal address at
No. 1916 San Marcelino St., Malate, Manila. Brighturn was authorized by
the POEA to recruit, process and deploy land-based workers for the
period 18 December 1999 to 17 December 2001.8

Genoves worked as a consultant and marketing officer of Brighturn. Aside

from her stint at Brighturn, Genoves was also connected with Riverland
Consultancy Service (Riverland), another recruitment agency located at
Room No. 210, LPL Building, Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City.
Private complainants Orillano, Panguelo, Abril and Garcia sought
employment at Brighturn for the positions of factory worker and electronic
operator in Taiwan.9 Notwithstanding private complainants' compliance
with all of the pre-employment requirements, including the payment of
placement fees, they were not able to leave the country to work abroad.
Sometime in June 2001, Panguelo was informed by a friend that
Brighturn was hiring factory workers for Taiwan. When Panguelo went to
Brighturn, he was promised employment abroad by Hu for P50,000.00.
Upon Hu's instruction, Panguelo paid in full the placement fee in the
amount of P50,000.00 to Genoves. The payment was evidenced by an
Official Receipt dated 16 October 2001 bearing Genoves' signature.
Panguelo waited for three years to be deployed to Taiwan. His waiting
was all for naught. Thus, Panguelo decided to abort his application and
demanded from Hu the return of the amount he paid for the placement
fee, but Hu could no longer return the money.10
Also sometime in September 2001, Abril went to Brighturn to apply as a
factory worker in Taiwan. At Brighturn, Abril was entertained by Hu who
oriented him on the necessary requirements for application which
included a valid passport, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Clearance and ID pictures. After complying with the documentary
requirements, Abril was required by Hu to pay the placement fee to
Genoves in the amount of P44,000.00. As shown in Official Receipts
dated 9 October 2001 and 26 October 2000, which were signed by
Genoves, Abril paid the whole amount of P44,000.00 as placement fee.
Abril was assured by Hu that he would be deployed to Taiwan by
December 2001 which was subsequently reset to April 2002. Despite
several postponements, Abril was not able to leave the country.11
For his part, Orillano came to know of Brighturn thru Genoves. Orillano
was interviewed at Brighturn by a Taiwanese principal in October 2001.
After the interview, Hu informed Orillano to submit a medical certificate,
NBI clearance and passport; and to pay the requisite placement fee in
the amount of P50,000.00. Believing that Hu could send him abroad,
Orillano faithfully complied with these requirements including the
placement fee, the payment of which was made to Genoves at
Brighturn's office. Despite such payment, however, Orillano was not able
to leave the country.12

Garcia suffered the same fate as her co-applicants. In April 2002, Garcia
applied as Electronic Operator at Brighturn wherein she was entertained
by Hu who informed her that Brighturn's license was suspended. Garcia
was then referred by Hu to Best One International (Best One), another
recruitment agency likewise located in Malate, Manila. While Garcia was
told by Hu that the processing of her documents would be done at Best
One, the placement fee, however, should be paid at Brighturn.
Accordingly, the amount of P60,000.00 was paid by Garcia to Hu and
Genoves as placement fee upon Hu's instruction. Almost predictably, the
promise of an employment abroad never came to pass.13
When Hu was not able to refund the amounts paid as placement fees
upon demand, private complainants went to NBI to file a complaint for
illegal recruitment against Hu and Genoves.
For her defense, Hu claimed that she was the President of Brighturn, a
duly authorized land-based recruitment agency. Brighturn had foreign
principals in Taiwan who were looking for skilled individuals willing to
work in a foreign country. Hu alleged that Brighturn had an established
recruitment procedure wherein applicants were only required to pay the
corresponding placement fees after the POEA had already approved their
employment contracts. According to Hu, announcements were posted all
over Brighturn's premises warning job applicants to pay placement fees
only to the cashier. After the expiration of its license issued by the POEA
on 18 December 1999, Brighturn failed to pursue its application for
renewal due its inability to post the required cash bond. Brighturn was
thus constrained to refer all pending applications to Best One. 14
Hu admitted knowing the private complainants because these individuals
went to her office demanding the return of their placement fees by
showing their official receipts. Hu averred that when she examined such
receipts, she found that private complainants paid their placement fees to
Riverland and not to Brighturn as shown in the heading of the said
receipts which bore the name and address of Riverland and its
proprietress, Genoves. Hu denied knowing Genoves.15
On 4 January 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision16 finding Hu guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Nenita Hu guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale under Section 6 and 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042,

and, accordingly, sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of

life imprisonment, pay the fine of P500,000.00 and to indemnify
private complainants Paul Abril in the amount of P44,000.00, Joel
Panguelo in the amount of P50,000.00 and Evangeline Garcia in
the amount of P50,000.00.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision17 dated 9 October 2007, confirmed
the presence of all the elements of illegal recruitment in large scale, and
thereby affirmed the conviction of Hu with the modification that the
amount of actual damages awarded to Garcia in the amount
of P50,000.00 be deleted.
Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
HU GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE.
Hu was charged with and convicted by the trial court of the crime of
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, which conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court found that Hu made enticing, albeit
empty promises, which moved private complainants to part with their
money and pay the placement fee.
For its part, the Solicitor General joined the lower courts in finding that Hu
was indeed guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. According to the
Solicitor General, all the elements of illegal recruitment in large scale had
been established beyond reasonable doubt.18
We cannot sustain the conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely: (1)
the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable
him to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and
(2) he undertakes any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and
placement" defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code.19 Recruitment
and placement is "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers; and includes referrals,
contact services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or
more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement." 20

The crime becomes Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale when the

foregoing two elements concur, with the addition of a third element - the
recruiter committed the same against three or more persons, individually
or as group.21
A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding
in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether
individually or as a group. While it is true that the law does not require
that at least three victims testify at the trial, nevertheless, it is necessary
that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed
against three or more persons.22
In the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, it is a basic tenet that
the prosecution has the burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the
accused for the offense with which he is charged. Ei incumbit probation
qui dicit non qui negat; i.e., "he who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove." The conviction of appellant must rest not on the weakness of his
defense, but on the strength of the prosecution's evidence. 23
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
prove that illegal recruitment was committed against three or more
persons. What we have uncovered upon careful scrutiny of the records
was the fact that illegal recruitment was committed against only one
person; that is, against Garcia alone. Illegal recruitment cannot
successfully attach to the allegations of Panguelo, Abril and
Orillano, since they testified that they accomplished their preemployment requirements through Brighturn from June 2001 up to
October of the same year,24 a period wherein Brighturn's license to
engage in recruitment and placement was still in full force and
effect. 25
While there were six private complainants in this case, four of whom were
presented during the trial, the prosecution, nonetheless, failed to
establish that Hu engaged in illegal recruitment acts against at least three
of these complainants. In offenses in which the number of victims is
essential, such as in the present petition, failure of the prosecution to
prove by convincing evidence that the offense is committed against the
minimum number of persons required by law is fatal to its cause of
action. Underscoring the significance of the number of victims was the
disquisition of Justice Florenz Regalado in People v. Ortiz-Miyake26:
It is evident that in illegal recruitment cases, the number of
persons victimized is determinative.Where illegal recruitment

is committed against a lone victim, the accused may be

convicted of simple illegal recruitment which is punishable
with a lower penalty under Article 39(c)27 of the Labor
Code. Corollarily, where the offense is committed against three or
more persons, it is qualified to illegal recruitment in large scale
which provides a higher penalty under Article 39(a)28 of the same
Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Regrettably, we cannot affirm the conviction of Hu for the offense of
illegal recruitment in large scale. While we strongly condemn the
pervasive proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on
innocent people anxious to obtain employment abroad, nevertheless, we
find the pieces of evidence insufficient to prove the guilt of Hu beyond
reasonable doubt. It is unfortunate that the prosecution evidence did not
pass the test of reasonable doubt, since the testimonies of its witnesses
unveil a contradicting inference -- that the recruitment of Panguelo, Abril
and Orillano was undertaken by Hu with the required authority from the
POEA.
Failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of Hu beyond reasonable
doubt does not absolve her of her civil obligation to return the money she
collected from private complaints Panguelo, Abril and Orillano, plus legal
interest in accordance with our ruling in Domagsang v. Court of
Appeals.29 There, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish a case to
warrant a conviction, but clearly proved a just debt owed to the private
complainant. Thus, the accused was ordered to pay the face value of the
check with 12% legal interest per annum, reckoned from the filing of the
information until the finality of the judgment. It is well settled that acquittal
based on reasonable doubt does not preclude an award for civil
damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the
accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, civil liability is not extinguished
where the acquittal is based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
since only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases. There
appears to be no sound reason to require that a separate action be still
filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already
been established in the criminal proceedings.30 In the present case, the
prosecution explicitly proved that private complainants parted with
substantial amounts of money upon the prodding and enticement of Hu
on the false pretense that she had the capacity to deploy them for
employment abroad. In the end, private complainants were not able to
leave for work abroad or get their money back.

Neither does her acquittal herein exempt Hu from subsequent criminal

prosecution for estafa31 provided that deceit, which is an essential
element of estafa, be proven by the prosecution.32 Apparently, Hu
deluded private complainants into believing that she had the capacity to
send them abroad for employment. Through this hoax, she was able to
convince private complainants to surrender their money to her in the vain
hope, as it turned out, of securing employment abroad.
This leaves us a case of simple illegal recruitment committed against
Garcia.
Garcia testified that she applied for employment in Taiwan for the position
of Electronic Operator thru Brighturn in April 2002. Due to the alleged
suspension of Brighturn's license, Hu referred her to a neighboring
agency (Best One), but Hu continued collecting placement fees from her.
The act of referral, which means the act of passing along or forwarding
an applicant after an initial interview to a selected employer, placement or
bureau, is included in recruitment.33 Undoubtedly, the act of Hu in
referring Garcia to another recruitment agency squarely fell within the
purview of recruitment that was undertaken by Hu after her authority to
recruit and place workers already expired on 17 December 2001.
Failure of Garcia to present proof of payment is irrelevant. The absence
of receipts in the case of illegal recruitment does not warrant the acquittal
of the appellant and is not fatal to the prosecution's case. As long as the
prosecution is able to establish through credible and testimonial
evidence, as in the case at bar, that the appellant had engaged in illegal
recruitment, a conviction for the offense can be very well justified.34
Irrefragably, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of Hu of the charge of illegal recruitment against Garcia when the
former referred the latter to another agency without the license or
authority to do so. The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of
Garcia, which unmistakably demonstrated how Hu successfully enticed
her to part with a considerable amount of money in exchange for an
employment abroad which was never realized. This finding was adopted
by the appellate court, considering that that the trial court was in the best
position to ascertain credibility issues, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during trial.

Aptly, the bare denials of Hu have no probative value when ranged

against the affirmative declarations of Garcia, even if the latter failed to
present receipts for the payments she had made. In People v. Villas,35 this
Court affirmed the conviction of the appellant for illegal recruitment even
if private complaints were not able to present any receipt that they paid
appellant anything, thus:
Neither is there merit in the contention of the defense that
appellant should be exonerated for failure of the prosecution to
present any receipt proving that private complainants paid her
anything. The defense argues that a receipt is the best evidence
to prove delivery of money and the absence thereof shows that
no payment was made.
This argument is not novel. The Court has previously ruled that
the absence of receipts evidencing payment does not defeat a
criminal prosecution for illegal recruitment. In People vs.
Pabalan [262 SCRA 574, 30 September 1996], this Court ruled:
"x x x the absence of receipts in a criminal case for illegal
recruitment does not warrant the acquittal of the accused
and is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. As long as
the witnesses had positively shown through their
respective testimonies that the accused is the one
involved in the prohibited recruitment, he may be
convicted of the offense despite the want of receipts.
"The Statute of Frauds and the rules of evidence do not
require the presentation of receipts in order to prove the
existence of recruitment agreement and the procurement
of fees in illegal recruitment cases. The amounts may
consequently be proved by the testimony of witnesses."
The private complainants have convincingly testified that the
accused enticed them to apply and, in actual fact, received
payments from them. And to these testimonies, the trial court
accorded credence. On the other hand, appellant has not shown
any reason to justify a modification or reversal of the trial court's
finding.
Our ruling in People v. Villas36 that the absence of receipts in illegal
recruitment case does not warrant the acquittal of the accused has been
reiterated in several cases.37 We are not unaware of the proliferation of

these scheming illegal recruiters who cunningly rob Filipino workers,

desperate to work abroad, of their money in exchange of empty
promises. This Court cannot be drawn to the ingenious ploy of these
illegal recruiters in withholding receipts from their victims in their vain
attempt to evade liability.
In fine, the Court will have to discard the conviction for illegal recruitment
in large scale meted out by the RTC, since only one applicant abroad
was recruited by Hu without license and authority from the POEA.
Accordingly, Hu should be held responsible for simple illegal recruitment
only. Hu's unsuccessful indictment for illegal recruitment in large scale,
however, does not discharge her from her civil obligation to return the
placement fees paid by private complainants.
Under Section 7(a) of Republic Act No. 8042,38 simple illegal recruitment
is punishable by imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1)
day but not more than twelve years and a fine of not less than two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that if the offense
is punishable by a special law, as in this case, the court shall impose on
the accused an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the said law and the minimum of
which shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
Accordingly, a penalty of eight (8) to twelve (12) years of imprisonment
should be meted out to Hu. In addition, a fine in the amount
of P500,000.00; and indemnity to private complainants -- Abril in the
amount of P44,000.00, Panguelo in the amount of P50,000.00, Garcia in
the amount of P60,000.00 and Orillano in the amount of P50,000.00, with
12% legal interest per annum, reckoned from the filing of the information
until the finality of the judgment - is imposed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 October 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02243 affirming the conviction
of the accused-appellant Nenita B. Hu for the offense of Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale and sentencing her to life imprisonment is
hereby VACATED. A new Decision is hereby entered convicting the
accused-appellant of the offense of Simple Illegal Recruitment committed
against private complainant Evangeline Garcia. She is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment. She is ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00
and to indemnify private complainant Evangeline Garcia in the amount

of P60,000.00, with 12% interest per annum, reckoned from the filing of
the information until the finality of the judgment.
Accused-appellant Nenita B. Hu is likewise ordered to indemnify private
complainants Paul Abril in the amount ofP44,000.00, Joel Panguelo in
the amount of P50,000.00, and Eric Orillano in the amount
of P50,000.00, with 12% interest per annum, as reckoned above.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184058

March 10, 2010

MARILYN D. MACARANAS - 83,000.00

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
MELISSA CHUA, Appellant.

NAPOLEON H. YU, JR. - 23,000.00

HARRY JAMES P. KING - 23,000.00

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Melissa Chua (appellant) was indicted for Illegal Recruitment (Large
Scale) and was convicted thereof by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila. She was also indicted for five counts of Estafa but was convicted
only for three. The Court of Appeals, by Decision1 dated February 27,
2008, affirmed appellants conviction.

ROBERTO C. ANGELES - 23,000.00

For purposes of their deployment, which amounts are in excess of or
greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees as
prescribed by the POEA, and without valid reasons and without the fault
of said complainants, failed to actually deploy them and failed to
reimburse expenses incurred in connection with their documentation and
processing for purposes of their deployment.
xxxx

The Information2 charging appellant, together with one Josie Campos

(Josie), with Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale), docketed as Criminal
Case No. 04-222596, reads:
The undersigned accuses JOSIE CAMPOS and MELISSA CHUA of
violation of Article 38 (a) PD 1413, amending certain provisions of Book I,
PD 442, otherwise known as the New Labor Code of the Philippines, in
relation to Art. 13 (b) and (c ) of said Code, as further amended by PD
Nos. 1693, 1920 and 2019 and as further amended by Sec. 6 (a), (1) and
(m) of RA 8042 committed in a [sic] large scale as follows:
That sometime during the month of September, 2002, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, representing themselves to
have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to ERIK
DE GUIA TAN, MARILYN O. MACARANAS, NAPOLEON H. YU, JR.,
HARRY JAMES P. KING and ROBERTO C. ANGELES for overseas
employment abroad without first having secured the required license from
the Department of Labor and Employment as required by law, and charge
or accept directly from:
ERIK DE GUIA TAN - P73,000.00

The five Informations3 charging appellant and Josie with Estafa, docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 04-222597-601, were similarly worded and varied
only with respect to the names of the five complainants and the amount
that each purportedly gave to the accused. Thus each of the Information
reads:
xxxx
That on or about . . . in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud xxx in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false
manifestations which they made to the said . . . to the effect that they had
the power and capacity to recruit the latter as factory worker to work in
Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given
the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means
of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said xxx to
give and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to the said accused the
amount of . . . on the strength of said manifestations and representations,
said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and
were made solely to obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount of . . .
which amount once in their possession, with intent to defraud, they
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and

converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage of said . .
. in the aforesaid amount of . . ., Philippine Currency.
xxxx
Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Her co-accused Josie
remained at large. The cases were consolidated, hence, trial proceeded
only with respect to appellant.
Of the five complainants, only three testified, namely, Marilyn D.
Macaranas (Marilyn), Erik de Guia Tan (Tan) and Harry James King
(King). The substance of their respective testimonies follows:
Marilyns testimony:
After she was introduced in June 2002 by Josie to appellant as
capacitated to deploy factory workers to Taiwan, she paid
appellant P80,000 as placement fee and P3,750 as medical expenses
fee, a receipt4 for the first amount of which was issued by appellant.
Appellant had told her that she could leave for Taiwan in the last week of
September 2002 but she did not, and despite appellants assurance that
she would leave in the first or second week of October, just the same she
did not.
She thus asked for the refund of the amount she paid but appellant
claimed that she was not in possession thereof but promised anyway to
raise the amount to pay her, but she never did.
She later learned in June 2003 that appellant was not a licensed
recruiter, prompting her to file the complaint against appellant and Josie.
Tans testimony:
After he was introduced by Josie to appellant at the Golden Gate, Inc.,
(Golden Gate) an agency situated in Paragon Tower Hotel in Ermita,
Manila, he underwent medical examination upon appellants assurance
that he could work in Taiwan as a factory worker with a guaranteed
monthly salary of 15,800 in Taiwan currency.

He thus paid appellant, on September 6, 2002, P70,0005 representing

placement fees for which she issued a receipt. Appellant welched on her
promise to deploy him to Taiwan, however, hence, he demanded the
refund of his money but appellant failed to. He later learned that Golden
Gate was not licensed to deploy workers to Taiwan, hence, he filed the
complaint against appellant and Josie.
Kings testimony:
His friend and a fellow complainant Napoleon Yu introduced him to Josie
who in turn introduced appellant as one who could deploy him to Taiwan.
On September 24, 2002,6 he paid appellant P20,000 representing partial
payment for placement fees amounting to P80,000, but when he later
inquired when he would be deployed, Golden Gates office was already
closed. He later learned that Golden Gates license had already expired,
prompting him to file the complaint.
Appellant denied the charges. Claiming having worked as a temporary
cashier from January to October, 2002 at the office of Golden Gate,
owned by one Marilyn Calueng,7 she maintained that Golden Gate was a
licensed recruitment agency and that Josie, who is her godmother, was
an agent.
Admitting having received P80,000 each from Marilyn and Tan, receipt of
which she issued but denying receiving any amount from King, she
claimed that she turned over the money to the documentation officer, one
Arlene Vega, who in turn remitted the money to Marilyn Calueng whose
present whereabouts she did not know.
By Decision of April 5, 2006, Branch 36 of the Manila RTC convicted
appellant of Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and three counts of Estafa,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of accused
Melissa Chua beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered
convicting the accused as principal of a large scale illegal recruitment
and estafa three (3) counts and she is sentenced to life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for
illegal recruitment.
1avvphi1

The accused is likewise convicted of estafa committed against Harry

James P. King and she is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
Four (4) years and Two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to
Six (6) years and One (1) day of prision mayor as maximum; in Criminal
Case No. 04-22598; in Criminal Case No. 04-222600 committed against
Marilyn Macaranas, accused is sentence [sic] to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of Four (4) years and Two (2) months of prision correctional as
minimum, to Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum; and in Criminal Case No. 04-222601 committed against Erik
de Guia Tan, she is likewise sentence [sic] to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of Four (4) years and Two (2) months of prision correctional as
minimum, to Eleven (11) years and One (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum.

Respecting the cases for Estafa, the appellate court, noting that a person
convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of Estafa as
penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
held that the elements thereof were sufficiently established, viz: that
appellant deceived the complainants by assuring them of employment in
Taiwan provided they pay the required placement fee; that relying on
such representation, the complainants paid appellant the amount
demanded; that her representation turned out to be false because she
failed to deploy them as promised; and that the complainants suffered
damages when they failed to be reimbursed the amounts they paid.

Accused Melissa Chua is also ordered to return the amounts of

P20,000.00 to Harry James P. King, P83,750.00 to Marilyn D.
Macaranas, and P70,000.00 to Erik de Guia Tan.

The appeal is bereft of merit.

As regards Criminal Cases Nos. 04-222597 and 04-222599, both are

dismissed for lack of interest of complainants Roberto Angeles and
Napoleon Yu, Jr.
In the service of her sentence, the accused is credited with the full period
of preventive imprisonment if she agrees in writing to abide by the
disciplinary rules imposed, otherwise only 4/5 shall be credited.

Hence, the present appeal, appellant reiterating the same arguments she
raised in the appellate court.

The term "recruitment and placement" is defined under Article 13(b) of

the Labor Code of the Philippines as follows:
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided, That
any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement. (emphasis supplied)

SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals, as stated early on, affirmed the trial courts
decision by the challenged Decision of February 27, 2008, it holding that
appellants defense that, as temporary cashier of Golden Gate, she
received the money which was ultimately remitted to Marilyn Calueng is
immaterial, she having failed to prove the existence of an employment
relationship between her and Marilyn, as well as the legitimacy of the
operations of Golden Gate and the extent of her involvement therein.
Citing People v. Sagayaga,8 the appellate court ruled that an employee of
a company engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal
together with his employer if it is shown that he, as in the case of
appellant, actively and consciously participated therein.

On the other hand, Article 38, paragraph (a) of the Labor Code, as
amended, under which appellant was charged, provides:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed
illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor
and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints
under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale
shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be
penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a

group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with
one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise
or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is
deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group. (emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that any recruitment activities to
be undertaken by non-licensee or non-holder of contracts, or as in the
present case, an agency with an expired license, shall be deemed illegal
and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. And
illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three or more persons individually or as a group.
Thus for illegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution has
to prove three essential elements, to wit: (1) the accused undertook a
recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under
Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused did not have the license or
the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers; and (3) the accused committed such illegal activity against three
or more persons individually or as a group.9
In the present case, Golden Gate, of which appellant admitted being a
cashier from January to October 2002, was initially authorized to recruit
workers for deployment abroad. Per the certification from the POEA,
Golden Gates license only expired on February 23, 2002 and it was
delisted from the roster of licensed agencies on April 2, 2002.
Appellant was positively pointed to as one of the persons who enticed the
complainants to part with their money upon the fraudulent representation
that they would be able to secure for them employment abroad. In the
absence of any evidence that the complainants were motivated by
improper motives, the trial courts assessment of their credibility shall not
be interfered with by the Court.10
Even if appellant were a mere temporary cashier of Golden Gate, that did
not make her any less an employee to be held liable for illegal
recruitment as principal by direct participation, together with the
employer, as it was shown that she actively and consciously participated
in the recruitment process. 11

Assuming arguendo that appellant was unaware of the illegal nature of

the recruitment business of Golden Gate, that does not free her of liability
either. Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale penalized under Republic Act
No. 8042, or "The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,"
is a special law, a violation of which is malum prohibitum, not malum in
se. Intent is thus immaterial. And that explains why appellant was, aside
from Estafa, convicted of such offense.
[I]llegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se. In
the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction.
In the second, such an intent is imperative. Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, is committed by any person
who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
fraud.12 (emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176264

January 10, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
TERESITA "TESSIE" LAOGO, Appellant.

Buenavidez, Billy dela Cruz, Jr. y Fernandez, Dante Lopez y Enriquez,

Teodulo dela Cruz y Mendoza, Edwin Enriquez y Panganiban and Gary
Bustillos y de Guzman by recruiting and promising them job placement
abroad, more particularly in Guam, which did not materialize, without first
having secured the required license or authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment.

DECISION
That the crime is committed in a large scale tantamount to economic
sabotage as the aforementioned seven persons were [recruited]
individually or as a group.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This petition assails the July 31, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01664, which affirmed the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, of Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal
Case No. 693-M-2001. The RTC found appellant Teresita "Tessie" Laogo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale.
Appellant Teresita "Tessie" Laogo was the proprietor and manager of
Laogo Travel Consultancy, a travel agency firm located along Padre
Faura Street in Manila. On March 7, 2001, an Information3 was filed
against appellant and a certain Susan Navarro (Susan) in Malolos,
Bulacan charging them of the crime of Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale).
The information reads:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Susan Navarro and
Tessie [Teresita] Laogo of the crime of illegal recruitment, penalized
under Art. 38 in relation to Art[s]. 34 and 39 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1412, committed as
follows:
That in or about and during the months of May and June 2000, in the
municipality of Bulacan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing
that they are non-licensee or non-holder of authority from the Department
of Labor to recruit and/or place workers in employment either locally or
overseas, conspiring, confederating together and helping each other, did
then and there wi[l]lfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in illegal
recruitment, placement or deployment activities for a fee, which they
received from complainants Edith Bonifacio-Ulanday, Rogelio Enriquez y

Contrary to law.
The charge stemmed from the following set of facts.
Sometime during the second week of March 2000, Susan invited several
individuals including six of the seven complainants namely, Teodulo
dela Cruz, Billy dela Cruz, Jr., Dante Lopez, Edwin Enriquez, Rogelio
Enriquez, and Gary Bustillos to her house in Bulacan, Bulacan to
celebrate the town fiesta. Appellant was among the several guests in
Susans house during the said occasion.
According to Teodulo dela Cruz, during the fiesta, Gary Bustillos
introduced him to Susan as somebody who could help him find work
abroad. Since Susan was Garys aunt, Teodulo immediately trusted
Susan. Susan told him he can apply as assistant cook and can work in
Guam, USA. Upon Susans instruction, Teodulo filled up an application
form4 and gave her P3,000.00 after the latter promised to process his
application to work abroad.5 On May 22, 2000, Susan accompanied
Teodulo to appellants travel agency office in Ermita where he paid an
additional P15,000.00 for his placement fee.6 A receipt bearing the logo
and name of Laogo Travel Consultancy was issued to him signed by
Susan.7 Months later, when Susans promise to send him abroad
remained unfulfilled, Teodulo, along with several other applicants, went to
appellants office and to Susans house to follow up their application, but
the two always told them that their visas have yet to be released.8
Similarly, Billy dela Cruz, Jr. also met Susan through Gary, who himself
was seeking help from Susan to work in Guam. At Susans house, Billy
saw Dante Lopez, Edwin Enriquez, and Rogelio Enriquez. Like him, the
three were also seeking Susans help to work abroad.9 Susan introduced

Billy to appellant, who promised him that she will send them abroad
within three months.10 After the meeting, Billy issued to Susan two
Metrobank checks, dated March 11 and May 10, 2000, bearing the
amounts P23,000.00 and P44,000.00, respectively, as partial payment for
his placement fee.11 On May 19, 2000, Billy also went to appellants travel
agency in Ermita and personally handed an additional cash of P6,000.00
to Susan, who thereafter gave the money to appellant. Appellant issued a
corresponding receipt12 for the P6,000.00 cash bearing her signature and
the name and logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy. After several months, no
word was heard from either Susan or appellant. Sensing that something
was wrong, Billy decided to report the matter to the authorities in
Bulacan, Bulacan and filed the complaint against Susan and appellant. 13
Dante Lopez testified that he was also introduced by Gary Bustillos to
appellant and Susan. Susan identified herself as an employee of
appellants travel agency. The two told him that they can send him and
his companions to Guam within the span of three months.14 Lopez paid
both accused P6,000.00 to process his papers, covered by a receipt
dated May 19, 2000 showing appellants signature. 15 Appellants promise,
however, turned sour after three months. When he confronted appellant,
the latter told him that he would be sent to a different country. Left without
a choice, Lopez waited. Again, the promise remained unfulfilled.16
According to Rogelio Enriquez, he also met appellant during the town
fiesta when Susan invited him to cook for her guests. Susan introduced
appellant as someone who could send him to work abroad. Eager about
the prospect, Rogelio immediately gave his P3,000.00 cash to Susan for
the processing of his visa and employment documents. 17 He saw Susan
hand the money to appellant.18 A week later, Rogelio gave an
additional P900.00 to Susan.19 No receipts were issued on both payments
since Rogelio failed to complete the required P6,000.00 placement
fee.20 Months passed but Rogelio heard nothing from either Susan or
appellant. Apprehensive, Rogelio verified the status of the Laogo Travel
Consultancy with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA). From the POEA, Rogelio learned that neither of the accused nor
Laogo Travel was licensed to recruit workers for employment abroad.
Aggrieved, Rogelio, together with his six companions, filed the complaint
against Susan and appellant.
Edwin Enriquez also paid P12,000.00 to Susan as processing fee for his
application to work in Guam. According to him, Susans husband and

appellant were present when he gave the money to Susan during the
town fiesta.21Susan issued a receipt dated May 16, 2000 to Edwin. The
receipt contained the logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy and was signed
by Susan with a description which says "Payment was for Placement
Fee."22
Two other persons, namely Edith Bonifacio-Ulanday and Gary Bustillos,
Susans nephew, were among the seven who filed the complaint against
Susan and appellant. The two, however, later decided to withdraw their
complaints after executing their respective affidavits of desistance. 23
On March 15, 2001, warrants of arrest24 were issued against Susan and
appellant. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.25 Susan,
meanwhile, remained at large. An alias warrant of arrest26 was issued by
the trial court against her but to no avail.
During the trial, appellant denied any participation in the illegal activities
undertaken by Susan. She insisted that Susan was not in any way
connected with her travel agency and that she confronted the latter when
she came to know of Susans recruitment activities. Appellant claimed
that she even had to rename her travel agency to Renz Consultancy and
Employment Services to avoid being associated with Susans recruitment
activities.27
Appellant admitted having met Rogelio at Susans house during the town
fiesta, but denied knowing the other complainants. According to
appellant, she came to know Rogelio when Susan specifically identified
him as the one who cooked the dishes after some guests prodded
Susan.28
Unsatisfied with appellants explanation, the trial court promulgated a
Decision29 finding her guilty of large scale illegal recruitment. The fallo of
the trial courts July 16, 2002 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding herein accused Teresita (Tessie) Laogo y Villamor
guilty as principal beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and pay a fine of P500,000.00 as imposed by law[;]
to indemnify the private offended parties x x x actual damages, as
follows: Teodulo dela Cruz P15,000.00, Billy dela Cruz P73,000.00,

Dante Lopez P6,000.00, Rogelio Enriquez P3,000.00, and Edwin

Enriquez P12,000.00[;] and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Aggrieved, appellant brought the case to us on appeal, raising the same

arguments she had raised at the CA.

In the service of her sentence the said accused, a detention prisoner,

shall be credited with the full time during which she had undergone
preventive imprisonment, pursuant to the provisions of Art. 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.

We affirm appellants conviction.

Pending the actual apprehension of the other accused Susan Navarro,

[who is] still at-large, on the strength of the warrant of arrest earlier
issued, let the record be committed to the archives subject to recall and
reinstatement, should circumstances so warrant for due prosecution
against her of this case.
SO ORDERED.30
Appellant filed an appeal before this Court, but said appeal was
transferred to the CA following our pronouncement in People v. Mateo. 31

Recruitment and placement refers to the act of canvassing, enlisting,

contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. When a person
or entity, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two
or more persons, that person or entity shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.39
Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, specifies that recruitment
activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority are
deemed illegal and punishable by law. And when the illegal recruitment is
committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group, then
it is deemed committed in large scale and carries with it stiffer penalties
as the same is deemed a form of economic sabotage.40
1avvphi1

In her Appellants Brief before the CA, appellant insisted that she had no
hand in the recruitment of the complainants and maintains that the
recruitment activities were made solely upon the initiative of accused
Susan Navarro.33 Appellant anchored her defense on the testimonies of
the complainants who declared that the transactions and the payments
were made not with her but with Susan.34 Appellant admitted that her
consultancy firm was merely engaged in the business of assisting clients
in the procurement of passports and visas, and denied that her agency
was involved in any recruitment activity as defined under the Labor Code,
as amended.35
32

On July 31, 2006, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision
affirming appellants conviction.36 The CA noted that although at times, it
was Susan with whom the complainants transacted, the records
nevertheless bear that appellant had a hand in the recruitment of the
complainants. The CA pointed out that appellant, together with Susan,
repeatedly assured the private complainants that her consultancy firm
could deploy them for overseas employment,37 leading the appellate court
to conclude that appellant consciously and actively participated in the
recruitment of the complainants.38

But to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused,

without being duly authorized by law, gave complainants the distinct
impression that he had the power or ability to send them abroad for work,
such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be
employed.41 It is important that there must at least be a promise or offer of
an employment from the person posing as a recruiter, whether locally or
abroad.42
Here, both the trial court and the CA found that all the five complainants
were promised to be sent abroad by Susan and herein appellant43 as
cooks and assistant cooks. The follow up transactions between appellant
and her victims were done inside the said travel agency. Moreover, all
four receipts issued to the victims bear the name and logo of Laogo
Travel Consultancy,44 with two of the said receipts personally signed by
appellant herself.45 Indubitably, appellant and her co-accused acting
together made complainants believe that they were transacting with a
legitimate recruitment agency and that Laogo Travel Consultancy had the
authority to recruit them and send them abroad for work when in truth
and in fact it had none as certified by the POEA.46 Absent any showing
that the trial court and the CA overlooked or misappreciated certain

significant facts and circumstances, which if properly considered, would

change the result, we are bound by said findings.47
Appellants contention that she had to change the name of her travel
agency to disassociate herself with Susans recruitment activities is too
lame to deserve serious consideration. In light of the testimonies of the
complainants that appellant with her co-accused promised them
employment abroad, we find appellants act of closing Laogo Travel
Consultancy and establishing a new one under her husbands name48 as
just an afterthought, a belated decision which cannot undo the damage
suffered by the private offended parties. It could indeed hardly be
construed as a simple reaction of an innocent person, as it in fact smacks
of a desperate attempt of a guilty individual to escape liability or to
confuse and dishearten her victims.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated July 31, 2006
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01664 is AFFIRMED in
toto.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO [183 SCRA 145;

G.R. NO. 81510; 14 MAR 1990]
Facts:

violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were

confiscated

against

unreasonable
Rosalie

Tesoro

of

Pasay

City

in

her

will

force

and

were

and

done

with

intimidation.

sworn

statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with

illegal recruitment.

Public

respondent

Atty.

Ferdinand

Issue:

Whether

or

Not

the Philippine

Overseas

Marquez sent petitioner a telegram directing him to

Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor)

appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him.

can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest)

On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had no

under

Article

38

of

the

Labor

Code

license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent

Administrator

TomasAchacoso issued

a Closure and

Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there

Held:

will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being

warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon

used or intended to be used as the means of committing

probable cause to bedetermined personally by the judge

illegalrecruitment, it having verified that petitioner has

after examination under oath or affirmation of the

(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and

Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers

particularly describing the place to be searched and the

for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing

persons or things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting

acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in

officers

relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then

The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of

tasked

group,

the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We reiterate

accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen,

that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no

went to petitioners residence. They served the order to a

longer

certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team

authorities must go through the judicial process. To that

confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA

extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor

a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties,

Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The

because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The

power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for

said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it

deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to

to

implement

the

said

Order.

The

Under the new Constitution, . . . no search

cannot

issue

issue

search

warrants

of

seizure

or arrest warrants.

or arrest.

Hence,

the

order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases,

like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole
domain of the courts. Furthermore, the search and
seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The
court held that the warrant is null and void, because it
must

identify

WHEREFORE,
paragraph

specifically
the

(c)

of

petition
the

the
is

things

to

GRANTED.

Labor

Code

be

seized.

Article
is

38,

declared

UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents

are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of
the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205

EASTERN ASSURANCE VS SEC. OF LABOR

FACTS: J&B Manpower is an overseas employment agency

registered with the POEA and Eastern Assurance was its surety
beginning January 1985. From 1983 to December 1985, J&B
recruited 33 persons but none of them were ever deployed. These
33 persons sued J&B and the POEA as well as the Secretary of
Labor ruled in favor of the 33 workers and ordered J&B to refund
them (with Eastern Assurance being solidarily liable). Eastern
Assurance assailed the ruling claiming that POEA and the
Secretary of Labor have no jurisdiction over non-employees (since
the 33 were never employed, in short, no employer-employee
relations).
ISSUE: Whether or not Eastern Assurance can be held liable in the
case at bar.
HELD: Yes. But only for the period covering from January
1985 when the surety took effect (as already held by the Labor
Secretary). The Secretary of Labor was given power by Article 34
(Labor Code) and Section 35 and 36 of EO 797 (POEA Rules) to
restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all
agencies, but also to promulgate rules and regulations to carry
out the objectives and implement the provisions governing said
activities.
Implicit in these powers is the award of appropriate relief to the
victims of the offenses committed by the respondent agency or
contractor, specially the refund orreimbursement of such fees as
may have been fraudulently or otherwise illegally collected, or such

money, goods or services imposed and accepted in excess of what

is licitly prescribed. It would be illogical and absurd to limit the
sanction on an offendingrecruitment agency or contractor to
suspension or cancellation of its license, without the concomitant
obligation to repair the injury caused to its victims.
Though some of the cases were filed after the expiration of the
surety bond agreement between J&B and Eastern Assurance,
notice was given to J&B of such anomalies even before said
expiration. In this connection, it may be stressed that the surety
bond provides that notice to the principal is notice to the surety.
Besides, it has been held that the contract of a compensated
surety like respondent Eastern Assurance is to be interpreted
liberally in the interest of the promises andbeneficiaries rather than
strictly in favor of the surety.

Patricia Sto.
Tomas vs Rey
Salac
This case is a consolidation of the following cases: G.R. No.
152642, G.R. No. 152710, G.R. No. 167590, G.R. Nos. 182978-79,
and G.R. Nos. 184298-99.
G.R. No. 152642 and G.R. No. 152710
In G.R. No. 152642, in 2002, Rey Salac et al, who are recruiters
deploying workers abroad, sought to enjoin the Secretary of Labor,
Patricia Sto. Tomas, the POEA, and TESDA, from regulating the
activities of private recruiters. Salac et al invoked Sections 29 and
30 of the Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant Workers Act which
provides that recruitment agency in the Philippines shall be
deregulated one year from the passage of the said law; that 5
years thereafter, recruitment should be fully deregulated. RA 8042
was passed in 1995, hence, Salac et al insisted that as early as
2000, the aforementioned government agencies should have
stopped issuing memorandums and circulars regulating the
recruitment of workers abroad.
Sto. Tomas then questioned the validity of Sections 29 and 30.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 29 and 30 are valid.

HELD: The issue became moot and academic. It appears that

during the pendency of this case in 2007, RA 9422 (An Act to
Strengthen the Regulatory Functions of the POEA) was passed
which repealed Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042.
G.R. 167590
In this case, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.
(PASEI) questioned the validity of the following provisions of RA
8042:
a. Section 6, which defines the term illegal recruitment. PASEI
claims that the definition by the law is vague as it fails to
distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters;
b. Section 7, which penalizes violations against RA 8042. PASEI
argues that the penalties for simple violations against RA 8042,
i.e., mere failure to render report or obstructing inspection are
already punishable for at least 6 years and 1 day imprisonment an
a fine of at least P200k. PASEI argues that such is unreasonable;
c. Section 9, which allows the victims of illegal recruitment to have
the option to either file the criminal case where he or she resides or
at the place where the crime was committed. PASEI argues that
this provision is void for being contrary to the Rules of Court which
provides that criminal cases must be prosecuted in the place
where the crime or any of its essential elements were committed;
d. Section 10, which provides that corporate officers and directors
of a company found to be in violation of RA 8042 shall
be themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. PASEI claims

that this automatic liability imposed upon corporate officers and

directors is void for being violative of due process.
RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI and
he declared the said provisions of RA 8042 as void. Secretary Sto.
Tomas petitioned for the annulment of the RTC judgment.

d. Section 10: The liability of corporate officers and directors is not

automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their
company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing
the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the
conduct of illegal activities.
G.R. 182978-79, and G.R. 184298-99

ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 6, 7, 9, and 10 of RA 8042 are

void.
HELD: No, they are valid provisions.
a. Section
6: The
law
clearly
and
unambiguously
distinguished between licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its
terms, persons who engage in canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers without the
appropriate government license or authority are guilty of illegal
recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful acts
enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who
engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with
the appropriate government license or authority, are guilty of illegal
recruitment only if they commit any of the wrongful acts
enumerated in Section 6.
b. Section 7: The penalties are valid. Congress is well within its
right to prescribed the said penalties. Besides, it is not the duty of
the courts to inquire into the wisdom behind the law.

In this case, Jasmin Cuaresma, a nurse working in Saudi Arabia

was found dead. Her parents received insurance benefits from the
OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare Administration). But when they
found out based on an autopsy conducted in the Philippines that
Jasmin was raped and thereafter killed, her parents (Simplicio and
Mila Cuaresma) filed for death and insurance benefits with
damages from the recruitment and placement agencywhich
handled Jasmin (Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.).
The case reached the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court
ruled that since Becmen was negligent in investigating the true
cause of death of Jasmin ( a violation of RA 8042), it shall be liable
for damages. The Supreme Court also ruled that pursuant to
Section 10 of RA 8042, the directors and officers of Becmen are
themselves jointly and solidarily liable with Becmen.
Eufrocina Gumabay and the other officers of Becmen filed a
motion for leave to intervene. They aver that Section 10 is invalid.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section is invalid.

c. Section 9: The Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section

15(a) of Rule 110, itself, provides that the rule on venue when it
comes to criminal cases is subject to existing laws. Therefore,
there is nothing arbitrary when Congress provided an alternative
venue for violations of a special penal law like RA 8042.

HELD: No. As earlier discussed, Section 10 is valid. The liability of

Gumabay et al is not automatic. However, the SC reconsidered its
earlier ruling that Gumabay et al are solidarily and jointly liable with
Becmen there being no evidence on record which shows that

they ere personally involved in their companys particular actions or

omissions in Jasmins case.