European Sociological Review

VOLUME 30

NUMBER 2

2014

207217

207

DOI:10.1093/esr/jct029, available online at www.esr.oxfordjournals.org

Online publication 11 October 2013

Previous School Results and Social

Background: Compensation and Imperfect
Information in Educational Transitions
Fabrizio Bernardi1,* and Hector Cebolla-Boado2
Abstract: In this article, we analyse whether previous school results have a social background-specific
impact on a students decision to continue in schooling. We refer to the model proposed by Breen and
Goldthorpe (1997) and scrutinize the theoretical underpinnings of the interaction between previous
school performance and educational choices. We provide two sets of predictions. First, a compensatory
effect might occur if inequality is greater among the worst-performing students than among others. In
this case, students from socio-economically advantaged backgrounds with poor school results would still
move to higher educational levels, whereas students from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds with poor school results would drop out. Second, inequality might be higher among average
performers. Both good and poor school results send stronger messages and clearer information than
scores in the middle of the distribution. If individuals from different socio-economic backgrounds
handle imperfect information differently, then the impact of social background could be larger on
average grades than on good or poor ones. To test these hypotheses, we used the French Panel dEle`ves
du Second Degre and focused on social background differences in the decision to opt for the academic
or the vocational track after the completion of compulsory education. Our findings support the
hypothesis of a compensatory effect. In the conclusion, we discuss further general implications of our
results for research on educational inequality.

Introduction
A key tenet in the research on educational inequality is
that grades, as well as any alternative proxy of previous
school performance, are used by families to infer the
probability of success when facing critical branching
points in the education system (Boudon, 1974). Little
attention has, however, been paid to differences in the
impact of academic performance on future educational
choices across social backgrounds. It is true, on the one
hand, that some studies have discussed the empirical
relevance of an interaction between social background
and academic performance, either as a built-in component of the specific decomposition method employed, or
as robustness checks. Yet, on the other hand, the
theoretical reasons as to why previous school results
might impact differently depending on social background have not been fully scrutinized. The main

contribution of the present article is to fill this gap in

the literature and to provide behavioural evidence on
how families of diverse social standings react differently
to similar childrens performance in school. As we argue,
our findings also hold important implications for the
model of educational transitions proposed by Breen and
Goldthorpe (1997).
The main question that we address in this article is
whether previous school results have a social background
specific impact on a students decision to continue
in schooling. We provide two sets of predictions. A
compensatory effect occurs if the transition probabilities
for upper-class students are less dependent on previous
performance than those of students of lower socioeconomic standing. In that case, students of higher
socio-economic standing with poor school results still
proceed to higher educational levels or onto more
prestigious educational tracks, whereas lower-class

SPS, EUI, Via dei Roccettini 9, San Domenico di Fiesole, 50014 Florence, Italy; 2UNED, Sociology department II,
Calle Obispo Trejo s/n, 28040 Madrid, Spain. *Corresponding author. Email: fabrizio.bernardi@eui.eu
The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. Submitted: March 2013; revised: July 2013; accepted: August 2013.

208

BERNARDI AND CEBOLLA-BOADO

students with poor school results are more prone to

drop out or to opt for less-demanding educational
tracks. Social background inequality in educational
transitions would then be higher among poorly performing students. A compensatory effect might come
about because upper-class students have a stronger
incentive to pursue ambitious school careers to avoid
social demotion, largely independent of the low estimates
of the likelihood of their success (Lucas, 2009).
Moreover, upper-class families have the necessary economic, social, and cultural resources to compensate for
previous poor school results.
Alternatively, inequality might be higher among average performers. The results on the extremes of the
achievement distribution might send stronger and clearer
messages than scores in the middle of the distribution.
When students attain average results, their families might
be less able to infer from their childs current performance their chances of succeeding at the next stage, which
can amplify the impact of social origin.
To test these predictions, we used the French Panel
dEle`ves du Second Degre, a longitudinal cohort study
that followed students joining compulsory secondary
school in 1995. We focused on social class differences in
the decision to opt for the academic or vocational track
after the completion of compulsory education.
Additionally, we examined whether and how these
differences are conditioned by previous performance.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows:
In the next section, we present the theory and
hypotheses that drive our work. A short description of
the French school system follows. The fourth section is
devoted to the presentation of our dataset, followed by a
discussion of the empirical findings. The concluding
section provides a summary of our results and a
discussion of their implications for the Breen and
Goldthorpe (1997) model and for social stratification
research.

Relative Risk Aversion, Subjective

Probability of Success, and
Resources
The Breen and Goldthorpe model (1997) (henceforth,
BG model) proposes three mechanisms through which
class differences in educational outcomes might originate. These mechanisms are Relative Risk Aversion (RRA),
differences in abilities and expectations of success, and
differences in resources. We elaborate on each of these
mechanisms to understand whether and why the impact
of previous results on decisions to continue in school
might vary depending on social background.

Relative Risk Aversion

A central assumption in the BG model is that students
and their families aim to achieve an educational level
that minimizes the risk of downward social mobility. A
corollary of this assumption is that students of higher
socio-economic standing will continue in education
when their probability of accessing the higher social
classes, either after completion of the next educational
level or after failing to do so, is higher than the
probability of accessing the higher social classes after
dropping directly out of education. Formally:
i  1  i  > 

where i is the expected probability of success in

completing the next educational level;  is the probability of accessing the higher social classes if the next
educational level is completed; (1  i) is the probability
of failing to complete the next educational level;  is the
probability of accessing the service class despite not
having completed the next educational level; and  is the
probability of accessing the higher social classes having
dropped out of education.
Based on (1), Lucas (2009) demonstrates that the RRA
implies that students of higher socio-economic standing
might discontinue education only under specific conditions, namely, when  is smaller than .1 This indicates
that the students might drop out only if they think that
their chances of occupational success are higher if they
leave education than if they stay in school and fail. Even
in that case, the students would still stay in education if
i and  were sufficiently high. In any case, upper-class
students of higher socio-economic standing will leave
school only when they perceive that their chances of
occupational success, and of avoiding downward mobility, are higher by leaving than by staying in school
(regardless of whether they fail or complete the next
educational level). This specific situation is labelled by
Lucas (2009) as the Gates Gambit, as the story of the
famous college dropout, Bill Gates, exemplifies. Despite a
high probability of success in education (i), the expected
occupation returns without education () might be
higher than the estimated future returns, both in the
event of failure () or success () in completing
university education.
Lucas (2009) formal analysis provided us with the
insight that for the large majority of students of higher
socio-economic standing, their decision to continue or
not in schooling is largely independent of the probability
of success at the next educational level. Except under the
very specific conditions epitomized by the Gates Gambit,
the aversion to downward mobility will always make it
more convenient for students of higher socio-economic

PREVIOUS SCHOOL RESULTS AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

standing to stay in school, regardless of their previous

performance.

The Differences in Abilities and the

Probability of Success
As previously mentioned, the subjective probability of
future success in education, i, is one of the key
parameters in the BG model. In general terms, the higher
i, the higher the probability of continuing in education.
Moreover, the subjective probability of future success is
interpreted as a function of manifested abilities in a
previous examination or the final grades at the previous
educational level (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997).
Formally,
i gai

where ai refers to previous school results.

A rather undertheorized assumption of the BG model
is that the function g is the same for all social classes. In
other words, when given similar school results, families
of different social classes would infer a similar subjective
probability of success at the next educational level.
However, if one follows Breen (1999), the subjective
probability of success at the next educational level can be
conceived of as a function of two factors: the individual
effort a student has made so far, and an ascriptive factor
related to the individuals innate ability. Thus, a family
interprets previous school results as a combination of
effort and ability. Formally,
i gai gai Ii ei

where Ii stands for individual ability and ei represents

effort. Framed in this way, class-specific differences in
school continuation rates might also stem from different
values attributed to  and . A poor performance might
be disregarded as an indicator of likely subsequent failure
the smaller  is, or if one believes that the poor
performance was caused by limited effort, which can be
corrected in the future. Alternatively, if poor performance is interpreted as a reflection of limited individual
abilitythat is, if more weight is given to Ii (large )
then there is less room for improvement at the next
educational level. Recent experimental work in social
psychology shows that academic success among highstatus groups and failure among low-status groups are
attributed to ability, whereas academic failure among
high-status and success among low-status groups tend to
be attributed to effort (Iatridis and Fousiani, 2009). In a
nutshell, if the view that poor school performance of
upper-class students is interpreted as the result of a lack
of effort, its negative implication on school continuation
decisions can be expected to be smaller.

209

Another mechanism that could have an impact is the

information that school results convey to families. Both
good and poor school results send clear messages to
families concerning the likelihood of their children
succeeding at higher stages of the educational system,
while scores in the middle of the distribution might be
more difficult to interpret. When faced with middling
results, families of lower socio-economic standing might
interpret this differently to those of higher standing. In a
scenario of incomplete information, lower-class families
might overestimate the level of selectivity of the next
educational level, undercutting their childs potential
ambition to pursue further education. Formally,
i gai ,k

where k is the perceived threshold in academic performance that has to be met to complete the next educational
level. The subjective probability of future success i will
then depend on the comparison between previous school
performance and k. Some uncertainty about the exact
value of k can, however, be supposed. Students with very
high or low previous performance are less likely to be
influenced by this uncertainty, the former group being
convinced of their ability to surpass the threshold as
opposed to what happens within the latter group. We
can also factor in the idea that upper-class families are
likely to possess a better knowledge about k, given their
own school experience, their higher level of involvement
in their childrens schooling, and their more frequent
interactions with teachers (Lareau, 1987). The crucial
point, then, is whether lower-class families overestimate
or underestimate k. If self-justification strategies are
assumed, one can expect that parents who have not
completed a given level of education will tend to
overestimate k as a way to justify their low educational
achievement.2 To sum up, if high- and low-performing
students are not affected by the uncertainty in k, while
lower-class families tend to overestimate k, then larger
class inequality can be expected among students with
average school performances.

Resources
Differences in resources do not play a key role in the BG
and are mainly conceived as economic resources to meet
the costs of education. Cultural and social resources,
however, in addition to economic ones, might play a
crucial role in compensating the effect of previous failure
or mediocre performance at school. For example,
because of their superior financial and cultural resources,
upper-class families could provide extra support to their
childrens schooling. These families can, for instance, pay
for private tuition or help with homework assistance.

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BERNARDI AND CEBOLLA-BOADO

Additionally, their knowledge of the education system

and their social contacts can also help to identify the
ideal school for their offspring (for example, less selective
institutions with fewer students and special
programmes).
Differences in economic, cultural, and social resources
across social classes would then complement the RRA
mechanism and the micro-psychological mechanism for
rationalization of a previous failure discussed in the
previous section. To summarize, parents of higher socioeconomic standing have great interest in avoiding
downward social mobility and tend to interpret a
previous failure as the result of a lack of effort. They
thus believe that the lack of effort can be compensated
for, and also have the resources to pursue such
compensation.

Summary of Hypotheses
Empirical tests of the BG model have modelled the
effects of motivational factors related to the RRA
mechanism and the effects of observed school performance in an additive manner (Need and de Jong, 2001;
Van de Werfhorst and Hofstede, 2007; Gabay-Egozi,
Shavit and Yaish, 2010). However, our previous discussion of the BG model suggests different mechanisms
that could possibly invalidate the assumption that school
performance and social background effect related to
status maintenance affect transitions in an additive
manner. We call these mechanisms compensatory
effects and incomplete information. These mechanisms
imply an interaction between the parameters modelling
performance and the social background in making actual
choices. In other words, when facing similar school
results, people of different classes might behave differently and, accordingly, make different school continuation choices.
A compensatory effect occurs if the upper-class students
move onto the next educational level (or onto a more
demanding academic track), disregarding low levels of
previous performance. This effect is predicted by the
RRA mechanism. In almost all situations, the fear of
downward mobility for upper-class students will make it
more attractive to continue in school, regardless of their
previous performance and their subjectively estimated
probability of failure. In contrast to upper-class students,
for those of lower socio-economic standing, the BG
model implies that past performance and its impact on
the subjective estimation of the probability of success is a
key parameter in their decision to continue in schooling
or not. Moreover, those of higher standing tend to
interpret school performance in terms of effort instead of
innate ability, thus making school continuation more

likely for this group, despite previous poor school

results. Finally, advantaged students have the social,
cultural, and economic resources to pursue compensation strategies. Figure 1 provides a graphic illustration of
the compensatory effect. The Y-axis refers to the
probability of staying in school, while the X-one refers
to previous performance at school. Figure 1 shows that
the probability for the upper-class group is rather
inelastic to previous performance. This graphically
summarizes our first hypothesis, namely, the compensatory effect, according to which the largest inequality in
the probability of school continuation between classes
should be observed among the low-performing students.
Alternatively, inequality might be higher in the middle
ranks of the range of grades. The specific cause of this is
that whereas good and bad grades send clear messages to
families regarding estimated chances in subsequent stages
of the educational system, scores in the middle of the
distribution are more difficult to interpret. If facing
imperfect information, families of lower standing could
over-estimate k and the level of selectivity of the next
educational level. Figure 2 illustrates this second hypothesis. klower and kupper refer to these perceived
thresholds for those of lower and higher socio-economic
standing, respectively. The probability of the children of
lower-standing families making the transition remains
low until the grades surpass the threshold klower. In
contrast, upper-class families set the threshold at a lower
level, and their probability of making the transition
begins to rise accordingly for a lower value of school
performance. As a consequence, a larger inequality
should be expected for average academic performance.
This summarizes our incomplete information hypothesis.

The French Educational System

In France, compulsory education covers elementary
(ecole elementaire) and lower secondary school (colle`ge)
up to age 16. Throughout this period, the system is
comprehensively organized. Post-compulsory upper secondary education is subsequently divided into three
tracks. The lycee general et technologique (general and
technological upper secondary school) provides general
and abstract training and represents the most straightforward path to university. The lycee professionnel
provides the Brevet detudes professionnelles (BEP) after
2 years. Students on this track can proceed to the
adaptation course (1 year) that bridges to the professional and technical lycee, although this alternative is
scarcely used. The other vocational credential is the
Certificat daptitude professionnelle (CAP), which prepares
the student for a specific occupation and is a direct path

PREVIOUS SCHOOL RESULTS AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Probability of
making the
transition

Upper class

Lower class

Previous grades
Figure 1 Compensatory class effect: inequality is greater
among those with poor grades

Upper class
Probability of
making the
transition

Lower
class

kupper

klower

Previous grades

Figure 2 Incomplete information: inequality is greater for

average grades

to the labour market. This track does not allow the

possibility of a Baccalaureat (BAC) degree.
The selection of students at the end of lower
secondary education onto the academic track (General
or Technological Lycees) or the vocational one (BEP and
CAP) is the critical junction of the French school system.
Previous studies have indeed shown that the outcome of
this educational transition largely conditions the later
opportunities to access university, and that large differences exist between the social classes of origin in the
distribution of students between the academic and
vocational tracks (Merle, 2002).
The tracking of students onto the academic and
vocational tracks is decided during the so-called proce`s
dorientation, which takes place at the end the final year
of colle`ge. After consultation with the families, a class
council formed by teachers and inspectors makes
decisions based on the students previous academic
achievement and the explicit wishes of the families. The

211

students academic achievement is evaluated through a

national examination called Brevet des colle`ges as well as
their school results in the last year of colle`ge. The aim of
the Brevet is to certify the level of academic achievement
at the end of colle`ge, but its results do not formally
condition access to post-compulsory upper education.
The proce`s dorientation was intended to reduce class
bias in the distribution of students across different
tracks (Duru-Bellat and Van Zanten, 1999). However, a
number of studies have shown that the families explicit
preferences are given greater weighting and that this
amplifies social background inequality (Roux and
Davaillon, 2001; Merle, 2002).

Data and Variables

The Panel dEle`ves du Second Degre (19952001) sampled
a cohort of 17,830 students who started lower secondary
school in 1995. The questionnaire de recrutement was
completed in 1995 using administrative files. It includes
basic demographic information, such as sex, place and
date of birth, and nationality. A number of follow-up
questionnaires collected yearly information on academic
progress and school careerssuivi de la scolarite de
lele`ve. At the end of lower secondary schooling (3e`me),
the heads of the schools completed another questionnaire with detailed information concerning grades and
the result of the selective process that links lower and
upper secondary schooling (procedure dorientation). A
follow-up questionnaire a year later allowed the head of
schools to check whether students ultimately dropped
out or accepted the placement proposed at the end of
compulsory schooling.
We have restricted the analysis to students born in
France (N 17,161). The bottom line of Table 1 reports
the loss of cases from the original to the analytical
sample. The sizeable reduction in the number of cases in
the analytic sample (N 12,670) is due to the large
number of observations with missing information on the
grades at the end of lower secondary schooling (Brevet
scores). However, it is reassuring that the distribution of
the primary independent variables (gender and social
class of origin) in Table 1 is very similar in the analytic
sample and in the original sample. Moreover, we
replicated all of the analyses, including an additional
category for those cases with missing values on Brevet.
Our primary finding also turns out to be highly robust
in this larger sample (N 15,741; see online Table A1).
Thus, we are confident that our conclusions, based on
the analytic sample, are reliable.
Our dependent variable is the track that the student
followed in upper secondary school. As we have argued
in the previous section, Table 1 shows that 40 per cent

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BERNARDI AND CEBOLLA-BOADO

Table 1 Descriptive statistics: original sample (students born in France only), sample at the end of lower
secondary education (ninth grade), and analytic sample with valid information on Brevet
End of 3e`me

End of 3e`me
dropout excluded

Analytic
sample

54.1
42.7
3.2

55.9
44.1

61.1
38.9

48.3

48.9

49.2

51.1

14.4
17.3
9.0
3.0
17.9
34.5
2.9
1.0

14.9
17.8
9.2
3.1
17.7
34.2
2.5
0.3

15.0
18.0
9.1
3.1
17.4
34.5
2.3
0.6

16.1
19.2
9.1
3.3
17.0
33.1
1.9
0.6
11.0

Original
sample
Dependent variable
Academic track
Vocational track
Drop-out
Independent variables
Gender (female)
Social class of origin
Upper class
Routine employees, higher grade
Petty-bourgeoisie
Farmer
Routine employees, lower grade
Skilled and unskilled workers
Inactivity
Missing social class
Brevet score (average)
Average Brevet within the
1st tertile of the Brevet distribution
2nd tertile of the Brevet distribution
3rd tertile of the Brevet distribution
Number of observations

17,161

16,265

15,741

8.0
10.9
14.1
12,670

Source: Panel dEle`ves du Second Degre (19952001).

of the students who did not drop out went into

vocational training; in contrast, 60 per cent of the
students opted for the academic track. Our dependent
variable takes the value of 1 if the student proceeds
towards the academic track (Seconde Generale et
Technologique) and 0 if the student chooses any of the
vocational tracks (professional lycee, first-year BEP, or
CAP).
As for our independent variables, we use the average
grades obtained in the Brevet des Colle`ges for
Mathematics and French as the key indicators of
previous school performance. The mean of Brevet
scores can range from 0 to 20. In our sample, the
minimum value is 4, the maximum value is 17, and
the average value is 11. In addition to the continuous
value for the individual average in the Brevet scores, we
have defined three dummy variables that refer to the
distribution of the Brevet scores in tertiles. Thus, an
individual receives a score of 1 on the dummy first
tertile if his/her average in Brevet score in French and
Math falls within the first tertile of the Brevet score
distribution.3 Social class of origin refers to the occupation of the head of the household when the student was
12 years old, and it is coded using the Erikson and

Goldthorpe class scheme with six categories. These are

the upper class (that includes professionals and managers), routine non-manual employees of higher grade,
petty-bourgeoisie (small proprietors with and without
employees), farmers, routine employees of lower grade,
and skilled and unskilled manual workers. In commenting on the results, we focus on the comparison between
the top and the bottom categories, i.e., the upper class
and the skilled and unskilled manual workers, that
together include 50 per cent of the population.
We estimated a number of linear probability models
(LPMs) with robust standard errors and logit models.
The coefficients of the LPM are almost identical to the
average marginal effects of the logit model. The advantage of the LPM over the logit model is not only that the
interpretation of marginal effect of the interactions that
are at the core of our analysis is much more straightforward (Norton, Wang and Ai, 2004) but also that they
help to compare nested non-linear models (Mood,
2010).
We have also conducted a number of robustness
checks that include the following: a different definition
of the dependent variable, considering the preferences
expressed by the families at the beginning of the

PREVIOUS SCHOOL RESULTS AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

213

Table 2 Transition to the academic track in France; linear probability model

Model 1
Gender (Female)
Social class of origin
Upper class (reference)
Routine employees, higher grade
Petty-bourgeoisie
Farmer
Routine employees, lower grade
Skilled and unskilled workers
No activity
Previous school results
Brevet score
Position in the Brevet distribution
1st tertile
2nd tertile (reference)
3rd tertile
Interactions
Routine employees (high)  Brevet
Petty-bourgeoisie  Brevet
Farmer  Brevet
Routine employees (low)  Brevet
Skilled/unskilled worker  Brevet
No activity  Brevet
Routine employees (high)  1st tertile
Petty-bourgeoisie  1st tertile
Farmer  1st tertile
Routine employees (low)  1st tertile
Skilled/unskilled worker  1st tertile
No activity  1st tertile
Routine employees (high)  3rd tertile
Petty-bourgeoisie  3rd tertile
Farmer  3rd tertile
Routine employees (low)  3rd tertile
Skilled/unskilled worker  3rd tertile
No activity  3rd tertile
Constant
N
BIC

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

0.11**

0.04**

0.05**

0.04**

0.05**

0.17**
0.27**
0.30**
0.37**
0.47**
0.60**

0.10**
0.13**
0.22**
0.20**
0.27**
0.33**

0.11**
0.15**
0.24**
0.22**
0.30**
0.37**

0.64**
0.82**
0.93**
0.86**
1.05**
0.99**

0.15**
0.20**
0.33**
0.29**
0.40**
0.56**

0.09**

0.05**
0.39**

0.28**

0.23**

0.08**
0.04**
0.06**
0.07**
0.06**
0.06**
0.03**

0.84**
12,670
15,970

0.29**
12,670
11,737

0.81**
12,670
11,920

0.24**
12,670
11,531

0.15**
0.13**
0.13*
0.12**
0.08*
0.08
0.11**
0.13**
0.24**
0.19**
0.26**
0.30**
0.88**
12,670
11,838

*P < 0.05; **P < 0.01.

Note: The models include a residual category of respondents with missing social class, not shown here.
Source: Panel dEle`ves du Second Degre (19952001).

orientation process instead of the final outcome; a

different treatment of the missing values in the Brevet
scores; a different conceptualization of social background
that also considers the highest level of education among
parents; the inclusion of those who have dropped out of
the education system; the replication of the models using
dummies for quartiles of the brevet distribution instead
of tertiles; and the replication of the results using the
average marginal effects (AME) of a logit model. The
results of these parallel analyses are available in the

supplementary online appendix, and they suggest that

the findings presented in the next section are robust.

Results
In Table 2, we present the results of our LPM models.
The first model includes only social class of origin and
sex. The second model adds school performance as
measured by the average Brevet score. The third model
breaks down the grades into three dummies that

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BERNARDI AND CEBOLLA-BOADO

correspond to tertiles in the distribution of grades (the

middle one being the reference category). In Models 4
and 5, the class of origin interacts with the average Brevet
score and with the tertile dummies.
Model 2 indicates that approximately one-half of the
observed class inequality in Model 1 is due to the
difference in school results. For instance, the coefficient
for the skilled and unskilled workers declines from 0.47
to 0.27 (a reduction of 43 per cent) once the Brevet is
controlled for.4 The only exceptions are farmers, for
whom the reduction is somewhat smaller (from 0.30 to
0.22, i.e., a reduction of 27 percentage points).
Model 3 specifies school results as dummy variables
that refer to the tertile distribution. The estimates for
social class are very close to the estimates of Model 2.
Next, in Model 4, we add the interaction effects between
the Brevet score and the dummies for social class. These
interaction effects are positive and statistically significant.
This result indicates that inequality, with respect to the
service class, is largest among the worst achievers and
becomes progressively smaller as the values of the mean
Brevet increase. This finding is in line with the hypothesis of a compensatory class effect discussed in the
second section. However, the specification of the mean
Brevet as a continuous variable in Model 4 does not
allow testing for non-linearity in the class-specific impact
of previous school results. For this reason, Model 5
breaks down the grade distribution into tertiles, and it
checks for non-linearity in the class-specific influence of
grades on the type of transition made in upper
secondary school.
With respect to the service class, the effects of the
social class dummies in Model 5 express the disadvantage
among those with middling academic performance (that
is, among those with a mean Brevet in the second tertile).
Thus, for a male student from an upper-class family with
a Brevet score within the range of the second tertile, the
probability of choosing the academic track is 88 per cent
(i.e., the constant term). For a male student from a
working-class background in the second tertile, the same
probability is 48 per cent (8840). Following on, the
interaction effects between the social-class dummies and
the dummies for the tertile distribution of Brevet are
negative in the case of the first tertile and positive in the
case of the third tertile. These results suggest that the
class inequality observed for the second tertile increases
among the worst-performing students and decreases
among the best-performing. The same pattern is observed
for other social classes. Thus, no support is found for the
incomplete information hypothesis that would suggest a
larger inequality in the middle of the grade distribution.
If that were the case, one would also observe positive
interaction effects for the first tertile.

Finally, very similar conclusions are drawn if one

focuses on the predicted probabilities for different
combinations of the class of origin and school results
using a logit model (Table 3). For all social classes, the
largest gap compared with service-class students is
observed among the worst-performing students (i.e.,
those in the first tertile). The gap progressively reduces
for the students in the second tertile, and it almost
disappears among the best-performing students. The
pattern is particularly accentuated for students coming
from white-collar or self-employed families.

Conclusions
We are now in a position to answer our initial research
question: do grades affect educational transitions differently depending on social background? The answer is a
clear yes. The results presented in the previous section
suggest that when compared with students of other
social origins, upper-class students in France are less
affected by previous school performance in choosing the
academic track or vocational track. In particular, upperclass students with below-average grades have a higher
probability of taking the academic track than students
with similar grades from other social classes. As a
consequence, the largest class inequality is concentrated
among students with previously poor academic performance. Among students of higher socio-economic standing
with below-average results, almost two in three students
(60 per cent) move onto the academic track, whereas the
same is true of only one in five students (20 per cent)
whose parents are routine employees of low grade or one
in seven (15 per cent) students whose parents are
manual workers (Table 3). The difference between social
classes is much smaller among high-performing students.
Thus, we find evidence of a compensatory class effect,
while not finding support for the incomplete information hypothesis, which suggests that inequality should be
larger in the middle of the distribution of school results.
The observed compensatory class effect is in line with
the prediction of the BG model. As highlighted by Lucas
(2009), the RRA mechanism implies that for most of the
students of higher socio-economic standing, the subjective probability of success proves irrelevant for their
school continuation decision, while it is a key parameter
in the choice of middle- and lower-class students.
In addition to the motivational factor explained by the
RRA mechanism, the two other mechanisms that are
part of the BG model might also contribute to the
emergence of a compensatory class effect. First, social
classes apparently differ in the way they interpret school
performance and infer expected probability of success,
attributing different weighting to effort and ability as

PREVIOUS SCHOOL RESULTS AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

215

Table 3 Predicted probability of probabilities of the transition to the academic track in France, by previous
school results and class of origin logit model

Upper class
Routine employees, higher grade
Petty-bourgeoisie
Farmer
Routine employees, lower grade
Skilled and unskilled workers

Brevet score in the . . .

First tertile

Second tertile

Third tertile

0.63
0.34
0.29
0.19
0.21
0.15

0.91
0.76
0.71
0.58
0.61
0.51

0.98
0.94
0.93
0.88
0.90
0.85

[0.590.67]
[0.320.37]
[0.260.32]
[0.150.22]
[0.190.23]
[0.140.16]

[0.900.93]
[0.730.78]
[0.670.74]
[0.520.64]
[0.590.64]
[0.490.53]

[0.980.99]
[0.940.95]
[0.920.94]
[0.850.91]
[0.880.91]
[0.830.87]

Confidence intervals in squared brackets.

Source: Panel dEle`ves du Second Degre (19952001).

causes of school results. Recent experimental evidence

suggests that failure of upper-class students tends to be
interpreted as a consequence of poor effort, whereas the
failure of working-class students is perceived as an
indicator of low ability (Iatridis and Fousiani, 2009). The
crux of the argument is that whereas it is possible to
change and increase the level of effort, an increase in
performance is more complicated (if at all possible) in
the case of ability. Second, upper-class families have the
economic, social, and cultural resources to correct for
previous academic failure and improve the efforts of
their children.
To conclude, we have three final remarks on how
common the French compensatory class effect might be,
its applicability to other research problems, and its
implications for the empirical test of the BG model and
the somewhat related area of research on primary and
secondary effects.
First, we suspect that the compensatory class effect
found at the end of lower secondary school in France is
rather pervasive and similarly applicable to other educational transitions in other countries. Indeed, there is
sparse evidence that appears to support this claim. For
instance, a larger social background inequality in the
decision to continue in schooling among low-performing
students is observed in disparate and polar contexts,
such as the Soviet Unions Leningrad in the late 60s
(Yanowitch, 1977: p. 65) and the United States in the
late 70s (Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; Figure 2.7: p.
108). However, the last word on this issue can only be
offered when systematic replications have been performed in different countries. In this respect, we would
expect that the compensatory effect is larger for those
educational transitions whose outcomes entail higher risk
of social downward mobility. Therefore, the compensatory effect is possibly more relevant at earlier educational
junctions, when compared with choices about tertiary
education. Moreover, we would expect that it is smaller

for those educational transitions that are more strictly

regulated and formally dependent on previous educational performance. To put it another way, the compensatory effect will be larger in those educational
systems and for those educational transitions that allow
more space for manoeuvre to families. This latter
expectation goes, however, with the caveat that even
where progress in education is most formally regulated,
the crucial idea underlying the compensatory effect is
that those of higher socio-economic standing will find
other channels to compensate a previous failure, and
effectively maintain their advantage (Lucas, 2001).5 For
instance, they might disproportionately take advantage of
second-opportunity education or recur to schooling
abroad.
Second, we believe that the compensatory effect does
not apply solely to the interplay between previous grades
and school continuation decisions. It can naturally be
generalized to other situations, such as the consequences
of retention in those educational systems where retaking
is common, or to placement in a less prestigious
educational setting in a tracked system. There is evidence
demonstrating that the negative consequences of retention are smaller (Gambetta, 1987: pp. 121122) and that
movements from less to more prestigious tracks are
more common for students from more advantaged
backgrounds (Jacob and Tieben, 2009; Tables 3 and 4).
The compensatory effect can also manifest itself outside
the educational system. In its most general formulation,
the effect would state that whenever a problematic event
occurs, its negative implications will be much more
limited for those of the upper class. Poor grades are the
specific case studied in this article, but the compensatory
effect could also be relevant for other events known to
have negative consequences for the educational and
occupational outcome of an individual, such as juvenile
arrest, early pregnancy, or parental divorce. The compensatory class effect, thus, depicts a general mechanism

216

BERNARDI AND CEBOLLA-BOADO

that potentially underlies the making of social inequality

in many dimensions over life course.6
Finally, the existence of an interaction between social
background and school performance or, less technically,
the fact that social classes respond differently to previous
school performance in their school continuation decision
has important implications for empirical tests of the BG
model and the related area of research on primary and
secondary effects. Various studies have confirmed the
behavioural predictions of this rational choice model of
education; however, the (relatively) few studies that have
directly investigated motivational mechanisms find less
consistent results, particularly with regard to the social
demotion avoidance mechanism (Need and de Jong,
2001; Stocke, 2007; van de Werfhorst and Hofstede, 2007;
Gabay-Egozi, Shavit and Yaish, 2010). However, these
articles have modelled the effects of motivational factors
related to the RRA mechanism and subjective probability
of success (or observed school performance) in an
additive manner. Because the elasticity of grades varies
by social class and because service-class students in
particular are largely unaffected by previous performance
in their school continuation decision (as actually predicted by the RRA mechanism), these tests might be
somewhat off target. The same applies to those recent
studies that have investigated the primary and secondary
effects as additive effects and, once controlled for
previous school performance, interpret the effect of
social background as secondary effects (Cebolla-Boado,
2011; Schindler and Lorz, 2012; Barg, 2013). If, as our
findings appear to suggest, secondary effects are primarily
concentrated among students with below-average performance, then an additive specification might produce
biased estimates. We hope that our research might make
other researchers more aware of the fact that social classes
do not apparently respond in the same way to previous
school performance in their school continuation decision.

Notes
1
2

There is no space here to develop the formal

demonstration, but see Lucas (2009: pp. 482483).
Research on risk perception indeed suggests that
people tend to exaggerate risks that are new or
unfamiliar (Slovic, 2000). That would be the case
for the risk of failure at the next educational level
for those parents who have not attended it.
The cutoff points for the first tertile are 1 and 9.7,
for the second tertile 9.7 and 12, and for the third
tertile 12 and 19.5. These cutoff points are based on

the sample distribution of the average scores on

Brevet. The three tertiles, however, almost perfectly
overlap with three broad categories that have a
clearer meaningful interpretation. A score <10 is
considered insufficient, 1012/20 is considered fair,
and >12 is considered satisfactory or good. We have
replicated the analysis also using these more substantive criteria for the definition of the categories
and the results (available on request) do not change.
A similar result for the cohort of students who
started lower secondary education in 1995 is also
reported by Ichou and Vallet (2013). Using different
decomposition techniques, they find that about onehalf of the observed inequality in the transition to
post-compulsory education between upper- and
working-class pupils is due to differences in previous academic performance.
On a theoretical level, the compensatory class effect
discussed in this article can thus be fruitfully framed
at the interconnection between the BG and effectively maintained inequality (EMI) models. Lucas
(2009: p. 506) makes the case that the two theories
are complementary. We also believe that focusing
on how social classes react to a previous educational
failure provides an advantageous perspective to
integrate the two theories and to understand classbased strategies to maintain and reproduce inequality. Draconian word limits prevent us from further
elaborating on this point.
However, a negative event does not randomly occur.
This posits a serious problem of endogeneity for the
study of the compensatory effect as defined in this
article. See Morgan (2012) for a discussion and
Bernardi (2012) for an attempt to address empirically this problem.

Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at ESR online.

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