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Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

Free Agency
Author(s): Gary Watson
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 8 (Apr. 24, 1975), pp. 205-220
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024703
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THE JOURNALOF PHILOSOPHY


VOLUME

IN

LXXII, NO. 8, APRIL 24, I975

FREE AGENCY *

thisessayI discussa distinction


thatis crucialto a correct
accountof freeactionand to an adequateconceptionof humanmotivation
and responsibility.
I

a personis freeto
According
to one familiarconception
offreedom,
theextentthathe is able to do or get whathe wants.To circumscribea person'sfreedomis to contractthe rangeof thingshe is
able to do. I thinkthat,suitablyqualified,thisaccountis correct,
and thatthechiefand mostinteresting
usesoftheword'free'can be
explicatedin its terms.But thisgeneralline has been resistedon
a numberof different
objecgrounds.One of the mostimportant
in
I
this
paper-is
tions-and theone uponwhich shallconcentrate
thatthisfamiliarviewis too impoverished
to handletalkof free
actionsandfreewill.
Frequently
enough,we say,or areinclinedto say,thata personis
notin controlofhisownactions,thathe is nota "freeagent"with
Possible
respectto them,even thoughhis behavioris intentional.
examplesof thissortof actionincludethosewhichare explained
byaddictions,
manias,and phobiasofvarioussorts.But theconcept
of freeactionwouldseemto be pleonasticon theanalysisof freedomin termsof theabilityto getwhatone wants.For if a person
doessomething
intentionally,
thensurelyhe wasable at thattimeto
do it. Hence,on thisanalysis,he was freeto do it. The familiar
accountwould not seem to allow for any furtherquestions,as
thisacfaras freedom
is concerned,
abouttheaction.Accordingly,
countwouldseemto embodya conflation
offreeactionand intentionalaction.
* I have profited
fromdiscussions
students,
colleagues,
withnumerousfriends,
and otheraudiences,on the materialof thisessay;I would like to thankthem
collectively.
However,specialthanksare due to JoelFeinberg,HarryFrankfurt,
and Thomas Nagel.

205

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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Philosophers who have defended some form of compatibilism


have usually given this analysisof freedom,with the aim of showare not reallyincompatiblewith
ing thatfreedomand responsibility
determinism.Some critics have rejected compatibilismprecisely
because of its association with this familiar account of freedom.
is true,
For instance,Isaiah Berlin asks: if determinism
responsi... whatreasonscanyou,in principle,
adduceforattributing
moralrulesto [people]whichyouwouldnotthinkit
bilityor applying
choosers-kleptomaniacs,
reasonableto applyin thecaseofcompulsive
and thelike?1
dipsomaniacs,
The idea is that the sense in whichactionswould be freein a deterministicworld allows the actions of "compulsive choosers" to be
free.To avoid thisconsequence,it is oftensuggested,we mustadopt
some sortof "contracausal"viewof freedom.
Now, thoughcompatibilistsfromHobbes to J. J. C. Smarthave
given the relevantmoral and psychologicalconceptsan exceedingly
crude treatment,this crudityis not inherentin compatibilism,nor
does it result fromthe adoption of the conceptionof freedomin
termsof the ability to get what one wants. For the differencebetween free and unfree actions-as we normally discern it-has
nothingat all to do with the truthor falsityof determinism.
In the subsequentpages, I want to develop a distinctionbetween
wantingand valuing whichwill enable the familiarview of freedom
to make sense of the notion of an unfreeaction. The contention
will be that, in the case of actions that are unfree,the agent is
unable to get what he most wants,or values, and this inabilityis
due to his own "motivationalsystem."In this case the obstruction
to the action that he most wants to do is his own will. It is in this
respectthat the action is unfree: the agent is obstructedin and by
of theaction.
theveryperformance
I do not conceivemy remarksto be a defenseof compatibilism.
This point of view may be unacceptable for various reasons,some
of whichcall into question the coherenceof the conceptof responsibility.But thesereasonsdo not include the factthat compatibilism
reliesupon the conceptionof freedomin termsof the abilityto get
what one wants, nor must it conflatefree action and intentional
action. If compatibilismis to be shownto be wrong,its criticsmust
go deeper.
if

What mustbe trueof people if thereis to be a significantnotion of


free action? Our talk of free action arises from the apparent fact
1

Four Essays on Liberty (New York: Oxford, 1969), pp. xx-xxi.

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207

thatwhat a personmostwantsmay not be what he is finallymoved


to get. It followsfromthis apparent fact that the extent to which
one wants somethingis not determinedsolely by the strengthof
one's desires (or "motives") as measured by their effectiveness
in
action. One (perhaps trivial)measure of the strengthof the desire
or want is thatthe agentacts upon thatdesireor want (trivial,since
it will be nonexplanatoryto say that an agent acted upon that
desire because it was the strongest).But, if what one most wants
may not be what one most stronglywants,by this measure, then
in whatsensecan it be truethatone mostwantsit?2
To answerthisquestion,one mightbegin by contrasting,
at least
in a crude way, a humean with a platonic conceptionof practical
reasoning. The ancients distinguishedbetween the rational and
the irrational parts of the soul, between Reason and Appetite.
Hume employed a superficiallysimilar distinction.It is important
to understand,however,that (for Plato at least) the rational part
of the soul is not to be identifiedwithwhat Hume called "Reason"
and contradistinguished
fromthe "Passions." On Hume's account,
Reason is not a source of motivation,but a facultyof determining
what is true and what is false, a facultyconcerned solely with
"mattersof fact" and "relations among ideas." It is completely
dumb on the question of what to do. Perhaps Hume could allow
Reason this much practical voice: given an initial set of wants
and beliefs about what is or is likely to be the case, particular
desires are generated in the process. In other words, a humean
mightallow Reason a crucial role in deliberation.But its essential
role would not be to supply motivation-Reason is not that kind
of thing-but ratherto calculate, within a contextof desires and
ends, how to fulfillthose desires and serve those ends. For Plato,
however,the rational part of the soul is not some kind of inference
mechanism.It is itselfa source of motivation.In general form,the
desiresof Reason are desiresfor "the Good."
Perhaps the contrastcan be illustratedby some elementarynotionsfromdecision theory.On the Bayesian model of deliberation,
a preferencescale is imposed upon various states of affairscontingentupon courses of action open to the agent. Each state of
affairscan be assigned a numericalvalue (initial value) according
to itsplace on the scale; given thisassignment,and the probabilities
2I am goingto use 'want'and 'desire'in theveryinclusivesensenow familiar
in philosophy,wherebyvirtuallyany motivationalfactorthat may figurein
the explanationof intentional
actionis a want;'desire'will be used mainlyin
connection
withtheappetitesand passions.

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thatthosestatesof affairswill obtain if the actionsare performed,a


finalnumericalvalue (expected desirability)can be assigned to the
actions themselves.The rational agent performsthe action with
thehighestexpecteddesirability.
In these terms,on the humean picture, Reason is the faculty
that computes probabilitiesand expected desirabilities.Reason is
in this sense neutral with respect to actions, for it can operate
equally on any given assignmentof initial values and probabilities
-it has nothingwhatsoeverto say about the assignmentof initial
values. On the platonic picture,however,the rational part of the
soul itself determineswhat has value and how much, and thus
is responsibleforthe originalrankingof alternativestatesof affairs.
It may appear that the differencebetween these conceptionsis
as to what is to be called "Reason" or "rational,"
merelya difference
and hence is not a substantivedifference.In speaking of Reason,
Hume has in mind a sharp contrastbetween what is wanted
and what is thoughtto be the case. What contrastis implicit in
the platonic view that the ranking of alternativestates of affairs
is the task of the rational part of the soul?
The contrasthere is not trivial; the differencein classificatory
schemes reflectsdifferentviews of human psychology.For one
thing,in sayingthis (or what is tantamountto this) Plato was calling attentionto the fact that it is one thing to think a state of
affairsgood, worth while, or worthyof promotion,and another
simply to desire or want that state of affairsto obtain. Since the
notion of value is tied to (cannot be understoodindependentlyof)
thoseof the good and worthy,it is one thingto value (thinkgood)
a state of affairsand another to desire that it obtain. However, to
thinka thinggood is at thesame timeto desireit (or its promotion).
Reason is thus an original spring of action. It is because valuing
is essentiallyrelated to thinkingor judging good that it is appropriate to speak of the wants that are (or perhaps arise from)
evaluations as belonging to, or originatingin, the rational (that
is, judging) part of the soul; values provide reasons for action.
The contrastis with desires,whose objects may not be thought
good and which are thus, in a natural sense, blind or irrational.
Desires are mute on the question of what is good.8
8To quote just one of manysuggestive
passages:"We must. . . observethat
withineach one of us thereare twosortsof rulingor guidingprinciplethatwe
follow.One is an innatedesireforpleasure,theotheran acquiredjudgmentthat
aims at whatis best.Sometimestheseinternalguidesare in accord,sometimes
at variance;now one gains the mastery,
now the other.And when judgment
guidesus rationallytowardwhatis best,and has the mastery,
thatmasteryis

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209

Now it seemsto me that-given the view of freedomas the ability


to get what one wants-there can be a problemof freeaction only if
theplatonicconceptionof thesoul is (roughly)correct.The doctrine
I shall defendis platonic in the sense that it involvesa distinction
betweenvaluing and desiringwhich depends upon therebeing independent sources of motivation. No doubt Plato meant considerablymore than this by his parts-of-the-soul
doctrine; but he
meant at least this. The platonic conception provides an answer
to the question I posed earlier (207): in what sense can what one
most wants differfrom that which is the object of the strongest
desire?The answer is that the phrase 'what one most wants' may
mean either "the object of the strongestdesire" or "what one
mostvalues." This phrase can be interpretedin termsof strengthor
in termsof rankingorderor preference.The problemof freeaction
arises because what one desires may not be what one values, and
what one mostvalues may not be what one is finallymoved to get.4
The tacit identificationof desiringor wantingwith valuing is so
common5 that it is necessaryto cite some examples of this distinction in order to illustratehow evaluation and desire may diverge.
There seem to be twowaysin which,in principle,a discrepancymay
arise. First,it is possible that what one desiresis not to any degree
called temperance,
but whendesiredragsus irrationally
towardpleasure,and
has come to rule withinus, the name given to that rule is wantonness"
(Phaedrus,237e-238e;Hackforth
trans.).
For a fascinating
discussionof Plato's parts-of-the-soul
doctrine,see Terry
Penner's"Thoughtand Desirein Plato,"in GregoryVlastos,ed., Plato: A Collectionof CriticalEssays,vol. xI, (New York: Anchor,1971).As I see it (and
hereI have beeninfluenced
byPenner'sarticle),thedistinction
I have attributed
to Plato was meantby him to be a solutionto the socraticproblemof akrasia.
I would argue that thisdistinction,
thoughnecessary,
is insufficient
for the
task,becauseit does not markthe difference
between("mere")incontinence
or
weaknessof will and psychological
compulsion.This difference
requiresa careful examinationof the variousthingsthatmightbe meantin speakingof the
strength
ofa desire.
4 Here I shall not press the rational/nonrational
contrastany furtherthan
this,thoughPlatowouldhavewishedto pressit further.
However,one important
and anti-Humeanimplicationof the minimaldistinction
is this: it is not the
case that,if a persondesiresto do X, he therefore
has (or even regardshimself
as having)a reasonto do X.
5 For example,I take my remarksto be incompatible
with the characterizationof value R. B. Perrygivesin GeneralTheoryof Value (Cambridge,
Mass.:
HIarvard,
1950).In ch. v, Perrywrites:"This, then,we take to be the original
sourceand constantfeatureof all value. That whichis an objectof interestis
eo ipso investedwithvalue."And 'interest'is characterized
in thefollowing
way:
". . . likingand disliking,
desireand aversion,will and refusal,or seekingand
avoiding.It is to this all-pervasivecharacteristic
of the motor-affective
life,
this-state, act, attitude or disposition of favor of disfavor,to which we propose

to givethenameof'interest'."

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valued, held to be worthwhile, or thoughtgood; one assigns no


value whatever to the object of one's desire. Second, although
one may indeed value what is desired,the strengthof one's desire
may not properly reflect the degree to which one values its
object; that is, although the object of a desire is valuable, it may
not be deemed the most valuable in the situation and yet one's
desireforit may be strongerthan the want forwhat is mostvalued.
The cases in which one in no way values what one desires are
perhaps rare, but surelytheyexist. Consider the case of a woman
who has a sudden urge to drownher bawling child in the bath; or
the case of a squash player who, while sufferingan ignominious
defeat,desiresto smash his opponent in the face with the racquet.
It is just false that the mothervalues her child's being drownedor
that the player values the injury and sufferingof his opponent.
But theydesire thesethingsnonetheless.They desire them in spite
of themselves.It is not that theyassign to these actions an initial
value which is then outweighed by other considerations.These
activities are not even representedby a positive entry,however
small, on the initial "desirabilitymatrix."
It may seem fromthese examples that this firstand radical sort
of divergencebetweendesiringand valuing occursonly in the case
of momentaryand inexplicable urges or impulses. Yet I see no
conclusive reason why a person could not be similarlyestranged
froma ratherpersistentand pervasivedesire,and one that is explicable enough. Imagine a man who thinkshis sexual inclinations
are the work of the devil, that the very fact that he has sexual
inclinations bespeaks his corrupt nature. This example is to be
contrastedwith that of the celibate who decides that the most fulfillinglife forhim will be one of abstinence.In thislattercase, one
of the thingsthat receive considerationin the processof reaching
his all-things-considered
judgment is the value of sexual activity.
There is something,fromhis point of view, to be said for sex, but
thereis more to be said in favorof celibacy.In contrast,the man
who is estrangedfromhis sexual inclinationsdoes not acknowledge
even a prima facie reason for sexual activity;that he is sexually
inclined toward certain activitiesis not even a consideration.Another way of illustratingthe differenceis to say that,for the one
man, forgoingsexual relationshipsconstitutesa loss, even if negligible compared with the gains of celibacy; whereas from the
standpointof the other person,no loss is sustainedat all.
Now, it mustbe admitted,any desiremay provide the basis fora
reason insofaras nonsatisfactionof the desire causes sufferingand

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211

hinders the pursuit of ends of the agent. But it is importantto


notice that the reason generatedin thisway by a desire is a reason
forgettingrid of the desire,and one may get rid of a desire either
by satisfyingit or by eliminating it in some other manner (by
tranquilizers,or cold showers). Hence this kind of reason differs
importantlyfrom the reasons based upon the evaluation of the
activitiesor states of affairsin question. For, in the formercase,
attaining the object of desire is simply a means of eliminating
discomfortor agitation,whereasin the lattercase that attainment
is the end itself.Normally,in the pursuit of the objects of our
wants we are not attemptingchieflyto relieve ourselves.We aim
to satisfy,
not just eliminate,desire.
Nevertheless,aside fromtransitory
impulses,it may be that cases
wlhereinnothingat all can be said in favorof the object of one's
desire are rare. For it would seem that even the person who conceives his sexual desiresto be essentiallyevil would have to admit
that indulgence would be pleasurable, and surely that is something. (Perhaps not even this should be admitted.For indulgence
may not yield pleasure at all in a contextof anxiety.Furthermore,
it is not obvious that pleasure is intrinsicallygood, independently
of the worthof the pleasurable object.) In any case, the second sort
of divergencebetweenevaluation and desire remains:it is possible
that,in a particularcontext,what one wants most stronglyis not
whatone mostvalues.
The distinctionbetweenvaluing and desiringis not, it is crucial
to see, a distinctionamong desires or wants according to their
content. That is to say, there is nothing in the specificationof
theobjectsof an agent'sdesiresthatsinglesout some wantsas based
upon that agent'svalues. The distinctionin question has ratherto
do with thesource of the want or withits role in the total "system"
of the agent's desires and ends. It has to do with why the agent
wantswhathe does.
Obviously, to identifya desire or want simply in termsof its
contentis not to identifyits source(s). It does not followfrommy
wantingto eat that I am hungry.I may want to eat because I want
to be well-nourished;or because I am hungry;or because eating
is a pleasant activity.This singledesiremayhave threeindependent
sources.(These sourcesmay not be altogetherindependent.It may
be that eating is pleasurable only because I have appetites for
food.) Some specificationsof wants or desires-for instance, as
cravings-pick out (at least roughly)the sourceof the motivation.
It is an essential featureof the appetites and the passions that

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theyengender(or consistin) desireswhoseexistenceand persistence


are independentof the person'sjudgment of the good. The appetiteof hungerinvolvesa desireto eat whichhas a sourcein physical
needs and physiologicalstatesof the hungryorganism.And emotions such as anger and fear partlyconsistin spontaneousinclinations to do various things-to attack or to flee the object of one's
emotion,for example. It is intrinsicto the appetitesand passions
that appetitiveand passionate beings can be motivatedin spite of
themselves.It is because desiressuch as thesearise independentlyof
the person'sjudgmentand values thatthe ancientslocated the emotions and passions in the irrational part of the soul; 6 and it is
because of this sort of independence that a conflict between
valuing and desiringis possible.7
These points may suggestan inordinatelydualistic view according to which persons are split into inevitablyalien, if not always
antagonistic,halves. But this view does not follow fromwhat has
been said. As centralas it is to human life, it is not often noted
that some activitiesare valued only to the extent that they are
objects of the appetites. This means that such activities would
never be regardedas valuable constituentsof one's life were it not
for one's susceptibilityto "blind" motivation-motivation independent of one's values. Sexual activityand eating are again examples. We may value the activityof eating to the degree that it
provides nourishment.But we may also value it because it is
an enjoyable activity,even though its having this status depends
upon our appetites for food, our hunger. In the case of sex, in
fact, if we were not erotic creatures,certain activitieswould not
only lose theirvalue to us, theymightnot even be physiologically
possible.
These examples indicate,not that thereis no distinctionbetween
desiring and valuing, but that the value placed upon certain
of desires that
activitiesdepends upon their being the fulfillment
arise and persistindependentlyof what we value. So it is not that,
when we value the activityof eating,we thinkthereare reasons to
eat no matterwhat other desireswe have; rather,we value eating
when food appeals to us; and, likewise,we value sexual relation8 Notice that most emotions differfrompassions like lust in that they involve
beliefs and some sort of valuation (cf. resentment).This may be the basis for
Plato's positing a third part of the soul which is in a way partly rationalviz. Thumos.
7 To be sure, one may attempt to cultivate or eliminate certain appetites and
passions,so that the desires that result may be in this way dependent upon one's
evaluations. Even so, the resulting desires will be such that they can persist
independentlyof one's values. It is rather like jumping froman airplane.

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2I3

shipswhen we are aroused. Here an essentialpart of the contentof


our evaluation is that the activityin question be motivatedby certain appetites.These activitiesmay have value for us only insofar
as they are appetitivelymotivated, even though to have these
appetitesis not ipso factoto value theirobjects.
Part of what it means to value some activitiesin thisway is this:
we judge that to cease to have such appetitesis to lose something
of worth.The judgment here is not merelythat, if someone has
these appetites,it is worth while (ceterisparibus) for him to indulge them.The judgmentis ratherthat it is of value to have and
(having them) to indulge these appetites. The formerjudgment
does not account forthe eunuch's loss or sorrow,whereasthe latter
does. And the latterjudgmentlies at the bottomof the discomfort
one may feel when one envisagesa situationin which,say,hunger
is consistentlyeliminated and nourishmentprovided by insipid
capsules.
It would be impossible for a non-eroticbeing or a person who
lacked the appetite for food and drink fully to understand the
value most of us attach to sex and to dining. Sexual activitymust
strikethe non-eroticbeing as perfectlygrotesque.(Perhaps that is
whylust is sometimessaid to be disgustingand sinfulin the eyes of
God.) Or consider an appetite that is in fact "unnatural" (i.e.,
acquired): the craving for tobacco. To a person who has never
known the enticementof Lady Nicotine, what could be more
incomprehensiblethan the filthypractice of consummatinga fine
meal by drawinginto one's lungs the noxious fumesof a burning
weed?
Thus, the relationshipbetweenevaluation and motivationis intricate.With respectto many of our activities,evaluation depends
upon the possibilityof our being moved to act independentlyof
our judgment.So thedistinctionI have been pressing-thatbetween
desiringand valuing-does not commitone to an inevitable split
between Reason and Appetite. Appetitivelymotivated activities
aspectsof his
maywell constitutefora personthe mostworth-while
life.8But the distinctiondoes commitus to the possibilityof such
a split. If there are sources of motivation independent of the
agent'svalues, then it is possible that sometimeshe is motivatedto
do thingshe does not deem worthdoing. This possibilityis the basis
forthe principalproblemof freeaction: a personmaybe obstructed
by his own will.
8 It is reported that H. G. Wells regarded the most important themes of his
life to have been (1) the attainmentof a World Society,and (2) sex.

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A related possibilitythat presentsconsiderableproblemsfor the


understandingof freeagencyis this: some desires,when theyarise,
what appear to be the agent's evaluations,
may "color" or influience
but only temporarily.That is, when and only when he has the
desire,is he inclined to thinkor say that what is desiredor wanted
is worthwhile or good. This possibilityis to be distinguishedfrom
another,accordingto which one thinksit worthwhile to eat when
one is hungryor to engage in sexual activitywhen one is so inclined.
For one maythinkthiseven on the occasionswhen the appetitesare
silent. The possibilityI have in mind is rather that what one is
disposed to say or judge is temporarilyaffectedby the presenceof
the desirein such a way that,both beforeand afterthe "onslaught"
of the desire, one judges that the desire's object is worth pursuing (in the circumstances)whetheror not one has the desire. In
this case one is likely,in a cool moment,to think it a matterfor
regretthatone had been so influencedand to thinkthatone should
guard against desiresthat have this property.In othercases it may
not be the desire itselfthat affectsone's judgment,but the set of
conditions in which those desires arise-e.g., the conditions induced by drugs or alcohol. (It is noteworthythat we say: "under
the influenceof alcohol.") Perhaps judgments made in such cirIn any event,this
cumstancesare oftenin some sense self-deceptive.
phenomenonraises problemsabout the identificationof a person's
values.
Despite our examples,it would be mistakento conclude that the
only desires that exhibit an independence of evaluation are
appetitiveor passionate desires.In Freudian terms,one may be as
dissociated from the demands of the super-egoas from those of
the id. One maybe disinclinedto move away fromone's family,the
thoughtof doing so being accompanied by compunction;and yet
this disinclination may rest solely upon acculturation rather
perthan upon a currentjudgmentof what one is to do, reflecting
Or,
taking
and
interests.
haps an assessmentof one's "duties"
another example, one may have been habituated to think that
divorceis to be avoided in all cases,so that the aversionto divorce
persistseven thoughone sees no justificationformaintainingone's
marriage.In both of these cases, the attitudehas its basis solely in
acculturationand existsindependentlyof the agent'sjudgment.For
this reason, acculturateddesiresare irrational(better:nonrational)
in the same sense as appetitive and passionate desires. In fact,
despite the inhibitionsacquired in the courseof a puritanup-bringing, a person may deem the pursuitof sexual pleasure to be worth

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2I5

while, his judgment siding with the id ratherthan the super-ego.


Acculturatedattitudesmay seem more akin to evaluation than to
appetite in that they are often expressed in evaluative language
("divorce is wicked") and result in feelingsof guilt when one's
with them.But, since conflictis posactions are not in conformity
sible here, to want somethingas a result of acculturationis not
therebyto value it,in thesenseof 'to value' thatwe want to capture.
It is not easy to give a nontrivialaccountof the sense of 'to value'
in question. In part, to value somethingis, in the appropriate
circumstances,to want it, and to attributea want for something
to someone is to say that he is disposed to tryto get it. So it will
not be easy to draw thisdistinctionin behavioralterms.Apparently
the differencewill have to do with the agent's attitudetoward the
various thingshe is disposed to tryto get. We mightsay that an
agent'svalues consistin those principlesand ends which he-in a
cool and non-self-deceptive
moment-articulatesas definitiveof the
good, fulfilling,and defensiblelife. That most people have articulate "conceptionsof the good," coherentlife-plans,systemsof ends,
and so on, is of course somethingof a fiction.Yet we all have
more or less long-termaims and normativeprinciplesthat we are
willingto defend.It is such thingsas thesethat are to be identified
withour values.
The valuational systemof an agent is that set of considerations
which, when combined with his factual beliefs (and probability
estimates),yields judgmentsof the form: the thing for me to do
in these circumstances,all thingsconsidered,is a. To ascribe free
agency to a being presupposesit to be a being that makes judgmentsof this sort.To be thissortof being, one must assign values
to alternativestatesof affairs,that is, rank themin termsof worth.
The motivationalsystemof an agent is that set of considerations
which move him to action. We identifyhis motivational system
what motivateshim. The possibilityof unfreeaction
by identifying
consistsin the fact that an agent's valuational systemand motivational systemmaynot completelycoincide.Those systemsharmonize
to the extentthat what determinesthe agent's all-things-considered
judgmentsalso determineshis actions.
Now, to be sure,since to value is also to want,one's valuational
and motivational systemsmust to a large extent overlap. If, in
appropriate circumstances,one were never inclined to action by
some alleged evaluation, the claim that that was indeed one's
evaluation would be disconfirmed.Thus one's valuational system

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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

must have some (considerable) grip upon one's motivationalsystem.The problemis that thereare motivationalfactorsother than
valuational ones. The free agent has the capacity to translatehis
values into action; his actionsflowfromhis evaluational system.
One's evaluational systemmay be said to constituteone's standpoint, the point of view from which one judges the world. The
importantfeatureof one's evaluational systemis that one cannot
coherentlydissociate oneself from it in its entirety.For to dissociate oneself from the ends and principlesthat constituteone's
evaluational system is to disclaim or repudiate them, and any
ends and principles so disclaimed (self-deceptionaside) cease to
be constitutiveof one's valuational system.One can dissociateoneselffromone set of ends and principlesonly fromthe standpointof
another such set that one does not disclaim. In short,one cannot
dissociateoneselffromall normativejudgmentswithoutforfeiting
all standpointsand therewithone's identityas an agent.
Of course,it does not followfromthe fact that one must assume
some standpointthatone musthave only one, nor thatone's standpoint is completelydeterminate.There may be ultimate conflicts,
irresolvabletensions,and thingsabout which one simplydoes not
know what to do or say. Some of these possibilities point to
problems about the unity of the person. Here the extreme case
is pathological. I am inclined to think that when the split is
severeenough,to have more thanone standpointis to have none.
This distinction between wanting and valuing requires far
fullerexplicationthan it has receivedso far.Perhaps the foregoing
remarks have at least shown that the distinctionexists and is
important,and have hinted at its nature. This distinctionis importantto the adherentof the familiarview-that talk about free
action and free agency can be understoodin termsof the idea of
being able to get what one wants-because it gives sense to the
claim that in unfreeactions the agentsdo not get what theyreally
or most want. This distinctiongives sense to the contrastbetween
freeaction and intentionalaction. Admittedly,furtherargumentis
required to show that such unfreeagents are unable to get what
theywant; but the initial step towardthis end has been taken.
At this point, it will be profitableto considerbrieflya doctrine
that is in many respectslike that which I have been developing.
The contrastwill, I think,clarifythe claims that have been advanced in theprecedingpages.

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217

FREE AGENCY
III

In an imnportant
and provocative article," Harry Frankfurthas
offereda descriptionof what he takes to be the essentialfeatureof
"the concept of a person," a feature which, he alleges, is also
basic to an understandingof "freedomof the will." This featureis
volitionsas well as first-order
desires.
the possessionof higher-order
Frankfurtconstruesthe notion of a person'swill as "the notion of
an effectivedesire-one that moves (or will or would move) a
person all the way to action" (8). Someone has a second-ordervolition, then,when he wants "a certaindesire to be his will." (Frankfurtalso considersthe case of a second-orderdesire that is not a
second-ordervolition,whereone's desireis simplyto have a certain
desire and not to act upon it. For example, a man may be curious
to know what it is like to be addicted to drugs; he thus desires
to desire heroin,but he may not desire his desire for heroin to be
effective,
to be his will. In fact,Frankfurt'sactual example is somewhat more special, for here the man's desire is not simplyto have
a desireforheroin: he wants to have a desireforheroin which has
a certainsource,i.e., is addictive.He wants to know what it is like
to crave heroin.) Someone is a wanton if he has no second-order
volitions.Finally, "it is only because a person has volitionsof the
second order that he is capable both of enjoying and of lacking
freedomof the will" (14).
Frankfurt'sthesisresemblesthe platonic view we have been unfolding insofar as it focuses upon "the structureof a person's
will" (6). I want to make a simple point about Frankfurt'spaper:
namelythat the "structural"featureto which Frankfurtappeals is
not thefundamentalfeatureforeitherfreeagencyor personhood;it
to the taskhe wantsit to perform.
is simplyinsufficient
One job thatFrankfurtwishesto do with the distinctionbetween
lower and higherordersof desire is to give an account of the sense
in which some wants may be said to be more truly the agent's
own than others(though in an obvious sense all are wants of the
agent) the sense in which the agent "identifies"with one desire
ratherthan anotherand the sense in whichan agent may be unfree
with respect to his own "will." This enterpriseis similar to our
volition" is
own. But we can see that the notion of "higher-order
not reallythe fundamentalnotion forthesepurposes,by raisingthe
question: Can't one be a wanton,so to speak, withrespectto one's
desiresand volitions?
second-order
9 "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," this JOURNAL,

(Jan.14,1971):5-20.

LXVIII,

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In a case of conflict,Frankfurtwould lhaveus believe thatwhat it


is to identifywith some desire rather than another is to have a
volition concerningthe formerwhich is of higherorder than any
concerningthe latter.That the firstdesire is given a special status
over the second is due to its having an n-ordervolition concerning
it, whereas the second desire has at most an (n - 1)-ordervolition
concerningit. But whydoes one necessarilycare about one's higherorder volitions?Since second-ordervolitionsare themselvessimply
desires,to add them to the contextof conflictis just to increase
the numberof contenders;it is not to give a special place to any of
those in contention.The agent may not care which of the secondorder desires win out. The same possibilityarises at each higher
order.
writes:
Frankfurt
Quite aware of thisdifficulty,
limitto thelengthof theseriesof desiresof
There is no theoretical
higherand higherorders;nothingexceptcommonsenseand,perhaps,
an individualfromobsessively
refusingto
a savingfatigueprevents
himself
withanyof his desiresuntilhe formsa desireof the
identify
nexthigherorder(16).
But he insiststhat
sucha seriesof acts[i.e.,theformation
It is possible... to terminate
withoutcutting
When
it offarbitrarily.
of everhigher-order
volitions]
withone ofhisfirst-order
desires,
a personidentifies
himself
decisively
"resounds"throughout
endlessarray
thepotentially
thiscommitment
volitionto be
of higherorders. . .The factthathis second-order
movedbythisdesireis a decisiveone meansthatthereis no roomfor
of volitionsof higherorders. . .
thepertinence
questionsconcerning
he has made meansthathe has
of thecommitment
The decisiveness
volition,at
questionabout his second-order
decidedthatno further
anyhigherorder,remainsto be asked(16).
But either this reply is lame or it reveals that the notion of a
higher-ordervolition is not the fundamentalone. We wanted to
know what preventswantonnesswith regard to one's higher-order
volitions.What gives these volitionsany special relation to "oneself"?It is unhelpfulto answerthat one makes a "decisivecommitment,"where thisjust means that an interminableascent to higher
ordersis not going to be permitted.This is arbitrary.
shows is that the notion of ordersof desires
What this difficulty
or volitionsdoes not do the work that Frankfurtwants it to do.
It does not tell us why or how a particularwant can have, among
all of a person's "desires,"the special propertyof being peculiarly

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FREE AGENCY

219

be somethingto the notionsof acts of identihiis"own." There mnay


ficationand of decisivecommitment,
but theseare in any case different notionsfromthatof a second-(or n-) orderdesire.And if these
are the crucial notions,it is unclear why these acts of identification cannot be themselvesof the firstorder-that is, identification
with or commitmentto courses of action (rather than with or
to desires)-in which case, no ascentis necessary,and the notion of
higher-order
volitionsbecomessuperfluousor at least secondary.
In fact,I thinkthatsuch acts of "identification
and commitment"
(if one goes for this way of speaking) are generallyto courses of
action, that is, are first-order.
Frankfurt'spictureof practicaljudgment seems to be that of an agent with a given set of (first-order)
desiresconcerningwhich he then formssecond-ordervolitions.But
this picture seems to be distorted.As I see it, agents frequently
formulate values concerning alternativesthey had not hitherto
desired. Initially,theydo not (or need not usually) ask themselves
which of their desires they want to be effectivein action; they
ask themselveswhich courseof action is mostworthpursuing.The
initial practical question is about coursesof action and not about
themselves.
Indeed, practical judgments are connected with "second-order
volitions." For the same considerationsthat constituteone's onbalance reasonsfordoing some action,a, are reasonsforwantingthe
"desire" to do a to be effective
in action, and forwantingcontrary
desiresto be ineffective.
But in general,evaluations are prior and
of the firstorder. The first-order
desires that result frompractical
judgmentsgenerate second-ordervolitions because they have this
special status; they do not have the special status that Frankfurt
wantsthemto have because thereis a higher-order
desireconcerning
them.
Therefore,Frankfurt'spositionresemblesthe platonic conception
in its focus upon the structureof the "soul." 10But the two views
draw theirdivisionsdifferently;
whereasFrankfurtdivides the soul
into higher and lower ordersof desire,the distinctionfor Platoand for my thesis-is among independentsources of motivation."
10 Frankfurt'sidea of a wanton, suitably construed,can be put to furtherilluminatinguses in moral psychology.It proves valuable, I think,in discussingthe
problematicphenomenonof psychopathyor sociopathy.
11Some very recent articles employ distinctions,for similar purposes, very
like Frankfurt'sand my own. See, for example, Richard C. Jeffrey,
"Preferences
among Preferences,"this JOURNAL, LXXI, 13 Uuly 18, 1974): 377-391. In "Freedom
and Desire," Philosophical Review, LXXXIII, 1 (January 1974): 32-54, Wright
Neely appeals to higher-orderdesires,apparentlyunaware of Frankfurt'sdevelopment of this concept.

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220

THE JOIJRNALOF PHILOSOPHY


IV

In conclusion,it can now be seen that one worrythat blocks the


acceptance of the traditional view of freedom-and in turn, of
compatibilism-is unfounded.To returnto Berlin's question (206,
above), it is false that determinismentails that all our actions and
choiceshave the same statusas thoseof "compulsivechoosers"such
as "kleptomaniacs,dipsomaniacs,and the like." What is distinctive
about such compulsivebehavior,I would argue, is that the desires
and emotionsin question are more or less radicallyindependentof
the evaluational systemsof these agents.The compulsivecharacter
of a kleptomaniac'sthieveryhas nothing at all to do with determinism.(His desiresto steal may arise quite randomly.)Rather, it
is because his desires express themselvesindependentlyof his
evaluational judgments that we tend to think of his actions as
unfree.
The truth,of course,is that God (traditionallyconceived) is the
only free agent, sans phrase. In the case of God, who is omnipotent and omniscient,there can be no disparitybetween valuational and motivational systems.The dependence of motivation
upon evaluation is total,for thereis but a single source of motivation: his presumablybenign judgment.12 In the case of the Brutes,
as well, motivation has a single source: appetite and (perhaps)
passion. The Brutes(or so we normallythink)have no evaluational
system.But human beingsare onlymoreor less freeagents,typically
less. They are freeagentsonly in some respects.With regard to the
appetitesand passions,it is plain thatin some situationsthe motivational systemsof human beingsexhibitan independencefromtheir
values which is inconsistentwith freeagency; that is to say,people
are sometimesmovedby theirappetitesand passionsin conflictwith
theirpracticaljudgments.13
As Nietzsche said (probably with a rather differentpoint in
mind): "Man's belly is the reason why man does not easily take
himselffora god." 14
GARY WATSON

Universityof Pennsylvania
12 God could not act akratically.In this respect,Socrates thought people were
distinguishable from such a being only by ignorance and limited power.
13 This possibilityis a definitivefeature of appetitive and passionate wants.
14 Beyond Good and Evil, section 141.

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