1

INDEPENDENTCOMMISSIONTO
ADDRESSMEDIAANDACTIVISTKILLINGS

Createdunder
AdministrativeOrderNo.157(s.2006)

REPORT
0
INTRODUCTION
Thereisnoshirkingthefactthatpeople,almostallofthemactivistsormilitants,
have been killed. There is no denying the reality that militant citizens have been
liquidated.Thenumbersvary.TaskForceUsigofthePhilippineNationalPolicelisted
downonehundredeleven(111)killings,whichhassinceincreasedtoonehundredthirty
six(136). AmnestyInternational,initsofficialwebsite,mentions244victims. The
groupKarapatanissaidtohavecountedatleast724killings.Unfortunately,noneofthe
socalledactivist/militantgroups,betheyoutrightcommunistorsatellitegroups,came
forwardifonlytoinformtheCommissionofthenumbersoftheirmemberswhohave
becomevictimsofextrajudicialkillings.Bethisasitmay,thenumber,whetheratalow
of111accordingtoTaskForceUsig,orahighof724ofKarapatan,isonetoomany.
Itissaidbythosewhowouldjustifythesekillingsthatthevictimsareenemiesof
theState.Verily,onesattentionmaybecalledtothescreamsindeathofthevictimsof
the Communist Party of the Philippines, its armed group the New Peoples Army
(NPA),anditsfrontorganizations.Surely,everpresentistheonlytoohumanfeelingof
wantingtoseeonesenemiesandoppressorsbitethedust,sotospeak,struckdownonthe
quick based on ones own personal concept of justice or on the militarys unilateral
assessmentthattheyareenemiesoftheState.
Thismaywellbeso,butitshouldbecarefullynotedthatthevictims,ofwhich
thisCommissionisconcerned,wereallnoncombatants.Theywerenotkilledinarmed
clashesorengagementswiththemilitary. Theywerekilled,itissaid,bymotorcycle
ridinghoodedkillersinassassinationmanner.
Governmentagencieshardlyneedremindingthatinademocraticandcivilized
statesuchasours,onemustupholdandobservetheruleoflaw,theprinciplesofjustice,
reportfinalsig

2
andthesystemandrulesofhowitisdispensedfrominvestigationtoarrest,toinquest,
andtotrial. Thesystemmaybefarfromperfect,givingrisetothetemptationtotake
shortcuts. Butprecisely,shortcutsareindefianceofthesystemofimpartialjustice.
Therulesmustbeobservedatalltimes.
ThisistheveryreasonwhyPresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyo,understandably
alarmedbythesekillings,createdthisCommissiontogettothebottomofwhythese
extrajudicial or extralegal killings are happening and who probably are responsible
therefor.
Itisregrettablethatthemilitantgroupswhichshouldbemostinterestedinseeing
justicedone,forthwithtaggedtheCommissionasnotindependentincomposition.They
refusedtoheedinvitationsoftheCommissiontoappearnotnecessarilywithwitnesses
to the killing, for they may have none (or if there were witnesses, we could not in
conscienceforcethemtotestifyiftheywerefearfuloftheirsafety),butifonlytoinform
theCommissionoftheirownbodycountofvictimsaswellastogivetheirreasonswhy
theybelievethatthemilitaryisresponsibleforthekillings.
Nevertheless, this Commission gathered what information it could find from
different sources. It became apparent early on that the number of killings, whether
accordingtoKarapatanorTaskForceUsig,isonetoomany.

A.

Factualbackdrop

Inthewakeofadisturbingwaveofunexplainedkillingsofcivilianactivistsand
mediapersonnel,PresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyoissuedAdministrativeOrderNo.
157 entitled Creating an Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist
Killings.TheCommissionwasgiventhetasktoprioritizeandfocusinvestigationof
mediaandactivistkillingsandthereaftertosubmitrecommendationstothePresidenton
policiesandactions,includingprosecutionandlegislativeproposals,if any,aimed at
eradicating the root causes of the extrajudicial killings and breaking such cycle of
violence.Necessarily,theCommissionsfirstandforemosttaskwastodeterminetheroot
cause of the said killings, and if possible, the persons or interest group responsible
therefor.

reportfinalsig

3
The Commission was not created to solve the killings, or any of them, by
pinpointingtheactualgunmeninvolved.NeitherwilltheCommissionprosecutewhoit
believesarethepersonsbehindsuchkillings.Thosetasks,whichwouldtakeyearsandan
army of investigators and prosecutors to finish, would be best left to the regularly
constitutedlawenforcementauthoritiesandtheDepartmentofJustice.

B.

Procedure

ItwasdecidedbytheCommissionthatthemosteffectivewayofgatheringthe
necessaryinformationabouttheextrajudicialkillingswastoconductpublichearingsat
which evidencewouldbepresentedandresourcepersons andwitnesses testify. The
General Counsel, under the auspices of the Commission, would be responsible for
gathering,sorting,andpresentingtheevidenceandwitnessesatthehearings.
Facedwithanumberofpotentialwitnessesandresourcepersons,theCommission
planned to invite resource persons or witnesses from the various activist or militant
groups,familiesofvictims,aswellasthepoliceandmilitaryauthorities.
TheCommissionintendedtopresent,asitsfirstsetofwitnesses,thefamiliesof
thetwostudentsoftheUniversityofthePhilippineswhohadthenrecentlydisappearedin
Hagonoy, Bulacan, and were feared to be the latest victims of extrajudicial killings.
Unfortunately,despiteinvitationssenttothesaidfamiliesthroughthegoodofficesof
CommissionerNeliaGonzalezandotherofficialsoftheUniversityofthePhilippines,
theydeclinedtoappear,seeminglyupontheurgingofKarapatan.Likewise,despitethe
numerous invitations extended by the Commission, Karapatan and other activist or
militant groups refused to cooperate, and rather questioned the Commissions
independence.
SincetheCommissionessentiallyreliedonthevoluntarycooperationofwitnesses
andresourcepersons,therewasnothingtheCommissioncoulddoaboutthereluctanceof
the activist groups to join the investigation, except perhaps by demonstrating its
independence,probity,andintegrityinthehearingstobeheldandinitseventualreport.
Inthemeantime,duetothelackofotherwitnessesandresourcepersonsfromthe
activist and militant groups, the Commission opted to call the police and military
authoritiestoprovidetheirowninformationontheextrajudicialkillings.

reportfinalsig

The Commission first called the Philippine National Police, which sent Gen.
AvelinoRazon,DeputyDirectorofthePNP,togetherwithhisretinue. Gen.Razonis
likewise the head of Task Force Usig, which was created to investigate, solve, and
otherwisehandlethesameextrajudicialkillings,anditwasinhiscapacityassuchhead
thatheappearedbeforetheCommission. TheCommissionwaslikewiseinformedthat
Task Force Usig was instructed by the President herself to cooperate fully with the
Commission. Gen.RazonpresentedacomprehensivereportontheactivitiesofTask
ForceUsigandtheirviewsandopinionsonthesuspectsbehindthekillings.
Thereafter,theCommissioncalledontheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,which
wasrepresentedbytheChiefofStaffGen.HermogenesEsperon,whogaveabriefreport
or statement on the killings, and answered various questions propounded by the
Commission. The next witness was Retired Gen. Jovito S. Palparan, Jr., who was
confrontedforhisimageandreputationastheprimesuspectbehindtheextrajudicial
killings.
The Commission then extended an invitation to the Commission on Human
Rights,whichwasrepresentedbyChairpersonPurificacionQuisumbing.
Thereafter,theCommissionheldhearingsinBacolod,NegrosOccidental,andin
Davao City on the alleged killings of peasants and nongovernmental organization
workerssuspectedtobeperpetratedbyhiredgoonsoflandowners. TheCommission
notedthatthesekillingsarewithinitsmandatetolookinto,consideringthatthevictims
werefarmersorpeasantactivists.

I.

UNDISPUTEDFACTS

Fromtheproceedings,itbecameplainthatcertainmattersandfactswerewell
nigh undisputed. Although not necessarily proven in such a manner that would be
bindinginacourtoflaw,thesefactsareneverthelessacceptedassuchbyallconcerned
and,therefore,maybepresumedtobetrue.
Thefirstundisputedfactisthatthereindeedhavebeenextralegalkillings,andthat
thevictimswerealmostentirelymembersofactivistgroupsorweremediapersonnel.
reportfinalsig

5
Thenumbersofvictimsandthetheoriesbehindtheirdeathsvarybetweentheversionsof
thePNPandthemilitary,ononehand,andKarapatanandAmnestyInternational,onthe
other.However,itisundisputedthattherewerekillings.
Moreimportantly,itisalsoundisputedthattherewasariseinthenumberof
killingstoanextentsufficienttoalarmactivistgroups,nongovernmentalorganizations,
the PNP, and, in fact, the President herself. Similarly expressing concern was the
international community, especially the European Union. The military and police
authorities likewise agree with the activist groups that there was even a rise in the
extrajudicialkillingsofactivistsandmilitantsbetween2001and2006ascomparedtoa
similarperiodpriorthereto.
Likewisewithoutdisputeisthemannerofthekillings.FromthereportsofTask
ForceUsig,victimsweregenerallyunarmed,alone,orinsmallgroups,andweregunned
downbytwoormoremaskedorhoodedassailants,oftentimesridingmotorcycles.The
assailantsusuallysurprisedthevictimsinpublicplacesortheirhomes,andmadequick
getaways. Itisundisputedthatthekillingssubjectoftheinvestigationdidnotoccur
during military engagements or firefights. These were assassination or ambush type
killings, professional hits carried out quickly and with the assailants escaping with
impunity.
ItisalsoundisputedthatthePNPhasnotmademuchheadwayinsolvingthese
killings.Outofthe111killingsofactivistsacknowledgedbythePNP,only37hadbeen
forwardedtotheproperprosecutorsofficeforpreliminaryinvestigationorfiledincourt.
Obviously,thereasonfor thispoor scorewastherefusalof Karapatanandits allied
groupstocomeforwardandcooperate.Lastly,itisclearthattheriseinkillingsofsuch
activistswhomthemilitarybrandsasenemiesofthestatewastosuchanextentthatit
could not possibly be attributed to a simple increase in the crime rate. In fact, the
circumstancesclearlyshowthatsuchkillingsofactivistsandmediapersonnelispursuant
toanorchestratedplanbyagrouporsectorwithaninterestineliminatingthevictims,
invariablyactivistsandmediapersonnel.Themilitaryestablishmentitselfacknowledges
this,byattributingtheriseinkillingstoapurgeofranksbytheCPPNPA.

II.
PRESENTATIONOFWITNESSES/

RESOURCEPERSONS

reportfinalsig

6

A.

TaskForceUsig;PNPDeputyDirectorGen.AvelinoI.Razon,Jr.

1.

Introduction

Task Force Usig (TFU) was created, upon instructions of President Gloria
MacapagalArroyo, by Secretary Ronaldo V. Puno of the Department of Interior and
LocalGovernment,toinvestigatethemediaandpoliticalkillings.

2.

Statisticsonkilledactivistsandnewsmen/mediamen

1.

TFU reportedthatfromthe2001to2006,thetotalnumberofslain/partylist
membersreached111whilethetotalnumberofmediamenkilledforthesameperiod
reached26.TFUsstatisticsaremuchlowerthanthefiguresreportedbyKarapatanand
AmnestyInternationalforthesameperiod.AccordingtoKarapatan,therewasatotalof
724killingswhileAmnestyInternationalclaimsthattherewasatotalof244killings.
Gen.Razoncouldnotexplainthedifferenceinthefiguresbecauseaccordingtohim,
KarapatanandAmnestyInternationalhaverefusedtomeetwithTFU.Anupdatedreport
ofTFUasof23November2006showsanincreasedtotalof115casesofkillingsof
activistsormilitants. Outofthistotal,46casesarealreadyfiledincourtandthe
remaining69arestillunderextensiveinvestigationandcasebuildup.
2.1

Out of the 111 extrajudicial militant killings, 37 criminal

complaintshavebeenfiled,while74casesarestillunderinvestigation.Thelow
numberofcasesfiledisallegedlydueto:(1)lackofwitnesses;(2)absenceof
sufficient evidence; and (3) the pendency of preliminary investigation. Gen.
Razonfurtheraddedthatthereislackofconfidenceintheimpartialityofpolice,
fearofreprisalbyotherelementsofsociety,andlackofinterestofthevictims
families.
2.2

Ofthetotalof26mediapersonskilled,twentyone(21)caseshave

beenfiledwhilefive(5)arestillunderinvestigation.Whenaskedtoexplainthe
substantialdifferenceintheefficiencyoftheinvestigationonmediamenkillings
visvis militantpersons,Gen.Razonsaidthatinthecaseofmediapersonnel,
therearemorewitnessesandthepolicehavereceivedmorecooperationfromthe
media.
1

SeealsoUpdateonTaskForceUsigasofSeptember12,2006,p.8,submittedbyGen.Razontothe
CommissiononSeptember12,2006,
reportfinalsig

3.

Casessolved

Gen.RazonstatedthatthePNPdeemsacasesolvedinlinewithaNAPOLCOM
Resolutionstatingthatacaseissolvedwhenasuspecthasbeenidentifiedandcharges
have been filed before the prosecutor or the court, without prejudice to further
investigation.However,Gen.Razonclarifiedthatitisnotaninternationaldefinition.
Intruth,thesolutionefficiencyof29%isevendeceptiveormisleading. As
statedinTFUsupdatedreportOutofthetotal45casesfiledincourt,thePNPhasfiled
5caseswith8arrestedsuspectswhoareallinjail;filed25casesunderpreliminary
investigation,filed1casewithsurrenderedsuspect,whilethesuspectsfortheremaining
15incidentsarestillatlargeandaresubjectofmanhuntoperations.Itisnot,therefore,
entirelyaccuratethat45caseshavealreadybeenfiledincourtsince25cases[are]under
preliminaryinvestigation.Thus,only20caseshaveactuallybeenfiledincourt;25cases
areonlyunderpreliminaryinvestigation.Thesecasesmayyetbedismissedforlackof
probablecause.Ofthe20casesfiledincourt,theaccusedorsuspectshavebeenarrested
inonly(6)cases.Itcannotthenbeaccuratelysaidthattheaccusedinthe27caseshave
been brought to justice. Indeed, with respect to the 78 cases still under extensive
investigation,itisevendoubtfulwhethertheperpetratorscanevenbeidentified.
Whenaskedforthemeaningofthetermofunderextensiveinvestigation,Gen.
Razonsaidineachcase,regularcaseconferencesareheld,moremenareassignedto
investigateandtheorganizationofspecialteamssuchasTFU.Uponinquiry,hereplied
thatTFUreceivesamonthlybudgetofP300,000.00.Asanincentive,eachmemberof
theunitreceivesP5,000.00foreverysuspectcapturedorcasesolved.
Gen.RazonfurthertestifiedthatthePNPhasnotbeensuccessfulininvestigating
thekillingsofmilitantsbecausetheCPP/NPAhasterrorizedthewitnesses.

4.

Reasonforpoliticalkillings.

Gen.RazonadmittedthatTFUstillcannotexplainthereasonfortheincreasein
politicalkillings.Thus,TFUfellshortofitsobjectivetoestablishwhoisresponsible

reportfinalsig

8
for the killings and to determine whether there is a pattern of serialized killings
victimizingleftistactivistandjournalist.2
4.1

Gen.Razonrefusedtoattributetheupsurgeofpoliticalkillingsto

thePresidentsdeclarationofanalloutwaragainstthecommunistinsurgents.
4.2

Buthewasquicktosaythattheirrecordsshowthatthekillingsare

theresultofCPP/NPAownpurgingbecauseoffinancialopportunism.
Gen.RazonadmittedthatheagreeswiththestatementofGen.Palparan
thatorganizationssuchasKarapatanandBayanMunaarefrontsoftheCPP
NPA,andthatunlesswestopfoolingourselvesthattheyarenotfronts,wewill
notbeabletosolvetheinsurgencyproblem.HefurtherassertedthattheNDF
andBayanMunaprovidesupport,money,resources,andlegalassistancetothe
CPP/NPA.
However,whenaskedbyChairmanMelowhetherTFUhasdataonwhom
amongthosekilledwerefinanceofficers,Gen.Razoncouldpointtoonlytwo
victimswhowereallegedlyinvolvedinfinancialoperations.
5.

TFUdidnotinvestigateGen.Palparan,norwasheaskedtoaccount

forhisstatements.

5.1

Notwithstanding the widespread reports that Gen. Palparan had

beensuspectedofbeinginvolvedintheextrajudicialkillingofleftistactivists,
TFUneversummonedGen.Palparanforquestioningorinvestigation.Gen.Razon
madeitclearthatGen.PalparanisnotunderthejurisdictionofthePNPorTask
ForceUsig.Moreover,hestatedthattherewasstillnobasis/evidencetosummon
orinvestigateapersonalitysuchasGen.Palparan. ThePNPneedstooperate
withinthelaw.Hence,itneedsevidencebeforeitcaninvestigateofficers.
Atty.Vinluanpointedout,however,thatthepurposeofinvestigationis
preciselytogatherevidence.PNPdoesnotneedevidencebeforeitcaninvestigate
Gen.Palparan

Id.onp.18

reportfinalsig

9
5.2

Gen.RazontestifiedthatTFUdidnotasktheDeputyOmbudsman

for the Military to look into the alleged violations of Gen. Palparan and the
military. However, hesupposedlyaskedtheheadoftheAFPtolookintothe
participationofthemilitaryinthekillings.Atty.Vinluanaskedforcopiesofsuch
letterrequest.

6.

Commandresponsibility

TFUdidnotinvestigatehigherrankingmilitaryofficials.Gen.Razonclaimedthat
thePNPcannotgofurtherthanthesuspect.IftheSergeantremainssilentorrefusesor
failstopointtotheinvolvementofasuperiorofficer,thePNPcannotgohigher.
TFUpointedoutthatmilitaryoperationsarebeyondthescopeoftheTFU.Since
themilitaryconductsitsownoperations.TFUinvestigatedonlyfourmilitarypersonnel.

7.

Personalopinion

WhenaskedbyChairmanMelowhetherhewouldhavesummonedGen.Palparan
ifthelatterwereunderhiscommand,Gen.Razonrepliedthathewouldhaveimmediately
calledGen.Palparantoexplainwhytherewasanapparentincreaseintheincident[s]in
theareaswherehewasassigned.3ButGen.RazonalsosaidthatGen.Palparanwillnot
incriminatehimself.

8.

RecommendationsofTFU

Toconcludehistestimony,GeneralRazonmadethefollowingrecommendations
forthesuccessfulinvestigationandpreventionoffuturekillings:
8.1

Closer collaboration of law enforcement/prosecution without

sacrificingtheirimpartiality;

8.2

Fasterissuanceofwarrantsofarrests;

8.3

Expediteconductofpreliminaryinvestigations;

TSN,September12,2006,p.3031

reportfinalsig

10
8.4

StrengthenWitnessProtectionProgram,increasebudgettoprovide

economicopportunitiesforfamilies.

B.

AFPChiefofStaffGen.HermogenesEsperon:

1.

OpeningStatement:AFPPolicyandPractice

Gen.EsperonsternlydeclaredthattheAFPdoesnotcondoneoremploysummary
executionsasamatterofpolicyandpractice.Neitherdoesittolerateabuses,crimes,or
summaryexecutions. TheAFPisaprofessionalinstitution,whichdoesnotengagein
summaryexecutions.TheAFP,infact,operatesonthebasisoftheConstitutionandthus
holdsthevalueofhumanlifetothehighestdegree.Severalpublications4havebeenmade
toeducateAFPssoldiers:
a. AFPStandingRulesofEngagement
b. ProtectionofNonCombatantsinthePhilippines
c. The Philippine Army Soldiers Handbook on Human Rights and
InternationalHumanitarianLaw
d. Primer on the Comprehensive Agreement on the Restrict for Human
RightsandInternationalHumanitarianLaw
e. RulesofBehavioronCombat
f. LoveofCountry/PagmamahalsaBayan
g. CodeofEthics
Gen.EsperonfurthersaidthatitisunfairtolinktheAFPtoallpoliticalkillings
justbecausethepoliticalinclinationofthevictimsistowardtheleft.Hestatedthatthe
AFPhasbeenstereotypedastheperpetratoroftheextrajudicialkillingsofjournalists
andmilitants.SubjectingtheAFPtoatrialbypublicityisamodusoperandibytheCPP
NPA.5
However,Gen.EsperonrefusedtocategoricallystatethattheAFPhasabsolutely
nothingtodowiththekillingsofactivists,assuchstatementmightbetoopresumptuous.
6

Gen.EsperonfurnishedtheCommissionwithcopiesoftheenumeratedpublications.
TSN,September14,2006,pp.67
6
TSN,September18,2006,p.3.
5

reportfinalsig

11
2.

Reaction

to Gen. Jovito Palparans Statement Bayan,

Karapatan,
AnakngBayanareallfrontorganizationsoftheCPPNPAwithBayanMunaasthe
umbrellaorganization.
Gen.Esperonagreedthatthereistruthtothesaidstatement.Heclaimedthatthe
CPPNPAusesasashieldtheNationalDemocraticFront(NDF),whichisanaggrupation
oflegalorganizationsthatareinfiltratedwithmembersoftheCPPNPA.Forexample,
BayanMuna,whilebeingalegalorganizationhaselementsthatarealsomembersofthe
CPPNPA. Thesemembersareconvenientlyhidingunderalegalorganizationtoserve
theendsoftheCPP.Therefore,theseorganizationsbecomethefrontorganizationsofthe
armedstruggleoftheNPA.Whatismeantbythetermfrontorganizationsisthatmany
membersofthelegalorganizationareidentifiedmembersoftheNPA.Thesemembers,
whoareidentifiedwiththeCPPNPA,arefoolingthese(legal)organizationstobethe
umbrellaoftheCPPNPAandworkultimately,wittinglyorunwittingly,forthecauseof
theCPPNPA.

3.

PresentationentitledKnowingtheEnemy

Gen.EsperonconfirmedtheexistenceofanAFPBriefingpresentationentitled
KnowingtheEnemywhichexplicitlyaccusesprogressiveleftistorganizationsofbeing
frontorganizationsoftheCPPNPA.

4.

AFPconsiderstheCPPNPAasenemyofthestate

TheCPPNPAistreatedasanenemyofthestatebecausethePhilippinesisa
democraticstate. TheCPPNPAwantstosupplantourdemocraticwayoflifewitha
communistideology.7
However,Gen.EsperonwasquicktoclarifythatitdoesnotfollowthattheAFP
similarlytreatssomeleftwingorganizations(whichareconsideredfrontorganizationsof
theCPPNPA)asenemiesofthestatebecausethesearelegalorganizationsandservea
function in a democratic way of life. He added that Gen. Palparans statement that
CongressmenSaturOcampoandTeddyCasioareenemiesofthestatemighthave
beenpromptedbythefactthattheformerwasaknownmemberoftheCPP.8
7

TSN,September14,2006,p.11
Idatp.12

reportfinalsig

12

5.

Reaction

to Gen. Palparans statement, Even

though they are in

government,asCongressrepresentatives,nomatterwhatappearancetheytake,they

arestillenemiesoftheState
,asreportedinthePhilippineDailyInquirer,May16,

2006issue.

Gen.Esperonsaidhehasnotbeengivenamanuscriptthatcontainedthesaid
statement.Headdedthattherecouldbetruthtothematterinlightofanarrationmadeby
acertainMr.Piedad,aformerNPACommanderandawitnesstothemassgravesin
Inupakan,Leyte.AccordingtoMr.Piedad,theordersforthemasskillingscamefrom
NPApersonalitieswhichareknowninthefiledasKaGres,JomaSison,KaLouieandKa
Satur. InanotherincidentatAurora,aletterwasuncoveredwhichmentionsthename
KaSaturasresponsibleforthepurchaseofFiveMillionPesos(P5,000,000.00)worth
of explosives. Thoughtherealidentityof KaSaturisunknown,itseemstobea
popularnameintheunderground. Thus,thiscouldbethebasisforGen.Palparans
statements.9

6.

Local

Communist Movement (LCM) Influenced versus LCM

Infiltrated(asbasedonanAFPlecture)
IndicatorsofanLCMInfluencedorganization:
1. createdorestablishedbytheCPPNPANDFandotherfactions
oftheLCM;
2. undertheinfluenceofanationaldemocraticundergroundmass
organization of the CPP or its counterpart in the reactionist
faction;
3. adaptstheNDFtwelvepointprogramoftheactionsandsimilar
programsoftheotherLCMfaction;
4. activelyinvolvedinmultisectoralrallies,whereinissuesraised
arebeyondthetraditionalinterestoftheparticularsocietyit
represents;
5. radicalandviolentintheconductofmassprotestaction.
AsectoralorganizationisclassifiedasaLCMInfiltratedifitsatisfiesanytwoof
thefollowingindicators:
1.
2.
3.
9

Id.atp.13.

reportfinalsig

Not categorized as LCMInfluenced but is actively

involvedinpartylistactivities;
Undertheinfluenceofanationaldemocraticunderground
mass organization of the CPP or its counterpart in the
reactionistfaction;
its aims, objectives, policies and/or pronouncements are
similartothepoliticallinesexpoundedbytheLCM;

13
4.
5.

Activities are similar or complimentary to those of the

LCM;
Maintains a close relationship with suspected LCM
personalitiesand/ororganizations.

Gen.Esperondeniedknowingthesourceofthelecture. However,hesaidthat
thosearewaysthatcouldbeusedinclassifyingorganizations.ThestructureoftheCPP
NPANDFisasfollows:TheCPPisthebrain;theNPAisthearmedgroup;andtheNDF
istheshield.TheNDFiscomposedoflegalorganizationsthatmayhavebeeninfiltrated
bytheCPPandNPA.

7.

PresidentArroyosordertowageanalloutwaragainsttheCPPNPA

asacausefortheriseinactivistkillings
Gen.Esperonexplainedthatanalloutwarmeanswagingaholisticwar.The
strengthofthemilitarywillbeardownupontheenemyandatthesametime,thevarious
governmentagenciesshouldalsocontributeinsolvingtherootcausesofinsurgencysuch
aspovertyandinjustice.Theriseofactivistkillingshasnothingtodowiththemarching
ordersofthePresident.
TheAFPiscurrentlydeployingforcestoaddressthearmedthreat.Atthesame
time,itisalsoimplementingprojects,calledKalayaanBarangayProgram,whichbrings
in smallscale development to 600 barangays nationwide. The program involves
infrastructuredevelopment,daycare,etc.

8.

One

of the basic strategies of the total war is to neutralize the

leadershipoftheCommunistTerroristMovement(CTM)ortheLocalCommunist
Movement(LCM)

Gen.EsperonexplainedthattheAFPaimstoneutralizetheleadersoftheguerilla
front,whoarebonafidemembersoftheNPAasevidencedbycaptureddocuments.10

9.
ForeignSupportforCPPNP

A
Gen.EsperonmanifestedthattheAFPhascapturedseveraldocumentswhich
provethattheCPPNPAhadbeenreceivingsupportfromforeignorganizations.Further,
10

Id.atpp.3031.

reportfinalsig

14
thepurposeofJoseMariaSisonandLuisJalandoniforbeingoutofthecountryistoget
supportfromoutsidethecountryforthelocalcommunistmovement.11
Gen.Esperonreported,however,thatsincetheCPPNPAhasbeenclassifiedasa
foreignterroristorganizationbytheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanUnion,muchoftheir
foreignfundinghasdriedup.

InvestigatingencountersbetweentheAFPandtheCPPNPA
10.

WhenaskediftheAFPhasinvestigatedkillingsduringcombatencounters,Gen.
Esperonmentionedthatallencountersaretreatedasasceneofcrimeandisconductedby
thesceneofcrimeoperations(SOCO),whichisajointundertakingoftheAFPandthe
PNP.However,ithasnoformalorganization.UnderExecutiveOrderNo.546,thePNP
hasbecomeanequalpartnerincounterinsurgency.

Procedureforcomplaintsfiled
11.

WhenaskedabouttheAFPsinvestigationsintokillings,GeneralEsperonstated
thatbeforeaninvestigationcancommence,acomplaintmustfirstbefiled. Fromthe
years2000to2006,atotalof770complaintswereinvestigated.Complaintscomefrom
theCommissiononHumanRights,thevictimsthemselves,foreignornongovernmental
organizations, the Department of Foreign Affairs, or the jointmonitoring committee.
Thereafter,thereportoftheinvestigationwillbesubmittedtotheGeneralHeadquarters.12
However,Gen.EsperonaddedthatalthoughtheAFPentertainsthecomplaints
filed,itisthePNPwhichistherightfulorcorrectagencytoproceedwiththecriminal
investigation, with the AFP simply cooperating with the PNP by giving inputs and
makingitspersonnelavailableforinvestigation.

ListofNPAvictims
12.

13

ToemphasizehispointthattheCPPNPAisthepartytoblamefortheactivistand
media killings, General Esperon stated that AFP records show that a total of 1,227
personshavebeenliquidatedbytheNPA. Outofthe1,227,384wereAFPandPNP
11

Id.atp.31.
Id.atpp.3435.
13
AlistofthevictimswasfurnishedtheCommission.
12

reportfinalsig

15
officersorpersonnelwhile843werecivilians. Interestingly,inthelistofliquidated
civilians,eight(8)ofthemwerealsoknowntobemembersofthegroupKarapatan.14

ReportofTaskForceUsig
13.

In theReport,atotalof 111militants wereslain,sixof whomwereslainby

military elements (2 military, 1 CAFGU, 3 military assets) and 10 other cases were
allegedlylinkedtothemilitary.However,thesecaseshavenotbeenreferredtotheAFP
forinvestigation.15
Gen. Esperon relayed his conversation with Gen. Razon wherein the latter
mentionedthat15caseswereperpetratedbytheNPA.

AngTala
14.

AngTalaisanofficialpublicationoftheAFPwhichispublishedbytheCivil
RelationsService. Themagazinemaycontainarticlesthatdonotreflecttheofficial
positionoftheAFP.
Gen.Esperonadmittedhavingheardaboutthe2002articlewrittenbyCol.John
BonatuswhichclamedthattheNDFformedBayanMunaandthatitsgrowinginfluence
intheelectoralandparliamentaryarenaisanationalsecurityproblem.However,hesaid
thathecouldnotcommentthereonashehasnotreadit.
AFPInvestigationofGen.JovitoPalparan
15.

ItwasnotedthattherewasanincreaseinactivistkillingsintheareaswhereGen.
Palparanwasassigned.Thus,itearnedhimthemonikerButcherorBerdugo.16
Gen. Esperon said that an internal investigation was conducted by the AFP.
However,noformalinvestigationwasconductedsincenoformalcomplaintswerefiled

14

TSN,September14,2006,pp.3637.
TheCommissionformallyreferredthecasestotheAFPforinvestigation.TSN,September18,2006,pp.
56.
15

16

Id.atp.12.

reportfinalsig

16
againstGen.Palparan.Theinternalinvestigationsconductedwereinformalinnatureand
thus,norecordswerekept.17
Moreover,whenthereportscameoutinthemedia,TaskForceUsigwasalready
organized.Thus,theAFPdeemeditmoreappropriatetoletthetaskforceconductany
investigationlesttheAFPbeaccusedofwhitewashingthematter.18
Additionally,Gen.EsperonsaidthattoinvestigateGen.Palparanduringthetime
whenhewasneutralizingtheNPAwouldhavebeencounterproductive. 19AlthoughGen.
EsperonadmittedthattheAFPhasthepowerandauthoritytoinvestigateifanyofits
officers has violated certain rules and regulations, such investigation may, however,
muddle or obstruct any ongoing operation. Gen. Esperon added that the AFP has
confidenceinthedulyconstitutedinvestigativebody.20
Atty.Vinluanmentionedanincidentin MindorowhereinEdenMarcellanaand
EddieGumanoywereabductedby20menbelievedtobemembersofthemilitaryand
militaryassets.Gen.Esperoncouldnotsaywhetheraninvestigationwasconductedon
thematter,reasoningthathewasstationedinBasilanatthetimetheincidenthappened.
16. ReactiononthefollowingstatementsmadebyGen.Palparan:

GeneralEsperonwasaskedforhisreactiontoGeneralPalparanspublicimageand
statementsappearinginmediareports,amongwhichwereasfollows:
Potentialvigilantestyleactionsbyanticommunistelementsoutsidethe
military organization cannot be stopped completely and the killing of
activistsarenecessaryincidenttoconflict.
Icannotordermysoldierstokill,itstheirjudgmentcall,theycandoiton
theirown.
Iencouragepeoplevictimizedbycommunistrebelstogeteven.
ThekillingsarebeingattributedtomebutIdidnotkillthem,Ijustinspire
thetriggermen.
Their(threestudentdoingresearchworkoutsideManila)disappearance
isgoodforusbutastowhoabductedthemwedontknow.

17

Idatpp.14,17&19.
Idatp.17.
19
Idatp.20.
20
Idatpp.2122.
18

reportfinalsig

17
Gen. Esperon refused to answer any question in relation to Gen. Palparans
statements,reasoningthatGen.Palparanhimselfshouldbetheonetoanswerthesame.
ChairmanMeloaskedGen.EsperonifitoccurredtohimtocallGen.Palparanto
explainhisstatements.Gen.EsperonrelatedthathecalledGen.Palparanregardingthe
three(3)studentswhodisappeared.Gen.Palparandeniedanyinvolvementandexpressed
hiswillingnesstosubmittoanyinvestigationbytheTaskForceUsig. Gen.Esperon
addedthatherecalledcallingGen.Palparanaboutastatement(heforgotwhich)andthe
lattersaidhewasmisquotedbythenewspaper.Gen.Esperonadvisedhimtobecareful
withhisstatements.21
Gen.Esperonsaidthatassumingtheabovestatementsweretrue,thosearenot
rightwordsthatshouldcomefromanofficer.Headdedthatthestatements,iftrue,do
notreflectwellontheAFP,butitdoesnotmeanthatthemilitaryshouldbeblamedfor
thekillings.22
ItappearsthattheAFPdidnotinvestigateGen.Palparanonthematteronthe
groundthatnoformalcomplaintwaslodged.
CommandResponsibility
17.

Whenaskedabouthisconceptofcommandresponsibility,GeneralEsperonstated
thatitmeansthatacommanderisresponsibleforwhathismendoorfailtodointermsof
accomplishingthemission. Itdoesnotincludecriminalliabilityofthesuperiorifhis
menorsubordinatescommitanillegalactthatiscriminalinnature.Onlythesubordinate
shouldbeliableforthecriminalactandnotthesuperiorcommander.Thecommanderis
responsibleonlyforactsheauthorized.23
In relation to reported abuses allegedly committed by Gen. Palparan, Gen.
Esperonsaidthattheseareonlyaccusationsandthatnocomplaintswerefiled.Moreover,
he reiterated that the matter is left to be investigated by Task Force Usig and the
Commission.

18.
ActionsthatmaybeundertakenbytheAFPtopreventextrajudicial

killings
21

TSN,18September2006,pp.2526.
TSN,18September2006,p.26.
23
Idatpp.2829.
22

reportfinalsig

18

When asked what the AFP is doing to prevent extrajudicial killings, General
EsperonsimplymentionedthattheAFPhasitsrulesonengagementandthattheAFP
conductscourseswhichhaveamoduleonhumanrightsandthereareseveralpublications
toreinforceAFPsobservanceofhumanrights.
Atty.Vinluansuggestedthatinordertostopextrajudicialkillings,themilitary
shouldcorrecttheimpressionthatleftwingorganizations,suchasBayanMuna,Gabriela,
andAnakPawis,arefrontsoftheCPPNPA.Gen.EsperoncounteredthatSaturOcampo
shoulddenouncetheNPA.Bydoingso,theAFPwillknowthatpreviousmembersofthe
CPPNPAhavetrulyseveredtheirrelationswiththeunderground.
General Esperon, at this point, presented to the Commission copies of the
followingbooks:
BreakingThroughbyJoelRocamoraExhibitJ
SufferThyComradesbyRobertFrancisGarciaExhibitK
The Philippine Revolutionary Movement Combining Armed and Legal
StrugglesbyLuisJalandoniExhibitL
CoordinationwithTaskforceUsig
19.

Gen. Esperon said that AFPs lack of coordination with Task Force Usig is
intentional as it did not want to influence the latters report. Further, coordination
betweenthetwobodiesmightbemisconstrued.However,Gen.Esperonaddedthatjust
themorninghetestified,herequestedGen.RazontofurnishtheAFPwithareportsothat
itcanbeusedasabasisforitsownactions.
HesaidthatisitpossiblethattheevaluationofTaskForceUsigmaybedifferent
fromtheevaluationoftheAFP. However,intheend,itwillbethecourtswhichwill
decideshouldcasesbefiled.

Star

20.
AFPsgoalofbeatingtheNPAby2010asreportedinthePhilippine

Gen.Esperondeclinedtodiscusstheoperationaldetailsonhow todefeatthe
NPA.However,hesaidthatAFPwillgivedevelopmentalactivitiestocommunitiesand
reportfinalsig

19
trytowintheheartsandmindsofthepeoplesimilartothecaseofBohol.Gen.Esperon
explainedthatduetotheeffortsofthemilitary,BoholisnowfreeofroamingNPAsand
hasbecomeatouristspot.HeaddedthatthepeopleofBohollikeGen.Palparan.24

21.

Summary/NotableMatters:

a.

TheAFPdidnotconductanyformalinvestigationofsuspects,but

admitsariseinreportedkillings.
b.

GeneralEsperonisconvincedthattherecentactivistandjournalist

killings were carried out by the CPPNPA as part of a purge. Captured

documentssupposedlyprovethis.Thefullcontentsoracopyofthedocuments,
however,werenotpresentedtotheCommission.
c.

Likewise,GeneralEsperonwasfirminhispositionthatthevictims

weremembersoftheCPP/NPAandthattheactivistorganizations,whilelegal,
are infiltrated by the CPPNPA. He stated that these organizations are being
manipulatedbytheNPA.
d.

Gen. Esperon admitted receiving reports about Palparan being

suspectedofconductingextrajudicialkillings,beingcalledBerdugo,etc.buthe
attributedthistopropagandaofCPP/NPA.
e.

General Esperon admitted that no formal investigation was

conductedbytheAFPonGeneralPalparan,simplybecausenocomplaintwas
filed.HementionedthathemerelycalledGeneralPalparanonhiscellphoneand
didnotgobeyondthelattersdenials.

C.

Maj.Gen.JovitoS.Palparan:

1.

Introduction

Maj.Gen.JovitoS.PalparanservedintheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesfor
thirtythree(33)yearsbeforehisretirementonSeptember11,2006.Hewasinvitedbythe
24

Idatp.43.

reportfinalsig

20
Commissiontoshedlightontheheightenednumberofextrajudicialkillingsofmedia
workers and political activists that transpired in the various posts to which he was
assignedincluding,butnotlimitedto,thefollowing:
CommandingGeneral

7thInfantryDivision,CentralLuzon
September2005September2006

CommandingGeneral

8thInfantryDivision,EasternVisayas
February2005August2006

BrigadeCommander

2ndInfantryDivision,Mindoro
May2001April2003

2.

PropagandaWar

DuringGen.PalparansassignmentinMindoroandEasternVisayas,thepeoplein
thesaidareasgavehimcertaindisapprovingmonikerssuchastheButcher,Berdugo
ng Mindoro and Berdugo ng Samar in the context of the rampant extrajudicial
executionsofleftwingactivistsduringhisassignment.
Whenaskedabouthowheearnedthesenicknames,Gen.Palparanansweredthatit
wasthemilitantsandtheCPPNPAthatgavehimthenicknamesasapartoftheirso
calledpropagandawar.Hestressedthatevenbeforehisarrivalintheareastowhichhe
wasassigned,therewerealreadymanykillingsofbothmilitantsandnonmilitants.Gen.
Palparanfurtherstatedthatthekillingsthattranspiredduringhisassignmentweremerely
highlightedasaformofblackpropagandatodiscredithiseffortsinthearea.25

3.

Organizations/Party

List Representatives as support systems of the

CPPNPA;EnemiesoftheState

Gen.PalparanstatedthatcertainOrganizationsandPartyListRepresentativesact
assupportsystemsprovidingmaterialsandshelterfortheCPPNPA. However,when
askedtonametheseorganizations,Gen.Palparandeclinedtomentionthempubliclybut
onlyagreedtodisclosethenamesoftheseorganizationsinacloseddoorsession.26

TSN,September26,2006pages4,29;seealsoMajorGeneralJovitoPalparan:ComingToATown
NearYou?Accessibleathttp://tornandfrayed.typepad.com/tornandfrayed/2005/10/maj_general
25

_jov.html
26

Id.atp.8.

reportfinalsig

21
Whenaskedabouthispreviousstatementsaccusingpartylistorganizationssuch
asBayan,Karapatan,Gabriela,andAnakBayanasfrontorganizationsoftheCPPNPA
with BayanMunaastheumbrellaorganization,Gen.Palparanneither confirmednor
denied having made these statements.27 Upon further questioning, however, Gen.
PalparansaidthathebasedthisinformationonvideoclippingsofCPPChairmanJoma
SisonnamingcertainNationalDemocraticFrontOrganizationsasthesupportsystems
oftheCPPNPA.28
Gen.PalparanaffirmedhisearlierstatementmadebeforetheCourtofAppeals
whereinhesaidthattheseseeminglylegitimateandordinaryorganizationsareactually
enemiesofthestate.Hemadeanexception,however,withrespecttomembersofthese
organizationswhomaynotreallybeenemiesofthestatebutareconsideredassuchdue
totheirmembershipintheseorganizations.29
InaninterviewbyPiaHontiverosandTonyVelasquezontheTVProgramTop
Story,Gen.PalparanwasaskedwhyheconsideredorganizationslikeBayanMunaas
frontsfortheNPA.Inresponsethereto,Gen.Palparansaidalotofthemembersare
actuallyinvolvedinatrocitiesandcrimes Whenaskedwhatevidencehehadto
supportthisallegation,hesaidthathehadnoevidence,butthathecouldfeelit.Atthe
Commission hearing, however, Gen. Palparan said that there are witnesses who are
formermembersoftheseorganizationsthathaveseveredtheirmembershipwhocanattest
tothis.30 ThesewitnessesortheirstatementswerenotpresentedtotheCommission.
Gen.Palparanalsostressedthatalotofmembersandnotallmembersareinvolvedin
atrocitiesandcrimes.31

4.

Gen.

Palparans Statements implicating specific Party List

Organizations

Gen.Palparanwas reportedtohave madethefollowingstatements beforethe

mediaimplicatingspecificPartyListOrganizationssuchasBayan,Karapatan,Gabriela,
andAnakBayanasfrontsfortheNPA,towit:

27

Id.atp.10.
Id.atp.9.
29
Id.atpp.89.
30
Id.
31
Id.atp.11.
28

reportfinalsig

22
Even though they are in Government as Party List
Representatives, no matter what appearance they take, they are still
EnemiesoftheState.(May16,2006,PhilippineDailyInquirer)32
ThePartyListMembersofCongressaredoingthingstofurther
therevolution,thecommunistmovementIwishtheywerenotthere
(InterviewwithPiaHontiverosandTonyVelasquezTopStory)33
ItismybeliefthatthesemembersofpartylistinCongressare
providing the daytoday policies of the rebel movement (February 3,
2006,FrenchPressAgency)34
WhenaskedtoconfirmduringtheCommissionhearingwhetherornothemade
thesestatementsbeforethemedia,Gen.Palparanonlyconfirmedthestatementgivenin
TopStory.Withrespecttotheothers,hesimplyevadedtheissuebysayingthathewas
notsureorthathecouldnotrecallmakingthestatements. 35Whenaskedtonamewhich
organizationshewasreferringtoasenemiesofthestate,Gen.PalparanrespondedI
justwanttobegeneral,Ijustdontwanttospecify36
Duringthelatterpartofhistestimony,however,whenhewasbeingquestionedby
Chief State Prosecutor Zuo, Gen. Palparan specifically named Bayan Muna as a
recruitmentagencyoftheCPPNPAinMindoro,towit:

in the course of our operation, there were some reports that that
BAYANMUNAheadquartersatthetimeinMindorowasusedasahideout
ofthearmedgroup. AndasIsaid,arecruitmentagencybecausethey
recruit young people there as members of some organizations then
eventually go up in the mountain. And then, there were those who
surrenderedtousconfirmingthis37

5.

Gen.PalparansviewontherepealoftheAntiSubversionAct

Gen.PalparanreiteratedhisviewthattherepealoftheRepublicActNo.1700(the
AntiSubversionAct)wasamistakeandcalledforthereintroductionoflegislationthat
would criminalize membership in the CPP and sympathetic organizations.38 The
followingstatementsofGen.Palparanwerereportedinconnectiontherewith:

32

Id.atp.14.
Id.
34
Id.atpp.1415.
35
Id.atpp.1315.
36
Id.atp.13.
37
Id.atp.61.
38
Id.atp.17.
33

reportfinalsig

23
Iwantcommunismtotallyerased.(May21,2006,PhilippineStar)39
towagetheongoingcounterinsurgencyby"neutralizing"
notjustarmedrebelsbutalsoawebofallegedfrontorganizationsthat
includeleftistpoliticalparties,humanrightsandwomen'sorganizations,
even lawyers and members of the clergy. (Wagging the Buffalo
September25,2006,Newsweek)40
Whenaskedabouthisstatements,Gen.Palparanconfirmedhavingutteredthem
butqualifiedthetermneutralizationbystatingthatitdoesnotonlypertaintophysical
eliminationandarmedconfrontationbutalsobypromotingdialoguesandcourtingpeople
tosupporttheAFP.41

6.

InternalTerritorialDefenseSystem

IntheNewsweekarticleentitledWaggingtheBuffalo,thefollowingwasalso
mentioned:
In the Central Luzon province of Nueva Ecija, Palparan's anti
communiststrategyistoengagelocals,gatherintelligenceandidentify
outsideagitators.Smallmilitaryteamsblockaccesstosocalledmilitants
representing political parties like Bayan Muna and Akbayan, which
Palparan considers "a different face of [communist] political warfare
that'snothealthyforourdemocracy."Thegoal,hesays,istoneutralize
rebel activities by empowering the "silent majority." To that end, the
militaryiscreatingvillagelevelmilitiatokeeprebelsandactivistsout
aftersoldiersdepart.
WhenGen.Palparanwasaskedabouttheaccuracyofthereport,heinitiallyrefused
tocommentonit.42 Uponfurtherquestioning,however,hequalifiedsomeofthepoints
raisedtherein:

6.1

EmpoweringtheSilentMajority

Gen.Palparansaidthatthegreatermajorityofthepeopleareusually
threatenedbyasmallgroupofbadelements,theCPPNPA.Themajority
should be empowered to defend themselves if they are attacked or
propagandizedevenbyfighting,ifnecessary.43
39

Id.
Id.atp.18;SeealsoacopyofthearticleWaggingtheBuffalo
41
Id.atp.19.
42
Id.atp.20.
43
Id.atp.21.
40

reportfinalsig

24

6.2

VillageLevelMilitia

Gen. Palparan said that the term villagelevel militia is not

accuratebecauseaccordingtohim,thecorrecttermisInternalTerritorial
DefenseSystemorBarangayDefenseSystem. Heexplainedthatonce
theAFPleavesafterclearinganareafromenemyinfluence,theresidentsof
thatareashouldbeencouragedtoorganizeasagroupinordertodefend
themselvesfromintruders.44

6.3

CorrelationbetweenDefenseSystemandescalatedkillings

InanarticleentitledPalparan:IEncouragedCivilianstoFightBack
publishedintheAugust22,2006issueofManilaStandardToday,Gen.Palparan
was reported to have admitted that wherever he was assigned, the killings
escalated. Wheninitiallyaskedabouttheveracityofthearticle,Gen.Palparan
denied the accuracy of the statement. After further questioning, however, he
qualifiedthestatementbysayingthatthekillingswerealreadyrampantbeforehis
arrival.Thereafter,theincidentsofkillingswouldincreaseduringthestartofhis
campaignforaperiodofaboutfivetosixweeksandthenafterwards,thereisa
drasticreductioninthenumberofkillings.45

7.

Specificinquiriesonescalatednumberofextrajudicialkillingsduring

Gen.PalparansToursOfDuty

Gen.Palparanwasaskedtoconfirmthecontentsoflistsofvictimsofextrajudicial
executionsduringhistoursofdutyinMindoro(35killings),EasternVisayas(22killings)
andCentralLuzon(75killings)butherefusedtoconfirmordenytheaccuracyofthesaid
lists becausehesaidhedidnothaveanyknowledgeofthesefacts. Moreover,Gen.
Palparan refused to give credence to the said lists because they were prepared by
Karapatan.

8.

CollateralDamage;CiviliansandLocalOfficials;VigilanteKillings

44

Id.atp.22.
Id.atpp.2526.

45

reportfinalsig

25

During the course of his testimony, Gen. Palparan confirmed making the
followingstatements:
8.1

CiviliansKilledinCrossfire

Myordertomysoldiersisthat,iftheyarecertainthatthereare
armedrebelsinthehouseoryard,shootthem.Itwilljustbetoobadif
civiliansarekilledintheprocess. Wearesorryifyouarekilledinthe
crossfire.46
9.2

CollateralDamage

Therewouldbesomecollateraldamage,butitwillbeshortand
tolerable.Theenemywouldblowitupasamassiveviolationofhuman
rights.Buttome,itwouldjustbenecessaryincidents.47
8.3

DeathofCiviliansandLocalOfficials

Sorry nalang kung may madamay na civilian; The death of

civiliansandlocalofficialsweresmallsacrificesbroughtaboutbythe
militarys antiinsurgency campaign. Philippine Daily Inquirer 12
September200648
8.4
Military:

VigilanteStyleActionsbyAntiCommunistElementsOutsidethe

[T]heycannotbestoppedcompletelythekillings,Iwouldsay
arenecessaryincidentsinaconflictbecausethey(referringtotherebels)
areviolent.Itsnotnecessarythatthemilitaryaloneshouldbeblamed.
Wearearmed,ofcourse,andtrainedtoconfrontandcontrolviolence.
But other people whose lives are affected in these areas are also
participating49
Gen.Palparan,however,deniedhavingmadethefollowingstatements:
8.5
Iencouragepeoplevictimizedtogeteven.50(Gen.Palparan
saidthathemerelyencouragedthepeopletodefendthemselvesandto
fightifnecessary.)
8.6
Nabuoang alsamasasaMindoronuong dumating ako,
kumikilosangmgaitosaalanganingoras. Maysarilisilangpagkilos.
Hindi na kami makapahinga kung pati lahat ng pagkilos nila ay
46

Id.atp.30.
Id.
48
Id.atp.33.
49
Id.atp.34.
50
Id.atp.35.
47

reportfinalsig

26
susubaybayan namin. Nakakatulong naman sila sa paglaban sa NPA
gayondinangmgakatuladngRHB.
8.7
ThekillingsarebeingattributedtomebutIdidnotkill
them,Ijustinspiredthetriggermen.

9.

ResponsibilityofsoldiersunderGen.Palparanscommand

Gen.Palparandeniedthemediareportquotinghimtohavesaid:Icannotorder
mysoldierstokill.Itstheirjudgmentcall.Theydoitontheirown.Heclarifiedthat
hiscorrectwordswere:
perhapsmaybe,if thereare,andif theydothat,thats theirown
responsibility,itsnotmine51
Gen.Palparan,however,admittedutteringthephrase:
somesoldiersareemotionalwhentheircomradesarehurtorkilled.
Therecouldbesoldierswhodecidetotakethelawintotheirownhands.
Butthatsillegal.52
FromthetenorofGen.Palparansanswers, heentertainedthepossibilitythat
someofhissoldiersmayhavebeenresponsibleforthekillingsalthoughtheywere
notdirectedbytheircommander.However,hestatedthereisstillnoprovenincident
linkinganyofhissoldiersinanyofthekillings.53
In fact, Gen. Palparan confirmed his statement given before the House of
RepresentativesCommitteeonNationalDefenseandSecurityonMay25,2005wherein
hesaid:Icannotcategoricallydenythat(referringtothemilitaryhavingspecialunits,
notproperlyidentifiedinbonnetsandmasks,operatinginthemiddleofthenight.) 54
Gen.Palparan,however,alsosaidthatiftherearefactsprovingthatthey(soldiers)are
engaged in such activities, he is willing to submit them.55 He also denounced any
involvement by the AFP in the acts that may have been carried out by individual
soldiers.56
51

Id.atp.32.
Id.
53
Id.atp.33.
54
Id.atp.42.
55
Id.atp.43.
56
Id.atp.44.
52

reportfinalsig

27

10.
OnthekillingsofMr.EddieGumanoyandMs.EdenMarcellana

Gen.PalparandeniedanyinvolvementinthekillingofMs.EdenMarcellana.She
wasintheprocessofobjectingtoGen.PalparanspromotiontoBrigadierGeneralbefore
theCommissiononAppointments.
Gen.Palparansaidhewasunawareofthepolicereportoftheincidentstatingthat
militarypersonnelwereinvolvedintheabductionandkillingofMs.Marcellanaandthat
there was a witness that identified one of the suspects as a sergeant working as an
Intelligence Officer withthe204th InfantryBrigadeunder Gen.Palparans command.
Whenquestionedfurther,however,Gen.Palparancontradictedhimselfandadmittedthat
hehadknowledgeoftheincidentbecauseheaccompaniedtheSergeanttotheDOJtofile
hiscounteraffidavit.57
DespiteknowledgeoftheinvolvementofmilitarypersonnelinthekillingofEden
Marcellana, Gen. Palparan did not order the investigation of the military personnel
allegedlyinvolvedbecausetherewerealreadyanumberofinvestigatorsdoingsuch
andIdonthaveauthorityatthattime...58
11.
InvestigationbytheCommitteeonCivil,PoliticalandHumanRights

oftheHouseofRepresentatives.

Gen. Palparan refused to comment on the findings and conclusions of the

investigationbytheCommitteeonCivil,Political,andHumanRightsoftheHouseof
Representatives with respect to the human rights violations in the Southern Tagalog
Region, particularly in Mindoro, primarily because the said committee includes
RepresentativesSaturOcampo,EtangRosales,andLizaMasawhoareallegedlybiased
consideringthattheyhadearlierdeclaredGen.Palparanastheirenemy.59Gen.Palparan
alsorefusedtoconfirmthefactthattheAFPsdefensewasthatthekillingsweredoneby
thegroupcalledAlsaMasa.60

12.
InvestigationofGen.PalparanbyPresidentialTaskForce

57

Id.atp.47.
Id.
59
Id.atp.51.
60
Id.atp.52.
58

reportfinalsig

28

Gen. Palparan said that he was not investigated by the AFP despite the
recommendationsoftheCommitteeonCivil,Political,andHumanRightsoftheHouse
ofRepresentatives. HesaidthathewasonlyinvestigatedbyaPresidentialTaskForce
regardingthekillingsofMr.EddieGumanoyandMs.EdenMarcellana. 61Apparently,the
saidtaskforcedidnotholdGen.Palparanresponsibleforthekillings.

13.
CommandResponsibility

Gen.Palparandeniedtheconclusionthathedidnotdiscouragesoldiersunderhis
commandfromtakingthelawintotheirownhands.62 Thiswasinconsistent,however,
withhisearlierstatementwhereinhesaidIcannotordermysoldierstokill,itistheir
judgmentcall.Theydoitontheirown.
WithrespecttotheconclusionthatGen.Palparandidnotactuallyexerteffortsto
preventorstoptheillegalactsofhissoldiers,Gen.PalparansimplyrespondedThere
wasnoillegalactonmysoldiersthatanyonecouldmention.
Whenaskedwhetherornothediscouragedvigilantestylekillingsofactivistsby
peopleorelementsoutsidethemilitaryorganization,Gen.PalparanrepliedIcouldnot
discouragethembecauseIdonotevenknowthem.63
Gen. Palparan agreed with the concept under the Doctrine of Command
Responsibility that responsibility for summary executions or disappearance extends
beyondthepersonorpersonswhoactuallycommittedthoseacts. Anyonewithhigher
authority, who authorized, tolerated or ignored these acts are liable for them. In
connectiontherewith,however,hesaidthathisfailuretoinvestigatehissoldiersallegedly
responsibleforsomeofthekillingsdoesnotconstitutetoleranceoftheseactsbecause
noneofhissoldiers(exceptintwocases)wereidentified.
WhenaskedabouthisstatementgivenduringaforuminSuluHotelonAugust21,
2006Iamresponsible(referringtoextrajudicialkillings),relativelyperhaps, Gen.
Palparansaidthathisactionscouldhaveencouragedpeopletotakethelawinto

61

Id.atp.5354.
Id.atp.54.
63
Id.atp.55.
62

reportfinalsig

29
theirownhands. Gen.Palparan,however,qualifiedthisbysayingitwasnotreally
intentionalonhispart.64
With respect to failing to take steps at preventing these actions (extrajudicial
killings),GenPalparanstated:
SoifIhave,withinmycapacitytopreventit,Iwouldpreventthesame.
Butinthecourseofourcampaign,Icouldhaveencouragedpeopletodo
that.Somaaaringmayresponsibilityakodoon,onthataspect.Buthow
couldIpreventthat,weareengagedinthisconflict. Allmyactuations
reallyaredesignedtodefeattheenemy. Andindoingso,othersmight
havebeenencouragedtotakeactionsontheirown...
whoeverdidthiscouldhavebeenencouragedbymyactionsand
actuationsinthecourseofmycampaign,whoevertheyare.ThatiswhyI
saidrelatively.Iftherearesomesoldiers,maybethen,Icouldhavebeen
remissinthataspect. Butwearedoingourbesttokeepoursoldiers
withinourmandate.65

14.

CPPNPAPurgeTheory

Significantly,however,whenaskedaboutCPP/NPAsparticipationinthepolitical
killings,hetestifiedthatthekillingsarenotattributabletotheallegedCPP/NPApurge.
IdontchargeittoNPApurge.Healsomentionedthathehadtobeskepticalonth[ese]
report[s].66

D.

InformationfromtheCommissiononHumanRights

OnOctober3,2006,ChairpersonPurificacionQuisumbingoftheCommissionon
Human Rights (CHR) appeared as a resource person and invited members of the
Commission to the CHR and to look at their statistics. Initially, she verbalized her
displeasurewiththesubpoenaissuedtotheCHR.Whilesherecognizedthecreationof
theCommissionbythePresident,shehowever,gavetwopropositions,viz:(1)forthe
Commissiontosenditsresearchersastheirrecordsareopen,and(2)haveadialogueon
mutualconcerns,asamatterofcourtesy.ChairmanMeloexcusedtheCHRChairperson
asshehadnopersonalknowledgeorinformationofthefactswhichtheCommissionwas
64

Id.atp.57.
Id.atp.58.
66
Id.atp.72.
65

reportfinalsig

30
interestedinlookinginto,butdirectedtheGeneralCounseltocoordinatewiththeCHRto
securethesaidnecessaryinformationfromthelattersrecords.

E.

TaskForceMapalad:farmersbeneficiariesinNegrosOccidental

OnNovember27,2006inBacolodCity,theCommissionconductedaprobeof
killingsinvolvingmembersofTaskForceMapalad(TFM),agroupororganizationof
farmersbeneficiariesinNegrosOccidental. TFMPresidentRoditoAngelespresented
severalwitnessesanddocumentsrelativetothekillingsandwoundingofTFMmembers,
whoarebeneficiariesoftheagrarianreformprogramsandredistributionoflandholdings
invariouspartsofNegrosOccidental.Some250TFMalliedfarmerbeneficiaries(FBs)
attendedthehearingandbroughtwiththempostersandpicturesoffamilymemberswho
diedinseparateincidents.Theyclaimedthatlandownersandtheirgoonsareresponsible
for the killings and there is lack of support from authorities to arrest suspects and
expediteactiononthecasestheyfiledwhicharependingbeforethecourtsorprosecution
offices.
Among those presented were witnesses on the murders of land reform
beneficiariesMarioDomingo,TeresaMameng,WilfredoCornea,RicoAdevaandRonilo
Vasquez. TestifyingintheIlonggodialect,JiniferTinerostatedthatonMay17,2006,
armed followers of former landowner Farley Gustilo in Hacienda Cambuktot, La
Castellana,killedMarioDomingowhowasinstalledasfarmerbeneficiary.Thecasefor
murderispendingbeforetheProvincialProsecutionOfficeofNegrosOccidental.
NenitaAdevatoldtheCommissionthatonApril15,2006ataround4:30p.m.,
whilesheandherhusband,RicoAdeva,aTFMorganizer,wereontheirwayhometo
HaciendadeFuegoII,BarangayBagtic,SilayCity,three(3)suspects,namely,Ronald
Europa,acertainBoyNegroandanunidentifiedman,membersoftheRevolutionary
ProletarianArmy(RPA),shotherhusband,RicoAdeva,ten(10)times,hittinghimonhis
bodyandhead.ShesaidthatRicowasshotinherpresenceasshebeggedforhislife.
ShefiledacomplaintformurderbeforetheOfficeoftheCityProsecutionOfficeofSilay
City.
LolitaPederisoclaimedthatonSeptember3,2004,securityguardsoflandowner
MarioVillanuevaledbyJuanitoSuriaga,destroyedthefencethatseparatedthefarmers
reportfinalsig

31
beneficiariesinthetwentyone(21)hectaresawardedtothemundertheCARPLawfrom
Villanuevasland. Suddenly,theguardsstartedstrafingtheirhousesandthefarmers
scamperedforsafety.Earlynextmorning,thebodyofTeresaMameng,aleaderofthe
agrarianreformbeneficiariesinHaciendaConchita,Villanueva,BarangaySagang,La
Castellana,wasdiscoveredatthecornfieldnearherhouse.Themurdercasefiledagainst
SuriagaispendingbeforetheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch63,LaCarlotaCity.
NenitaCorneatestifiedthatonJune26,2006ataround8p.m.,herhusband,
WilfredoCornea,waskilledbytwo(2)goonswearingmasksinHaciendaMulawin
Lanatan in Barangay Poblacion, Sagay City. One of the suspects was identified as
AmadorVillaandfarmlandadministratorJosephLacsonwaslinkedtothekilling. A
complaintformurder againstLacsonandVillawas filedbeforetheCityProsecution
OfficeofSagayCity
LeticiaVasqueztoldtheCommissionthatonFebruary12,2001,eight(8)armed
goonsofGustiloopenedfireatTFMARBswhowereharvestingcropsinthetwenty
three(23)hectareswhichtheyhadoccupiedandcultivatedandkilledRoniloVasquezand
woundedthree(3)others. AcaseforHomicideispendingbeforetheRegionalTrial
Court,Branch63,LaCarlotaCity.
The other cases presented to the Commission included the following, viz: a)
shooting on December 7, 2002 of Jimmy Mameng and Jonathan Pronete, both of
HaciendaConchitaVillanueva,LaCastellana.Acaseforfrustratedhomicideispending
before theRegionalTrialCourt,Branch63,LaCarlotaCity;b)woundingofRonito
Boltron on January 5, 2004 in Hacienda MulawinLanatan, Sagay City. A case for
frustratedmurderispendingbeforeRegionalTrialCourt,Branch60,SagayCity;andc)
shootingofEdgardoCauntoyonDecember29,2004inHaciendaNeliaMinakalawin
BarangayRizalandLopezJaenabysecurityguardsoflandowners.Casesforattempted
andfrustratedmurderarependingbeforetheOfficeoftheCityProsecutionofSagay
City.
Chairman Melo explained that the Commission is focusing its attention on
agrarianrelatedkillingsbecauseitiswithinitsmandatetolookintoanycaseofviolence
involving media people, militants and activists and to fasttrack the investigation of
thereof.Sincethevictimsinthesecasesarefarmeractivists,theyarewithinthescopeof
theCommissionsmandate.

reportfinalsig

32

Themembers of theCommission, impressed by the courageandwill toseek

justiceofthefarmerbeneficiaries,whoarenotinanywayantigovernment,assuredthem
that the Commission will bring their concerns before the appropriate government
agenciesforthespeedyresolutionoftheircases. Forhispart,ChiefStateProsecutor
Zuno,directedtheProvincialandCityProsecutorsofNegrosOccidentaltohastenthe
resolutionofthecasesinvolvingfarmerbeneficiaries.

F.
ProbeinDavaoCity

OnDecember11,2006,theCommissionheldawholedayhearinginDavaoCity
toprobethekillingofGeorgeandMaricelVigo,EnricoCabanit,andHernandoBaria,
whowerelikewiseinvolvedinagrarianreformeffortsandtheorganizationofpeasant
farmers.

1.

GeorgeandMaricelVigo

The spouses George and Maricel Vigo were working for Peoples Kauyahan
Foundation,Inc.aUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP)projectpartner
fortheupliftmentofinternallydisplacedpersons,includingpeasantfarmers. George
Vigo likewise had a local AM radio show concerning agrarian reform issues. The
spousesVigoweregunneddowninSingao,KidapawanCity,Cotobatobyunidentified
menonJune19,2006.
Mr.VenancioBafilar,afriendofthespousesVigotestifiedthatbeforehewas
gunneddown,GeorgeVigoconfidedtoMr.Bafilarthathehadbeenreceivingdeath
threats,andthathewasbeingsuspectedofauthoring,makingorotherwisebeingbehind
the production of a video recording contained in a certain compact disc. This video
recordingwasofacertainbloodlessraidconductedbyNPArebelsuponthemunicipal
hallandPNPStationofMagpet,Cotobato.
Bafilar mentioned that the spouses Vigo were political supporters of
Congresswoman Emmylou TalioSantos and her faction, including Angelita Pelonio,
reportfinalsig

33
whowasrunningformayorofMagpetagainstincumbentEfrenPiol.Infact,Maricel
VigowasworkingintheofficeofCongresswomanTalioSantos. TheTaliosarethe
politicalenemiesofthePiolfaction,whichincludesCotobatoGovernorEmmanuelF.
Piol.Essentially,BafilarstestimonyinsinuatesthatthemurderofthespousesVigowas
politicalinmotivation,andthatthepartiesresponsiblecomefromthecampofthePiols.
ThespousesVigowerealsoincontactwithacertainKaBenjie,asuspectedNPA
member,whomGeorgeVigointerviewedanumberoftimesinhisradioshow.TheVigos
were also supposedly eyewitnesses when Ka Benjie was summarily executed by the
military.
Fr.PeterGeremia,anAmericanpriestworkingfortheTribalFilipinoProgramof
theDioceseofKidapawan,testifiedonhisknowledgeaboutthedeathsofthespouses
Vigo.HementionedthatpriortoandafterthedeathoftheVigos,hewassubjectedto
surveillancebyunidentifiedarmedmen.GeorgeVigoalsoconfidedtoFr.Geremiathata
militaryassetwarnedhim(GeorgeVigo)thathewasinthelistahanofthemilitary.
AfterthekillingoftheVigos,Fr.Geremiaalsoreceivedwrittendeaththreatsthat
thekillingoftheVigoswasamessagetohimandtheTribalFilipinoProgramthatthey
wouldbenext.ThewrittenthreatmoreorlessstatedthatwhoeversupportstheNPA,
deathiswhattheydeserve.
InoneincidentinColumbio,Cotobato,Fr.Geremiawasbeingfollowedbysome
men, one of whom suddenly drew his gun. Upon seeing the gun, Fr. Geremias
companions rushed him inside a store and later asked for help from the house of
ColumbioMayorBermudez.MayorBermudez,however,statedthattherewasnothinghe
coulddobecause,hesaid,thatthegunmenweremilitary.
Fr.GeremiaalsotestifiedthatinamediapresentationbyCol.JohnBucuofthe
40thIBIntelligenceUnit,he(Fr.Geremia)wasidentifiedasasupporteroftheNPAa
fact which Fr. Geremia strongly denies. In fact, Fr. Geremia mentions that after
confronting Col. Bucu and clarifying that he was not an NPA supporter, the latter
apologizedforthefalseinformationtheyreceived.However,Fr.Geremiawasinformed
thathisnameandthoseofhisstaffarestillmentionedininterrogationsofsuspected
NPAs,andthatheisstillundersurveillance,albeitmorediscreetly.

reportfinalsig

34
Fr.Geremiastatedthattheprobablereasonwhyheandhiscolleaguesandstaff
weresuspectedofbeingNPAsupporterswastheirconstantmonitoringofhumanrights
violationsandprovidinglegalassistancetosuspectsdetainedbythemilitary. Infact,
withtheiraid,someofthesesuspectsfiledcounterchargesagainstmilitaryofficers,such
asMajorRubenAgarcio,Lt.EduardoManukan,andCol.CesarIdioofthe25 thIB.Fr.
GeremiarequestedtheCommissionandtheNationalBureauofInvestigationtolookinto
thethreatsagainsthimandhisstaff,andthereasonforthesurveillanceonthem.
Apartfromtheiroraltestimony,theaforementionedwitnessesalsopresentedtheir
written statements together with supporting documents. The affidavits of other
witnesses,namelyGregorioAlave,MaryGraceDingal,andReaLigtas,weresubmitted
totheCommission.Duetolackoftime,however,theywerenolongercalledtodeliver
oraltestimony.
GregorioAlave,theyoungerbrother of MaricelVigo,claimedtohaveseen a
certainTotoAmanciointhesceneofthecrimeafewminutesbeforetheshootingofthe
Vigos. Amancioissaidtobeanotoriousgunforhireconnectedwithpowerfullocal
politicianswhomAlavedidnotidentifybutinsinuatedtobethePiols. Despitehis
information,theTaskForceVigocreatedbytheprovincialgovernmenttoinvestigatethe
VigokillingsaccusedacertainDionisioJekJekMandanguitasthegunman. Alave,
however,claimsthatthisisnotpossiblebecauseMadanguitbelongedtothe39thInfantry
BattalionofthePhilippineArmyandwasinthecompanyoftheCIDGlongbeforethe
Vigokilling.

2.

EnricoCabanit

EnricoCabanitwasthechairpersonoftheWADECOREmployeesandAgrarian
Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (WEARBAI) and the Secretary General of
PambansangUgnayanngmgaNagsasarilingOrganisasyonsaKanayunan(UNORKA
National). Hewasassassinatedbyanunidentifiedgunmanwearingabonnetatthe
publicmarketofPanaboCity,DavaoDelNorteonApril24,2006. Woundedinthe
incidentwasDaffodilCabanit,EnricoCabanitsdaughter.

Aswitnesses,theCommissioncalledP/SeniorInvestigatorWilfredoPuertoand
PO3 Domingo Ranain, who investigated the Cabanit murder. PSI Puerto is the
Intelligence Officer of the Panabo City Police Station, while Ranain is the police
reportfinalsig

35
investigator on duty for the Cabanit murder. They both claimed that they already
solvedthecrimeandthatitwasacertainEnriqueSolonwhowasthegunman.Enrique
Solonwassupposedlyidentifiedpostmortembyeyewitnesses,ashehadbeenkilledin
similarfashioninGeneralSantosCitysomedayslater. Likewise,acertainBenedick
MallorcasupposedlyoverheardSolondrunkenlyboastingaboutkillingCabanit.
However,therearenumerousdiscrepanciesandsuspiciousdetailsregardingthe
investigationwhichtendedtodisprovethepolicetheory,therebypromptingtheGeneral
Counseltointensivelycrossexaminethewitnesses.Inparticular,thefollowingdetails
weresuspicious:

ThebodyofCabanitwasnotautopsiedbeforeburial,inviolation

ofstandardprocedure,anddespiterequestsforautopsybyCabanitsfamily;

Thesupposedeyewitness,Mr.RyanCatalan,neverstatedinhis

affidavitthathesawthefaceoftheassailant.Hence,hisidentificationofSolons
bodyasthegunmanisunreliable.

Solonsbodyandfaceatthetimethesupposedwitnessesidentified

itwereseverelyswollen(asshowninthesubmittedpicture),thatitwasvirtually
impossibletoidentifyhimbasedonhisallegedfleetingappearanceatthecrime
scene.

ThepolicereportedthatCabanitwasshotwitha9mmhandgun

threetimes,andthattheyrecovered9mmcartridgesatthesceneofthecrime.
However, the NBI expert witness stated that, upon his examination, Cabanit
sustainedonlytwo(2)gunshotwoundsandthat,duetotheirdiameter,theycould
nothavebeencausedbya9mmslug,butonlybynolessthan.45caliberpistol
slugs.

The police did not bother to bring Daffodil Cabanit to see and

identifySolonasthegunman.DaffodilCabanitisinthebestpositiontosee,
describeandidentifyherfathersassailant.
Afterseveralquestions,thepoliceofficersstatedthattheinvestigationwasstill
ongoinginthattheyhaveyettoidentifythemastermindforthekilling.TheCommission
inquiredastowhatstepsthepoliceweretakingtodoso.Thepoliceofficersstatedthat
theywerewaitingforfurtherinformationfromtheirwitness,Mr.BenedickMallorca.
TheCommissionnotedthattheinvestigationshouldnotbekeptidlywaitingforawitness

reportfinalsig

36
tovolunteerinformation,especiallysincethecaseofCabanitis,accordingtoTaskForce
Usigsreport,underextensiveinvestigation.
TheNBIsMedicoLegalexaminer,Dr.EdgarSaballa,testifiedonhisautopsyof
CabanitsbodyundertakenafteritsexhumationwasorderedbytheCommission. He
discoveredthatthereweretwo(2)gunshotwoundsandnotthree(3)asstatedinthe
policereport.Healsoconcludedthat,basedontheentrywounds,theweaponusedwasa
.45 caliber pistol, and definitely not a 9mm pistol as stated in the police report.
Unfortunately, no slugs were recovered from Cabanits body for possible ballistic
examination.
Last to testify was Mr. Rodolfo Imson, the local Regional Director of the
DepartmentofAgrarianReform. HetestifiedastothegoodcharacterofCabanit,but
thattheDARhasnoideawhowasbehindhiskilling. He,however,mentionedthat
violenceisaconstantproblemintheimplementationoftheagrarianreformprogram,and
thathehimselfhasbeenreceivingdeaththreatsfromunknownparties.

3.

HernandoBaria

Hernando Baria was a farmer and officer of a local farmers group in Iloilo
provincecalledtheAsaoFarmersandResidentsAssociation(AFRA).Hewasshotand
killedonJuly23,2005bypolicemenduringanencounterinvolvingtheserviceofan
allegedsearchwarrant.
Hernando Barias widow, Jovita Baria, testified before the Commission that
Balasan townViceMayorSusanBedroistheonebehindthekillingofherhusband.
Accordingtoher,thekillingwasmotivatedbyherhusbandbeingoneofthebeneficiaries
ofagrarianreformimplementationoverthelandownedbyBedro,andbecausehewas
oneoftheinstrumentalofficersofAFRA.Uponprodding,however,shealsoadmitted
thatherhusbandpossessedanunlicensedfirearmandfiredthesameduringtheencounter
withthepolice.Italsoappearedthatthepolicewereinpossessionofasearchwarrant
fortheAFRApremiseswhereBariawasstaying.
JovitaBariafiledmurderchargesagainsttheconcernedpoliceofficerswhichis
nowcurrentlypendingwiththeofficeoftheOmbudsman.

reportfinalsig

37

G.

PresentationofMediagroups

OnNovember21,2006,theCommissionmetofficersoftheNationalPressClub
(NPC)todiscussthekillingofseveralmediamenandtheirchillingeffectonpress
freedom.
Themembersofthemediabelievedthattheydonothavethepowertostop,much
less control the killing of media men. The NPC officers cited the law enforcement
component,includingtheevidencegathering,investigation,andprosecutionsystems,as
wellaspoliticalpressure,asthemainproblemsthatneedtobeaddressedinordertosolve
thesekillingsandtopreventfutureincidents. Theystatedthatfirmandeffectivelaw
enforcementandprosecutionareeffectivedeterrentstothiskindofkillings.
TheNPCsaidthatthekillingofjournalistsismostlikelyrelatedtopoliticiansor
moneyedinfluentialpersons.Sincemanylawenforcementauthoritiesorpolicemenare
underthewingsofthesepoliticiansorinfluentialpersons,itisverydifficultforlaw
enforcementauthoritiestobeeffective.
The NPC cited the killing or wounding of the following media men and the
suspectsbehindthem:
a.

PhilipAgustininDingalan,Aurora,wherethesuspectisMayorIlarde;

b.

AlbertoUrsalinoinMalabonCity,wherethesuspectisacertainJimenez;

c.

JonathanAbayoninGeneralSantosCity,wherethesuspectisanarmy
technicalsergeant;

d.

PabloHernandez whoreceivedseveral threats and was stabbed several

timesbutmanagedtosurvive.Thesuspectisamemberofthemaritime
policeforce.

H.
PresentationofUnitedChurchofChristofthePhilippinesandtheNational

CouncilofChurchesofthePhilippines.

reportfinalsig

38
OnDecember22,2006,officialsoftheUnitedChurchofChristofthePhilippines
(UCCP)andtheNationalCouncilofChurchesofthePhilippines(NCCP)metwith
PresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyoandChairmanMelo,amongothers.TheUCCPand
NCCPreportedthat10clergyand5layworkersofchurchbasedprogramshavebecome
victimsofextrajudicialkillings.Theyalsomentionedthat8UCCPmemberswhowere
alsoactiveinpeoplesorganizationsweresimilarlyslain.Amongthosementionedinthe
listofslainclergymenisBishopAlbertoB.RamentooftheIglesiaFilipinaIndependiente
whosecasehasbeenremovedfromthelistofactivistkillingsandhasbeenclassifiedas
oneofrobbery.
WhileitiswasnotclearifthesekillingsarewithintheCommissionsmandated
scopeoftheinquiry,thesamebeingneitheractivistnormediarelated,theCommission
neverthelessendorsedthesecasestotheNationalBureauofInvestigation,throughNBI
DirectorandCommissionerNestorMantaring,whoundertooktoprioritizeandexpedite
theinvestigationofthesecases.

III.
CASESTUDIES

A.

ProfileofVictims

Themajorityofthevictimsoftheextrajudicialkillingsweremembersoftheso
calledleftwingorganizationsprimarilyBayanMuna,Anakpawis,BagongAlyansang
Makabayan,KarapatanandKPD(KilusanparasaPambansangDemokrasya)andother
causeorientedgroupslike,forexample,TaskForceMapaladandUNORKA(Ugnayanng
mgaNagsasarilingOrganisasyonsaKanayunan)workingforagrarianreformandother
socialjusticeissues.
TheCommissionwasgivenbyTaskForceUsigthefilesrelatingtofourteen(14)
casesofextrajudicialkillingofactivistsormilitantswhicharesupposedtobetypicalor
representativeofthecasesunderinvestigationbyTaskForceUsig.
Therecordsof saidcasesshowacommonpatterninthemethodologyof the
attacks,theleftistprofileofthevictimsoratleastmembershipinacauseorientedgroup,
andthelackofprogressintheinvestigationorprosecutionofthecase.

reportfinalsig

39
Theattacksinhalfofthecaseswerecarriedoutbyunidentifiedmenridingon
motorcycles and wearing bonnet masks (Sotero Llamas, Jose Doton, Noel Capulong,
VictorinaGomez,PaquitoDiaz,ElenaMendiolaandEnricoCabanit)
Ontheleftistprofileofthevictims:ThevictimsweremembersofBayanMuna
(RubenApolinario,ExpeditoAlbarillo,SoteroLlamas,NoelCapulong,ElenaMendiola,
Juanito Mesias, Jose Doton), Anakpawis (Tito Macabitas), and other causeoriented
groups, namely, Kapisanan Para Sa Pambansang Demokrasya (Analiza S. Abanador),
BinodganPeoplesOrganization,anactiveadvocateagainstlargescalemininginKalinga
(RafaelBangit),ConfederationforUnity,RecognitionandAdvancementofGovernment
Employees, a militant organization fighting for equal rights, better benefits and
opportunitiesingovernmentworkplaces(PaquitoDiaz),andUNORCA,anorganization
activeintheimplementationoftheagrarianreformlaw(EnricoCabanit).
Thecaseshaveremainedunsolved(RubenApolinar,ExpeditoAlbarillo,Rafael
Bangit, Noel Capulong, Victorina Gomez, Paquito Diaz). In five (5) of the cases,
althoughcriminalcomplaintsagainstthesuspectshavebeenfiledwiththeOfficeofthe
Public Prosecutor, the identification of the suspects is at best dubious (Annaliza
Abanador,SoteroLlamas,TitoMacabitas,ElenaMendiola.Withrespecttotheparticular
case of Enrico Cabanit, the alleged two eyewitnesses supposedly identified a certain
EnriqueSolonwho,atthetimeoftheidentification,wasalreadydead;theidentification,
tosaytheleast,ishighlyquestionable.
Theinvestigationinmanyofthecaseshasmetablankwall(RubenApolinar,
Expedito Albarillo, Rafael Bangit, Noel Capulong, Victorina Gomez, Paquito Diaz).
Withrespecttothecasespendingpreliminaryinvestigation,thesuspectsarestillatlarge
(AnnalizaAbanador,SoteroLlamas,TitoMacabitas,ElenaMendiola).
Itisonlyinonecase(JoseDoton)wheretheaccusedhasbeenarrestedbutthere
isnoindicationinthepolicefileastothestatusofthecase.

1.

RubenApolinar

RubenApolinarwasaBayanMunacoordinatorofSanTeodoro,OrientalMindoro
whilehiswife,RodrigaApolinar,wasamemberoftheGabriela.Whilethespouseswere
sleepingwiththeireightyearolddaughterattheirhouseinBarangayIlag,SanTeodoro,
reportfinalsig

40
OrientalMindoroatabout9:30p.m.onMay20,2002,unidentifiedpersonsriddledthe
housewithbullets,killingallthree. SixtythreepiecesofemptyshellsofM16were
recoveredfromthecrimescene. Thepolicenevercameupwithanysuspect;thecase
remainsunsolved.

2.

AnnalizaS.Abanador

AnnalizaS.Abanador,35yearsold,single,wasamilitantleaderandmemberof
theKapisananParaSaPambansangDemokrasya(KPD)andformerpresidentofBATAS
ACT,amilitantgroup.OnMay18,2006,atabout5:30p.m.,herbodywasdiscoveredby
a coemployee, riddled with multiple gunshot wounds, at the Dakki Sale Center in
Balanga,Bataanwhereshewasworkingasanassistantpersonnelofficer.Four(4)spent
shellsfiredfroma.45calibrepistolandone(1)deformed.45calibreslugwererecovered
fromthecrimescene.
ThepolicefiledchargesagainsttheallegedsuspectsAllanPrado@IanandJose
Carabeo@Toktok,reportedlybothmembersoftheCPPNPAbasedontheidentification
of a tricycle driver who supposedly saw the suspects coming out of the Dakki Sale
Center.Thedriveridentifiedthesuspectsfromphotographsshowntohimbythepolice.
Based on said identification and without having apprehended the suspects
remainingatlarge,thePNPfiledacriminalcomplaintformurderwiththeOfficeofthe
CityProsecutorofBalangaCity,BataanonMay30,2006.

3.

ExpeditoAlbarillo

ExpeditoAlbarilloandhiswifeEmmanuelaAlbarilloweremembersofBayan
Muna.Atabout6a.m.atSitioIbuye,Brgy.Calsapa,SanTeodoro,OrientalMindoro,the
spouses,afterbeinghogtiedanddraggedfromtheirhouse,wereshottodeathbyeight(8)
unidentifiedmen,threeofwhomwerewearingbonnets.
ThepolicereportreferstothespousesaslielowmembersofCPP/NPAand
ExpeditoAlbarillowassupposedlylinkedtotheassassinationofthelateMayorOscar
AldabaofSanTeodoro.

reportfinalsig

41
ThePNPobtainedthestatementofthemotherofExpeditoAlbarillothatshewas
nolongerinterestedinpursuingtheinvestigation.Itwouldseemthatthisisthereason
whythepolicehasstoppedanyfurtherinvestigation.

4.

SoteroLlamas

SoteroLlamasjoinedtheCPP/NPAduringthemartiallawregimeofPresident
Marcos; he was forced to go underground because he was an active member of the
KabataangMakabayan. AfterhewascapturedinMay1995,hewasgrantedamnesty
undertheJointAgreementonSecurityandImmunityGuarantee.Hethereafterservedas
politicalconsultantfortheNDFinthepeacenegotiationsbetweentheNDFandtheGRP
from1997to2004. HealsoservedaspoliticalaffairsdirectorofthePartyListBayan
Muna.Inthe2004elections,heranforinAlbaybutlost.
OnMay29,2006,atabout8:30a.m.,whileonboardamulticabwhichwas
maneuveringtomakeauturn,threemenonboardamotorcycleapproachedtherightside
ofthemulticabandatcloserangefiredseveralshots,hittingLlamasonceonthehead
andthriceonthebodywhilethedriversustainedonegunshotwoundontherightarm.
Llamaswaspronounceddeaduponarrivalinthehospital.
Twoallegedeyewitnesses,amalepedicabdriveranda19yearoldfemalestudent,
whowerenotnamedinthefile,supposedlyidentifiedoneofthegunmenasEdgardo
Sevilla,allegedlyamemberoftheCommunistTerroristgroupoperatinginthefirstand
second districts of Albay. The two witnesses were supposedly presented before the
Office of theRegional StateProsecutor andtheyaffirmedtheir statementspositively
identifying Edgardo Sevilla and one Edgar Calag. According to the police, their
intelligencereportdisclosedthatEdgardoSevillaiscurrentlyanNPAcommanderwhile
EdgardoCalag,adischargedPhil.ArmyspecialforcesmemberwhowentAWOLafter
killinghisdetachmentcommander,isbelievedtobeanNPAmemberoperatinginAlbay
andSorsogon.

5.

JoseDoton

JoseC.DotonwastheSecretaryGeneraloftheBagongAlyansangMakabayan
(BayanMuna)andPresidentofTIMMAWA(TignayTiMannalonaMangwayawayati
Agno).Atabout10:30a.m.onMay16,2006,whilethevictimandhisbrother,Cancio
reportfinalsig

42
Doton,wereontheirwayhomeonboardamotorcycle,withthevictimasbackrider,two
personswearinghelmetsonboardamotorcyclewhowereapparentlytailingthemfired
severalshotsatthem. Thevictimandhisbrotherfelldown. Thereafter,oneofthe
gunmenapproachedJoseDotonwhowaslyingonthegroundandshothiminthehead.
Hewasrushedtoahospitalbutwaspronounceddeadonarrival.Hisbrotherwashitat
thebackbutmanagedtosurvive. TheincidenthappenedonAnongRoad,Sabangan
River,BrgyCamanggan,SanNicolas,Pangasinan.
AcomplaintformurderandfrustratedmurderhasbeenfiledagainstacertainJoel
S.Floresbecause:(a)themotorcyclesupposedlyusedinthekillingisregisteredinhis
name;and(b)the.45calibrepistolfoundinhispossessionwhensubjectedtoaballistic
examinationturnedouttobetheoneusedintheshooting.
According to the police report, the identities of the suspects cannot be
establishedasofthistimesince therearenowitnesseswhohadsurfacedtogivean
eyewitness account of the incident and that the motives for the killing cannot be
established. ThereisnoreportonthestatusofthecasefiledagainstJoelS.Flores.

6.

RafaelBangit

On June 8, 2006, at about 3:30 p.m., Rafael Bangit, 45 years old, married,
SecretaryGeneralofBinodnganPeoplesOrganizationandanactiveadvocateagainst
largescalemininginKalinga,andChairmanofBayanMunaKalingaProvince,wasa
passengerinabusboundforBaguioCityfromTabuk,Kalinga.Afterthebushadastop
overfordinnerinBrgyQuezon,SanIsidro,Isabelaand,asthepassengerswereaboutto
board,apersonwearingablackbonnetsuddenlyappearedandshotthevictim,including
GloriaCasuga,aschoolprincipal,wholikewisesustainedfivegunshotwounds.
ThepersonwhoshotRafaelBangitwaswithotherarmedmenwhofledonboard
aDelicavan,whichhadapparentlybeentailingthebussinceitleftTabuk,Kalinga.
Therehasbeennoprogresswhatsoeverintheinvestigationofthecase.

7.

NoelNoliCapulong

reportfinalsig

43
NoelNoliCapulong,aBayanMunaLagunaChapterleaderandamemberof
theUnitedChurchofChristinthePhilippines(UCCP)wasshottodeathonMay27,
2006atabout6p.m.inBrgy.Parian,CalambaCity,bytwounidentifiedsuspectsridingon
amotorcycle.Oneofthesuspectswhowasthebackrideralightedfromthemotorcycle
andshotthevictimatcloserangewhowasonboardanownertypejeep.Thesuspects
were both wearing bonnets but the gunman supposedly wore the bonnet only as a
headgear.AsofMay2006,CapulongwasthefourthmemberoftheUCCPtobekilled.
Acriminalcomplaintformurderissupposedtohavebeenfiledagainstacertain
AlfredoAlinsunurinwiththeCityProsecutorsOffice,CalambaCity,butthefiledoes
notindicatetheevidentiarybasisforthecharge.Therespondentisatlarge.

8.

VictorinaGomez

VictorinaGomez,63yearsold,awidowwasthebarangaycaptainofBrgy.Parian,
MexicoPampanga. Theshootingoccurredatabout5:30p.m.onDecember16,2005,
while Ms. Gomez, together with Brgy. Kagawad Romeo Atienza, Brgy Kagawad
ReynaldoMacabali,andotherpersonswerewalkingtowardsherhouseafterattendinga
meeting hosted by the 69th Infantry Batallion, Philippine Army held at the Mexico
GymnasiuminMexico,Pampanga.Twounidentifiedmalesuspectswearinghelmetsand
ridingamotorcyclewereresponsibleforthekilling.Whileoneofthesuspectskeptthe
engine of the motorcycle running, the other walked towards Ms. Gomez and her
companionandshottodeathMs.GomezandKagawadRomeoAtienza;Brgy.Kagawad
Reynaldo Macabali was seriously wounded. Afterwards, the gunman immediately
boardedthemotorcycleandtheassailantsspedaway.
The gunman apparently used a cal 9mm machine pistol with a silencer.
Recoveredfromthecrimescenewereemptyshellsanddeformedslugsfromasuspected
cal.9mmpistol.
Therehasbeennoreportedprogressinthepoliceinvestigationwhatsoever.

9.

TitoMacabitas

TitoMacabitaswasapparentlyassociatedwith,ifnotanactivememberof,Anak
Pawisandonseveraloccasionshadbeensightedinseveralralliesoftheleftistshere
reportfinalsig

44
(SanJoseCity)andinMetroManila.Hewasemployedasautilityworkeroroverseerat
theVillaRamosResortandHotelwhichisownedbyDr.BenReyes,aknownAnak
Pawisadviser.TheresortissaidtobeafrequentvenueofmeetingsofAnakPawisand
otherleftistgroups.
OnOctober20,2005,atabout10:10p.m.whileTitoMacabitasandhiswife,Eva
D.Macabitas,wereintheirresidenceatBrgy.Manicla,SanJoseCityandwhilethey
werealreadyinbed,theywereawakenedbyaknockontheirbedroomdoor.Evelyn,a
nieceofTitoMacabitas,informedthelatterthatsomebodywaslookingforhim. Tito
Macabitasdecidedtogoouttocheck,followedbyhiswife..Uponreachingthesideof
thehouseofEvelyn,themanlookingforTitoMacabitasapparentlyaskedthelatterhis
namebecausehiswifeheardherhusbandsayingthathewasTitoMacabitas. Atthat
juncture,thestrangershotTitoMacabitasandalsohiswifewhowashitinthepalmofher
right hand. Theassailantfledina waitingvehicle (Itis notclear whether it was a
motorcycle,acarorajeep;accordingtothewifeMayroonpongmaingaynamotorna
nakaparadasamalapitlangsabahayniEvelyn.(AffidavitofEvaD.Macabitas).
Acriminalcomplaintformurderandfrustratedmurderhasbeenfiledagainsta
certainDindoMendozaandtwoothers(unidentified).BasedonthestoryofoneArmand
Arce,hewasallegedlyaskedbyDindoMendozaatabout7p.m.onOctober20,2005to
join in killing Tito Macabitas who supposedly discovered their extortion racket in
collectingmoneyfromestablishmentsbypretendingtobemembersoftheNPAandhad
threatenedtoreportthemtotheauthorities.AccordingtoArce,herefusedtojoinand
thatDindoMendozawithtwocompanionslefttoproceedtoBrgy.Maniolathatnight.
Earlymorningofthefollowingday,ArmandoArceallegedlylearnedthatTitoMacabitas
hadbeengunneddown.

10.
PaquitoPaxDiaz

PaquitoPaxDiaz,42yearsold,singleandsupposedlyanAWOLemployeeof
theDepartmentofAgrarianReform,wasshotandkilledonJuly6,2006,atabout6p.m.
inBrgy.54,EsperasAvenue,TaclobanCity,bytwomotorcycleridingmalesuspects.
Thebackriderarmedwitha.45calibrepistolapparentlyfittedwithasilenceractedas
thetriggermanwhoshotthevictimtwicewhilethelatterwaswaitingforafriendalong
EsperasAvenue.Thedriverofthemotorcyclewaswearingahelmetwhilethegunman
wassportingaballcapwhichpartlycoveredhisface.
reportfinalsig

45

At the time of his death, Paquito Pax Diaz was the Chairperson of the
Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees
(COURAGEEasternVisayas), a militant organizationfighting for equal rights, better
benefits and opportunities in government work places, and was allied with other
progressive groups such as Alliance of Water Concessionaires (ALWAGON), Bayan
Muna, Anak Pawis, Gabriela, Anak ng Bayan, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and
others. TheCOURAGEundertheleadershipofMr.Diazwasthenengagedinalegal
battlebetweentheLeyteMetroWaterDistrictEmployeesAssociation(LMWDEA),an
affiliate of COURAGE, and the previous LMWD management under then General
ManagerEngr.RanulfoC.Felicianothatwastriggeredbytheallegeddismissalof26
LMWDemployees.
Absolutely no progress has been reported. No witness could even give a
description of the perpetrators to provide sufficient basis for a cartographic sketch
becausethedriverofthemotorcyclewaswearingahelmetwhilethegunmanhadaball
caponwhichpartlycoveredhisface.

11.
ElenaMendiola

ElenaMendiola,54yearsold,marriedandtheSecretaryGeneralofBayanMuna
IsabelaChapterwasshotsixtimesintheheadonMay10,2006,atabout8p.m.,in
BarangayGaritSur,EchagueIsabela,bytwomalepersonswearingblackbonnetmasks.
Killed at the same time was her supposed livein partner, Ricardo Ric Balauag,
Bayan Muna Chairman, Municipality of Echague. The perpetrators fled on board a
motorcycle.
Awitness,BayaniVillanueva,gaveasupplementalstatementdatedJune1,2006
thatonMay10,2006ataround8p.m.,whileonboardhismotorcyclegoingtothehouse
ofRubyCorpuzinBarangayGaretSur,Echague,IsabelatomeetwithRicardoBalauag
heheardseveralburstsofgunfirepromptinghimtoseekcoverandatthatjuncturehe
saw two armed men in black sweaters ridingintandem on asportstype motorcycle
removingtheirbonnetmaskswhilefleeingtowardshisdirection. Asthelightofhis
motorcyclewasstillon,hewasabletoidentifyRenatoBusaniaandTimoteoCorpuz
whomhesupposedlymetonMarch2,2006afterhewastoldbyRicardoBalauagabout

reportfinalsig

46
thetwopersonsfrequentinghishouseandthreateninghimwithharmifhefailedto
producesomething.

12.
JuanitoMesias,Jr.

JuanitoMesias,28yearsold,marriedandamemberofBayanMunaKananga
ChapterwaskilledonMay13,2001atabout11:30p.m.atBarangaySanIsidro,Kananga,
Leyte.Thevictim,togetherwithDaniloGusandoandothercompanions,whileridingon
their respective motorcycles and campaigning for their candidate, incumbent Mayor
GiovanniEdM.Nepari,wasambushedbytheallegedsuspects,OmarSumodlayon,said
tobeaformerNPAmember,andMelquiadesSumodlayon. Mesiasdiedonthespot
whilehiscompanionDaniloGuisandowaswounded.
ThecaseformurderandfrustratedmurderispendingtrialbeforetheRegional
Trial Court of Ormoc City. The Task Force Usig file on the case given to this
Commissiondoesnotindicatetheunderlyingevidenceinsupportofthecaseagainstthe
allegedsuspects.

13.
EnricoCabanit

EnricoCabanit,marriedandsecretarygeneralofthePambansangUgnayanng
mgaNagsasarilingLocalnaOrganisasyonsaKanayunan(UNORCA),anorganization
thatisastaunchadvocateofagrarianreformandsocialjustice,waskilledonApril24,
2006,atabout66:30p.m.neartheunloadingareaoffishcarsatthePanaboPremium
MarketinPanaboCity,DavaoNorte. Twounidentifiedpersonsridingintandemona
motorcyclewithnoplatenumberwereresponsible.Thebackriderwearingawhiteupper
basketballgarmentwithhisfacepartiallycoveredwithapieceofclothalightedandshot
EnricoCabanitwho,withhisdaughterDaffodil,waswaitingfortransportation.Enrico
CabanitdiedonthespotbutDaffodilwasonlywoundedandshesurvived.
AcertainEnriqueSolonwhowaskilledinGen.SantosonMay26,2006was
identified by two alleged eyewitnesses Ryan Catalan and Romeo Cabillo as the
gunmanwhoshotandkilledEnricoCabanit.

TheidentificationofEnriqueSolonasthegunmanandkillerofEnricoCabanitis
highlyquestionableandnotcredible.Thetwoeyewitnesses,basedontheirstatements,
reportfinalsig

47
didnotreallygetagoodlookatthegunmanandcouldnothavepositivelyidentifiedhim
bylookingatthecadaverofEnriqueSolonwhoseswollenface,basedonthephotograph
lookedmarkedlydifferentfromthefaceofthelatterwhenhewasalive. (Thiscaseis
moreextensivelydiscussedinconnectionwiththehearingheldinDavaoCitybythe
Commission).

14.
TeresaMameng

TeresaMameng,59yearsold,married,aTaskForceMapaladmember,wasfatally
hitbyabulleton3September2004ataboutmidnightwhenagroupofarmedmen,with
assaultrifles,firedwithoutanyprovocationatagroupofshantiesoccupiedbyCARP
farmerbeneficiarieswhoweremembersofTaskForceMapaladattheoutskirtsofthe
VillanuevaSugarPlantationlocatedatHaciendaConchitaVillanueva,Brgy.Sagang,La
Castellana,NegrosOccidental.
Basedupontheinvestigationofthepolice,acomplaintformurderandmultiple
attemptedmurderwasfiledon6September2004againstfourmembersoftheTuguis
Security Services, Inc. who were hired by the management of Hacienda Conchita
Villanueva;thecomplaintwaslateramendedtoincludeJuanitoSuriaga,anoverseerof
thehacienda. (However,on21March2006,thechargeofmurderwasdowngradedto
homicideperaresolutionissuedbytheProvincialProsecutorsOffice). Thecasehas
beendraggingonfortwoyearswithoutanysignificantprogress.

B.
MethodologyofAttacks

Theextrajudicialkillingsofactivistswerecarriedoutinagreatnumberofcases
byunidentifiedmenridingonmotorcycleswearinghelmetsorbonnetmasks.
Theattackersrodeintandemontheirmotorcycles,withthebackridergettingoff
todotheshooting.Insomeofthecaseswheretheattackerskilledtheirvictimsonfoot,
theymadetheirescapeusingmotorcycles.

reportfinalsig

48
The efficiency and confident manner with which the attacks were undertaken
clearlysuggestthatthekillerswerewelltrainedprofessionalswhoknewtheirbusiness
well. Manyoftheattackswerecarriedoutduringdaytimeandconsummatedwitha
limitednumberofshotshittingtheirintendedtarget.Thefamiliesofthevictimsinmany
of the cases reported previous death threats or surveillance by suspected military or
policepersonnel.

IV.
FINDINGS

From the evidence and presentations received by the Commission, it became

apparentearlyonthattheCommissionmustdifferentiateitsinquiryintothekillingsof
activistsfromthoseofmediapersonnelandagrarianreformmovement.Itappearedthat
thekillingsofmediapersonnelaremoreorlessattributabletoreprisalsforthevictims
expossorothermediapractices.Inthemediakillings,localpoliticians,warlords,orbig
businessinterestsareviewedasthepartiesresponsibleforthekillings,whileinagrarian
reform related killings, it is suspected that landowners and those opposed to the
implementationoflandreformarebehindthekillings.Ontheotherhand,thekillingsof
activistswereinvariablylaidatthedoorstepofthemilitary.
TheinvestigationofkillingsofmediapersonnelbythePNPwasnotablymore
successfulthanthatthatofactivistkillings. Forthemediakillings,formalcomplaints
havebeenfiledinagreatmajorityofcases. Suspectsinthemediakillingshavebeen
namedandidentified.Inactivistkillings,therehavebeenameaslynumberofcomplaints
filedwiththeauthorities.
Inall,thekillingsofmediapersonnelhavebeen,moreorless,solved,compared
totheactivistkillingsandagrarianreformrelatedkillings.Ontheotherhand,itisnot
cleariftheagrarianreformrelatedkillingshavethesameetiologyastheactivistkillings.
Thus, the Commission hereby sees fit to submit its findings on activist killings
independentlyofthatofthemediakillingsandagrarianreformrelatedkillings.

MEDIAKILLINGS
Itappearsthatthekillingofmediapersonnelhasbeencharacterizedbythelackof
acentralorhomogenoustheoryforthemotivestherefor.Mostofthekillingshavebeen
reportfinalsig

49
plausiblyattributedtoeitherpersonalvengeance,localpolitics,orcommercialconcerns.
Whilethemediakillingsarebynomeanslessabhorrentthantheactivistkillings,thefact
is that no central theory accusing agents of the government of the systematic
assassinationofmediapersonnelhasbeenforwarded,nottomentionsubstantiated.
Likewise,theprogressorperformanceofthePNPinsofarasthemediakillingsare
concernedismuchbetterthanthatpertainingtoactivistkillings. TaskForceUsighas
forwardedforprosecution21outofthe26casesofslainmediamen.
Nonetheless, the increase in the number of slain media men should not go
unheeded.Thefactisthatcertainpersonsorgroupshavebeensoboldastoassaultand
killmediapersonnelfortheirownselfishinterests.Thiscannotbecondoned.ThePNP
aswellastheprosecutionarmofthegovernmentshouldmakesurethattheperpetrators
ofthesecrimesarebroughtswiftlytojustice.

AGRARIANREFORMRELATEDKILLINGS

WiththeexceptionofHernandoBaria,thekillingoffarmersactivistsappearedto
havefollowedthesamepatternasotheractivists.InthecaseoftheVigospouses,their
killingcouldhavebeenmotivatedbypoliticalreasonsorbyreasonoftheirperceivedties
with the NPA. In the case of Enrico Cabanit, it appears that he was killed for his
activitiesasapeasantfarmerleader,andnotforaffiliationwithpoliticiansorwiththe
NPA.Inanycase,theirdeathsareequallydeplorableandcannotbecountenanced.Most
ofthecasesofagrarianrelatedkillingshavependinginvestigationsorlegalactionbefore
theproperauthorities.Hence,theresultofsuchinvestigationsshouldshedmorelighton
the personsorinterestsbehindthekillings. Inthisregard,theprosecutionandlaw
enforcementauthoritiesconcernedshouldexpeditetheinvestigationandprosecutionof
thesecrimes.Particularattentionshouldbeplacedontheinvestigationsbeingundertaken
bythepoliceinthevariouscases,specificallythatofCabanit,itappearingthatthepolice
seemedtohavefailedtoearnestlyandproperlyinvestigatethesame.
ACTIVISTKILLINGS
From the evidence gathered, and after an extensive study of the same, the
Commission comes to the conclusion that there is no direct evidence, but only
circumstantialevidence,linkingsomeelementsinthemilitarytothekillings.THEREIS
reportfinalsig

50
NOOFFICIALORSANCTIONEDPOLICYONTHEPARTOFTHEMILITARYOR
ITS CIVILIAN SUPERIORS TO RESORT TO WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES
EUPHEMISTICALLY CALL ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES MEANING
ILLEGALLIQUIDATIONS.However,thereiscertainlyevidencepointingthefingerof
suspicionatsomeelementsandpersonalitiesinthearmedforces,inparticularGeneral
Palparan,asresponsibleforanundeterminednumberofkillings,byallowing,tolerating,
andevenencouragingthekillings.

A.
THERE

IS SOME CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO

SUPPORT THE PROPOSITION THAT SOME ELEMENTS
WITHIN OR CONNECTED TO THE MILITARY ARE
RESPONSIBLEFORTHEKILLINGS:

Nowitnesscameforwardtotestifythatheorshewitnessedthemilitaryorany
militarypersonnelactuallyparticipateinanyextrajudicialkilling.Neitheraretherein
almost all the cases any eyewitnesses to the killings who could actually identify the
perpetrators,muchmoreidentifythemasmembersofthemilitary.
QuitedeplorableistherefusaloftheactivistgroupssuchasKarapatan,Bayan
Muna,etc.,topresenttheirevidencebeforethecommission. Iftheseactivistgroups
were indeed legitimateand not merelyNPAfronts,astheyhavebeenscornfully
tagged,itwouldhavebeentotheirbestinteresttodisplaytheevidenceuponwhich
theyrelyfortheirconclusionthatthemilitaryisbehindthekillings. Infact,this
refusalirresistiblylendsitselftotheinterpretationthattheydonothavethenecessary
evidencetoprovetheirallegationsagainstthemilitary.Itwouldnotevenbeunreasonable
tosaythattheirrecalcitranceonlybenefitsthemilitaryspositionthattheyareindeed
merefrontsfortheCPPNPAandthus,enemiesofthestate.
Nevertheless,despitetherefusaloftheactivistgroupstocooperate,andregardless
of the question of their legitimacy, certain facts, taken together with admissions and
statements by the witnesses, lead the Commission to conclude that there is some
circumstantialevidence that acertaingroupinthemilitary, certainlynot thewhole
militaryorganization,isresponsibleforthekillings.Tomaintainotherwisewouldbe
closingoneseyestoreality.

1.

Motive

reportfinalsig

51

Atonce,itbecomesclearthatperhapsasmallgroupinthearmedforcesmaybe
saidtohavethemotivesfortheeliminationofthecivilianactivists.Inagreatmajorityof
thecasesofactivistkillings,theonlyexplanationforthevictimsdeathsisthefactthat
theywereallegedlyrebels,orconnectedwiththeCPP/NPA.Apartfromanegligiblefew
solvedcases,thePNPhasnotuncoveredanyotherexplanationfortheirkilling.
AsadmittedbyGen.EsperonandGen.Palparanthemselves,thearmedforces
considersthesocalledleftwingandsomepartylistorganizations,andtheirmembers,
enemiesofthestate,whoshouldbeneutralized. Theyqualifytheirstatementby
statingthatthewordneutralizedoesnotnecessarilymeankilling,butshouldbetaken
inthecontextoftheirholisticapproachtothewaroncommunismthatis,toinclude
sociocivicandotherworksdesignedtobringcommunistrebelsbacktothefoldofthe
lawandthusneutralizetheirthreat.Nonetheless,thefactthatcertainelementsinthe
military would take the more direct approach to neutralizing the enemy cannot be
discounted. General Palparan, for one, stated that he cannot categorically deny the
possibilitythatsomeofhismenmayhavebeenbehindsomeofthekillings.
No plausible explanation has been given for the rise in extrajudicial killings,
exceptthatthekillingswereperpetratedbytheCPPNPApursuanttoapurgeofitsranks.
ItisarguedthatdocumentshavebeencaptureddetailingthisplanoftheCPP/NPA,and
thattherearewitnessestotestifytothisfact. Thedocumentsandwitnesses,however,
despiterequestbytheCommission,werenotpresented.
WhilethePNPstatedthatsomeofthevictimsmayhavebeentargetedbythe
CPP/NPAforallegedfinancialopportunism,noclearbasisorevidencewaspresented
inthatregard.Infact,noneofthevictimswaspositivelyidentifiedasafinancialofficer
of the CPP/NPA. In anycase,theoverwhelmingmajorityofthevictimsweremere
students,peasants or laborers,and thus,were highlyunlikely to have committed any
financialopportunism. Thentoo,itissurprisingifthereindeedisanongoingpurge
amongtheranks of theCPPNPA,whythemilitaryhasdonenothingtopromoteor
encouragesuchrift.Verily,ifyourenemiesbegintofightamongthemselves,theresult
couldonlybetoyourbenefit.
Moreover, it would be contradictory for the military to consider the purge
theorywhileatthesametimeclaimthatthevictimswereenemiesoftheState. Ifthe
reportfinalsig

52
CPPNPA,theavowedenemyoftheState,wereindeedmindedtopurgethevictimsfrom
itsranks,thenitwouldhavebeenintheinterestofthemilitarytobringthevictims,being
possibledefectorsorinformants,tothegovernmentsfold. Enigmatically,themilitary
hascontinuedtoclassifythevictimsasenemiesofthestate. Thisthrowsthewhole
purgetheoryoutoflineandmakesitsomewhatimprobable.
Moretelling,however,isthefactthatGeneralPalparanhimselfdoesnotbelieve
inthispurgetheory,declaringthathehadnoreasontobelievethatthekillingswere
perpetratedbytheCPP/NPA.
Theforegoingleads only totheconclusionthatthepurgetheorycannotbe
accordedcredence.
TheNPApurgetheorybeingdiscredited,theonlyothertheoryleftisthatcertain
elementswithinorconnectedtosomemilitaryofficersareresponsibleforthekillings.
Thevictims,accordingtoGeneralPalparanandothers,wereenemiesoftheState;hence,
theirneutralization.

2.

CapacityandOpportunity

Thesuspectedgroupinthemilitaryhasnodoubtthecapacityorthemeansto
carryoutthekillings. Infact,thekillingsappeartobewellorganizedandthekillers
adequatelyequipped.Moretelling,however,isthefactthat,withtheCPPNPAoutofthe
question,onlyagroupwithcertainmilitarycapabilitiescansucceedincarryingoutan
orchestratedplanofeliminatingitsadmittedenemies.
Too,thisgroupadmittedlyhasalltheopportunitytocarryoutthesaidkillings.
Itsmembersroamthecountrysidefreefromrestrictions,pursuanttotheiralloutwar
oncommunism.Theirpresenceintheareaswherethekillingsoccurredisundeniable.If
therewerekillingsquadsorassassinsfromtheNPAroaminginanyparticularareaready
tostrikeagainstitsformercadres,themilitary,nodoubt,wouldbeoneofthefirstto
know.

3.

Reaction

reportfinalsig

53
Likewise,thereactionofsomeofficersofthearmedforcestotherisingnumber
of killings lends itself to the inference that they were not much averse to what was
happening.Practicallynothingwasdonetopreventorinvestigatethekillings,notevento
lookintotheworseningpublicopinionandaccusationsagainstGeneralPalparan.

4.

GeneralPalparan

TheriseinkillingssomehowbecamemorepronouncedinareaswhereGeneral
Palparanwasassigned.ThetrendwassounusualthatGeneralPalparanwassaidtohave
leftatrailofbloodorbodiesinhiswakewhereverhewasassigned. Heearnedthe
monikerBerdugofromactivistandmediagroupsforhisreputation.GeneralPalparan
ascribeshisgrislyreputationtohisenemies,aspartoftheirpropagandacampaignto
discredithimandtodenigratehisexcellentperformanceinimplementingthevarious
missionsandprogramsassignedtohimbyhissuperiors.
GeneralPalparan,clearlythemaninthecenterofthemaelstrom,admitstohaving
utteredstatementsopenlyencouragingpersonstoperformextrajudicialkillingsagainst
thosesuspectedofbeingcommunists,albeitunarmedcivilians.Worse,hewasreported
tohaveexpresseddelightatthedisappearanceofatleasttwopersons,merestudents,
butwhoweresuspectedofbeingcommunistoractivists.67 Amongtheseinculpatory
itemsarethefollowing:
Gen. Palparan stated that certain Organizations and Party List
Representatives act as support systems providing materials andshelter for the
CPPNPA.68
InterviewedbyPiaHontiverosandTonyVelasquezontheTVProgram
TopStory,Gen.Palparan,whenaskedwhyheconsideredorganizationslike
BayanMunaasfrontsfortheNPA,responded,sayingalotofthemembers
areactuallyinvolvedinatrocitiesandcrimesWhenaskedwhatevidencehe
hadtosupportthisallegation,hesaidthathehadnoevidence,butthathecould
feelit.
Referringtocertainactivistorganizations,Gen.Palparanmentioned:
67

PhilippineCommunistsCallforResumptionofTalks,ReuterNews,July3,2006.
TSN,September26,2006,p.8.

68

reportfinalsig

54

Even though they are in Government as Party List

Representatives,nomatterwhatappearancetheytake,theyarestill
EnemiesoftheState.(May16,2006,PhilippineDailyInquirer)69
ThePartyListMembersofCongressaredoingthingsto
furthertherevolution,thecommunistmovementIwishtheywere
notthere(InterviewwithPiaHontiverosandTonyVelasquez
TopStory)70
ItismybeliefthatthesemembersofpartylistinCongress
are providing the daytoday policies of the rebel movement
(February3,2006,FrenchPressAgency)71
inthecourseofouroperation,thereweresomereports
thatthatBAYANMUNAheadquartersatthetimeinMindorowas
usedasahideoutofthearmedgroup.AndasIsaid,arecruitment
agencybecausetheyrecruityoungpeoplethereasmembersofsome
organizations then eventually go up in the mountain. And then,
therewerethosewhosurrenderedtousconfirmingthis72

Inconnectionwiththerepealoftheantisubversionlaw,hestated:
Star)

73

I want communism totally erased. (May 21, 2006, Philippine

towagetheongoingcounterinsurgencyby"neutralizing"
notjustarmedrebelsbutalsoawebofallegedfrontorganizationsthat
includeleftistpoliticalparties,humanrightsandwomen'sorganizations,
even lawyers and members of the clergy. (Wagging the Buffalo
September25,2006,Newsweek)74
IEncouragedCivilianstoFightBack(August22,2006issueof
ManilaStandardToday)

Otherstatements:
Myordertomysoldiersisthat,iftheyarecertainthat
therearearmedrebelsinthehouseoryard,shootthem.Itwilljust
betoobadifciviliansarekilledintheprocess.Wearesorryifyou
arekilledinthecrossfire.75
Therewouldbesomecollateraldamage,butitwillbeshort
andtolerable.Theenemywouldblowitupasamassiveviolationof
humanrights.Buttome,itwouldjustbenecessaryincidents.76

69

Id.atp.14.
Id.
71
Id.atpp.1415,TSN
72
Id.atp.61.
73
Id.
74
Id.atp.18.
75
Id.atp.30.
76
Id.
70

reportfinalsig

55
Sorrynalangkungmaymadamaynacivilian.;Thedeath
ofciviliansandlocalofficialsweresmallsacrificesbroughtabout
by the militarys antiinsurgency campaign. (Philippine Daily
Inquirer,September12,2006)77
[T]hey cannot be stopped completely the killings, I
would say are necessary incidents in a conflict because they
(referring to the rebels) are violent. Its not necessary that the
militaryaloneshouldbeblamed. Wearearmed,ofcourse,and
trainedtoconfrontandcontrolviolence. Butotherpeoplewhose
livesareaffectedintheseareasarealsoparticipating78
ThekillingsarebeingattributedtomebutIdidnotkill
them,Ijustinspiredthetriggermen.
Onbeingaskedifhissoldiersareresponsibleforthekillings:
perhapsmaybe,ifthereare,andiftheydothat,thatstheir
ownresponsibility,itsnotmine79
somesoldiersareemotionalwhentheircomradesare
hurtorkilled.Therecouldbesoldierswhodecidetotakethelaw
intotheirownhands.Butthatsillegal.80
I cannot categorically deny that (referring to the military
havingspecialunits notproperlyidentifiedinbonnets andmasks
operatinginthemiddleofthenight.)81
I am responsible (referring to extrajudicial killings),
relativelyperhaps,Gen.Palparansaidthathisactionscouldhave
encouraged people to take the law into their own hands. He,
however,qualifiedthisbysayingitwasnotreallyintentionalonhis
part.82
SoifIhave,withinmycapacitytopreventit,Iwould
preventthesame.Butinthecourseofourcampaign,Icouldhave
encouragedpeopletodothat.Somaaaringmayresponsibilityako
doon,onthataspect.ButhowcouldIpreventthat,weareengaged
inthisconflict.Allmyactuationsreallyaredesignedtodefeatthe
enemy.Andindoingso,othersmighthavebeenencouragedtotake
actionsontheirown.
whoeverdidthiscouldhavebeenencouragedbymyactionsand
actuationsinthecourseofmycampaign,whoevertheyare.Thatis
whyI said,relatively. If thereare somesoldiers,maybe then,I
couldhavebeenremissinthataspect.Butwearedoingourbestto
keepoursoldierswithinourmandate.83

77

Id.atp.33.
Id.atp.34.
79
Id.atp.32.
80
Id.
81
Id.atp.42.
82
Id.atp.57.
83
Id.atp.58.
78

reportfinalsig

56
GeneralPalparansnumerouspublicstatementscaughtonfilmorrelayedthrough
printmediagivetheoverallimpressionthatheisnotabitdisturbedbytheextrajudicial
killingsofcivilianactivists,whomheconsidersenemiesofthestate.Headmitshaving
uttered statements that may have encouraged the said killings. He also obviously
condonesthesekillings,byfailingtoproperlyinvestigatethepossibilitythathismenmay
havebeenbehindthem.
GeneralPalparansstatementsandcavalierattitudetowardsthekillingsinevitably
revealsthathehasnoqualmsaboutthekillingofthosewhomheconsidershisenemies,
whetherbyhisorderordonebyhismenindependently.Hementionsthatifhismenkill
civilianssuspectedofNPAconnections,itistheircall,obviouslymeaningthatitisup
tothemtodoso. Thisgivestheimpressionthathemaynotorderthekillings, but
neitherwillheorderhismentodesistfromdoingso.Underthedoctrineofcommand
responsibility,GeneralPalparanadmittedhisguiltofthesaidcrimeswhenhemadethis
statement. Worse,headmittedlyoffersencouragementandinspirationtothosewho
mayhavebeenresponsibleforthekillings.
Healsoadmitstohavinghelpedinthecreationofsocalledbarangaydefense
forces, which may or may not be armed, to prevent the entry of CPP/NPA in such
barangays.Suchdefenseforcesareequivalenttoanunofficialcivilianmilitia.Itiswell
knownthatsuchmilitiacaneasilydegenerateintoamindlessarmedmob,wherethe
majority simply lord it over the minority. This is a fertile situation for extrajudicial
killings.Inthisway,GeneralPalparancontributedtotheextrajudicialkillingsbycreating
idealsituationsfortheircommissionandbyindirectlyencouragingthem.

Then too, during a hearing before the Committee on National Defense and
SecurityoftheHouseofRepresentativesheldonMay25,2005,GeneralPalparanwas
askedthefollowingquestionsbytheChairmanoftheCommittee,CongressmanRoilo
Golez:
The Chairman: Thank you, Your Honor. May we have your
comment on the accusation that you have special teams not properly
identifiedinbonnetsormasksoperatinginthemiddleofthenight?
Mr.Palparan: YourHonor,Icannotcategoricallydenythatand
alsoadmitthat,butouroperations
TheChairman:Youdohaveteamsthatoperatethatway?
reportfinalsig

57

Mr.Palparan:Idonthaveofficialpolicyonthatmatter.
ThelackofacategoricaldenialonthepartofGen.Palparaninrespectofwhether
theunitsunderhiscommandhavespecialteamsnotproperlyidentified[and]inbonnets
ormasksoperatinginthemiddleofthenightis,asamatteroflaw,anadmissionofthe
existenceofsuchspecialteams84.Obviously,suchspecialteamsoperatinginthemiddle
ofthenightwearingmasksorinbonnetshaveonlyonesinisteranddeviouspurposeor
objective:theextrajudicialeliminationoftheenemiesofwhoeverformedtheseteams.
Moreover,itisnotdisputedthatthenumberofkillingsroseintheareaswhere
Gen.Palparanwasassigned. Gen.Palparanexplainedthatthiswasduetoincreased
numberofoperationsagainsttheNPA,thusresultinginmoreencountersanddeaths.
However,thefiguresfortheincreaseinnumberofcivilianactivistskilled outside of
encounterswasnotexplained. Inanycase,allotherauthoritiesadmitthattherewas
indeedariseinthekillingsofunarmedactivistsandmediapersonnel.
However,duetothelackofcooperationfromtheactivistgroups,notenough
evidencewaspresentedbeforetheCommissiontoallowittopinpointandeventually
to recommend prosecution of the persons ultimately responsible for the killings.
Thereisnodefiniteoridentifiableperson,entityorinterestbehindthekillings.Thereis
likewisenodefinitiveaccountoftheactualnumberofactivistkillings.EvenKarapatan
andAmnestyInternationalhavewildlydifferingfigures.
The circumstantial evidence presented before the Commission and the
inferencesitdrawstherefromareprobablygrosslyinadequatetosupportacriminal
conviction, considering the requirementthat convictionbeforea court requires proof
beyondreasonabledoubt.However,theCommissionisnotacourtoflawbridledwith
thestrictrulesonadmissibilityandweightofevidence. Thus,itcanproceedwitha
certaindegreeofcertitudeinstatingthat,inallprobability,someelementsinthemilitary,
amongwhomissuspectedtobeGeneralPalparan,areresponsiblefortherecentkillings
ofactivists. Inanycase,furtherindepthinvestigationintothenumerouskillings,
includingextensiveevidencegathering,isnecessaryforthesuccessfulprosecutionof
thosedirectlyresponsible. Inthis,thetestimonyofwitnessesandthepresentationof
evidencefromthevictimsandtheirfamiliesandcolleagueswouldbeindispensable.
84

Section32,Rule130,RulesofCourt.

reportfinalsig

58

B.

GENERAL

PALPARAN AND PERHAPS SOME OF HIS

SUPERIOR OFFICERS, MAY BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR
FAILINGTOPREVENT,PUNISHORCONDEMNTHEKILLINGS
UNDERTHEPRINCIPLEOFCOMMANDRESPONSIBILITY.

Itbeingwellnighobviousthatsomeelementsinthemilitarywerebehindthe
killingsofactivists,itbecomesequallyplainthatsomerankingofficersintheArmy(for
theNavy,AirForceandCoastGuardarenothereininvolved),havenotperformedtheir
function of investigating or preventing the said killings, as well as punishing their
perpetrators.Underthedoctrineofcommandresponsibility,onemaybeheldresponsible
forthekillingsifheauthorized,encouraged,ignoredortoleratedthekillings.
Thisfailuretoactmayperhapsbeattributedtothemisconceptionofsomethat
commandresponsibilityextendsonlytoactswhichacommanderordersorauthorizes,
and not to criminal acts of his subordinates done on their own, although he had
knowledgeor,hadreasontoknowof,orshouldhaveknownaboutthesame.Failureto
investigateandtopunishisjustasinculpatory.

1.

CommandResponsibilitydefined

Contrary to the apparently inaccurate notion of command responsibility

entertained by some officers in the AFP, command responsibility in the modern
internationallawsenseisalsoanomissionmodeofindividualcriminalliabilitywherein
thesuperiorofficerisresponsibleforcrimescommittedbyhissubordinatesforfailingto
preventorpunishthem(asopposedtocrimesheordered).
The doctrine of command responsibility is not unfamiliar, being a guiding
principle in military organizations. The doctrine was formalized by the Hague
Conventions IV (1907) and X (1907) and applied for the first time by the German
SupremeCourtinLeipzigafterWorldWarI,inthe TrialofEmilMuller. Mullerwas
sentencedbytheCourtforfailingtopreventthecommissionofcrimesandtopunishthe
perpetratorsthereof.

reportfinalsig

59
The1946 Yamashita case85 isadecisionoftheUSSupremeCourtwhichwas
appealedfromthePhilippineSupremeCourt,whenthePhilippineswasstillacolonyof
theUnitedStates. TheUSSupremeCourtconvictedYamashitaasthesuperiorofthe
JapaneseforceswhichcommittedunspeakableatrocitiesthroughoutthePhilippines,acts
of violence, cruelty, and murder upon the civilian population and prisoners of war,
particularlyalargescalemassacreofciviliansinBatangas,aswellaswholesalepillage
andwantondestructionofreligiousmonumentsinthecountry.TheUSSupremeCourt
determined thatYamashitapossessedthedutyas anarmycommander to controlthe
operationsofhistroops,andwascriminallyliableforpermittingthemtocommitsuch
despicable acts. Various laws of warfare were cited as basis of such superior
responsibility: Articles 1 and 43 of the Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague
Conventionof1907,Article19oftheTenthHagueConventionof1907,andArticle26of
the 1926 Geneva Convention on the wounded and sick. The Court concluded that
Yamashitapossessed:86
anaffirmativedutytotakesuchmeasuresaswerewithinhis
powerandappropriateinthecircumstancestoprotectprisonersofwarand
thecivilianpopulation.Thisdutyofacommandingofficerhasheretofore
beenrecognized,anditsbreachpenalizedbyourownmilitarytribunals.87
IntheMedinacase,88 concerningtheinfamousMyLaiMassacreinVietnam,it
washeldbyanAmericanCourtMartialthatacommanderwillbeliableforcrimesofhis
subordinateswhenheordersacrimecommittedorknowsthatacrimeisabouttobe
committed,haspowertopreventit,andfailstoexercisethatpower.
After the Hague Convention, the first international treaty to comprehensively
codifythedoctrineofcommandresponsibilityistheAdditionalProtocolI(API)of1977
totheGenevaConventionsof1949,Article86(2)ofwhichstatesthat:
the fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was
committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from
responsibilityif they knew, or had information which should have
enabledthemtoconcludeinthecircumstancesatthetime,thathewas
committingorabouttocommitsuchabreachandiftheydidnottakeall
feasiblemeasureswithintheirpowertopreventorrepressthebreach.
Article87obligesacommanderto"preventand,wherenecessary,tosuppressand
reporttocompetentauthorities"anyviolationoftheConventionsandofAPI.InArticle
85

327U.S.1(1946).
CASSESSE,ANTONIO,INTERNATIONALCRIMINALLAW203204(2003).
87
Id.,citingtheYamashitacase.
88
U.S.v.Medina,32C.M.R.1182(A.C.M.R.1973)
86

reportfinalsig

60
86(2)forthefirsttimeaprovisionwould"explicitlyaddresstheknowledgefactorof
command responsibility."89 While the Philippines signed and ratified the Geneva
Conventionof1949,ithasonlysignedandhasnotratifiedAPI.
TheestablishmentoftheInternationalCriminalTribunalforYugoslavia(ICTY)
bytheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilhasledtofurtherinternationaljurisprudenceon
thedoctrineofcommandresponsibility.
Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute states that the fact that the crimes were
committedbyasubordinatedoesnotrelievehissuperiorofcriminalresponsibilityifhe
kneworhadreasontoknowthatthesubordinatewasabouttocommitsuchactsorhad
donesoandthesuperiorfailedtotakethenecessaryandreasonablemeasurestoprevent
suchactsortopunishtheperpetrators. In Prosecutorv.Delalicetal (the Celebici
case), the ICTY elaborated a threefold requirement for the existence of command
responsibility,whichhasbeenconfirmedbysubsequentjurisprudence90:
1. theexistenceofasuperiorsubordinaterelationship;
2. thatthesuperiorkneworhadreasontoknowthatthecriminalactwasabouttobe
orhadbeencommitted;and
3. thatthesuperiorfailedtotakethereasonablemeasurestopreventthecriminalact
ortopunishtheperpetratorthereof.

Theapplicablestandardsof knowledgedefinedinthesecondrequirementcan
furtherbeclassifiedas:(a)Actualknowledgewhichmaybeestablishedbyeither
directorindirectevidence;and(b)Hadreasontoknowwhereinabsenceofknowledge
is not a defense where the accused did not take reasonable steps to acquire such
knowledge.Notably,inthecaseofProsecutorvTimohirBlaskic,(theBlaskiccase),it
washeldthatignoranceisnotadefensewherethe
absenceofknowledgeistheresultofnegligenceinthedischargeofduties.
Thelatestexpressionofthedoctrineofcommandresponsibilityininternational
lawisinArticle28oftheRomeStatuteoftheICCwhichstates:

89

Command Responsibility:The Mens Rea Requirement By Eugenia Levine, Global Policy Forum

February2005,athttp://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/general/2005/command.htm
90
ConfirmedinthelatercasesofTheProsecutorvTimohirBlaskic,CaseNo.IT9514T,Judgment,Trial
Chamber,3March2000par294;TheProsecutorvZlatkoAleksovksi,Case.No.IT9514/1T,Judgment,
TrialChamber,25June1999,par69;TheProsecutorvDarioKordicandMarioCerkez,Caseno.IT95
14/2,Judgment,TrialChamber,26February2001,par401; TheProsecutorvDragoljubKunaracand
RadomirKovac,CaseNo.IT9623,Judgement,TrialChamber,22February2001,par.395.
reportfinalsig

61
Inadditiontoothergroundsofcriminalresponsibilityunderthis
StatuteforcrimeswithinthejurisdictionoftheCourt:
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a
military commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes
withinthejurisdictionoftheCourtcommittedbyforcesunderhis
orhereffectivecommandandcontrol,oreffectiveauthorityand
control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to
exercisecontrolproperlyoversuchforces,where:

(i) Thatmilitarycommanderorpersoneitherknewor,
owingtothecircumstancesatthetime,shouldhaveknown
thattheforceswerecommittingorabouttocommitsuch
crimes;and
(ii)Thatmilitarycommanderorpersonfailedtotakeall
necessaryandreasonablemeasureswithinhisorherpower
to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the
matter to the competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution.
(b)Withrespecttosuperiorandsubordinaterelationshipsnot
describedinparagraph(a),asuperiorshallbecriminally
responsibleforcrimeswithinthejurisdictionoftheCourt
committedbysubordinatesunderhisorhereffectiveauthorityand
control,asaresultofhisorherfailuretoexercisecontrolproperly
oversuchsubordinates,where:

(i)Thesuperioreitherknew,orconsciouslydisregarded
informationwhichclearlyindicated,thatthesubordinates
werecommittingorabouttocommitsuchcrimes;
(ii)Thecrimesconcernedactivitiesthatwerewithinthe
effectiveresponsibilityandcontrolofthesuperior;and
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and
reasonablemeasureswithinhisorherpowertopreventor
repress their commission or to submit the matter to the
competentauthoritiesforinvestigationandprosecution.

Article 28(a) imposes individual responsibility on military commanders for

crimescommittedbyforcesundertheireffectivecommandandcontroliftheyeither
knewor,owingtothecircumstancesatthetime,shouldhaveknownthattheforceswere
committingorabouttocommitsuchcrimes.
Interpreted literally, Article 28(a) adopts the stricter should have known
standard.Notably,theTrialChamberinCelebicistronglysuggestedthatthelanguageof
Article 28(a) may reasonablybe interpreted to impose anaffirmative duty to remain
informedoftheactivitiesofsubordinates.However,giventheexampleaffordedbythe
reportfinalsig

62
ICTYsconflictinginterpretationsoftheknowledgerequirementinArticle86(2)ofAPI,
itcannotbeassumedthataliteralinterpretationofArticle28(a)willbeadoptedbythe
ICC.Infact,themeaningofthephraseowingtothecircumstancesatthetime,should
have known in Article 28(a) has already become a point of contention within
internationallawliterature.APIandtheRomeStatute,however,havenotbeenratified
bythePhilippines,butclearlytheinternationaltrendistowardstheirapplication.
Fromthelonglineofinternationalconventionsandcases,itcanbeseenthatthe
doctrineofcommandresponsibilityhasevolvedfromitssimplisticmeaningatthetimeof
theHagueConventiontowardsthemuchmorestringentconceptundertheRomeStatute.
Hence,inthe Yamashita case,acommanderhadthedutytotakeappropriatestepsor
measurestopreventabusesonprisonersandciviliansbyhissubordinates. InAPI,a
superiorisresponsibleifhefailstotakefeasiblemeasurestopreventorreportviolations
if he hadknowledge or informationof thesame. In the Medina standard,thesame
responsibility extends to violations or abuses by subordinates which a commander
should have knowledge of, meaning that the commander is now responsible for
criminalactsofhissubordinatesofwhichhehadactualorconstructiveknowledge.In
theICTYStatuteandinthecasesofDelalicandBlaskic,thecommanderisliableifhe
fails to act when he had reason to know that offenses would be or have been
committed by his subordinates. The Rome Statute adopts the stricter should have
knownstandard,inwhichthecommander hasanaffirmativedutytokeephimself
informed of the activities of subordinates. Clearly, the indubitable trend in
international law is to place greater and heavier responsibility on those who are in
positionsofcommandorcontrolovermilitaryandpolicepersonnel,theonlyforceswith
themostlethalweaponsattheirdisposal.

2.

CommandResponsibilityasBindingCustomaryInternationalLaw

Asearlyas1949,thePhilippineSupremeCourthadtheoccasiontorulethatthe
HagueConvention,includingthedoctrineofcommandresponsibility,wasadoptedasa
generallyacceptedprincipleofinternationallawbythePhilippines.Inthiscase,shortly
aftertheendofWorldWarII,ShigenoriKuroda,aLieutenantGeneralintheJapanese
ImperialArmy,questionedbeforetheSupremeCourtthecreationofamilitarytribunal
that triedhimfor his commandresponsibilityinfailingtopreventhis troops from
committingabusesandatrocitiesagainsttheFilipinopopulaceduringWorldWarII.He
claimedthattheHagueConventiononRulesandRegulationscoveringLandWarfare,of
reportfinalsig

63
whichhewasaccusedofviolating,amongothers,wasinapplicablesincethePhilippines
wasnotyetasignatoryorpartytoitwhentheallegedviolationstookplace.
In ruling against Kurodas objection, the Supreme Court of the Philippines91
categoricallystatedthatwhilethePhilippineswasindeednotapartyorsignatorytothe
HagueConventionatthetimesinquestion,itnonethelessembodiedgenerallyaccepted
principlesofinternationallawadoptedbythe1935Constitutionaspartofthelawofthe
land.TheSupremeCourt,throughChiefJusticeMoran,stated:
ItcannotbedeniedthattherulesandregulationsoftheHague
andGenevaconventions formpartofandarewhollybasedonthe
generallyacceptedprinciplesofinternationallaw.Infact,theserules
andprincipleswereacceptedbythetwobelligerentnations,theUnited
StatesandJapan,whoweresignatoriestothetwoConventions.Suchrules
andprinciples,therefore,formpartofthelawofournationevenifthe
Philippineswasnotasignatorytotheconventionsembodyingthem,
for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its
scopeandisnotconfinedtotherecognitionofrulesandprinciplesof
internationallawascontainedintreatiestowhichourgovernmentmay
havebeenorshallbeasignatory.92
EvenwithoutKuroda,thedoctrineofcommandresponsibilityhastrulyacquired
thestatusofcustomaryinternationallaw,andisthusbindingonallnationsdespitethe
lackofanyratifiedtreatyembodyingit,atleastinsofarasthePhilippinesisconcerned.
ItslonganduniversallyacceptedapplicationsinceWWIuntilthepresentallowsthis.In
fact, based on the jurisprudence of the ad hoc international tribunals, and of other
internationaltribunalsandnationalcourts,aswellasonstatepractice,nolessthanthe
InternationalCommitteeontheRedCross(ICRC),haspronouncedthefollowingasa
rule of customary international humanitarian law, in both international and non
internationalarmedconflicts,bindingonallStates:
Rule153.Commandersandothersuperiorsarecriminallyresponsiblefor
warcrimescommittedbytheirsubordinatesiftheyknew,orhadreasonto
know, that thesubordinates were about to commit or were committing
suchcrimesanddidnottakeallnecessaryandreasonablemeasuresin
their power to prevent their commission, or if such crimes had been
committed,topunishthepersonsresponsible.93

91

InKurodav.Jalandoni,G.R.No.L2662.March26,1949;90Phil.70(1951)
Id.,emphasissupplied.
93
HENCKAERTS,JEANMARIE AND LOUISE DOSWALD BECK,ICUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 558
(2005).
92

reportfinalsig

64
Moreinterestingly,thePhilippines,evenifnotapartytoAdditionalProtocolIto
the1949GenevaConventions,isamongthestatescitedbytheICRCwhosemilitary
manuals,militaryinstructions,andlegislationspecifytheresponsibilityofcommanders
forthecrimesoftheirsubordinates,confirmingthattheaboverulehascrystallizedintoa
norm of customary international humanitarian law.94 In truth, the Philippine Armed
ForcesownArticlesofWarrecognizesacommandersresponsibilityfortheactionsof
hissubordinatesunderthegeneralprovisionthatacommandermustmaintaindiscipline
withinhisranks.Thus,Article97oftheArticlesofWarstates:
GeneralArticle.Though notmentionedinarticles,alldisorders
andneglectstotheprejudiceofgoodorderanddisciplineandallconduct
ofanaturetobringdiscredituponthemilitaryservicesshallbetaken
cognizanceofbyageneralorspecialorsummarycourtmartialaccording
tothenatureanddegreeoftheoffense,andpunishedatthediscretionof
suchcourt.

Likewise, the utterance of statements which tend to induce subordinates to

misbehave, such as words that would inspire subordinates to commit extrajudicial
killings,iscategoricallypunishedintimesofwarunderArticle76oftheArticlesofWar.
Furthermore,Article 105of the Articlesof War recognizes the dutyof commanding
officertopunishmenunderhiscommandforminoroffensesandimposesapenaltyfor
hisfailuretometeouttheappropriatepenaltywhenthereisenoughevidencetowarrant
suchdisciplinarymeasure.
Hence,itisclearthatthedoctrineofcommandresponsibilityingeneralhasbeen
adoptedbythePhilippines95,asagenerallyacceptedprincipleofinternationallaw,and
hence,aspartofthelawoftheland.ThedoctrinesrefinementsandrestatementsAPI
andtheRomeStatute,whilesignedbybutasofyetlackingratificationbythePhilippines,
may be considered similarly applicable and binding. This was probably put best by
JusticePerfectoinhisseparateopinioninYamashitav.Styer,96wherehestated:
The treaties entered into between members of the family of
nationsarebutspecificdefinitionsandreinforcementsofthegeneral
commonlawofnations,the"unwritten"rulesofwarfare,whichfor
centurieshavelimitedthemethodandmannerofconductingwars.
Thecommonlawofnations,bywhichallstatesareandmustbebound,
dictatesthatwarfareshallbecarriedononlyinaccordancewithbasic
considerationsofhumanityandchivalry.
94

Id.,at559,fn.45.
UnderthepronouncementinKuroda.
96
75Phil.563,G.R.No.L129.December19,1945.
95

reportfinalsig

65

3.

InternationalandStateResponsibility

Whilethekillingsarecertainlynotattributabletothemilitaryorganizationitself,
ortheState,butonlytoindividualsorgroupsactingpursuanttotheirowninterests,this
doesnotmeanthattheStatecansitidlybyandrefusetoact.Ultimately,theStatehasthe
responsibilityofprotectingitscitizensandmakingsurethattheirfundamentalliberties
arerespected.
Thegrowingworldwideconsensusforstateresponsibilityfornonstateactsposits
thatiftheStatefailstoinvestigate,prosecuteorredressprivate,nonstateactsinviolation
of fundamental liberties, it is ineffect aidingtheperpetrators of suchviolations, for
whichitcouldbeheldresponsibleunderinternationallaw.OfnoteistherulingofThe
InterAmericanCourtofHumanRightsinVelasquezRodriguesv.Honduras,97viz:
172.[]Anillegalactwhichviolateshumanrightsandwhichis
initiallynotdirectlyimputabletoaState(forexample,becauseitistheact
of private person or because the person responsible has not been
identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not
because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to
preventtheviolationortorespondtoitasrequiredbytheConvention.
173. [] What is decisive is whether a violation of the rights
recognized by the Convention has occurred with the support or the
acquiescenceofthegovernment,orwhethertheStatehasallowedtheact
to take place without taking measures to prevent it or to punish those
responsible.Thus,theCourtstaskistodeterminewhethertheviolationis
theresultofaStatesfailuretofulfillitsdutytorespectandguarantee
thoserights,asrequiredbyArticle1(1)oftheConvention.
174. The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to
preventhumanrightsviolationsandtousethemeansatitsdisposalto
carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its
jurisdiction,toidentifythoseresponsible,toimposetheappropriate
punishmentandtoensurethevictimadequatecompensation.
175. This duty to prevent includes all those means of a legal,
political,administrativeandculturalnaturethatpromotetheprotectionof
humanrightsandensurethatanyviolationsareconsideredandtreatedas
illegal acts, which, as such, may lead to the punishment of those
responsibleandtheobligationtoindemnifythevictimsfordamages[]
97

CaseNo.7920,July29,1988;quotedbythenJustice,nowChiefJusticeReynatoS.PunoinLibertyand
Prosperity,PanelPaperdeliveredattheNationalForumonLibertyandProsperity,ManilaHotel,August
25,2006.TheConventionreferredtothereinistheAmericanConventiononHumanRights,orthePactof
SanJose,CostaRica.
reportfinalsig

66

177.Incertaincircumstances,itmaybedifficulttoinvestigateacts
thatviolateanindividualsrights.Thedutytoinvestigate,liketheduty
toprevent,isnotbreachedmerelybecausetheinvestigationdoesnot
produceasatisfactoryresult.Nevertheless,itmustbeundertakenina
serous manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective. Aninvestigationmusthaveanobjectiveandbeassumedby
theStateasitsownlegalduty,notasasteptakenbyprivateintereststhat
dependsupontheinitiativeofthevictimorhisfamilyorupontheiroffer
ofproof,withoutaneffectivesearchforthetruthbythegovernment.This
istrueregardlessofwhatagentis eventuallyfoundresponsiblefor the
violation.Wheretheactsofprivatepartiesthatviolatetheconventionare
not seriously investigated, those parties are aided in a sense by the
government, thereby making the State responsible on the international
plane.98

TheInterAmericanCourtofHumanRightseventuallyfoundHonduras,asastate,
liablefortheprolongeddetentionanddisappearanceofadetainee,therebyentitlingthe
victimsfamilytodamages.
Thesameoffensesmayalsogiverisetoliabilityforthecommandersfordamages
underthemunicipallawofotherStates.InanothercaserelevanttothePhilippinesetting,
MaximoHilaov.EstateofFerdinandMarcos99 decidedbytheNinthCircuitofU.S.
CourtofAppeals,victimsandfamiliesofvictimsofhumanrightsviolationsduringthe
administrationofPres.FerdinandMarcosfiledaclasssuitagainsttheestateofthelate
President seeking damages for human rights abuses committed against them or their
decedents.TheprincipaldefenseoftheMarcosEstatewasthattheEstatewouldonlybe
heldliableforactsactuallycommittedbyFerdinandMarcos.TheU.S.CircuitCourtof
Appealsrejectedthisdefenseunderthedoctrineofcommandresponsibility,holdingthat
[A]higherofficialneednothavepersonallyperformedororderedtheabusesinorderto
be held liable and that [R]esponsibility for torture, summary execution, or
disappearancesextendsbeyondthepersonwhoactuallycommittedthoseactsanyone
withhigherauthoritywhoauthorized,toleratedorknowinglyignoredthoseactsisliable
forthem.100Thisshowsthatresponsibilityforactscommittedinviolationofcustomary
internationallawmayberecognizedoutsidethestatewheretheywerecommittedbythe
internationalcommunity.

98

Id.,emphasissupplied.
103F.2d767.
100
Emphasisandunderscoringsupplied.
99

reportfinalsig

67
4.

Responsibilityforkillingsislimitedtoindividualofficersandrequires

furtherproofofawrongfulactoromission.

WhileStateresponsibilityispossibleforprivateacts,thereisnobasistohold
liabletheentiremilitaryleadership,oreventheentireleadershipofoneofitsbranches,
underthedoctrineofcommandresponsibility.Thefindingshereindonotjustifyaruling
thateachandeveryhighrankingofficerinthemilitary,ortheinstitutionitself,shouldbe
heldliableforthekillings.
Inanycase,commandresponsibilityshouldalwaysbecoupledwithaculpable
act or omission. Hence, if it is shown that the officer concerned took the
appropriatestepstoaddresstheviolationsofhissubordinates,thenhecannotbe
heldliableforthemunderthedoctrineofcommandresponsibility.Inall,command
responsibilitysimplyrequiresameasureofdiligenceandintegrityonthepartofthe
commander.Hecannotsimplylethismenrunamuckwithouthiscontrolordisciplinein
the same way that he cannot turn a blind eye to atrocities committed by them. If
diligenceintheperformanceofdutyisshown,thenthecommandercannotbeheld
responsible.

NoevidencewaspresentedtotheCommissionthat,inregardtotheactivitiesof
GeneralPalparan,hewas calledupontoaccountfor andtoexplainthesamebyhis
superiors. Indeed, General Palparans public statements alone could have provoked
disciplinaryactionagainsthim,nottomentioncourtmartial,forviolationoftheArticles
ofWar. Theseoffensesareseriousandcannotsimplybebrushedaside. Itwas,thus,
morecompellingfortheproperofficersintheAFPleadershipatleasttoinvestigatethe
utterancesandbehaviorofGeneralPalparanandthekillingsbehindthem.Inthesame
vein,underthedoctrineofcommandresponsibility,itwasnotpropertocontendthatno
actionunderthecircumstanceswastakenbecausenocomplainthadbeenlodgedagainst
Gen.Palparanand/orthatanyway,TaskForceUsigcouldverywellhavecalledhimto
accountforhisactionsandwords.
Fortunately,thePresidentwas,asusual,ontopofthesituation.Shepromptly
recognizedtheneedforofficialstateactiontoaddresswhatshefeltwasadisturbingrise
inthenumberofkillingsofmediamenandactivists. Sherecognizedthatshehadthe
dutytoaddressthesituationappropriately.ShecreatedTaskForceUsigtoprioritizethe

reportfinalsig

68
investigationofthekillings.WhileTaskForceUsigwasplaguedwithdifficulties,thisat
leastshowedthatthegovernmentwasseriouslygoingtodoitsdutytoaddressthese
killings.
In the same vein, the Presidents creation of this independent Commission is
testimonytohercommitmenttounearththeetiologyofthesekillingsandhopefullyto
preventfurtherkillings,aswellastobringtheperpetratorsthereoftojustice.Sadly,her
gesture has been largely misinterpreted by her political opponents as a whitewash,
which,asthisreportitselfwillshow,isnotthecase.

V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

TheCommissionsrecommendations,whichmostlyfallwithinthePrincipleson
the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extralegal, Arbitrary and Summary
Executions,recommendedbytheEconomicandSocialCounciloftheUnitedNationson
May24,1989,areasfollows:

A.

Politicalwill

WithrespecttotherecentkillingofAbraRepresentativeLuisBersamin,Jr.,the
Presidentvowedthattheperpetrators,mastermind,andall,willbebroughttojustice.As
regardsthecommunistinsurgency,thePresidenthasorderedthearmedforcestocrushit
withintwoyears.
Inthefieldofextralegalkillings,itisurgedthatthePresidentreiterateinthe
strongestpossiblemannerherexpressionsorpronouncementsofdeterminationandfirm
resolvetostopthesame.Ifextrajudicialexecutionsaretobestopped,thepoliticalwillto
dowhatisrighthowevergreatthecostmustpervadealllevelsofgovernmentsothatour
belovedcountrycanmovetowardsthegreateridealsofdemocracyandjustice;itmust
startwiththePresidentwhomustpursuethepreventionandprosecutionofextrajudicial
killingswithurgencyandfervor.

reportfinalsig

69
AsrecommendedbyAmnestyInternational,theGovernmentmustconsistently
andatalllevelscondemnpoliticalkillings.ThePresidentandallthedepartmentsofthe
Governmentshouldmakecleartoallmembersofthepoliceandmilitaryforcesthat
extrajudicialexecutionswillnotbecountenancedunderanycircumstances.

B.

Investigation

To ensure that all reports and complaints of extrajudicial killings against the
militaryareinvestigatedpromptly,impartially,andeffectively,theinvestigationmustbe
conducted by a body or agency independent from the armed forces. This civilian
investigativeagencyshouldbeindependentof,andnotunderthecommand,control,or
influenceoftheArmedForces,anditmusthavecontrolofitsownbudget.Thepersonnel
must be civilian agents well trained in law enforcement and investigative work and
equipped with the necessary array of technical devices to enhance their investigative
capabilities.Theymustbeauthorizedtoexecutewarrantsandmakearrests.Theymust
beprovidedwithanadequateforensiclaboratoryandothertechnicalservices. Inthe
United States, the Armys professional investigative agency is called the Criminal
InvestigationDivision;theAirForcesiscalledtheOfficeofSpecialInvestigation;the
NavyandMarinesareservicedbytheNavalCriminalInvestigationService;andforthe
CoastGuard,theorganizationiscalledtheCoastGuardInvestigationService.Ourarmed
forcesisnotsobigastorequireseparateagenciesforitsservices.Asingleinvestigating
bodywillbeenough.ThePresidentshouldrecommendlegislationtoCongressforthe
creationofasimilarinvestigationagencytolookintoandprosecutecomplaintsagainst
militarypersonnel.
OnthepartofthePNP,thelawthatcreatedtheNationalPoliceCommission(Rep.
ActNo.6995)shouldbeamendedandstrengthenedtoensurethethoroughandimpartial
investigationoferringpoliceofficers bypersonnelnotunder thecontrolof thePNP
command.
Intheconductoftheinvestigationofextrajudicialkillingofactivists,orofany
caseforthatmatter,thePNPmustbeenjoinedtoensurethattheevidencemustbestrong
andsufficientforconviction.ThepresentpolicyofthePNPasconfirmedbyPolice
DeputyDirectorGeneralAvelinoRazon,Jr.inhistestimonybeforetheCommissionto
considertheirjobdoneorfinishedfromthemomenttheyhavefiledthecomplaintwith
the office of the public prosecutor has inevitably encouraged sloppy and shoddy
reportfinalsig

70
investigations;itisnotinfrequentthatpoliceinvestigators,especiallyinremoteareas,
wouldfileacasewiththeofficeofthepublicprosecutor,nomatterhowinadequatethe
evidenceis,justsotheycansaythatthecasehasbeensolvedandifitislaterdismissed
forinsufficiencyofevidencetheyblametheprosecutorforincompetenceorforbeing
corrupt.
The office of the public prosecutor in each province or city must assign
prosecutorstoreviewallcomplaintsfiledbythepolicetoevaluatethesufficiencyof
evidencenotonlytodeterminetheexistenceofprobablecausebutalsoforconviction.If
thereviewingprosecutorisoftheopinionthattheevidenceisinsufficient,thenhemust
rejectthecomplaintandreturnittothepolice,indicatingwhatadditionalevidenceis
needed.Onceacomplaintisacceptedaftersuchreview,itmeansthatthereisenough
evidenceforasuccessfulprosecution.Thiswillavoidfingerpointingonwhoistoblame
forthedismissalofacaseoracquittaloftheaccusedand,moreimportantly,compelthe
policetodoathoroughjobintheinvestigationofeverycase.
If after the lapse of six (6) months from the commission of the extrajudicial
killingofanactivistormediapersonalitytheinvestigationbyPNPhasnotyieldedany
positiveresult,the policepersonnelinchargemust requesttheNBItotakeover the
investigation.Forthispurpose,theNBImustbeprovidedwiththenecessaryfundsand
allowedtohireadditionalpersonnelifnecessary.

C.

Prosecution

Toensurethatthoseresponsiblefortheextrajudicialexecutionofactivistsand
mediapeoplearebroughttojusticeandthattheprosecutionishandledwithefficiency
anddispatch,theDepartmentofJustice(DOJ)mustcreateaspecialteamofcompetent
and welltrainedprosecutorstohandlethetrialofsaidcases. Also,theDOJshould
requesttheSupremeCourttodesignatespecialcourtstohearandtrysaidcasesandto
require the courts so designated to give the highest priority to them, conduct daily
hearings,andresolvethemwithinsix(6)months.
Withrespecttopendingcasestheprosecutionofwhichhasnotbeenmovingfor
lackofjudgesorbecauseofthefaultornegligenceofthepublicprosecutor,theOfficeof
the Chief State Prosecutor shouldmakerepresentations withtheOffice of the Court
reportfinalsig

71
Administratortodetailjudgestothevacantsalas,ortodesignatespecialprosecutorsto
takeovertheprosecution,asthecasemaybe.
Asregardskillingsinareaswherewitnessesareafraidtotestifybecauseoffearof
reprisal,stepsshouldbetakentotransferthevenuetoManila.

D.

Protectionofwitnesses

Aspartoftheneedtoensurethesuccessfulprosecutionofthoseresponsiblefor
extrajudicialkillings,thepresentWitnessProtectionProgramcreatedunderRepublicAct.
No.6981shouldbeenhancedandmademoreeffectivesoastoguaranteethesafetyof
witnesses to the killings. The existing program is suffering from lack of funds and
necessary manpower. The Government must give the highest priority to the
improvement,strengthening,andfundingofsaidprogram,preferablypatternedafterthe
U.S.federalwitnessprotectionprogram.101
Theprogramshouldalsobemadeavailabletopersonswhohavereceiveddeath
threatsorwhoareotherwiseindangerofextralegal,arbitraryorsummaryexecution.

E.

Speciallawforstrictchainofcommandresponsibility

ThePresidentshouldproposelegislationtorequirepoliceandmilitaryforcesand
other government officials to maintain strict chainofcommand responsibility with
respecttoextrajudicialkillingsandotheroffensescommittedbypersonnelundertheir
command,controlorauthority.Suchlegislationmustdealspecificallywithextralegal,
arbitrary,andsummaryexecutionsandforceddisappearancesandprovideappropriate
penaltieswhichtakeintoaccountthegravityoftheoffense.Itshouldpenalizeasuperior
governmentofficial,militaryorotherwise,whoencourages,incites,toleratesorignores,
anyextrajudicialkillingcommittedbyasubordinate.Thefailureofsuchagovernment
officialtopreventanextrajudicialkillingifhehadareasonableopportunitytodoso,or
hisfailuretoinvestigateandpunishhissubordinate,ortootherwisetakeappropriate
action todeter or preventits commissionor punishhis erringsubordinateshouldbe
criminalized.Evengeneralinformatione.g.,mediareportswhichwouldplacethe
superioronnoticeofpossibleunlawfulactsbyhissubordinateshouldbesufficientto
holdhimcriminallyliableifhefailedtoinvestigateandpunishhissubordinate.
101

See18U.S.C.A.section3521.

reportfinalsig

72

Thereshouldbenorequirementthatacausalrelationshipbeestablishedbetween
asuperiorsfailuretoactandthesubordinatescrime;hisliabilityunderthedoctrineof
commandresponsibilityshouldbebasedonhisomissiontopreventthecommissionof
theoffenseortopunishtheperpetrator.

F.

EnhancementofinvestigativecapabilitiesofthePNPandNBI.

The investigative capabilities of the PNP and NBI should be improved and
enhancedthroughthefollowingmeasures,amongothers:

(a)

improvementoftheforensiclaboratoriesandequipmentofthePNPand
NBIandfurthertrainingofforensictechnicians;

(b)

establishmentofanationalautomatedballisticinformationsystem;

(c)

procurementofasoftwareprogramforcompositesketchesofsuspects;

(d)

adoptionof crimemappinginallpolicestationsandNBIoffices; and

(e)

strengtheningoftheinformationrewardsystem.

G.
Properorientationandtrainingofsecurityforces.

Perhapsmuchofthefailureoftheproperandaccountableofficerstoprevent,
investigate,orpunishcriminalactsbytheirsubordinatesstemsfromalackofproper
understandingandemphasisonthepresentconceptofcommandresponsibility.TheAFP
should be encouraged and supported to conduct intensive seminars, orientations, or
training for mid to highranking officers, to make them conscious of the prevailing
doctrinesofcommandresponsibility,andtheramificationsthereof.Thiswillhopefully
fosterresponsibilityandaccountabilityamongtheofficersconcerned,aswellasthemen
theycommand.
Understandable is the militarys wariness in dealing with the party list
organizations. However, unless otherwise declared outside the law by competent

reportfinalsig

73
authority,theseorganizationsshouldbetreatedwithfairnessandtheirmembersshould
notbeunilaterallyconsideredasenemiesofthestate.
AssuggestedinAmnestyInternationals14pointProgramforthepreventionof
extralegalexecutions:Theprohibitionofextrajudicialexecutionsshouldbereflectedin
thetrainingofallofficialsinvolvedinthearrestandcustodyofprisonersandallofficials
authorized to use lethal force and in the instructions issued to them. These officials
shouldbeinstructedthattheyhavetherightanddutytorefusetoobeyanyorderto
participateinanextrajudicialexecution.Anorderfromasuperiorofficerorapublic
authority must never be invoked as a justification for takingpart inan extrajudicial
execution.

VI.
CONCLUSION

InancientSparta,lifewasdictatedbywar. Inthoseturbulenttimes,citystates
werealmostconstantlyatwarwithotherneighboringcitystatesandwithmarauding
invaders.Thus,astrongmilitarywasabsolutelynecessarytothesurvivalofthestate.
All male Spartan citizens were automatically warriors, and had to train and
eventuallyfightassuch. SuchmilitarismgaveSpartaitsgreatness. Thevalorofits
warriorsandtheirunflinchingmilitarydisciplinearelegendary,eventothisday. They
were the strands with which was woven the fabric of Spartan society. Everything
revolvedaroundtheSpartanwarriors.Indeed,itwasstatedthat,unlikeotherancientcity
statessuchasAthensorRome,onecannolongerseegreattemples,palacesorbuildings
inwhatwasonceSparta,butstillthevalorousdeedsofSpartansarerecalledandremain
standardsofmilitaryorganizations.
Spartans,astheyarelegendarynow,wereprobablyaweinspiringthen.Sogreat
was their military prowess that a mere three hundred of them, reinforced by only a
handfulofallies,heldofftheinvadingPersianhordesatThermopylae,thusallowing
precioustimefortherestoftheGreekalliestoorganizeadefense.Historyshowsthatit
paystohaveamightyarmedforceThePersianswereeventuallydefeated.

reportfinalsig

74
Inmoderntimes,theimportanceofthearmedforcescannotbetakenlightly.In
the Philippines, the lack of a cohesive and disciplined armed force allowed the
colonizationofthecountrybySpain.ThesamereasonledtheAmericanstosimplytake
thecountryawayfromSpain,andquelltheFilipinoresistance. Intheearlystagesof
WorldWarIIinthePacific,Japansmilitarymightoverwhelmeditsenemies,including
thePhilippines,thoughbolsteredbyAmericantroopsandordnance.Indeed,oneofthe
main reasons for the colonizers is that the Philippines occupies a strategic military
locationinthispartoftheglobe.
Today,theimportanceofthemilitaryisnotlostuponthisCommission. Itis
absolutelynecessarybecauseofthethreattothenationposedbycommunistinsurgency.
TheConstitutionprovidesthat[t]heArmedForcesofthePhilippinesistheprotectorof
thepeopleandtheState.102 TheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,asprotectorofthe
people,ismandatedtoridthecountryofsuchinsurgency. Verily,theAFPasawhole
remainsloyaltotheConstitution.
Whilecommunistinsurgencymustbeaddressed,thefightagainstitmustnotbeat
the expense of the Constitution and the laws of the nation, and it hardly needs
emphasizing,notattheexpenseofinnocentcivilians. Thearmedforcesisnotastate
withinastate,norareitsmembersoutsidetheambitoftheConstitutionoroftheruleof
law.Oursisagovernmentoflaws,notofmen.Onthepervadingreachoftheruleoflaw,
alegalluminaryopinedthus:

Theruleoflawissupposedtopervadeourlegalsystem.
Theruleoflawhasbeenconsidered,inagovernmentlikeours,as
equivalenttothesupremacyoftheConstitution.Itisgenerallyrecognized
that the Constitution sets the limits on the powers of government; it
prevents arbitrary rule and despotism; it insures government by law,
insteadofgovernmentbywill,whichistyrannybasedonnakedforce.103

InthePhilippines,justlikeinanyruleabidingsociety,thereexistsahierarchyof
human positive laws, the highest of which is the Constitution, being the highest
expression of the sovereign will of the Filipino people.104 The principle of
102

SeeSection3,ArticleIIoftheConstitution.
Tolentino,Arturo.TheRuleofLawandourConstitution,36U.S.T.L.REV.41[1985]
104
SeeSenatev.Ermita,G.R.Nos.169777,169659,169660,169667,169834,1711246,20April2006,where
theSupremeCourtdeclared:
FortheConstitution,beingthehighestexpressionofthesovereignwillofthe
Filipinopeople,mustprevailoveranyissuanceofthegovernmentthatcontravenesits
103

reportfinalsig

75
ConstitutionalsupremacywasexplainedbyaneminentauthorityinConstitutionallawin
thiswise:
[TheConstitution]isthewritteninstrumentagreeduponbythe
peopleastheabsoluteruleofactionanddecisionforalldepartments
andofficersofthegovernmentandinoppositiontowhichanyactor
ruleofanydepartmentorofficerofthegovernment,orevenofthepeople
themselves, will bealtogether void. It is, in other words,the supreme
writtenlawoftheland.105

The Philippines, declares the Constitution, is a democratic and republican

State.106 AnessentialcharacteristicofsuchStateisthe ruleoflaw,whichprincipleis
expresslymentionedintheConstitutionsPreamble.Accordingtothepreviouslycited
authority,theruleoflawexpressestheconceptthatgovernmentofficialshaveonlythe
authoritygiventhembylawanddefinedbylaw,andthatsuchauthoritycontinuesonly
withtheconsentofthepeople107 Thus,withoutanyhesitation,theSupremeCourtin
Callantav.OfficeoftheOmbudsman108 declaredthat[i]nourjurisdiction,theruleof
law,andnotofmen,governs,whileinVillavicenciov.Lukban,109itupheldtheprimacy
oflawbydeclaringthat[n]oofficial,nomatterhowhigh,isabovethelaw.
TherationaleforthisruleoflawwasprobablybestexpressedbyBrandeisinthis
wise:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperiledifitfailstoobservethelawscrupulously.Ourgovernmentisthe
potentomnipresentteacher.Forgoodorill,itteachesthewholepeopleby
example.Crimeiscontagious.Ifthegovernmentbecomesthelawbreaker,
itbreedscontemptforthelaw,itinviteseverymantobecomealawunto
himself,itinvitesanarchy.Todeclarethatintheadministrationofcriminal
lawtheendjustifiesthemeans....wouldbringterribleretribution.110

In fact, the Supreme Court is not unfamiliar with the present situation. Of
particularinterestisthecaseofAbercav.Ver.111Inrulingthatpreemptivestrikesbythe
militaryagainstsuspectedcommunistsafehousesviolatedthecivilrightsofthevictims,
mandates.
105

Bernas,Joaquin,S.J., The1987PhilippineConstitution:ACommentary,p.xxxivv(1996Ed.); citing

Cooley,ConstitutionalLimitations3(1868);emphasissupplied.
106
Section1,ArticleIIoftheConstitution.
107
Bernas,Joaquin,S.J,The1987Constitution:AReviewerPrimer,p.3(4thEd.,2002).
108
G.R.Nos.11525374,30January1998.
109
39Phil.778(1919).
110

1Olmsteadv.U.S.277U.S.438;J.Brandeis,dissentingopinion.
160SCRA590;G.R.No.L69866.April15,1988

111

reportfinalsig

76
andthusmadetheperpetratorsthereofliablefordamages,theSupremeCourt,through
JusticePedroL.Yap,stated.
Itsmessageisclear;nomanmayseektoviolatethosesacredrights
withimpunity.Intimesofgreatupheavalorofsocialandpoliticalstress,
whenthetemptationisstrongesttoyieldborrowingthewordsofChief
JusticeClaudioTeehankeetothelawofforceratherthantheforceof
law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and
libertiesareimmutableandcannotbesacrificedtothetransientneedsor
imperiousdemandsoftherulingpower.Theruleoflawmustprevail,or
elselibertywillperish.Ourcommitmenttodemocraticprinciplesandto
theruleoflawcompelsustorejecttheviewwhichreduceslawtonothing
buttheexpressionofthewillofthepredominantpowerinthecommunity.
"Democracycannotbeareignofprogress,ofliberty,ofjustice,unless
thelawisrespectedbyhimwhomakesitandbyhimforwhomitis
made.Nowthisrespectimpliesamaximumoffaith,aminimumof
idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life
demandsofusacertainresiduumofsentimentwhichisnotderivedfrom
reason,butwhichreasonneverthelesscontrols.
x

Itmaybethattherespondents,asmembersoftheArmedForcesof
thePhilippines,weremerelyrespondingtotheirduty,astheyclaim,"to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and
subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President
Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in
pursuance of such objective, to launch preemptive strikes against
allegedcommunistterroristundergroundhouses.Butthiscannotbe
construedasablanketlicenseorarovingcommissionuntrammeledbyany
constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and
liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the
Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to
whichallofficials,highorlow,civilianormilitary,oweobedienceand
allegianceatalltimes.
x

Bethatasitmay,however,thedecisivefactorinthiscase,inour
view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or
employeeorperson"directly"or"indirectly"responsiblefortheviolation
oftheconstitutionalrightsandlibertiesofanother.Thus,itisnottheactor
alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages
underArticle32; thepersonindirectlyresponsiblehasalsotoanswer
forthedamagesorinjurycausedtotheaggrievedparty.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public
officials undertheConstitutionacquiresaddedmeaningandassumesa
largerdimension.Nolongermayasuperiorofficialrelaxhisvigilance
or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the
thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions
committedbythelatteragainsttheconstitutionallyprotectedrights
reportfinalsig

77
and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people
power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the
governmentwascallousorindifferentto,ifnotactuallyresponsiblefor,
therampantviolationsofhumanrights.Whileitwouldcertainlybetoo
naivetoexpectthatviolatorsofhumanrightswouldeasilybedeterredby
theprospectoffacingdamagesuits,itshouldnonethelessbemadeclearin
nouncertaintermsthatArticle32oftheCivilCodemakesthepersons
whoaredirectly,aswellasindirectly,responsibleforthetransgression
jointtortfeasors.112

Evenassumingthatthesevictimsandtheseenemiesofthestateareindeed
guiltyofcrimesagainstthenation,theyhavenotbeenconvictedofthesaidoffenses.If
somemilitaryelementsindeedhadreasontobelievethatthesepersonswereNPAagents
oroperatives,thentheycouldhavesimplyinstitutedthepropercriminalactionsagainst
themandhadthemarrested.Bydeclaringpersonsenemiesofthestate,andineffect,
adjudgingthemguiltyofcrimes,thesepersonshavearrogateduntothemselvesthe
power of thecourtsand of theexecutivebranchof government. Itis as if their
judgmentis:Thesepeople,asenemiesofthestate,deservetobeslainonsight.This,
they cannot do. Such an abuse of power strikes at the very heart of freedom and
democracy,whichare,ironically,theverybylinesandprinciplestheserogueelements
invokeinseekingtheneutralizationofthesesocalledenemiesofstate.
This Commission is not ignorant or unmindful of the crimes committed by
insurgents,norofthebenefitsofhavingadecentmilitarytodefendourfreedomandway
oflife.Tobesure,thoseslainbyrebelsandinsurgentsfaroutnumberthekillings
attributedbytheleftisttothegovernment.Manyofoursons,husbands,andfathers
havebeenslainorinjuredinencounterswiththeNPA,orhavebeenassassinatedby
dreadedhitmenormoweddowninambuscadesandotheractsofterrorismoftheCPP
NPA.Understandable,justified,andcommendable,infact,isthefervorwithwhichthe
State,throughthemilitary,feelstheneedtoavengetheseheroeswhoperishedinthe
defenseofthecountry. However,thisshouldnotbeatthecostofthefreedomweare
protectinginthefirstplace.
Themilitaryandpoliceauthoritiesarelaudableandnecessaryinstitutions,whose
smoothoperationaccordingtotheConstitutionisabsolutelyessentialtothecountrys
security.Themilitaryshouldnotbeallowedtodescendtotheleveloftheinsurgents

112

Id.,at601606;emphasissupplied.

reportfinalsig

78
andrebelsthemselveswiththeirlawless,treacherousmethodologies.Itisinthislight
thatthewhipmustbecrackedtobringtheroguemilitaryelementsbackinline.
ThewordsoftheSupremeCourtinAbercav.Ver113areapropos:
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from
pursuingtheirassignedtaskorcarryingouttheirmissionwithvigor.We
havenoquarrelwiththeirdutytoprotecttheRepublicfromitsenemies,
whetheroftheleftoroftheright,orfromwithinorwithout,seekingto
destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very
existence.Whatwearemerelytryingtosayisthatincarryingoutthistask
and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed,
otherwise,theveryfabricofourfaithwillstarttounravel.Inthebattle
ofcompetingideologies,thestruggleforthemindisjustasvitalasthe
struggleofarms.Thelinchpininthatpsychologicalstruggleisfaithin
theruleoflaw.Oncethatfaithislostorcompromised,thestruggle
maywellbeabandoned.

SomemaysaythatthisCommissionisquicktoplaceblameonthemilitary,while
ithardlyconsideredthepastheinouscrimescommittedbythosewhowouldoverthrow
thegovernment.Somemaysaythatthedeathorkillingoftheactivists,whileillegal,isa
blessingforwhichthemilitaryshouldbecommended. Somewillevensaythatthe
militarydeservesspecialtreatmentowingtotheircrucialroleincontaininganddefeating
insurgency.
Nay,wesay. Themilitarymustmatchitsstrengthwithrestraint,andtheonly
specialtreatmentthemilitarywillreceivefromthisCommission,andbeforeanyinquiry
for that matter, is that it will be judged with more stringent standards. As General
Esperonsaidinregardtothecourtmartialofsomearmyandmarineofficers,military
justice is harsh and strict. Truly, justice must be stern and exacting on the military
becausethemilitaryhasgreatpower,andwithgreatpowercomesgreaterresponsibility.
AstheBookofWisdomstates:
THEMIGHTYSHALLBEMIGHTILYPUTTOTHETEST

RESPECTFULLYSUBMITTED.

January22,2007.
113

Idat604;emphasissupplied.

reportfinalsig

79

JOSEA.R.MELO
ASSOCIATEJUSTICE(Ret.),
SUPREMECOURT
Chairman

NESTORM.MANTARING
DIRECTOR,NATIONALBUREAUOF
INVESTIGATION
Commissioner

JOVENCITOR.ZUO
CHIEFSTATEPROSECUTOR
Commissioner

NELIAT.GONZALEZ
REGENT,UNIVERSITYOFTHE
PHILIPPINES
Commissioner

REV.JUANDEDIOSM.
PUEBLOS,D.D.
BISHOPOFBUTUAN
Commissioner

Attested:
ATTY.ROGELIOA.VINLUAN
GeneralCounsel

reportfinalsig