Casibang

EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., ETC., ET AL. vs. VICENTE GELLA, ETC., ET AL.
(THE SECOND EMERGENCY POWER CASE) G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953
FACTS: Eulogio Rodriguez, et. al. seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546
issued in 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and
essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief
in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes,
volcanic action and other calamities. These EOs were issued pursuant to
Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs. Dinglasan, Congress passed
House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President
due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting as a fact.

FACTS:
Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected mayor of Rosales,
Pangasinan. Casibang, his only rival, filed a protest against election on the grounds
of rampant vote buying, anomalies and irregularities and others. During the
proceedings of this case, the 1973 Constitution came into effect. Respondent Yu
moved to dismiss the election protest of the petitioner on the ground that the trial
court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the new
Constitution and the new parliamentary form of government.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs issued issued have no force and effect on the ground
that they are violative of the principle of separation of power.

ISSUES:
1.

Whether Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution rendered the protest
moot and academic; and

2.

Whether Section 2, Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the

revamp of the entire local government structure.

HELD: Yes, the EOs are invalid. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs
issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not
invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for
which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president
cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war
contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of
Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For
while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to
recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress
to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought
not to be the law. Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency,
whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be
compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to
keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that
the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.

RULING:
1.

2.

As stated in Santos vs. Castaneda, the constitutional grant of privilege to

continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons
who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the
new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately
encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the
duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest" and that "subject
to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the
Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the
framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the
statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame
prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed
mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed
candidate-elect's right to the contested office.
Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest
case with a political color. For simply, that section allocated unto the National
Assembly the power to enact a local government code "which may not
thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its Members, defining a
more responsive and accountable local government allocating among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources,
and providing for their qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries,
powers, functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating
to the organization and operation of the local units" but "... any change in the
existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose."

Rodriguez v Gella
G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953
Paras, C.J.:

Facts:
1.

Petitioners sought to invalidate Executive Orders (EO) 545 and 546 issued on
November 10, 1952. EO 545 appropriated the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and
essential public works, while EO 546 set aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the
provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic
action and other calamities.

2.

Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other

obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the Congress, or if the

national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited

latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto.

period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Accordingly the National Assembly

3.

If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general appropriations,

passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the national policy that

none can remain in respect of special appropriations; otherwise he may accomplish

"the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and

indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671

Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with

expressly limited the power of the President to that continuing "in force"

extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in section 2)

appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so that, even

authorizing the President, "during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such

assuming that the Act is still effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by

rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy

executive orders make new appropriations.

declared in section 1."

4.

The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse

3. House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency Powers Acts but was vetoed by the

or otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise

President. HB 727 may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the

such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfil its

Congress to formally declare the termination of the emergency powers.

responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that
although the Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been normally

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders are still operative

functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President still has any
residuary powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping,

NO.

1. EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. The Congress has

if not conflict.

5.

The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in

since liberation repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds for the operation

allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times

of the Government, public works, and many others purposes, with the result that as to

of war or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of

such legislative task the Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume

the Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient

the corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from the President.

procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should
not create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the

2.

CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that

the National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended

wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the
Constitution.

that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a
cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the President, the result would be

G.R. No. L-6266; February 2, 1953

FACTS:

On August 26, 1949, the court passed upon the status of CA No. 671 approved on
December 16, 1949. Five members held that the Act ceased to be operative in its
totality when the Congress convened in special session. Herein petitioners seek to
invalidate EO Nos. 545 and 546 appropriating the sum of P37, 850, 500 for urgent
and essential public works and setting aside the sum of P11, 367, 600 for relief from
typhoons, floods and other calamities. Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to
revoke CA 671 but was vetoed by the President.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 545 and 546 are still operative

without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that
the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to
curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO

HELD:
Act 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency whereby the consent of the
agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust,
in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or
the will of the agent. The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that
the power lasted only during the emergency resulting from the last world war. That
emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of the last world war, was
contemplated by the members of the National Assembly. Shelter may not be sought in
the proposition that the President should be allowed to exercise emergency powers
for the sake of speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the people
because we have the Constitution designed to establish a government under a
regime of justice, liberty and democracy, and since our government is based on the
system of separation of powers. Wherefore, EO Nos. 545 and 546 are declared null
and void.

626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The

WHEREFORE, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are hereby declared NULL and
VOID, and the respondents are ordered to desist from appropriating, releasing,
allotting, and expending the public funds set aside therein. SO ORDERED, without
costs.

a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of

movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent
slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and
explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The
SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary
to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is

separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers
to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Police Power Not Validly Exercised
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO
626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the
movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef.
On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He
was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as
unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said
that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even

GR No. L-74457, March 20, 1987

FACTS:In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A which orders
that nocarabao and carabeef shall be transported from one province to another; such
violation shall
besubject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charita
bleinstitutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Insp
ectionCommission may see fit for the carabeef and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as theDirector of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of
the carabaos.On January 13, 1984, Petitioners 6 carabaos were confiscated by the p
olice stationcommander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for having been transported from
Masbate to Iloilo inviolation of EO 626-A. He issued a writ for

replevin
, challenging the constitutionality of saidEO. The trial court sustained the confiscation
of the animals and declined to rule on the validityof the law on the ground that it
lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC.Hence, this petition for
review filed by Petitioner.ISSUE:Whether or not police power is properly
enforcedHELD: NO. The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of
the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police
power is simply defined as
the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of th
egeneral welfare. As long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the
public welfare,its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary.
In the case at bar, E.O.626-A has the same lawful subject as the original executive
order (E.O. 626 as cited in Toribiocase) but NOT the same lawful method. The
reasonable connection between the means employedand the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing. The challengedmeasure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve thecarabaos
is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive.
QuickGuide: Petitioner assails constitutionality of E.O. No. 626-A prohibiting the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. E.O. No.
626-A was held unconstitutional for violating the due process clause.

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo in
January 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander for
violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos
and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of E.O. No.
626 (except when the carabo is seven years old if male, and eleven years old if
female). The penalty is confiscation of the carabaos and/or the carabeef.
ISSUE:
Whether E.O. No. 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the outright
confiscation of carabao and carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries,
thus denying due process.
RULING:
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain so
conveniently resilient for due process is not an iron rule. Flexibility must be the best
virtue of guaranty. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing
which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as
a safeguard against official arbitrariness.
It is noted that E.O. No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the
carabaos but on their movement. The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the question of measure is
missing. Even if there was a reasonable relation, the penalty being an outright
confiscation and a supersedeas bond of Php12,000.00. The executive order defined
the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, thus
denying the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.

questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos.
After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court
declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to
the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue:
Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was
carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed.
FACTS:

To sum up, it was found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. Due
process is violated for the owner was denied the right to hear his defense and was
not seen fit to assert and protect his rights. Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby
declared unconstitutional, and the superseceas bond is cancelled.
Pelaez
FACTS:

From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued
executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the
implementation of said executive orders.

Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks
to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in
audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive orders
aforementioned.
ISSUE:
Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President
does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in
the legislative department.
RULING:
Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law,
and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere
in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to
act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive,
insofar as local governments are concerned. Such control does not include the
authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new
one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply
with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power
than what was vested in him by the Constitution.

The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the
municipalities referred to.

Emmanuel Pelaez Vs. Auditor-General (1965)

This is a special civil action for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunctioninstituted by Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as
taxpayer,against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives
andagents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation
of the EOs issued by the President creating 33 municipalities and/or any
disbursementby said municipalities.
FACTS:

In 1964, the President, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative

Codeissued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirtythree(33) municipalities.Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void
on the ground thatsaid Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No.
2370 andconstitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.When RA 2370 (The
Barrio Charter) provides that barrios may "not be created ortheir boundaries altered
nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding
provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in theareas affected" and the
"recommendation of the council of the municipality ormunicipalities.Section 68 of
RAC, which said EOs are based, provides that the President maydefine or divide the
boundary or boundaries of any province, sub-province,municipality, municipal district
XXX as the public welfare may require provided, thatthe authorization of the
Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained.Petitioner argues that the President
under the new law cannot create a barrio, howmuch more of a municipality which is
composed of several barrios.Respondent answered that a new municipality can be
created without creating newbarrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the
jurisdiction of the newmunicipality. This answer however overlooks on the main import
of the petitionersargument, which questions the Presidents authority to create
municipalities.Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create
municipalities underthis section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative
power, relyingupon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan.
ISSUE:
WON the President has the legislative authority to issue the EOs
creatingmunicipalities.

PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR-GENERAL G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965 FACTS:
President Diosdado Macapagal, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126
to 129; creating thirtythree (33) municipalities. petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice
President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, questioned the said EOs and petitioned
the court to restrain the Auditor General and his representatives and agents, from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive
orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said
executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been
impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the 33 municipalities is null and void on the
ground that the President has no power to create municipalities.
HELD: Yes, the creation of the 33 municipalities is null and void as the power to
create municipal corporations is solely legislative in nature. Although Congress may
delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the

execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation

of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it
must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.

passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive

Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or
formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law,
but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with
the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation of our Republican system. Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does
it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.

1917, so far as it purports to grant any such power, is invalid or, at the least, already

orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

The Vice-President contends that the President has no power to create a municipality
by executive order. It is argued that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of
repealed, in light of the Philippine Constitution and Republic Act 2370 (The Barrio
Charter)
The Vice President further alleges that "If the President, under this new law, cannot
even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several
barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?"
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can
be created without creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the
jurisdiction of the new municipality.

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,

ISSUE:

vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
G.R. No. L-23825
December 24, 1965

Whether or not the President of the Philippines, in the exercise of its executive power
can create municipalities.
HELD:
Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

DOCTRINAL RULE:
"municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes."

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may
be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

FACTS:
By virtue of section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, the presidents of the
Philippines in exercised its executive power issued executive orders creating several
municipalities in different places in the Philippines.

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers
of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well
as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the

The Vice President of Philippines Emmanuel Pelaez as a taxpayer, instituted a

special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the
Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from

Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned.

In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly

does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on
March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the
Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory
enactment.7
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void
ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any
disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.

Casibang v. Aquino
G.R. No. L-38025 August 20, 1979
Makasiar, J.
Facts:
Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9,
1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local
elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner,
who seasonably filed a protest against the election of the former with the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies
and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes
in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4)
open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and
other violations of the 1971 Election Code.
In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines issued Proclamation No.
1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two months
thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971
Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to
supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same was thereafter
overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the
Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, the Supreme
Court declared that there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect.

Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had

already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had rested his
case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner
on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in
view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which
principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2
of Article XI a political question has intervened in the case.
Respondent Yu contended that ... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution
relative to all local governments have been superseded by the 1973
Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our
parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution
under its Article XI. He further submitted that local elective officials
(including mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They are only in
office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New
Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII.
The thrust of the political question theory of respondent Yu is that
the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, protected
only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and
effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in office and their
term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same
has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent President of the
Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI
thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local
government structure by the enactment of a local government code, thus
presenting a question of policy, the necessity and expediency of which
are outside the range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent
Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election
protest of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a question or policy
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislative or Executive branch of the government.
Issue:
whether the issue involves a political question and therefore
beyond judicial ambit
Held:

No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not

render moot and academic pending election protest cases. The
constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new
Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or
employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect,
cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every
person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an
elective office, albeit under protest or contest and that subject to the
constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the
Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of
the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the
statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the timeframe prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings
beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a
proclaimed candidate-elects right to the contested office.

of the office. In other words, the term refers to the period, duration of
length of time during which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay
therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although
Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the
petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein
petitioners, in an election protest, of the right of the private respondents
to continue holding their respective office. What has been directly
affected by said constitutional provision is the term to the office, although
the right of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is coextensive with the term thereof, and that it is erroneous to conclude
that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of
office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding
their respective offices under a new term. They hold their respective
offices still under the term to which they have been elected, although the
same is now indefinite.

The right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in

office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of
the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed
elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971
elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to
their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the
same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments,
then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of
office given to them by said constitutional provision.

The New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of

courts of first instance to hear, try and decide election protests: Section 7
of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that all existing laws not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
modified or repealed by the National Assembly. And there has been no
amendment, modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of
1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file an election contest
against those proclaimed elected, and according to Section 8, Article
XVII of the New Constitution all courts existing at the time of the
ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their
jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this
Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried
and determined under the laws then in force. Consequently, the Courts
of First Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should
continue and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election
protests filed by herein petitioners.

Until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise,

the right of respondent (protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the
legality of his election which has been protested by herein petitioner.
Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral protest,
respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or
presidential decree terminates his tenure of office pursuant to said
Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution.
There is a difference between the term of office and the right to
hold an office. Aterm of office is the period during winch an elected
officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and
enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A right to hold a public office is
the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities

While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is

now the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as elective
provincial and city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests
concerning municipal elective positions.

General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines

merely reiterated his powers under Section 9 of Article XVII of the New
Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to modify the aforesaid
constitutional provision.
General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A,
does not expressly include electoral contests of municipal elective
positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; for
said General Order, after affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to
decide in accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil cases,
simply removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain crimes
specified therein as well as the validity, legality or constitutionality of any
decree, order or acts issued by the President or his duly designated
representative or by public servants pursuant to his decrees and orders
issued under Proclamation No. 1081.
In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, the electoral protest
case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political
question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of
the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly
reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election
protest. The term political question connotes what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those
questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly
non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue involved in
a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has
been a prior legislative or executive determination to which deference
must be paid. Political questions should refer to such as would under
the Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in
regard to which full discretionary authority is vested either in the
President or Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary
to pass upon.

Casibang vs Aquino
FACTS:Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as
the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections. Herein
petitioner filed on November 24, 1971 a protestagainst the election of the
former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of As
the proceedings continued, the 1973 Constitution was ratified. Yu moved to
dismiss the election protestof petitioner on the ground that the trial court had
lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivityof the 1973
Constitution by reason of which Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory
Provisions] andSection 2 of Article XI a political question has intervened in
the case. Respondent Yu contended that "...the provisions in the 1935
Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded by the
1973Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our
parliamentary form of government. Thisis clear in the New Constitution under
its Article XI." He further submitted that local elective officials haveno more
four-year term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the
appointing power embodiedin the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of
Article XVII. CFI ruled in favor of Yu.ISSUE
WON the protest case is a political questionHELD:

No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there
any act of theincumbent President or the Legislative Department to be
indirectly reviewed or interfered with if therespondent Judge decides the
election protest. The term "political question" connotes what it means
inordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which under the Constitution,are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authorityhas
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issuesdependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure" The only issue in the electoral protestcase dismissed by
respondent Judge on the ground of political question is who between
protestant herein petitioner and protestee herein respondent Yu
was the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan,and legally entitled to
enjoy the rights, privileges and emoluments appurtenant thereto and to
discharge thefunctions, duties and obligations of the position. If the
protestee's election is upheld by the respondentJudge, then he continues in
office; otherwise, it is the protestant, herein petitioner. That is the
onlyconsequence of a resolution of the issue therein involved a purely
justiciable question or controversy asit implies a given right, legally

demandable and enforceable, an act or ommission violative of said right,and

a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. Any
judgment to be made on thatissue will not in any way collide or interfere with
the mandate of Section 9 of Article XVII. Neither doesSection 2 of Article XI

stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color. For
simply,that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a
local government code