-

I
c
CBSR 4isrRET
SEC

SECPJT
SIBH ASSESSMENT 34(IXd))
V
MIS
t
3
j4D
I
TRAISI 2057/B ILODEAU
FROM;
AnlcaralM-C5
Pascal Laurin CS
Michelle Raty CS

TO:

DATE:

073UN2013

CIC PILE:

W300457930 I UCI 40158281

8281
CESA FILE: CA2013.4049389 /4015CIT: Iran
01 DEC1965 I Male / COB: Iran /
SUBJECT: Ramin FALLA1 / DOE:
Ecvntive Suniarnrv
013, for
a (TRy) hi Ankara on March 19,2
t
Vis
iden
Res
ary
por
Tem
a
for
lied
1. Mr. Ramin FALLAFI app
e years, Canadian Plasma
ly created business thr the ccitt thre
the purposes of working on his new
Resources / Exaphartna Inc. (B)
shgabi since October2001.
naging Director of Fanavari Azmayeh procurement connected to e
Ma
the
n
bee
has
J-I
LIA
FA
Mr.
2.
this company has been involved wit
Iranian nuclear program. (S)
temporary
pleted the final assessment of the
com
)
has
SD
(NS
n
isio
Div
ing
een
ble
Scr
that there are reasona
3. The National Security
applicant named above, It is assessed
resident application for the primary is inadmissible to Canada pursuant to paragraph 34(1 )(d) of the
)
H
urity of Canada. (13
grounds to believe that Mr. FALLA
PA) for bcing a danger in the sec
(IR
Act
ion
tect
Pro
ee
Mg
Re[
wJd
n
haraigratio
following:
l be labeled in accordance with the
wil
ort
rep
this
out
ugh
thro
tion
rma
The info
(S)
(B)
(U)

Refers to Secret information

Refers to Protected B information
tion
Refers to Unclassified infbzma

Law

tiont 34 to 37 include
constitute inadmissibility under sec e are reasonable
that
s
fact
the
A,
IRP
the
of
33
Pursuant to section
facts for which ther
unless otherwise provided, include . The threshold of reasonable grounds
facts arising from omissions and,
iW
occ
e occurred, arc occurring or may
grounds to believe that they hav

CanadT
Page

CB$RSFC

SECREt

to believe has been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mugcyera v. Canada (Minister of
Cftizenshlp and ImmiRration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, at paragraph 114. (U)
34. (1) A pemianerit resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for...
(d) being a danger to the security of Canada...
Applicant-SiecificJ*formaiion
On April 12, 2013, TR.AIS received a referral from the Canadian Mission in Ankara for Ramin FALLAH
(hereafter refened to as the applicant) who has applied for a Temporary Resident Visa (TRV) for the purposes
of working on his newly created business for the next three years, Canadian Plasma Resources / Exaphartna
Inc. The business address for these entities am indicated as 508 Spadina Avenue in Toronto. Ontario. (B)
According to the information provided, the applIcant has been the Managing Director of Fanavari
Azmayeshgabi since October 2001. Prior to that, he was the Marketing Director of the same company from
1996 to 2001. From 1991 to 1996 he was a sales manager for Technology Azmaycshgahi and a salesman for
that same company from 19811 to 1991. (B)

As Managing Director of Panavari Azmayeshgahi, the applicant indicates in his C.V. being in charge of! 80
employees. As part of his duties, he indicates perfbrm duties as managing director for a leading importing
company in the field of medical and laboratories equipment, and one of the biggest medical and laboratories
companies at Iran. (B)
According to FOSS, the applicant was previously issued TRVs in August 2001, July 2003, and August 2005.
(B)
Topic-Specific Information
gctions awsiiinn
Since 2006, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has imposed four rounds of sanctions (Resolutions
1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010)] against Iran in response to the proliferation risks
presented by its nuclear program in tight of Irans continuing failure to meet the requirements of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to comply with the provisions of earlier UNSC Resolutions
to suspend aft uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. (U)
The UNSC Resolutions provide for the following: impose an embargo on certain goods and services that
could contribute to irans activities linked to enrichment, reprocessing, heavy water or the development of
nuclear wenpons delivery systems; prohibit the provision of technical or financial assistance on products

Canad
Pagc2of5

.9

CBSA 481c
StCRET

under the export ban; impose a travel ban for designated Iranian officials; and implement a freeze of nets of
designated Iranian companies and officials. (U)
On July 22, 2010, Canada implemented the IJNSC Resolutions with the Special Economic Measur (Jraa)
2 On November 21.2011. Can daxdposed
Regulations, under the Special Economic Measures 4cr (SEMA).
new sanctions against fran to prohibit financial transactions with Iran, expand the list of prohibited goods to
include all goods used in the petrochemical, oil and gas industry In iran, amend the list of prohibited goods to
include additional hems that could be used in Itans nuclear program, and add new individuals and entities to
the list of designated persons found in Schedule I of the SEMA Regulations. (U)
Fsnavari Azmaveshgpbi

According to its website

:
4
Our company was formed in 1985 with the ann to supply medical and laboralaiy instruments. Our mission
is to furnish our clients with a solution and not a simple sale of instrument. Installation, Training and 10
years after sales services are guaranteed by us.. Fanevari succeeded to become a reliable institution for the
heatthesre sector; thanks to a continuous growth period resulted from investments made for lorigderm
planning and development and based on safeguarding our national imerests. Weve attempted to obtain our
customers satisthction using 25 years of our management teams experience and selected set of the best
medical products, in folbwmg area:
Providing high quality equipments and superior technology proportionate to necessities of medical centers.
Designing, consulting and providing engineering services before choosing the required equipments.
Obtaining our customers relief using our experienced technical team who are responsible to provide
guarantee and after sales service which can optimia medical centers investments with superior
performance.
Fanavail Azmayeshgahl reprnscnts well known brands and sophisticated products:
Siemens: Ultrasound systems, C-Ami, Mobile X-Ray, Mammography, Lithotripsor System, Radiology.
Fluoroecopy system, Angiogrephy and MRI
Olynspus: Wkle range of Endoscopic Products in 01, Rcspiratory and surgery
Covidien: Surgical Staplers. Advanced Laparoscpic Instruments, Oenersl and Specialty Sutures,
Biosurgexy and 1VS
Getinge. Hospital Sterilizers and Washer Dsmfnctora
Maquec Ventilators, Ceiling Pendants, Surgical Lights
Daincca: Ancstiwsla machines
Accoithng to classified infonnation ol,taiiwd on June 3,2013:

Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations, SORI2OIO-165 July22, 2010, escusred 02 October2012,
g:llcanadzettc.ec.carn-Io2r2Ol0flO lO.flS.O4Ihunl!sor-dorsl 6.ej1gJfl5J.

Special Economic Measures (iran) Regulations, SORI2OIO-165 July22, 2010, accessed 02 October2012,

flip:lirsriadaneac.cWv-eWe220i 0f4mj(sor.dosi65-eiiajiiip1,
Sanctions against han, accessed 02 October2012,
Fanavari Azmayeehgahi, About Us, ht ,iwwwfa.,avariwm!httniiaboutus.htui1 {acceed lune 7,20131

ga

Canad
Page 3 cfS

Ii

CBSA SFC

s
the U.K.s Department of Business innovation and Skill
The company Fanavari Aznrnyeshgahl is listed on
:
5
that
s
state
ate Sabz Co. which
(BIS) as Fanavan Azniayeshgahi eke Eghlim Sana
nce of
the Export Control Organisation (ECO) experie
The entities in chided on the list are mainly based on
to a
rsion
dive
of
risks
ptable
unacce
s due to
either invoking the WML) End-Use Control or refusing ticence
WMD programme of concern,
that have
have beco named in licence applications
Entities anti organistitions are also included where they tion (EU) 96112010 of 25th October 2G10, or in
Regula
been refused in line with the provisions of CouncilStajem
erg issued on 9th November 2,010 by Mark Prisk,
erial
Minist
n
Writte
om
Kingd
line with the United
Minister of State for Business and Enterprise.
or
list, for whom we may not have received applicahons
Lu addition, (here are adier entities included in the or refuse a Iicences but for whom there is publicly
ls
enquiries in which to invoke the End-Use Contro
programmes of concern.
available information indicating their involvement in WMD
ed. (U>
ti has had liccnses both granted and deni

According to this document, Fanavari Azrnayeshgal

ed by Japans Ministry of Economy, Trade

ucenl
ndurn
doc
r
Fanavari Azmayesbgalii is also llswd on a 1
and Industry as an entity of potential WMI) concern.

pharmna& Canadian Plasma Resources

Exnphannas websile, its mission is:
According to the mission statement found on
order to
sowno plasma and plasma derived therapies in
To provide a reliable supply of Ike highest quality
make Canada self-sufficient.
According to its vblon
acturer in Canada
To be recognized as the leading source plasma manuf
s,
service
cts
and
for our excellence, innovative proiu

and tobe internationally renowned

dian Plasma
According to the mission statement for Cana
ranIIst-0tl.5Jia4 acccssed June 6, 2013)

Iuk-dbit-l
pJ/ww.lranwauth.orsJjtotemrneni1UK
y,
Industr
ant
Ministry of Economy, Trade

June?, 2013)

ncoracrate.s1atement5 taceemsed Jane 7.20131

E,tapbarma. About Exaphamie. bttp:fwww.exmiin
June 7, 2013]
Tbid
htlIJwww vcoIasnIe.caIcoIpolanaLefnis (accessed
Canadlan Plasuta Resources, About Us,
9
Carad, Caa
Agency

Q*. IWVC4

Irenj4m J

Canad
4 S
Page

of

It

FC
CBSA 45SEC
RET

and reliability
ply plasma ot the highest quality
sup
l
wil
ces
our
Res
sma
Pla
ld
Canadian
Canada and around the wor
that improve and savC Hves itt
According to lb vision:

ure Canada
reliable supply of plasma to ens
The goal is to provide a safe and
s detived from ft.
human plasma and therapeutic

for creating treatments

will be self4uffic lent in

strives to
Canadian Plasma Rasournas
derived therapies fermi
d fbr importing of plasma
nee
the
e
inat
elim
ally
ntu
eve
Significantly dec,eae and
ntrie
other plasma producing cou
*

duce
2. Have the capability to pro

lly.
plasma derived therapeutics loca

Rarnin FaLIah

is identified
ar website the applicant
Ye
ess
sin
Bu
e
Th
in
ted
the applicant :
with the applicant pos
of the questions posed to
e
som
According to an Interview
ong
Am
hi.
hga
yes
Funavasi Azrna
as the Managing Director of
medical ludnatry?
ynar company provide to the
dou
a.
vic
aer
and
ts
duc
TflY What sort of pro
ters,
pitals and imaging cen
s imaging products to hosvide raaduines nocssary for
men
Sie
ply
sup
nly
mai
We
addition, we pro
R.AMIN FALLAN
I, X-ray, and ultra-sound. In company. Also, we supply surgical products
se
Including systems such as MR
ane
Jap
a
us,
mp
different parts of the
supplied by Oly
endoecopy, though these are n and laparoscopic surgery, and we source those from to hospitalsboth
like staples and suturos for ope te of the advanced surgical products that we supply
cover CSR, oparuting
of smi
world. These arc examples ply products from Gchnge and Maquet, their products
private and state, We also sup .
room equipment, and ventilators
blems with shipments?
t
Do you capetiesee tiny pro
airy product that you wan
y
are very bureaucratic for
istr
Iran
Min
in
is
the
ton
lth,
cus
Hea
The
.
of
ous
y
Fortunately, nothIng very seri se, You have to have the permission of the Ministr world, for example in
to release from the customs hou toms to obtain its release. In other puts of the you receive it at your
that
to cus
of Cornnicrcc and then go ped to companies via OHL, and then the day after nkItnl and they told us
ship
Fra
are
in
ts
duc
use
huge wareho
Armenia, die pro
problems at customs we
se. Siemens has established a
office, not In the customs hou Tehrun because of this huge investment Yet, due to ssary cost for us, though
in
ause its an unnece
that we would not need mie
. We aim to get rid of It, bec
ran
Teb
in
use
eho
a
war
e
hav
have to
t.
we cannot do that at the momen

Ibid.

de, hcipi
w Raisin Fdlah. uFeom the InsI

The BusIness Year, Intervie wie 6, 20t31

ide taccasred
2QJ tffrom.the4ns

wdrtbu5iresstrsiiuu

u1yL,I.1cI

juiiiz

Canae5datS
Pag

T3

cisa 4isf C
SECRET

Pursuant to paragraph 34(IX4) of 1I&PA, an applicant may be found inadmissible for being a danger to the
sccwity of Canada; therefore, an individual who has engaged, engages, or will eagage in proLifemtlon of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) may be found inadmissible to Canada. The Supreme Comnt of Canada
held in Surek v. Cara4a (Minister of Citizenship and Immigraaion), L2002] I S.C.R. 3, ai paragraph 5, that:
a fair, large and liberal Interpretation In accordance with International norms must be accorded
La danger to the security of Canada in deportation legislation. We recognize that danger to the
security of Canada is difficult to defoe We also accept dint the determination of what constitutes a
danger to the security of Canada Is highly fhet-based and political in a general sense. All this suggests
a bread aid flexible approach to national security and..a deferential standard of judicial review
tEawhasLc arkied.) (U)

The Court also held, at paragraph RE, that [ijntcrnational conventions must be interpreted in light of canant
conditions:

1110 insist on direct proof of a specitlc threat to Canada as the test for dauger lathe security of Canada
Is to Sat the bar too high. There must be a real and serious possibility of adverse effect to Canada. But
the threat need not be direct naiher it may be grounded ii, distant events that indirectly have a real
possibility ciharming Canadian security. tEmp hasis oddert I (U)
The Court concluded, at paragraph 90, that
IAI peraoa canstitutca a danger to the security nt Canada if ha or she poses a serious threat to
the secmity of Canada, whether direct an Indirect, and bearing In mind the fact that the security of
one coutry Is often dependent on the security of other nations. The threat rnu be serious, in the
sense that ii must be grounded art objectively reasonable suspicion based on evidence and in the sense
that the threatened harm must be substantial rather than negligible. Emphasir added.) (U>
In addition, the Federal Court of Appeal held in Suresh i Canada (M.C.L), (2000) 2 FC 592 (CA), at
paragraph 6!. that:
ITJtbe security of Canada cannot be limited en Instances where the personal safety of Canadians
Ii concerned. It should logically extend to instances where the integrity of Canadas Intenritiond
relations and obligations are aUected. It must be adcnowledged that only through lbs collective efforts
of nations will the threat of terrorism be diminished. The efficacy of those collective efforts is
undermined each time a natioO ptvvides terrorist organizations with a window of opportunity to openate
off-shore arid achieve indirectly what cannot be done as efficiently and eflectively ifl the country targeted
for tcrrcristattocks (Emphasis addeLj(U)
Although the Snresh case dealt with terrorism, the National Security Screening Division (NSSD) is of the
view that the arguments regarding what constitutes a danger to the security of Canada are applicable to
situations dealing with nuclear proliferation or proliferation of WMi) which constitutes a serious threat or
danger to the security of Canada. Nucicar proliferation constitutes a worldwide threat, hence the impvsdtafl
of economic sanctions on Iran. To note, as part of its non-proliferation policy, Canada is a signatory to the

Canacff

Page 6 of S

14

CBSA 4SFCET
SECR

s a safeguard
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which establishe
intertiatianal Treaty On the Non-Proliferation of
han is a party
ough
Alth
A).
nal Atomic Energy Agency (IAE
system under the responsibility of the Internatio
international
and
IAEA
the
by
ce
non-complian
to the NFl, as nientioned above, it has been found in
sanctions have been imposed against Iran. (U)
Canada is
constitutes a danger to the security of
In addition, the interpretation of the courts as to what
and
(0:
nragraphs 3(1)(h)
conrirmed in the objectives of IRPA, specifically in subp
are.
3. (1) The objectives of this Act with respect to Immigration in the security of Canadian society;
to
mainta
s
and
dian
Cana
of
(Ii) to protect the health and safety
ng resperS for human rights and by denying
(1) to promote ernatlaisi justiad end security by fosteri
or security risks.... (U)
acceas to Canadian territory to persons who are criminals
(Mtncter of
Canada held in Medovarski it Canada
In regards to section 3 of IAPA, the Supreme Court of
at paragraph 10, that
Ci&eisrhip andImmigrcuios), 12005)2 S.C.R. 539,
to prioritize security. This objective is given
The otijectives as expressed in the 11W4 indicate an interd records, by removing applicants with such
effct by praveasing the entry of applicants with criminalpermanent residents to behave lawfully while
of
records from Canada, and by emphasizing the obligationthe
predecessor atsiute, which emphasized the
in
focus
the
from
change
a
marks
lids
da.
Cana
in
e.g., see s. 3(IXI) of the IRPA versus s. 3(j) of thef
successful Integration of applicants more than security
er Act s. 3(lXh) of the IRP.4 versus s. 3(i)
f&ni
the
of
former Act a. 3(lXe) of the JRP4 versus s. 3(d)
IRPA and its provisions concerning permanent
the former Act. Viewed collectively, the objectives of theand security threats less [aniendy than under the
als
residents, communicate a strong desire to treat crimin
former Act (U)
personally
missible to Canada on security grounds be
There is no requ.irement that an individual who is inad ment that criminality be determined in order for an
quire
involved in acts of violence. There is, therefore, nore
Canada. (U)
of
rity
secu
to
the
er
dang
a
individual to be considered
iduals who
dian policy, NSSD is of the view that indiv
Considering the above case law, legislation arid Cana or preliferation of WMD may be found inadmissible
ion
ore.
are linked, directly or indirectly, to nuclear proliferat
nt a danger to the security of Canada. Furthermls or
prese
they
that
ve
belie
to
nds
grou
e
nabl
reaso
are
idua
there
as
are linked, directly or indirectly, to the indiv
NSSD is also of the view that individuals who iran may ho found inadmissible as there are reasonable
st
organizations listed in the SEMA sanctions again
the security of Canada. (B)
to
er
dang
a
titute
cons
they
that
ve
to
belie
grounds
In the case of that

d governments as
identified in opon sources and by allie
Fasiavari Azmayethgalii Company has also been was identified by the U.K.s Department of Business
ple, it
being an entity of WMD concern. For exam

CanadS
Page 7 of

CBSA 4SFC
SECIUl
Innovation and Skills (RIS) as entity that poses unacc
eptable risks of diversion to a WMD programme of
concern. It was also identified

by the Japanese government as an entity of

potential WMD COflCCtTh Funher,
according to its website, Fanavari Azmayeshgahi
rcpresents well-known brands and pruducts that have
potential dual-use application. For example, several produc
application, such as Xray equipment, which highlig ts under the Siemens brand have potential dual use
is
hted in the U.Ss 2010 TechnolOgy Alert List (TAL)
as critical technologies for the production of WMD
s. X-ray equipment / technologies highlighted in the TAL
include: FLASH DISCHARGE TYPE X-RAY SYSTE
MS, FLASII X-RAY, iMAGiNG SYSTEMS and X
AW
TJCH AS
I. Y.RAy1u

When considering the above, there are reason

able grounds to believe that the appliCaflt by virtue of his
position as Nanaging Director of Fanavari Azmay
eshgahi Company, and by virtue 0
f this carnpaays reported
Involvement with procurement connected to the
Iranian nuclear program, presents a danger to the security of
Canada and its allies and is inadmissible pursua
nt to paragraph 34(1 )(d) of IRPA (B).
Recommendation

The National Security Division (NSSD) recommends

that there are reasonable grotifld ifl believe that the
applicant is inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 34(I)(d
) of IRPA, at this time. The dcCiSi0fl of whether the
subject is inadmissible rests solely with the decisionm
akcr. We trust that the infnmiatio provided will be of
assistance in your decision-making process. (B)

Please do not hesitate to contact us should you require

additional information or QSSISWJ1CC
Temporary Resident Assessments and Intelligence Section
(TRAIS)
Outlook: CBSA-ASFCjnteIl_TempResScreenjRM
S-RensJflt_Res IcmpfilthRT
SMTP: lS-SRERT(Thcbsa-asfc,p,c.ca
This documeat casnwtes a record which may be e.cempt
from disclosure under the 4ccB 10 JJj.flJCJIIWi 4cr or
the Privacy 4cr. The information or intelligence may also protect
be
ed by the provisions of the Canada Evidence
Act. The information or intelligence must not be disclosed or
used
as
evidence without prior consultahbotl With the
Canada Border Services Agency (CIISA). Classified information
coataitied within this document Ca000( be
disclosed to outside parties

This document is the property of the CBSA lt is loaned to your agency /

department in cnfidCflCC br internal
only. It must not be reclassified or disseminated, in whole or in pan,
without the consent of the originBt

USC

Cana&

Page 5 of B