Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Contents
PART ONE: ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE............................................................................................................................................9
Chapter 1. Barriers to Access and the Right to Health Care..........................................................................................................9
Part 1. Health Insurance and the Uninsured....................................................................................................................................9
Part 2. The Consequences of Being Uninsured..............................................................................................................................10
Part 3. A Right to Health Care..........................................................................................................................................................10
The Right to Health Care.......................................................................................................................................................................10
Chapter 2. The Common Law: From No Duty of Care to Limited Social Responsibility....................................................10
Part 1. A Brief Overview of American Common Law...................................................................................................................10
Part 2. The Basis of the No Duty Principle..................................................................................................................................11
Hurley v. Eddingfield....................................................................................................................................................................11
Part 3. Termination and Formation of the Doctor-Patient Relationship: Undertaking and Abandonment...................12
Ricks v. Budge.................................................................................................................................................................................12
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EMTALA..................................................................................................................................................................................................14
Chapter 3. Federal Legislative Reform of the No Duty Principle: The Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act
(EMTALA)...........................................................................................................................................................................................14
Part 1. Introduction............................................................................................................................................................................14
Part 2. The EMTALA Statute.............................................................................................................................................................15
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Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Bruch........................................................................................................................................39
Krauss v. Oxford Health Plans.....................................................................................................................................................40
Part 7. ERISA and Preemption of State Law...................................................................................................................................40
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Medicare...................................................................................................................................................................................................47
Chapter 10. Medicare.........................................................................................................................................................................47
Part 3. Defining the Scope and Limits of the Medicare Entitlement...........................................................................................50
Part 4. Appeals of Individual Medicare Claims Denials..............................................................................................................50
Supplement. Note: The Final Demise of the Improvement Standard.........................................................................................50
Medicaid...................................................................................................................................................................................................51
Chapter 11. Medicaid.........................................................................................................................................................................51
Part 4. Medicaids History.................................................................................................................................................................51
Enactment........................................................................................................................................................................................51
Movement to Medicaid Managed Care: Medicaid as a Market Purchaser............................................................................51
Achievements..................................................................................................................................................................................51
Challenges.......................................................................................................................................................................................51
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National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius..............................................................................................52
How Medicaid works.........................................................................................................................................................................53
Statutory Requirements for the States.........................................................................................................................................53
General Requirements...................................................................................................................................................................53
Rules for Assessing Eligibility......................................................................................................................................................54
People Who MUST be Covered....................................................................................................................................................54
Rules for what Medical Care MUST be Covered.......................................................................................................................54
Acceptable State Coverage Limits................................................................................................................................................55
Curtis v. Taylor.......................................................................................................................................................................55
Cowan v. Meyers...................................................................................................................................................................55
Miller v. Whitburn.................................................................................................................................................................55
Dexter v. Kirschner................................................................................................................................................................55
Unacceptable State Coverage Limits...........................................................................................................................................55
Pinnecke..................................................................................................................................................................................55
Weaver v Reagan...................................................................................................................................................................55
Rules on Provider Participation and Compensation.................................................................................................................55
Getting the Plan Approved...........................................................................................................................................................56
Medicaid Statutory Entitlement.......................................................................................................................................................56
Private Enforcement of Federal Obligations...................................................................................................................................56
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal.................................................................................................................................................56
Providers Rights when dealing with the Termination of Contract with the State...............................................................57
Goldberg v. Kelly...................................................................................................................................................................57
Rosado v. Wyman..................................................................................................................................................................57
Wos v. E.M.A..........................................................................................................................................................................59
General Federal Cause of Action Statute - 42 USC 1983...........................................................................................................60
Maine v. Thiboutot................................................................................................................................................................60
Wilder v. Virginia..................................................................................................................................................................61
Blessing v. Freestone.............................................................................................................................................................61
Gonzaga v. Doe......................................................................................................................................................................61
Special Concerns: Americans with Disabilities Act..................................................................................................................62
Paying for Health Care...........................................................................................................................................................................63
Chapter 12. Paying for Health Care: Conceptual and Structural Considerations.....................................................................63
Introduction.........................................................................................................................................................................................63
Provider Payment...............................................................................................................................................................................64
What services to cover?.................................................................................................................................................................64
Setting Payment Rate.....................................................................................................................................................................64
Selecting Payment Method...........................................................................................................................................................65
Pay for Performance.......................................................................................................................................................................65
Special Issues for Medicare and Medicaid......................................................................................................................................65
Disproportionate Share (DSH) Payments...................................................................................................................................65
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Adena Regional Medical Center v. Leavitt........................................................................................................................66
Bad Debt..........................................................................................................................................................................................66
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Battle Creek v. Leavett..........................................................................................................................................................66
Medical Necessity..........................................................................................................................................................................67
Special Issue for Private Insurance..................................................................................................................................................67
Provider Access to Health Insurance Markets: Selection and De-selection...........................................................................67
Fair Procedure Doctrine Applies to Exclusion...........................................................................................................................67
Palm Medical Group v. State Compensation Ins. Fund..................................................................................................67
Any Willing Provider Laws..........................................................................................................................................................68
ERISA Preemption and Provider Payment.................................................................................................................................68
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Franciscan Skemp v. Central States.....................................................................................................................................68
PART THREE: HEALTH CARE QUALITY.........................................................................................................................................70
Medical Malpractice...............................................................................................................................................................................70
Chapter 14. Medical Malpractice and Health Care Quality.........................................................................................................70
Part 1. What Does Medical Malpractice Tell Is About Health Care Quality?............................................................................70
Part 2. From Physician Authority to Egalitarian Social Contract and Market Competition: Medical Malpractice Law and
Transformation of the Professional Standard of Care...................................................................................................................72
Part 3. From Local Medical Customer Practices to a National Standard of Acceptable Care..........................................72
Part 4. The Problem of Competing Standards: The Two Schools of Thought or Respectable (or Reputable) Minority
Doctrine................................................................................................................................................................................................73
Jones v. Chidester..................................................................................................................................................................73
TJ Hooper...............................................................................................................................................................................74
Helling v. Carey.....................................................................................................................................................................74
Part 6. When Has a New Standard Emerged? The Best Judgment Rule and the Problem of New Knowledge and
Technologies........................................................................................................................................................................................75
Washington v. Washington Hospital Center..............................................................................................................................75
Part 7. Clinical Practice Guidelines and the Standard of Care.....................................................................................................75
Diaz v. New York Downtown Hospital.......................................................................................................................................75
Part 8. Challenging Professional and Industry Standards............................................................................................................76
The Equally Well-Informed Expert and Available and Proven Scientific Safeguards Doctrines................................76
United Blood Services v. Quintana..............................................................................................................................................76
Osborn v. Irwin Mem. Blood Bank.....................................................................................................................................76
Part 9. Should the Professional Standard of Care Be Adjusted to Account for Patients Economic Circumstances?..........76
Informed Consent...................................................................................................................................................................................78
Chapter 15. Informed Consent to Treatment..................................................................................................................................78
Part 1. Introduction............................................................................................................................................................................78
Part 2. The Ride of a Patient-Oriented Standard of Informed Consent......................................................................................78
Canterbury v. Spence.....................................................................................................................................................................78
Part 4. Conflicts of Interest and the Physicians Fiduciary Duty..................................................................................................79
Moore v. The Regents of the University of California...............................................................................................................79
Health Information Confidentiality and Health Information Privacy............................................................................................79
Chapter 16. The Confidentiality of Health Information and Information Privacy...................................................................79
Part 1. Introduction............................................................................................................................................................................79
MacDonald v. Clinger....................................................................................................................................................................79
Part 2. Health Information Privacy: The HIPAA Privacy Rule....................................................................................................80
Liability Reform......................................................................................................................................................................................81
Chapter 17. Medical Liability and the Politics of Legal Change..................................................................................................81
Part 2. What Is the Nature and Extent of the Medical Liability Problem?.................................................................................81
Part 3. Fixing the Medical Liability Crisis...................................................................................................................................82
Part 5. Enterprise Liability.................................................................................................................................................................82
Definition.........................................................................................................................................................................................82
Proposals for Systematic Enterprise Liability in Health Care.................................................................................................82
Part 5. Non-Employee Physicians and the Expanding Concepts of Agency Nondelegable Duty..........................................84
Nondelegable Duties for Hospitals.............................................................................................................................................84
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Jackson v. Power....................................................................................................................................................................84
Part 6. The Rise of Hospital Corporate Liability............................................................................................................................85
The Structure of Hospital Governance........................................................................................................................................85
The Scope of Corporate Liability.................................................................................................................................................85
The Hospitals Duty to Monitor Treatment Done by Staff with Privileges............................................................................86
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital............................................................................................................86
Corporate Interference with Appropriate Medical Care..........................................................................................................86
Hospitals have a duty not to implement policies that interfere with the medical judgment of the physicians they
employ. If the hospital breaches that duty, it will be liable for any damages caused by the policy...................................87
Muse v. Charter Health Care........................................................................................................................................................87
Part 7. The Charitable Immunity Doctrine and Contractual Releases....................................................................................87
Tunkl v. Regents of University of California..............................................................................................................................87
Part 8. Structuring the Hospital Peer Review Process: State-Law Immunity, Privilege, and Regulation..............................87
Peer Review.....................................................................................................................................................................................87
Bryan v. James E. Holmes Regional Medical Center.................................................................................................................88
Part 9. Substantive Grounds for Adverse Hospital Action...........................................................................................................88
Payers and Health Care Quality...........................................................................................................................................................88
Chapter 20. Payers and Health Care Quality: Awakening the Sleeping Giant..........................................................................89
Part 1. Introduction: Old Concerns, Old Techniques and the Rise of Value-Based Purchasing.........................................89
Utilization Review (UR) of providers for them to participate.................................................................................................90
Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs)...........................................................................................................90
Peer Review Organizations (PROs).............................................................................................................................................90
Quality Improvement Organizations (QIOs).............................................................................................................................90
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Doyle v. Secretary of Health and Human Services...........................................................................................................91
Part 2. Legal Issues in Value-Based Purchasing.............................................................................................................................91
Liability of Payers for Medical Negligence and ERISA Preemption................................................................................................92
Chapter 21. Liability for Medical Negligence: Special Issues that Arise in Situations Involving Insurers and Health Plan
Administrators....................................................................................................................................................................................92
Part 2. Insurer Negligence in Connection with Coverage Determinations................................................................................92
Part 3. Liability for Medical Injuries Arising From Health Care Negligence............................................................................93
Vicarious Liability and Agency....................................................................................................................................................93
Williams v Good Health Plus, Inc.......................................................................................................................................94
Corporate Liability.........................................................................................................................................................................94
McClellan v. HMO................................................................................................................................................................95
Shannon v. McNulty.............................................................................................................................................................95
The woman's husband made the argument in court the public accommodation theory should be extended
to physicians because they are now licensed and regulated. The court rejected the argument and said that
public accommodation regulation has no place in medical practice
The courts reasoning relied on prioritizing individual liberty versus public duty
Chapter 3. Federal Legislative Reform of the No Duty Principle: The Emergency Medical
Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA)
Part 1. Introduction
General information about emergency departments
The majority of the people who come to the ER have insurance, either public or private, and are at the ER because
of an acute condition for which they cannot get seen elsewhere.
o Frequently referred their by primary care physicians
o Many people consider the insanely busy ERs to be a result of the massive flaws in the US healthcare
system
Enforcement
By Health and Human Services (HHS):
o Hospitals in violation civil money penalties
o Physicians who sign certificates of transfer and misrepresent the persons physical condition are subject to
penalties (if gross/flagrant cant participate in Medicare/Medicaid)
o Hospital not subject to penalties if on-call physician fails to show
Civil Enforcement: EMTALA has express right of action
o injured individuals can recover damages
o hospital that incurs financial loss due to other hospitals non-compliance can get damages
o Barris v. County of Los Angeles (1999): California damage caps on malpractice apply to EMTALA claims
because EMTALA states individuals may obtain damages available for personal injury under the law of
the state in which the hospital is located court finds personal injury was meant to be inclusive, include
general and specific provisions re: malpractice damages
o Power v. Arlington Hospital Assn (2007) Not all malpractice claims are EMTALA and vice versa, finds
that any action for violation of EMTALAs duty of care provisions qualifies as an action based on
professional negligence subject to VAs damage caps (fact-specific)1
Historically cases largely decided in favor of P; today the majority of cases come out in favor of D
Part 3. The Duty to Provide an Appropriate Screening
What is an appropriate screening?
Appropriate screening is designed to identify conditions of symptomatic patients, must be applied uniformly.
Patients are entitled to be treated as similarly situated patients would be treated, within a hospitals capabilities.
But the hospital itself determines what an appropriate screening is for them.
o E.g. If the hospital does not have an MRI machine, then it will not be expected for an appropriate
screening.
EMTALA does not guarantee a patient appropriate treatment, just screening.
o Malpractice occurs after the screening; e.g. misdiagnosis and bad treatment
o EMTALA is NOT a federal malpractice statute.
In order to prove an EMTALA violation, a patient only needs to prove disparate treatment. Does NOT need to
show motive. Power v. Arlington Hospital Association
An EMTALA suit will survive summary judgment if the plaintiff can show a genuine dispute over a material fact
as to the hospitals negligent/intentional behavior. Lewellen v. Schneck Medical Center
Cases:
Power v. Arlington Hospital Association (1994)
FACTS
o Susan Powers goes to the emergency department at Arlington Hospital in severe pain. The doctors gave
her pain meds and a referral, but did no blood test and discharged her before her urine test came back.
Powers returned the next night nearly dead from sepsis. She was immediately admitted into the ICU and
1 uninsured patient went to a hospital emergency room complaining of pain. She was given a prescription and, before the results of her
urine test were back, she was discharged and told to return if the pain got worse. The patient returned the next day, and it was
determined that she had an infection from attempting to lance a boil on her face. The existence of the boil was not referenced on any
reports. Because of the lack of earlier treatment, her legs were partially amputated, and she lost sight in one eye. On appeal, the court
found that it was not necessary for the patient to prove an improper An motive for the hospital's treatment or discharge decision in
order to recover for a breach of EMTALA. The patient met her burden of showing that the screening she was provided deviated from
that given to other patients, who likely would have received a blood test. However, the state's limitation of damages was applicable, and
recovery should have been limited to one million dollars under Va. Code Ann. 8.01-581.15. In addition, the liability limit for the taxexempt hospital should have applied, under Va. Code Ann. 8.01-38, because the action was one for negligence or other tort.
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put on life support. She eventually lost both of her legs, site in one eye, and suffered severe damage to her
lung.
Powers sued under EMPALA arguing that the hospital did not give her an appropriate screening because
her screening was less thorough than other patients usually receive.
Hospital argued that this was a malpractice suit not an EMPALA suit. They cited congress's express
intention not to preempt state malpractice law.
HELD
o Power's claim was proper under EMPALA
o It was not necessary for her to prove motive of the hospital, its only necessary to show disparate
treatment.
Dedicated emergency department means any department or facility of the hospital, regardless of whether
it is located on or off the main hospital campus, that meets at least one of the following requirements:
(1) It is licensed by the State in which it is located under applicable State law as an emergency
room or emergency department;
(2) It is held out to the public (by name, posted signs, advertising, or other means) as a place that
provides care for emergency medical conditions on an urgent basis without requiring a previously
scheduled appointment; or
(3) During the calendar year immediately preceding the calendar year in which a determination
under this section is being made, based on a representative sample of patient visits that occurred
during that calendar year, it provides at least one-third of all of its outpatient visits for the
treatment of emergency medical conditions on an urgent basis without requiring a previously
scheduled appointment.
Case Law
In the Matter of Baby K (1994)
FACTS
o Woman finds out during pregnancy that fetus has anencephaly (no brain above brain stem), decides not
to abort for religious reasons
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when she gave birth, the baby stopped breathing, mother wanted respiratory support rather than just
comfort care
physicians put baby on respirator even though violated standard of care
baby stabilized, went to nursing home, but would stop breathing periodically and come back to ER
Hospital filed lawsuit for declaratory rule that not required providing respiratory support to Baby K
because violated standard of care.
Hospital claimed condition was anencephaly, that EMTALA merely requires that they provide a
uniform service and the mode of treating anencephaly is comfort care
problem is that uniformity applies to screening, not stabilization because the stabilization
requirement does not use appropriate
The word appropriate is what triggers the discriminatory analysis under the screening
requirement
HELD
o Court found it was respiratory distress; not relevant that the baby had anencephaly according to the court,
once comes to hospital w/ emergency condition has to stabilize
o Hospital argued that under VA law, doctors cant be compelled to provide treatment they believe to be
ethically or medically inappropriate
But EMTALA preempts state law
emergency condition is apnea, not anencephaly
also when baby born, put her on respirator, so have shown willingness to act outside standard of
care
NOTE
o The lower court denied hospital under EMTALA and baby doe law, which declares it to be a violation of
civil rights laws covering people with disabilities to withhold life-sustaining treatment from infants with
disabilities. This decision was very controversial. The fourth circuit upheld decision solely under
EMTALA.
Part 6. The Duty to Stabilize and Furnish A Medically Appropriate Transfer
Transfer:
Cant transfer a patient who is not stable unless:
o (1) Person consents to transfer (informed consent)
o (2) Physician finds medical benefits outweigh medical risks of transfer; or
o (3) A qualified medical person who has conferred w/ physician signs statement agreeing that transfer is
necessary
Transfer must be appropriate:
o Transferring hospital provides medical treatment with the capacity to minimize risks to individuals
health and sends all medical records relating to emergency condition
o Receiving facility
Has available space/qualified personnel
Has agreed to accept transfer and provide appropriate medical treatment
o Transfer effectuated through qualified personnel and transfer equipment
o Medically appropriate is highly fact-specific, must look at the medical condition and technological and
personnel capacity of both hospitals
Other facilities can seek damages from unlawful transfer
Part 7. The Duties of Transferee Hospitals
Original EMTALA statute required that any hospital with specialized capabilities accept all transfers of emergent patients
that they had the capacity to help.
(g) Nondiscrimination. A participating hospital that has specialized capabilities or facilities (such as burn
units, shock-trauma units, neonatal intensive care units, or (with respect to rural areas) regional referral
centers as identifies by the Secretary in regulation) shall not refuse to accept an appropriate transfer or an
individual who required such specialized capabilities or facilitates if the hospital has the capacity to treat
the individual.
BUT the 2008 Amendments changed this:
o Eliminated the requirement that all specialized hospitals have to accept transfers they have the ability to treat
o This is the biggest issue with EMTALA today - especially comes up with psych patients
A hospital admits a psych patient, two days later they realize that this patient needs more
supervision or resources than they have at the hospital. But when they ask a hospital with a more
intense psych department for a transfer, the other hospital frequently refuses
The result is that the patient stays in the hospital that can't handle and help them.
o As a result, many hospitals keep patients in the ER as long as possible to insure that the patient can be transferred
if necessary
Part 8. On-Call Specialists
2003 Rule No longer required hospitals to have on-call specialists, even when there are no transfer possibilities.
Would not be a violation of EMTALA if transfer unstably because no transfer possible, no on-call specialist
available
RULE:
Each hospital must maintain an on-call list of physicians on its medical staff in manner that best
meets the needs of the hospitals patients, who are receiving services required under this section, in
accordance with the resources available to the hospital, including the availability of on-call physicians.
The hospital must have written procedures in place
o to respond to situations in which a particular specialty is not available or the on-call
physician cannot respond because of circumstances beyond the physicians control;
o to provide that emergency services are available to meet the needs of patients with
emergency medical conditions if it elects to permit on-call physicians to schedule
elective surgery during the time that they are on call or to permit on-call physicians to
have simultaneous on-call duties
Example:
Dabney v. Fort Walton Beach Medical Center (2007)
FACTS
o Patient came in with neurological damage. The on-call neurosurgeon was sick, no other specialists
available and three other hospitals refused to accept a transfer of P.
o P sued hospital for failing to have a back-up system to insure patient safety.
HELD
o No violation of EMTALA because the statute does not require having a system in place guaranteeing
transfer
Part 9. How Does the EMTALA Stabilization Duty Apply to Inpatients?
Two types of emergencies as inpatient:
o Admitted from ER w/ emergency condition
o Emergency arises once admitted
Courts were all over the place
Lopez Soto v. Hawayek(1998)
FACTS
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HELD
o The court found that the screening and stabilization requirements are disjunctive
reading together makes (b)s comes to hospital superfluous in light of (a)s comes to
language; comes to hospital reflects desire to cast wide net, no reference to ED
o Screening duty applies only to those who presents at ED
o BUT stabilization requirement applies to any individual in the hospital
Legislative history supports stabilization applies outside ED, Congress had broader
concerns re: antidumping than ED
o Transfer provisions apply regardless of how entered hospital
b and c are linked because (b)(1) ties need to stabilize to transfer provisions
Urban v. King (1994) (10th Cir): followed same disjunctive approach
Roberts v. Galen (1999) (SCOTUS):
FACTS
o The plaintiff Johnson was treated for severe injuries from a car accident at Humana Hospital.
o Some Humana personnel were aware that Johnson did not have insurance, and pushed for a
transfer, but her treating physicians both claimed to be unaware that she was uninsured.
o The question before the court was whether it was necessary for the hospital to be motivated by
financial considerations in order for Johnson to have an EMTALA claim.
HELD
o EMTALA does not require that a plaintiff prove improper motive as part of a stabilization claim
you have to stabilize people in hospital (does not mention linkage between screening and
stabilization)
Harry v. Marchant (2001) (11th Cir.)
found time between admittance through ED for emergency condition and transfer was long enough that
there was no duty to stabilize
(read stabilization and screening requirements together once admitted no longer covered by EMTALA,
if discharged unstably can sue for malpractice)
Bryant v. Adventist Health (2002) (9th Cir):
if you come through ED and are admitted, you lose EMTALA protections unless it is shown that you
were admitted as an inpatient to avoid EMTALA protections (subterfuge)
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
Rule specifying applicability of EMTALA to inpatients (appears to codify Marchant, decreased scope of
stabilization requirement, EMTALA ceases to apply once admitted as inpatient):
Exception: Application to inpatients.
(i) if a hospital has screened an individual * * * and found the individual to have an emergency
medical condition and admits the individual as an inpatient in good faith in order to stabilize the
emergency medical condition, the hospital has satisfied its (EMTALA) responsibilities * * *
(ii) This section is not applicable to an inpatient who was admitted for elective (non-emergency)
diagnosis or treatment.
How to show good faith? Consider whether the hospital asked about the patients ability to pay, whether
really tried to stabilize as inpatient
But hospitals are still required to provide quality care because:
o Malpractice liability
o Requirement of participation in Medicare/Medicaid
o Some facts may lead to different result depending on whether malpractice/EMTALA applies
Doesnt seem to apply if admitted through other means does not seem to square with Lopez Soto)
How the Law Creates Access to Health Care
Provisions
No discrimination in programs receiving federal assistance
Agencies that give out federal funds are in charge of enforcement
Regulations: detailed enforcement scheme, specific to health care
Recipients of federal assistance must sign assurance that will comply
Cant discriminate in selecting individuals to participate
Federal Assistance includes: loans, grants, Ks, Medicaid, cash welfare, grants to health care
institutions, payments to institutions participating in Medicare/Medicaid
Enforcement of Title VI
No express right of action title VI covers both:
De jure: intentional discrimination
De facto: facially neutral policy w/ disproportionate impact
o Was most prevalent way to get into court - i.e. change to Medicaid
disproportionately affected minorities (could not challenge on income
discrimination because not covered by federal civil rights law)
o 2000 no longer a right of action to enforce de facto discrimination (Alexander
v. Sandoval), still an action for de jure
o Now get around Sandoval by making demand to Attorney General to investigate
discriminatory practices rather than going to court
The reasoning in Sandoval threatens implied right of action in other federal civil rights laws
Subtly shifted burden of proof asks whether there was an intent to create a private
remedy
Claimed 602 was focused on agencies, not individuals
Medicaid has no specific private right of action re: denial of benefits
After Nixons election stripping of Civil Rights Authoritys power over Medicare/Medicaid
could only enforce by getting other agencies to adopt their standards
Part 3. Prohibition of Discrimination on the Basis of Disability: The Americans with Disabilities
Act and the Realization of Health Care as a Public Accommodations
o
Relevant Titles - ADA has 5 titles that were all worked on by separate committees then mashed together to pass
o Title II: public benefits;
o Title III: Public accommodations
includes doctors office
Break with common law; recognizes healthcare as a public accommodation
Up until this point, only emergency departments were considered public
accommodations
Meant to parallel the title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964
Wanted to require private entities to provide public accommodations
In order for a patient to qualify, must have:
o (1) Mental/physical disability that substantially limits a major life function - Physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits 1+ major life function
(include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping,
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking,
communicating, and working)
Record of such impairment; or
Regarded as having such an impairment
Bragdon v. Abbott
FACTS
o Sydney Abbott was refused service from her dentist, Randon Bragdon, after
disclosing her status as asymptomatic HIV+
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Bragdon agreed to fill the cavity, if it could be done in a hospital setting, but
Abbott would be required to pay the extra costs
Abbott sued for discrimination
She argued that reproduction should be considered "a major life function" and
her HIV interfered with that function
HELD
o Opinion of the court - J. Kennedy
Reproduction is a major life function under the ADA
Asymptomatic HIV qualifies one for protection under the act
Howe v. Hull
Doctor signing an invalid transfer order can be held liable under ADA if motivated by
discriminatory intent
o (2) Must be qualified (can do the job with reasonable accommodations) i.e. you are the person for
whom the public benefit was intended
o (3) Must be discrimination
Exceptions:
o Where the individual poses a direct threat
More than an insignificant risk
Objective: Determined based on medical information; would a reasonable doctor perceive a
direct threat (not whether this doctor did)
o Individual is offered a reasonable alternative really has to be reasonable
LIUR is calculated by adding the ratio of Medicaid revenues divided by total revenues to the
ratio of inpatient charity charges divided by total charges
o (2) A Medicaid utilization rate more than one standard deviation above the mean Medicaid utilization
rate in the state
o (3) A low-income cost ratio criteria for designating a Medicare DSH hospital
Looks at the costs of all low-income patients, including Medicaid, poor Medicare patients,
patients financed by state or local indigent care programs, and uncompensated care
(4) Measuring uncompensated care as a percent of total cost.
Community Health Centers (CHCs) in the U.S. are neighborhood health centers generally serving Medically Underserved
Areas (MUAs) including persons who are
o
Uninsured
Underinsured
low-income
living in areas where there is little access to primary health care available
Medically Underserved Areas/Populations are areas or populations designated by the Health Resources and Services
Administration, or HRSA as having: (1) too few primary care providers, (2) high infant mortality, (3) high poverty and/or
(4) high elderly population.
Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSAs) are designated by HRSA as having shortages of (1) primary medical care, (2)
dental or (3) mental health providers and (a) may be geographic (a county or service area), (b) demographic (low income
population) or (c) institutional (comprehensive health center, federally qualified health center or other public facility).
High levels of US spending is the result of far higher out-of-pocket payments by individuals and
employers' contributions to workers' health insurance coverage
The law did permit the sale of the information if doctors consented to it.
Drug companies argues that the law violated the first amendment because it did not
outlaw all uses of prescriber information, only use of the information to sell
pharmaceuticals
o
HELD
Found for the drug companies
Agreed that the law impermissibly violated the first amendment because it was a content
based regulation
Attempts to ensure solvency by regulating
o Licensure
Companies are frequently subject to oversight
o Capitalization
Companies must maintain adequate reserves to pay claims
o Operations and management
Including control of experience rating and medical underwriting practices
Consumer Protection Statutes
o Prohibiting overreaching, unfairness, fraud or deceptive practices.
High pressure sales tactics are outlawed
o Insurance sales agents are required to be registered and licensed
o There must be a certain level of fairness in processing claims
o Companies are frequently required to get state approval of the form of sales contracts and appeals
processes to ensure appropriate enforcement of contracts
o State insurance departments may have the power to impose penalties and issue cease and desist orders.
Access to insurance
o Defining who must be allowed access to individual and group policies
o When coverage may be restricted with the use of pre-existing conditions or waiting periods
o When companies can vary premiums in relation to certain characteristics of policyholders
Such as age, gender, health status, or prior claim experience
Content of insurance coverage
o What benefits must be covered
Such as coverage of treatment for mental illness, substance abuse, maternity care, or prescription
drugs
customers, but then her husband gets sick and they are sent to the investigation
unit.
CA statute prohibited post-claims underwriting, was defined as rescinding,
canceling, limiting K due to plans failure to do underwriting of information on
or provided in a K (with exception for willful misrepresentation);
HELD
o In order to avoid violating the statute, insurance companies need to make a
record of their investigation at the front end
o Insurers cannot rescind coverage after subscriber begins to rely on it
It would give companies incentive remain ignorant take subscriber's
premiums before rescinding the coverage when it's actually needed
Rescissions have now been outlawed by the ACA
Portability Protections
A group health plan and health insurance issuer offering group health insurance coverage may,
with respect to a participant or beneficiary, impose a pre-existing condition exclusion only if: (1)
such exclusion relates to a condition (whether physical or mental) regardless of the cause of the
condition, for which medical advice, diagnosis, care or treatment was recommended or received
within the 6 month period ending on the enrollment date; (2) such exclusion extends for a period
of not more than 12 months (or 18 months in the case of a late enrollee) after the enrollment date;
and (3) the period of such preexisting condition exclusion is reduced by the aggregate of the
periods of creditable coverage applicable to the participant or beneficiary as of the enrollment
date
An individual with one years creditable coverage could not as a general rule be subject to
pre-existing condition exclusions
Plans cant use preexisting condition exclusions for greater than 12 months
Plans cant use: genetic information, pregnancy, conditions of newborn or adopted kid as
preexisting conditions
Caveats regarding use of preexisting condition:
Can use alternative method to calculate creditable coverage (i.e. without regard to
specific benefits or based on several classes or categories of benefits)
Differential can be based on different deductibles (i.e. difference of deductibles for mental
illness services preexisting exclusion for those services may be applied)
HMOs can impose affiliation period as opposed to preexisting condition exclusion
Four conditions to special enrollment periods
(1) The individual must have turned down enrollment initially because she has other
coverage at the time coverage was previously offered to the employee or dependent
(2) The individual must state in writing at the time that enrollment was offered that his or
her other coverage was the reason for declining new coverage
(3) The individuals other coverage must either have been exhausted or else terminated as
a result of the loss of eligibility for the coverage
(4) The individual must request enrollment within 30 days after the date of exhaustion or
termination
Anti-Discrimination - Plans cannot establish rules for eligibility of any individual to enroll based on:
Health status; Medical condition; Claims experience; Receipt of health care; Medical history; Genetic
information; Evidence of insuraibility; Disability
Also not allowed to use higher premiums based on health status or base waiting periods on
health condition
Discrimination provisions do not require benefits other than those covered to prevent them from
establishing limitations in benefits
It is OK for generally applicable terms of plan to have disparate impact, unless is directed at
individuals
Wellness programs dont violate HIPAA, but essentially precludes coverage for members with
health conditions by turning wellness incentives into penalties
Availability and Renewability
Guaranteed Issue:
Small Group Market: Any insurance issuer that offers insurance coverage in the small
group market in a state:
o (A) Must accept every small employerin that state that applies for such
coverage; and
o (B) must accept for enrollment under such coverage every eligible individual
who applies for enrollment during the period in which the individual first
becomes eligible to enroll under the terms of the group health plan and may not
Balance bill
Insurers introduced fee schedules amount paid by insurer did not raise as the doctors/hospitals raised
their charges; if doctors accepted assignment the patient would owe the remainder
Networks
In-network doctors agree to accept a lower fee in exchange for a flow of patients; this model took off
quickly, also in public sector; but cost savings were temporary
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO)
An organization that on a pre-paid basis provides managed care for health insurance and acts as a liaison
with health care providers. HMOs require that all health care is provided by in-network providers,
except emergency care.
Purpose
To integrate financing and health care into hybrid entities that, through greater clinical and
financial integration, could insure the population while managing care through greater emphasis
on prevention and efficiencies.
Utilization review
Retrospective: insurance companies would not pay after procedure was done because deemed medically
unnecessary; insurance companies did not fare well in court
Prospective: insurance companies required prior authorization of a certain treatment before would agree
to pay for it
Managed Care
Goal is to combine financing and care with a single enterprise in which coverage is conditioned in whole
or in part on the use of a network, while providers' access to insured patients depends on their
participation and acceptance of the insurer's control over access to coverage
Consumer-driven Care
High deductible health plans (HDHP) with HSAs
Problems
HDHP plans fail to distinguish between the unnecessary use of high cost services and the use of
large amounts of care to address significant health needs. Therefore people often forgo necessary
care.
These plans are primarily bought buy young people, leaving older people to buy traditional
plans. In turn traditional plans get more expensive.
Lower income people rarely receive employer contributions to their HSAs.
age and geographical location without regard to gender or most pre-existing conditions
(excluding tobacco use).
Minimum standards for health insurance policies are established.
Individual mandate
o requires all individuals not covered by an employer sponsored health plan, Medicaid, Medicare or other
public insurance programs to secure an approved private-insurance policy or pay a penalty, unless the
applicable individual has a financial hardship or is a member of a recognized religious sect exempted by
the Internal Revenue Service. The law includes subsidies to help people with low incomes comply with
the mandate.
Health insurance exchanges
o Each exchange will serve as an online marketplace where individuals and small businesses can compare
policies and buy insurance (with a government subsidy if eligible). In the first year of operation, open
enrollment on the exchanges runs from October 1, 2013 to March 31, 2014, and insurance plans purchased
by December 15, 2013 will begin coverage on January 1, 2014. In subsequent years, open enrollment will
start on October 15 and end on December 7.
Vouchers for the exchanges
o Low-income individuals and families whose incomes are between 100% and 400% of the federal poverty
level will receive federal subsidies on a sliding scale if they purchase insurance via an exchange. Those
from 133% to 150% of the poverty level will be subsidized such that their premium costs will be 3% to 4%
of income. In 2013, the subsidy would apply for incomes up to $45,960 for an individual or $94,200 for a
family of four; consumers can choose to receive their tax credits in advance, and the exchange will send
the money directly to the insurer every month. Small businesses will be eligible for subsidies.
Medicaid Expansion
o Eligibility expanded to include individuals and families with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty
level, including adults without disabilities and without dependent children. The law also provides for a
5% "income disregard", making the effective income eligibility limit for Medicaid 138% of the poverty
level. Furthermore, the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) enrollment process is
simplified.
o However, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012), the Supreme Court ruled
that states may opt out of the Medicaid expansion, and several have done so.
Reforms to the Medicare payment system
o Intended to promote greater efficiency in the healthcare delivery system by restructuring Medicare
reimbursements from fee-for-service to bundled payments. Under the new payment system, a single
payment is paid to a hospital and a physician group for a defined episode of care (such as a hip
replacement) rather than individual payments to individual service providers.
o In addition, it has been asserted that the Medicare Part D coverage gap will shrink incrementally, closing
completely by January 1, 2020.
Employer Mandate
o Businesses which employ 50 or more people but do not offer health insurance to their full-time employees
will pay a tax penalty if the government has subsidized a full-time employee's healthcare through tax
deductions or other means.
o In July 2013, however, this provision was unilaterally delayed for one year by President Obama.
FACTS
o Bartkis bought a health insurance policy from Wohlers that was later swapped for another policy.
Wohlers assured Bartkis that the new policy was essentially the same.
o Bartkis got cancer and got pre-approved for 24-hour hospital stay and surgery. However, the actual stay
took 27 hours in total.
o The insurance company billed Bartkis for everything other than the room and board, calling all medical
expenses ancillary charges. The ancillary charges, a new provision of the second policy, took into effect
because Bartkis was in the hospital for more than 24 hours and was therefore an inpatient.
o Bartkis sued for breach of contract and bad faith.
HELD
o The jury did not error in their finding of bad faith.
o An insurer's belief that the contract does not cover certain claims is not sufficient to preclude a finding of
bad faith.
o Allowing insurers to avoid punitive damages merely be including vague language would encourage
poorly written contracts that manipulate subscribers.
o Wohlers represented Bartkis's new policy as comprehensive and comparable to the old one, when it
actually was no better than a hotel voucher.
o This undeniable misrepresentation and absurd interpretation of "ancillary charges" are unreasonable.
o Bad faith generally requires: deliberate intent to mislead NOT negligent or sloppy language
o Contrapreferendum: construe a contract against the drafter because has control of the language
ERISA
Chapter 8. ERISA
Part 2. History and Statutory Structure
Why pass ERISA?
o Established by Congress to address the mismanagement of employee benefits
o Under-funded pension plans
o Mismanagement failings during periods of decline
o Create uniformity in 1974 states were the only entities that regulated health insurance therefore there
was a lot of variation between states.
State-to-state variation put a huge burden on national companies and unions
o When enacted, Congress was considering nationalized health care (either growing Medicare to cover all
Americans, or creating a new federally-administered health insurance system)
What did ERISA cover?
o ERISA addresses Employee Welfare Benefit Plans (EWBP) (1002) (Does NOT apply to benefits plans for employees of
religious organizations/government)
o Does not require that an employer provide insurance to its employees or retirees, but it regulated the
operation of a health benefit plan if an employer chooses to establish one.
o Requires that EWBPs
1. Have certain ascertainable eligibility and benefits;
2. Are offered in the context of private employment;
3. Involve some degree of ER administration
Can be either
Self-insured
Fully insured the product sold to the plan is NOT an EWBP
o Categories of legal analysis (they tend to run together
Establishment/design of employer-sponsored health plan
what classes of benefits are listed + items/procedures covered within each service/benefit class
benefit definitions
limitations
exclusions
the purpose of these limitations is to:
curb moral hazard
minimize risk
discriminate
Administration of terms of the plan
Do you qualify? i.e. is it medically necessary for you?
Liability for physical and other types of Harm
o Two doctrinal lenses:
o ERISA preemption
o ERISA plan administration and fiduciary duties haunted by tension between:
unregulated markets
egalitarian social contract
Part 3. Fiduciary Duty of Information and Disclosure
ERISA requires that insurance companies disclose some documents upon the written request of a subscriber who is
challenging a coverage decision.
Any document that administrators or agents use when making a coverage decision must be disclosed.
o Including proprietary practice guidelines that are not typically disclosed.
If the documents are not disclosed within 30 days of the written request, the subscriber might be entitled to
statutory penalties for the late production.
In a coverage dispute, a plaintiff should always ask for all documents used to make the decision
29 USCS 1024 (b)(4)
The administrator shall, upon written request of any participant or beneficiary, furnish a copy of the
latest updated summary plan description,[,] and the latest annual report, any terminal report, the
bargaining agreement, trust agreement, contract, or other instruments under which the plan is
established or operated. The administrator may make a reasonable charge to cover the cost of
furnishing such complete copies. The Secretary may by regulation prescribe the maximum amount
which will constitute a reasonable charge under the preceding sentence.
Having the decision-maker consider the evidence presented by both parties prior to reaching a decision.
29 USCS 1133
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary, every employee benefit plan shall-(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits
under the plan has been denied, setting forth the specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner
calculated to be understood by the participant, and
(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full
and fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.
Shelby County Health Care Corp. v. Majestic Star Casino, LLC Group Health (2009)
FACTS
o
An employee of the plan administrator's subsidiary sustained injuries in a one-car accident.
o
It was inconclusive whether the employee was driving under the influence, though there was suggestive
evidence. However, in his report a contractor for the insurance company claimed the accident was a result of
intoxication.
o
The employee received treatment at one of the claimant's medical facilities and assigned his insurance
benefits to the claimant.
o
The plan's third-party administrator denied benefits, finding that the employee's medical expenses were
excluded from coverage under an illegal-act provision because he was driving without a license and driving
without insurance at the time of the accident.
HELD
o
The third-party administrator and the plan administrator erred in denying the claim for benefits because
there was an insufficient causal link between the employee's injuries and the act of driving without a license
or driving without insurance.
o
Although ERISA creates a cause of action for plan participants to challenge benefits determination, it does
not specify the standard of review. SCOTUS has established that a denial of benefits is to be reviewed de novo.
But if a plan grants the administrator discretion to determine eligibility for benefits or construe
the plan, then the district and appellate courts must review the denial of benefits under the highly
deferential arbitrary and capricious standard.
o
Instead of conducting a full and fair review of the employee's claim, the plan fiduciaries abdicated their
responsibilities by rubber-stamping its contractors' report.
o
As a result, the insurance company lost the deferential standard of review in reviewing the lower court's
decision.
Part 5. Health Benefit Plan Design and the ERISA Settlor Function
When an employee is acting as in the function of a settlor and making business decisions, those decisions are not subject
to ERISA's fiduciary rules. As fiduciaries carry much more liability for their decisions, insurance companies have a strong
incentive to classify all decisions as settlor functions.
The court has classified settlor functions as:
Choosing the type of plan, or options in the plan;
Amending a plan, including changing or eliminating plan options;
Requiring employee contributions or changing the level of employee contributions;
Terminating a plan, or part of a plan, including terminating or amending as part of a bankruptcy process.
Settlors have roughly unlimited discretion to design, amend and cancel their plans when and however they want (unless
there is a law on point). A corporate official who has dual roles is bound by ERISAs fiduciary roles only when managing
the plan; not when performing settlor functions.
Part 6. Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisions (omit p. 349-358 (Note on When is Health Care Medically
Necessary?) and pick up again at 358.
Introduction
ERISA does address the standard of review for for judicial review of fiduciary decisions
Judicial review of a fiduciary decision frequently arises in the context of a decision to deny a claim for coverage brought
under ERISA 502(a)(1)(B)
FACTS
The plaintiff challenged the denial of benefits under his ERISA plan
The Court of Appeals held that where the employer is itself the administrator and
fiduciary of an unfunded plan, deference is unwarranted given the lack of assurance of
impartiality on the employer's part.
In this situation, benefits denials should be subject to de novo judicial review (rather than
review under the arbitrary and capricious standard)
The Court of Appeals also held that the right to disclosure of plan information extends
both to people who are entitled to plan benefits and to those who claim to be, but are not,
so entitled.
HELD
A de novo standard of review applies when reviewing claims denials is the administrator
of the plan has the discretion to determine eligibility,
But parties can contract for a different standard
o Trust law created a deferential standard of review when a trustee exercises
discretionary standards because the trustee
Preemption debate centers on Congressional intent When should state regulatory powers have to give way to a
federal regulatory vacuum??
Preemption is important because:
Remedies under ERISA are limited to breach of contract (no punitive damages)
Unlike in states, the Department of Labor does not have staff, resources, tradition, or desire to
address thousands of complaints.
Statute: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (29 U.S.C. Ch. 18)
Parts of the statute applicable to preemption:
o
514 (29 U.S.C. 1144)
Preemption Clause
Displaces state laws that "relate to" an employee health or benefit plan
Savings Clause
State laws that "regulate insurance" are saved from preemption is they "relate to" ERISA plans.
Note: adecision that the state law does not relate to ERISA is a far more powerful displacement of
ERISA preemption than a finding that this law is saved
(a) Supersedure; effective date. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003 (a) of this title and not exempt under section
1003 (b) of this title. This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
(b) Construction and application.
(Savings Clause) (2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities.
(Deemer Clause) (2)(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003 (a) of this title, which is
not exempt under section 1003 (b) of this title (other than a plan established primarily for the purpose of
providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance
company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of
insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies,
insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
anything that fell within the field is the exclusive purview of the federal government regardless of
whether the federal law had any standards at all
Entirely changed the legal landscape of health benefits and disability benefits (a rare occurance to have
such strong preemption in light of federalism)
o
FACTS
NY had a human rights statute that forbade discrimination based on pregnancy. The law required
that healthcare plans cover maternity care.
Delta offered ERISA plans and sued under the argument that the NY's anti-discrimination law is
preempted by ERISA.
HELD
Looked up to Relates to in Black's law dictionary and found two definitions [textual
approach]:
Connection with OR
The court finds the law has a connection with employee benefit plans
because the law directly affected how companies could design their plan
Reference to
Does the law refer to the employee welfare benefits plan? No the law did
not specifically refer to employee benefit plans.
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers (1995):
FACTS
A NY state statute charged surcharges (basically taxes) on bills of patients with commercial
insurance.
Commercial Insurers challenged the law based on the claim that ERISA preempted the statute
with regards to employer-based commercial insurance.
Argued that the state law "related to" the plans (514(a)) and was not saved (514(2)(a))
because it was a tax law, not an insurance law
The statute "related to" because it would affect commercial insurance, which sold
employer-based coverage
HELD
Court steps back from textual approach (use in Shaw) because everything relates to everything
else
The statute here dealt with the fundamental ability of states to raise revenue, which they
needed to cover the sick and uninsured that the commercial plans wouldnt cover
The court found the Congressional intent of ERISA was uniformity that would make it possible
for companies to decide benefits on national scale
Laws that have indirect economic effects, such as licensing laws and this surcharge law do NOT
relate to the plans
because the laws do not bind plans to any particular choice, nor preclude plans from
taking a uniform administrative approach
FACTS
(ERISA define employee benefit plans as both health care plans and
apprenticeship/training programs)
HELD
The wage statute did not relate to ERISA apprenticeship program, not preempted by
ERISA.
Reference to plan
Found Health Facility Assessment tax was not the sort of law Congress expected ERISA to supersede;
Every state law that increases the cost of providing benefits will have some effect on the
administration of ERISA plans, but it is not the case that each of these laws is preempted by the federal
statute
State laws that are generally applicability and only have an indirect effect on ERISA plans are
not preempted
Can apply in areas of the law that are not directly in conflict [IMPLIED PREEMPTION]
Boggs v. Boggs (1997): court found ERISAs non-alienation provisions conflicted with and therefore
preempted a Louisiana community property law
Breyer, dissent: disagreed that state law concerned something Congress wanted to keep out of
state reach, it involved family, property, and probate all traditionally state concerns
Foster v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan (ED Mich, 1997): state law mandating Blues to offer
certain benefits did not relate to ERISA because it merely imposes an indirect economic influence plans are
still free to select another insurer
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff (1991): ERISA preempted Washington probate law because it conflicted with ERISA,
was not uniform with, and it had a connection with state ERISA plans
FACTS
Private insurance companies challenged the law on the grounds that it was preempted by ERISA.
HELD
The Massachusetts benefits mandate is saved under the Savings Clause because it is a
state regulation of ERISA plans.
The law applies to the product, they have to comply under (b)(2)(A)
FACTS
Illinois statute provided for external review of denial of coverage by an HMO, which functions as
a second opinion but doesn hot have the authority to order the HMO to cover the procedure.
HELD
The law affects ERISA plans because it subjects them to another level of review and would be
preempted under 514(a), but is saved under (b)(2)(a) tests:
not all three need to be met; here the 2nd and 3rd factors are clearly met
1st factor: have the effect of transferring or spreading the policyholder's risk
3rd factor: affects the policy relationship by putting the HMO agreement into
concrete terms
FACTS
Kentucky enacted a law mandating that "a health insurer shall not discriminate against any
provider who is located within the geographic coverage area of the health benefit plan and who is
willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation established by the health insurer."
HELD
New Test for (b)(2)(A): For a state law regulating insurance to be saved, it must satisfy two
requirements:
(1) the state law must be specifically directed towards entities engaged in insurance
This law regulates insurance by imposing conditions on the right to engage in the
insurance business
(2) the state law must substantially affect the risk pooling arrangements between the
insurer and the insured
This law does affect risk pooling because insurers can no longer seek insurance
from closed network for a lower premium, also may get providers in new areas, which
would increase use
Makes it harder for insurer to determine how much they will have to pay
if insurer knows will deny at certain rate, can no longer do this because of external review
Particularly as insurance products become hybrid products harder to isolate laws directed at insurers
o
o
under the plan and the plan has to provide the benefits
But remedies are limited can only get those provided by federal law
502(a)(1)(b) right to go to court under ERISA, must first go through appeals process, exhaust
administrative remedies
Preemption under 502 trumps savings clause
Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux (1987):
FACTS
A commercial insurer was found liable under state law for "tortuous breach of contract" and
violating "the Mississippi law of bad faith" through an improper processing of a claim for benefits
under an insured employee benefit plan
Insurer appeals the lower courts decision on the principle that the state tort statutes were
preempted by ERISA
HELD
Statute is preempted because the claims relate to plan because this claim is accusing the
insurer of maliciously administering the plan
Prong 2: The law is related to pooling of risk because it does not increase the cost
of premiums, you have to factor in the cost of litigation (once offset price of insurance, it
affects risk spreading)
ERISA provides the exclusive remedies for employee benefits plans, all you can get is
ERISA 502; express right of action in 1132
NOTE
This case was thunderous when it came down because people had not understood the exclusivity of
remedies under the preemption statute,
Presumed 514 would save state laws and if a law were targeted on insurance industry, then even
state law remedies would apply (did not consider effect of 502)
502 is a complete preemption statute for remedies
Congress made exclusive the permissible ERISA remedies, one of which does not include
damages
The court found that the law was saved, but Rush argued that it was trumped by Congressional intent re:
remedies (502 trumps savings clause, therefore complete preemption)
HELD
Souters test:
The result was disliked by Rush because the insurer used to be able to entirely control the
record, now the independent reviewer can get stuff in there too
NOTE
State statutes have been stricken down in violation of ERISA if they go beyond adding to the
remedies provided under ERISA (i.e. state insurance administrator can enforce/construe terms of K)
FACTS
A MD statute for external review that allowed both external review and imposition of treatment
orders:
HELD
ERISA simply requires plans to provide some mechanism for review, states are
allowed to set of review procedures as long as not in direct conflict
This law didn't conflict because it only required payment of benefits if claim was
within the terms of the insurance contract
The insurance commissioner may settle fate of benefit, but does not enlarge the claim
beyond benefits available under ERISA (does not implicate ERISAs enforcement scheme at all)
Encourage employers to offer benefits by insulating the plans from damages relief
If you follow the reasoning of the courts around the issue of ERISA plan decision-making, the concept of
an ERISA plan determination = that of a fiduciary [benefits review panel in self-insurer] acts as a trustee
You dont want huge damages penalties raiding a pension plan although the plan would realistically get
insurance to avoid this
The Interaction of Coverage and the Americans with Disabilities Act
Safe Harbor
501(c) (safe harbor): insurers can underwrite risks based on ADA-covered disorders unless its subterfuge
o The Americans with Disabilities Act provides safe harbor for insurance companies
Allegedly the safe harbor is designed to ensure that exclusions are bona fide and consistent with
state law, but most courts refuse to apply it
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company (7th cir, Posner 1999)
o FACTS
Two HIV positive men, who were life partners, were insured by Mutual of Omaha.
The policy on their plans had a lifetime cap of $100,000, but treatment for HIV/AIDS was capped
at $25,000.
The men sued their insurance company under the ADA arguing that insurance is a public
accommodation and their behavior discrimination against HIV positive individuals.
o HELD
502(a) of ADA no individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the
full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations
of any place of public accommodation by the owner, lessee, or operator of such a place.
An insurance policy cant refuse to sell to someone with AIDS
Caps dont make selling policies to AIDS patients illusory because the cap is only on
AIDS-related ailments AIDS cap would be meaningless if did not include opportunistic
diseases and rare disorders that affect AIDS patients; when AIDS patients are attacked by
a disorder, it is truly a different disease
Under 302(a), a business is not required to alter its inventory (i.e. provide individual shoes to
people with one leg or provide books in Braille) to accommodate disabled
It is hardly a judicial function to police the services offered
Doesnt change argument that asks for removal of limitation (as opposed to offering a
new product)
501(c) (safe harbor): insurers can underwrite risks based on ADA-covered disorders unless its
subterfuge
This provision is more helpful to the defendant, but the plaintiff uses it to show that ADA
regulates content because it is making an exception
But the right to enjoyment includes the right to buy on equal terms cant use caps to
prevent people from AIDS from buying at all
This is consistent with legislative history (does not defer to amicus by DOL because had
not created any regulations on that point)
McCarran-Ferguson Act: forbids federal statutes from being construed to impair any law enacted
by the state to regulate insurance
Ps interpretation would violate this act because federal courts can police for exclusion of
ADA conditions, but cant make sure actuarial decisions are sound or consistent with
state law.
What the act bars is an interpretation of 302(a) that interjects federal courts into the
regulation of the insurance industry
302(a) does relate to insurance in the sense that it cant bar sales of insurance to disabled
Of the arguments put forth in Doe, the more cogent argument focuses on ADA 501(c) ADA does not regulate
insurance conduct
o The nature of insurance companies is to discriminate its called fair discrimination or the classification
of risk
o If Congress really wanted federal courts to regulate the insurance industry, it would have said so bluntly
(would upend historic oversight of insurance industry)
After Doe revival of belief that ADA reaches content of coverage Supreme Court handed down Olmstead v.
OC has been cited for proposition that Posner was wrong, does reach content of insurance, but mostly Posners
case reigns
Medicare
entitlement, you have already paid in, comes out of payroll (is in jeopardy because there is a lower ratio of
workers to elderly now)
o Both parts A & B are outlawed in detail in the statutes all the benefits are pre-determined
Part B covers physician services, outpatient hospital care, preventive services, some home health, diagnostic
procedures, and durable medical equipment (DME; e.g., wheelchairs)
o you have to pay a premium (25%), the other 75% comes from general revenue (not limited by structure of
underlying tax system); there is a legal presumption that you are enrolled and you have to actually opt
out from deducting the payment from the Social Security check
Part C (Medicare Advantage) provides Medicare-covered benefits through private plans that contract with
Medicare, such as HMOs and PPOs.
o An alternative to traditional Medicare; beneficiaries can enroll in a private plan
Includes HMOs, PPOs, and private-fee-for-service (PFFS) plans
o Medicare pays private plans a fixed amount per enrollee
o Enrollees receive all Medicare-covered benefits (Parts A and B)
Can also include Part D benefits
Often includes extra benefits
Part D covers prescription drugs provided by private plans that contract with Medicare, including stand-alone
prescription drug plans and Medicare Advantage plans.
o Essentially a subsidy of government to buy private plans
Additional subsidies for low incomes Part D enrollees
o Plans can offer a standard benefit, but most offer an equivalent alternative design; benefits vary widely
Must provide
classes of drugs provided in US pharmacopeia (formulary created by advisory
committee) OR
actuarial equivalent of the formulary
o (can alter donut hole structure to benefit certain consumers)
o Benefit to the insurer of being able to alter the plan is that people will continue
using their maintenance drugs (people are price sensitive, if dont use those
drugs catastrophic costs)
o 90% of beneficiaries had drug coverage in 2011, up from 66% in 2004
o Donut hole closing by 2020
Currently: The standard benefit looks like
Deductable
Initial coverage limit
**Gap in coverage**
Catastrophic coverage
Coverage limit
Remedial provision expressly provides that either class of entitled beneficiaries to challenge a decision by the
Secretary
o Very formal structure jurisdictional provision is also the right of action
o 405(h): provides formal process that needs to be followed
o 405(g) lays out process of appeal:
Part A/D claims
Must exhaust administrative remedies to have judicial appeal
o Intermediary/carrier deny claim
o File first stage appeal desk review by carrier (done by letter, phone)
o Second stage before ALJ from HHS (there used to be a high win rate at this
point, no longer the case)
o Go before grant appeals board of HHS
o Federal court
This is a slow-moving process, especially with horrible backlog of cases
o
Coverage Gaps
o Medicare provides basic benefits, but has no limit on out-of-pocket expenses, and does not cover many
high-cost services used by seniors and people with disabilities
Gaps in benefits include:
No limit on out-of-pocket expenses for A/B services
No long-term care benefit (covers limited skilled nursing facility and home health
services)
No dental care, or dentures
No hearing aids
No routine eye exams/ eyeglasses
Creates formula for required Medicare savings if spending exceeds target, the lesser of:
the amount projected Medicare per capita costs exceeds the spending target, or
0.5% of projected Medicare spending in 2015, rising to 1.5% in 2018 and future years
Secretary implements Boards proposals unless Congress enacts alternative with equivalent savings
Secretary submits proposal to implement savings if Board fails to do so
Board proposals cannot ration care, reduce benefits, increase cost-sharing, modify benefits, eligibility, or
premiums, raise taxes, or before 2020 reduce payments for certain providers.
As of today, no members have been nominated or confirmed by the Senate
o
o
Challenges/Problems
o Budget and financing
Medicare is 16% of the federal budget and rising
Medicare is rising as a share of the economy
Medicare faces long-term financing challenges, with fewer workers to support retirees, and
growing number of Medicare beneficiaries
o Beneficiaries
Beneficiaries incur relatively high out-of-pocket expenses as a share of income and household
budgets (no limit on spending, dental, or long-term care)
Medicares benefit structure is complex (traditional Medicare); unclear how well beneficiaries
navigate private marketplace, but have many choices
o Other challenges
Improving care management and targeting interventions to beneficiaries with the greatest needs
and highest costs
Setting fair payments to plans and providers (e.g. the SGR)
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
FACTS
o Four plaintiffs wanted to undergo controversial/risky BCBR procedure to improve lung function; three
plaintiffs had already had the surgery; one could not afford it, was asking for prior authorization
o Secretary had told contractors not to pay for BCBR because it was a waste of resources, no evidentiary
basis that was proper way to handle emphysema
o The plaintiffs appealed before ALJ (HHS) presented that the doctor thought the surgery was necessary
(used to be able to get an 80% reversal of denials) ALJs were not bound by intermediary letters
o Secretary passed regulation that ALJs could not rule in favor of compensation for BCBR coverage
exclusion
o Ps who already had surgery
Claims arose before rule, they want ALJ amendments reinstated
Not much they could do because this is a design function, not judicially reviewable
Challenging whether Secretary exceeded administrative powers
o Mr. Ringer did not have claim of payment before the rule, sought prior authorization - change in
Medicare happened before he had a claim at all
HELD
o Opinion of the Court - C.J. Rehnquist
Medicaid
Challenges
Difficulty achieving equal health care access
o Causes according to MACPAC (Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission)
The unique characteristics of beneficiaries, which creates greater clinical challenges
Frequent fluctuations in coverage because of its strict eligibility limitations
The availability of providers
Inadequate numbers of community health centers, public hospitals and health systems
The rate of provider participation in the program
Factors effecting utilization - the geographic and cultural isolation of poor communities
Low provider payments
o Because the money comes from employment taxes (people who have health care), Medicaid pays its
providers less than anyone else, including Medicare
o The result is that already inadequate health care access has been exacerbated by low fees
States refusing to expand under the ACA
o SCOTUS held that it was unconstitutional for the federal government to threaten to withhold all Medicaid
funding if the states didnt expand the program and establish the health care markets required by the
ACA
o National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (SCOTUS 2012)
FACTS
Several provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act were challenged by
the states and people who will be required to by insurance coverage
HELD
Opinion of the Court - C.J. Roberts (However, no other justices signed his explanation of
why the Medicaid expansion was coercive to the states)
o The provision of the ACA that requires the states to accept the Medicaid
expansion or forego all federal funding for Medicaid violated the 10th
amendment
Medicaid constitutes such a large percentage of most states' budgets that
it was coercive to threaten to withhold that funding
The threat was a gun to head scenario for states
o BUT, while the mechanism was unconstitutional, the court only redacted the
penalty, so that states have a choice as to whether they want to create the
exchange without the threat of Medicaid funding being lost.
o As a result, many states have refused to expand Medicaid
General Requirements
Must meet the requirements for comparable and uniform medical services across the state
Care must be provided with "reasonable promptness"
Eligibility standards and coverage rules must be reasonable
o States must comply with federal requirements related to the methods and standards for evaluating assets
Beneficiaries must have the right to seek services from the qualified provider of their choice
States must provide "fair hearings" for individuals whose claims were denied or not acted upon quickly enough
Payments to providers are sufficient to enlist enough providers to make care accessible
Rules for Assessing Eligibility
Medicaid Eligibility is a question of who will be excused from full market risk, is a function of a series of criteria:
o Category fit into mandatory/optional criteria?
o Financial evaluation method updated by the ACA
Now, states can NOT use asset tests to establish income, must use the "modified adjusted gross
income" methodology for calculating financial eligibility
Change was intended to result in more uniform eligibility for nonelderly, non-disabled,
non-pregnant adult
o State residency
o Citizenship/Legal Status ACA established a 5-year waiting period for people who are legally present by
not citizens
People Who MUST be Covered
Beneficiary Eligibility Requirements - 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)
o Original 1965 Requirements
Mandatory Coverage Groups
"Dependent" children and their caretaker relatives who receive assistance from Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
"Poverty level" children and pregnant women
Low-income Medicare beneficiaries
o "Optional" Coverage Groups
About four dozen additional suggested categories that are defined by their illness, their place of
residence, or other descriptors.
The goal was to distinguish the "deserving" from the "non-deserving" poor
o Additional ACA Requirements
Must cover all individuals with family incomes below 133% of the federal poverty level
Rules for what Medical Care MUST be Covered
The statutory definition of Medical Assistance (42 U.S.C. 1396d(a)) includes some required and some optional
benefits.
o The required benefits are not necessarily more medically necessary
The list is the result of history and past health policy
Ex. Prescription drug coverage is optional, rural health clinics are required
o Often the optional benefits are often the most important
Exs. Prescription drugs, institutional care for persons with mental retardation, home and
community care
In 2004, 30% of all state spending went to optional items and services
Special rules for children under the age of 21
o Medicaid Early Periodic Screening Diagnostic and Treatment (EPSDT)
All categories of benefits and services falling under the federal definition of "medical assistance"
MUST be furnished for persons under 21, even if not covered for adults
Miller v. Whitburn: Must cover EPSTD services even if not in state plan, i.e. transplants
Requires broad coverage of preventative services
Check-ups
Immunizations
Vision
Dental
Hearing
Eliminates state discretion to impose fixed limits on coverage unrelated to the medical necessity
of care for individual children
States have explicit statutory rights to enforce their entitlement to federal payments
Entitlement of eligible individuals to a defined set of services
Entitlement of participating providers to payment for covered services they render
Under an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulation that permits the defense that a
worker's disability on the job would pose a direct threat to his health, Chevron defended its action.
HELD
o Opinion of the Court J. Souter (Unanimous)
The ADA did not preclude the EEOC's regulation; Chevron was permitted to use the harm-to- self
defense.
Test for Assessing Agency Regulations
Has Congress directly spoken on this issue?
o Is the statute clear?
If the Statute is ambiguous, was the agencys interpretation reasonable?
o Only reach #2 if the statute is unclear
In this case
Deference applies to the regulation because it made sense of the statutory defense for
qualification standards that are job-related and consistent with business necessity.
o The risk of violating the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) was
enough to show that the regulation was permissible. "
Providers Rights when dealing with the Termination of Contract with the State
Goldberg v. Kelly: welfare is a benefit given on basis of brutal need, so the level of process required transcends
normal due process
o So while Medicare can terminate contract and give hearing, Medicaid cant
MEDCARE HMO v. Bradley: Court found MEDCARE was entitled to a pre-termination hearing before the state
terminated their Medicare contract; required full hearing on question of whether or not they were in compliance
with the contract. MEDCARE made a due process claim:
o Court had to first find whether had property interest:
o Court found MEDCARE had property interest in the contract because they have an entitlement to
payment for each covered life
Property interest = human beings)
o Then had to determine whether had been afforded due process:
o Looked at Matthews factors:
Private interest affected by governmental action
Risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of additional safeguards
The governmental interest, including the fiscal and financial burdens that additional or substitute
procedural requirements would entail
o Private interest: The court found that if the contract were terminated pending litigation would
dissolution of MEDCARE (totally reliant on revenues from Medicaid); beneficiaries would have no care;
o Public Interest: would not be a big deal for the state to have a pre-termination hearing;
o Risk of erroneous deprivation: there were no pre-deprivation procedural safeguards, led to risk of
erroneous deprivation Medicaid agency not aware of position of parties about the charges against
MEDCARE,
This case has been codified in the Medicaid statute now Medicaid agencies MUST give pre-termination hearings
Beneficiaries Rights when there is a Violation of the State Plan
Medicaid beneficiaries have a right to a fair hearing when they are adversely affected by agency conduct that
appears to be in violation of the state plan
Hearing is before a fair hearing officer who must interpret the state plan
BUT cant assess whether the state plan itself is in violation of state law
Beneficiaries and Providers Rights when the State Plan is in Violation of the Federal Medicaid Statute
o
There is no express right of action, the cause of action has changed over the years
When a federal laws inherent structure is to convey an interest to people, there is an implied
right of action
This is essentially a supremacy clause claim (state plan violated terms of federal statute)
Recent cases have muddled the doctrine surrounding these types of claims
Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012)
FACTS
California Legislature approved a series of cutbacks in the payments to physicians, hospitals and
pharmacies to address the state's budget deficit.
Multiple providers sued in federal court arguing that the cutbacks violated the Supremacy
Clause
Argued that if the cutbacks were approved, the state would not provide the level of care
required under the federal Medicaid statute.
The 9th Circuit found for the providers and blocked the cutbacks
SCOTUS granted cert to hear the states appeals
Initially intended to decide the issue of "whether Medicaid providers and recipients may
maintain a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce a federal Medicaid law"
HOWEVER, before the cases were heard, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS) approved the states budget changes
Therefore, the issue before the court changed
Question before the court
Whether - once the agency has approved the state plans - groups of Medicaid providers
and beneficiaries may still maintain a Supremacy Clause action asserting that the state
statutes are inconsistent with federal Medicaid law
HELD
Opinion of the Court - J. Breyer (joined by J. Kennedy, J. Ginsburg, J. Sotomayor and J. Kagan)
Vacated the 9th Circuit's judgments and remanded the cases - permitting the parties to
argue before the circuit again as a case of first impression
Cases are not moot
CMS's approval of the rate reductions does not make the providers/beneficiaries
cases moot, because
The challengers still believe the changes violate federal law
The federal-court injunctions remain in place, forbidding California to implement
the agency-approved rate reductions
BUT, cases are in a different posture
The respondents will likely have to seek review of the agency determination under
the APA
CMS has acted under a statutory grant of authority, and their decision carries
some weight - therefore it needs to be considered
The Administrative Procedure Act is designed to handle these types of disputes
Provides for judicial review of final agency decisions
Emily M. Armstrong, daughter of Sandra and William Earl Armstrong, was born on February 25,
2000. She was seriously injured during her delivery resulting in mental retardation, cerebral palsy
and several other medical conditions.
NC Medicaid has covered Emily since she was 2 months old - paying over $1.9 million in
medical expenses on Emilys behalf.
Emilys parents sued the physicians for malpractice and won $2.8 million.
NC DHHS placed a lien on Emilys settlement
NC's third-party liability statutes says
when a patient wins an award of medical expenses, DHHS has the right to recover
either the total amount spent on the patients health care, or one third of the patients
recovery payment, which ever is less.
Emilys parents brought suit against the DHHS
claiming that federal Medicaid law prevents the DHHS from taking her proceeds.
Federal law prohibits recovery from any payments not made for past medical
expenses.
Under North Carolina law a minor child is not allowed to recover for past
medical expenses,
Therefore, Emilys settlement could not include such expenses.
HELD
Opinion of the Court - J. Kennedy
The NC law is preempted by federal law to the extent that it would allow the state to
recover part of a Medicaid beneficiary's tort judgment or settlement not designated for
medical expenses.
Arbitrarily designating one-third of a judgment as recoverable medical expenses
lacks any limiting principle.
If upheld, nothing could stop a state from arbitrarily designating one-half or all
of a judgment as medical expenses.
Calculating the actual amount of medical expenses in each case may be more difficult
than the one-third rule, but similar allocation procedures are already used other
circumstances
Such as worker's compensation and separating compensatory and noncompensatory damages for tax purposes.
Dissent - C.J. Roberts
No regulation or prior case law requires a specific allocation of damages recovered for
medical expenses.
States should be allowed more leeway to come up with a workable regulation to
recoup Medicaid payments.
Preemption theory claims brought by individual claimants have no place in a Spending
Claude context
Resolution of a potential conflict between state law and federal law in the
administration of Medicaid lay in the hands of the Secretary of HHS
NOTES
In finding that the states recovery law violated Medicaids anti-lien provision, Justice Kennedy,
used the classic language of a preemption analysis without questioning the propriety of such a
claim.
In the view of the majority of the Court, a preemption analysis in the context of Spending
Clause statutes is alive and kicking, even though the Court had ducked that very
question in Douglas only a year before.
In summary
A 6 justice majority holds that Medicaid beneficiaries and providers can sue the state for violating federal
law under an implied right of action or the Supremacy Clause BEFORE HHS has ruled on the validity of the
state's policy in question
There is no clear ruling on the ability of beneficiaries and providers to sue AFTER HSS has permitted the
regulation
A 3 justice minority holds that beneficiaries and providers NEVER have any sort of private right of action
- can't use an implied right or the Supremacy Clause
Maine v. Thiboutot (1980) plaintiffs were alleging that Maine was reducing benefits and therefore
violating rights
Found that when statute is silent on matter of enforcement (even in the case of a constitutional
claim) there is no implied private right of action
BUT plaintiffs could use 42 USC 1983 to enforce their rights under federal law
Any federal statute, including those imposing conditions on federal funding, create a federally
enforceable right in court
Medicaid began to be assessed provision-by-provision.
Rules to be enforceable:
Must be unequivocal proof of Congressional intent to create an enforceable right, much like
implied right of action (Gonzaga)
Most courts DO still find enforceable a provision that requires states to make medical assistance
available to all beneficiaries
Cases
FACTS: Providers brought a suit against Virginia alleging that they were denied what entitled to
under the federal payment formula
It was good that the plaintiffs were providers because it made Medicare look less like
welfare.
HELD: Court found for hospitals, but focused on the hospital repayment section of the Medicaid
Act
They found the section created a binding obligation for states to adopt reasonable rates,
that the provision of funds is conditioned on compliance, and that it is enforceable because the
provision allows a court to look at the statutes specific factors re: reasonable rate to determine if
is really reasonable raises the provision to specific and enforceable and is therefore a right
under 1983
Following Wilder, there were a trilogy of cases revisiting the theme w/ an increasingly conservative court
FACTS: plaintiffs argued that there was not enough assistance from states to families to reunify
families, they pointed to statutory provision that required reasonable accommodations
HELD: Court found the statute did place a requirement on states, but there must be evidence of
rights creating language (the reasonable efforts language alone did not enforceable right because the
statute did not define it)
Distinguished Wilder because that statute actually required states to adopt reasonable
payments
This does seem like a triable issue there are guidelines, regulations, and can compare to
other states
BUT the child welfare statute does not have open-ended funding (cap on what federal
government sends states)
The analysis is similar to Wilder, but that the Court would find a requirement that the
states act in a certain way with limited funding is beyond the pale
Blessing v. Freestone (1997)
FACTS: the issue was whether there were legally enforceable rights under the federal child
support enforcement program to get better, more rapid payment of child support.
HELD: No federal right that state comply with statute because was not intended to benefit
individual women and children
Required not just that the statute provide a mandate, but a mandate that can be
effectively enforced, meaning that it require the state to do something specific
Found that 1983 is still available to enforce clearly defined statutory rights - even where
there are administrative mechanisms to protect Ps interests
Gonzaga v. Doe (2002)
FACTS: College student alleged violation by state university of FERPA rights (breach of privacy)
HELD: Court required that the plaintiff cite rights creating language (i.e. shall clear right of
action)
Reiterated need for unequivocal proof of Congressional intent to create enforceable right
the same burden applies for Ps regardless of whether claim is brought under 1983 or implied
right of action
1983 has own remedy, must just show that the statute individual right
After Gonzaga, certain parts of Medicaid dont have rights-creating language
The theory of requiring rights to be specific is to avoid upsetting deals or delicate balances
established in the free administrative markets; but could it not be that Congress was silent as to
remedies because thought that courts were adequate remedies
Ex: plans must be consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality care and are sufficient
to enlist providers such that care is available to people consistent with that of people in the area
(access requirement)
i.e. 9th Circuit found that it was not enforceable because it is concerned with the
procedural administration of Medicaid
BUT one example of a provision that is still enforceable is the provision at the heart of
Medicaid requires states to make medical assistance available to all beneficiaries; courts are still
enforcing this
Not clear whether duty to provide medical assistance will be enforceable
Is considered federal financial assistance unlike Medicare (although Medicare does bind hospitals)
Doctors did not ask for exemption from Medicaid (assumed doctors would not take Medicaid)
The success of the claim depends on whether it is framed in terms of content (Rodriguez) or administration
(Olmstead)
Rodriguez: parallels Doe v. Mutual of Omaha, ADA does not reach content of insurance, not required to offer
benefits that did not offer just because disabled people want those benefits
Plaintiffs w/ mental disabilities wanted cuing services to help them attain independence
City paid for cuing services along with other care for people with physical disabilities, but not
alone so not available for people with mental disabilities
Not violation of Medicaid: Because the service was not required under Medicaid, state can
distinguish by diagnosis (non-discrimination provision not applicable)
Not violation of ADA: nothing in ADA requires state to change benefits covered (although could
argue that payment is part of administration rather than plan design you cant administer a benefit in a
discriminatory manner under Title II)
Olmstead: Court found not covering community care for qualified mentally ill was violation of ADA, court
ordered relief (community care coverage under Medicaid)
The holding was a qualified yes entitled to remedy where states treatment professionals have
determined community placement is appropriate, transfer to community care is not opposed by
individual, and the placement can reasonably be accommodated, taking into account states resources
and needs of others w/ mental disabilities
Here GA had a number of waivers for community care they had not filled found placement
could be reasonably accommodated on remand
After this decision, created incentive not to ask for waivers because would get killed if asked for
slots that did not fund/fill; if did not have slots would be fundamental alteration of plan if had to go
and get more coverage (like Doe)
Dissent: noted that the plaintiffs had not really shown discrimination on basis of condition, just
that the attorney general had defined institutionalization as discrimination
These cases show the importance of factual development in Medicaid cases, i.e. theories of the case in
Rodriguez
City: safety monitoring alone is not provided and P wanted it provided for mentally ill
Ps: city did off safety monitoring, and discriminated because they only granted it to physically,
but not mentally, disabled
Once court adopted citys version, was viewed as a law suit to expand citys care; if had accepted
Ps version, would have been re: administration of care
Plaintiffs only have a shot in ADA/Medicaid cases if they argue bias is in administration (can win
on a reasonable modification theory)
Cases also show states can unbundle broad optional service categories and carve out specific
procedural limits
Chapter 12. Paying for Health Care: Conceptual and Structural Considerations
Introduction
The American health care paradox; we believe that
Health care is a special good. It needs to be available to all so that people don't needlessly suffer.
BUT, our system has NO legal duty of care, therefore millions of Americans are without health insurance.
Consequences of uncompensated care
Uninsured use healthcare much less often
Provider Payment
Terms of payment makes a significant difference in terms of access and use of care;
o i.e. very high deductibles, depending on what the exclusions are in the deductible, it may essentially
foreclose access to care
o the fact that someone is covered does not determine how much the provider will be paid
Insurers suck up revenues, in order to spend it within their budget, they must make a number of considerations:
What services to cover?
Benefit class: primary care, hospital, dental, vision, etc.
Procedures/services within class
Both private insurers and Medicaid may cover the same class, but recognize different procedures, i.e. they both
recognize well-child care, but only Medicaid pays for:
o Developmental assessment
o Exams for kids offered in schools
Each procedure is given a code (CPT/IDC) grouped by disease/injury if not given a code, it will not be
reimbursed
Can decide not to cover a never event or services that are per se unnecessary
Certain exclusions (i.e. intoxication exclusions) can result in people not getting the appropriate care i.e. hospitals
wont screen people for intoxication when they come into the ER after a car accident, even though that is the most
effective time for an intervention, because the hospital would essentially be forfeiting payment; some states have
enacted statutes that ban such exclusions based on this recognition and the desire to preserve revenues for ERs
Question #1 can make a huge difference on the case rate, i.e. if mental health services are/or not covered,
makes a difference for rate of someone with mental illness
Capitation
o Per member per month blended rate for all members
o Physicians become mini-insurers particularly risky for small providers
o
The purpose of the Ohio law is not to convert those people to Medicaid
beneficiaries, but to attach a payment to them
o The hospitals argue that Ohio had the Medicaid plan approved, which gives DSH
payments to these low income people, but this is a weak argument, the plan does
not consider these people to be recipients of Medicaid; Medicaid allows plans to
adjust rates to account for uncompensated care
(2) If ambiguous, was CMSs interpretation reasonable?
o Didnt really have to get to this question
o If they had, the court would defer unless the Secretarys decision was arbitrary
Medicaid has its own DSH: to cover cost of uninsured
o
Bad Debt
Medicare also recognizes bad debts as a cost of healthcare
This is due to strong lobbying
o Hospitals argued that they did not want to make aggressive collection efforts against the poor elderly
Medicare has high deductibles and co-pays, not met by people in the middle because:
o Very little income
o Too rich to qualify for Medicaid
o Too poor to be able to afford Medigap
Represents a deal struck with hospitals
o Medicare will pay these costs, but only after reasonable collection efforts
o Battle Creek v. Leavett (2007)
FACTS: Hospitals wanted Medicare to pay for bad debts even while they were still pending at the
collection agency.
Medicare Act requires four elements for bad debt payments:
o Must be from covered benefits
o The health care provider must make reasonable collection efforts
o DHHS must deem the debt uncollectible
According to Secretary of DHHS, there was a presumption of
uncollectibility after 120 days
Hospitals wanted to collect from Medicare because 120 days had passed - even though
they had not made sufficient efforts to collect
o Said they would pay back Medicare if they received money from the collection
agency
HELD: It was reasonable for secretary to conclude that as long as they have debts in collection,
providers can't recover because it would not be sound business judgment otherwise;
120 day presumption does not relieve provider from having to fulfill reasonable collection
requirement
Medicare is not a cash cow that advances money to hospitals
o NOTES
This case illustrates the difference between manuals and regulations the latter gets more
deference
It might have come out differently if the hospitals had a differential collection policy
Try to collect loner for private individuals
Cut off after a while for elderly because the purpose of the program is to avoid harassing
these people
But here the hospital tried to have it both ways, and they lost
Medical Necessity
To qualify for Medicare payments, a provider must show that products/services were medically necessary
o Medicare pays the provider
o If later founds out that it was not covered, will reassess and recoup funds
Medical Malpractice
o
o
o
SES
Highest Income
Casual sponsorship
Semi-Committee Sponsorship
Level of Communication
Doctor committed to patient beyond
disease
More involvement of house staff, still
large participation by doctor
Physician nominally responsible for
patients prognosis and treatment, but
staff is largely in control
Part 2. From Physician Authority to Egalitarian Social Contract and Market Competition:
Medical Malpractice Law and Transformation of the Professional Standard of Care
Grounded in state tort law
o Whether performance fell below professional standard of care
Advances in medicine have raised peoples expectations of what a doctor can achieve
o Primary purpose is to deter injury-producing behavior
Elements:
o Duty
o Breach this is where the standard of care comes in, you have to show that the standard exists and that it
was breached; even where a standard really doesnt exist and doctors must resort to trial-and-error (such
as mental illness in children), there is still a standard
o Causation
o Damages
Does little to improve quality of care
Only a few injured patients bring suit, only those cases that will bring high contingency fees
Malpractice does little to increase quality of care
People who are not injured by medical malpractice may in fact be compensated
Part 3. From Local Medical Customer Practices to a National Standard of Acceptable Care
History of Medical Malpractice
Social authority and social organization of medical profession changed dramatically from 1870 1960:
o Entry to profession governed by medical boards
o Medical education controlled by accreditation process
Locality Rule
Requires a doctor to have the reasonable caliber of skill and knowledge that is generally possessed by surgeons
and physicians in the locality where he or she practices
Originally developed because medical knowledge did not disperse,
o Protected rural doctors from testimony by city doctors
o Was relaxed by most courts to same or similar locality
Exception:
reliance on customary practice is not adequate where doctor knew/has reason to know
that customary practice is problematic
Problems with the standard:
o Required local doctors to testify against other doctors in the area (bias, or hard to find expert);
o Permitted local practitioners to set authoritative local standard
Today
o Most jurisdictions have done away with locality rule, although North Dakota still adheres to the same or
similar locality rule
National Standard
Requires a doctor to use the degree of skill and care of a reasonably competent practitioner in his field under same
or similar circumstances
Adopted in most jurisdictions; tends to raise standards
o Knowledge and skill defined by national standard
o Resources and equipment are defined by local standard
o Even where the locality rule applies, a national standard applies to specialists, hospitals
Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital Association (1975):
o that degree of care and skill which is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in the same class
to which he belongs, acting in the same of similar circumstances. Under this standard, advances in the
profession, availability of facilities, specialization or general practice, proximity of specialists and special
facilities, together with all other relevant considerations, are taken into account.
Hall v. Hilbun (Miss. 1985)
o FACTS: Plaintiff sued his wifes surgeon for medical malpractice/wrongful death.
At trial, P sought to introduce the testimony of one Dr. Hoerr, a retired Cleveland physician. The
trial court excluded much of Hoerr's testimony on the grounds that he was unfamiliar with local
standards.
o HELD: A physicians duty of care to a patient is to be judged by national, not local, standards.
Exception: when a locality lacks the necessary resources to meet national standards
Medical practice has become increasingly "nationalized" in scope.
Medical school admissions standards are largely the same across the country. Physicians
are much more mobile than before.
Medical education and literature are available nationwide.
The needs of a patient are largely the same for any particular medical condition, no
matter where the patient is geographically located.
Part 4. The Problem of Competing Standards: The Two Schools of Thought or Respectable
(or Reputable) Minority Doctrine
One of the problems in medicine is that there are often multiple ways to deal with the same problem. Courts have
developed special doctrine in order to deal with conflicting expert testimony over the proper treatment or standard of care
The Two Schools of Thought or Respectable (or Reputable) Minority Doctrine
o The doctrine shields physicians who have followed a prescribed treatment or procedure that has been
accepted by medical experts even though other medical experts advocate an alternative approach.
The goal is to relieve physicians who follow a course of reputable treatment from litigation and
the loss of their professional standing.
Jones v. Chidester (S.Ct. Pa. 1992)
o FACTS
A patient sued his orthopedic surgeon who caused serious nerve injury for medical malpractice.
At the trial, both sides presented testimony by medical experts. The experts disagreed on whether
the surgeons techniques were medically acceptable.
Before deliberation, the judge gave the jury an instruction on the two schools doctrine
A doctor cannot be held liable for exercising her judgment in applying a court of
treatment supported by a reputable and respected body of medical experts.
Jury found for the surgeon and the patient appealed.
o HELD
A practitioner has an absolute defense to a claim of malpractice when it is determined that the
prescribers treatment or procedure has been approved by a considerable number of medical
experts
Even if there is an alternate school of thought that recommends another approach, or
It is agreed among experts that alternative treatments and practices are acceptable.
A school of thought should be adopted not only by reputable and respected physicians in order
to insure quality but also by a considerable number of medical practitioners
It is insufficient to show that a small minority of physicians agree with a questionable
practice.
But there is no concrete number for considerable number
Burden is on the physician to show that the school of thought exists
Levine v. Rosen (1992)
o The jury should not decide which standard is right, just whether there are two schools of thought, juries
should not review medical standard on its merits.
Henderson v Heyer-Schulte Corp (1992)
o Court asked whether physician undertook a form of treatment which a reasonable person of the medical
community would not undertake under the circumstances
This assessment ignored the role of shifting standards over time and the role of the jury.
State Board of Medical Examiners v McCrosky (1992)
o Held that the Colorado licensure board could set standards of care
While the US law defers to physicians in many ways, it does not let them set the standard of care by their own
culture
o Considerations to set national standard:
Cost/benefits
Degree of diffusion
Level of knowledge
Part 6. When Has a New Standard Emerged? The Best Judgment Rule and the Problem of
New Knowledge and Technologies
As scrutiny increased over the variations in geographic treatment options, it became more important for medical
providers to determine at what point a doctor should be required to use her best judgment.
The court had noted that requiring a doctor to use best judgment and deviate from customary practice increased
their risk.
In order to mitigate that risk, doctors began to inform their patients of the competing perspectives on potential
treatments. This practice was intended to enable the patient to exercise a truly informed choice.
The courts are split as to the use of Clinical Practice Guidelines (CPGs) to establish standard of care.
o CPGs are based on the examination of current evidence within the paradigm of evidence-based medicine.
Modern clinical guidelines identify, summarize and evaluate the highest quality evidence and
most current data about prevention, diagnosis, prognosis, therapy including dosage of
medications, risk/benefit and cost-effectiveness.
Then they define the most important questions related to clinical practice and identify all
possible decision options and their outcomes.
In order for a CPG to be used in court, an attorney must formally offer it as substantive evidence in order to give
opposing counsel fair opportunity to object.
o It is not sufficient for an expert witness to claim that the guidelines simply represent the standard of care.
Part 9. Should the Professional Standard of Care Be Adjusted to Account for Patients
Economic Circumstances?
Should the cost of care be an intrinsic factor in setting the standard of care?
1/6 of Americans are uninsured and 1/5 of Americans are on public insurance that doctors wont accept due to
limited reimbursement
Murray v. UNMC Physicians (Neb. 2011)
o FACTS
Mary Murray died from complications caused by pulmonary arterial hypertension. Robert
Murray alleged that UNMC caused the death of Mary by failing to administer Flolan therapy to
treat her condition.
Shortly before Marys death, UNMC was preparing Mary for said therapy, but was waiting on
approval by her insurance company.
UNMC argued that waiting for insurance approval was standard practice
o Most patients are not able to pay for the drug without insurance and it could be
more dangerous if treatment was started and then stopped.
A jury found in favor of UNMC
BUT the district court concluded that expert testimony by UNMC physicians was
inconsistent with the proper standard of care
o As a matter of law, a medical standard of care cannot be tied to or controlled by
an insurance company or the need for payment.
The court then granted Robert a new trial. UNMC appealed the courts decision.
o HELD
The provider did not violate the standard of care
Determined that UNMCs decision was out of concern for the patients well-being.
Physicians were weighing the risk to Marys health of delaying treatment against the risk
to Marys health of potentially interrupted treatment.
Rejected the trial courts decision that UNMC made its decision to delay Flolan therapy based on
economic reasons
Overruled the district courts decision to grant Robert a new trial.
o NOTE
The Court did NOT decide whether the standard of care for physicians should incorporate
considerations such as cost control or allocation of limited resources
Additionally, public hospitals and community health standards are notably substandard and malpractice has done little to
correct this.
Greater Washington DC Area Council of Senior Citizens v. District of Columbia Government (1975) (finding DC
government had a duty to use resources effectively)
o The overwhelming and, indeed, the uncontroverted evidence compels the conclusion that in the several
areas where testimony and evidence have been submitted, the treatment and care of patients and the
facilities at D.C. General fall well below any acceptable level of quality and efficiency and that the
defendants have failed to provide adequate medical care and service to patients in accordance with
recognized standards of medical practice in this community.
Unitary standard
Under principles of ethics, once a doctor has agreed to care for the patient, owes the same duty of care and fidelity
regardless of income.
Critique - Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary Medical Malpractice Standard by John Siliciano
o Argues that the unitary standard disincentivizes physicians from caring for the under-resourced poor
further impairing their access to appropriate treatments
o Instead, physicians should be allowed to recognize explicitly the economic standard of their patients in
determining the level of treatment to furnish and should be held to a liability standard only in relation to
the level of care chosen
Informed Consent
This is contrary to the standard in other countries, such as France, where the standard is to withhold information
about the severity of that persons condition, the US has moved in this direction due to the rise of consumerism,
which has created an expectation that patients are self-empowering
In soliciting the patients consent, the doctor has fiduciary duty to disclose all information
material to the patients decision, which includes the physicians financial interests
HHS enacted HIPAA in 1996 because Congress failed to act within three years
o deals with health privacy
o also designed to begin process of electronic information age that we are now in
HIPAA does NOT supersede stricter state laws, it is the federal floor of privacy protection
o It does preempt state law that is contrary to it
o Does NOT preempt mandatory state reporting laws (child abuse, infectious disease, etc.)
o Does not shield health data for purposes of litigation
o Does NOT address individual health records i.e. Google Health right now they are too rarely used to
be regulated in a meaningful way; although it DOES provide that you have a right to view/copy your
medical records (even if not allowed under state law)
o Does not bar doctors from talking to patients or others that they pull into their zone of privacy
So, despite common perception, HIPAA does NOT create a total shield, deals with privacy NOT
confidentiality
HIPAAs privacy rule is the result of two balancing tests:
o Personal privacy vs. Flow of information (particularly pronounced due to HIT)
o Need for uniformity vs. Custom and practice of state law
Its privacy rule applies to covered entities that transmit health information in electronic form really a standard
of conduct for providers than a right for information privacy for patients
o these entities to create and post operating procedures re: information privacy, in particular the
transmission of health information to other people (certain things are outright prohibited, such as selling
patient lists to marketers)
o Allows transmission of health information w/out the individuals consent for purposes of:
Treatment doctor can transfer information if patient is referred to specialist
Payment insurance company can demand health information in determining claims for
payment
Healthcare operations - health benefit plan can get the information to change coverage design,
think about premiums, use by actuaries
Also allows the information to be transmitted to the individual, family members and
others involved in care as long as the individual is given the opportunity to object, when
is secondary to a permitted disclosure, for national priority purposes (health care
oversight, public health, research, law enforcement, when required by another law.
Note that research is not included, even when it is really health services research (must get
authorization to use)
o A unitary standard applies regardless of the type of health information involved
Where authorization is required, it must include:
o Specific and meaningful description of the information to be disclosed
o Name or specific identification of the person authorized to disclose the info
o Name or specific identification of the persons to whom the info can be disclosed
o A description of each purpose of the requested use or disclosure
o An expiration date or event
o The signature of the individual and date
o Required statements to place the individual on notice of his/her rights
There are no private remedies under HIPAA
o HHS is in charge of enforcement
o The fact that the conduct violated HIPAA may be evidence that it violated the standard of care in a state
cause of action
Liability Reform
There is an imperfect relationship between independent assessment of liability/injury costs and the
outcomes of legal disputes.
Medical malpractice claimants are overcompensated for their losses.
o Evidence shows that medical claimants tend to be under- rather than overcompensated.
Medical care is costly because of medical malpractice.
o DHHS has estimated the amount of money that would be saved if a national non-economic damages cap
was placed at $250,000. Over 10 years, the cap would save the county 50 billion dollars. Compare that to
the 10 trillion dollars that the federal government alone will spend on health care in the next 10 years.
o
4.
5.
No fault compensation model (i.e. vaccine injury): reduces damage awards in return for faster, more
comprehensive coverage
Shielding health care providers from the risk of medical liability: done largely to protect the provider, i.e. raise
standard of care to gross negligence, shorten SOL, cap damages, exhaust administrative remedies
Federal Incursions into medical liability reform: ACA state liability reform demonstrations are limited in
scope and focus on the development by states of alternative dispute resolution systems
Definition
Enterprise liability is a legal doctrine under which individual entities can be held jointly liable for some action on
the basis of being part of a shared enterprise.
It is a form of secondary liability in which an entire organization may be held responsible for the obligations
and/or offences of its constituent units.
Proposals for Systematic Enterprise Liability in Health Care
In the early 1990s, two proposals were made to establish a model for enterprise liability that would replace suits against
individual physicians:
(1) A system of hospital-based liability
(proposed in 1992 by law professors Paul Weiler and Kenneth Abraham,14)
o The goal of the proposal was to consolidate the defense of medical malpractice claims
o Hospitals were chosen to assume the lead in defense because the majority and most serious medical
malpractice cases arise from hospital care
Wanted to place liability on the institution with the clearest involvement in health care delivery
o Problems
A broad shift toward ambulatory and home-based care has resulted in a greater percentage of
malpractice cases with no hospital affiliation
Most physicians dont work directly for hospitals
(2) A system of health plan-based liability
o considered in 1993 by President Clintons Task Force on National Health Care
o The proposal was to give liability for medical malpractice to the newly formed health plans were to be
created in the 1993 health care reform
Health care plans were to be integrated organizations that combined health care financing with
the provision of services.
o Theoretically, it was a good suggestion
In an environment where health care is planned, managed, and provided by a system instead
of being rendered by unaffiliated, individual practitioners, holding health plans primarily
accountable for instances of medical malpractice is appealing for three reasons.
Health plans already would be primarily responsible for cost containment.
Legal liability for negligent health outcomes should make health plans reluctant
to cut costs by reducing quality
Medical malpractice arises between parties who have a pre-existing relationship, which
health plans could formalize and extend.
The relationship between health plans and beneficiaries could form the basis for
quality improvement activities, communication of grievances, and efficient
dispute resolution.
Health could be subjected to significant direct regulation and oversight.
Health plans were required to comply with national standards on the
accessibility and impartiality of grievance procedures; to collect, process, and
Other than anesthesiologists, radiologists, pathologists and ER doctors, most hospital doctors get bulk of
patients from private practice; are not considered employees of hospital
From 1930s 1940s, it became clearer that hospitals were responsible for quality of care:
o Emergence of hospital industry
o AHA and TJC stated hospitals provided quality care
o Courts abandoned charitable immunity and captain of the ship
Truhitte v. French Hospital (Cal. 1982): rejected captain of the ship theory because the hospital
also had a duty acting through its nurses, should be liable if it doesnt create procedures to
control activities of nurses
There were four main pieces that accounted for the shift in doctrine toward hospital liability:
o Increase in technology: hospitals were viewed as capable of complicated and advanced treatment
o Privatization of hospitals: over time the role of hospitals in medical training became such that they
stopped being doctors workshops and became institutions in their own right (are largely non-profit)
o Hospitals became accredited: led to the understanding that hospitals themselves saw themselves as
entities whose conduct should be held up to examination by suit
o Hospitals became rich: with insurance, people were able to pay
o
Part 5. Non-Employee Physicians and the Expanding Concepts of Agency Nondelegable Duty
Nondelegable Duties for Hospitals
Definition of a Non-Delegable Duty
o An obligation that cannot be outsourced to a third party according to the terms of the contract. In the
event that it is delegated, the second party reserves the right to reject the performance of the obligation.
Hospitals have a non-delagable duty to run the hospital without negligence.
o Non-delegable duty applies when the responsibility is so important to the community that it cannot be transferred
to another. The court found this standard was met because the hospital industry was so heavily regulated
by state law, bylaws, and licensing standards. Holding a hospital license is lucrative, so they should be
held to those standards.
o Jackson v. Power (Supreme Court of AK 1987): hospital put up a sign that the doctors were supplied by
another corporation. The court finds that the hospital had a non-delegable duty to run hospital nonnegligently.
Non-delegable duty applies when the responsibility is so important to the community that it cannot be
transferred to another.
The court found this standard was met because the hospital industry was so heavily
regulated by state law, bylaws, and licensing standards.
Holding a hospital license is lucrative, so they should be held to those standards.
This is a means to hold the hospital responsible for actions of independent contractors.
Under state law, hospital had a duty to have an on-duty physician
TJC standards required:
o ER to be directed by a physician member of the hospital staff;
o ER to be integrated with other units/departments of the hospital
o Emergency care to be guided by written policies and procedures
o Quality of care to be continually reviewed, evaluated, and assured through
establishment of quality control standards
Hospitals bylaws also required ER committee to supervise clinical work of ER
Unique situation in hospital context, you are really relying on the hospital to provide you
with a doctor (can this be extended to anesthesiologists, pathologists, radiologists?)
o The interesting thing about this theory is that it is not necessary to have a negligent doctor because the
hospital itself is liable
Dismissed the hospitals argument that its only duty was to avoid being negligent in selection of doctors.
Found that the bylaws, regulations, and standards introduced by the plaintiff provided evidence of
custom
The medical profession expects hospitals to assume a certain level of responsibility for the patient
hospitals are supposed to hire staff, train staff, monitor performance, and rectify errors - did not
do these things
NOTES:
o Important case because it rejected the argument that hospitals duties are confined solely by custom of
similarly situated hospitals
o A breakthrough in liability - first time a court found that a hospital was a provider in its own right
o
o
This standard likely applies to modern health benefits services corporation also interferes with medical practice
all the time by denying coverage
o
o
An alternative way to protect the public is an active licensing board, in that case, if you had your license
revoked, you could not practice anywhere
Currently the licensing boards do a miserable job maintaining quality oversight
The best known example of this is the Libby Zion story where the daughter of a New York Times
reporter got sick on Thanksgiving and was taken to the hospital. There was no one on duty other
than residents who had been awake for 130+ hours. No one attended to her, just strapped her to
gurney and she died. There was a huge investigation, which resulted in NY licensing board
passing a standard that residents can only work for 80 hours/week.
Chapter 20. Payers and Health Care Quality: Awakening the Sleeping Giant
Part 1. Introduction: Old Concerns, Old Techniques and the Rise of Value-Based Purchasing
Payers have taken an increasingly large role in the regulation of health care quality
In the 1970s and before, there was privity between the individual and insurer, but nothing between the insurer
and provider sue insurer in contract, sue doctor for malpractice
Since the 1970s, there has arisen a situation in which there is a very clear relationship between the provider and
payer (i.e. the provider is in the payers network)
There are three models for payers to control healthcare quality:
Peer review: look at procedure after it has occurred
Prior authorization: approve or disapprove before the treatment occurs, i.e. formulary
Payment:
o Pay for Performance
Basis of P4P is that how one gets paid has an influence on what one does
this was tried with capitation and failed (led doctors to financial ruin or to under-serve
patients)
but economic models may still qualify
the goal is to increase quality while holding down costs
Reward either (1) explicit conduct, or (2) outcomes considered beneficial to society with payment
Types of incentives:
o Basis:
bonus on patient-by-patient basis
coordinate payments to individual physicians for achieving certain
performance measures
incentives at organizational level
o Type of incentive:
Money
Put doctor at higher tier
Penalties
Exclude doctors
o Metric:
Clinical process of care and outcomes
Structure of the practice
Mix of metrics
There was a four-fold increase in P4P in private plans from 2003-2004; has come to
Medicare/Medicaid2
Problems
o Lack of common concept of quality
o Investment costs
o Does not take into account type of patients served, may create an incentive not to
take high-risk patients
o Poses legal issues of disclosure/informed consent, and professional negligence
nad corporate liability
Physician Tiering
The long-standing use of networks shows that the idea of tying money to conduct is not new
Has increased with tiering, particularly in self-insured plans
Degree of incentivization/punishment varies by plan
criteria are considered proprietary
Patients can attack tiering just as they attacked other elements of provider networks
Moran: Wanted external review
Krauss: wanted condition covered even though was out of network provider because had
bought supplemental insurance coverage
Providers can attack tiering:
Defamation
Absence of Fair Process
Breach of K
Fraud
MedPac issued formal recommendations for P4P and Medicare/Medicaid already have demo projects, such as:
The DOQ-IT, which promotes Electronic Health Records to increase quality and safety.
- Medicare Care Management Performance Demonstration is a P4P pilot to promote adoption of Electronic Health
Records.
- Physician voluntary Reporting Program, which reports to CMS feedback to improve services.
Providers get a tax relief to participate in these demonstration projects.
2
The settlement in Washington Medical Association (Wash. 2007) case suggests types of
modifications that make the practice of tiering more acceptable:
Give physicians input before using new performance measure
Give physicians notice before publishing new scores
Post physicians scores and explanation of data, as well as a means to identify the types of
patients the doctor serves
Allow doctors to appeal determinations about scoring via independent review
Physician selection/de-selection
Guidelines often used in conjunction with payment incentives, the purpose is to get the providers
practicing in a way that appears to be in conformance with the evidence
o
o
Medicare: the first insurer to get involved in the quality of care. They established a number of different review
organizations that were designed to ensure a high quality of care.
Utilization Review (UR) of providers for them to participate
Would review necessity of extended stay
If disagreed, could terminate stay giving patients 4 more days of pay to make arrangements
Tool for cost-containment, but did not perform well in terms of quality
Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs)
Role was to establish standards for local in-hospital UR committees
Unable to achieve more than minor improvements
Peer Review Organizations (PROs)
performed same function of determining medical necessity, whether care met quality standards, whether
inpatient services could be more economical
Had a wider geographic scale than the PSROs
Did not require as much physician input weakened input of profession
Contracts between HHS and PROs contained highly specific and quantified objectives
In 1982, the PROs were converted into DRG police
Quality Improvement Organizations (QIOs)
New generation of PROs also serve to draft quality standards and are involved with local physicians
They perform medical review on quality in six clinical areas QIOs are expected to initiate local projects in these
areas
They review individual quality of care and EMTALA claims
o If QIO deems care substandard, the physician cant charge for it
o Can also deny care on basis of necessity, level of care, and quality grounds
o Has created never events for which a physician can never receive payment (i.e. hospital acquired
infections)
Providers can seek post-termination review.
o First, the doctor is entitled to a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
o Then he may appeal an adverse ALJ decision to the Secretary's Appeals Council.
o Finally he can obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Secretary.
Biggest complaint of doctors is that there is no right to access administrative law judge until after
the Inspector General decides.
o Doyle v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (1st Cir 1988)
HELD: The doctor had not exhausted his administrative remedies because the Secretary had not
rendered a final decision. Therefore, could not bring claim in federal court.
Policy behind exhaustion:
o Allow agency to develop a factual record, apply expertise, exercise discretion,
correct mistakes
o Promotes accurate results
o encourages expeditious decision-making
Exception from exhaustion
Chapter 21. Liability for Medical Negligence: Special Issues that Arise in Situations Involving
Insurers and Health Plan Administrators
Managed care organizations are liable for corporate liability where they are "providing health care services rather than
merely providing money to pay for services."
Based on the theory that managed care organizations are hybrid organizations both providers and insurers
o They either pay for care or offer levels of care conditioned on use of network
o This combination raises complex questions when their conduct results in medical injury
Two legal frameworks to consider this question
o Medical Liability/Tort Law
focuses on professional medical conduct that falls below professional norms
o Insurance, K, trust law
focuses on resource allocation
Part 2. Insurer Negligence in Connection with Coverage Determinations
A third party payer of services can be held medically liable if the error is in the design and implementation of costcontainment measures, such as when decisions regarding the necessity of care ignore actual medical necessity
Wickline v. State of California (Cal. App. 1986)
o Third party payors of health care services can be held legally accountable when medically inappropriate
decisions result from defects in the design or implementation of cost-containment mechanisms.
For example, when appeals made on a patient's behalf for medical or hospital care are arbitrarily
ignored or unreasonably disregarded or overridden.
o However, the physician who complies without protest with the limitations imposed by a third party
payor, when his medical judgment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility for his
patient's care.
He cannot point to the health care payor as the liability scapegoat when the consequences of his
own determinative medical decisions go sour.
o Patients harmed by withholding care should recover from all involved in deprivation, including third
party payers
McEvoy v. Group Health Cooperative of Eau Claire (Wis. 1997)
o FACTS
Pursuant to the contractual terms of the HMO's insurance policy with the subscribers, a mother
and her daughter, the HMO was to pay for out-of-network care up to the policy limits.
The HMO referred and approved the daughter for treatment for anorexia at an out-of-network
inpatient clinic.
Although four weeks of benefits remained under the subscribers' contract, the HMO
discontinued coverage based on cost concerns. The subscribers' brought an action against the
HMO for bad faith breach of their insurance policy.
HELD
HMOs that make out-of-network benefit decisions are insurers for the purpose of application of
the tort of bad faith.
Not all malpractice cases against HMO physicians may be pursued under the guise of the tort of
bad faith.
The tort of bad faith is not designed to apply to classic malpractice cases arising from
mistakes made by a health care provider in diagnosis or treatment.
Bad faith tort claims arise in out-of-network provider situations when the HMO unreasonably
refuses to provide a service or cover payments to outside providers for which it is contractually
obligated.
To prevail on a bad faith tort claim against an HMO, must show by clear and convincing evidence
(1) there was no reasonable basis for the HMO to deny the plaintiff's claim
(2) that the HMO either knew or recklessly failed to ascertain that the care should have
been covered.
o Including if the HMO bases its decision on cost-containment mechanisms,
despite a demonstrated medical need and a contractual obligation
HMO is liable for damages proximately related to the breach and for punitive damages
for bad faith, oppression, fraud, and malice
The tort of bad faith, sufficiently "relate to" employee benefits plans to fall under ERISA
preemption.
Only HMO subscribers of ERISA-exempt plans or who purchase their subscription plans
individually may use the tort
Long v. Great West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. (Wyo. 1998):
o A state law providing for administrative appeals regarding claims for medical services received by public
employees does not bar a bad faith breach of K action against insurer for unreasonably denied preauthorization of services when appeal procedure does not apply to pre-authorization or prospective
utilization review decisions
HMOs cant hide behind one of their dual functions to avoid liability they can be held liable as insurers or providers
MacAvoy and Wickline had contractual complaints
Boyd had a complaint about the care itself
The crucial thing is the CONDUCT you are looking at
o
Part 3. Liability for Medical Injuries Arising From Health Care Negligence
Vicarious Liability and Agency
Although a physician holds independent contractor status with respect to a hospital, he may nevertheless be an
agent of the hospital with respect to the patient.
o Where a hospital "holds out" the physician as its employee, there is an ostensible agency relationship
between the hospital and the physician.
o A holding out occurs when the hospital acts or omits to act in some way which leads the patient to a
reasonable belief he is being treated by the hospital or one of its employees.
Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center (Pa. Superior Ct. 1988)
o FACTS
Appellant husband filed a wrongful death action against his HMO alleging vicariously liability
for the negligence their networked physicians.
HELD
This is a strict medical malpractice case and there was no basis for suit.
BUT, an HMO can be held liable for the actions of its physicians under the theory of
ostensible/apparent agency.
Doctors may be agents if:
o Patient looks to institution rather than individual for care
HMO agreed to furnish doctors
P selected doctor from list of HMOs doctor (how restrictive does this list
have to be to qualify?)
o HMO holds out physicians as employees
HMO screens doctors
Doctors must comply with HMO regulations
HMOs doctors are gatekeepers
o Patient submitted self to care of doctor due to HMOs invitation
Chase v. IPA, Inc. (Mass. 1991): The court failed to find ostensible agency because the plaintiff did not know about
the arrangements with the doctors employed by the office where her OB-GYN worked.
o Under this theory, liability requires reliance on IPAs representations that the doctor is its employee or
agent.
Petrovich v Share Health Plan of Illinois (Ill. 1999) The court found HMO liable under apparent authority
o Justifiable reliance is met where the patient relies on the HMO rather than a specific physician to provide
care
o In the master agreement between sponsor and HMO, HMO held self out to be selling healthcare,
underscored role of HMO in ensuring quality care
o Where a person has no choice but to enroll with a single HMO and does not rely on a single physician,
they are relying on the HMO to provide care, particularly where there is no prior relationship
o Accountability is necessary to counterbalance HMO goal of cost-containment (consistent with national
trend)
Williams v Good Health Plus, Inc. (Texas 1987): HMO could not hold self out as practicing medicine because
corporate practice of medicine doctrine, therefore could not be vicariously liable under apparent authority
o
Corporate Liability
McClellan v. HMO (Penn. 1995): HMOs have a non-delegable duty to select and train only competent primary
care physicians
Shannon v. McNulty (Penn. 1998): no reason why duties applicable to hospitals should not apply to HMOs when
performing similar functions as a hospital; when a benefits provider interjects self into rendering of medical
decisions, must do so in a reasonable manner.
Jones v. Chicago HMO (Ill. 2000):
o Court found HMO liable for institutional negligence because breached duty to enrollees by assigning an
excessive number of patients to Dr. J.
It is reasonably foreseeable that assigning an excessive number of patients to a primary care
physician could result in injury.
o The court found a theory for institutional negligence in the healthcare context under Darling,
To determine whether to extend it to Chicago HMO, look at:
Contracts
Charter
How operates
Functions: actuarial, network, payment
It applied to HMOs because:
It had doctors, hospitals
Its contract with the state of Illinois provided that it was organized for the purpose of
providing healthcare services and warrants that will do so according to prevailing
community standards
Part 4. When Does ERISA Preempt the Medical Liability of Insurers and Plan Administrators?
Corcoran v. United Healthcare (5th Cir. 1992)
FACTS
o Louisiana tort action asserted by the Corcorans for the wrongful death of their child allegedly resulting
from Uniteds medical decision not to preauthorize her hospitalization for her high risk pregnancy
(Utilization Review under Quality Care Program).
A medical malpractice claim against the insurance company
Argued that when United Healthcare denied coverage they were making medical
decisions about the childs care making them liable is liable for the death.
HELD
o ERISA preempts state law on the tort and contract actions in which a beneficiary seeks to recover damages
for improper processing of claim for benefits (Pilot Life)
o Although United made medical decisions, it did so in the context of benefits.
There is no way to untangle the business and medical decision making when making a
prospective coverage decision
A matter of cost-containment, not medical judgment
although we disagree with Uniteds position that no part of its actions involves medical
decisions, we cannot agree with the Corcorans that no part of Uniteds actions involves
benefits determinations. In our view, United makes medical decisions as part and parcel
of its mandate to decide what benefits are available under the Bell plan. As the QCP
(benefits reviewer) booklet concisely puts it, United decides what the medical plan will
pay for. When Uniteds actions are viewed from this perspective, it becomes apparent
that the Corcorans are attempting to recover for a tort committed in the course of
handling a benefits determination. The nature of benefits determinations is different
from the type of decision that was at issue in Pilot Life, but it is a benefit determination
nonetheless. The principle of Pilot Life that ERISA pre-empts state law claims alleging
improper handling of benefits claims is broad enough to cover the cause of action
asserted here.
Allowing Corcorans suit would undermine Congress goal that ERISA plans be subject to uniform body
of law
Liability laws may be applied differently, would increase cost of care
Congress can preempt state law that interferes with ERISA
The lack of another remedy does not affect the preemption analysis
No 502 claim
Patient didnt receive any benefits, so she cant make a 502 claim because the only remedy
for 502 is receiving the denied benefits
o (Here would have been the cost of the foregone hospitalization);
Alternatively patient can sue for a TRO right after benefits were denied
o (not realistic - requires a patient to know that she needs a lawyer and find an
attorney who specializes in ERISA.)
Emotional damages not available under contract/trust principles that guide ERISA interpretation
There is not really a doctor-patient relationship between United/Corcorans to support a
contract theory of recovery
Lack of K relationship between United and Corcorans also undermines theory under breach of
fiduciary duty
502(a)(1)(B) is concerned only with whether benefits were received, rights under terms of plans
refers to contractual rights other than benefits
Courts are unlikely to remove a case to federal courts if
Here the question was NOT to clarify benefits under plan, rather the quality of those benefits
(might be different if there were K terms re: quality)
The court notes that Corcoran is correct but inapposite because complaints here dealt with
medical care rather than decisions by third party administrators
NOTE
o In summary
What Dukes does is draw a line between claims about the denial of benefits (preempted) and
quality of care (not preempted);
the problem is that this is hard to apply in practice;
Congress did not envision plans would make medical decisions when enacted ERISA
FACTS
o
o
Involved two types of claims under Texas liability statute that allowed an action to be brought against a
payer for defective medical judgment.
The claims were pretty weak:
Patient claimed that the formulary made him sick when another drug had to be substituted for
Vioxx, the other plaintiff was injured when dismissed prematurely consistent with the plans
practice guideline. Both were found to be removable and preempted.
HELD
o Opinion of the Court - J. Thomas (Unanimous)
Congress intended ERISA to provide a uniform system for regulating retirement schemes and
benefits
Any state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements or supplants the ERISA civil
enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA
remedy exclusive and is therefore preempted."
Removal
Removable because are completely preempted.
o Congress established an extensive civil enforcement scheme is one of those
provisions with such extraordinary preemptive power that it converts an
ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for
purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule
Plaintiffs claim that the claims were independent of ERISA because they are about quality
of care under the Texas statute
o BUT duties imposed by that statute do not arise independently of ERISA (that
statute does not require the carrier to provide beneficiaries with services in the
plan)
ERISA can preempt even when the statute doesnt specify an exact remedy
o Congress policy choices to include some/exclude other remedies would be
undermined if beneficiaries could obtain remedies under state law rejected by
Congress
Preemption: Articulated that Dukes/Corcoran applied.
If claim is for quality of care/treatment, then it is not preempted (Dukes), can allege that
the company was vicariously negligent (Boyd v. Albert Einstein) or corporate negligence re:
quality (Jones v. Chicago HMO)
If the claim is claiming a benefit/coverage and exists as a result of ERISA plan, you
cannot enforce a state law for injuries caused by the conduct of the payer (Corcoran)
Under this holding, it does not matter if the plan is self-insured or not - it does not turn on 514
preemption, rather, it is a question of 502 preemption because it deals with remedies under
ERISA, blocks you from getting remedies that are not covered by 502 (Pilot Life)
SUMMARY
Back back where we began
o Ginsburgs concurrence in Davila indicates that the Court has concluded that ERISA 502(a) does not
include make-whole relief
the Courts decisions deny extra-K damages, equitable compensatory damages, personal liability
for K obligation to pay money
ERISAs preemption creates a regulatory vacuum
o After Davila, courts began dismissing mixed eligibility claims and claims re: coverage rather than health
care quality
essentially any case in which a state claim could be read as duplicating an ERISA claim and/or
adding a remedy, the federal courts can be expected to dismiss
Other theories on special liability standards for hybrid companies:
Bovbjerg: claims HMO health benefits may be considered not only, or even primarily, from the
perspective of individual patients, but from the perspective of the enrolled population as a group
Malpractice should not be able to interfere inappropriately with HMOs ability to cut costs in
deciding what care to provide
Courts case by case approach is not well suited to assess tradeoffs HMOs make to improve care
in certain areas; community of HMOs is not likely better off with a customary standard
although many courts defer to the managed care industry
Competition advocates believe a plan could agree to limit tort law rights of subscribers to reduce costs
Hospital markets exhibit product differentiation, meaning that consumers have clear preferences for some
competitors services over others.
o Antitrust law does not prohibit a single firm from gaining a monopoly by virtue of having a superior
product.
Therefore, a merger between hospitals representing consumers clear first and second choices could have serious
anticompetitive effects, even if the merged hospitals overall market share remained moderate.
United States v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center (N.Y. 1997)
o FACTS
The DOJ tried to stop the defendant hospitals from merging because they were sufficiently
prestigious to constitute must-haves for managed care networks.
o HELD
the government failed to meet its burden of proof that the merger would violate 7 of the
Clayton Act
rejected the governments anchor hospital theory
o in essence viewing all acute care hospitals as interchangeable.
There was significant competition from other hospitals in the area and the merged entity would
not have an undue share of the relevant product and geographic markets.
Managed care plans were driving the hospitals' decisions to affiliate or merge, decisions on what
services to offer, and decisions with regard to price.
There was no evidence that the merged hospital entity would not reduce costs or would result in
reduced service or treatment of patients.
Community services, not profit maximization, was the driving force of both hospitals.
Barriers to Entry
Ball Memorial Hospital v. Mutual Hospital Insurance
court held PPO by Blues was not a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. The court found that the relevant market
was health care financing, and that the blues had market share but not market power because:
Blues could not block entry to market
Their productive asset is money, which is easily produced and fungible
They face vigorous competition firms can easily enter into and out of this market
Total sales is not enough to show market power
The doctors felt that they were losing money if they joined or losing volume if they stay out; but the court found that a
primary injunction would be contrary to public interest because the PPOs kept premiums down
Part 2. Exclusionary Conduct or Lawfulness
United States v. Alcoa
Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts
Part 3. Special Problems Raised by Horizontal Collaborations
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society