TAADA & MACAPAGAL VS. CUENCO ET. AL.

Petition for Certiorari & Preliminary Injunction

Ponente:

Justice Concepcion

Personalities:

Lorenzo Taada

Diosdado Macapagal
Petitioners

Mariano Jesus Cuenco

Francisco Delgado
Alfredo Cruz
Catalina Cayetano
Manuel Serapio
Placido Reyes
Fernando Hipolito
Respondents
Taada, Teehankee & Macapagal
for petitioners

Solicitior General Ambrosio Padilla

Solicitor Troadio Quizon Jr.
For respondents

FACTS:
On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate on behalf of the
Nacionalista Party elected respondents Cuenco & Delgado as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal upon the
nomination of Senator Primicias, an NP member. The two
seats, originally for minority party nominees, were filled with
NP members to meet the Constitutional mandate under Sec.
2 Art. 6, over the objections of lone Citizen Party Senator
Taada. Consequently, the Chairman of the Tribunal
appointed the rest of the respondents as staff members of
Cuenco & Delgado. Petitioner alleges that the nomination by
Sen. Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the
Senate, violates Sec. 2, Art. 6 of PC, since 3 seats on the ET
are reserved for minority senators duly nominated by the
minority party representatives. Furthermore, as respondents
are about to decide on Electoral Case No. 4 of Senate, the
case at bar is a violation not only of Taada's right as CP
member of ET, but respondent Macapagal's right to an
impartial body that will try his election protest. Petitioners
pray for a writ of preliminary injunction against respondents
(cannot exercise duties), to be made permanent after a
judgment to oust respondents is passed. Respondents
contend that the Court is without jurisdiction to try the
appointment of ET members, since it is a constitutional right
granted to Senate. Moreover, the petition is without cause of
action since Taada exhausted his right to nominate 2 more
senators; he is in estoppel. They contend that the present
action is not the proper remedy, but an appeal to public
opinion.
ISSUES:
1. WON Court has jurisdiction over the matter
2. WON Constitutional right of CP can be exercised by NP,
or the Committee on Rules for the Senate
HELD:

1. Yes. The Court has jurisdiction.

FACTS:

RATIO: The case at bar is not an action against the Senate

compelling them to allow petitioners to exercise duties as
members of ET. The ET is part of neither House, even if the
Senate elects its members. The issue is not the power of the
Senate to elect or nominate, but the validity of the manner
by which power was exercised (constitutionality). The Court is
concerned with the existence and extent of said discretionary
powers.

After the 1955 national elections, the membership in

2. No.

members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of

RATIO: Although respondents allege that the Constitutional

mandate of 6 Senate members in the ET must be followed,
this cannot be done without violating the spirit & philosophy
of Art. 6, Sec. 2, which is to provide against partisan
decisions. The respondents' practical interpretation of the law
(modifying law to fit the situation) cannot be accepted;
although they followed mandate on number, they disobeyed
mandate on procedure. The contention that petitioner Taada
waived his rights or is in estoppel is not tenable. When
interests of public policy & morals are at issue, the power to
waive is inexistent. Taada never led Primicias to believe that
his nominations on behalf of the CP are valid.

Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3

the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista

Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Taada who
belonged to the Citizens Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the
other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but
was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).
But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its
9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the

WHEREFORE:
The Senate cannot elect members of the ET not
nominated by the proper party, nor can the majority party
elect more than 3 members of the ET. Furthermore, the CRS
has no standing to nominate, and the election of respondents
Cuenco & Delgado void ab initio. The appointment of the
staff members are valid as it is a selection of personnel - a
matter under the discretion of the Chairman.
TAADA & MACAPAGAL VS. CUENCO ET. AL.

senators from the minority party. But since there is only one
minority senator the other two SET members supposed to
come

from

the

minority

were

filled

in

by

the

NP.

Taada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So

did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be
dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the
Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election
contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP)
averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of
the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued
that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in
the

Senate

alone

and

the

remedy

for

Taada and

Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts

but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that
the

issue

is

justiciable

question.

The

term Political

Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance,

2

namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions

which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The
Supreme Court is not being asked by Taada to decide upon
the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Taada
was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the
SET are valid which is a judicial question. Note that the SET
is a separate and independent body from the Senate which
does not perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in
the supposed seat of the minority members) must not come
from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the
SET, apparently already appointed members that would fill in
the minority seats (even though those will come from the
majority party). This is still valid provided the majority
members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting)
concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its
own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply
with the Constitution.
Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs,
39 SCRA 268
FACTS:
3

From December 1963 to July 1964, Republic Flour Mills

(petitioner) exported Pollard and/or bran which was loaded
from lighters alongside vessels engaged in foreign trade
while anchored near the breakwater. The Commissioner of
Customs and The Court of Tax Appeals (respondent) assessed
the petitioner by way of wharfage dues on the said
exportations in the sum of P7,948.00, which assessment was
paid by petitioner under protest
In this case, Republic Flour Mills, Inc. would want the
Court to interpret the words products of the Philippines
found in Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code , as
excluding bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) on the ground that,
coming as they do from wheat grain which is imported in the
Philippines, they are merely waste from the production of
flour. Another main argument of the petitioner is that no
government or private wharves or government facilities were
utilized in exporting such products. In that way, it would not
be liable at all for the wharfage dues assessed under such
section by respondent Commission of Customs.
On the other hand, the stand of respondent
Commissioner of Customs was that petitioner was liable for
wharfage dues upon receipt or discharge of the exported
goods by a vessel engaged in foreign trade regardless of the
non-use of government-owned or private wharves.
Respondent Court of Tax Appeals sustained the action taken
by the Commissioner of Customs under the appropriate
provision of the Tariff and Customs Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was
in accordance with law
RULING/HELD:
As stated on the Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom
Code, "There shall be levied, collected and paid on all articles
imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of
the Philippines exported from the Philippines, a charge of two

pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage." appears to

be quite precise. Section 2802 refers to what is imported and
exported.
The objective of this act must be carried out. Even if
there is doubt to the meaning of the language employed, the
interpretation should not be at war with the end sought to be
attained. If petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas
motivated by the same desire to be excluded from the
operation of the Tariff and Customs Code would likewise be
entitled to sympathetic consideration. It was desirable then
that the gates to such efforts at unjustified restriction of the
coverage of the Act are kept closed. Otherwise, the end
result would be not respect for, but defiance of, a clear
legislative mandate
The decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of
November 27, 1967 is affirmed with costs against petitioner.
Roman Catholic Apostolic Administration of Davao v.
Land Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596
Facts:
Rodis executed a deed of sale over a parcel of land in
favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of
Davao, a corporation sole, with Msgr. Thibault, a Canadian
Citizen, as the actual incumbent. When the Roman Catholic
Administrator presented the deed of sale for registration at
the Register of Deeds of Davao, the latter required that the
corporation sole prepare an affidavit declaring that 60% of
the members were Filipino citizens.
In spite of assurance by the corporation sole that the
totality of the Catholic population of Davao would become
the owner of the property, the Register of Deeds still had
some doubts as to the registerability of the document, and
referred the matter to the Land Registration Commissioner.

The Land Registration Commissioner found that the

corporation sole was not qualified to acquire private lands in
the Philippines because of the requirement that 60% of the
corporation was actually owned or controlled by Filipino
citizens; as the present incumbent of the corporation was a
Canadian citizen, the LRC found that the corporation sole was
not compliant.
Consequently the corporation sole instituted an action
for mandamus with the Supreme Court alleging that the sale
in favor is in favor of the Catholic Church, which is qualified
to acquire private agricultural lands for the establishment
and maintenance of places of worship, and prayed that the
registration be recognized.
Issue: Whether or not the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao Inc. is entitled to acquire private
properties
Held: Yes.
Ratio: In a corporation sole, the bishops or archbishops who
sit as the incumbent are merely administrators of the church
properties, and they only hold these in trust for the church.
Consequently, upon the death of the incumbent of the
corporation sole, the church properties acquired will pass on
to his successor in office.
The Court also finds that here is no provision of law
that confers ownership of the church properties on to the
Pope, or even to the corporation sole or heads of the
corporation sole who are mere administrators of said
properties; rather, ownership of these properties fall and
develop upon the congregation.
While the Catholic congregation does follow the
guidance of the Pope, there cannot be said to be a merger of
personalities between the Pope and the Catholic Church, and
it cannot be said that the political and civil rights of the
Catholics are affected by their relationship with the Pope; the

fact that the clergy derive their authorities from the Vatican
does not mean that the Pope bestows his own citizenship to
each priest. To allow the theory that all of the Churches
around the world would follow the citizenship of the Pope
would lead to the absurdity that each member of the Catholic
Church would be a citizen of the Vatican or of Italy. As such, it
cannot be said that the citizenship of the corporation sole, as
created under Philippine laws, is altered by the citizenship of
whoever is the incumbent head.

register these properties in its name in the Register of Deeds

of Davao.

The Corporation Law recognized that corporation soles

as those which are organized and composed of a single
individual for the administration of the properties not used
exclusively for religious worship of the church. The successor
in office will become the corporation on ascension to office.
Furthermore, the Corporation Law also recognized that the
corporation sole can purchase real property, although there
are restrictions as to the power to sell or mortgage
depending on the rules, regulations and discipline of the
church concerned. As such, the Court finds it absurd that the
corporation sole can purchase properties but would not be
able to register properties in its name.

Governor

While the Constitution prohibits foreigners from taking,

acquiring, exploiting or developing the natural resources of
the country, the Court finds that the provisions relating to
these are not applicable to corporation soles because they
are merely administrators of the properties titled in their
name. Furthermore, the administration of these properties is
for the benefit of the members of the congregation, which is
overwhelmingly comprised of Filipinos.

P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that

As the acquisition of the properties is for the benefit of

the congregation, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator
of Davao cannot be deprived of the right to acquire by
purchase or donation real properties for charitable,
benevolent and educational purposes, nor of the right to
5

US v. Ang Tang Ho, G.R. No. 17122, February 27, 1922

Facts: During a special session, the Philippine Legislature
passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing
the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said
act

under

extraordinary
General

to

circumstances

issue

the

authorizes

necessary

Rules

the
and

Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products.

Pursuant to this Act, the Governor General issued Executive
Order 53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and
illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of
eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that
prescribed by the Executive Order. He was charged in
violation of the said Executive Order and was found guilty as
charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a
there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor
General.
Issues: Whether or not there was an undue delegation of
power to the Governor General.
Discussions: By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only
to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact
laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected
by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to
the question here involved, the authority of the GovernorGeneral to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and

corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the

Legislature did not specify or define what was any cause,

organic law.

or what was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay

Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to

provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should
contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy
required to take the place of all others without the
determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to
matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that
could not be delegated, and without which the act could not
possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its
terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of
the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of
the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature,
so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in
presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or
event.
Ruling: Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the
violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which
constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no
crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature
left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say
what was and what was not any cause for enforcing the
act, and what was and what was not an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn, and under certain undefined
conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold,
without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a
proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or
not the law should be enforced, how long it should be
enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The
6

or corn, Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon

which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of
the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale
was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General
issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not
say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice,
and the defendant is charged with the sale of one ganta of
rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price
greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.
US v. Ang Tang Ho, G.R. No. 17122, February 27, 1922
FACTS:
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special
session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act
Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and
Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances,
authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary
Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such
products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued
Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20,
1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be
sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a
ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos.
The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the
EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August
8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO. He was
found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence

countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the

Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566.

Governor General.

2013

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the

Governor General.

November 19,

This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and

G.R. No. 209251.

HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed

The so-called pork barrel system has been around in

because he committed the act prior to the publication of the

the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly

EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime.

known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members

Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of

of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from

an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and

Congressional

the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.

Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the

Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act

wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use
as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others
without the determination of the insurance commissioner in
respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative
discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the
act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be
complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the
legislative branch of the government and nothing must be
left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or
delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it

Pork

Barrel

to

the

latest

Priority

pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations

Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done
in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken
down to P40 million for hard projects (infrastructure
projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million
for soft projects (scholarship grants, medical assistance,
livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100
million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;

is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to

take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of
any prescribed fact or event.
Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141

c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100

million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The

PDAF

articles

in

the

GAA

do

provide

for

realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may

request for the realignment of funds into their department
7

provided that the request for realignment is approved or

II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is

concurred by the legislator concerned.

constitutional.

Presidential Pork Barrel

HELD:

The president does have his own source of fund albeit

I.

No,

the

congressional

pork

barrel

system

is

not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork

unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the

barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds,

following principles:

from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been around since
1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived
from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since
about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It
regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The
executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this
includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged

executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel

by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers,

system, whats happening was that, after the GAA, itself a

headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the

law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to

corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by

which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a

Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in

clear act of implementing the law they enacted a violation

funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs

of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older

(non-government organizations) which would make it appear

case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel,

that government funds are being used in legit existing

then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund,

projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An audit

was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend

was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the

where their pork barrel funds go).

results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several
others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court
questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:

This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning

the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence
of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in

I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is

Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people

constitutional.

legislative power but only insofar as the processes of

referendum

and

initiative

are

concerned).

That

being,

being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is

legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it

approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which

cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the

he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the

Constitution.

president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the

appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA again,

Exceptions to the rule are:

(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but
this shall involve purely local matters;
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy
in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within
limits,

and

subject

to

such

limitations

and

restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and

export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties
or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the
individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF
money should go to is a violation of the rule on nondelegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate
funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses
comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual
members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state
that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual
member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is
the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he
may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already
9

effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the

President useless.

(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers

specified

Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which

d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to
manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development
Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs
and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF,
particularly on the part of the members of the house of
representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can
either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national
government (note, a congressman is a national officer)
meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is
contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on
local autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under
the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of
a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the
presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because
it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in

pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork
comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and
not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910,
which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as
amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter,
provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among
others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall
form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall
be used to further finance energy resource development and
for other purposes which the President may direct;

(Congressional Pork Barrel). However, it has also come to

refer to certain funds to the Executive. The Congressional
Pork Barrel can be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works Act of
1922), the Support for Local Development Projects during the
Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas
Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development
Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the
Priority Development Assistance Fund under the Joseph
Estrada administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal
Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III administrations.
The Presidential Pork Barrel questioned by the
petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential
Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special
fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by thenPresident Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and

(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a

consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration,

part of PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a General

exploitation,

Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in

resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social

government infrastructure projects.

Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983)

These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of

Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation
contemplated therein does not have to be a particular
appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the
case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

and

development

of

indigenous

energy

or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming

Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in
1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a
special funding facility managed and administered by the
Presidential Management Staff through which the President
provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects

BELGICA v. OCHOA

not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the

FACTS:

share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of

In the Philippines, the pork barrel (a term of

American-English origin) has been commonly referred to as
lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature
10

PAGCOR.
Over

the

years,

pork

funds

have

increased

tremendously. In 1996, an anonymous source later identified

as former Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge

2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are

sums of government money went into the pockets of

matters of policy subject to judicial review

legislators as kickbacks. In 2004, several citizens sought the

nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 General
Appropriations

Act

for

being

unconstitutional,

but

the

Supreme Court dismissed the petition. In July 2013, the

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into
allegations that the government has been defrauded of
some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using
funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various

3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue

4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court)
on Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez (Philconsa)
and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against
Monopoly

and

Poverty

v.

Secretary

of

Budget

Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of

constitutionality of the pork barrel system under the

government agencies for scores of ghost projects. The

principles of res judicata and stare decisis

investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-

B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel

blowers who declared that JLN Corporation JLN standing

for Janet Lim Napoles had swindled billions of pesos from
the public coffers for ghost projects using no fewer than 20
dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade.

WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional considering that
they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on

In August 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the

1.) separation of powers

results of a three-year audit investigation covering the use of

2.) non-delegability of legislative power

legislators PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three

(3) years of the Arroyo administration.
As for the Presidential Pork Barrel, whistle-blowers

3.) checks and balances

4.) accountability

alleged that [a]t least P900 Million from royalties in the

5.) political dynasties

operation of the Malampaya gas project intended for agrarian

6.) local autonomy

reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy [NGO].

C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel

ISSUES:

WON the phrases:

A. Procedural Issues
1.)

Whether

or

not

(WON)

the

issues

raised

in

the

consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable

controversy
11

and

(a) and for such other purposes as may be hereafter

directed by the President under Section 8 of PD 910 relating
to the Malampaya Funds, and

(b) to finance the priority infrastructure development

currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an

projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or

immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of

destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and

the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines

under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
relating to the Presidential Social Fund,
are

unconstitutional

insofar

as

As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the
issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic
by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes

they

constitute

undue

delegations of legislative power

moot when there is no more actual controversy between the

parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon
the merits. The respondents proposed line-item budgeting

HELD AND RATIO:

scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the

A. Procedural Issues

useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared

No question involving the constitutionality or validity of

towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article

a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the

which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally

Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for

effective and existing. Neither will the Presidents declaration

judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or

that he had already abolished the PDAF render the issues

controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the

on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of

person challenging the act must have the standing to

government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul

question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the

its legal existence.

question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest

opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.

Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless,

jurisprudence

dictates

that

the

moot

and

academic

principle is not a magical formula that can automatically

1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in

dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will decide

these cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is

cases, otherwise moot, if:

clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties

on the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Also, the
questions

in

these

consolidated

cases

are

ripe

for

adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions

allowing for their utilization such as the 2013 GAA for the
PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund are
12

i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This is clear

from

the

fundamental

posture

of

petitioners

they

essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with

respect to the principles of separation of powers, non-

delegability of legislative power, checks and balances,

compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to

accountability and local autonomy.

the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar,

ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and the

paramount public interest is involved: This is also apparent
from

the

nature

of

the

interests

involved

the

constitutionality of the very system within which significant

and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the
anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that
the government may be guided on how public funds should
be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.

amounts of public funds have been and continue to be

iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. This

utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of

is called for by the recognition that the preparation and

exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount

passage

public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been

imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The myriad of

lodged at a time when the systems flaws have never before

issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds

been magnified. To the Courts mind, the coalescence of the

are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are

CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and

capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial

the governments own recognition that reforms are needed

review.

to address the reported abuses of the PDAF demonstrates a

prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the
importance of the matter.

of

the

national

budget

is,

by

constitutional

2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork Barrel

System is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the
political branches of government but rather a legal one which

It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners

the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.

claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical.

Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional

Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings

lines is a task that the political branches of government are

made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated

incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of

audit arm of the government. if only for the purpose of

judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has

validating

justiciable

not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial

controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings

power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith

under the CoA Report to be sufficient.

(Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution).

iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation

3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the

of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the

instant cases. Petitioners have come before the Court in their

public: This is applicable largely due to the practical need for

respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly,

a definitive ruling on the systems constitutionality. There is a

assert that they dutifully contribute to the coffers of the

13

the

existence

of

an

actual

and

National Treasury. As taxpayers, they possess the requisite

cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the

standing to question the validity of the existing Pork Barrel

entire Pork Barrel System. Also, the ruling in LAMP is

System under which the taxes they pay have been and

essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality

continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from the

and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits. Thus, res judicata

unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules.

cannot apply.

Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there

is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.

On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar

to any attempt to re-litigate where the same questions
relating to the same event have been put forward by the
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided

by

competent

court.

Absent

any

powerful

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled

countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided

the standing requirement given that the issues they have

alike. Philconsa was a limited response to a separation of

raised may be classified as matters of transcendental

powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring

importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of

post-enactment

paramount public interest. The CoA Chairpersons statement

Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more

during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy

holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF

involves not [merely] a systems failure but a complete

and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of

breakdown of controls amplifies the seriousness of the

the entire Pork Barrel System as well as (b) the intra-

issues involved. Indeed, of greater import than the damage

relation of post-enactment measures contained within a

caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal

particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those

wound

related to the area of project identification but also to the

inflicted

upon

the

fundamental

law

by

the

enforcement of an invalid statute.

4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment
on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if,

identification

authority

to

Members

of

areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the

issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may
be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason
against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.

between the first and second actions, there exists an identity

In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa

of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. This

ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional

required identity is not attendant hereto since Philconsa and

inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full

LAMP involved constitutional challenges against the 1994

resort to stare decisis. Since the Court now benefits from

CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article respectively. However, the

hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA Report), it

14

must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar

therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also

as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of

points out that respondents have failed to substantiate their

Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely

position that the identification authority of legislators is only

recommendatory.

of recommendatory import.

Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural

technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine
susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in
these cases, stare decisis would not apply.

In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all

other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to
wield

B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel

any

form

of

post-enactment

authority

in

the

implementation or enforcement of the budget, the Court also

1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently

accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects
they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork
Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory
authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be

declared that informal practices, through which legislators

have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget
execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and,
hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.

construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second

2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-

paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators have also been

delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to

accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund

individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as

release (Special Provision 5 under the 2013 PDAF Article) and

settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power to

realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under

appropriate must be exercised only through legislation,

the 2013 PDAF Article).

pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another,

authorized to participate in the various operational aspects
of budgeting, including the evaluation of work and financial
plans for individual activities and the regulation and release
of funds, in violation of the separation of powers principle.
That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory
in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition

covers

any

role

in

the

implementation

or

enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must

15

which states: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury

except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. The
power of appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting
apart by law a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a
specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual
legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which
they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would
go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they

themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise

Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for

the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in

multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical

Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes

missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical

individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said

materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This

legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which

setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual

the Constitution does not, however, allow.

amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further

3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79
Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the
said amount would be further divided among individual

determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a

discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents
power of item veto.

legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum

The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the

allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively

CoA

appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As

obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in

these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators

more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds.

only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it

Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a line by line

means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not

budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project,

have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and

and per implementing agency.

thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of

lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting
system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget
which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the Presidents power of item veto. As
petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide
between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF
allocation without knowing the specific projects of the
legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the
detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even

without

its

post-enactment

legislative

identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain

constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79
16

Chairperson

relays,

limit[ed] state

auditors from

4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would

be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with postenactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on
activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very
same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that:

[A

Senator

or

Member

of

the

House

of

Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any

office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where
he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of
project implementation renders them susceptible to taking
undue advantage of their own office.

However, the Court cannot completely agree that the

same

post-enactment

authority

and/or

the

making equal the unequal (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of

individual

PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact

legislators control of his PDAF per se would allow him to

of office, without taking into account the specific interests

perpetrate himself in office. This is a matter which must be

and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a

analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case

result,

basis.

metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district

Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that

the close operational proximity between legislators and the

Executive department, through the formers post-enactment
participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this
matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not
strictly

concern

the

Pork

Barrel

Systems

intrinsic

5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is

considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase
as may be defined by law. In this respect, said provision
does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action. Therefore, since there appears
to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political
dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling
on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated
argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has
not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System
would be able to propagate political dynasties.
6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the
system which actually belies the avowed intention of
17

district

representative

of

highly-urbanized

representative of a far-flung rural province which would be

relatively underdeveloped compared to the former. To add,
what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and PartyList Representatives and in some years, even the VicePresident who do not represent any locality, receive funding
from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.

constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial

assessment.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator

control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs)
which

are

already

corresponding
economic

sanggunian

and

development

legally

social

efforts

mandated
in

setting
its

assist

the

the

direction

and

coordinating

territorial

jurisdiction.

development,
within

to

of

Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions

are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their
programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden
nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national
officers that have no law-making authority except only when
acting as a body.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel
YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue

delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down

development and exploitation programs and projects of the

a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of

government, remains legally effective and subsisting.

the Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for

which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the
said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and,
in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.

Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of

PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the
Presidential Social Fund may be used to [first,] finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due
to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the

That the subject phrase may be confined only to

Office of the President of the Philippines.

energy resource development and exploitation programs

and projects of the government under the principle of
ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is
to be construed to include or be restricted to things akin
to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first,
the phrase energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government states a singular
and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a
statutory reference of specific things from which the general
phrase for such other purposes may be limited; second, the
said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely
energy development programs of the government; and, third,
the Executive department has used the Malampaya Funds for
non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase,
thereby contradicting respondents own position that it is
limited

only

to

energy

resource

development

and

exploitation programs and projects of the government.

However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for
the use of the Malampaya Funds to finance energy resource
18

The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the

authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social
Fund

only

for

restoration

purposes

which

arise

from

calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives him

carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any
infrastructure project he may so determine as a priority.
Verily, the law does not supply a definition of priority
infrastructure development projects and hence, leaves the
President without any guideline to construe the same. To
note, the delimitation of a project as one of infrastructure is
too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain
to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase to finance the
priority

infrastructure

development

projects

must

be

stricken down as unconstitutional since similar to Section 8

of PD 910 it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient
standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all
other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.
BELGICA v. OCHOA SHORTER VERSION
I. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

A. Congressional Pork Barrel

1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently

WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional considering that
they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on
1.) separation of powers

accorded
projects

post-enactment
they

desire

to

authority
be

(a)

funded

to

identify

through

the

various

Congressional Pork Barrel allocations; (b) and in the areas of

fund release and realignment. Thus, legislators have been, in
one form or another, authorized to participate in the various
operational aspects of budgeting, violating the separation of

2.) non-delegability of legislative power

powers principle. That the said authority is treated as merely

3.) checks and balances

recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional

4.) accountability

tenor

5.) political dynasties

implementation

since

the
or

prohibition

covers

enforcement

of

any
the

role
law.

in

the

Informal

practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded

6.) local autonomy

into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed

B. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel

as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

WON the phrases:

excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same

(a) and for such other purposes as may be hereafter

directed by the President under Section 8 of PD 910 relating
to the Malampaya Funds, and
(b) to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines
under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
relating to the Presidential Social Fund,
are

unconstitutional

insofar

delegations of legislative power

* HELD AND RATIO:
A. Congressional Pork Barrel
19

as

they

constitute

undue

unconstitutional treatment.
2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of nondelegability since legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as
settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress.
3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79
Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit. Legislators
make intermediate appropriations of the PDAF only after the
GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law. Thus, actual
items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into
the General Appropriations Bill and are thus put into effect
without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/postenactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters
the creation of a budget within a budget which subverts
the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently

impairs the Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners

project implementation renders them susceptible to taking

aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a)

undue advantage of their own office.

accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without

knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or
may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b)
rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other
legislators with legitimate projects.
Even

without

its

post-enactment

legislative

constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79

Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for
multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical
missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical
materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This
setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents
power of item veto.
4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would
be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with postenactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on
activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very
same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides
[A

Senator

or

Member

of

the

House

of

Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any

office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where
he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of
20

the individual legislators control of his PDAF per se would

allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a matter
which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a
case-to-case basis.

identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain

that:

However, the same post-enactment authority and/or

Also, while it is possible that the close operational

proximity between legislators and the Executive department,
through the formers post-enactment participation, may
affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely
borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly
concern the Pork Barrel Systems intrinsic constitutionality. As
such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is
considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase
as may be defined by law. Therefore, since there appears
to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political
dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling
on this issue. In any event, the above-stated argument on
this score is largely speculative since it has not been properly
demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to
propagate political dynasties.
6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the
system which actually belies the avowed intention of
making equal the unequal. The gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office,
without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a

result,

district

representative

of

highly-urbanized

Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of

metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district

PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the

representative of a far-flung rural province which would be

Presidential Social Fund may be used to finance the priority

relatively underdeveloped compared to the former. To add,

infrastructure development projects. This gives him carte

what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-

blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure

List Representatives and in some years, even the Vice-

project he may so determine as a priority. The law does not

President who do not represent any locality, receive funding

supply a definition of priority infrastructure development

from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.

projects and hence, leaves the President without any

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator

control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs),
instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared
towards managing local affairs. The programs, policies and
resolutions of LDCs should not be overridden nor duplicated
by individual legislators, who are national officers that have
no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.

guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a

project as one of infrastructure is too broad of a
classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of
facility.

Thus,

the

phrase

to

finance

the

priority

infrastructure development projects must be stricken down

as unconstitutional since similar to Section 8 of PD 910 it
lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of
the delegating law.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.

C. Presidential Pork Barrel

YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the

83896, February 22, 1991

FACTS:

President under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue

Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio

delegation of legislative power as it does not lay down a

R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan

sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the

T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were

Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which

consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a

the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said

declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No.

phrase

284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.

gives

the

President

wide

latitude

to

use

the

Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and,

in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.

21

Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners

allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or

positions in addition to their primary positions. The pertinent

Issue:

Whether

provisions of EO 284 is as follows:

constitutional.
Decision:

Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant

No.

or
It

is

not

Executive

Order

unconstitutional.

No.

Petition

284

is

granted.

Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.

secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive

Ratio: In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of

Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not

Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. By

more than two positions in the government and government

restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,

corporations and receive the corresponding compensation

undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition

therefor.

their primary position to not more that two positions in the

Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is

required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess
position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in
rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two
positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such
corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary,
or assistant secretary.
The

petitioners

are

challenging

EO

284s

constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of

Article VII other than those provided in the constitution.

government and government corporations, EO 284 actually

allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution
must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those
particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art
VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
83896, February 22,

According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against

1991

holding any other office or employment in government are

FACTS:

those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice

President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet
under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice
is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued

Executive Order No.

284 which allowed members of the

Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to

hold other government offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil
Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law

22

is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being

holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in

challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds

the government, except in those cases specified in the

exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which

Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts

provides:

held

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members

of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure. They shall not,
during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special

without

additional

compensation

in

an

ex-officio

capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary

functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members
(then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and
deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive
officials should be considered as mere personal opinions
which cannot override the constitutions manifest intent and
the peoples understanding thereof.

privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in

agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-

relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,

owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They

EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number

shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their

of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or

office.

assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless

otherwise provided in this Constitution, the only exceptions
against

holding

any

other

office

or

employment

in

Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely:

(i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary

position to not more than 2 positions in the government and

government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to
hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention
of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar

GR No. 122156 Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),

pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation 50, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued shares of the Manila
Hotel (MHC). There were 2 bidders, Manila Prince Hotel Corp.
(a Filipino corp.) and Renong Berhad (a Malaysian firm).
Manila Princes bid was initially lower but it later on matched
the bid of Renong Berhad which GSIS refused to accept,
hence the petitioner came to court.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987
Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from
23

FACTS: (In order of chronological events)

1. The close bidding on September 18,1995 was participated
by:
a. Manila Prince, offered to buy 51% of MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58/share.
b. Renong Berhad, offered to buy the same # of shares at
P44.00/share. (ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator).
2. Pending declaration of the winning bidder, Manila Prince
sent a letter to GSIS to match the bid price of Renong
Berhad of P44.00/share.
3. In a subsequent letter, Manila Prince issued a Managers
Check amounting to P33,000,000.00 as bid security which
GSIS refused to accept.
4. Manila Prince, apprehensive that the bid will be awarded
to Renong Berhad, came to Court on prohibition and
mandamus.
5. The Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
enjoining respondents from consummating the sale to
Renong Berhad.
6. Manila Prince invoked Sec. 10, par. 2, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution:
The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the
economic and planning agency, when the national
interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or
to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum
of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such
higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain
areas of investments. The Congress shall enact
measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned
by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities.
24

7. Manila Prince submits that MHC has been identified with

the Filipino nation, a historical monument and landmark,
and a part of the national patrimony.
8. Respondents argued that Sec. 10 Art. XII is merely a
statement of principle and not a self-executing provision,
and granted it is, MHC does not fall under the term
national patrimony which refers to land of public domain,
water, minerals coal, etc. as cited in the 1 st & 2nd par. of
Sec.2 Art XII.
ISSUE(s):
1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art XII of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision and requires no
implementing legislation
2. Granted that provision is self-executing, whether or not
51% of shares of Manila Hotel Corporation falls under the
term national patrimony?
3. Whether or not respondent GSIS shall give preference to
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation over Malaysian firm
Renong Berhad after the former has matched the bid offer
of the latter
HOLDING:
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
(Filipino First Policy) stating in the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, is a self-executing provision. A constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. Above provision is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which

needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for

its enforcement.
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it
refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos. Manila Hotel is a living testimonial of Philippine
heritageits own historicity associated with our struggle for
sovereignty, independence and nationhood, thus forms part
of our nations patrimony. Also, since the acquisition of the
51% shares entails actual control and management of the
hotel thus 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the
hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
Respondent should give preference to Filipino
corporation Manila Prince Hotel over Malaysian firm
Renong Berhad. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of
the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos, the
mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the

25

highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. In the

instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in
a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question
that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of
the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a
foreign firm, the award should go to the Filipino.
VERDICT: Respondent is directed to cease and desist from
selling 51% of the shares of MHC to Renong Berhad, and to
accept matching bid of petitioner to purchase the subject
51% of the at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale.