CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

CASE DIGESTS
MIDTERMS
PART I. DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SUSANA NAPAT-A
LOSS OF EXHIBITS IS INCONSEQUENTIAL The
subsequent loss of exhibits (box and marijuana
leaves) did not affect the case for the trial court had
described the evidence in the records. In People vs
Mate, 103 SCRA 484, we ruled that "even without the
exhibits which have been incorporated into the
records of the case, the prosecution can still
establish the case because the witnesses properly
identified those exhibits and their testimonies are
recorded." Furthermore, in this case, appellant's
counsel had cross-examined the prosecution
witnesses who testified on those exhibits.
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO vs. THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the twin
elements of (1) the existence of the subject firearm
and ammunition, and (2) the fact that the accused
who possessed or owned the same
does not have the corresponding license for it.
The Court on several occasions ruled that either the
testimony of a representative of, or a certification
from, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms
and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a
licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the second element of possession
of illegal firearms. The prosecution more than
complied when it presented both.
Failure to offer an unlicensed firearm as evidence is
not fatal provided there is competent testimony as to
its existence.
We hasten to add that there may also be conviction
where an unlicensed firearm is presented during trial
but through inadvertence, negligence, or fortuitous
event (for example, if it is lost), it is not offered in
evidence, as long as there is competent testimony as
to its existence.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANSON ONG
For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper,
the following elements must be proved: (1) the
identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the
consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. What is material is the proof that
the transaction actually took place, coupled with the
presentation before the court of the corpus delicti.
In determining the credibility of prosecution
witnesses regarding the conduct of buybust
operation, the "objective test," as laid down in People
v. Doria, 28 is utilized. It has been held that it is the
duty of the prosecution to present a complete picture
detailing the buy-bust operation from the initial
contact between the poseurbuyer and the pusher,
the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration, until the consummation of the sale by
the delivery of the illegal subject of sale. The manner
by which the initial contact was made, the offer to
purchase the drug, the payment of the buy-bust
money, and the delivery of the illegal drug must be
the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to ensure that
law abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to
commit an offense.
In the case at bar, the evidence for the prosecution
failed to prove all the material details of the buy-bust
operation. The details of the meeting with the
informant, the alleged source of the information on
the sale of illegal drugs, appear hazy.

MICHAEL PADUA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Padua was charged and convicted for violation of
Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling
dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep.
Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug
trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation.
Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act
No. 9344, the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006" was violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32
of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule
on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" has application
in this case. Section 68 36 of Rep. Act No. 9344 and
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to
suspension of sentence and not probation.
Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section
38 37 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be
retroactively applied for petitioner's benefit. Section
38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child
under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense
charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence. Section 40
38 of Rep.
Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child
reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine
whether to discharge the child, order execution of
sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already
reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no
longer be considered a child 39 for purposes of
applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of
Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as
far as his case is concerned.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORBERTO
DEL MONTE y GAPAY @ OBET
At the outset, it must be stated that appellant raised
the police officers' alleged noncompliance with
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 for the first time
on appeal. This, he cannot do. It is too late in the day
for him to do so. In People v. Sta. Maria in which the
very same issue was raised, we ruled:
The law excuses non-compliance under
justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable
grounds may excuse the police officers involved in
the buy-bust operation in this case from complying
with Section 21 will remain unknown, because
appellant did not question during trial the
safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed,
the police officers' alleged violations of Sections 21
and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised
before the trial court but were instead raised for the
first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant
least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses
in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their
integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to
evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, he must so state in the form of
objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the
question for the first time on appeal. (Emphases
supplied.)
We would like to add that non-compliance with
Section 21 of said law, particularly the making of the
inventory and the photographing of the drugs
confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs
inadmissible in evidence.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal
sale of drugs are (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
All these elements have been shown in the instant
case. The prosecution clearly showed that the sale of
the drugs actually happened and that the shabu

subject of the sale was brought and identified in

court. The poseur buyer positively identified
appellant as the seller of the shabu. Per Chemistry
Report No. D-728-2002 of
Forensic Chemical Officer Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria, the
substance, weighing 0.290 gram, which was bought
by PO1 Tolentino from appellant in consideration of
P300.00, was examined and found to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARK DELA CRUZ
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal
sale of drugs are: (1) the identities of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
The corpus delicti should be identified with
unwavering exactitude. This Court believes that the
prosecution failed to clearly establish the chain of
custody of the seized plastic sachets containing
shabu from the time they were first allegedly
received until they were brought to the police
investigator.
As a general rule, the testimony of the police officers
who apprehended the accused is usually accorded
full faith and credit because of the presumption that
they have performed their duties regularly. However,
when the performance of their duties is tainted with
irregularities, such presumption is effectively
destroyed.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHILS., INC. (CCBPI) vs.
QUINTIN J. GOMEZ, a.k.a. "KIT" GOMEZ and
DANILO E. GALICIA, a.k.a. "DANNY GALICIA"
Is the hoarding of a competitor's product containers
punishable as unfair competition under the
Intellectual Property Code (IP Code, Republic Act No.
8293) that would entitle the aggrieved party to a
search warrant against the hoarder?
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
Articles 168.1 and 168.2 of the IP Code, provide the
concept and general rule on the definition of unfair
competition. The law does not thereby cover every
unfair act committed in the course of business; it
covers only acts characterized by "deception or any
other means contrary to good faith" in the passing
off of goods and services as those of another who
has established goodwill in relation with these goods
or services, or any other act calculated to produce
the same result.
From jurisprudence, unfair competition has been
defined as the passing off (or palming off) or
attempting to pass off upon the public the goods or
business of one person as the goods or business of
another with the end and probable effect of
deceiving the public. It formulated the "true test" of
unfair competition: whether the acts of defendant are
such as are calculated to deceive the ordinary buyer
making his purchases under the ordinary conditions
which prevail in the particular trade to which the
controversy relates. One of the essential requisites in
an action to restrain unfair competition is proof of
fraud; the intent to deceive must be shown before
the right to recover can exist. The advent of the IP
Code has not significantly changed these rulings as
they are fully in accord with what Section 168 of the
Code in its entirety provides. Deception, passing off
and fraud upon the public are still the key elements
that must be present for unfair competition to exist.
A first test that should be made when a question
arises on whether a matter is covered by the Code is
to ask if it refers to an intellectual property as
defined in the Code. If it does not, then coverage by
the Code may be negated. A second test, if a
disputed matter does not expressly refer to an
intellectual property right as defined above, is

whether it falls under the general "unfair

competition" concept and definition under Sections
168.1 and 168.2 of the Code.
The question then is whether there is "deception" or
any other similar act in "passing off" of goods or
services to be those of another who enjoys
established goodwill.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the RTC
correctly ruled that the petitioner's search warrant
should properly be quashed for the petitioner's
failure to show that the acts imputed to the
respondents do not violate the cited offense.
There could not have been any probable cause to
support the issuance of a search warrant because no
crime in the first place was effectively charged.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO vs. MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER,
LILY F. RAQUEO, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, MA. CRISTINA
A. ILUSORIO, AND AURORA I. MONTEMAYOR
There are thus four elements to be taken into
account "in determining whether there is a prima
facie case" of perjury, viz.:
(a) that the accused made a statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that
the statement or affidavit was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and
administer oath; (c) that in the statement or affidavit,
the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion
of a falsehood; and (d) that the sworn statement or
affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or
made for a legal purpose. (Citation omitted)
It is the deliberate making of untruthful statements
upon any material matter, however, before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath
in cases in which the law so requires, which is
imperative in perjury.
Venue, in criminal cases, being jurisdictional, the
action for perjury must be instituted and tried in the
municipality or territory where the deliberate making
of an untruthful statement upon any matter was
made, in this case, in Makati and Tagaytay.
It was in Makati and Tagaytay where the intent to
assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and
where the alleged untruthful statement finds
relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of
whether new owner's duplicate copies of the CCT and
TCTs may issue.
Whether the perjurious statements contained in the
four petitions were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is
immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being
the intentional giving of false statement.
NORGIE CRUZ y CASTRO vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
whereby ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in
the execution of their criminal plan. For the
successful prosecution of the illegal sale of shabu,
the following elements must be established: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the
sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and its payment. What is material is
the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti as evidence. Thus, the delivery of the
illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the
seller
of
the
marked
money
successfully
consummate the buy-bust transaction.
The failure of the poseur-buyer to testify on the
actual purchase is not fatal to the prosecution's
cause.
The failure to present the buy-bust money is likewise
not fatal. The marked money used in the buy-bust
operation
is
not
indispensable
but
merely
corroborative in nature. In the prosecution for the

sale of dangerous drugs, the absence of marked

money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for
the prosecution as long as the sale of dangerous
drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of
the transaction
is presented before the court. Neither law nor
jurisprudence requires the presentation of any
money used in the buy-bust operation. What is
material to a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The
prosecution duly established both in this case.
Settled is the rule that prior surveillance is not a
prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment
operation especially so if the buy-bust team is
accompanied by the informant, as in this case. The
police officers may decide that time is of the essence
and dispense with the need of prior surveillance. The
absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not
affect the legality of the buy-bust operation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUIZ GARCIA
Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR offers some
flexibility in complying with the express requirements
under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, i.e., "non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items." In Sanchez, we clarified
that this saving clause applies only where the
prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and
thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds. We
also stressed in Sanchez, that in such case, the
prosecution must show that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized have been
preserved.
These conditions were not met in the present case,
as the prosecution, in the first place, did not even
recognize the procedural lapses the police committed
in handling the seized items. Had the prosecution
done so, it would not have glossed over the
deficiencies and would have, at the very least,
submitted an explanation and proof showing that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
have been preserved.
In the present case, while PO1 Garcia duly testified
on the identity of the buyer and seller, on the
consideration that supported the transaction, and on
the manner the sale took place, the prosecution's
evidence failed to establish the chain that would
have shown that the marijuana presented in court
was the very item seized from Ruiz at the time of his
arrest.
Given the procedural lapses pointed out above,
serious uncertainty hangs over the identification of
the seized marijuana that the prosecution introduced
into evidence. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully
prove the elements of the crime charged, creating a
reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the
accused. As we pointed out in the opening statement
of our Ruling, this brings the case to a situation
where the defense does not even need to present
evidence as it has no viable case to meet. We need
not therefore discuss the specific defenses raised.
Nor do we need to discuss the lower courts'
misplaced reliance on the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties, except to state
that the presumption only arises in the absence of
contrary details in the case that raise doubt on the
regularity in the performance of official duties.
Where, as in the present case, the police officers
failed to comply with the standard procedures
prescribed by law, there is no occasion to apply the
presumption.

LIBERATA AMBITO, BASILIO AMBITO, and CRISANTO

AMBITO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT
OF APPEALS
The elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1)
making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply
on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3)subsequent dishonor of the
check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment.
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22
is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the nonpayment of an obligation
which the law punishes. Thus, the mere act of
issuing a worthless check whether as a deposit, as
a guarantee or even as evidence of preexisting debt
is malum prohibitum.
Under B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution must prove not
only that the accused issued a check that was
subsequently dishonored. It must also establish that
the accused was actually notified that the check was
dishonored, and that he or she failed,
within five (5) banking days from receipt of the
notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount
due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment.
Absent proof that the accused received such notice,
a prosecution for violation of the Bouncing Checks
Law cannot prosper.
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records that
would indicate that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito was
given any notice of dishonor by PSI or by Manila
Bank, the drawee bank, when the subject checks
were dishonored for insufficiency of funds upon
presentment for payment. In fact, all that the OSG
can aver regarding this matter is that co-petitioner
Basilio Ambito had been notified of the fact of
dishonor since PSI filed a collection case against
petitioners more than three (3) years before the
same filed the criminal cases before this Court.
While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state
that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in
conjunction, however with Section 3 of the law, i.e.,
"that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit
with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be
explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal,"
a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to
be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court
has previously held that both the spirit and letter of
the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to
be punished thereunder not only that the accused
issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise
the accused has actually been notified in writing of
the fact of dishonor.
There being no proof that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito
was given any written notice either by PSI or by
Manila Bank informing him of the fact that his checks
were dishonored and giving him five (5) banking days
within which to make arrangements for payment of
the said checks, the rebuttable presumption that he
had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds has
no application in the present case.
The elements of Estafa by means of deceit, whether
committed by false pretenses or concealment, are
the following (a) that there must be a false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means. (b)
That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of the fraud. (c)
That the offended party must have relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is,
he was induced to part with his money or property
because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or

fraudulent means. (d) That as a result thereof, the

offended party suffered damage.

that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of

the evidence are removed.

In the prosecution for Estafa under Article 315,

paragraph 2 (a) of the RPC, it is indispensable that
the element of deceit, consisting in the false
statement or fraudulent representation of the
accused, be made prior to, or at least simultaneously
with, the delivery of the thing by the complainant.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of

custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the
item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone
not in the chain to have possession of the same.

The false pretense or fraudulent act must be

committed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud, it being essential that such
false statement or representation constitutes the
very cause or the only motive which induces the
offended party to part with his money. In the absence
of such requisite, any subsequent act of the accused,
however fraudulent and suspicious it might appear,
cannot serve as basis for prosecution for estafa
under the said provision.
As borne by the records and the pleadings, it is
indubitable that petitioners' representations were
outright distortions of the truth perpetrated by them
for the sole purpose of inducing PSI to sell and
deliver to co-petitioner Basilio Ambito machineries
and equipments. Petitioners knew that no deposits
were ever made with RBBI and RBLI under the name
of PSI, as represented by the subject CCTDs, since
they did not intend to deposit any amount to pay for
the machineries. PSI was an innocent victim of
deceit, machinations and chicanery committed by
petitioners which resulted in its pecuniary damage
and, thus, confirming the lower courts' finding that
petitioners are guilty of the complex crime of Estafa
through Falsification of Commercial Documents.
The pronouncement by the appeals court that a
complex crime had been committed by petitioners is
proper because, whenever a person carries out on a
public, official or commercial document any of the
acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the
RPC as a necessary means to perpetrate another
crime, like Estafa, Theft, or Malversation, a complex
crime is formed by the two crimes.
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the RPC, the
elements of falsification of public documents through
an untruthful narration of facts are: (1) the offender
makes in a document untruthful statements in a
narration of facts; (2) the offender has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;
(3) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely
false; and (4) the perversion of truth in the narration
of facts was made with the wrongful intent to injure a
third person.
As earlier discussed, the issuance of the falsified
CCTDs for the sole purpose of obtaining or
purchasing various machinery and equipment from
PSI amounts to the criminal offense of Estafa under
Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC.
The petitioners
falsified the subject CCTDs, which are commercial
documents, to defraud PSI. Since the falsification of
the CCTDs was the necessary means for the
commission of Estafa, the assailed judgment of the
appeals court convicting petitioners of the complex
crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial
Documents is correct.
SUSAN SALES Y JIMENA vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, the existence of all dangerous drugs is a
sine qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is
the very corpus delicti of the crime of violation of the
said Act. It is thus essential that the prohibited drug
confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very
same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that
the identity of said drug be established with the
same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to
make a finding of guilt. The "chain of custody"
requirement performs this function in that it ensures

The Court finds that neither was physical inventory

nor photograph of the sachet and buy-bust money
taken in the presence of petitioner, or her
representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, as required by
law, was taken. No justification whatsoever was
proffered by the apprehending team for its failure to
observe the legal safeguards. In fine, the prosecution
failed to establish petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Her acquittal is thus in order.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL DIVISION OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN
To our mind, the repeated use of an alias within a
single day cannot be deemed "habitual", as it does
not amount to a customary practice or use. This
reason alone dictates the dismissal of the petition.
We agree, with the Sandiganbayan position that the
rule in the law of libel that mere communication to
a third person is publicity does not apply to
violations of CA No. 142. Our close reading of Ursua
particularly, the requirement that there be
intention by the user to be culpable and the historical
reasons we cited above tells us that the required
publicity in the use of alias is more than mere
communication to a third person; the use of the alias,
to be considered public, must be made openly, or in
an open manner or place, or to cause it to become
generally known. In order to be held liable for a
violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must
have held himself out as a person who shall publicly
be known under that other name. In other words, the
intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua
when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened
Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate
his intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose
Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua
were not part of the public who had no access to
Estrada's privacy and to the confidential matters that
transpired in Malacaang where he sat as President;
Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared
matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while
Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office
and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the
privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada
could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose
Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact
alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the
room at that time. The same holds true for Estrada's
alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez,
assuming the evidence for these representations to
be admissible. All of Estrada's representations to
these people were made in privacy and in secrecy,
with no iota of intention of publicity.
The nature, too, of the transaction on which the
indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable
expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act
related to the opening of a trust account a

transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely

confidential in nature.
We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under
R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are
statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy.
Given the private nature of Estrada's act of signing
the documents as "Jose Velarde" related to the
opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim
that there was already a public use of alias when
Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need
not even consider here the impact of the obligations
imposed by R.A. No. 1405 on the bank officers; what
is essentially significant is the privacy situation that
is necessarily implied in these kinds of transactions.
This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy
effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction
was done publicly or with the intent to use the alias
publicly.
In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we
simply looked at the totality of the circumstances
obtaining in Estrada's use of the alias "Jose Velarde"
vis--vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide here
whether Estrada's use of an alias when he occupied
the highest executive position in the land was valid
and legal; we simply determined, as the
Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made liable
for the offense charged based on the evidence the
People presented. As with any other accused, his
guilt must be based on the evidence and proof
beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of criminal
liability requires. If the People fails to discharge this
burden, as they did fail in this case, the rule of law
requires that we so declare. We do so now in this
review and accordingly find no reversible error of law
in the assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JASON SY
In dealing with prosecutions for the illegal sale of
drugs, what is material is proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated
drug as evidence. Jurisprudence has firmly
entrenched the following as elements in the crime of
illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold
and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2)
he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a
dangerous drug.
In the instant case, the Court finds that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses adequately
establish
these
elements.
The
trial
court's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses must be
accorded the highest respect, because it had the
advantage of observing their demeanor and was thus
in a better position to discern if they were telling the
truth or not. The Court has no reason to doubt the
assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility
of the prosecution and defense witnesses. The
testimony of the buy-bust team established than an
entrapment operation against accused-appellant was
legitimately and successfully carried out on 3
December 2000, where accused-appellant was
caught
selling
987.32265
grams
of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. A
scrutiny of the accounts of PO3 Ricardo Amontos,
PO2 Christian Trambulo and Senior Inspector Culili,
detailing how PO2 Trambulo negotiated, thru
cellphone, with accused-appellant on the purchase
price and the amount of shabu to be delivered,
actual delivery of the shabu, the giving to the
accused the marked and boodle money and the
subsequent arrest of the accused show that these
were testified to in a clear, straightforward manner.
Their testimonies are further bolstered by the
physical evidence consisting of the shabu presented
as evidence before the court.
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. The existence of the dangerous drug is a

condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal

sale of dangerous drugs. SPO2 Trambulo, the poseurbuyer, testified that upon confiscation of the box with
the shabu, he affixed his initials CVT and the date of
confiscation of the box. Thereafter, he placed the
evidence in his car until they reached the CIDG
office, whereupon he showed the same to P/Inspector
Culili and the evidence was inventoried as well. Culili
then instructed him to bring the evidence to the
crime laboratory for examination. When the duty
officer received the evidence at the crime laboratory,
Senior
Inspector
Maria
Luisa
Gundran-David
conducted the laboratory examination.
What is material is the delivery of the prohibited drug
to the buyer which, in this case, was sufficiently
proved by the prosecution through the testimony of
the poseur-buyer and the presentation of the article
itself before the court.
The Court finds no material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The fact
that Mana, Culili and Tupil were shown to have
committed abduction with extortion in the Go Lip Tse
case does not mean that they committed the same in
this operation, nor does it negate the fact that
accused-appellant did not commit the offense.
JUANITO R. RIMANDO vs. COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS AND NORMA O. MAGNO
In the case at bar, the cause of the confusion
appears to be the fact that the security guards who
were being charged with violation of the election gun
ban were bearing firearms within the immediate
vicinity of their place of work, but their place of work
happened to be a residential subdivision where they
were guarding the residences of private persons.
Indeed, this seeming conflict between the general
rule (which allows the bearing of arms within the
immediate vicinity of the security personnel's place
of work) and the exception (which states that prior
written approval from the COMELEC is necessary
when security personnel are guarding private
residences or offices) can be harmonized if we
interpret the exceptions as pertaining to instances
where the security personnel are outside the
immediate vicinity of their place of work or where the
boundaries of their place of work cannot be easily
determined. Applying this interpretation to the case
at bar, prior written approval from the COMELEC is
only required when a member of a security agency is
guarding private residences outside the immediate
vicinity of his place of work, or where the exact area
of his assignment is not readily determinable.
The confusion in the interpretation of this
proscription lies in the peculiar circumstances under
which security guards perform their duties. There are
security guards hired to escort individuals. Since they
are mobile, their place of work cannot be determined
with exactitude hence, the need for an authority from
the Comelec for them to carry their firearms. There
are also guards hired to secure the premises of
offices, or residences. And because these offices
adjoin other offices or that these residences adjoin
other houses, the actual place of work or its
immediate vicinity cannot be fixed with ease, there is
also a need for these guards to secure authority from
the Comelec. Lastly, there are guards assigned to
secure all the houses in a subdivision, or all offices in
one compound, or all factories within a complex, or
all stores within a mall. In this case, the place of work
of the guards therein detailed can be easily
determined by the visible boundaries. And because
the place of work can be determined, the Gun Ban
exemption is required only when the firearms are
brought outside said subdivision, or compound, or
complex, or mall.
From the provisions of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328,
one of the prohibited acts is for a member of a
privately owned or operated security agency to bear
firearms outside the immediate vicinity of his place
of work. Such prohibition shall not apply 1) when the

member of the security agency is in the actual

performance of his duty in the specific area of his
assignment with prior written authority from the
Commission, and 2) when such member is guarding
private residences, buildings or offices with prior
written authority from the Commission.
However, these two instances presuppose that the
member of the security agency was undertaking his
duties in such a manner that the boundaries of his
place of work cannot be determined with exactitude.

Petitioners have established neither an actual charge

nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372.
Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed
definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible.
The Court reminds litigants that judicial power
neither contemplates speculative counseling on a
statute's future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor
allows the courts to be used as an extension of a
failed legislative lobbying in Congress. WHEREFORE,
the petitions are DISMISSED.

Here, it is undisputed that security guards Carag and

Enaya were bearing licensed firearms while
performing their assigned task as guards inside the
subdivision, which was their place of work. That
being the case, there was no need to secure a
written authority from the COMELEC under Section
261 (s) of the Omnibus Election
Code. Hence, there was no violation at all of that
particular provision. We, thus, concur with petitioner
that he did not commit an election offense on
February 27, 2001, the day the shooting incident
happened within the premises of Sta. Rosa Homes at
Santa Rosa, Laguna.

ELENITA C. FAJARDO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

In dissecting how and when liability for illegal
possession of firearms attaches, the following
disquisitions in People v. De Gracia are instructive:
The rule is that ownership is not an essential
element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely
possession which includes not only actual physical
possession but also constructive possession or the
subjection of the thing to one's control and
management. This has to be so if the manifest intent
of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the
same perils to public security, which the law
penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a
prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To
accomplish the object of this law the proprietary
concept of the possession can have no bearing
whatsoever.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZENAIDA QUEBRAL y

MATEO, FERNANDO LOPEZ y AMBUS and MICHAEL
SALVADOR y JORNACION
The police officers had information that two men and
a woman on board an owner type jeep would arrive
in Balagtas and hand over a consignment of shabu at
a gas station in town to a known drug dealer whose
name was on the police watch list. When these
things unfolded before their eyes as they watched
from a distance, the police came down on those
persons and searched them, resulting in the
discovery and seizure of a quantity of shabu in their
possession. In such a case, the search is a valid
search justifying the arrest that came after it.
It would have been impractical for the police to apply
with the appropriate court for a search warrant since
their suspicion found factual support only at the
moment accused Eusebio Quebral, Fernando Lopez,
and Zenaida Quebral rendezvoused with Michael
Salvador at the Petron gas station for the handover
of the drugs. An immediate search was warranted
since they would have gone away by the time the
police could apply for a search warrant. The drugs
could be easily transported and concealed with
impunity.
This Court has ruled that the report of an official
forensic chemist regarding a recovered prohibited
drug enjoys the presumption of regularity in its
preparation. Corollarily, under Section 44 of Rule
130, Revised Rules of Court, entries in official records
made in the performance of official duty are prima
facie evidence of the facts they state. Therefore, the
report of Forensic Chemical Officer Sta. Maria that
the five plastic sachets PO3 Galvez gave to her for
examination contained shabu is conclusive in the
absence of evidence proving the contrary.
As the trial court correctly observed, the accusedappellants failed to provide any reason why of all the
people plying through the roads they had taken, the
police chose to frame them up for the crime. They
also failed to explain why the police would plant such
huge amount of shabu if a small quantity would be
sufficient to send them to jail. No arresting officer
would plant such quantity of shabu solely to
incriminate the accused who have not been shown to
be of good financial standing.
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK,
INC. vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372),
"An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People
from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human
Security Act of 2007, 1 signed into law on March 6,
2007.

But is the mere fact of physical or

constructive possession sufficient to convict a person
for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be
an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the
law? This query assumes significance since the
offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum
prohibitum punished by a special law, in which case
good faith and absence of criminal intent are not
valid defenses.
When the crime is punished by a special
law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not
necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the
intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special
law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to
perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person
may not have consciously intended to commit a
crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that
act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In
the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be
criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate
the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done
freely and consciously.
In the present case, a distinction should be made
between criminal intent and intent to possess. While
mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient
to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm,
it must still be shown that there was animus
possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the
accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without
regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which
the accused may have harbored in possessing the
firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of
the accused to commit an offense with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. This is not important in
convicting a person under Presidential Decree No.
1866.
Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a
violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the
accused had no authority or license to possess a
firearm, and that he intended to possess the same,
even if such possession was made in good faith and
without criminal intent. Concomitantly, a temporary,
incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control
of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a
statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of
weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus,
although there is physical or constructive possession,
for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there
is no offense committed.

Certainly, illegal possession of firearms, or, in this

case, part of a firearm, is committed when the holder
thereof:
(1) possesses a firearm or a part thereof;
(2) lacks the authority or license to possess the
firearm.
We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor
constructive possession of the subject receivers. The
testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only
saw Valerio on top of the house when the receivers
were thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner
holding the receivers, before or during their disposal.
At the very least, petitioner's possession of the
receivers was merely incidental because Valerio, the
one in actual physical possession, was seen at the
rooftop of petitioner's house. Absent any evidence
pointing to petitioner's participation, knowledge or
consent in Valerio's actions, she cannot be held liable
for illegal possession of the receivers. Petitioner's
apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a
firearm can only proceed from the assumption that
one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen
tucked in the waistband of her shorts earlier that
night. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to
convert such assumption into concrete evidence.
The gun allegedly seen tucked in petitioner's
waistband was not identified with sufficient
particularity; as such, it is impossible to match the
same with any of the seized receivers. Moreover,
SPO1 Tan categorically stated that he saw Valerio
holding two guns when he and the rest of the PISOG
arrived in petitioner's house. It is not unlikely then
that the receivers later on discarded were
components of the two (2) pistols seen with Valerio.
These findings also debunk the allegation in the
information that petitioner conspired with Valerio in
committing illegal possession of part of a firearm.
There is no evidence indubitably proving that
petitioner participated in the decision to commit the
criminal act committed by Valerio.
In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must
be shown to exist: (a) the existence of the subject
firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who
possessed
the
same
does
not
have
the
corresponding license for it.
By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal
possession of part of a firearm must yield these
requisites:
(a) the existence of the part of the firearm; and
(b) the accused who possessed the same does not
have the license for the firearm to which the seized
part/component corresponds.
In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt the elements of the crime. The
subject receivers one with the markings "United
States Property" and the other bearing Serial No.
763025 were duly presented to the court as
Exhibits E and E-1, respectively. They were also
identified by SPO2 Nava as the firearm parts he
retrieved after Valerio discarded them. His testimony
was corroborated by DYKR radio announcer Vega,
who witnessed the recovery of the receivers. Anent
the lack of authority, SPO1 Tan testified that, upon
verification, it was ascertained that Valerio is not a
duly licensed/registered firearm holder of any type,
kind, or caliber of firearms. To substantiate his
statement, he submitted a certification to that effect
and identified the same in court. The testimony of
SPO1 Tan, or the certification, would suffice to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the second element.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LUIS PAJARIN y DELA
CRUZ and EFREN PALLAYA y TUVIERA
The Court has held in numerous cases that the failure
of the police to comply with the procedure laid down
in R.A. 9165 would not render void the seizure of the
prohibited substance for as long as the apprehending
officers give justifiable reason for their imperfect
conduct and show that the integrity and evidentiary

value of the
compromised.

confiscated

items

had

not

been

Here, the prosecution failed to show that the

substances allegedly seized from the accused were
the same substances presented in court to prove
their guilt. Usually, the seized article changes hands
from the police officer who takes it from the accused,
to the supervising officer at their station, to the
messenger who brings them to the police crime
laboratory, and then to the court where it is adduced
as evidence. Since custody and possession change
over time, it has been held indispensable that the
officer who seized the article places it in a plastic
container unless it is already in one, seals it if yet
unsealed, and puts his marking on the cover. In this
way there is assurance, upon inspection, that the
substance reaches the laboratory in the same
condition it was seized from the accused.
Here, the police officers did not mark the sealed
plastic sachets to show that they were the same
things they took from the accused. Rather, the
marking on the items were done by the station
investigator who would have no way of knowing that
the substances were really seized from the accused.
The marking of captured items immediately after
they are seized from the accused is the starting point
in the custodial link. This step is vital because
succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the
markings as reference. Failure to place such
markings paves the way for swapping, planting, and
contamination of the evidence. These lapses
seriously cast doubt on the authenticity of the corpus
delicti, warranting acquittal on reasonable doubt.
Further, as a rule, the police chemist who examines a
seized substance should ordinarily testify that he
received the seized article as marked, properly
sealed and intact; that he resealed it after
examination of the content; and that he placed his
own marking on the same to ensure that it could not
be tampered pending trial. In case the parties
stipulate to dispense with the attendance of the
police chemist, they should stipulate that the latter
would have testified that he took the precautionary
steps mentioned. Here, the record fails to show this.
ROSALIO S. GALEOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Petitioners were charged with falsification of public
document under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, which states: Art.
171. Falsification by public officer, employee or
notary or ecclesiastic minister. The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee,
or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any
of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting,
signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when they did
not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an
act or proceeding statements other than those in fact
made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts
The elements of falsification in the above provision
are as follows:
(a) the offender makes in a public document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of
the facts narrated by him;
(c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.
In addition to the afore-cited elements, it must also
be proven that the public officer or employee had
taken advantage of his official position in making the
falsification. In falsification of public document, the
offender is considered to have taken advantage of
his official position when (1) he has the duty to make

or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the

preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official
custody of the document which he falsifies. Likewise,
in falsification of public or official documents, it is not
necessary that there be present the idea of gain or
the intent to injure a third person because in the
falsification of a public document, what is punished is
the violation of the public faith and the destruction of
the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.
All the elements of falsification of public documents
by making untruthful statements have been
established
by
the
prosecution.
Statements
concerning relationship may be proved as to its truth
or falsity, and thus do not amount to expression of
opinion. When a government employee is required to
disclose his relatives in the government service, such
information elicited therefore qualifies as a narration
of facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
As chief executive and the proper appointing
authority, Ong is deemed to have issued the
certification recommending to the CSC approval of
Galeos' appointment although he admitted only the
authenticity and due execution of Exhibit "I". Since
Ong was duty bound to observe the prohibition on
nepotistic appointments, his certification stating
compliance with Section 79 41 of R.A. No. 7160
constitutes a solemn affirmation of the fact that the
appointee is not related to him within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity. Having executed
the certification despite his knowledge that he and
Rivera were related to each other within the fourth
degree of affinity, as in fact Rivera was his cousin-inlaw because the mother of Rivera's wife is the sister
of Ong's mother, Ong was guilty of falsification of
public document by making untruthful statement in a
narration of facts. He also took advantage of his
official position as the appointing authority who,
under the Civil Service rules, is required to issue such
certification.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL PALOMA y
ESPINOSA
To prove the crime of illegal sale of drugs under
Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, the prosecution is
required to prove (a) the identity of the buyer and
the seller as well as the object and consideration of
the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment given for the same. Further, the
prosecution must present in court evidence of corpus
delicti.
Under the "objective" test set by the Court in People
v. Doria, the prosecution must clearly and adequately
show the details of the purported sale, namely, the
initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the
pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or
payment of the consideration, and, finally, the
accused's delivery of the illegal drug to the buyer,
whether the latter be the informant alone or the
police officer. This proof is essential to ensure that
law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to
commit the offense.
Here, PO2 Amigo's testimony miserably failed to
establish the required details of the supposed illegal
drug sale.
While law enforcers enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties, this
presumption is disputable by contrary proof and
cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the
accused to be presumed innocent. The totality of the
evidence presented in this case does not support
Paloma's conviction for violation of Section 5, Article
II of R.A. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the
offense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO
BACUS ALCUIZAR

The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case,

constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and
in sustaining a conviction under Republic Act No.
9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti
must definitely be shown to have been preserved.
This requirement necessarily arises from the illegal
drug's unique characteristic that renders it indistinct,
not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering,
alteration or substitution either by accident or
otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty
on the identity and integrity of the seized drug,
evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug
presented in court is the same illegal drug actually
recovered from the accused-appellant; otherwise, the
prosecution for possession under Republic Act No.
9165 fails.
The chain of custody rule requires that the marking
of the seized items should be done in the presence of
the apprehended violator and immediately upon
confiscation to ensure that they are the same items
that enter the chain and are eventually the ones
offered in evidence.
SPO1 Agadier admitted that he only marked the
seized items at the police station. While the rule
allows marking of evidence to be done in the nearest
police station, this contemplates a case of
warrantless searches and seizures. In this case, the
police officers were able to secure a search warrant
prior to their operation. SPO1 Agadier did not offer an
explanation or a justification on why he did not
immediately mark the plastic packs of shabu seized
inside appellant's house notwithstanding that an
inventory receipt was even prepared while the police
officers were still inside the house of appellant. They
were given sufficient time and opportunity to prepare
for its implementation. Thus, failure to comply with
the marking of evidence immediately after
confiscation constitutes a first gap in the chain of
custody. Also, failure of the police officers to mark
the dangerous drugs immediately after their seizure
and the vague recollection of SPO1 Agadier
concerning the custody of the drugs from the
residence of appellant up to the time it was
submitted to the crime laboratory constitute a huge
and significant gap in the chain of custody which
substantially affects the identity of the corpus delicti.
To successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession
of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be
established: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the said drug.
The Court of Appeals ruled that appellant is
presumed to have been in possession of the
prohibited drugs when they were found in his house.
While this presumption may be true, it is certainly
not conclusive and may be rebutted by contrary
evidence. It is worthy to reiterate that this Court
entertains serious doubts as to whether the
prohibited drugs were indeed found in appellant's
house considering that there were no other witnesses
presented to prove it. And it is by the same doubt
that constrains this Court to acquit appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO S.
DELOS REYES, alias "Botong," and RAYMUNDO G.
REYES, alias "Mac-Mac"
In the instant case, SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and
PO3 Yumul uniformly testified before the RTC that
they brought the arrested suspects to the police
office for investigation. SPO1 Lectura and PO3
Santiago were vague as to how they ascertained as
shabu the contents of the box inside the white plastic
bag, immediately after seizing the same from
accused-appellant Reyes and before proceeding to
the police office; while PO3 Yumul explicitly testified
on cross- examination that he saw the shabu for the
first time at the police office. At any rate, all three
police officers recounted that the shabu was marked

by SPO1 Benjamin David only at the police office.

Without valid justification for the in flagrante delicto
arrests of accused-appellants, the search of accusedappellants' persons incidental to said arrests, and the
eventual seizure of the shabu from accusedappellants' possession, are also considered unlawful
and, thus, the seized shabu is excluded in evidence
as fruit of a poisonous tree. Without the corpus delicti
for the crime charged, then the acquittal of accusedappellants is inevitable.
All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the
arresting team cannot simply validate, much more
cure, the illegality of the arrest and consequent
warrantless search of accused-appellant. Neither can
the presumption of regularity of performance of
function be invoked by an officer in aid of the process
when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of
rights secured by the Constitution.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming
accused-appellant's conviction because, first, the
presumption is precisely just that a mere
presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this
case, . . . [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth.
Second, the presumption of regularity in the
performance
of
official
functions
cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence
that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCOS
SABADLAB y NARCISO
In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to prove
his allegation of denial and frame-up by strong and
convincing evidence. He, in fact, presented no
evidence to prove the same, and instead relied on
the alleged irregularity in the buy-bust operation
brought about by the inexact name mentioned in the
Pre-operation Report from the Makati Police Station
and the Certificate of Coordination from the PDEA. On
this matter, the accused-appellant argued that the
buy-bust operation was illegal as it was made without
a close coordination with PDEA.
As this Court held in People v. Berdadero, the Internal
Rules and Regulations, "is silent as to the
consequences of the failure on the part of the law
enforcers to seek the authority of the PDEA prior to
conducting a buy-bust operation . . . . [T]his silence
cannot be interpreted as a legislative intent to make
an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal or
evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest
inadmissible." In the case at bar, even if we assume
for the sake of argument that Narciso Sabadlab and
accused-appellant Marcos Sabadlab y Narciso alias
Bong Pango could have been different persons, the
established fact remains that it was accusedappellant who was caught in flagrante delicto by the
buy-bust team. Following the aforementioned
jurisprudence, even the lack of participation of PDEA
would not make accused-appellant's arrest illegal or
the evidence obtained pursuant thereto inadmissible.
Neither is prior surveillance a necessity for the
validity of the buy-bust operation.
ROGELIO S. REYES vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
The burden rests in the Prosecution to see to it that
the evidence of guilt satisfies the standard of moral
certainty demanded in all criminal prosecutions. The
standard demands that all the essential elements of
the offense are established as to leave no room for
any doubt about the guilt of the accused. The courts
should unfailingly impose the standard in order to
prevent injustice from being perpetrated against the
accused.
Guided by the standard, we acquit petitioner.
This appeal involves two distinct drug-related
offenses, namely: illegal sale of dangerous drugs,

and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The

successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs requires: (a) proof that the transaction or sale
took place, and (b) the presentation in court as
evidence of the corpus delicti, or the dangerous
drugs themselves. On the other hand, the
prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs
necessitates the following facts to be proved,
namely: (a) the accused was in possession of
dangerous drugs, (b) such possession was not
authorized by law, and (c) the accused was freely
and consciously aware of being in possession of
dangerous drugs. For both offenses, it is crucial that
the Prosecution establishes the identity of the seized
dangerous drugs in a way that the integrity thereof
has been well preserved from the time of seizure or
confiscation from the accused until the time of
presentation as evidence in court. Nothing less than
a faithful compliance with this duty is demanded of
all law enforcers arresting drug pushers and drug
possessors and confiscating and seizing the
dangerous drugs and substances from them.
Here, the Prosecution failed to demonstrate a faithful
compliance by the arresting lawmen of the rule on
chain of custody. To start with, the fact that the
dangerous drugs were inventoried and photographed
at the site of arrest upon seizure in the presence of
petitioner, a representative of the media, a
representative of the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official, was not shown. As
such, the arresting lawmen did not at all comply with
the further requirement to have the attending
representative of the media, representative of the
DOJ, and elected public official sign the inventory and
be furnished a copy each of the inventory. Instead,
the records show that PO2 Payumo placed the
markings of "RRS-1" on the sachet allegedly received
from petitioner and "RRS-2" on the two sachets
allegedly seized from petitioner's hand already at the
police station with only petitioner present. Yet, the
Prosecution did not also present any witness to
establish that an inventory of the seized articles at
least signed by petitioner at that point was prepared.
We clarified in People v. Sanchez that in compliance
with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, supra, the physical
inventory and photographing of the seized articles
should be conducted, if practicable, at the place of
seizure or confiscation in cases of warrantless
seizure. But that was true only if there were
indications that petitioner tried to escape or resisted
arrest, which might provide the reason why the
arresting team was not able to do the inventory or
photographing at petitioner's house; otherwise, the
physical inventory and photographing must always
be immediately executed at the place of seizure or
confiscation.
In People v. Pringas, the non-compliance by the buybust team with Section 21, supra, was held not to be
fatal for as long as there was justifiable ground for it,
and for as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the confiscated or seized articles were
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or
team. The Court further pronounced therein that
such non-compliance would not render an accused's
arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from
him inadmissible, for what was of utmost importance
was the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized or confiscated
articles, considering that they were to be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
However, the omissions noted herein indicated that
the State did not establish the identity of the
dangerous drugs allegedly seized from petitioner
with the same exacting certitude required for a
finding of guilt.
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO vs. HON. EPHREM S.
ABANDO
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by
elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the

Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay

Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte. The mass grave
contained skeletal remains of individuals believed to
be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease"
(Operation VD) launched by members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's
Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected
military informers.
Issue: Whether the murder charges against
petitioners should be dismissed under the political
offense doctrine
The political offense doctrine is not a ground to
dismiss the charge against petitioners prior to a
determination by the trial court that the murders
were committed in furtherance of rebellion.
Under the political offense doctrine, "common
crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political
offense, are divested of their character as "common"
offenses and assume the political complexion of the
main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,
consequently, cannot be punished separately from
the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to
justify the imposition of a graver penalty."
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being
absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus, when a
killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the
killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing
assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its
mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and
punished as rebellion alone.
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors
are obliged to consistently charge respondents with
simple rebellion instead of common crimes. No one
disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal
procedure that the institution of criminal charges,
including whom and what to charge, is addressed to
the sound discretion of the public prosecutor. But
when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a
defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the
court to determine whether the act of killing was
done in furtherance of a political end, and for the
political motive of the act to be conclusively
demonstrated.
We had already ruled that the burden of
demonstrating
political
motivation
must
be
discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of
mind which only the accused knows. The proof
showing political motivation is adduced during trial
where the accused is assured an opportunity to
present evidence supporting his defense. It is not for
this Court to determine this factual matter in the
instant petitions.
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against
petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the
trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the
filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long
as petitioners would not be placed in double
jeopardy.
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the
crime of rebellion, as defined and penalized under
Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944
was filed before the RTC Makati against petitioners
and several others. However, petitioners were never
arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944. Even before
the indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC
Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad had
already filed a petition before this Court to seek the
nullification of the Orders of the DOJ denying their
motion for the inhibition of the members of the
prosecution panel due to lack of impartiality and
independence. When the indictment was filed,
petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad filed
supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 06-944. We eventually ordered the

dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a

first jeopardy never had a chance to attach.
CRISTE B. VILLANUEVA vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE and HORST-KESSLER VON SPRENGEISEN
The pivotal issue in this case is factual whether or
not, based on the records, there was probable cause
for the private respondent's indictment for perjury.
Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a
falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by
authority of law on a material matter. The elements
of the felony are: (a) That the accused made a
statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a
material matter. (b)
That the statement or affidavit was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and
administer oath. (c) That in that statement or
affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood. (d) That the sworn
statement or affidavit containing the falsity is
required by law or made for a legal purpose. A mere
assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not
enough. The assertion must be deliberate and willful.
Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must be malice
on the part of the accused. Willfully means
intentionally; with evil intent and legal malice, with
the consciousness that the alleged perjurious
statement is false with the intent that it should be
received as a statement of what was true in fact. It is
equivalent to "knowingly." "Deliberately" implies
meditated as distinguished from inadvertent acts. It
must appear that the accused knows his statement
to be false or as consciously ignorant of its truth.
Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according
to belief or conviction as to its truth. A false
statement of a belief is not perjury. Bona fide belief in
the truth of a statement is an adequate defense. A
false statement which is obviously the result of an
honest mistake is not perjury.
There are two essential elements of proof for perjury:
(1) the statement made by the defendants must be
proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the
defendant did not believe those statements to be
true. Knowledge by the accused of the falsity of his
statement is an internal act. It may be proved by his
admissions or by circumstantial evidence. The state
of mind of the accused may be determined by the
things he says and does, from proof of a motive to lie
and of the objective falsity itself, and from other facts
tending to show that the accused really knew the
things he claimed not to know. A conviction for
perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the
contradictory sworn statements of the accused. The
prosecution must prove which of the two statements
is false and must show the statement to be false by
other evidence than the contradicting statement.
URBANO M. MORENO vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and NORMA L. MEJES
Norma L. Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno
from running for Punong Barangay on the ground
that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the
crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1)
Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar
on August 27, 1998. Moreno filed an answer averring
that the petition states no cause of action because
he was already granted probation.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order
placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but
is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of
sentence. We held that the grant of probation to
petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal
penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory
penalties of suspension from public office and from
the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage. Applying this doctrine to the instant case,
the accessory penalties of suspension from public
office, from the right to follow a profession or calling,

and that of perpetual special disqualification from the

right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were
similarly suspended upon the grant of probation. It
appears then that during the period of probation, the
probationer is not even disqualified from running for
a public office because the accessory penalty of
suspension from public office is put on hold for the
duration of the probation.
We agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should
be construed as an exception to the Local
Government Code. While the Local Government Code
is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of local elective officials, the
Probation Law is a special legislation which applies
only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory
construction that a later statute, general in its terms
and not expressly repealing a prior special statute,
will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such
earlier statute.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
ANTIMONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL vs. GLASGOW
CREDIT AND COLLECTION SERVICES, INC. and
CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK, INC.
On July 18, 2003, the Republic filed a complaint in
the RTC Manila for civil forfeiture of assets (with
urgent plea for issuance of temporary restraining
order [TRO] and/or writ of preliminary injunction)
against the bank deposits in account number CA-00510-000121-5 maintained by Glasgow in CSBI.
The petition essentially presents the following issue:
whether the complaint for civil forfeiture was
correctly dismissed on grounds of improper venue,
insufficiency in form and substance and failure to
prosecute.
Under Section 3, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in
Cases of Civil Forfeiture, therefore, the venue of civil
forfeiture cases is any RTC of the judicial region
where the monetary instrument, property or
proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an
unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense
are located. Pasig City, where the account sought to
be forfeited in this case is situated, is within the
National Capital Judicial Region (NCJR). Clearly, the
complaint for civil forfeiture of the account may be
filed in any RTC of the NCJR. Since the RTC Manila is
one of the
RTCs of the NCJR, it was a proper venue of the
Republic's complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgow's
account.
Whether or not there is truth in the allegation that
account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 contains the
proceeds of unlawful activities is an evidentiary
matter that may be proven during trial. The
complaint, however, did not even have to show or
allege that Glasgow had been implicated in a
conviction for, or the commission of, the unlawful
activities of estafa and violation of the Securities
Regulation Code. A criminal conviction for an
unlawful activity is not a prerequisite for the
institution of a civil forfeiture proceeding. Stated
otherwise, a finding of guilt for an unlawful activity is
not an essential element of civil forfeiture. Thus,
regardless of the absence, pendency or outcome of a
criminal prosecution for the unlawful activity or for
money laundering, an action for civil forfeiture may
be separately and independently prosecuted and
resolved.
While there was admittedly a delay in the
proceeding, it could not be entirely or primarily
ascribed
to
the
Republic.
That
Glasgow's
whereabouts could not be ascertained was not only
beyond the Republic's control, it was also attributable
to Glasgow which left its principal office address
without informing the Securities and Exchange
Commission or any official regulatory body (like the
Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Department of

Trade and Industry) of its new address. Moreover, as

early as October 8, 2003, the Republic was already
seeking leave of court to serve summons by
publication. We see no pattern or scheme on the part
of the Republic to delay the disposition of the case or
a wanton failure to observe the mandatory
requirement of the rules. The trial court should not
have so eagerly wielded its power to dismiss the
Republic's complaint.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, this Court declared
that the rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are
actions in rem. While that case involved forfeiture
proceedings under RA 1379, the same principle
applies in cases for civil forfeiture under RA 9160, as
amended, since both cases do not terminate in the
imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of
the properties either acquired illegally or related to
unlawful activities in favor of the State.
As an action in rem, it is a proceeding against the
thing itself instead of against the person. In actions
in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is not a prerequisite to conferring
jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless,
summons must be served upon the defendant in
order to satisfy the requirements of due process. For
this purpose, service may be made by publication as
such mode of service is allowed in actions in rem and
quasi in rem. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED.
ANGEL CELINO, SR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU
The accused can be convicted of illegal possession of
firearms, provided no other crime was committed by
the person arrested. The word "committed" taken in
its ordinary sense, and in light of the Constitutional
presumption of innocence, necessarily implies a prior
determination of guilt by final conviction resulting
from successful prosecution or voluntary admission.
In the present case, however, petitioner has only
been accused of committing a violation of the
COMELEC gun ban. As accusation is not synonymous
with guilt, there is yet no showing that petitioner did
in fact commit the other crime charged.
In sum, when the other offense involved is one of
those enumerated under R.A. 8294, any information
for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed
because the illegal possession of firearm would have
to be tried together with such other offense, either
considered as an aggravating circumstance in
murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of
rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup
d'etat. Conversely, when the other offense involved
is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294,
then the separate case for illegal possession of
firearm should continue to be prosecuted.
PART II.
LAUREL VS DESIERTO
The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman directed
petitioner, Chairman of the National Centennial
Commission (NCC), to submit his counter affidavit on
the charges of anomalies found by the Senate Blue
Ribbon and Saguisag Committees. The Blue Ribbon
Committee recommended his prosecution for
violation of the rules on public bidding on the award
of centennial contracts and manifest bias in the
issuance of the Notice to Proceed in the absence of a
valid contract, while the Saguisag Committee
recommended the further investigation of petitioner
for violations of Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019, Section
4 (a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. 6713, and
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner
moved to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction
claiming that he is not a public officer and that NCC
is a private organization. The motion was denied by
the Ombudsman, hence, the instant recourse.

The NCC was created under Administrative

Order No. 223 and Executive Order No. 128 to ensure
a more coordinated and synchronized celebrations of
the Philippine Centennial and wider participation
from the government and nongovernment or private
organizations. It aims to implement the state policies
on the promotion of the nation's historical and
cultural heritage and resources. It is thus a public
office performing executive functions. Thus, the
Chairman of this Committee is a public officer who
may be investigated by the Office of the
Ombudsman.
A definition of public officers cited in
jurisprudence is that provided by Mechem, a
recognized authority on the subject: A public office is
the right, authority and duty, created and conferred
by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
power, an individual is invested with some portion of
the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The
individual so invested is a public officer.
In the Court's decision in Uy, we held that "it
is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the
authority to file the corresponding information/s
against petitioner in the regional trial court. The
Ombudsman exercise prosecutorial powers only in
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan." The
foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived.
Upon motion for clarification by the Ombudsman in
the same case, the Court set aside the foregoing
pronouncement in its Resolution dated March 20,
2001. The Court explained the rationale for this
reversal. The power to investigate and to prosecute
granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any
public officer or employee when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
The law does not make a distinction between cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those
cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that
the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public
official" is broad enough to embrace any crime
committed by a public officer or employee.
HANNAH EUNICE SERANA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government
scholar ** accused, along with her
brother, of swindling government funds?
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
offense of estafa. Section 4 (B) of P.D. No. 1606
reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple
or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
Evidently,
the
Sandiganbayan
has
jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public
officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible
or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the
offenses included in Section 4 (B) of P.D. No. 1606.
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The
jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements
that (a) the offense is committed by public officials
and employees mentioned in Section 4 (A) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is
committed in relation to their office.
Petitioner UP student regent is a public
officer. Petitioner contends that she is not a public
officer. She does not receive any salary or
remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the
first or likely the last time that we will be called upon
to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down
the definition of a public officer. 39 The 1987
Constitution does not define who are public officers.
Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found
in different statutes and jurisprudence.
Petitioner claims that she is not a public
officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular
tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of

merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines

the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
officers enumerated in P.D. No.1606. In Geduspan v.
People, 43 We held that while the first part of Section
4 (A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and
higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of
Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the
said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express
provision of law.
Section 4 (A) (1) (g) of P.D. No. 1606
explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction
over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government owned or controlled corporations, state
universities
or
educational
institutions
or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As
the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs
functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a
non-stock corporation. 45 By express mandate of
law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606. Moreover, it is well
established that compensation is not an essential
element of public office. 46 At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office. 47 Delegation of
sovereign functions is essential in the public office.
An investment in an individual of some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes
one a public officer. 48
The administration of the UP is a sovereign
function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP
performs a legitimate governmental function by
providing
advanced
instruction
in
literature,
philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving
professional and technical training. 49 Moreover, UP
is maintained by the Government and it declares no
dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according to the
Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even
assuming that she is a public officer, the
Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over
the offense because it was not committed in relation
to her office. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is
determined by the averments in the information.
More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the
pleas or the theories set up by defendant or
respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a
motion to quash.
Otherwise, jurisdiction would
become dependent almost entirely upon the whims
of defendant or respondent.
In the case at bench, the information
alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being
then a student regent of U.P., "while in the
performance of her official functions, committing the
offense in relation to her office and taking advantage
of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with
her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the government." (Underscoring
supplied) Clearly, there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it
did not quash the information based on this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should be
raised during trial on the merits. It is contended
anew that the amount came from President Estrada's
private funds and not from the government coffers.
Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that the
funds came from the Office of the President and not
its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
Under the information, it is averred that "petitioner
requested the amount of FifteeN Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the
Office of the President, and the latter relying and
believing
on
said
false
pretenses
and
misrepresentation gave and delivered to said
accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October
24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos

(P15,000,000.00)." Again, the Court sustains the

Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the
P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be
ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant
case.
TECSON VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Claiming that Demetrio Tecson, then mayor
of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, solicited and
received P4,000.00 as consideration of the issuance
of a business permit in her favor, Salvacion Luzana
filed an administrative complaint against Tecson
before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. A complaint
for violation of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act" was likewise filed with the OMBUDSMAN. The
administrative case was dismissed on October 23,
1991. On June 30, 1995, the Sandiganbayan
rendered
a decision convicting Tecson. Hence, this petition
wherein Tecson interposed res judicata and double
jeopardy, among others.
Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law. It has
no bearing in the criminal proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan. A public officer may be held civilly,
criminally and administratively liable for a wrongful
doing. Thus, the dismissal of an administrative case
does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal
prosecution for the same or similar acts which were
the object of the administrative complaint.
The
proceedings
conducted
by
the
Sanggunian were not criminal but administrative in
nature. Hence, double jeopardy will not lie. Absent a
showing that the prosecution witnesses were
actuated by any improper motive, their testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit. Recourse to the
records showed that no error of law or abuse of
discretion was committed by the respondent court
when it gave credence to the positive testimony of
the prosecution's witness as opposed to petitioner's
bare denials. Denial, like alibi, is a weak defense,
which becomes even weaker in the face of positive
testimony by prosecution witnesses. The petition was
denied.
Having
been
exonerated
by
the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur in the
administrative case, he now submits the same is res
judicata and thus bars the Sandiganbayan from
hearing his case. Petitioner's theory has no leg to
stand on. First, it must be pointed out that res
judicata is a doctrine of civil law. It thus has no
bearing in the criminal proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan. Second, it is a basic principle of the
law on public officers that a public official or
employee is under a three-fold responsibility for
violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission.
This simply means that a public officer may be held
civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a
wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act
results in damages to an individual, the public officer
may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured
party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction,
the erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally,
such violation may also lead to suspension, removal
from office, or other administrative sanctions. This
administrative liability is separate and distinct from
the penal and civil liabilities. Thus, the dismissal of
an administrative case does not necessarily bar the
filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar
acts, which were the subject of the administrative
complaint. We conclude, therefore, that the decision
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur
exonerating petitioner in Administrative Case No. SP
90-01 is no bar to the criminal prosecution before the
Sandiganbayan.
ESPINOSA VS OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN
Petitioner Francisco Enriquez was Municipal
Treasurer, while petitioner Carmencita G. Espinosa
was Administrative Officer and Acting Municipal
Cashier of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of
Pasig. By virtue of Local Government Audit Order No.
88- 01-3, an audit examination of the cash and
accounts of the Pasig Treasury covering the period

from May 4, 1987 to November 30, 1987 was

conducted. The audit disclosed, among other things,
that Enriquez's accounts contained a shortage
amounting to P3,178,777.41, which shortage was
mainly due to a dishonored China Banking Check No.
303100 dated October 7, 1987 in the amount of
P3,267,911.10. Said check was deposited with the
Quezon City Treasury as part of the collections of the
Pasig Treasury. The check was dishonored for several
reasons. A demand for the restitution of the value of
the dishonored check was made on Enriquez.
However, Enriquez denied responsibility for the
shortage. He claimed that it was Espinosa, the
custodian of the check, who was responsible for the
alleged shortage. Enriquez and Espinosa were
charged, tried and convicted of the crime of
malversation of public funds by the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan found that petitioners, in
conspiracy with each other, misappropriated public
funds in their custody and sought to cover up the
shortages already existing in the municipal treasury's
collections by depositing the subject check. The
Sandiganbayan found the denials of the accused and
their acts of shifting the blame and passing the
responsibility for the dishonored check to each other
as unacceptable and indicative of their guilt.
After an assiduous scrutiny of the pleadings
and the evidence, testimonial and documentary, the
Supreme Court acquitted the petitioners. The
evidence in this case has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused were guilty of the
crime charged for the following reasons: First, there
was no evidence to prove that the Pasig Treasury
incurred a cash shortage in the amount of
P3,178,777.41. Second, there was no evidence that
Enriquez or Espinosa had received such an amount,
which they could no longer produce or account for at
the time of the audit.
Third, there was no showing that the subject check
was received by the Pasig Treasury in an official
capacity; that there was a duty to receive or collect
the said amount, and that there was an obligation to
account for the same. The evidence submitted,
would point out that the subject check was not
issued in payment of taxes or obligations due to the
municipality and, consequently, no official receipt
was issued for it. Indeed, the subject check never
formed a portion of the public funds of the
municipality for which either Enriquez or Espinosa
are accountable for.
The crime of malversation for which
ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA had been charged is
defined under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
The elements of malversation under the above penal
provision are: (a) That the offender is a public officer.
(b) That he has the custody or control of funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office. (c) That
those funds or property are public funds or property
for which he is accountable. (d) That he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or,
through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take them.
We are constrained to conclude that the
prosecution, upon whose burden was laden the task
of establishing proof beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioners had committed the offense charged,
failed
to
discharge
this
obligation.
The
Sandiganbayan found the denials of the accused and
their acts of shifting the blame and passing the
responsibility for the dishonored check to each other
as unacceptable and indicative of their guilt.
However, it must be emphasized that although the
evidence for the defense may be characterized as
weak, criminal conviction must come from the
strength of the prosecution's evidence and not from
the weakness of the defense. We are not convinced
that the evidence in this case has proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused are guilty of the
crime charged.
There is no evidence to prove that the Pasig

Treasury incurred a cash shortage in the amount of

P3,178,777.41, which amount, incidentally, is even
less than the amount of the dishonored check. As per
report of the audit team, the alleged shortage was
computed and based on the value of the dishonored
check. As stated in the assailed decision, it was only
the drawn check, based on the audit examination
that brought about the shortage. It was palpable
error for the Sandiganbayan to conclude that the
check which the audit team had pinpointed as the
shortage due to its dishonor was at the same time,
intended and used by ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA to
"cover up" shortages in the funds allegedly in their
custody. The shortage must be clearly established as
a fact, i .e., that over and above the funds found by
the auditor in the actual possession of the
accountable officers, there is an additional amount of
P3,178,771.42 which could no longer be produced or
accounted for at the time of audit. Evidence of
shortage is necessary before there could be any
taking, appropriation, conversion, or loss of public
funds that would amount to malversation. It makes
no sense for any bogus check to be produced to
"cover up" an inexistent malversation. Indeed, no
less than the sole witness for the prosecution, audit
team leader, Carmelita Antasuda, who conducted the
cash count and cash examination of the Pasig
Treasury, testified that based on their audit
examination, it was only the subject check that
brought about the shortage.
The Sandiganbayan relied on the statutory
presumption that the "failure of a public officer to
have duly forthcoming any public funds with which
he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that
he has put such missing funds or property to
personal uses." It must be emphasized that the
prima facie presumption arises only if there is no
issue as to the accuracy, correctness, and regularity
of the audit findings and if the fact that funds are
missing is indubitably established. In the instant
case, audit team leader Carmelita Antasuda could
not even equivocally state whether it was cash or
check that was lost, if at all there was any, belying
the accuracy and correctness of the team's audit
report.
There is no showing that the subject check
was received by the Pasig Treasury in an official
capacity; that there was a duty to receive or collect
the said amount; and that there was an obligation to
account for the same. The evidence submitted, just
to the contrary, would point out that the subject
check was not issued in payment of taxes or
obligations due to the municipality and consequently
no official receipt was issued for it. Indeed, the
subject check never formed a portion of the public
funds of the municipality for which either ENRIQUEZ
or ESPINOSA are accountable for.
There would appear to have been lapses or
deficiencies in the observance of auditing rules and
regulations in the handling of the funds of the
municipal treasury e.g. delay in deposits of
collections, cash balances exceeding cash reserve
limit, loose controls and no control records, etc. as
pointed out by the audit team, and questions as to
how a private check was bundled together with
legitimate collections of the Pasig Treasury for
transmittal to the Quezon City Treasury, but the
same do not warrant a finding of criminal culpability,
which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt on the
part of ENRIQUEZ and ESPINOSA. However, the
Chairman of the Commission on Audit should be
apprised of this decision for whatever action he may
deem appropriate.
LACSON
VS
THE
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY,
SANDIGANBAYAN
This is a petition for prohibition and
mandamus filed by petitioner Panfilo M. Lacson and
petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco
Zubia, Jr. questioning the constitutionality of Sections

4 and 7 of Republic Act 8249 an Act which further

defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They
also seek to prevent the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos.
23047-23057 against them on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. They further argued that if the case is
tried before the Sandiganbayan, their right to
procedural due process would violate as they could
no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the
Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under RA 7975,
before recourse to the Supreme Court.
The Court ruled that the challengers of
Sections 4 and 7 of RA 8249 failed to rebut the
presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness
of the questioned provisions. The classification
between those pending cases involving the
concerned public officials whose trial has not yet
commenced and whose cases could have been
affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction under RA 8249, as against those cases
where trial had already started as of the approval of
the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes
real differences. Since it is within the power of the
Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject
to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably
anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction
would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why
it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a
transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors
cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them
under a different category from those similarly
situated as them. Moreover, petitioner's and
intervenor's contention that their right to a twotiered appeal which they acquired under RA 7975 has
been diluted by the enactment of RA 8249 is
incorrect. The same contention had already been
rejected by the Court considering that the right to
appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature
that can be regulated by law.
The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory
right to appeal is not included in the prohibition
against ex post facto law. RA 8249 pertains only to
matters of procedure, and being merely an
amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of
an ex post facto law.
Anent the issue of jurisdiction, the Court
ruled that for failure to show in the amended
informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official
functions of those accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder
and therefore, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
Accordingly, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7
of RA 8249 is sustained and the Addendum to the
March 5, 1997 resolution of the Sandiganbayan is
reversed.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of
R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the offense
committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as
amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),
(b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c)
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration
cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the
offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c)
and (e) is a public official or employee holding any of
the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section
4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the
office.
Considering that herein petitioner and
intervenors are being charged with murder which is a
felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal
Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional
offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4
of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials

and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of

[Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to their office." The
phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to
include the crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accused's official
functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the
official position or rank of the offender that is,
whether he is one of those public officers or
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4.
The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of
the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the
criminal participation of the accused public officer as
to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice
or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress
simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606
which does not mention the criminal participation of
the public officer as a requisite to determine the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the
Constitution or statute. The elements of that
definition must appear in the complaint or
information so as to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule
that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information, and not
by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against
petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4
[paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that
the offense charged must be committed by the
offender in relation to his office in order for the
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. This
jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which
mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have
jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by public
officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, "in
relation to their office as may be determined by law."
This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the
new [1987] Constitution when it declared in Section 4
thereof that the Sandiganbayan "shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or
hereafter may be provided by law."
The stringent requirement that the charge
be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense which the accused is
alleged to have committed in relation to his office
was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the
mere allegation in the amended information that the
offense was committed by the accused public officer
in relation to his office" is not sufficient. That phrase
is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment
that would show the close intimacy between the
offense charged and the discharge of the accused's
official duties. In People vs. Magallanes, where the
jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the
Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled: "It is an
elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information and not
by the result of evidence after trial. "In (People vs.
Montejo (108 Phil. 613 [1960]), wherethe amended
information alleged Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of
Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police
patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular
policemen and . . . special policemen appointed and
provided by him with pistols and high power guns
and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is
under his command . . . supervision and control
where his co-defendants were stationed, entertained
criminal
complaints
and
conducted
the
corresponding investigations as well as assumed the
authority to arrest and detain person without due
process of law and without bringing them to the
proper court, and that in line with this set-up
established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such,
and acting upon his orders his co-defendants
arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in
consequence thereof. We held that the offense
charged was committed in relation to the office of
the accused because it was perpetrated while they

were in the performance, though improper or

irregular of their official functions and would not have
been committed had they not held their office,
besides, the accused had no personal motive in
committing the crime thus, there was an intimate
connection between the offense and the office of the
accused. "Unlike in Montejo the informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court
below do not indicate that the accused arrested and
investigated the victims and then killed the latter in
the course of the investigation. The informations
merely allege that the accused, for the purpose of
extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00
abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims,
and failing in their common purpose, they spot and
killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that
shall control, and not the evidence presented by the
prosecution at the trial." In the aforecited case of
People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase
committed in relation to public office does not appear
in the information, which only signifies that the said
phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific
factualallegations in the information that would
indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of
the accused's official duties and the commission of
the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as
having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended
informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official
functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder
and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the
Sandiganbayan.
ROMUALDEZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN

QUINON VS PEOPLE
For failure to return the two super caliber .
38 pistol and their magazines and one 12-gauge
shotgun that were issued to him during his
incumbency and by reason of his function as Station
Commander of Calinog, Iloilo PC/INP, Pablo N. Quion
was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of
Malversation of Public Property. Thus, he interposed
this petition for review claiming that the
Sandiganbayan erred in holding that he is an
accountable public officer. The Court ruled that
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code is designed to
protect the government and to penalize erring public
officials
and
conspiring
private
individuals
responsible for the loss of public funds and property
by reason of corrupt motives or neglect or disregard
of duty. Its all encompassing provision cannot be
limited by petitioner's absurd interpretation of the
provisions of the Administrative Code restricting the
application thereof only to government funds and to
bonded public officials. Accordingly, the decision of
the Sandiganbayan was affirmed.
The elements of malversation, essential for
the conviction of an accused under the above penal
provision are: 1. That the offender is a public officer;
2. That he has the custody or control of funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office; 3. That
the funds or property are public funds or property for
which he is accountable; and 4. That he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or
through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take them.
An accountable public officer, within the
purview of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, is
one who has custody or control of public funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office. To be
liable for malversation, an accountable officer need
not be a bonded official. The name or relative
importance of the office or employment is not the
controlling factor. What is decisive is the nature of

the duties that he performs and that as part of, and

by reason of said duties, he receives public money or
property which he is bound to account.
In the case at bar, the delivery to petitioner
of the firearms belonging to the Government, by
reason of his office as Station Commander of Calinog,
Iloilo, PC-INP, necessarily entailed the obligation on
his part to safely keep the firearms, use them for the
purposes for which they were entrusted to him, and
to return them to the proper authority at the
termination of his tenure as commander, or on
demand by the owner, the duty to account for said
firearms. Thus, in Felicilda v. Grospe, the Court held a
police officer accountable for the firearms issued to
him
and
consequently
convicted
him
for
malversation of public property when he failed to
produce said firearms upon demand by the proper
authority.
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code is
designed to
protect the government and to penalize erring public
officials
and
conspiring
private
individuals
responsible for the loss of public funds and property
by reason of corrupt motives or neglect or disregard
of duty. Its all encompassing provision cannot be
limited by petitioner's absurd interpretation of the
provisions of the Administrative Code restricting the
application thereof only to government funds and to
bonded public officials.
Under Article 217 of the Code, the failure of
the public officer to have duly forthcoming such
public funds or property, upon demand by a duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that
he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use. Considering that petitioner failed to
adduce evidence on why he failed to produce, after
the expiration of his term and despite lawful demand,
the two .38 caliber pistols with Serial Nos. 310136
and 310150 issued to him by reason of his duties as
Station Commander of the Calinog, Iloilo, PC-INP, the
Sandiganbayan
correctly
convicted
him
of
malversation of public property.
MENESES VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that any public officer who, by reason of the
duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, or through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
person to take such public funds or property, wholly
or partially, shall be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property
(Emphasis supplied).
The grant of loans through the "vale"
system is a clear case of an accountable officer
consenting to the improper or unauthorized use of
public funds by other persons, which is punishable by
the law. To tolerate a such practice is to give a
license to every disbursing officer to conduct a
lending operation with the use of public funds. There
is no law or regulation allowing accountable officers
to extend loans to anyone against "vale" or chits
given in exchange by the borrowers. On the other
hand, in Cabello vs. Sandiganbayan, we held that the
giving of "vales" by public officers out of their
accountable funds is prohibited by P.D. No. 1145,
otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code
of the Philippines and Memorandum Circular No. 570,
dated June 24, 1968 of the General Auditing Office.
CABRERA ET. AL VS MARCELO
TABUENA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Tabuena and Peralta stress that they were being
charged with intentional malversation. But they were
convicted of malversation by negligence. Their
theory is that such variance is a reversible flaw.

We do not agree with Tabuena and Peralta on this

point. Illuminative and controlling is "Cabello v.
Sandiganbayan " where the Court passed upon
similar protestations raised by therein accusedpetitioner Cabello whose conviction for the same
crime of malversation was affirmed, in this wise: ". . .
even on the putative assumption that the evidence
against petitioner yielded a case of malversation by
negligence but the information was for intentional
malversation, under the circumstances of this case
his
conviction
under
the
first
mode
of
misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation
is committed either intentionally or by negligence.
The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a
modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the
mode charged differs from the mode proved, the
same offense of malversation is involved and
conviction thereof is proper."
Good faith is a valid defense in a
prosecution for malversation for it would negate
criminal intent on the part of the accused.
In so far as Tabuena is concerned, with the
due presentation in evidence of the MARCOS
Memorandum, we are swayed to give credit to his
claim of having caused the disbursement of the P55
Million solely by reason of such memorandum.
Tabuena had no other choice but to make the
withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS
Memorandum required him to do. He could not be
faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the
presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is
something easier said than done. Marcos was
undeniably Tabuena's superior the former being
then
the
President
of
the
Republic
who
unquestionably exercised control over government
agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. In other words,
Marcos
had
a
say
in
matters
involving
intergovernment agency affairs and transactions,
such as for instance, directing payment of liability of
one entity to another and the manner in which it
should be carried out. And as a recipient of such kind
of a directive coming from the highest official of the
land no less, good faith should be read on Tabuena's
compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with
the MARCOS Memorandum. Tabuena therefore is
entitled to the justifying circumstance of "Any person
who acts in obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful purpose." The subordinatesuperior relationship between Tabuena and Marcos is
clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of the order
contained in the MARCOS Memorandum, as it has for
its purpose partial payment of the liability of one
government agency (MIAA) to another (PNCC). The
MARCOS Memorandum is patently legal (for on its
face it directs payment of an outstanding liability)
and that Tabuena acted under the honest belief that
the P55 million was a due and demandable debt and
that it was just a portion of a bigger liability to PNCC.
Thus, even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal
and the subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the
subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be
a mistake of fact committed in good faith. The
principles underlying all that has been said above in
exculpation of Tabuena equally apply to Peralta in
relation to the P5 Million for which he is being held
accountable, i.e., he acted in good faith when he,
upon the directive of Tabuena, helped facilitate the
withdrawal of P5 Million of theP55 Million of the MIAA
funds.
There is no denying that the disbursement,
which
Tabuena admitted as "out of the ordinary," did not
comply with certain auditing rules and regulations.
But this deviation was inevitable under the
circumstances Tabuena was in. He did not have the
luxury of time to observe all auditingprocedures of
disbursement considering the fact that the MARCOS
Memorandum enjoined his "immediate compliance"
with the directive that he forward to the President's
Office the P55 Million in cash. Be that as it may,
Tabuena surely cannot escape responsibility for such

omission. But since he was acting in good faith, his

liability should only be administrative or civil in
nature, and not criminal.
The Sandiganbayan made the finding that
Tabuena had already converted and misappropriated
the P55 Million when he delivered the same to Mrs.
Gimenez and not to the PNCC. We do not agree. It
must be stressed that the MARCOS Memorandum
directed Tabuena "to pay immediately the Philippine
National Construction Corporation, thru this office,the
sum of FIFTY FIVE MILLION . . .," and that was what
Tabuena precisely did when he delivered the money
to Mrs. Gimenez. Such delivery, no doubt, is in effect
delivery to the Office of the President in as much as
Mrs. Gimenez was Marcos' secretary then.
Furthermore, Tabuena had reasonable ground to
believe that the President was entitled to receive the
P55 Million since he was certainly aware that Marcos,
as Chief Executive, exercised supervision and control
over government agencies. And the good faith of
Tabuena in having delivered the money to the
President's office (thru Mrs. Gimenez), in strict
compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum, was not
at all affected even if it later turned out that PNCC
never received the money.
Even assuming that the real and sole
purpose behind the MARCOS Memorandum was to
siphon-out public money for the personal benefit of
those then in power, still, no criminal liability can be
imputed to Tabuena. There is no showing that
Tabuena had anything to do whatsoever with the
execution of the MARCOS Memorandum. Nor is there
proof that he profited from the felonious scheme. In
short, no conspiracy was established between
Tabuena and the real embezzler/s of the P55 Million.
MENDIOLA VS PEOPLE
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED
(ANTI-GRAFT LAW); KNOWINGLY GRANTING LICENSE
OR PERMIT TO UNQUALIFIED PERSONS, AND
CAUSING UNDUE INJURY TO ANY PARTY; A
SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW MAY BE THE BASIS
OF GOOD FAITH; GOOD FAITH, VALID DEFENSE, IN
CASE AT BAR. The information for violation of Section
3(j) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, alleged that
Ortillada, Rosales and Blanco were not legally
entitled to "building permits for market stalls" for the
reason that "the place or location to where these
permits were issued is already covered by a valid and
existing building permit previously by accused on
March 12, 1987 in favor of the Municipality of
Angono, Rizal." The evidence at the trial, showed
that when petitioner issued the building permit for
the new or Phase II building, he noted the
encroachment of the proposed building upon the
Phase I market stalls of Ortillada, Rosales and Blanco
and had precisely required that the building plan be
corrected. The factors tending to show good faith on
the part of petitioner Mendiola include the following:
Firstly, the permits issued by petitioner to Ortillada,
Rosales and Blanco upon their application were
merely temporary renovation permits that authorized
the renovation of the stalls demolished by the Phase
II contractor. As pointed out earlier, these renovation
permits were qualified by the terms of an
accompanying transmittal letter issued by petitioner
Mendiola stating that the renovation permits would
become ineffective should the courts or proper
higher authority restrain the three (3) permittees
from renovating their makeshift market stalls.
Secondly, the three (3) permittees were long-time
stallholders, having been so at least since the fire
which had destroyed the old Angono Public Market.
They were not strangers to the Angono Public Market,
since they were stallholders, with temporary stalls, in
APM-Phase I. Thirdly, the three (3) permittees had
outstanding and paid-up municipal business permits
when petitioner issued them their stall renovation
permits. Fourthly, the permittees' temporary stalls
had been demolished without prior hearing or a court
order, or a demolition order from the authorized
building official which was petitioner Mendiola
himself. Thus, whether Ortillada, Rosales and Blanco

were legally entitled to the temporary renovation

permits presented a substantial question of law and
it is well to recall that mistake on a doubtful or
difficult question of law may be the basis of good
faith. There are other factors, environmental in
nature, tending to show good faith on the part of
petitioner Mendiola which relate to Resolution No. 71987 of the
Angono Municipal Council, the enabling Resolution
which lay at the heart of the boiling controversy
between the Phase I stallholders and the Phase II
awardees. Firstly, as already pointed out, the validity
of Resolution No. 7-1987 was being litigated before
the courts. The record shows that there were at least
three (3) cases before the Regional Trial Court of
Binangonan involving the validity or enforceability of
Resolution No. 7-1987. What was brought up before
the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari was
an interlocutory order of the trial court in one of the
cases denying a preliminary writ of injunction
stopping the construction of the new building.
Secondly, the decision dated 31 August 1988 of the
Secretary, DPWH, was not really final since the
applicable statute itself provided for an appeal by
way of a petition for review before the Office of the
President. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor
General, we believe and so hold that all the above
factors support the claim of good faith in respect of
both the first and second charges against petitioner
Mendiola. The question of validity and enforceability
of Resolution No. 7-1987 was all pervasive and
inevitably affected both the entitlement of the three
(3) Phase I stallholders to the temporary renovation
permits issued by petitioner Mendiola and the
entitlement of the contractor and Phase II awardees
to a certificate of partial occupancy of the admittedly
incomplete new building. The facts or events
surrounding the first charge are so intertwined with
those surrounding the second charge as to render it
very difficult to separate them, even conceptually.
CAUSING UNDUE INJURY TO ANY PARTY;
EVIDENT BAD FAITH, NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT
BAR;
ABSENCE
OF
ANY
ALLEGATION
THAT
ACCUSEDRECEIVED MONEY FOR ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED RENOVATION PERMIT. Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, requires proof of
"manifest partiality" or "evident bad faith" or "gross
inexcusable negligence." The information for
violation of Section 3(e) alleged only "evident bad
faith." We believe that, in the totality of the
circumstances of this case, the prosecution failed to
show beyond reasonable doubt the presence of any
of these three (3) elements. Indeed, it appears that
the prosecution failed to overcome the presumption
of good faith to which every public official, acting in
discharge of his official duties, is entitled. The
petitioner, caught between two (2) contending
groups was constantly trying to specify in writing the
reasons for his acts. While one need not agree with
all his acts or stated reasons therefor or the wisdom
thereof, one cannot say that they were so obviously
and palpably sham justifications for merely arbitrary
and capricious acts as to warrant a finding of
"evident bad faith." No one had claimed that
petitioner received any money for issuing the
renovation permits or refraining from issuing the
demanded certificate(s) of partial occupancy.
ABSENCE OF UNDUE INJURY TO ANY PARTY
IN CASE AT BAR. There is also substantial doubt
whether the element of "undue injury to any party"
required in Section 3(e) was adequately shown by
the prosecution. The respondent Sandiganbayan
apparently overlooked the circumstance that the
Phase II awardees had in fact entered and occupied
their respective stalls in the new building, without
waiting for the certificate(s) of partial occupancy
which they demanded from petitioner Mendiola and
without paying heed to Resolution No. 097-1988 of
the new Municipal Council warning them not to open
up their stalls in the still incomplete new building.
The record strongly suggests that petitioner Mendiola
had the misfortune of getting caught in the middle of

a heated controversy between two (2) local interest

groups and between the outgoing OIC municipal
officials and the incoming newly elected set of
municipal officials. In the course of requiring
complete
compliance
with
all
formal
and
documentary requirements for issuance of a
certificate of occupancy or partial occupancy, he was
charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019 as amended,
doubtless at the behest of the Phase II awardees, the
contractor and the old or OIC set of municipal
officials. Had he in fact issued the demanded
certificate(s) of partial occupancy, he in all
probability would have been charged criminally by
the Samahan of Phase I stallholders and the newly
elected municipal officials, probably under the same
statutory provisions. The Court of Appeals decision
did not pass upon the merits of the question of
validity of Resolution No. 7-1987; it merely assumed
the validity of that Resolution which was precisely
being controverted before the trial court. The DPWH
Secretary did not pass upon the grounds relating to
Resolution No. 7-1987 urged in the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner Mendiola and the new
Mayor. Under these circumstances, the filing of the
two (2) criminal informations appears quite
unfortunate. We note also that, so far as the record
would show, petitioner Mendiola was, curiously, the
only person or public official criminally charged in
connection with the whole affair. That the three (3)
Phase I stallholders on whose stalls the new building
encroached happened to be relatives or friends of
petitioner, appears to us as essentially if not
completely
co-incidental;
the
ruling
of
the
Sandiganbayan that petitioner deliberately chose to
protect the interests of his relatives and friend and
not the interests of the general community appears
bereft of basis and as speculative. The standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt was not met.
LAYNO VS PEOPLE
The law on nepotism, as provided in Section
49(a) of PD No. 807, prohibits the appointing or
recommending
authority
from
making
any
appointment in the national, provincial, city or
municipal governments or in any branch or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, in favor of his (appointing
or recommending authority's) relative within the third
degree of consanguinity or affinity. Thus, in order to
guarantee that the law is duly observed, it is
required, among others, that the appointment paper
should be accompanied by a certification of the
appointing or recommending authority stating
therein that he is not related to the appointee within
the third degree of consanguinity or affinity. Although
Section. 49(a) of PD No. 807 does not explicitly
provide that the appointing or recommending
authority shall disclose his true relationship with the
appointee in the form of a certification, nonetheless,
in the light of the rulings in People vs. Po Giok To
(196 Phil. 913) and People vs. Kho, (CA G.R. No.
03618-CR), the legal obligation of the appointing or
recommending authority to state the true facts
required to be stated in the certification is inherent in
the law on prohibition against nepotism and the
nature and purpose of such certification. In the case
at bar, since the petitioner was the appointing
authority when he made the appointment in favor of
his son, Fernando T. Layno, as meat inspector in the
office of the municipal treasurer of Lianga, Surigao
del Sur, he had the legal obligation to disclose in the
certification his true relationship with the appointee.
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS;
DEFENSE OF GOOD FAITH UNAVAILING IN CASE AT
BAR. This Court has indeed ruled that good faith is a
valid defense in a charge of falsification of public
documents by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts. In the present case, however, the
petitioner's claim of good faith is unavailing as it is
inconsistent with his very defense that he did not
sign nor issue the certification in question. As held by
the Sandiganbayan "The plea cannot be accepted.
He expressly admitted that Fernando Y. Layno was his

legitimate son. Nevertheless, he deliberately

disregarded that fact, brazenly certifying that he was
not related to him within the third degree of
consanguinity. The perversion was designed to
conceal his father-son relationship from the Civil
Service Commission and thereby deceived it, as it
was in fact deceived, in approving the appointment
he extended to him. The criminal intent is not only
obvious, but is also presumed, from the untruthful
narration of fact. The crime of falsification having
already
been
committed,
no
acts
showing
subsequent repentance and abandonment of
purpose, even if true, can relieve the accused of his
penal liability."
FALSIFICATION BY PUBLIC OFFICER; MAKING
UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACT;
REQUISITES; CASE AT BAR. In Syquian vs. The People
of the Philippines, (171 SCRA 223), this Court held
that: "The offense of falsification by a public officer
under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed by 'any public officer, employee or notary
who, taking advantage of his official position, shall
falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts: . .. 4. Making untruthful statements in
a narration of fact; . . .' It is settled that in this fourth
kind of falsification, the following requisites must
concur: (a) That the offender makes in a document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) That
he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the
facts narrated by him; and (c) That the facts narrated
by the offender are absolutely false (Cabigas v.
People, G.R. No. 67472, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 18.)"
After a thorough review of the records, the Court
finds that all the elements of the crime of falsification
of public document under Article 171, par. 4, of the
Revised Penal Code are present in the case at bar.
The petitioner was a public officer being then the
incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Lianga,
Surigao del Sur, when he issued on 16 March 1980
the appointment in favor of Fernando Y. Layno as a
meat inspector in the office of the municipal
treasurer of Lianga. In connection with the said
appointment, the petitioner taking advantage of his
official position, issued the certification (Exh. B) a
public document stating therein that he is not
related to the appointee within the third degree of
consanguinity or affinity; but, as previously
discussed, he had the legal obligation to disclose his
true relationship with the appointee. The facts
narrated by the petitioner in the said certification are
absolutely false because the bare fact and naked
truth is that the appointee Fernando Y. Layno is his
legitimate son.
INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER VS COURT OF APPEALS

BANCO FILIPINO VS PURISIMA

ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT;
ADDITIONAL
EXCEPTIONS
TO
RULE
AGAINST
DISCLOSURE OF BANK DEPOSITS UNDER REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 1405. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, on dismissal
due to unexplained wealth, is an additional exception
under Republic Act No. 1405.
INQUIRY
INTO
ILLEGALLY
ACQUIRED
PROPERTY; EXTENDS TO PROPERTY RECORDED IN
THE NAME OF OTHER PERSON. The inquiry into
illegally acquired property - or property NOT
"legitimately acquired" - extends to cases where
such property is concealed by being held by or
recorded in the name of other persons. This
proposition is made clear by R.A. No. 3019 which
quite categorically states that the term, "legitimately
acquired property of a public officer or employee
shall not include . . . property unlawfully acquired by
the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its
being recorded in the name of, or held by,
respondent's spouse, ascendants, descendants,
relatives or any other persons.

RATIONALE. To restrict the inquiry only to

property held by or in the name of the government
official or employee, or his spouse and unmarried
children, would make available to persons in
government who illegally acquire property an easy
and fool-proof means of evading investigation and
prosecution; all they would have to do would be to
place the property in the possession or name of
persons other than their spouse and unmarried
children.
CLARO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT;
SECTION 2 (b) THEREOF; PUBLIC OFFICER DEFINED
AND CLASSIFIED; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR.
Petitioner misconstrues the definition of "public
officer" in R.A. No. 3019 which, according to Sec. 2(b)
thereof "includes elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the
classified or unclassified or exemption service
receiving compensation, even nominal, from the
government. . .." The word "includes" used in
defining a public officer in Sec. 2(b) indicates that the
definition is not restrictive. The terms "classified,
unclassified or exemption service" were the old
categories of positions in the civil service which have
been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career
Service by PD 807 providing for the organization of
the Civil Service Commission and by the
Administrative Code of 1987. Non-career service in
particular is characterized by (1) entrance on
bases other than those of the usual test of merit and
fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure
which is limited to a period specified by law, or which
is coterminous with that of the appointing authority
or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the
duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made. The Non-Career Service shall
include: (1) Elective officials and their personal or
confidential staff; (2) Secretaries and other officials
of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the
pleasure of the President and their personal or
confidential staff(s); (3) Chairman and members of
commissions and boards with fixed terms of office
and their personal or confidential staff; (4)
Contractual personnel or those whose employment in
the government is in accordance with a special
contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring
special or technical skills not available in the
employing agency, to be accomplished within a
specific period, which in no case shall exceed one
year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work
or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum
of direction and supervision from the hiring agency;
and (5) Emergency and seasonal personnel. It is
quite evident that petitioner fails under the noncareer service category (formerly termed the
unclassified or exemption service) of the Civil Service
and thus is a public officer as defined by Sec. 2(b) of
the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No.
3019). The fact that petitioner is not required to
record his working hours by means of a bundy clock
or did not take an oath of office became unessential
considerations in view of the above-mentioned
provision of law clearly including petitioner within the
definition of a public officer.
SECTION 3 (b) THEREOF; COMMITTED BY
MERE DEMAND; CASE AT BAR. Petitioner asserts that
it was improbable for him to have demanded
P200,000.00 from Engr. Resoso, when he could have
just talked directly to the contractor himself. It is
quite irrelevant from whom petitioner demanded his
percentage share of P200,000.00 whether from the
contractor's project engineer, Engr. Alexander Resoso
or directly from the contractor himself Engr. Jaime
Sta. Maria, Sr. That petitioner made such a demand is
all that is required by Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 and
this element has been sufficiently established by the
testimony of Engr. Resoso.
ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. Similarly,
petitioner's averment that he could not be
prosecuted under the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices

Act because his intervention "was not required by

law but in the performance of a contract of services
entered into by him as a private individual
contractor," is erroneous. As discussed above,
petitioner falls within the definition of a public officer
and as such, his duties delineated in Annex "B" of the
contract of services are subsumed under the phrase
"wherein the public officer in his official capacity has
to intervene under the law." Petitioner's allegation, to
borrow a cliche, is nothing but a mere splitting of
hairs. Among petitioner's duties as project manager
is to evaluate the contractor's accomplishment
reports/billings hence, as correctly ruled by the
Sandiganbayan he has the "privilege and authority to
make a favorable recommendation and act favorably
in behalf of the government," signing acceptance
papers and approving deductives and additives are
some examples. All of the elements of Sec. 3(b) of
the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act are, therefore,
present. Anent the second issue, we likewise find
Petitioner's allegations completely bereft of merit.
Petitioner insists that the prosecution has failed to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that
the charges against him should be rejected for being
improbable, unbelievable and contrary to human
nature. We disagree. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean that which produces absolute
certainty. Only moral certainty is required or "that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind." We have extensively reviewed
the records of this case and we find no reason to
overturn the findings of the Sandiganbayan.
BERONA VS SANDIGANBAYAN

DOROMAL VS SANDIGANBAYAN
WHEN THE CHARGE HAS BEEN CHANGED;
RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED IS SUBSTANTIAL. The petitioner's right to a
preliminary investigation of the new charge is
secured to him by the following provisions of Rule
112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. That
right of the accused is "a substantial one." Its denial
over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it
subjects the accused to
the loss of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law" (U.S. vs. Marfori, 35 Phil. 666).
ACCUSED ALONE MAY WAIVE THE RIGHT.
The Solicitor
General's argument that the right to a preliminary
investigation may be waived and was in fact waived
by the petitioner, impliedly admits that the right
exists. Since the right belongs to the accused, he
alone may waive it. If he demands it, the State may
not withhold it.
ABSENCE OF, IS NOT A GROUND TO QUASH
THE COMPLAINT; CASE MUST BE REMANDED FOR
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. As the absence of a
preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the
complaint or information (Sec. 3, Rule 117, Rules of
Court), the proceedings upon such information in the
Sandiganbayan should be held in abeyance and the
case should be remanded to the office of the
Ombudsman for him or the Special Prosecutor to
conduct a preliminary investigation. Thus we did rule
in Luciano vs. Mariano, 40 SCRA 187, 201; Ilagan vs.
Enrile, 139 SCRA 349 and more recently in
Sanciangco, Jr. vs. People, 149 SCRA 1, 3-4.
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT;
PRESENCE OF A SIGNED DOCUMENT, NOT A SINE
QUA NON FOR THE PETITIONER TO BE CHARGED. The
Sandiganbayan in its order of August 19, 1988
correctly observed that "the presence of a signed
document bearing the signature of accused Doromal
as part of the application to bid . . . . is not a sine qua
non" (Annex O, p. 179. Rollo), for, the Ombudsman
indicated in his Memorandum/Clearance to the
Special Prosecutor, that the petitioner "can rightfully
be charged . . . with having participated in a business
which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of

Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC

remained a family corporation in which Doromal has
at least an indirect interest." (pp. 107-108, Rollo)
PARTICIPATION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN ANY
BUSINESS; BAN IS SIMILAR TO THE PROHIBITION IN
THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW. Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution provides that "the President, VicePresident, the members of the Cabinet and their
deputies or assistants shall not . . . during (their)
tenure, . . . directly or indirectly . . . participate in any
business." The constitutional ban is similar to the
prohibition in the CivilService Law (PD No. 807, Sec.
36, subpar. 24) that "pursuit of private business . . .
without the permission required by Civil Service
Rules and Regulations" shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against any officer or employee in
the civil service.
VIOLATION OF PROHIBITION COMMANDS
SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE; LEAVE OF ABSENCE IS
NOT A BAR TO PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION. Since the
petitioner is an incumbent public official charged in a
valid information with an offense punishable under
the Constitution and the laws (RA 3019 and PD 807),
the law's command that he "shall be suspended from
office" pendente lite must be obeyed. His approved
leave of absence is not a bar to his preventive
suspension for as indicated by the Solicitor General,
an approved leave, whether it be for a fixed or
indefinite period, may be cancelled or shortened at
will by the incumbent.
CIVIL SERVICE; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION;
MAXIMUM PERIOD IS 90 DAYS. As we held in Layno,
Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan , 136 SCRA 536 (1985), a
preventive suspension for an indefinite period of
time, such as one that would last until the case
against the incumbent official shall have been finally
terminated, would "outrun the bounds of reason and
result in sheer oppression" and a denial of due
process. The petitioner herein is no less entitled to
similar protection. Since his preventive suspension
has exceeded the reasonable maximum period of
ninety (90) days provided in Section 42 of the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines (P.D. 807), it should
now be lifted.
BOLASTIG VS SANDIGANBAYAN
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019; PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION
UNDER
SECTION
13
THEREOF
MANDATORY.
It is now settled that Sec. 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory for the
Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against
whom a valid information charging violation of that
law. Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any
offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property is filed. The court trying a case has
neither discretion nor duty to determine whether
preventive suspension is required to prevent the
accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses
or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing
malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless
the accused is suspended he may frustrate his
prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or
do both, in the same way that upon a finding that
there is probable cause to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused. The law does
not require the court to determine whether the
accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction
of the court.
NINETY-DAY
PERIOD
OF
PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION; EXPLAINED. It is indeed true that in
some of our decisions the expression "the maximum
period of ninety (90) days" is used. But that is only
for the purpose of emphasizing that the preventive
suspension therein involved, which were for more
than ninety (90) days, were excessive and
unreasonable. It is to be noted that the ninety-day
period of preventive suspension is not found in Sec.
13 of Republic Act No. 3019 but was adopted from

Sec. 42 of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. NO. 807),

which is now Sec. 52 of the Administrative Code of
1987. . . . The duration of preventive suspension is
thus coeval with the period prescribed for deciding
administrative disciplinary cases. If the case is
decided before ninety days, then the suspension will
last less than ninety days, but if the case is not
decided within ninety days, then the preventive
suspension must be up to ninety days only. Similarly,
as applied to criminal prosecutions under Republic
Act No. 3019, preventive suspension will last for less
than ninety days only if the case is decided within
that period; otherwise, it will continue for ninety
days. The duration of preventive suspension will,
therefore, vary to the extent that it is contingent on
the time it takes the court to decide the case but not
on account of any discretion lodged in the court,
taking into account the probability that the accused
may use his office to hamper his prosecution.
CONTENTION THAT SUSPENSION WILL
DEPRIVE PETITIONER'S CONSTITUENCY OF HIS
SERVICES NOT SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR REDUCING
MANDATORY PERIOD. The fact that petitioner's
preventive suspension may deprive the people of
Samar of the services of an official elected by them,
at least temporarily, is not a sufficient basis for
reducing what is otherwise a mandatory period
prescribed by law. The vice governor, who has
likewise been elected by them, will act as governor.
Indeed, even the Constitution authorizes the
suspension for not more than sixty days of members
of Congress found guilty of disorderly behavior, thus
rejecting the view expressed in one case that
members of the legislature could not be suspended
because in the case of suspension, unlike in the case
of removal, the seat remains filled but the
constituents are deprived of representation.

CABAL VS KAPUNAN
ANTI-GRAFT
LAW;
FORFEITURE
OF
UNEXPLAINED WEALTH; NATURE OF FORFEITURE AS
PENALTY. The purpose of the charge against
petitioner is to apply the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1379, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the
State of property of a public officer or employee
which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired
property. Such forfeiture has been held, however, to
partake of the nature of a penalty.
EXEMPTION
OF
DEFENDANTS
FROM
OBLIGATION TO BE WITNESS AGAINST THEMSELVES.
Proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed
criminal or penal, and hence, the exemption of
defendants in criminal cases from the obligation to
be witness against themselves are applicable
thereto.
FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY IN SUBSTANCE IS
A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING FOR THE PURPOSE OF
PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; CASE OF BOYD vs.
U.S. and THURSTON vs. CLARK, CITED. In Boyd vs.
U.S. (116 U.S. 616, 29 L. ed., 746), it was held that
the information, in a proceeding to declare a
forfeiture of certain property because of the evasion
of a certain revenue law, "though technically a civil
proceeding, is in substance and effect a criminal
one", and that suits for penalties and forfeitures are
within the reason of criminal proceedings for the
purposes of that portion of the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution of the U.S. which declares that no
person shall be compelled in a criminal to be a
witness against himself. Similarly, a proceeding for
the removal of an officer was held, in Thurston vs.
Clark (107 Cal. 285, 40 pp. 435, 437), to be in
substance criminal, for said portion of the Fifth
Amendment applies "to all cases in which the action
prosecuted is not to establish, recover or redress

private and civil rights, but to try and punish persons

charged with the commission of public offenses" and
"a criminal case is an action, suit or cause instituted
to punish an infraction of the criminal laws, and, with
this object in view, it matters not in what form a
statute may clothe it; it is still a criminal case . . . ."
CASE
OF
ALMEDA
vs.
PEREZ,
DISTINGUISHED.
In Almeda vs. Perez, L-18428
(August 30, 1962) the theory that, after the filing of
respondents' answer to a petition for forfeiture under
Republic Act No. 1379, said petition may not be
amended as to substance pursuant to our rules of
criminal procedure, was rejected by this Court upon
the ground that said forfeiture proceeding is civil in
nature. This doctrine refers, however, to the purely
procedural aspect of said proceeding, and has no
bearing on the substantial rights of the respondents
therein, particularly their constitutional right against
self-incrimination.
REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN (2002)
The Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) issued a sequestration writ
against all the assets, shares of stock, property
records and bank deposits of Hans Menzi Holdings
and Management, Inc. (HMHMI). The estate of Hans
M. Menzi, in behalf of HMHMI, filed with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to lift freeze order which
was granted by the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the
Republic of the Philippines filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for review assailing the resolution of
the Sandiganbayan lifting the freeze order. The Court
set aside the Sandiganbayan resolution and
remanded the case back to the Sandiganbayan to
resolve the issue of the issuance of the writ of
sequestration. The Sandiganbayan lifted the writ of
sequestration reasoning that there was no prima
facie
factual
basis
for
its
issuance.
The
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
The Supreme Court ruled that the
Sandiganbayan has full authority to decide on all
incidents in the ill-gotten case, including the
propriety of the writs of sequestration that the PCGG
initially issued. In the absence of competent
evidence showing thus far that President Marcos or
his cronies ever acquired Bulletin shares of the late
Hans M. Menzi or HMHMI that might be subject to
sequestration, the Supreme Court may not void the
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in question.
Moreover, the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court over decisions or final orders of the
Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of law. The
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the
Court's function to examine and weigh all over again
the evidence presented in the proceedings below.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME
COURT OVER DECISIONS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
LIMITED TO QUESTIONS OF LAW. It is well settled
that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
over decisions or final orders of the Sandiganbayan is
limited to questions of law. A question of law exists
when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of
facts; or when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being
admitted.
QUESTION OF FACT, DEFINED. A question of
fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query
invites calibration of the whole evidence considering
mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence
and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances
as well as their relation to each other and to the
whole, and the probability of the situation.
SANDIGANBAYAN HAS FULL AUTHORITY TO
DECIDE ON ALL INCIDENTS IN THE ILL-GOTTEN CASE
INCLUDING THE PROPRIETY OF THE WRITS OF
SEQUESTRATION IN CASE AT BAR. We agree with

respondents that the Sandiganbayan has full

authority to decide on all incidents in the ill-gotten
case, including the propriety of the writs of
sequestration that the PCGG initially issued. Based
on the evidence the PCGG submitted so far to the
Sandiganbayan, the late Hans M. Menzi owned the
Bulletin Publishing Corporation almost one hundred
(100%) per cent since 1957, except those Bulletin
shares sold to U.S. Automotive corporation in 1985,
those converted to treasury shares in 1986, and
those sold to the general public at public offerings. In
the absence of competent evidence showing thus far
that President Ferdinand E. Marcos or his cronies ever
acquired Bulletin shares of the late Hans M. Menzi or
HMHMI that might be subject to sequestration, we
may not void the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in
question.
REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN (2003)
These consolidated cases stemmed from the
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (1) ordering the
calling
and
holding
of
the
Eastern
Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc.
(ETPI) annual stockholders meeting for 1992 under
its supervision and (2) authorizing the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to cause
the holding of a special stockholders' meeting to
increase ETPI's authorized capital stock and to vote
therein the sequestered Class "A" shares of stock.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Members of the
Sandiganbayan
cannot
participate
in
the
stockholders meeting for the election of the ETPI
Board of Directors. Neither shall the Clerk of Court be
appointed to call such meeting and issue notices
thereof. The Sandiganbayan shall appoint, or the
parties may agree to constitute, a committee of
competent and impartial persons to call, send notices
and preside at the meeting for the election of the
ETPI Board of Directors. The Court likewise ruled that
the PCGG cannot vote sequestered shares to elect
the ETPI Board of Directors or to amend the Articles
of Incorporation for the purpose of increasing the
authorized capital stock unless there is a prima facie
evidence showing that said shares are ill-gotten and
there is an imminent danger of dissipation.
Consequently, the Court referred the petitions at bar
to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence to
determine whether there is a prima facie evidence
showing that the sequestered shares in question are
ill-gotten and there is an imminent danger of
dissipation to entitle the PCGG to vote them in a
stockholders' meeting.
SEQUESTERED SHARES; EXCEPTION. The
PCGG cannot thus vote sequestered shares, except
when there are "demonstrably weighty and
defensible grounds" or "when essential to prevent
disappearance or wastage of corporate property."
TWO-TIERED
TEST
IN
DETERMINING
WHETHER SEQUESTERED SHARES MAY BE VOTED
UPON. The principle laid down in Baseco was further
enhanced in the subsequent cases of Cojuangco v.
Calpo and Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Cojuangco, Jr. , where this Court
developed a "two-tiered" test in determining whether
the PCGG may vote sequestered shares: The issue of
whether PCGG may vote the sequestered shares in
SMC necessitates a determination of at least two
factual matters: 1. whether there is prima facie
evidence showing that the said shares are ill-gotten
and thus belong to the state; and 2. whether there is
an
immediate
danger
of
dissipation
thus
necessitating their continued sequestration and
voting by the PCGG while the main issue pends with
the Sandiganbayan.
INAPPLICABLE IN CASES INVOLVING FUNDS
OF PUBLIC
CHARACTER. The two-tiered test, however, does not
apply in cases involving funds of "public character."
In such cases, the government is granted the
authority to vote said shares, namely: (1) Where
government shares are taken over by private persons

or entities who/which registered them in their own

names, and (2) Where the capitalization or shares
that were acquired with public funds somehow
landed in private hands.
STOCK AND TRANSFER BOOK, SHALL BE THE
BASIS OF DETERMINING THE TRUE OWNERS OF THE
SHARES OF STOCK, REGARDLESS OF THE PRESENCE
OF ALTERATIONS BY SUBSTITUTION THEREIN; CASE
AT BAR. This Court sees no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Sandiganbayan in ruling that: "The
charge that there were "alterations by substitution"
in the Stock and Transfer Book is not a matter which
should preclude the Stock and Transfer Book from
being the basis or guide to determine who the true
owners of the shares of stock in ETPI are. If there be
any substitution or alterations, the anomaly, if at all,
may be explained by the corporate secretary who
made the entries therein. At any rate, the accuracy
of the Stock and Transfer Book may be checked by
comparing the entries therein with the issued stock
certificates. The fact is that any transfer of stock or
issuance thereof would necessitate an alteration of
the record by substitution. Any anomaly in any entry
which may deprive a person or entity of its right to
vote may generate a controversy personal to the
corporation and the stockholder and should not
affect the issue as to whether it is the PCGG or the
shareholder who has the right to vote. In other
words, should there be a stockholder who feels
aggrieved by any alteration by substitution in the
Stock and Transfer Book, said stockholder may object
thereto at the proper time and before the
stockholders meeting." Whether the ETPI Stock and
Transfer Book was falsified and whether such
falsification deprives the true owners of the shares of
their right to vote are thus issues best settled in a
different proceeding instituted by the real parties-ininterest.
REGISTRATION IS A PREREQUISITE FOR
VOTING OF SHARES; RATIONALE. Explaining why
registration is a prerequisite for the voting of shares,
this Court, in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company, Inc., v. Bitanga, discoursed: "Indeed, until
registration is accomplished, the transfer, though
valid between the parties, cannot be effective as
against the corporation. Thus, the unrecorded
transferee cannot vote nor be voted for. The purpose
of registration, therefore, is two-fold: to enable the
transferee to exercise all the rights of a stockholder,
including the right to vote and to be voted for, and to
inform the corporation of any change in share
ownership so that it can ascertain the persons
entitled to the rights and subject to the liabilities of a
stockholder. Until challenged in a proper proceeding,
a stockholder of record has a right to participate in
any meeting; his vote can be properly counted to
determine whether a stockholders' resolution was
approved, despite the claim of the alleged
transferee. On the other hand, a person who has
purchased stock, and who desires to be recognized
as a stockholder for the purpose of voting, must
secure such a standing by having the transfer
recorded on the corporate books. Until the transfer is
registered, the transferee is not a stockholder but an
outsider."
STOCK CERTIFICATES; CONSIDERED AS
NON-NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS; CASE AT BAR. With
respect to the PCGG's submission that under Section
34 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, it may take
title to the shares represented by the blank stock
certificates found in Malacaang and vote the same,
the same is untenable. The PCGG assumes that stock
certificates are negotiable. They are not. ". . .
[A]lthough a stock certificate is sometimes regarded
as quasi - negotiable, in the sense that it may be
transferred by delivery, it is well settled that the
instrument is non-negotiable, because the holder
thereof takes it without prejudice to such rights or
defenses as the registered owner or creditor may
have under the law, except insofar as such rights or
defenses are subject to the limitations imposed by

the principles governing estoppel." That the PCGG

found the stock certificates endorsed in blank does
not necessarily make it the owner of the shares
represented therein. Their true ownership has to be
ascertained in a proper proceeding.
NO OTHER COURT THAN THE ONE
CONTEMNED WILL PUNISH A GIVEN CONTEMPT;
EXCEPTION. "In whatever context it may arise,
contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the
failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an
affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with
which it is clothed. As a matter of practical judicial
administration, jurisdiction has been felt properly to
rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a
given controversy. Partly because of administrative
considerations, and partly to visit the full personal
effect of the punishment on a contemnor, the rule
has been that no other court than the one
contemned will punish a given contempt. The
rationale that is usually advanced for the general
rule that the power to punish for contempt rests with
the court contemned is that contempt proceedings
are sui generic and are triable only by the court
against whose authority the contempts are charged;
the power to punish for contempt exists for the
purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum
and respect in its presence and due obedience to its
judgments, orders and processes; and in order that a
court may compel obedience to its orders, it must
have the right to inquire whether there has been any
disobedience thereof, for to submit the question of
disobedience to another tribunal would operate to
deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency." The
above rule is not of course absolute as it admits
exception "when the entire case has already been
appealed [in which case] jurisdiction to punish for
contempt rests with the appellate court where the
appeal completely transfers to proceedings thereto
or where there is a tendency to affect the status quo
or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the
appellate court."
GARCIA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
ONG VS SANDIGANBAYAN
LAW ON FORFEITURE OF ILL-GOTTEN
WEALTH; REPUBLIC ACT 1379; FORFEITURE OF
PROPERTY PARTAKES THE NATURE OF A PENALTY. In
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled that forfeiture
proceedings under RA 1379 are civil in nature and
not penal or criminal in character, as they do not
terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in
the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in
favor of the State. Moreover, the procedure outlined
in the law is that provided for in a civil action,
viz.: . . . . Hence, unlike in a criminal proceeding,
there is to be no reading of the information,
arraignment, trial and reading of the judgment in the
presence of the accused. In the earlier case of Cabal
v. Kapunan, however, we declared that forfeiture to
the State of property of a public official or employee
partakes of the nature of a penalty and proceedings
for forfeiture of property, although technically civil in
form, are deemed criminal or penal. We clarified
therein that the doctrine laid down in Almeda v. Perez
that forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature applies
purely to the procedural aspect of such proceedings
and has no bearing on the substantial rights of the
respondents therein. This ruling was reiterated in
Katigbak v. Solicitor General, where we held that the
forfeiture of property provided for in RA 1379 is in the
nature of a penalty. It is in recognition of the fact that
forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty that RA
1379 affords the respondent therein the right to a
previous inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation
in criminal cases. Preliminary investigation is an
inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well- founded belief
that a crime has been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial. Although the right to a preliminary investigation
is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution but a mere statutory privilege, it is

nonetheless considered a component part of due

process in criminal justice.
AFFORDS A CO-RESPONDENT WHO IS NOT A
PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE THE RIGHT TO A
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. RA 1379, entitled "An
Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any
Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by
Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the
Procedure Therefor," expressly affords a respondent
public officer or employee the right to a previous
inquiry similar to preliminary investigation in criminal
cases, but is silent as to whether the same right is
enjoyed by a co-respondent who is not a public
officer or employee. Is this silence to be construed to
mean that the right to a preliminary investigation is
withheld by RA 1379 from a co-respondent, such as
Nelly Ong, who is not herself a public officer or
employee? The answer is no. It is a significant fact in
this case that the questioned assets are invariably
registered under the names of both Jose and Nelly
Ong owing to their conjugal partnership. Thus, even
as RA 1379 appears to be directed only against the
public officer or employee who has acquired during
his incumbency an amount of property which is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such
public officer or employee and his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired
property, the reality that the application of the law is
such that the conjugal share of Nelly Ong stands to
be subjected to the penalty of forfeiture grants her
the right, in line with the due process clause of the
Constitution, to a preliminary investigation.
FAILURE TO NOTIFY THE PETITIONERS OF
THE PROCEEDINGS AND TO BE PRESENT THEREAT IS
A DENIAL OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS WHICH TAINTS
THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. However, Ong
calls the Court's attention to the fact that he was not
notified of the subpoenas duces tecum ad
testificandum apparently issued to SGV, Allied Bank
and the BIR and the proceedings taken thereon. This
objection was raised in his Motion dated February 17,
1993, which was, unfortunately, perfunctorily denied.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman
provides
that
the
"preliminary
investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Court shall be
conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the
following provisions: . . . (f) If, after the filing of the
requisite affidavits and their supporting evidences,
there are facts material to the case which the
investigating officer may need to be clarified on, he
may conduct a clarificatory hearing during which the
parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be
present but without the right to examine or crossexamine the witness being questioned. Where the
appearance of the parties or witness is impracticable,
the clarificatory questioning may be conducted in
writing, whereby the questions desired to be asked
by the investigating officer or a party shall be
reduced into writing and served on the witness
concerned who shall be required to answer the same
in writing and under oath." Ong, therefore, should
have been notified of the subpoenas duces tecum ad
testificandum issued to SGV, Allied Bank and the BIR.
Although there is no indication on record that
clarificatory hearings were conducted pursuant to the
subpoenas, Ong is entitled to be notified of the
proceedings and to be present thereat. The fact that
he was not so notified is a denial of fundamental
fairness which taints the preliminary investigation.
DOES NOT OFFEND THE BASIC CONCEPT OF
FAIRNESS AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
Finally, the attacks against the
constitutionality of RA 1379 because it is vague,
violates the presumption of innocence and the right
against self incrimination, and breaches the authority
and prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, are unmeritorious. The law is
not vague as it defines with sufficient particularity

unlawfully acquired property of a public officer or

employee as that "which is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property." It also
provides a definition of what is legitimately acquired
property. Based on these parameters, the public is
given fair notice of what acts are proscribed. The law,
therefore, does not offend the basic concept of
fairness and the due process clause of the
Constitution.
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE CLAUSE; PRINCIPLE OF PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE, EXPLAINED. Neither is the presumption
of innocence clause violated by Sec. 2 of RA 1379
which states that property acquired by a public
officer or employee during his incumbency in an
amount which is manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer or employee and to his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property shall be presumed prima facie to
have been unlawfully acquired. As elaborated by Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, under the principle of presumption of
innocence, it is merely required of the State to
establish a prima facie case, after which the burden
of proof shifts to the accused. In People v. Alicante,
the Court held: No rule has been better established
in criminal law than that every man is presumed to
be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. In a criminal prosecution,
therefore, the burden is upon the State to prove
every fact and circumstance constituting the crime
charged, for the purpose of showing the guilt of the
accused. While that is the rule, many of the States
have established a different rule and have provided
that certain facts only shall constitute prima facie
evidence, and that then the burden is put upon the
defendant to show or to explain that such facts or
acts are not criminal. It has been frequently decided,
in case of statutory crimes, that no constitutional
provision is violated by a statute providing that proof
by the State of some material fact or facts shall
constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that
then the burden is shifted to the defendant for the
purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent
and are committed without unlawful intention. . . .
The State having the right to declare what acts are
criminal, within certain well defined limitations, has a
right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a
crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima
facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the
defendant the burden of showing that such act or
acts are innocent and are not committed with any
criminal intent or intention.
DOES NOT INFRINGE THE RIGHT AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION. The constitutional assurance of
the right against self-incrimination likewise cannot be
invoked by petitioners. The right is a prohibition
against the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from the accused. It is simply
a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
accused's own lips, against his will, admission of his
guilt. In this case, petitioners are not compelled to
present themselves as witnesses in rebutting the
presumption established by law. They may present
documents evidencing the purported bank loans,
money market placements and other fund sources in
their defense.
OMBUDSMAN; MUST BE CIRCUMSPECT IN
ITS CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. The
next question is whether we should direct the
Ombudsman to rectify the errors committed during
the preliminary investigation, i.e., the failure to give
Ong notice of the subpoenas issued to SGV, Allied
Bank and the BIR and notice of the Resolution
directing the filing of the petition for forfeiture. To so
order the Ombudsman at this point would no longer
serve any useful purpose and would only further
delay the proceedings in this case. Verily, petitioners
have been allowed to fully plead their arguments
before this Court. After all has been said, this case

should now be allowed to proceed in its course.

Nonetheless, we find this an opportune time to
admonish the Ombudsman to be more circumspect
in its conduct of preliminary investigation to the end
that participants therein are accorded the full
measure of their rights under the
Constitution and our laws.
POWERS. Petitioners are the first to agree
that the Ombudsman is vested with jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a
public officer or employee when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
They recognize that the Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction over cases, such as the present one,
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The problem with
petitioners' contention is their assumption that the
Ombudsman, a constitutionally-created body, will not
perform its functions faithfully. The duality of roles
which the Ombudsman exercises does not
necessarily warrant a conclusion that it will be given
to making a finding of probable cause in every case.
At any rate, "[I]n the debates on this matter in the
Constitutional Commission, it was stressed by the
sponsors of the Office of the Ombudsman that,
whereas the original Tanodbayan was supposed to be
limited to the function of prosecution of cases
against public functionaries, generally for graft and
corruption, the former would be considered 'the
champion of the citizen,' to entertain complaints
addressed to him and to take all necessary action
thereon." This should leave no doubt as regards the
constitutionality and propriety of the functions
exercised by the Ombudsman in this case. Verily, the
Court in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, reviewed the
powers of the
Ombudsman and held: At present, the powers of the
Ombudsman, as defined by Republic Act No. 6770
corollary to Section 13, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, include, inter alia, the authority to: (1)
investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the
exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over,
at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases; and (2)
investigate and initiate the proper action for the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth and/or unexplained
wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the
prosecution of the parties involved there. In the same
case, we declared that the Ombudsman has the
correlative powers to investigate and initiate the
proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or
unexplained wealth which were amassed after
February 25, 1986. There is therefore no merit in
petitioners' contention that the absence of
participation of the OSG taints the petition for
forfeiture with nullity.
SEGOVIA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Petitioners who hold regular executive
positions in the National Power Corporation were
designated by the NPC Board to compose the
Contract Committee for NPC projects. During the prequalification and bidding for a project, it declared a
failure of bidding and directed a re-bidding. The
recommendation was unanimously approved by the
NPC Board, but for no apparent reasons, the project
was eventually cancelled. Feeling aggrieved by the
turn of events, Urban, the lowest bidder in the failed
bidding filed a complaint before the Ombudsman.
After investigation, an information was accordingly
filed with the Sandiganbayan charging petitioners
with violation of R.A. 3019. They were suspended
pendente lite. The suspension is the subject of this
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
before the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that
their suspension was not mandatory considering that
the positions they occupy were quite sensitive and
had no relations to prequalification of contractors,

biddings or awards which was an additional

function temporarily assigned to them.
The Supreme Court held that under R.A.
3019, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory
after a determination has been made of the validity
of the information in a pre-suspension hearing
conducted for that purpose. It is also had the
occasion to reiterate the rule as was stressed in
Libanan v. Sandiganbayan that . . . When the statue
is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any
extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the
law. Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally mandates
the suspension of a public official from office pending
a criminal prosecution against him. This Court has
repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is
mandatory, and there are no 'ifs' and 'buts' about it.
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION; SUSPENSION OF
PUBLIC
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES; NOT PENAL IN
CHARACTER BUT MERELY PREVENTIVE MEASURE
BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT. The validity of Section 13,
R.A. 3019, as amended treating of the suspension
pendentelite of an accused public officer may no
longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly
upheld by this Court. As early as 1984, in Bayot v.
Sandiganbayan, the Court held that such suspension
was not penal in character but merely a preventive
measure before final judgment; hence, the
suspension of a public officer charged with one of the
crimes listed in the amending law, committed before
said amendment, does not violate the constitutional
provision against an ex post facto law. The purpose
of suspension is to prevent the accused public officer
from frustrating or hampering his prosecution by
intimidating or influencing witnesses or tampering
with documentary evidence, or from committing
further acts of malfeasance while in office.
Substantially to the same effect was the Court's
holding, in 1991, in Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, that
preventive suspension is not violative of the
Constitution as it is not a penalty; and a person
under preventive suspension remains entitled to the
constitutional presumption of innocence since his
culpability must still be established.
POWER TO SUSPEND LIES IN THE COURT IN
WHICH CRIMINAL CHARGE IS FILED. The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that
the power of preventive suspension lies in the court
in which the criminal charge is filed; once a case is
filed in court, all other acts connected with the
discharge of court functions including preventive
suspension should be acknowledged as within the
competence of the court that has taken cognizance
thereof, no violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers being perceivable in that acknowledgment.
APPLICABILITY OF SUSPENSION PENDENTE
LITE. The provision of suspension pendente lite
applies to all persons indicted upon a valid
information under the Act, whether they be
appointive or elective officials; or permanent or
temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or
non-career service. It applies to a Public High School
Principal; a Municipal Mayor; a Governor; a
Congressman; a Department of Science and
Technology (DOST) non-career Project Manager, a
Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG). The term "office" in
Section 13 of the law applies to any office which
might currently be holding and not necessarily the
particular office in relation to which he is charged.
MANDATORY. It is mandatory for the court to
place under preventive suspension a public officer
accused before it. Imposition of suspension, however,
is not automatic or self-operative. A pre-condition
therefor is the existence of a valid information,
determined at a pre-suspension hearing. Such a
hearing is in accord with the spirit of the law,
considering
the
serious
and
far-reaching
consequences of a suspension of a public official
even before his conviction, and the demands of

public interest for a speedy determination of the

issues involved in the case. The purpose of the presuspension hearing is basically to determine the
validity of the information and thereby furnish the
court with a basis to either suspend the accused and
proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or
refuse suspension of the latter and dismiss the case,
or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs
its validity. The accused should be given adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of
the criminal proceedings against him; e.g. that he
has not been afforded the right to due preliminary
investigation; that the acts imputed to him do not
constitute a specific crime (under R.A. 3019 or the
Revised
Penal Code) warranting his mandatory suspension
from office under Section 13 of the Act; or that the
information is subject to quashal on any of the
grounds set out on Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
But once a proper determination of the validity of the
information has been made, it becomes the
ministerial duty of the court to forthwith issue the
order of preventive suspension. The court has no
discretion, for instance, to hold in abeyance the
suspension of the accused official on the pretext that
the order denying the latter's motion to quash is
pending review before the appellate courts.
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION; MAY NOT EXCEED
NINETY (90) DAYS. However, the preventive
suspension may not be of indefinite duration or for
an unreasonable length of time; it would be
constitutionally proscribed otherwise as it raises, at
the very least, questions of denial of due process and
equal protection of the laws. The Court has thus laid
down the rule that preventive suspension may not
exceed the maximum period of ninety (90) days in
consonance with Presidential Decree No. 807 (the
Civil Service Decree), now Section 52 of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
PURPOSES OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION.
The
Court's
pronouncement
in
Bolastig
v.
Sandiganbayan , supra, are germane: "Our holding
that, upon the filing of a valid information charging
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Book II, Title 7 of
the Revised Penal Code, or fraud upon government or
public property, it is the duty of the court to place the
accused under preventive suspension disposes of
petitioner's other contention that since the trial in
the
Sandiganbayan is now over with respect to the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution there is
no longer any danger that petitioners would
intimidate prosecution's witnesses. The fact is that
the possibility that the accused would intimidate
witnesses or otherwise hamper his prosecution is just
one of the grounds for preventive suspension. The
other one is, to prevent the accused from committing
further acts of malfeasance while in office."
SOCRATES VS SANDIGANBAYAN
THE CHARACTER OF THE CRIME IS NOT
DETERMINED BY THE TITLE OF THE INFORMATION
BUT BY THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE BODY THEREOF.
Axiomatic is the rule that what controls is not the
designation of the offense but its description in the
complaint or information. The real nature of the
criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information. It is not the technical name given by the
fiscal appearing in the title of the information that
determines the character of the crime but the facts
alleged in the body of the information. This Court has
repeatedly held that when the facts, acts and
circumstances are set forth in the body of an
information with sufficient certainty to constitute an
offense and to apprise the defendant of the nature of
the charge against him, a misnomer or innocuous
designation of a crime in the caption or other parts of
the information will not vitiate it. In such a case, the

facts set forth in the charge controls the erroneous

designation of the offense and the accused stands
indicted for the offense charged in the statement of
facts. The erroneous designation may be disregarded
as surplusage.
WHERE THE OFFENSE MAY BE COMMITTED
IN SEVERAL MODES, THE RULE IS IT IS SUFFICIENT TO
PROVE THE OFFENSE AS COMMITTED IN ANY ONE OF
THEM IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION. It is an old
and well-settled rule in the appreciation of
indictments that where an offense may be
committed in any of several different modes, and the
offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to have
been committed in two or more of the modes
specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense
committed through any one of them, provided that it
be such as to constitute the substantive offense.
Thereafter, a judgment of conviction must be
sustained if it appears from the evidence in the
record that the accused was guilty as charged of any
one of these modes of the offense.
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION;
ABSENCE
THEREOF IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE QUASHAL OF A
COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION. It has been
consistently held that the absence of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the
criminal information or render it defective. Dismissal
of the case is not the remedy. It is not a ground for
the quashal of a complaint or information. The proper
course of action that should be taken is for the
Sandiganbayan to hold in abeyance the proceedings
upon such information and to remand the case to the
office of the Ombudsman for him or the Special
Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation, if
the accused actually makes out a case justifying such
relief.
AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO QUASH
IS INTERLOCUTORY ANDNOT APPEALABLE. We have
but to reiterate the fundamental rule that an order
denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and
therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of
a petition for certiorari. Such order may only be
reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal
from the judgment after trial. In other words, it
cannot be the subject of appeal until the judgment or
a final order is rendered. The ordinary procedure to
be followed in that event is to enter a plea, go to trial
and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on
appeal from the final judgment. The special civil
action for certiorari may be availed of in case there is
a grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT LAW);
SUSPENSION OF PUBLIC OFFICER IS MANDATORY
AFTER THE VALIDITY OF THE INFORMATION HAS BEEN
UPHELD IN A PRE-SUSPENSION HEARING. This Court
has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law,
the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after
the validity of the information has been upheld in a
pre-suspension hearing is conducted to determine
basically the validity of the information, from which
the court can have a basis to either suspend the
accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of
the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and
dismiss the case, or correct any part of the
proceeding which impairs its validity. That hearing
may be treated in the same manner as a challenged
to the validity of the information by way of a motion
to quash. It is evident that upon a proper
determination of the validity of the information, it
becomes mandatory for the court to immediately
issue the suspension order. The rule on the matter is
specific and categorical. It leaves no room for
interpretation. It is not within the court's discretion to
hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused
officer on the pretext that the order denying the
motion to quash is pending review before the
appellate courts. Its discretion lies only during the
pre-suspension hearing where it is required to
ascertain whether or not (1) the accused had been
afforded due preliminary investigation prior to the

filing of the informations against him, (2) the acts for

which he was charged constitute a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the
provisions of Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, or (3) informations against him can be
quashed, under any of the grounds provided in
Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. Once the
information is found to be sufficient in form and
substance, then the court must issue the order of
suspension as a matter of court. There are no ifs and
buts about it. This is because a preventive
suspension is not a penalty. It is not imposed as a
result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the
official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension. To further emphasize the
ministerial duty of the court under Section 13 of
Republic Act No.
3019, it is said that the court trying a case has
neither discretion nor duty to accused from using his
office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his
prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in
office. The presumption is that unless the accused is
suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or
commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the
same way that upon a finding that there is probable
cause to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the
law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the
arrest of the accused. The law does not require the
court to determine whether the accused is likely to
escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court.
IT IS THE DUTY OF THE PROSECUTING
OFFICER TO FILE CHARGES AGAINST WHOMSOEVER
THE EVIDENCE MAY SHOW TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR
AN OFFENSE. The rule under Section 1, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court, as reformulated in Section 2, Rule
110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is that
all criminal actions must be commenced either by
complaint or information in the name of the People of
the Philippines "against all persons who appear to be
responsible for the offense involved." The law makes
it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the
charges against whomsoever the evidence may show
to be responsible for an offense. This does not mean,
however, that they have no discretion at all; their
discretion lies in determining whether the evidence
submitted justify a reasonable belief that a person
has committed an offense. What the rule demands is
that all persons who appear responsible shall be
charged in the information, which conversely implies
that those against whom no sufficient evidence of
guilt exists are not required to be included.
MOTION TO QUASH; GROUNDS; FAILURE TO
ASSERT, MAY BE DEEMED A WAIVER THEREOF. A
failure to include other persons who appear to be
responsible for the crime charged is not one of the
grounds provided under Section 3, Rule 117 for which
a motion to quash the information against the
accused may be filed, most especially in the case at
bar where there is prima facie proof that petitioner is
probably guilty of the offense charged, aside from
the fact that there is no allegation of conspiracy in
the informations. Besides, such an infirmity would
neither have the effect of extinguishing or mitigating
petitioner's liability if he is subsequently found guilty
of the offense charged. Section 8, Rule 117 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that "the
failure of the accused to assert any ground of a
motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion
to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion
to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged,
lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged,
extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy."
The failure to include a co-accused is not covered by
the exception; hence, the same is deemed waived.
REMEDIES OF THE OFFENDED PARTY IN
CASE THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTOR REFUSES TO
FILE
INFORMATION.
Where
the
government

prosecutor unreasonably refuses to file an

information or to include a person as an accused
therein despite the fact that the evidence clearly
warrants such action, the offended party has the
following remedies: (1) in case of grave abuse of
discretion, he may file an action for mandamus to
compel the prosecutor to file such information; (2) he
may lodge a new complaint against the offenders
before the Ombudsman and have a new examination
conducted as required by law; (3) he may institute
administrative charges against the erring prosecutor,
or a criminal complaint under Article 208 of the
Revised Penal Code, or a civil action for damages
under Article 27 of the Civil Code; (4) he may secure
the appointment of another prosecutor; or (5) he
may institute another criminal action if no double
jeopardy is involved.
CASTILLO-CO VS BARBERS
Congressman Junie Cua, in the course of the
congressional investigation, discovered irregularities
in the purchase of heavy equipment by petitioner
and the Provincial Engineer constituting overpricing,
purchase of reconditioned and not brand new
equipments, absence of public bidding and
inspection, and advance payment prior to delivery.
He filed a complaint against the two before the Office
of the Ombudsman for violation of Sections 3(e) and
3 (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended. Petitioner was placed under preventive
suspension for 6 months a week after the filing of the
complaint. The order was approved by the Deputy
Ombudsman
for
Luzon.
Their
motions
for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed
the present recourse contesting the authority of the
Deputy Ombudsman to sign the order of preventive
suspension, the period of suspension was excessive,
and denial of due process.
The Supreme Court held that R.A. 7975 (An
Act to Strengthen the Functional and Standard
Organization of the Sandiganbayan, as amended)
does not suggest that only the Ombudsman and not
his deputy may order the preventive suspension of
officials occupying positions classified as grade 27 or
above; that the Ombudsman and his deputy may
order preventive suspension pursuant to the
provisions of Section 24 of R.A. 6770 and Section 9,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman; that preventive suspension, being
merely a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation, may be decreed even before the
charges are heard; and that the six-month
suspension of petitioner is within the limits
prescribed by Section 24 of R.A. 6770.
PUBLIC
OFFICERS;
PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION; A PUBLIC OFFICER WITH A SALARY
GRADE OF 27 OR ABOVE MAY BE SUSPENDED BY THE
OMBUDSMAN OR HIS DEPUTY. Under the provisions of
Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 6770 and Section 9, Rule
III of the Rules of Procedure of the office of the
Ombudsman, there cannot be any doubt that the
Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend
an officer or employee, where appropriate, as
indicated
by
the
word
"or"
between
the
"Ombudsman" and "his Deputy." The word "or" is a
disjunctive term signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from each of the other
things enumerated. The law does not require that
only the
Ombudsman himself may sign the order of
suspension.
NOT IN THE NATURE OF PENALTY, HENCE,
CAN BE DECREED EVEN BEFORE THE CHARGES ARE
HEARD. A preventive suspension, however, can be
decreed on an official under investigation after
charges are brought and even before the charges are
heard since the same is not in the nature of a
penalty, but merely a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation.

IMMEDIATE ISSUANCE THEREOF DOES NOT

CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The fact
that the said order was issued seven days after the
complaint was filed did not constitute grave abuse of
discretion. The immediate issuance of such order is
required in order to prevent the subject of the
suspension from committing further irregularities.
Such prompt action, moreover, is in consonance with
Section 15 of R.A. 6770.
PUBLIC OFFICIALS ENJOY THE PRESUMPTION
OF REGULARITY OF PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES. We
do not give much credence to petitioner's
suggestions of a malicious conspiracy between the
Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero and Congressman
Cua, reputedly petitioner's political adversary, to
harass her. The Deputy Ombudsman and the
Congressman, being public officials, enjoy the
presumption of regularity of performance of duties.
Such presumption can be overcome only by strong
and convincing evidence. No such evidence exists in
this case.
PUBLIC
OFFICERS;
PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION; CONDITIONS; MET IN CASE AT BAR.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the conditions
required to sustain her preventive suspension have
been met in this case. These conditions are: (1) That
the evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) That any of
the following circumstances are present: (a) the
charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges
would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.
DETERMINATION WHETHER THE EVIDENCE
OF GUILT IS
STRONG RESTS UPON THE DETERMINATION OF THE
OMBUDSMAN. The first requisite rests upon the
determination of the disciplining authority, the Office
of the Ombudsman in this case: As held in
Buenaseda v. Flavier, however, whether the evidence
of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the
Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence
before him. A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions
in cases involving capital offenses is not required. In
rejecting a similar argument as that made by
petitioner in this case, this Court said in that case:
The import of the Nera decision is that the
disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide
when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is
bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which
expressly left such determination of guilt to the
'judgment' of the Ombudsman on the basis of the
administrative complaint . . . We find no reason to
disturb such determination in this case.
EVIDENCE NEED NOT BE ADDUCED TO
PROVE THAT PETITIONER MAY INFLUENCE POSSIBLE
WITNESSES OR MAY TAMPER WITH PUBLIC RECORDS.
Petitioner's high position likewise gives her access to
public records and the clout to influence possible
witnesses. Her continued stay in office may thus
prejudice the prosecution of the case filed against
her. It is immaterial that, as petitioner contends, no
evidence has been adduced to prove that petitioner
may influence possible witnesses or may tamper with
the public records. It is sufficient that there exists
such a possibility.
SUSPENSION FOR SIX (6) MONTHS, WITHIN
THE PRESCRIBED LIMITS. Finally, the duration of
petitioner's suspension is not excessive. Petitioner's
suspension for six (6) months is within the limits
prescribed by Section
24 of R.A. 6770. The length of the period of
suspension within such limits, like the evaluation of
the strength of the evidence, lies in the discretion of
the Ombudsman.
JARAVATA VS SANDIGANBAYAN

ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT;

SECTION 3 (b) THEREOF; OFFICIAL INTERVENTION BY
PUBLIC OFFICER MUST BE REQUIRED BY LAW; CASE
AT BAR. Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, refers
to a public officer whose official intervention is
required by law in a contract or transaction. There is
no law which invests the petitioner with the power to
intervene in the payment of the salary differentials of
the complainants or anyone for that matter. Far from
exercising any power, the petitioner played the
humble role of a supplicant whose mission was to
expedite payment of the salary differentials. In his
official capacity as assistant principal, he is not
required by law to intervene in the payment of the
salary differentials. Accordingly, he cannot be said to
have violated the law afore-cited although he exerted
efforts to facilitate the payment of the salary
differentials.
QUIBAL VS SANDIGANBAYAN
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES;
ELEMENTS FOR
CONVICTION. Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019
requires proof of the following facts, viz: 1.The
accused is a public officer discharging administrative
or official functions or private persons charged in
conspiracy with them; 2. The public officer
committed the prohibited act during the performance
of his official duty or in relation to his public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross, inexcusable negligence;
and 4. His action caused undue injury to the
Government or any private party, or gave any party
any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to
such parties.
ELEMENT OF MANIFEST PARTIALITY AND
EVIDENT BAD FAITH, ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR.
Petitioners insist that their guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt for they did not act with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross,
inexcusable negligence nor did they cause any injury
or damage to the municipal government for the
construction of the municipal market was eventually
completed. We reject these contentions. The
construction of the municipal market should have
been finished on March 7, 1988. At the time of the
audit on August 31, 1988, however, only 36.24% of
the construction of the market has been completed.
Yet, out of the contract price of P652,562.60,
petitioners already paid the contractor a total of
P650,000.00. In so doing, petitioners disregarded the
provision in the contract that payment should be
based on the percentage of work accomplishment.
Moreover, the contract provided that in case of delay
in the completion of the project, the contractor shall
be liable for liquidated damages at the rate of 1/10 of
1% of the contract price per day of delay. Petitioners
did not impose this provision against the contractor.
By their acts, petitioners clearly acted with manifest
partiality and evident bad faith relative to the
construction of the municipal market.
ELEMENT
OF
GROSS
NEGLIGENCE;
CONSTRUED IN CASE AT BAR. Petitioners' acts and
omissions are, to say the least, grossly negligent.
Gross negligence is the pursuit of a course of conduct
which would naturally and reasonably result in injury.
It is an utter disregard of or conscious indifference to
consequences. In cases involving public officials,
there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is
flagrant and palpable. In the case at bench,
petitioners' acts and omissions demonstrated an
utter lack of care in enforcing the contract for the
construction of the public market and a reckless
disregard of the COA rules and regulations regarding
disbursement of municipal funds. Petitioners contend
that they released P650,000.00 of the contract price
to enable the contractor to take advantage of the low
cost of construction materials prevailing at that time.
Plainly petitioners' act violates the provision of the
contract requiring that payment shall be made on the
basis of the percentage of completion of the project .
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the

Sandiganbayan: . . . "The escalation of prices of

construction materials which allegedly prompted
Quibal to pay the contractor prematurely is not a
justification that would absolve the accused public
officers from criminal liability. The parties could have
included an escalation clause in the contract . . .
Moreover, there is a law which authorizes the
adjustment of contract price (R.A. 5979, as amended
by PD No. 454) . . ."
UNDUE INJURY OR DAMAGE CAUSED TO THE
GOVERNMENT; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR.
Petitioners also insist that no undue injury or damage
was caused to the municipal government considering
the later completion of the public market. We cannot
share this myopic view. The construction of the
municipal market was completed only at the end of
December 1989 when it should have been finished
by March 7, 1988. This unnecessary delay of almost
two (2) years caused considerable monetary loss to
the municipal government in the form of monthly
rentals. The least that petitioners should have done
was to enforce the penalty clause of the contract
(providing for payment of liquidated damages in case
of breach) when the contractor failed to meet his
deadline on March 7, 1988. Instead of doing so,
petitioners even made two (2) additional payments
to the contractor (on March 14 and April 22, 1988) in
the total sum of P250,000.00. Thus,
it cannot
be successfully argued that the acts and omissions of
petitioners did not cause damage or injury to the
municipal government.
WHEN PROVED, REQUEST FOR RE-AUDITING
NO LONGER FEASIBLE. To bolster their claim of denial
of due process, petitioners cite the case of Tinga v.
People of the Philippines (No. L-57650, April 15,
1988, 160 SCRA 483). Petitioners' reliance on the
Tinga case is misplaced. In said case, we ruled that
Tinga was denied due process when the Commission
on Audit refused to conduct a reevaluation of the
accountabilities of Tinga. The ruling was based on
the Court's finding that COA's evaluation of Tinga's
accountabilities was replete with errors. Petitioners
also claim that considering the value of the unused
stockpile of construction materials and supplies, a reaudit would prove that the payment they made was
justified and that the actual cost of the project at the
time of the initial inspection is indeed P650,000.00.
We hold that the suggested re-audit would not
exonerate the petitioners. The re-audit cannot blur
the fact that undue damage has already been caused
to the municipal government in view of the delay in
the construction of the municipal market and the
failure of the petitioners to enforce the penalty
clause in the construction contract.
RIOS VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Petitioner, then incumbent Mayor of San
Fernando, Romblon, was charged with
violation
of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) for alleged unauthorized disposition of
confiscated, assorted and sawn tangible lumber
without proper authority from DENR and the
Sangguniang Bayan. He moved to quash the
information on the ground of lack of probable cause
and alleged that the disposition of lumber did not
result in any "undue injury" because the proceeds of
the disposition went to the coffers of the municipal
government. On motion by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, petitioner was suspended pendente lite
by the Sandiganbayan for a period ninety days.
Reconsideration sought by petitioner was denied,
hence, the present recourse.
The Supreme Court held that the act of
disposing confiscated lumber without proper
authority from the DENR and the Sangguniang Bayan
constituted a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. It
also held that it was mandatory for the
Sandiganbayan to suspend any incumbent public
officer charged with violation of R.A. 3019 or any
crime committed by public officers or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property; and that any single preventive suspension

of local elective officials should not extend beyond

sixty (60) days.
DISPOSAL OF CONFISCATED LUMBER WITHOUT PRIOR
AUTHORITY FROM DENR AND THE SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN, A VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) OF R.A. 3019.
The act of disposing of confiscated lumber without
prior authority: from DENR and the Sangguniang
Bayan constituted a violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
3019. Therefore, there is probable cause to hold
petitioner liable for such act, for which the
information was validly filed.
PUBLIC OFFICE; PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC
TRUST. This
Court would like to stress adherence to the doctrine
that public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives. Public servants
must bear in mind this constitutional mandate at all
times to guide them in their actions during their
entire tenure in the government service. "The good
of the service and the degree of morality with every
official and employee in the public service must
observe, if respect and confidence are to be
maintained by the Government in the enforcement of
the law, demand that no untoward conduct on his
pan, affecting morality, integrity and efficiency while
holding office should be left without proper and
commensurate sanction, all attendant circumstances
taken into account."
R.A. 3019; SUSPENSION OF PUBLIC OFFICER
VALIDLY
CHARGED WITH VIOLATION THEREOF, MANDATORY.
The suspension pendent lite meted out by the
Sandiganbayan is, without doubt, a proper and
commensurate sanction against petitioner. Having
ruled that the information filed against petitioner is
valid, there can be no impediment to the application
of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, which states, inter
alia: "Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any
incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act
or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or
for any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution
and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office."
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION OF LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; PERIOD
SHALL NOT EXCEED SIXTY
(60) DAYS. It is settled jurisprudence that the
aforequoted provision (Sec. 13, R.A. No. 3019) makes
it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any
public officer who has been validly charged with a
violation of R.A. No. 3019, Book II, Title 7 of the
Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property. "The
court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to
determine whether preventive suspension is required
to prevent the accused from using his office to
intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or
continue committing malfeasance in office." This is
based on the presumption that unless the public
officer is suspended, he may frustrate his
prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or
both. On the other hand, we find merit in petitioner's
second assigned error. The Sandiganbayan erred in
imposing a 90-day suspension upon petitioner for the
single case filed against him. Under Section 63 (b) of
the Local Government Code, "any single preventive
suspension of local elective officials shall not extend
beyond sixty (60) days."
ARIAS VS SANDIGANBAYAN
This case presents a conspiracy of silence
and inaction where chiefs of office who should have
been vigilant to protect the interest of the
Government in the purchase of Agleham's two-

hectare riceland, accepted as gospel truth the

certifications of their subordinates, and approved
without question the million-peso purchase which, by
the standards prevailing in 1976-78, should have
pricked their curiosity and prompted them to make
inquiries and to verify the authenticity of the
documents presented to them for approval. The
petitioners kept silent when they should have asked
questions; they looked the other way when they
should have probed deep into the transaction. Since
it was too much of a coincidence that both
petitioners were negligent at the same time over the
same transaction, the Sandiganbayan was justified in
concluding that they connived and conspired to act
in that manner to approve the illegal transaction
which would favor the seller of the land and defraud
the Government.
STATE AUDIT CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
ASPECTS OF THE AUDITIONAL FUNCTION OF AN
AUDITOR. The primary function of an auditor is to
prevent
irregular,
unnecessary,
excessive
or
extravagant expenditures of government funds. The
auditorial function of an auditor, as a representative
of the Commission on Audit, comprises three
aspects: (1) examination; (2) audit: and (3)
settlement of the accounts, funds, financial
transactions and resources of the agencies under
their respective audit jurisdiction (Sec. 43,
Government Auditing Code of the Phil.). Examination,
as applied to auditing, means "to probe records, or
inspect securities or other documents; review
procedures, and question persons, all for the purpose
of arriving at an opinion of accuracy, propriety,
sufficiency, and the like." (State Audit Code of the
Philippines, Annotated by Tantuico, 1 982 Ed., p. 57.)
EMINENT DOMAIN; TAX DECLARATION; A
GUIDE OR INDICATOR OF THE REASONABLE VALUE
OF THE PROPERTY. The acquisition of Agleham's

riceland was not done by expropriation but through a

negotiated sale. In the course of the negotiations,
there was absolutely no allegation nor proof that the
price of P80 per square meter was its fair market
value in 1978, i.e., eleven (11) years ago. What the
accused did was to prove the value of the land
through fake tax declarations (Exhs. B, F, K), false
certifications (Exhs. J, D and E) and a forged sworn
statement on the current and fair market value of the
real property (Exh. Z) submitted by the accused in
support of the deed of sale. Because fraudulent
documents were used, it may not be said that the
State agreed to pay the price on the basis of its
fairness, for the Government was in fact deceived
concerning the reasonable value of the land. When
Ocol testified in 1983 that P80 was a reasonable
valuation for the Agleham's land, he did not clarify
that was also its reasonable value in 1975, before
real estate values in Pasig soared as a result of the
implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project.
Hence, Ocol's testimony was insufficient to rebut the
valuation in Agleham's genuine 1978 Tax Declaration
No. 47895 that the fair valuation of the riceland then
was only P5 per square meter. A Tax Declaration is a
guide or indicator of the reasonable value of the
property (EPZA vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305).
PARTIALITY; MAYBE PROVEN BY ATTENDANT
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE ABSENCE OF DIRECT
EVIDENCE. Partiality for Agleham/Gutierrez may be
inferred from their having deliberately closed their
eyes to the defects and irregularities of the
transaction in his favor and their seeming neglect, if
not deliberate omission, to check, the authenticity of
the documents presented to them for approval. Since
partiality is a mental state or predilection, in the
absence of direct evidence, it may be proved by the
attendant circumstances.