TECSON V.

COMELEC1
G.R. NO. 161434, 3 MARCH 2004
FACTS: The case at bar is a consolidated case filed by petitioners questioning
the certificate of candidacy of herein private respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr. The latter filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
President of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) party.
He represented himself in said certificate as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
which reason that petitioners filed a petition before the Comelec to disqualify private
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy on the ground that the latter made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino when in truth his
parents were foreigners and he is an illegitimate child. The Comelec dismissed the
petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
HELD: Before discussing on the issue at hand it is worth stressing that since private
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was born on August 20, 1939, the applicable law then
controlling was the 1935 constitution. The issue on private respondents citizenship is so
essential in view of the constitutional provision that, No person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to
read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of
the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. Natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the evidence
presented which the Supreme consider as viable is the fact that the death certificate of
Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private respondent
Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years,
in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo
Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of
residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death.
Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since
Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of private
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter is governed by
the provisions of the 1935 Constitution which constitution considers as citizens of the
Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in
fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate
or illegitimate.
1

Senate of the Phils. v Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006
Facts:
1.
Assailed in this petition was the constitutionality of Executive Order 464 issued by
the President. Petitioners contend that the President abused its power and prayed that
said law be declared null and void. EO 464 requires that heads of departments obtain
the consent of the President before they can validly appear before investigations
including the one conducted in the Senate. It also grants executive privilege on all
classified or confidential information between the President and the public officers
covered by the EO.
2.

The Senate conducted an investigation and issued invitations to various officials of

the Executive department as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail
project. Said public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Sen. Enrile urging the
Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the
contract covering the said project. The Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security likewise issued invitations to officials of the AFP.

3.

Executive Ermita sent a letter to the Senate requesting postponement of the

hearing. On the same day (Sept 28, 2005) the President issued EO 464. Despite this
development, the investigation pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen.
Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending. Both were subsequently relieved for
defying the Presidents order.

4.

Hence, three petitions (Bayan Muna, Sen. Chavez, Alt.. Law Group), for certiorari and
prohibition and TRO, were filed before the Supreme Court challenging the
constitutionality of E.O. 464.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in
Congress
YES. EO 464 bars the appearance of executive officials before the Congress, hence it
deprives it of the information in possession of these officials.

1.

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 Article VI of the

Constitution. This power is incidental to the legislative function. The power of inquiry
with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change;
and when it does not possess the required information, recourse must be had on others
who possess it. This power is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.

The operation of the government is a proper subject for investigation, as held in Arnault
case.
2.

Although the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to
the power of inquiry, which fall under the rubric of executive privilege. It is defined by
Schwartz as the power of the government to withhold information from the public, the
courts and the Congress. (e.g. state secret privilege, informers privilege, generic
privilege)

3.

The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section
21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of
powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot
frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for
information. The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory
process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent
with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

4.

Congress undoubtedly, has a right to information from the executive branch whenever
it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on
the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and
why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions,
the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is
impermissible.

5.

Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is
recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While
executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not
depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.
Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to
disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

Sec. 21 (Inquiry in Aid of Legislation) vs Sec. 22 (Question Hour)

6.

A distinction was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour.
While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory
in inquiries in aid of legislation. These are two distinct functions of the legislature. Sec.
21 and 22 while closely related does not pertain to the same power of the Congress.

One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation with the
aim of eliciting information that may be used in legislation while the other pertains to
the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress oversight function. Hence, the oversight function of Congress may
only be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in
pursuit of legislation.
7.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege, and not by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted
from this power the president on whom the executive power is vested, hence beyond
the reach of the Congress except by the power of impeachment. Members of SC are
likewise exempt from this power of inquiry. This is on the basis of separation of powers
and fiscal autonomy, as well as the constitutional independence of the judiciary.
On the constitutionality of EO 464

8.

Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the

Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be
construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the
question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading
is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much
as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional. Section 1 cannot, however, be
applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is
not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in
such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the
President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

9.

Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. Section 3 of E.O. 464,
therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions
claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of
privilege authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid. The claim of privilege
under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the
claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has
not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the
withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely
frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.

10. The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464
is, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of inquiry.

11. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever
it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on
the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and
why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the
executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly
asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient
of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. Resort to any means then by which
officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed
valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to
inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up something of
much greater value our right as a people to take part in government.

PIMENTEL vs CONGRESS
( Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for President and VicePresident in the May 10, 2004 Elections [G.R. No. 163783. June 22, 2004]
EN BANC R E S O L U T I O N
Facts:
Petition for Prohibition. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the
continued existence of the JointCommittee. The petition corollarily prays for the issuance
of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from
conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of
Congress on Canvassing.
Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment sine die(w/o date fixed) on June 11,
2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its las tregular session, [its] term ... terminated and
expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to
2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters
and proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress.
ISSUE: WON the Joint Committee performing election canvass even after the
termination of congress session is constitutional.
RULING:
Sec. 15. Art VI - The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of
July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to
be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the
opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
The President may call a special session at any time.
Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the term of the present Twelfth
Congress did not terminate and expire upon the adjournment sine die of the regular
session of both Houses on June 11, 2004.
Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the
term of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30day recess before the opening of its next regular session (subject to the power of the
President to call a special session at any time).
Section 4 of Article VIII provides that "[t]he term of office of the Senators shall be
six years and shall commence, unlessotherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election." Similarly, Section 7 provides that"[t]he
Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years.
Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present
Twelfth Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have"passed
out of legal existence."
The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon
the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect

its non-legislative functions. In fact, the joint public session of both Housesof
Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII to canvass the
votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and VP has not, and cannot,
adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only
when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio .
Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has
accomplished its purposes.
Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to
canvass the votes and proclaim the duly elected President and VP, its existence as the
National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred
the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has
not become functus officio
.

SOLIVEN vs. MAKASIAR

167 SCRA 393 Political Law Constitutional Law Presidents Immunity From Suit
Must Be Invoked by the President
FACTS: Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was
charged with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaintaffidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint
affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention
on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then
the president would allow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and
conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a
president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself
thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than
the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from
suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance
or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided
attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office
and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the
President is the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot
be assumed and imposed by any other person.

Rubrico vs. Arroyo

February 18, 2010
FACTS:
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging
to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force
Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the
petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo
were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men
following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the
individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the
security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately
file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender
of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce
documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material
inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the
President may not be sued during her incumbency.
Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the
President, et al.
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and
dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
HELD:
The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of
government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a
concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an
express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already
understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving
as such.
The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for
failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body
for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that
followed.

GLORIA vs. CA

FACTS: Respondent was appointed School Division Superintendent, Division of City

Schools, Quezon City. Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports, the President reassigned him as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of
Science and Technology on the ground that he is an expert in vocational and technical
education. Respondent questioned the validity of his reassignment on the ground that it
is indefinite and it violated his security of tenure.
HELD: There is nothing to show that the reassignment of respondent is temporary. The
evidence or intention to reassign respondent had no definite period. It is violative of his
security of tenure
HELD: The contention is untenable. The petition is not directed against the President.
Presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts.

CIVIL LIBERTIES vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

194 SCRA 317 Political Law Ex Officio Officials Members of the Cabinet
Singularity of Office EO 284
FACTS: In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284
which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries
to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions
subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO
averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being
challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article
7 of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies
or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are
those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as
a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice
is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit
the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from
holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in
those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to
posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members
(then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general
rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions
which cannot override the constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding
thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art
IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the

number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries

may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the
government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the
1987 Constitution itself.

SECTION 8 ARTICLE 7, 1987 CONSTITUTION

ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO
(G.R. NO. 146710-15, MARCH 2, 2001)
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected
President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Both
petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30,
1998.During his term, the petitioner experienced a sharp descent from power started on
October 4, 2000 when Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of
the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving
millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage.
Numerous investigations commenced both from the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air that on October
11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral letter asking the petitioner to step
down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern.
Political tensions continued to heat up as key economic advisers and members of the
cabinet defected. On November 13, in a tumultuous session, the house of
representatives finally transmitted the articles of impeachment to the senate signed
by 115 represenatatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of
Representatives. On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial
of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme
Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding. The political tension rose during
the impeachment trial particularly during the December hearings when Clarissa
Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank testified on the existence of the
Jose Velarde account. The impeachment trial reached its turning point when on the
fateful day of January 16, by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the
opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that
petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde."
The non-opening of the second envelope led to the resignation of the public and
private prosecutors and the spontaneous outburst of anger by the people in EDSA
which is now referred to as the EDSA dos.
Petitioners fall from power became more apparent starting January 19 when
key officials from the armed forces, the PNP and his other cabinet members withdrew
support. At about 12:00 noon of January 20 Chief Justice Davide administered the
oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner
and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace while leaving a press statement
indicating his strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of the
proclamation of the respondent as President and that he is leaving the Palace as he
does not wish to prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the case at bar is a political question and hence, are beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court to decide
2. Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is
an Acting President.
HELD:
1.)No the case at bar is not a political question. Accordingly, it is within the
jurisdiction of the Court to decide. In the case of Tanada v. Cuenco, the Court,
through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer
"to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a
great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question
doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government.
Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the
Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision,
however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to
prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did
not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In fine, the legal distinction between
EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of
the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition
the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the
President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government
that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the
succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I
presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.
2. ) No. President Estrada is not on leave, he resigned from office. Resignation is not
a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond
quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal

requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be

implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter
of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace. Consequently, whether or not
petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during
and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior
facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using
this totality test, the Court holds that petitioner resigned as President. The
petitioners resignation is shown in the following instances:
a. he left Malacaang
b. he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic
albeit with reservation about its legality
c. he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say
he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears
d. he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.
e. he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come
ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future
challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up;
f. he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President
2. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the
criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada
3. Whether or not the petitioner is immune from the charges filed against
HELD:
1. No, petitioner is not only temporarily unable to act as president. House Resolution
Nos. 175,176, and 178, as well as Senate Resolutions No. 82, 83 and 84 show that
both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner
Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of
inability.
2.) No. Conviction in the impeachment proceedings is not a condition precedent for
the criminal prosecution of the petitioner. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada
was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss

of the presidency. Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is

untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then
convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar
against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will
place him in a better situation than a non- sitting President who has not been
subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal
prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear
that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the
President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him
3.) No. The petitioner is not immuned from the cases filed against him by virtue of
him being an unsitting president. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are
criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no
stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the
death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to
commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It
will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful
acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the
State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any trespasser.
Executive power; power of reorganization; rationale. And in Domingo v. Zamora [G.R.
No. 142283, February 6, 2003], the Court gave the rationale behind the Presidents
continuing authority in this wise: The law grants the President this power in recognition
of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive
Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of
being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his
directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the
President. Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal AffairsInvestigative and Adjudicatory Division, et al., G.R. No. 196425. July 24, 2012.

Executive power; power of reorganization; nature. Generally, this authority to

implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office or a function
from the Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the other way
around. Only Section 31(1) [of the Administrative Code] gives the President a virtual
freehand in dealing with the internal structure of the Office of the President Proper by
allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units,
apart from the less drastic move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to
another. Again, in Domingo v. Zamora, the Court noted: However, the Presidents

power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292
should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper.
Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President
Proper byabolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from
one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the Presidents
power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the
Office of the President is limited to merelytransferring functions or agencies from the
Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, andvice versa.

ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS
(177 SCRA 668)
FACTS:
In February 1986, Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the
non-violent people power revolution and forced into exile. Corazon C. Aquino was
declared President of the Philippines under a revolutionary government.
After three years, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to
the Philippines to die. But President Aquino has stood firmly in the decision to bar the
return of Mr. Marcos and his family - considering the dire consequences to the nation of
his return at a time when the stability of the government is threatened from various
directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward.
ISSUE: Whether or not in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
HELD:
Yes, the President has the Power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from
returning to our country.
The Constitution says that the executive power shall be vested in the President. It
also enumerates certain specific powers. The enumeration, however, does not exhaust
the totality of executive powers. Tradition recognizes that the powers of the President
are more than the sum of enumerated executive powers. The duty of the government
to serve and protect the people as well as to see to the maintenance of peace and
order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare argue towards the existence of residual instated powers.

ARTICLE VII- EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

BINAMIRA VS. GARRUCHO
(188 SCRA 154 [1990])
FACTS:
The petitioner, Binamira, was the former General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority by virtue of the designation of the Minister of Tourism with the
approval of President Aquino. Subsequently, Garrucho was delegated by the President as
the new Secretary of the Ministry. Garucho then had taken over the position of Binamira
as the General Manager of Philippine Tourism Authority. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. W/N a person designated to a position by a member of the
cabinet should step down to a person newly designated by
the President to that same position.
2. Distinguished designation from appointment
HELD:
1. YES.The designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his
claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that
The decree clearly provides that the appointment of the
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall
Be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any
other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion,
Which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally
speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to
assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the
President.
His designation being an unlawful encroachment on a
presidential prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder to the position in
question. Even if it be assumed that it could be and was authorized, the designation
signified merely a temporary or acting appointment that could be legally withdrawn at
pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a different reason).
2. Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise
involves the naming of a particular
person to a specified public office.
That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely
designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this
sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which
does not confer security of tenure on the person named.
MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO

G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

FACTS:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelecs
EID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March
2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together with other
commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim appointment,
respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address
transferring petitioner to the Law Department.
Petitioner requested Benipayo to
reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law
Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April
10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees
are prohibited during the election period. Benipayo denied her request for
reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November
6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en
banc.
She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint 16 with the Law
Department17against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h)
of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service
laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the
instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC,
respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of
the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary
appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING:
We find petitioners argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes

an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until

disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the
vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments
during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac34 and Solicitor
General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.35 The ad interim appointments
of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which
authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take
effect immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent" 36, this
provision should be harmonized with the Presidents power to extend ad
interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the
appointees can assume office will negate the Presidents power to make ad
interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give
meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear
intent of the framers of the Constitution.