TE VS TE

Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition.

Psychological

incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has become a clichd subject of
discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much
ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily
imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally
inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and devoid of
any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision 1[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the
January 19, 2004 Resolution2[2] denying the motion for the reconsideration of the
challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena
Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association
in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowenas close friend; but,
as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena.
That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and
respondent, a freshman.3[3]

1[1] Penned by Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices

Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; rollo, pp. 23-36.
2[2] Id. at 38-39.

Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another
and developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or
around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they
elope.

At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless.

Her

persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu
that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket. 4
[4]
However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house
accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a
job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her
uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad, and
Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide,
Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place.5[5]
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married.
He was then 25 years old, and she, 20. 6[6] The two then continued to stay at her
uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe was not allowed to go
out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter
not to leave Rowena.7[7] At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to
3[3] TSN, September 12, 2000, p. 2.
4[4] Id.

5[5] Id. at 2-3.

6[6] Records, p. 8.
7[7] TSN, September 12, 2000, pp. 3-4.

his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents home and live with
them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get
his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father
about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited,
and insisted that Edward must go home.8[8]
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and
stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and her family
whenever they telephoned to ask for him.9[9]
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena.

Unmoved by his

persistence that they should live with his parents, she said that it was better for
them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.10[10]
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the
annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological
incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.11[11]
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered
the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether
there was collusion between the parties.12[12] In the meantime, on July 27, 2000,

8[8] Id.
9[9] Id.
10[10] Id. at 4.
11[11] Records, p. 1.

the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the
OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings.13[13]
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it
could not determine if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it
recommended trial on the merits.14[14]
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties
psychologically incapacitated, and made the following findings and conclusions:

BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult
born and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He finished two years in
college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently unemployed. He is
married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented
himself at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for
Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological
incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one
deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the business world by whom he
[considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are said to be
handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet
and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After
1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International
Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner,
he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full
servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from
his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and
hear its message.
12[12] Id. at 24.
13[13] Id. at 36-37.
14[14] Id. at 39.

Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father
and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree
and shared intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend prior to that with
petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this
became the foundation of their intimate relationship. After a month of dating,
petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having problems with his family.
Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that she
actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had
insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated
because he is not prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she
insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is rich. In the last
week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she
already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to
the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house
of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was
compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not
find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek help
from petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all
of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent decided to go back to
her home for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a
few days of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she wanted
to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when he arrived at their
house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold,
respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner
got scared so he went home again. Respondent would call by phone every now
and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent
went to the extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his
family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make
amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage.
Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on
April 23, 1996, respondents uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that
very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the
Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after
arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived,
respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was threatened in so
many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent even
threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission their
military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a
declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look for him at his
parents[ ]and relatives[ ]houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able
to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament and they

forgave him and supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner,
however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent.
When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,]
after the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live
instead to[sic] the home of petitioners parents while they are still studying.
Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she would only live with him if they
will have a separate home of their own and be away from his parents. She also
intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he would
inherit from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these
not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own
family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them
to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents.
He told her already that he was disinherited and since he also does not have a job,
he would not be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have
any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed
petitioner that they should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be
undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both
parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He was still in the
state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically
involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature
and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was
motivated by different notions on marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still
unsure and unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be
on the search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not
really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling
with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it
boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of
respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of

the reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and
spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the
aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in
her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on
marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good
fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized,
she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed.
Upon the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her
way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and
marry himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken
out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution solemnized by religious
and law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently
clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still
unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening
their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is
extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and
undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is
suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial
Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested during
marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities that made marriage a
big mistake for them to take.15[15]

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision 16[16] declaring the
marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. 17
[17] The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.18[18]

15
16
17

On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision 19[19]
in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling.20[20] It
ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent. The
clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the
information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not
shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the
evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina21[21] needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. 22[22] The CA faulted the lower court for
rendering the decision without the required certification of the OSG briefly stating
therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may
be, the petition.23[23] The CA later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.24[24]

18
19
20

21
22
23[23] Rollo, pp. 28-35.
24[24] Supra note 2.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review
on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.25[25]
In his memorandum,26[26] petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting
its own judgment for that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the
marriage void, not only because of respondents psychological incapacity, but
rather due to both parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that
there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent.
Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because the
latter represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the
pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.27[27]
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum, 28[28] that the annulment
petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of the essential marital
obligations that the parties failed to comply with.

The root cause of the

psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it
medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical

25[25] Rollo, p. 79.

26[26] Id. at 95-104.
27[27] Id. at 100-102.
28[28] Id. at 82-93.

psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes
that the requirements in Molina29[29] were not satisfied.30[30]
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of
the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void.31[31]
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the
development of jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code32[32] provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that
drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon
Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in
Santos v. Court of Appeals:33[33]
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the
29[29] Supra note 21.
30[30] Rollo, pp. 86-92.
31[31] Supra note 22.
32[32] Id.
33[33] G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.

UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985
of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil
Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes CojuangcoTeodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had
thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a
new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been
tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some
members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce
between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or
de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a
proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree
of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have
obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually,
such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another
name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to
discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision
Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code,
they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as
a special contract of permanent partnership
between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix
the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by law.
With the above definition, and considering the Christian
traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which
the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong
opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter
from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry
to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two
Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of
absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial

declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available

in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not
only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve
the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on
grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes
was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such
action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid
the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the
present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the
Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the
proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an
additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
(7) those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage
may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34.
Art. 33. The action or defense for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
shall not prescribe.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may
already be dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee
on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an
absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald
Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with Archbishop
Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed
that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and
void on the ground of lack of due discretion for causes that, in other

jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature

marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse
by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to
cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also
informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of
machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality
anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.34
[34]

In her separate opinion in Molina,35[35] she expounded:

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand
the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated
to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced
the following revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any
reference to wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage and to mentally incapacitated. It was explained
that these phrases refer to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which
is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation. There
being a defect in consent, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable
marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are
cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.
34[34] Id. at 38-41. (Italics supplied.)
35[35] Supra note 21.

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that

psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term psychological or
mental impotence, Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984
session that this term is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express it as psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . . Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: Such incapacity must also be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion
of the phrase and is incurable but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this
would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice
Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one
may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice
Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz.:
1.
contract;
2.
3.

lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as

reasons of public policy;
special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under special cases and
special situations, hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as
finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for
avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in
nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the
marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential

requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions
on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the
more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are
incapable of contracting marriage: 3. (those) who, because of causes of a
psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage
provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: A marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two
types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law,
however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages.
When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal annuls a marriage, it actually declares the
marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified
by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a
Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by Civil Law as
severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another
marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with
those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of
married couples have found themselves in limbofreed from the marriage bonds
in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage
under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new
marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous
situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon
Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Codeand classified
the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent
from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code,
while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized
the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: Canon #1081
required persons to be capable according to law in order to give valid consent;

Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of the major elements
required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that
internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line
of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment called
lack of due discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of due discretion
means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of
the wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means
that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or
she made during the wedding ceremony.
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the
foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in
several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was
probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the
marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the
Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight,
the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept
proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after
the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the
ceremony.36[36]

Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological

incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. 37[37]
The law is then so designed as to allow some resiliency in its application.38[38]
36[36] Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 681-685.
37[37] Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108,
quoting Sempio-Dy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1998, p. 37.
38[38] Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33, at 31.

Yet, as held in Santos,39[39] the phrase psychological incapacity is not

meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 40[40] of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity;
and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to
the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 41[41]
This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction
must be made between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely
between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the
essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference by an
ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela,
and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive law to enter
such contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house
is located in a different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the
house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the hypothesis
contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not
deal with the psychological process of giving consent because it has been
established a priori that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both
know well the object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather,
C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The
contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a
39[39] Id.
40[40] Article 68 of the Family Code provides in full:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support.

41[41] Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33, at 34.

psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is
directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes
this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with
positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of
consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a
result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding
psychic incapacity with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions,
there has been an increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity different
from others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage,
especially the incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a
sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and
in every case imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher
faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that
are purely so that is to say, they arise from certain physiological dysfunction of
the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the
higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free human
acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain
anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities
which are not normal, either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania,
satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism,
homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether
possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted
continues to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the
gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The
question though is whether such a person can assume those responsibilities which
he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to understand them. In this latter
hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues
from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to
posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this
regard. The initial steps taken by church courts were not too clear whether this
incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to posit the object of
consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect,
under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and its
judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the
moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the
inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these
circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a
decision made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse, would not be a free
act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the
intellect is always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It

would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there
are certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand
perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his
consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit
the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way
and with usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the consent
may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to
an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen
his way more clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear
conceptual distinction between the inability to give consent on the one hand, and
the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that
nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually
able to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a
free and intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of
eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another sphere:
delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise
treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing the
object of consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania.
According to him, such an affliction usually leaves the process of knowing and
understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the
delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the
selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress
towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in
the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent judgment,
and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram Sabattani
concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not
only with regard to the moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to
the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in such a
condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although
she may have no difficulty in understanding what the obligations of marriage are,
nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual
to refer to this ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar
expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in some anomalies and
disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will
and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it
from the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084.
Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself in a
valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders that person

incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle

affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the
contractants are not capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One
immediately thinks of those cases where one of the parties is so self-centered
[e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a union
with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A
second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of
beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very
substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable
to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The canon speaks, not of
the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of
realizing or contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather than
qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be
the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the economic good
and the financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum
conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for
detained and individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of
the case concerns a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He
concluded that while the respondent may have understood, on the level of the
intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming
them because of his constitutional immorality.
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the
fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision
but also and especially during the moment of execution of decision. And when
this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual
fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration that
must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to assume
the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of
the party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium
in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of
19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume
the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person,
precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as
regards the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are
invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A lack of
empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A
sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is
usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which
others are taken advantage of in order to achieve ones ends.

Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial

obligations. One of them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their
corresponding obligations are basically centered around the good of the spouses
and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be
necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or
even all of these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship
is impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal
relationships in marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial
traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric
homosexuality was understood to be invalidating of marriage that is to say, is
homosexuality invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the responsibilities
of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively,
however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the
obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with
charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a
person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of matrimonial consent is
understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius
vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical
structure to account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The
homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional
cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse.
Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily
suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not
by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the
homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because
he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the
invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object
of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the
source of incapacity specified by the canon: causes of a psychological nature.
Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is a reference to the personality of
the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the psychic part of
the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic
constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that
the person is incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A
person is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he is
found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes the
assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in ones
consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating
incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however

remote, in the development of the habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic
constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the source of the
incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom.42[42]

Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis,

that should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically
incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment in
Tuason v. Court of Appeals,43[43] ruled that the findings of the trial court are final
and binding on the appellate courts.44[44]
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was
not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,45[45]
explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court
and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in
the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of
Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one
of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case
basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers,

42[42] Dacanay, Canon Law on Marriage: Introductory Notes and Comments, 2000
ed., pp. 110-119.
43[43] 326 Phil. 169 (1996).
44[44] Id. at 182.
45[45] 334 Phil. 294, 300-304 (1997).

had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict

standards in Molina,46[46] thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted
in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2)
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3)
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need
not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4)
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
46[46] Supra note 21.

same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of

marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5)
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6)
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason
that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Churchwhile remaining
independent, separate and apart from each othershall walk together in synodal
cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8)
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.47[47]

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership

concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio
V. Panganiban, three justices concurred in the result and another three
including, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose their individual
separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that each
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or
generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on
all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting
its own judgment for that of the trial court.48[48]
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,49[49] the Court has
applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the laws clear
intention that each case is to be treated differently, as courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

47[47] Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 676-680.
48[48] Id. at 680.

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid
set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity.
Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the
dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of
Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the world. 50[50] The
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who
have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality
anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court,
Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.
Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman
49[49] See Republic of the Philippines v. Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No.
171042, June 30, 2008; Nilda V. Navales v. Reynaldo Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June
27, 2008; Lester Benjamin S. Halili v. Chona M. Santos-Halili, et al., G.R. No. 165424,
April 16, 2008; Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 123;
Paras v. Paras, G.R. No. 147824, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 81; Navarro, Jr. v.
Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 121; Republic v. TanyagSan Jose, G.R. No. 168328, February 28, 2007, 517 SCRA 123; Zamora v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 141917, February 7, 2007, 515 SCRA 19; Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris,
G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 396; Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No.
139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177; Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March
10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353; Villalon v. Villalon, G.R. No. 167206, November 18, 2005,
475 SCRA 572; Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA
508; Carating-Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422;
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 735;
Ancheta v. Ancheta, 468 Phil. 900 (2004); Barcelona v. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil.
626 (2003); Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175 (2002); Pesca v. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713
(2001); Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425;
Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000); Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
126010, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA 76.
50[50] See Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 668.

Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.51[51]

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided
by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among
51[51] Ng, Apruebo & Lepiten, Legal and Clinical Bases of Psychological Incapacity,
2006 ed., pp. 14-16, cites the following:Canon 1095, 3 concerning psychological incapacity
pointed out cases of various psychological disorders from the Roman Rota as enumerated
below (Fr. Bacareza, 1999).
6.1. From the 1917 Code of the Second Vatican Council
1.

Coram Teodori in Italy on January 19, 1940 on Nymphomania.

2.

Coram Heard on June 5, 1941 on Nymphomania.

3.

Coram Heard in Quebec on January 30, 1954 on Lethargic Encephalitis.

4.
Coram Mattioli in Quebec, Canada on November 6, 1956 on General
Paralysis.
5.

Coram Sabbatani in Naples, Italy on June 21, 1957 on Nymphomania.

6.

Coram Mattioli in Rome on November 28, 1957 on Schizophrenia.

7.

Coram Lefebvre on December 19, 1959 on Nymphomania.

8.

Coram De Jorio on December 19, 1961 on Schizophrenia.

6.2 From the Second Vatican Council to the Promulgation of the 1983
Code
9.

Coram Monsigneur Charles Lefebre on the following:

a.

Homosexuality,

b.

Hypersexuality-Nymphomania,

c.

Hypersexuality-Satyriasis, and

d.

Affective Immaturity and Passive Dependent Personality.

which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard
against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. 52[52] The
Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital
abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.

10.

Coram Monsigneur Lucien Anne on February 25, 1969 on Lesbianism.

11.

Coram De Jorio on April 30, 1969 on Maturity of Judgment.

12.

Coram Jose Maria Pinto Gomez on the following:

13.

14.

a.

Serious Paranoid Schizophrenia (November 26, 1969),

b.

Anti-Social Personality Disorder (March 18, 1971),

c.

Vaginismus or Psychic impotence; Frigidity (July 15, 1977)

d.

Neurasthenic Psychopath (April 20, 1979)

e.

Sexual Disorder (December 3, 1982)

Coram Bruno on the following:

a.

Hypersexuality-Nymphomania (December 15, 1972)

b.

Sexual Neurosis (March 27, 1981)

c.

Psychoneurosis (December 17, 1982)

Coram Jose Maria Serrano Ruiz on the following:

a.

Hypersexuality-Satyriasis (April 5, 1973)

b.

Lack of Interpersonal Integration (April 15, 1973)

c.

Immature Personality (July 9, 1976)

d.

Psychic Immaturity (November 18, 1977)

e.

Depressive Neurosis (July 12, 1978)

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological

incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is
actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person
afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be
stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are

15.

16.

f.

Obsessive-Compulsive Personality (May 23, 1980)

g.

Frigidity (July 28, 1981)

h.

Affective Immaturity (January 15, 1977)

Coram Ewers on the following:

a.

Affective Immaturity (January 15, 1977)

b.

Sexual Neurosis (April 4, 1981)

Coram Pariscella on the following:

a.

Obsessive-Compulsive Neurosis (February 23, 1978)

b.

Homosexuality (June 11, 1978)

17.

Coram Fiore (May 27, 1981)

18.

Coram Agustoni (March 23, 1982)

6.3. After the Promulgation of the 1983 Code of Canon Law

19.

Rotal Case No. 41:c. Colagiovanni on March 3, 1983 on Homosexuality

20.

Rotal Case No. 42 c. Huot on July 18, 1983 on Alcoholism and Immature
Personality.

21.
22.

Rotal Case No. 43: c. Giannechini on July 19, 1983 on Homosexuality.

Rotal Case No. 45: c. Colagiovanni on November 22, 1983 about an expriest who was a liar, cheat and swindler (Anti-Social Personality)

manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly.53[53] Let it be noted that in

Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void
from the very beginning.54[54]

To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity

under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose
too much of a concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its
business. And second, because the judicial declaration of psychological incapacity
operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would
have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality disorder.
On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the
risk of the latters disorder recurring in their marriage.
23.

Rotal Case No. 46: c. Stankiewiez on November 24, 1983 on

Homosexuality.

24.

Rotal Case No. 47: c. Egan on March 29, 1984 on Hysterical Personality.

25.

Rotal Case No. 48: c. Di Felice on June 9, 1984 on Psychic Immaturity.

26.

Rotal Case No. 49: c. Pinto on May 30, 1986 on Alcoholism and
Gambling.

27.

Rotal Case No. 50: c. Giannecchini on December 20, 1988 on

Hypersexuality-Nymphomania.

52[52] Justice Padillas Dissenting Opinion, Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note
33, at 36-37; Ancheta v. Ancheta, supra note 49, at 917.
53[53] Supra note 34.
54[54] See Article 36 of the Family Code; see also Justice Carpios Dissenting Opinion,
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 272, 299.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina

in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in
Antonio v. Reyes,55[55] there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which
should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals.

II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They
met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted
ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.56[56]
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
55[55] Supra note 49, at 370.
56[56] Records, pp. 54-55; TSN, November 7, 2000, pp. 5-6.

decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental

temperaments of the parties.57[57]
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about
the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to
these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's
mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged
and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did
not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the
past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from
that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no
longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to
marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature,
lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological
incapacity, not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders
that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or
the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a
developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to
57[57] Archbishop Oscar V. Cruz, D.D., of the Archdiocese of Lingayen-Dagupan,
explains in Marriage Tribunal Ministry, 1992 ed., that [s]tandard practice shows the
marked advisability of Expert intervention in Marriage Cases accused of nullity on
the ground of defective matrimonial consent on account of natural incapacity by
reason of any factor causative of lack of sufficient use of reason, grave lack of due
discretion and inability to assume essential obligationsalthough the law
categorically mandates said intervention only in the case of impotence and
downright mental disorder x x x. (p. 106).

give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that
the spouses must be other oriented since the obligations of marriage are rooted
in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality
but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and
support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered
in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to
the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the
marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to
the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage,
etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might
lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding
conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties.
Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her
inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the
individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses consistently fall short of
reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for
anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment
on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the
more traditional categories often fits very easily into the
psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are
already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the
emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment
at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases
seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or

carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack

of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of
due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into
civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised
at the time the marriage was entered into.58[58]

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals59[59] emphasizes the importance of

presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys
psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos60[60] asserts, there is no requirement that the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity.61[61] Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or

58[58] Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 685-688.
59[59] Supra note 49, at 88; see also Republic v. Quintero-Hemano, supra note 49,
at 743.
60[60] Supra note 49, at 850; see also Republic v. Quintero-Hemano, supra note 49,
at 742; Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 49, at 526; Zamora v. Court of Appeals, supra
note 49, at 27; Paras v. Paras, supra note 49, at 96-97.
61[61] The Court, however, by saying[T]he assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was
based merely on descriptions communicated to him by respondent. The doctor never
conducted any psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so.
In fact, his Professional Opinion began with the statement [I]f what Alfonso Choa said
about his wife Leni is true, x x x
xxxx
Obviously, Dr. Guanzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had
merely been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions
and secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his testimony can be
dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.

the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the
presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the
parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe
and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.62[62] Parenthetically, the

Dr. Guanzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess petitioners
character, not only through the descriptions given by respondent, but also through the
formers at least fifteen hours of study of the voluminous transcript of records of this case.
Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to examine the records of this
case, we still find his assessment of petitioners psychological state sorely insufficient and
methodologically flawed.
in Choa v. Choa (Supra note 49, at 190-191), in effect, required the personal examination of
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.

62 [62] Psychologists of the Psychological Extension Evaluation Research Services

(PEERS) enumerate the segments of the psychological evaluation report for
psychological incapacity as follows:Identifying Data: Personal Information

Referral Question:
Data coming from informants and significant others
(psychologists, psychiatrists, physicians, parents, brothers, sisters, relatives, friends,
etc.).

Test Administered (Dates): List by name

Background Information:
Current Life Situation: Presenting complaint (personal and marital conflict), history of
problem, and consequences in clients life.
Life History Information: Childhood development, educational history, vocational
history, medical history, sexual and marital history, personal goals.

Behavior Observations: Description of client, relationship with examiner, and test

related behaviors.
Interpretation of Test Results:

Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,63[63] an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed
psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and evaluation of the
psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in
the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of
Intellectual Functioning: Wechsler tests, Stanford-Binet, etc. Obtained IQ scores and
specific strengths and deficits.
Cognitive Functioning: Rorschach, TAT, MMPI, etc. Perception of reality or perceptual
efficiency, conceptual organization, psychological needs, conflicts, preoccupations,
suspiciousness, hallucinations, or delusions.
Emotional Functioning (MMPI, Rorschach, etc.): Liability of emotions, impulse control,
predominant concerns like aggression, anxiety, depression, guilt, dependency, and
hostility.
Relationship Patterns (MMPI, Rorschach, TAT, etc.): Problem areas in work or school,
friendships, intimate relationships, difficulties such as immaturity, irresponsibility,
cooperativeness, sociability, introversion, impulsivity, aggression, dangerousness to
self or others.
Defenses and compensations: Evidence of any strength, any coping mechanisms, or
any useful compensation that might be helping the client maintain himself/herself.

Integration of Test Results with Life History: Presenting a clinical picture of the client
as a total person against the background of his marital discords and life
circumstances. Hypotheses posed through the referral question and generated and
integrated via test results and other reliable information.

Summary, Conclusion, Diagnosis, Prognosis:

Summary: Emphasis should be on conciseness and accuracy so that the reader can
quickly find the essential information and overall impression.
Conclusion:
Integrating the material (data) into a more smoothly stated
conceptualization of the clients personality and problem areas as regards root
causes and characteristics as ground for nullity of marriage.
Diagnosis:
Diagnostic impression is evolved form the data obtained, formed
impression of personality disorders, and classified mental disorders based on the
criteria and multi axial system of the DSM IV.

the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties prerogative to
present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we
consider as adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with
personality disordersto repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The
Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders as follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a
persons recent and long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are
not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible,
maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or anxieties
or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal functioning.
Personality disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue
through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An individual
may have more than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders,
despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to
pervasive problems in social and occupational adjustment. Some individuals with
personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid,
obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such
qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as
difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their
problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or
Prognosis: Predicting the behavior based on the data obtained that are relevant to
the current functioning of the client, albeit under ideal conditions.

Recommendation: Providing a careful specific recommendation is based on the

referral sources and obtained data in dealing with a particular client that may be
ameliorative, remedial, or unique treatment/intervention approaches.
As to
psychological incapacity, specific recommendation on the nullity of marriage based
on Article 36 of the Family Code and expertise and clinical judgment of the Clinical
Psychologist should be given emphasis. (Ng, Apruebo & Lepiten, Legal and Clinical
Bases of Psychological Incapacity, supra note 51, at 179-181.)

63[63] A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 15, 2003.

difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can
lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints
propose a variety of causes of personality disorders. These include Freudian,
genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity.
Freudian
Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of
development led to certain personality types. Thus, some disorders as described
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are
derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and dependent
behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation
at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional
aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the
phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in
intimate relationships. However, later researchers have found little evidence that
early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific
personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic
factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders;
there is less evidence of inheritance of other personality disorders. Some family,
adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to
genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality,
researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid
(5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of aggression and a past history of
suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet
monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have
been reported in antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is the most
widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline patients reported that 38
percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a
control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Associations
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or
DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders.
Individuals who have these disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits
and traits.

Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality

disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear overly emotional,
erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passiveaggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often
appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality disorder not
otherwise specified, that can be used for other specific personality disorders or
for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific personality
disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term
concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.64[64]

Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner

A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive
behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their
capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times
they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood.
Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions
without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their
important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when
they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on
their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from
other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.65[65]

and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows

64[64] Kahn and Fawcett, The Encyclopedia of Mental Health, 1993 ed., pp. 291-292. See
Bernstein, Penner, Clarke-Stewart, Roy, Psychology, 7th ed., 2006, pp. 613-614, defining
personality disorders as long-standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much
severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of
functioning and, beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who
display them and for others. Some psychologists view personality disorders as interpersonal
strategies or as extreme, rigid, and maladaptive expressions of personality traits. (Citations
omitted.)

65[65] Id. at 131.

Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the

conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a
job over a period of years, disregard for the rights of others (either through
exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite
commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame others.
There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard,
lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may
befit some individuals who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of
self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of others may be hidden prior to a
public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as
moral insanity. The term described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not
accompanied by impairments in reasoning.
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality
disorder is one of the four dramatic personality disorders, the others being
borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.66[66]

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered,
the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the
expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on
ground of both parties psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial
court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses deportment, arrived at the
same conclusion.

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder,

cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love,
respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make
everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his
66[66] Id. at 50-51.

important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when
he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do
things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.67[67] As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything
dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has
no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no
goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent.
Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume
the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for
the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse,
her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral
limitations imposed by society.68[68] Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent
is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with
her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological
incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is
thus, declared null and void.

67[67] Supra note 65.

68[68] Supra note 66.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari

is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.

REPUBLIC vs ORBECIDO III

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling
on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May 15,
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its
Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had
declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the
impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art.
26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him
by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a
son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently
live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26
OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to
the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a
petition for annulment or for legal separation. [5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law
that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
judicial determination.[6]

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to
remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.[7]

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that
the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for
judicial determination.[8]

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between

two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a

private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,
has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come
about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26
thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order
No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A
second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse

capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by
the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the
time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife
was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph
2 of Article 26:
1.

The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses

are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced
will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly
divorce them abroad can.

2.

This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for
Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them
abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can remarry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship
by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.[11]
In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife
became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The
Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute

may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.[12]

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1.

There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino

citizen and a foreigner; and

2.

A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or

her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still
a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly,
the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino
spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment
would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering
that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand,
legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence,
the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.[13]

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his
wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [14] Such foreign law must also be
proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws
must be alleged and proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce
decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a
Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and

remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents
bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry.
Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited
evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

PROTACIO GO vs SERVACIO

The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving

spouse without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is
not necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or
extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the
requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.
Antecedents

On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total
area of 17,140 square meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr.
(Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years later, or on March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr.
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver,69[1] whereby he affirmed under
oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had
purchased the two parcels of land (the property).
On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of
Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners.70[2] On December 28, 1999, Protacio,
Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Ritos wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the
property with an area of 5,560 square meters to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio) for
5,686,768.00.71[3] On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the
property,72[4]

but Servacio refused to heed their demand. After barangay

proceedings failed to resolve the dispute,73[5] they sued Servacio and Rito in the
Regional Trial Court in Maasin City, Southern Leyte (RTC) for the annulment of
the sale of the property.
The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the
property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio

69[1] Original records, p. 20.

70[2] Id., p.173.
71[3] Id., pp. 22-24 (the contract was denominated as Deed of Absolute Sale of a
Portion of Real Property).
72[4] Id., p. 26.
73[5] Id., p. 27.

without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and
Marta was null and void.74[6]
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the
property because he had purchased it with his own money.75[7]
On October 3, 2002,76[8] the RTC declared that the property was the conjugal
property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr.,
because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr.,
Rito, and Dina); that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by
virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta; that under Article 160 of the Civil
Code, the law in effect when the property was acquired, all property acquired by
either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that the
property thus acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to the wife; and that
Protacio, Jr.s renunciation was grossly insufficient to rebut the legal
presumption.77[9]
Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property,
holding that: xxx As long as the portion sold, alienated or encumbered will not be
allotted to the other heirs in the final partition of the property, or to state it plainly,
as long as the portion sold does not encroach upon the legitimate (sic) of other

74[6] Id., pp. 1-7.

75[7] Id., pp. 31-43.
76[8] Rollo, pp. 22-25.
77[9] Id.

heirs, it is valid.78[10] Quoting Tolentinos commentary on the matter as

authority,79[11] the RTC opined:

In his comment on Article 175 of the New Civil Code regarding the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, Senator Arturo Tolentino, says [sic]
Alienation by the survivor. After the death of one of the spouses,
in case it is necessary to sell any portion of the community property in
order to pay outstanding obligation of the partnership, such sale must be
made in the manner and with the formalities established by the Rules of
Court for the sale of the property of the deceased persons. Any sale,
transfer, alienation or disposition of said property affected without said
formalities shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that
belongs to the vendor as determined in the liquidation and partition.
Pending the liquidation, the disposition must be considered as limited
only to the contingent share or interest of the vendor in the particular
property involved, but not to the corpus of the property.
This rule applies not only to sale but also to mortgages. The
alienation, mortgage or disposal of the conjugal property without the
required formality, is not however, null ab initio, for the law recognizes
their validity so long as they do not exceed the portion which, after
liquidation and partition, should pertain to the surviving spouse who
made the contract. [underlining supplied]
It seems clear from these comments of Senator Arturo Tolentino on the
provisions of the New Civil Code and the Family Code on the alienation by the
surviving spouse of the community property that jurisprudence remains the same
- that the alienation made by the surviving spouse of a portion of the community
property is not wholly void ab initio despite Article 103 of the Family Code, and
shall be valid to the extent of what will be allotted, in the final partition, to the
vendor. And rightly so, because why invalidate the sale by the surviving spouse of
a portion of the community property that will eventually be his/her share in the
final partition? Practically there is no reason for that view and it would be absurd.
Now here, in the instant case, the 5,560 square meter portion of the 17,140
square-meter conjugal lot is certainly mush (sic) less than what vendors Protacio
78[10] Id.
79[11] Id.

Go and his son Rito B. Go will eventually get as their share in the final partition
of the property. So the sale is still valid.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, complaint is hereby DISMISSED
without pronouncement as to cost and damages.
SO ORDERED.80[12]

The RTCs denial of their motion for reconsideration 81[13] prompted the
petitioners to appeal directly to the Court on a pure question of law.
Issue
The petitioners claim that Article 130 of the Family Code is the applicable
law; and that the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made
without prior liquidation.
In contrast, although they have filed separate comments, Servacio and Rito
both argue that Article 130 of the Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of
the liquidation prior to the sale did not render the sale invalid, because the sale was
valid to the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his
share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs,
considering that what the sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the
property that the vendors were entitled to as heirs.82[14]
Ruling

80[12] Id., pp. 24-25.

81[13] Id., pp. 26- 27
82[14] Id., p. 65.

The appeal lacks merit.

Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially
within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six
month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving
the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without
compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete
separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent
marriage.

Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code,
viz:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property relations
during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary
application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships
of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this
Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n) [emphasis
supplied]

It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the
effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4
(Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband
And Wife) of the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property

after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the
liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must
be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no
dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, their property relation was properly characterized
as one of conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Martas death in
1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the
Civil Code,83[15] and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr.
and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal
partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.84[16] The ensuing
implied ordinary co-ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code,85
[17] to wit:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (399)

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of

Martas share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any
specific portion of Martas share without an actual partition of the property being
83 [15] Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:1.
either spouse.
xxx

Upon the death of

84[16] Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68873, March 31, 1989, 171
SCRA 524, 532-533.
85[17] Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Pascual, G.R. No. 163744, February 29,
2008, 547 SCRA 246.

first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was
an ideal or abstract quota in Martas share. 86[18] Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell
his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of
his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. 87[19] Consequently, the
sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other coowners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were
thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas
share.88[20] This result conforms to the well-established principle that the binding
force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so
(quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest).89[21]
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the
applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws. This provision gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely
void. Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had already
acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of the sale.

86[18] Acabal v. Acabal, G.R. No. 148376, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 555, 581.
87[19] Id., p. 582.
88[20] Aguirre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122249. January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA
310, 324, citing Fernandez v. Fernandez,G.R. No. 143256, August 28, 2001, 363
SCRA 811, 829.
89[21] Metrobank v. Pascual, supra, note 17, at p. 260, quoting from Aromin v.
Floresca, G.R. No. 160994, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 785, 815.

In their separate comments,90[22] the respondents aver that each of the heirs
had already received a certain allotted portion at the time of the sale, and that
Protacio, Sr. and Rito sold only the portions adjudicated to and owned by them.
However, they did not present any public document on the allocation among her
heirs, including themselves, of specific shares in Martas estate. Neither did they
aver that the conjugal properties had already been liquidated and partitioned.
Accordingly, pending a partition among the heirs of Marta, the efficacy of the sale,
and whether the extent of the property sold adversely affected the interests of the
petitioners might not yet be properly decided with finality. The appropriate
recourse to bring that about is to commence an action for judicial partition, as
instructed in Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals,91[23] to wit:
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to
sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one

co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void.
However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making
the buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or
for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third
person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but
the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the
possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v.
Bandoy, supra].
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in
cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as
well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an
action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.
xxx92[24]

90[22] Rollo, pp. 62-67, 79-83.

91[23] No. L-78178, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 738.

In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs
of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her. The
following observations of Justice Paras are explanatory of this result, viz:
xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would pertain
to the share of the surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it turns out
that there really would be, after liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the
whole transaction is null and void. But if it turns out that half of the property
thus alienated or mortgaged belongs to the husband as his share in the conjugal
partnership, and half should go to the estate of the wife, then that corresponding to
the husband is valid, and that corresponding to the other is not. Since all these can
be determined only at the time the liquidation is over, it follows logically that a
disposal made by the surviving spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held
that the sale of conjugal properties cannot be made by the surviving spouse
without the legal requirements. The sale is void as to the share of the deceased
spouse (except of course as to that portion of the husbands share inherited by her
as the surviving spouse). The buyers of the property that could not be validly sold
become trustees of said portion for the benefit of the husbands other heirs, the
cestui que trust ent. Said heirs shall not be barred by prescription or by laches
(See Cuison, et al. v. Fernandez, et al.,L-11764, Jan.31, 1959.)93[25]

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari; and

AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

DELA PENA vs AVILA

Filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, this petition
for review on certiorari seeks the reversal and setting aside of the Decision 94[1]

92[24] Id., p. 745.

93[25] I Paras , Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Sixteenth Ed., p. 592.
94[1] Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alino-Hormachuelos and concurred in by
Associate Justices Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of this Court) and Ramon M.
Bato, Jr.

dated 31 March 2009 rendered by the then Second Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90485,95[2] the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the
assailed Decision, dated December 18, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court of
Marikina City, Branch 272, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Gemma Avila dated November 4, 1997 and the
subsequent sale on auction of the subject property to FEBTC (now Bank of the
Philippine Islands) on March 15, 1999 are upheld as valid and binding.
SO ORDERED.96[3]

The Facts
The suit concerns a 277 square meter parcel of residential land, together with
the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina City and previously registered in
the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Pea (Antonia), married to Antegono A.
Dela Pea (Antegono) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-32315 of
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.97[4] On 7 May 1996, Antonia obtained from A.C.
Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in the sum of P250,000.00 which, pursuant to
the Promissory Note the former executed in favor of the latter, was payable on or
before 7 July 1996, with interest pegged at 5% per month. 98[5] On the very same
day, Antonia also executed in favor of Aguila a notarized Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over the property, for the purpose of securing the payment of said loan

95[2] CA rollo, CA-G.R. CV No. 90485, CAs 31 March 2009 Decision, pp. 113-131.
96[3] Id. at 130-131.
97[4] Exhibit C, TCT No. N-32315, Record, Civil Case No. 98-445-MK, Vol. II, pp. 45.
98[5] Exhibit E, Promissory Note, id. at 9.

obligation. The deed provided, in part, that (t)his contract is for a period of Three
(3) months from the date of this instrument.99[6]
On 4 November 1997, Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
over the property in favor of respondent Gemma Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma), for
the stated consideration of P600,000.00.100[7] Utilizing the document, Gemma
caused the cancellation of TCT No. N-32315 as well as the issuance of TCT No.
337834 of the Marikina City Registry of Deeds, naming her as the owner of the
subject realty.101[8] On 26 November 1997, Gemma also constituted a real estate
mortgage over said parcel in favor of respondent Far East Bank and Trust
Company [now Bank of the Philippine Islands] (FEBTC-BPI), to secure a loan
facility with a credit limit of P1,200,000.00.102[9] As evidenced by the Promissory
Notes she executed from 12 December 1997 to 10 March 1998, 103[10] Gemma
obtained the following loans from Visayas Avenue Branch of the FEBTC-BPI, in
the aggregate sum of P1,200,000.00, to wit:

Promissory Note

Date

Amount

Maturity

BDS#970779

12/02/97

P300,000.00

04/30/98

99[6] Exhibit D, Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, id. at 6-9.

100[7] Exhibit F, Deed of Absolute Sale, id. at 10-11.
101[8] Exhibit G, TCT No. 337834, id. at 12-13.
102[9] Exhibit 7, Real Estate Mortgage, id. at 27-30.
103[10] Exhibits 1 to 13A, FEBTC-BPI Promissory Notes, id. at 15-26.

BDS#970790

12/15/97

P100,000.00

04/14/98

BDS#980800

01/16/98

P100,000.00

04/30/98

BDS#980805

02/06/98

P100,000.00

04/30/98

BDS#980817

02/27/98

P150,000.00

04/30/98

BDS#980821

03/10/98

P450,000.00

04/30/98

On 3 March 1998, in the meantime, Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds
of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse Claim to the effect, among others, that she was
the true and lawful owner of the property which had been titled in the name of
Gemma under TCT No. 32315; and, that the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma
utilized in procuring her title was simulated.104[11] As a consequence, Antonias
Affidavit of Adverse Claim was inscribed on TCT No. 337834 as Entry No. 501099
on 10 March 1998.105[12] In view of Gemmas failure to pay the principal as well
as the accumulated interest and penalties on the loans she obtained, on the other
hand, FEBTC-BPI caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
constituted over the property.

As the highest bidder at the public auction

conducted in the premises,106[13] FEBTC-BPI later consolidated its ownership over

104[11] Exhibit H, Affidavit of Adverse Claim, id. at 14.
105[12] Id. at 13.
106[13] Exhibit 9, FEBTC-BPIs Written Bid, id. at 31.

the realty and caused the same to be titled in its name under TCT No. 415392 of
the Marikina registry.107[14]
On 18 May 1998, Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin John B. Dela Pea
(Alvin), filed against Gemma the complaint for annulment of deed of sale docketed
before Branch 272 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City as Civil
Case No. 98-445-MK. Claiming that the subject realty was conjugal property, the
Dela Peas alleged, among other matters, that the 7 May 1996 Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage Antonia executed in favor of Aguila was not consented to by Antegono
who had, by then, already died; that despite its intended 1998 maturity date, the
due date of the loan secured by the mortgage was shortened by Gemma who,
taking advantage of her proximate relationship with Aguila, altered the same to
1997; and, that the 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Gemma
was executed by Antonia who was misled into believing that the transfer was
necessary for the loan the former promised to procure on her behalf from FEBTCBPI.

In addition to the annulment of said Deed of Absolute Sale for being

simulated and derogatory of Alvins successional rights, the Dela Peas sought the
reconveyance of the property as well as the grant of their claims for moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and the costs.108[15]
Served with summons, Gemma specifically denied the material allegations
of the foregoing complaint in her 1 July 1998 answer. Maintaining that the realty
was the exclusive property of Antonia who misrepresented that her husband was
still alive, Gemma averred that the former failed to pay the P250,000.00 loan she
obtained from Aguila on its stipulated 7 July 1996 maturity; that approached to
107[14] Exhibit 12, TCT No. 415392, id. at 34.
108[15] Record, Civil Case No. 98-445-MK, Vol. 1, Dela Peas Complaint, pp. 1-4.

help prevent the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage constituted on the

property, she agreed to settle the outstanding obligation to Aguila and to extend
Antonia a P50,000.00 loan, with interest pegged at 10% per month; that to pay
back the foregoing accommodations, Antonia agreed to the use of the property as
collateral for a loan to be obtained by her from FEBTC-BPI, hence, the execution
of the impugned Deed of Absolute Sale; and, that conformably with the foregoing
agreement, she obtained loans in the total sum of P1,200,000.00 from FEBTC-BPI
and applied the proceeds thereof to the sums owed by Antonia. Together with the
dismissal of the complaint, Gemma also prayed for the grant of her counterclaims
for moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and the
costs.109[16]
On 25 September 1999, the Dela Peas filed a supplemental complaint,
impleading FEBTC-BPI as additional defendant. Calling attention to Antonias 3
March 1998 Affidavit of Adverse Claim and the Notice of Lis Pendens they
purportedly caused to be annotated on TCT No. 337834 on 10 December 1999, the
Dela Peas alleged that FEBTC-BPI was in bad faith when it purchased the
property at public auction on 15 March 1999.110[17] In their 12 November 1999
answer, FEBTC-BPI, in turn, asserted that the property was already titled in
Gemmas name when she executed the 26 November 1997 real estate mortgage
thereon, to secure the payment of the loans she obtained in the sum of
P1,200,000.00; and, that not being privy to Antonias transaction with Gemma and
unaware of any adverse claim on the property, it was a mortgagee in good faith,
entitled to foreclose the mortgage upon Gemmas failure to pay the loans she
109[16] Gemmas Answer, id. at 28-40.
110[17] Dela Peas Supplemental Complaint, id. at 129-134.

obtained. Seeking the dismissal of the complaint and the grant of its counterclaims
for damages against the Dela Peas, FEBTC-BPI alternatively interposed crossclaims against Gemma for the payment of the subject loans, the accumulated
interests and penalties thereon as well as such sums for which it may be held liable
in the premises.111[18]

On 14 April 2000, the RTC issued the order terminating the pre-trial stage
and declaring Gemma in default for failure to attend the pre-trial settings and to
engage the services of a new lawyer despite due notice and the withdrawal of her
counsel of record.112[19]

In support of their complaint, Antonia113[20] and

Alvin114[21] both took the witness stand and, by way of corroborative evidence,
presented the testimony of one Alessandro Almoden115[22] who claimed to have
referred Antonia to Gemma for the purpose of obtaining a loan. By way of defense
evidence, on the other hand, FEBTC-BPI adduced the oral evidence elicited from
Eleanor Abellare, its Account Officer who handled Gemmas loans, 116[23] and
Zenaida Torres, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document Examiner
who, after analyzing Antonias specimen signatures on the 7 May 1996 Deed of
111[18] FEBTCs Answer, id. at 148-155.
112[19] Id. at 204.
113[20] TSN, 26 May 2000; TSN, 30 June 2000.
114[21] TSN, 22 September 2000; TSN, 13 October 2000.
115[22] TSN, 12 August 2004.
116[23] TSN, 18 November 2004.

Real Estate Mortgage and 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale,117[24] issued
NBI Questioned Documents Report No. 482-802 to the effect, among others, that
said signatures were written by one and the same person.118[25]
On 18 December 2007, the RTC went on to render a Decision finding that
the subject property was conjugal in nature and that the 4 November 1997 Deed of
Absolute Sale Antonia executed in favor of Gemma was void as a disposition
without the liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code. Brushing
aside FEBTC-BPIs claim of good faith,119[26] the RTC disposed of the case in the
following wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows:
1). Declaring the Deed of Absolute dated November 04,
1997 in favor of defendant, [Gemma] as null and void;
2). Ordering defendant [FEBTC-BPI] to execute a deed of
reconveyance in favor of the [Dela Peas] involving the subject
property now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 415392
in the name of [FEBTC-BPI];
3). Ordering [Gemma] to pay the [Dela Peas] the
following:
a). the amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages; and
b). the amount of P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and
c). costs of the suit
On the cross-claim, [Gemma] is hereby ordered to pay [FEBTC-BPI] the
amount of P2,029,317.17 as of November 10, 1999, with twelve (12%) percent
interest per annum until fully paid.
117[24] TSN, 20 July 2006.
118[25] Exhibit 13 and submarkings, Record, Civil Case No. 98-445-MK, Vol. II, pp.
35-36.
119[26] Record, Civil Case No. 98-445-MK, Vol. I, pp. 440-457.

SO ORDERED.120[27]

Aggrieved, FEBTC-BPI perfected the appeal which was docketed before the
CA as CA-G.R. CV No. 90485. On 31 March 2009 the CAs Second Division
rendered the herein assailed decision, reversing the RTCs appealed decision, upon
the following findings and conclusions: (a) the property was paraphernal in nature
for failure of the Dela Peas to prove that the same was acquired during Antonias
marriage to Antegono; (b) having misled Gemma into believing that the property
was exclusively hers, Antonia is barred from seeking the annulment of the 4
November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale; (c) Antonias claim that her signature was
forged is belied by her admission in the pleadings that she was misled by Gemma
into executing said Deed of Absolute Sale and by NBI Questioned Document
Report No. 482-802; and, (d) FEBTC-BPI is a mortgagee in good faith and for
value since Gemmas 26 November 1997 execution of the real estate mortgage in
its favor predated Antonias 3 March 1998 Affidavit of Adverse Claim and the 10
December 1999 annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on TCT No. 337834.121[28]

The Issues
The Dela Peas seek the reversal of the assailed 31 March 2009 CA decision
upon the affirmative of following issues, to wit:
1) Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding
the house and lot covered by TCT No. N-32315 conjugal property of
the spouses Antegono and Antonia Dela Pea;

120[27] Id. at 456-457.

121[28] CA rollo, CA-G.R. CV No. 90485, pp. 113-131.

2) Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC

declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Antonia to (Gemma); and
3. Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding
(FEBTC-BPI) a mortgagee/purchaser in bad faith.122[29]

The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Although it is not
necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership, 123
[30] proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. 124[31] In the
case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals,125[32] this Court categorically ruled as
follows:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." However, the party who
122[29] Rollo, pp. 17-18.
123[30] Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120594, 10 June 1997, 273 SCRA 229, 236.
124[31] Manongsong v. Estimo, 452 Phil. 862, 878 (2003) citing Francisco v. CA, 359
Phil. 519, 526 (1998).
125[32] 359 Phil. 519 (1998).

invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove said
time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property
acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to
when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption
in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing
evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the
spouses.126[33]

As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Article 160 of

the Civil Code, the Dela Peas did not even come close to proving that the subject
property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and Antegono.
Beyond Antonias bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was
purchased when she was already married, 127[34] the record is bereft of any
evidence from which the actual date of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained.
When queried about the matter during his cross-examination, even Alvin admitted
that his sole basis for saying that the property was owned by his parents was
Antonias unilateral pronouncement to the effect.128[35] Considering that the
presumption of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when the
property alleged to be conjugal was acquired,129[36] we find that the CA cannot be
faulted for ruling that the realty in litigation was Antonias exclusive property.
Not having established the time of acquisition of the property, the Dela
Peas insist that the registration thereof in the name of Antonia R. Dela Pea, of
legal age, Filipino, married to Antegono A. Dela Pea should have already
126[33] Id. at 526.
127[34] TSN, 30 June 2000, p. 5.
128[35] TSN, 13 October 2000, pp. 4; 6.
129[36] Go v. Yamane, G.R. No. 160762, 3 May 2006, 489 SCRA 107, 117.

sufficiently established its conjugal nature. Confronted with the same issue in the
case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals,130[37] this Court ruled, however, that the phrase
married to is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife and cannot be
interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner. Because it is
likewise possible that the property was acquired by the wife while she was still
single and registered only after her marriage, neither would registration thereof in
said manner constitute proof that the same was acquired during the marriage and,
for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature. Since there is no showing as
to when the property in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name
of the wife alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging
exclusively to said spouse.131[38]
Viewed in light of the paraphernal nature of the property, the CA correctly
ruled that the RTC reversibly erred in nullifying Antonias 4 November 1997 sale
thereof in favor of Gemma, for lack of the liquidation required under Article 130 of
the Family Code.132[39] That Antonia treated the realty as her own exclusive
property may, in fact, be readily gleaned from her utilization thereof as security for
the payment of the P250,000.00 loan she borrowed from Aguila. 133[40] Despite
Gemmas forfeiture of the right to present evidence on her behalf, her alleged
130[37] 449 Phil. 419, 431 (2003).
131[38] Id. at 431-432.
132

[39] Art. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted,
the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially
or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon
the lapse of said period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
xxxx

133[40] TSN, 26 May 2000, p. 13

alteration of the 7 May 1996 Deed of Real Estate Mortgage to shorten the maturity
of the loan secured thereby was also properly brushed aside by the CA. The
double lie inherent in Antonias assertion that the same deed was altered by
Gemma to shorten the maturity of the loan to 1997 instead of 1998 is instantly
evident from paragraph 1 of the document which, consistent with 7 July 1996
maturity date provided in the Promissory Note she executed,134[41] specifically
stated that (t)his contract is for a period of Three (3) months from the date of this
instrument.135[42]
Antonias evident lack of credibility also impels us to uphold the CAs
rejection of her version of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the 4
November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Gemma.

In disavowing

authorship of the signature appearing on said deed,136[43] Antonia contradicted the

allegation in the Dela Peas complaint that she was misled by Gemma into signing
the same document.137[44] The rule is well-settled that judicial admissions like
those made in the pleadings are binding and cannot be contradicted, absent any
showing that the same was made thru palpable mistake. 138[45]

Alongside that

appearing on the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage she admitted executing in favor of
Aguila, Antonias signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was, moreover, found to
have been written by one and the same person in Questioned Document Report No.
134[41] Exhibit E, supra
135[42] Exhibit D, supra
136[43] TSN, 26 May 2000, p. 20
137[44] Record, Civil Case No. 98-445-MK, p. 2
138[45] Binarao v. Plus Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 154430, 16 June 2006, 491 SCRA 49,
54.

482-802 prepared by Zenaida Torres, the NBI Document Examiner to whom said
specimen signatures were submitted for analysis. 139[46]

Parenthetically, this

conclusion is borne out by our comparison of the same signatures.

For all of Antonias denial of her receipt of any consideration for the sale of
the property in favor of Gemma,140[47] the evidence on record also lend credence
to Gemmas version of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the assailed
4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale. Consistent with Gemmas claim that
said deed was executed to facilitate the loans she obtained from FEBTC-BPI which
were agreed to be used as payment of the sums she expended to settle the
outstanding obligation to Aguila and the P50,000.00 she loaned Antonia,141[48] the
latter admitted during her direct examination that she did not pay the loan she
obtained from Aguila.142[49] Presented as witness of the Dela Peas, Alessandro
Almoden also admitted that Gemma had extended a loan in the sum of P50,000.00
in favor of Antonia. Notably, Alessandro Almodens claim that the title to the
property had been delivered to Gemma as a consequence of the transaction143[50] is
at odds with Antonias claim that she presented said document to the Registry of
Deeds when she verified the status of the property prior to the filing of the
complaint from which the instant suit originated.144[51]
139[46] Exhibit 13.
140[47] TSN, 26 May 2000, pp. 18-19.
141[48] Record, Civil Case No. 98-445-MK, pp. 33-37.
142[49] TSN, 26 May 2000, pp. 21-22.
143[50] TSN, 12 August 2004, pp. 6-12.
144[51] TSN, 26 May 2000, pp. 27-28.

With the material contradictions in the Dela Peas evidence, the CA cannot
be faulted for upholding the validity of the impugned 4 November 1997 Deed of
Absolute Sale. Having been duly notarized, said deed is a public document which
carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. 145
[52] Regarded as evidence of the facts therein expressed in a clear, unequivocal
manner,146[53] public documents enjoy a presumption of regularity which may only
be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all
controversy as to falsity.147[54]

The burden of proof to overcome said

presumptions lies with the party contesting the notarial document 148[55] like the
Dela Peas who, unfortunately, failed to discharge said onus. Absent clear and
convincing evidence to contradict the same, we find that the CA correctly
pronounced the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid and binding between Antonia and
Gemma.
Since foreclosure of the mortgage is but the necessary consequence of nonpayment of the mortgage debt,149[56] FEBTC-BPI was, likewise, acting well within
its rights as mortgagee when it foreclosed the real estate mortgage on the property
upon Gemmas failure to pay the loans secured thereby. Executed on 26 November
1997, the mortgage predated Antonias filing of an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with
145[52] Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 517 Phil. 380, 388
(2006).
146[53] Sps. Alfarero v. Sps. Sevilla, 458 Phil. 255, 262 (2003).
147[54] Meneses v. Venturozo, G.R. No. 172196, 19 October 2011.
148[55] Destreza v. Rinoza-Plazo, G.R. No. 176863, 30 October 2009, 604 SCRA
775, 785.
149[56] Santiago v. Pioneer Savings and Loan Bank, 241 Phil. 113, 119 (1988).

the Register of Deeds of Marikina on 3 March 1998 and the annotation of a Notice
of Lis Pendens on TCT No. 337834 on 10 December 1999. The mortgage directly
and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the
possessor may be, to the fulfilment of the obligation for whose security it was
constituted.150[57]

When the principal obligation is not paid when due, the

mortgagee consequently has the right to foreclose the mortgage, sell the property,
and apply the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of the unpaid loan.151[58]
Finally, the resolution of this case cannot be affected by the principles that
banks like FEBTC-BPI are expected to exercise more care and prudence than
private individuals in that their dealings because their business is impressed with
public interest152[59] and their standard practice is to conduct an ocular inspection
of the property offered to be mortgaged and verify the genuineness of the title to
determine the real owner or owners thereof, hence, the inapplicability of the
general rule that a mortgagee need not look beyond the title does not apply to
them.153[60] The validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Antonia in
favor of Gemma having been upheld, FEBTC-BPIs supposed failure to ascertain
the ownership of the property has been rendered immaterial for the purpose of
determining the validity of the mortgage executed in its favor as well as the
subsequent extrajudicial foreclosure thereof.

150[57] Article 2126, Civil Code of the Philippines.

151[58] Talmonte v. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd., G.R. No.
166970, 17 August 2011.
152[59] Rural Bank of Siaton (Negros Oriental) v. Macajilos, G.R. No. 152483, 14 July
2006, 495 SCRA 127, 140.
153[60] Alano v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 171628, 13 June 2011.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit and the assailed CA Decision dated 31 March 2009 is, accordingly,
AFFIRMED in toto.

Digests:

TE VS TE
FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the
Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowenas
close friend but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to
court Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It was Rowena who asked that
they elope but Edward refused bickering that he was young and jobless. Her
persistence, however, made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that
month; he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat
ticket.
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncles
house and Edward to his parents home. Eventually they got married but without a
marriage license. Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house
unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month,
Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents. Edwards parents
wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they
have a separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was better for them to live
separate lives and they then parted ways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological

incapacity.
HELD:
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in
January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in
June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment
of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.

Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume

the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and
fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions
without advice from others, and allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and
gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of,
and has no goals and clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes
her unable to assume the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard
in the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without
remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as shown in this case,
respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological
incapacity, the precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus,
declared null and void.

Republic vs Orbecido
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at
the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a
daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his
wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley.
He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the
rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as
allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT,

INC., vs. HARPER
Petitioner, Shangri-la Hotel, appeals the decision promulgated whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the judgment by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) inQuezon City holding petitioner liable for damages for the murder of their
guest.
FACTS:
Christian Harper came to Manila on a business trip as the BusinessDevelopment
Manager for Asia of ALSTOM Power Norway AS, an engineering firm withworldwide
operations. He checked in at the Shangri-La Hotel. He was due to check out
onNovember 6, 1999. In the early morning of that date, however, he was murdered

inside his hotelroom by still unidentified malefactors.Respondents commenced this

suit in the RTC to recover various damages frompetitioner pertinently.RTC ruled in
favor of the respondents. CA affirmed.
CONTENTION:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES ARE
THEHEIRS OF THE LATE CHRISTIAN HARPER, AS THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE
ONRECORD SUPPORTING SUCH RULING.
ISSUE:
WON: THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES WERE ABLE TO PROVE WITH
COMPETENTEVIDENCE THE AFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT THAT
THEY ARE THEWIDOW AND SON OF MR. CHRISTIAN HARPER.
RULING:
The appeal lacks merit.
The Revised Rules of Court provides that public documents may be evidenced by a
copyattested by the officer having the legal custody of the record. The attestation
must state, insubstance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, as the casemay be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal,
under the seal of such court.If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the attested
copy must be accompanied with acertificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreigncountry, the certificate may be made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippinesstationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of
hisoffice.The documents involved in this case are all kept in Norway. These
documents have beenauthenticated by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs; they bear the official seal of the Ministry and signature of one, Tanja Sorlie.
The documents are accompanied by an Authentication by the Consul, Embassy of
the Republic of the Philippines in Stockholm, Swedento the effect that, Tanja Sorlie
is duly authorized to legalize official documents for the Ministry.Exhibits "Q" and "R"
are extracts of the register of births of both Jonathan Christopher Harper and the
late Christian Fredrik Harper, respectively, wherein the former explicitly declares
thatJonathan Christopher is the son of Christian Fredrik and Ellen Johanne Harper.
Said documentsbear the signature of the keeper, Y. Ayse B. Nordal with the official
seal of the Office of theRegistrar of Oslo, and the authentication of Tanja Sorlie of
the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Oslo, which were further authenticated by
Philippine Consul Marian Jocelyn R. Tirol. In addition,the latter states that said
documents are the birth certificates of Jonathan Christopher Harper and Christian
Fredrik Harper issued by the Registrar Office of Oslo, Norway on March 23,

2004.Exhibits "Q-1", on the other hand, is the Marriage Certificate of Christian

Fredrik Harper andEllen Johanne Harper issued by the vicar of the Parish of Ullern
while Exhibit "R-1" is theProbate Court Certificate from the Oslo Probate Court,
naming Ellen Johanne Harper andJonathan Christopher Harper as the heirs of the
deceased Christian Fredrik Harper. Thedocuments are certified true translations into
English of the transcript of the said marriagecertificate and the probate court
certificate. They were likewise signed by the authorizedgovernment translator of
Oslo with the seal of his office; attested by Tanja Sorlie and further certified by our
own Consul.In view of the foregoing, WE conclude that plaintiffs-appellees had
substantially complied withthe requirements set forth under the rules. WE would
also like to stress that plaintiffs-appelleesherein are residing overseas and are
litigating locally through their representative. While theyare not excused from
complying with our rules, WE must take into account the attendant realitythat these
overseas litigants communicate with their representative and counsel via
longdistance communication. Add to this is the fact that compliance with the
requirements onattestation and authentication or certification is no easy process
and completion thereof mayvary depending on different factors such as the location
of the requesting party from theconsulate and the office of the record custodian, the
volume of transactions in said offices andeven the mode of sending these
documents to the Philippines. With these circumstances under consideration, to
OUR minds, there is every reason for an equitable and relaxed application of the
rules on the issuance of the required attestation from the custodian of the
documents to plaintiffs-appellees situation. Besides, these questioned documents
were duly signed by theofficers having custody of the same.
Petitioner assails the CAs ruling that respondents substantially complied with the
rules on theauthentication of the proofs of marriage and filiation set by Section 24
and Section 25 of Rule132 of the Rules of Court when they presented Exhibit Q,
Exhibit Q-1, Exhibit R and Exhibit R-1,because the legal custodian did not duly attest
that Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1 were the correctcopies of the originals on file, and
because no certification accompanied the documents statingthat "such officer has
custody of the originals." It contends that respondents did not competentlyprove
their being Harpers surviving heirs by reason of such documents being hearsay and
incompetent. Petitioners challenge against respondents documentary evidence on
marriage and heirship is not well-taken.Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132
provide:Section 24. Proof of official record.
The record of public documents referred to in paragraph(a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publicationthereof or by
a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by
hisdeputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that suchofficer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is
in a foreign country, thecertificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, viceconsul, or consular agent or by any officer in

the foreign service of the Philippines stationed inthe foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.Section 25. What
attestation of copy must state.

Whenever a copy of a document or record isattested for the purpose of evidence,

the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is acorrect copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation mustbe
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of
a courthaving a seal, under the seal of such court. Although Exhibit Q,Exhibit Q1,Exhibit R and Exhibit R-1 were not attested by the officer having the legal custody
of the record or by his deputy in the manner required in Section 25 of Rule 132, and
said documents did not comply with the requirement under Section 24 of Rule132 to
the effect that if the record was not kept in the Philippines a certificate of the
personhaving custody must accompany the copy of the document that was duly
attested stating thatsuch person had custody of the documents, the deviation was
not enough reason to reject theutility of the documents for the purposes they were
intended to serve.Exhibit Q and Exhibit R were extracts from the registry of births of
Oslo, Norway issued onMarch 23, 2004 and signed by Y. Ayse B. Nordal, Registrar,
and corresponded to respondentJonathan Christopher Harper and victim Christian
Fredrik Harper, respectively. Exhibit Qexplicitly stated that Jonathan was the son of
Christian Fredrik Harper and Ellen JohanneHarper, while Exhibit R attested to the
birth of Christian Fredrik Harper on December 4, 1968.Exhibit Q and Exhibit R were
authenticated on March 29, 2004 by the signatures of Tanja Sorlieof the Royal
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway as well as by the official seal of that office.
Inturn, Consul Marian Jocelyn R. Tirol of the Philippine Consulate in Stockholm,
Swedenauthenticated the signatures of Tanja Sorlie and the official seal of the Royal
Ministry of ForeignRules of Court.
PROTACIO GO vs.SERVACIO
DOCTRINE:
The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse
withoutthe prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not
necessarily void if said portion hasnot yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial
partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At anyrate, the requirement of
prior liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.
FACTS:
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land (17,140 SQM) to
Protacio B. Go, Jr.

Twenty three years later, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and
Waiver, whereby heaffirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr.
(Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchasedthe two parcels of land (the property).
In 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the
petitioners.
On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Ritos wife
Dina B. Go) sold aportion of the property (5,560 SQM) to Ester L. Servacio
(Servacio).
On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but
Servacio refused to heedtheir demand.
They sued Servacio and Rito for the annulment of the sale of the property.
PETITIONERS:
Following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property became conjugal property;
andthat the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the
community propertybetween Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property
because he hadpurchased it with his own money.
RTCs RULING:Affirmed the validity of the sale.

However, declared the property was the conjugal property and not the
exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three vendors in the
sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr.,Rito, and Dina).
The participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their
being heirs of the lateMarta.
Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was
acquired, all propertyacquired by either spouse during the marriage was
conjugal unless there was proof that theproperty thus acquired pertained
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr. to Servacio was void for being made without
prior liquidation?
NO
RULING: Article 130 of the Family Code
reads:

Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugalpartnership property

shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
thedeceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the conjugal partnershipproperty either judicially or extra-judicially within
one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon thelapse of the six month
period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the
conjugalpartnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the
surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the
foregoingrequirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property
shall govern the property relations of thesubsequent marriage.

DELA PENA vs AVILA

Facts:The suit concerns a 277 square meter parcel of residential
land, together with theimprovements thereon, situated in
Marikina City and previously registered in the name of petitioner
Antonia R. Dela Pea (Antonia), married to Antegono A. Dela
Pea (Antegono) under TransferCertificate of Title (TCT) No. N32315 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. On 7 May 1996, Antonia
obtainedfrom A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in the sum of
P250,000.00. On the very same day, Antoniaalso executed in
favor of Aguila a notarized Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the
property, for thepurpose of securing the payment of said loan
obligation.On 4 November 1997, Antonia executed a notarized
Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of respondent
Gemma Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma), for the stated consideration of
P600,000.00. Utilizing thedocument, Gemma caused the
cancellation of TCT No. N-32315 as well as the issuance of TCT
No.337834 of the Marikina City Registry of Deeds, naming her as
the owner of the subject realty.On 18 May 1998, Antonia and her
son, petitioner Alvin John B. Dela Pea (Alvin), filed against
Gemmathe complaint for annulment of deed of sale docketed
before Branch 272 of the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Marikina
City. Claiming that the subject realty was conjugal property, the

Dela Peas alleged,among other matters, that the 7 May 1996

Deed of Real Estate Mortgage Antonia executed in favor of Aguila
was not consented to by Antegono who had, by then, already died
Issue:Whether the subject property is considered a conjugal
property so that the mortgaged entered into by petitioner is void
because of lack of consent from petitioners husband?
Ruling:The petition is bereft of merit.Pursuant to Article 160 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of the marriage is
presumed tobelong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or tothe wife.
Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was
acquired with funds of thepartnership, proof of acquisition during
the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of
thepresumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.Not having
established the time of acquisition of the property, the Dela Peas
insist that the
registration thereof in the name of Antonia R. Dela Pea, of legal
age, Filipino, married to Antegono A.Dela Pea should have
already sufficiently established its conjugal nature. Confronted
with the sameissue in the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, this
Court ruled, however, that the phrase married to is merely
descriptive of the civil status of the wife and cannot be
interpreted to mean that the husband isalso a registered owner.
Because it is likewise possible that the property was acquired by
the wife whileshe was still single and registered only after her
marriage, neither would registration thereof in saidmanner
constitute proof that the same was acquired during the marriage
and, for said reason, to bepresumed conjugal in nature. Since
there is no showing as to when the property in question was
acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone is
determinative of its nature asparaphernal, i.e., belonging
exclusively to said spouse.