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Interpretation and violation- the aff should be a topical defense of the resolution
Resolved before a colon reflects a legislative forum
Army Career College 13 # 12. Punctuation -- The Colon and Semicolon, United States Army, Warrant Officer Career
College, Last Reviewed: December 19, 2013, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/wocc/ColonSemicolon.asp
The colon introduces the following: A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon)
meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. A long quotation (one or
more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle
[Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) A formal quotation or question : The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we
have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment.
After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon)Dear Madam: (colon) The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock

A formal

resolution, after the word "resolved :" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

Should expresses an obligation

Nieto 9 Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311, Colo. Ct. App. 2009
"Should"

is "used . . . to express duty, obligation , propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [**15] interpreting the
weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative,
obligatory sense. HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should"
word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the

in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected
the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v.
McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but
not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts

interpreting the word

"should" in other types of jury instructions [**16] have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not
discretion . In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction
on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in
the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word
"should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning . State v. Rack,
318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's
use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating
that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

The United States splits sovereignty among federal and state governments
Andrew Power 13 et al, Active Citizenship and Disability: Implementing the Personalisation of Support, Cambridge University
Press, Jan 14, 2013, Page 88
The United States has a unique political and geographical landscape which provides a complex territorial system of administration of disability support
policy. It has an intricate federal-state level relationship , with different institutions and actors who can shape disability support policy in many different
ways and at various different scales. At the federal level the U nited S tates is a constitutional republic in which the president, Congressional and
judiciary share powers reserved for the national government, and the federal government shares sovereignty with the state governments.

Legalize is to make an illegal act lawful

Blacks Law Dictionary 95 What is LEGALIZE? [http://thelawdictionary.org/legalize/]
To make legal or lawful; to confirm or validate what was before void or unlawful; to add the sanction and authority of law to that which before
was without or against law.

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Topical Version of The Aff The United States should legalize all of the following in the United
States: marihuana, online gambling, physician-assisted suicide, prostitution, and the sale of
human organs.
This promotes a model of debate, as dialogue- normative restrictions are key to its potential
Galloway 7 DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RE- CONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS
AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE, Ryan Galloway, Assistant Professor and the Director of Debate at Samford University,
Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007)

Taking the resolution as an invitation to a dialogue about a particular set of ideas would preserve the affirmative teams obligation to
uphold the debate resolution. At the same time, this approach licenses debaters to argue both discursive and performative advantages.
While this view is broader than many policy teams would like, and certainly more limited than many critical teams would prefer, this approach captures the advantages of
both modes of debate while maintaining the stable axis point of argumentation for a full clash of ideas around these values. Here, I
begin with an introduction to the dialogic model, which I will relate to the history of switch-side debate and the current controversy. Then, I will defend my conception of debate as a dialogical
exchange. Finally, I will answer potential criticisms to the debate as a dialogue construct. Setting the Argumentative Table: Conceptualizing Debate as a Dialogue Conceiving debate as a
dialogue exposes a means of bridging the divide between the policy community and the kritik community. Here I will distinguish between formal argument and dialogue. While formal
argument centers on the demands of informal and formal logic as a mechanism of mediation, dialogue tends to focus on the relational aspects of an interaction. As such, it emphasizes the give-

As
dialogue, the affirmative case constitutes a discursive act that anticipates a discursive response. The consequent interplay does not
seek to establish a propositional truth , but seeks to initiate an in-depth dialogue between the debate participants. Such an approach would
and-take process of negotiation. Consequently, dialogue emphasizes outcomes related to agreement or consensus rather than propositional correctness (Mendelson & Lindeman, 2000).

have little use for rigid rules of logic or argument, such as stock issues or fallacy theory, except to the point where the participants agreed that these were functional approaches. Instead, a
dialogic approach encourages evaluations of affirmative cases relative to their performative benefits, or whether or not the case is a valuable speech act. The move away from formal logic
structure toward a dialogical conversation model allows for a broader perspective regarding the ontological status of debate. At the same time, a dialogical approach challenges the ways that
many teams argue speech act and performance theory in debates. Because there are a range of ways that performative oriented teams argue their cases, there is little consensus regarding the
status of topicality. While some take topicality as a central challenge to creating performance-based debates, many argue that topicality is wholly irrelevant to the debate, contending that the
requirement that a critical affirmative be topical silences creativity and oppositional approaches. However, if

we move beyond viewing debate as an ontologically independent

an invitation to dialogue, our attention must move from the ontology of the affirmative case to a consideration of the
case in light of exigent opposition (Farrell, 1985). Thus, the initial speech act of the affirmative team sets the stage for an emergent
response. While most responses deal directly with the affirmative case, Farrell notes that they may also deal with metacommunication regarding the process of negotiation. In this way, we
monologuebut as

may conceptualize the affirmatives goal in creating a germ of a response (Bakhtin, 1990) whose completeness bears on the possibility of all subsequent utterances. Conceived as a dialogue,
the affirmative speech act anticipates the negative response. A failure

to adequately encourage, or anticipate a response deprives the negative speech act and
the emergent dialogue of the capacity for a complete inquiry . Such violations short circuit the dialogue and undermine the potential
for an emerging dialogue to gain significance (either within the debate community or as translated to forums outside of the activity).
Here, the dialogical model performs as a fairness model , contending that the affirmative speech act, be it policy oriented, critical, or
performative in nature, must adhere to normative restrictions to achieve its maximum competitive and ontological potential.

Two net benefitsFirst, Fairness- They justify arbitrarily changing the question of the debate to an infinite number
of potential frameworks, destroying predictable limits and ensuring the Aff always wins. The
community chooses resolutionally divided ground because it is balanced and educational.
Arguments that arent linked to the plan are amorphous and unstable. A narrow, mutually
agreed-upon understanding of the topic is a pre-requisite to meaningful research and strategy.
This is a pre-condition to debate
Shively 00 Partisan Politics and Political Theory, Ruth Lessl, Assistant Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, p. 181-2

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ambiguists must say no tothey must reject and limitsome ideas and actions. In what
follows, we will also find that they must say yes to some things. In particular, they must say yes to the idea of rational per- suasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the
role of agreement in political contest , or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in
thinking that agreement marks the end of contestthat consen- sus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfectif
there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on
generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting
condition of contest and debate . As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been
The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The

one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the
premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we

cannot argue about something if we are not com- municating: if we cannot

agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree
about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it . For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with
someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if ones target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the
sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is
meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared
ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagree- ments. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an under- standing of the complaint at hand.
And a demonstrators audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly
contesting it. In other words, contestation

rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

Second nb decision-making skillsSecond decision-making skills- we make choices every day that affect those around us. We have
an obligation to the people affected by our decisions to use debate as a method for honing these
critical thinking and information processing abilities.
Stasis fostered by topical advocacy creates better decisions
Galloway 7 DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RE- CONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS
AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE, Ryan Galloway, Assistant Professor and the Director of Debate at Samford University,
Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007)
Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy. A Sirens Call: Falsely
Presuming Epistemic Benefits In addition to the basic equity norm, dismissing the idea that debaters defend the affirmative side of the topic encourages
advocates to falsely value affirmative speech acts in the absence of a negative response. There may be several detrimental
consequences that go unrealized in a debate where the affirmative case and plan are not topical . Without ground, debaters may fall
prey to a sirens call, a belief that certain critical ideals and concepts are axiological, existing beyond doubt without scrutiny . Bakhtin
contends that in dialogical exchanges the greater the number and weight of counter-words, the deeper and more substantial our
understanding will be (Bakhtin, 1990). The matching of the word to the counter-word should be embraced by proponents of critical
activism in the activity, because these dialogical exchanges allow for improvements and modifications in critical arguments. Muir
argues that debate puts students into greater contact with the real world by forcing them to read a great deal of information (1993, p. 285). He continues, [t]he constant consumption of

Through the
process of comprehensive understanding, debate serves both as a laboratory and a constitutive arena. Ideas find and lose adherents.
Ideas that were once considered beneficial are modified, changed, researched again, and sometimes discarded altogether. A central
argument for open deliberation is that it encourages a superior consensus to situations where one side is silenced. Christopher Peters contends,
The theory holds that antithesis ultimately produces a better consensus, that the clash of differing, even opposing interests and ideas in the
process of decision making...creates decisions that are better for having been subjected to this trial by fire (1997, p. 336). The
combination of a competitive format and the necessity to take points of view that one does not already agree with combines to
create a unique educational experience for all participants. Those that eschew the value of such experience by an axiological
position short-circuit the benefits of the educational exchange for themselves, their opponents, as well as the judges and observers of
such debates.
material...is significantly constitutive. The information grounds the issues under discussion, and the process shapes the relationship of the citizen to the public arena (p. 285).

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A switch-side format it require students see both sides of an issue

Bile 00 REASONING TOGETHER AS DIALECTICAL PARTNERS! "BEYOND PERSUASION" TOWARD "COOPERATIVE
ARGUMENTATION, Jeffery Thomas Bile, PhD candidate in the School of Interpersonal Communication at Ohio, Contemporary
Argumentation and Debate, http://www.cedadebate.org/CAD/index.php/CAD/article/viewFile/254/238
In our contentious culture, we surely need better ways to begin to discuss the issues without one side being against another (Griffin 101). If we took this approach, we could have discussions
that center on the complexity of issues, what their implications are, who might be affected and in what ways, and on how one choice over another changes the issue itself. So, I think the issue
of the "resolution" needs to be reconsidered from an invitational framework as well. (Griffin 101). l agree completely that these are worthwhile goals. Certainly, contemporary social problems
are not as simple as our dualistic debates often imply. Before

discarding binary topics too quickly, however, we should consider their contextual effects .
When combined with the requirement of switching sides, two-sided topics expand the possibilities for discovering that those with
whom we disagree might have tenable positions after all. Empathic learning is encouraged, then, when students agree to disagree in
the context of debate tournaments. A related issue, deserving much further exploration, is the problematic of counter-attitudinal advocacy created by mandatory side switching. l
sympathize with the view that students should not be "forced" to advocate a position that they do not believe. As a practical matter, I believe that most topics are ambiguous
enough to allow considerable opportunity to find positional comfort . But, more fundamentally, I'm not sure that l ultimately accept the contention that academic
counter-attitudinal advocacy is undesirable. The counter-attitudinal switch-sides structure of intercollegiate debate asks the student to imaginatively enter into
another's world and to try to understand why they might see it as they do. This convention may yield invitational dividends. Foss and Griffin recognize value
in asking communicators to seriously consider "perspectives other than those they presently hold and they encourage them to try to "validate those
perspectives even if they differ dramatically from the rhetor's own" (5). It seems to me that counter-attitudinal advocacy might be an excellent technique for encouraging just that. Debate
tournaments ask students to agree to model open-mindedness , empathy , and personal validation of multiple views. No one should be forced
to debate, but for those making the choice, agreeing to disagree encourages a consideration of the fallibility of one's own constructions of the
world as well as empathy for other ways of seeing things.

Through discussing paths of government action, debate teaches us to be better organizational

decision makers
William J. Kinsella 2 is Associate Professor of Communication @ North Carolina State University, Problematizing the
Distinction between Expert and Lay Knowledge, https://www.academia.edu/297063/Kinsella_W._J._2002_._Problematizing_the_Distinction_Between_Expert_and_Lay_Knowledge._New_Jersey_Journal_of_Communication_10_2_191-207, DOA:
3-3-14, y2k
As active and equal participants in policy discourse with an undeniable technical dimension , members of the public must
listen to , evaluate , and contribute to conversations with substantial technical content . Here Frank Fischers analysis complements that of Walter Fisher. Fischer (2000)
maintains that public participation is valuable in three ways: it cultivates democratic politics and thereby counters the trend toward technocratic control and
individual alienation , it provides legitimation for particular decisions as well as for public institutions, and it enhances the relevance and validity of technical analysis at all levels
of decision making . It is the third of these motives that Fischer examines most closely and most effectively, focusing on citizens abilities to contribute as well as on the usefulness of their contributions in particular policy decisions
Drawing on examples from Europe, Asia, and the United States, Fischer argues that many citizens are much more capable of grappling with
complex technical and normative issues than the conventional wisdom would have us believe (p. 260). His examples include cases of popular epidemiology
(Brown & Mikkelsen, 1990), successful citizen panels and juries (Crosby, 1995), the widely-acclaimed European consensus conferences (Joss & Durant, 1995), and the participatory research movement ( Cancian & Armstead, 1992; Laird, 1993; Reason,
1994). His goal is to identify viable mechanisms for substantive public participation in environmental decisions, as a step toward what Dryzek (1990, 1996) calls discursive democracy. As a leader in the argumentative turn or communicative turn in the

successful policy flows from a broad and comprehensive dialog in which citizens
articulate, interrogate, and transform each others perspectives . Within this dialog, the local knowledge of ordinary citizens and the abstract knowledge of technical experts interact synergistically
to provide more complete analyses and more effective decisions. Fischer provides considerable evidence that citizens are capable of direct participation , and that such participation is essential both
to democratic politics and to successful decision making. Nevertheless, reviews of existing approaches to public participation, especially as practiced in the United States, suggest that these often fall far
public policy discipline (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Healey, 1993), Fischer maintains that

short of Fischers ideal (Chess & Purcell, 1999; Fiorino, 1990, 1996; Laird, 1993; McComas, 2001; Rowe & Frewer, 2000). In the realm of environmental policy making, Fiorino (1996) has described this deficit as a participation gap. Acknowledging the limits
of technocratic decision making and responding to calls for more openness, U.S. federal and state agencies have developed a variety of public involvement methods including public meetings and hearings, citizen advisory boards, and citizen panels and juries.
Meanwhile, ballot initiatives and referenda have become increasingly influential in state and local environmental politics. These approaches are certainly valuable, and represent progress toward a more dialogic model. Nevertheless, they all have significant
limitations related to real or perceived limits on the abilities of ordinary citizens to participate in debates with substantial technical dimensions. Public meetings, widely utilized by many government agencies, are attempts at direct democracy but typically provide
only limited opportunities for citizen engagement with issues and decision makers. In many cases, this engagement is brief and comes only after the issues have been framed and a narrow menu of policy choices has been developed. In the worst cases, meetings
provide hollow participation in which citizens merely make noise in some political ritual rather than real influence over outcomes (Laird, 1993, p. 348). As Fiorino (1996) notes, in most public hearings the agency defines the agenda and establishes the
format. The hearing itself provides limited time for citizens to understand the technical or policy issues and to take a substantive part in the discussion. Indeed, the reliance on public hearings as a mainstay of public participation is one of the weaknesses of the
administrative process in the United States, in part because of the unequal relationship of citizens to government officials....Public hearings typically do not give citizens a share in decision making. Although they provide mechanisms for public views to come to
the attention of administrators, they do not directly engage citizens in the process of making policy choices or cede to citizens any control over the decision process itself (p. 202). Panels, juries, and advisory boards provide small numbers of citizens with
opportunities for more extended engagement, but these more highly involved individuals do not necessarily represent the larger public that remains distanced from the issues. Appointments to such bodies often emphasize interest group politics over direct
democracy (Fiorino, 1996; Laird, 1993; Williams & Matheny, 1995). Additionally, public interest representatives who serve in these bodies for extended time periods run the risk of going native by becoming specialized experts themselves. As these individuals
increasingly identify with their formal roles, they may lose contact with the communities and values that they are presumed to represent. In Fischer s view, [i]nterest group politics are not to be misconstrued with citizen involvement in the sense at issue here.
Although they speak in the name of large numbers of people, such groups are typically run by a small group of people at the top of their organizations. Indeed, interest group politics has seldom proven to be participatory democracy in action....Many grassroots
environmentalists in the United States, especially those identified with the environmental justice movement, strongly complain that the big environmental Washington-oriented organizations have lost touch with the local citizenry. Having become caught up in socalled Beltway politics, such organizations increasingly represent their followers only on paper (Fischer, 2000, pp. 33-34). Similarly, ballot initiatives are often developed by interest groups and brought to the polls based on popular support of their perceived or
claimed purposes, rather than close scrutiny and broad substantive participation. Understanding the full implications of a ballot measure often requires a substantial familiarity with the underlying technical and policy issues; as a result voters rely heavily on
opinion leaders and media representations to interpret the meanings of ballot measures. Furthermore, in this mode of action the influence that any one person can have is small. One of the many weaknesses of initiatives is that they force people to make
dichotomous choices, which offers them a very limited kind of decision authority (Fiorino, 1996, p. 202). The participation gap manifested in these practices has multiple roots. One of these is the sheer complexity, pace, and breadth of contemporary society,
which seems to offer individuals no alternative to reliance on specialists in myriad technical fields (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1990). Apathy, political alienation, and the many distractions of the consumer society are additional and related factors, although democratic
theorists argue that these are products of a thin political culture as much as they are causes of it (Barber, 1984). As Williams and Matheny (1995) have pointed out, prevailing notions of liberal politics offer few conceptual alternatives to a 8 dichotomous choice
between technocratic or managerial approaches and pluralist or interest group models. Both of these paradigms assumewhether correctly or incorrectlythat ordinary citizens lack the competencies required for deep engagement with policy issues. The
managerial approach, objectivist in its premises, seeks to solve this problem by delegating decision making to experts who can use objective analytical methods to identify optimum solutions. The pluralist model, relativist in its premises, seeks to do so by
facilitating competition and compromise among affected interest groups. Neither approach allows for the broad public dialog that would characterize the communitarian alternative suggested by Williams and Matheny, a form of strong democracy (Barber,
1984) in which ordinary citizens participate directly and have substantial influence. In this practical and discursive context, Fischer (2000) acknowledges that participation is a challenging and often frustrating endeavor...collective citizen participation is not

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something that just happens. It has to be organized, facilitated, and even nurtured (p. 260). In support of that goal Fischer and others (Kleinmann, 2000; Sclove, 1995; Williams & Matheny, 1995) seek to enlarge the repertoire of available participation methods,
drawing in part on Western European models. These scholars are primarily concerned with institutionalizing new approaches that allow for participation by greater numbers of citizens, over longer periods of time, in greater depth, and with increased authority

Ordinary citizens need not acquire the same depth of technical knowledge as specialists; indeed, their doing so would entail becoming specialists themselves and would impair
their status as representative members of the public. In this regard, Fiorino (1996) emphasizes the importance of direct participation of amateurs... as citizens engaged
in governance ...rather than professionals doing a job (p. 200). Nevertheless, to succeed as amateur experts members of the public must possess basic technical competencies. At the
most general level, these include a working vocabulary of scientific terms and concepts, and an overall understanding of how technical
reasoning operates . Understood as technical literacy these competencies are among the recognized goals of formal education, but the rapid
changes characteristic of contemporary society require that they be strengthened and continually refined. Basic technical knowledge of this sort enables citizens to follow evolving
policy issues , increases the likelihood that they will take an active interest in these issues, and prepares them for more successful
involvement with particular issues. If lay citizens are to participate more fully in public technical decisions , then their relationships with specialists must become
more dialogical. Technical professionals must not only be providers of prepackaged information and analysis ; such finished products lack
the contributions of the broader public while providing a misleading appearance of argumentative closure . Instead, specialists must serve as
advisors, counselors, or educators, helping rather than supplanting laypeople in the interpretation and use of technical findings. Laird (1993) remarks, [P]articipation must be meaningful. Part of that requirement is that citizens be educated about the issues at hand
and what they can do to influence policy decisions....In part, this criterion means that relevant information must be provided to citizens, but information is not enough. Inundating the people with mountains of raw data is not a democratic exercise. Rather, citizens

information, facts, and data are now more available

than ever before. However, to make use of these citizens must understand them in both their technical and their policy contexts : [I]t is not
enough that participants simply acquire new facts . They must begin, at some level, to be able to analyze the problem at hand. At the simplest level,
this means understanding the different interpretations that one can draw from the facts and trying to think about ways to choose
among those interpretations. At a more sophisticated level, it means beginning to learn how and when to challenge the validity of the asserted
facts, where new data would be useful, and how the kinds of policy questions being asked influence the type of data they
seek. Perhaps more important, analyzing a problem means being able to challenge the formulation of the problem itself, that is, for people to
decide for themselves what the most important questions are (Laird, 1993, pp. 353-354). Here Laird is calling for a type of citizen competency which extends beyond basic technical literacy. To
participate effectively, and to integrate the results of technical analysis with their own local knowledge and evaluative criteria, citizens also require a broader and more critical understanding of the
rhetoric and sociology of technical discourse. Fischer (2000) and others have assembled substantial evidence that this kind of citizen understanding is possible , but
must be given information and analysis that are genuinely educative. Citizen understanding must improve (pp. 347-348). As Laird recognizes,

to achieve this goal citizens, technical specialists, and policy specialists must collaborate closely. Fischer, like Laird, emphasizes the educational role that specialists must play as part of that collaboration:

These skills solve a laundry list of problems

Lundberg 10 Tradition of Debate in North Carolina in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century, Christian O.
Lundberg, Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2010, p311
The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities

debate builds capacity for critical thinking , analysis of public claims, informed decision
making , and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative

built by debate are not limited to speechas indicated earlier,

politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue
that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change,

Debate provides an
indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to
research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of
arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of
debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary
which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154).

failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context,
but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the
benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to
effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the
effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access
information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong
support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt
more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases.

debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the

kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was
(Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that

written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a
topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms

the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the
classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities . The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and
information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly
contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving
the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged , open-minded and self-critical
students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we
produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of
of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively,

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democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges , including:
domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change;
emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of
rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed
and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective
democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an]
increasingly complex world.

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2
Counterplan text: The United States should legalize all or nearly all of the following: PhysicianAid in dying, Sale of Human Organs, Online Gambling, and Prostitution
Legalizing marijuana is bad:
Legalization leads to corporate market control
Humphreys, psych prof at Stanford, 11
(Keith, public policy advisor, "Mis-imagining Marijuana Inc.," 7-24-11, http://www.samefacts.com/2011/07/drug-policy/misimagining-marijuana-inc/, accessed 9-13-14) PM
a legal
marijuana industry, namely that it would be corporate dominated, employ armies of lobbyists and fight to keep taxes and health and
safety regulations as minimal as possible. Mr. St. Pierre said that the food industry would be the best place to look for a parallel: About 90%
of food is produced by mega-corporations and a few small players cut up the remaining scraps of business. I tend to think that a legalized marijuana
industry would look like Big Tobacco indeed marijuana production companies may simply be divisions of tobacco companies but St. Pierre may have
I was recently on Nevada Public Radio with Allen St. Pierre, who is a leading marijuana legalization activist. We had similar views on the likely shape of

the better analogy. Our predictions arent particularly insightful. Indeed, they dont rise much above common sense: The shape of corporate America isnt hard to
discern. I was therefore intrigued to hear Mr. St. Pierre say that as he travels around the country, he spends a great deal of time disabusing legalization advocates of the
idea that a legalized marijuana industry wouldnt be, well, an industry. The likely form of a legalized marijuana industry isnt appreciated by many people who oppose
marijuana legalization either. Misimaginings of legalized cannabis in both camps are likely a consequence of the cultural meaning cannabis has for a significant portion
of the U.S. population. For millions of Americans, the word "marijuana" is hard-wired to the part of their brain that divides the human population into those
who went to Woodstock and those who went to Viet Nam. The

peculiar result is a largely left-wing movement fighting hard (alongside some

create a multinational corporation and a largely conservative movement fighting to stop the advance of capitalism
and the private sector. Some people on both sides misimagine a legalized marijuana industry made up of bucolic co-op farms run by hippies in tie dye t-shirts,
selling pot at the lowest possible profit to friendly independent business folk in the towns who set aside 10% of their profits to save the whales. This image is
pleasant to some and revolting to others, but thats as may be because its not what would happen under legalization. This will be tough for baby boomers to
corporate billionaires) to

hear, but the current generation of Americans doesnt know Woodstock from chicken stock and understands the Viet Nam War about as much as they do military action
in the Crimea. If the U.S. legalized marijuana today, those now fading cultural meanings would not rule the day, capitalism would.

Cannabis would be seen as a product to be marketed and sold just as is tobacco. People in the marijuana industry would wear suits,
work in offices, donate to the Club for Growth and ally with the tobacco industry to lobby against clean air restrictions . The plant
would be grown on big corporate farms, perhaps supported with unneeded federal subsidies and occasionally marred by scandals
regarding exploitation of undocumented immigrant farm workers. The liberal grandchildren of legalization advocates will grumble about the soulless
marijuana corporations and the conservative grandchildren of anti-legalization activists will play golf at the country club with marijuana inc. executives, toast George
Soros at the 19th hole afterwards and discuss how they can get the damn liberals in Congress to stop blocking capital gains tax cuts.

Corporate cannabis collapses the environment

Hughes, MS in Environmental Studies from Montana, 13
(Gary Graham, "Unsustainable Cannabis Agriculture Practices Must Come to an End," 9-3-13,
http://www.wildcalifornia.org/blog/unsustainable-cannabis-agriculture-practices-must-come-to-an-end/, accessed 9-13-14) PM

An undeniable point of fact is that industrial cannabis agriculture is having an increasingly quantifiable affect on local and global environments .
EPIC is committed to contributing to a level headed engagement on this complex and important human economic activity on the North Coast, with the goal of contributing to the design and
implementation of solutions that respect civil liberties as well as protect human and natural communities from the environmental

degradation that can be associated with

industrial grows. EPIC is engaging on this issue under the fundamental premise that the development of policy regarding marijuana on both a national and
local level must take environmental ramifications into consideration in order that a sane, healthy, and ecologically sustainable marijuana
agriculture paradigm be established. As a part of this effort, the following letter from EPIC was published this week in the Southern Humboldt and Northern Mendocino weekly
newspapers. To the Editor: This letter is intended to serve as a public statement about marijuana agriculture in Northern California on behalf of EPIC -the Environmental Protection
Information Center. Our organization wants to be clear about unsustainable and destructive practices associated with the marijuana industry. Cannabis obviously has the potential to contribute

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in a positive way to a viable and diversified local economy that does not degrade the natural qualities and authentic rural culture of our bioregion. Due to the egregious behavior of an
increasing number of irresponsible cannabis growers, the

positive potential of this industry is being squandered. Based upon the information we have seen in media
authorities must
focus their marijuana enforcement actions on those operations that result in environmental crimes such as this one. The scale of the
operation and the audacity of the water withdrawal, a result of what seems to be an absence of winter water storage, is very worrisome, in that it must be
only one example of environmentally degrading operations under way in watersheds around the region. The apparent absolute abuse of scarce water resources is
the type of practice that merits legal and media attention. Clearly, pumping water directly from a watercourse at this date, and in these unprecedented dry climatological
conditions, is to cause serious harm to aquatic systems, including a variety of endangered species. This is completely unsustainabl e, and is a
reports, the enforcement actions on Tuesday, Aug. 27 on Mattole Canyon Creek near Ettersburg exemplified the position of several conservation groups in our area that

violation of the most basic fundaments of a stewardship based land ethic. Responsible economic activity is a cornerstone to protecting our environment. For instance, EPIC has never been an
organization that was opposed to logging per se. EPIC has always advocated for the establishment of a wood products industry that treats the landscape with care, that protects irreplaceable
native ecosystems, and that democratizes economic opportunity. We advocate in the same vein around cannabis

agriculture: unsustainable practices must come to an

end, and responsible operations that promote the restoration of our watersheds must become the norm. EPIC hopes that a frank and open debate will arise of enforcement actions such as those
carried out on Mattole Canyon Creek last week, in order that our community responds in an integrated and responsible manner to these behaviors that are putting our
environment, our economy, and our future generations at risk.

Economic inequality and biodiversity loss risk extinction

Ehrenfeld, Ecology, Evolution, and Natural Resources prof at Rutgers, 5
(David, "The Environmental Limits to Globalization", Conservation Biology, 19.2, April 2005, accessed 9-13-14, Wiley Online) PM

The known effects of globalization on the environment are numerous and highly significant. Many others are undoubtedly unknown. Given these
circumstances, the first question that suggests itself is: Will globalization, as we see it now, remain a permanent state of affairs (Rees 2002; Ehrenfeld 2003a)? The
principal environmental side effects of globalizationclimate change, resource exhaustion (particularly cheap energy), damage to agroecosystems,
and the spread of exotic species, including pathogens (plant, animal, and human)are sufficient to make this economic system unstable and shortlived. The socioeconomic consequences of globalization are likely to do the same. In my book The Arrogance of Humanism (1981), I claimed that
our ability to manage global systems, which depends on our being able to predict the results of the things we do, or even to understand the systems we have
created, has been greatly exaggerated. Much of our alleged control is science fiction; it doesn't work because of theoretical limits that we ignore at our peril. We
live in a dream world in which reality testing is something we must never, never do, lest we awake. In 1984 Charles Perrow explored the reasons why we have trouble
predicting what so many of our own created systems will do, and why they surprise us so unpleasantly while we think we are managing them. In his book Normal
Accidents, which does not concern globalization, he listed the critical characteristics of some of today's complex systems. They are highly interlinked, so a change in
one part can affect many others, even those that seem quite distant. Results of some processes feed back on themselves in unexpected ways. The

controls of the system often interact with each other unpredictably. We have only indirect ways of finding out what is happening inside
the system. And we have an incomplete understanding of some of the system's processes. His example of such a system is a nuclear power plant,
and this, he explained, is why system-wide accidents in nuclear plants cannot be predicted or eliminated by system design. I would argue that globalization is a
similar system, also subject to catastrophic accidents, many of them environmentalevents that we cannot define until after they have occurred,
and perhaps not even then. The comparatively few commentators who have predicted the collapse of globalization have generally given social reasons to support their
arguments. These deserve some consideration here, if only because the environmental and social consequences of globalization interact so strongly with each other. In
1998, the British political economist John Gray, giving scant attention to environmental factors, nevertheless came to the conclusion that globalization is unstable and
will be short-lived. He said, There is nothing in today's global market that buffers it against the social strains arising from highly uneven economic development within
and between the world's diverse societies. The result, Gray states, is that The combination of [an] unceasing stream of new technologies, unfettered market
competition and weak or fractured social institutions has weakened both sovereign states and multinational corporations in their ability to control important events.
Note that Gray claims that not only nations but also multinational corporations, which are widely touted as controlling the world, are being weakened by globalization.
This idea may come as a surprise, considering the growth of multinationals in the past few decades, but I believe it is true. Neither governments nor giant

corporations are even remotely capable of controlling the environmental or social forces released by globalization, without first controlling
globalization itself. Two of the social critics of globalization with the most dire predictions about its doom are themselves masters of the process. The late Sir James
Goldsmith, billionaire financier, wrote in 1994, It must surely be a mistake to adopt an economic policy which makes you rich if you eliminate your national workforce
and transfer production abroad, and which bankrupts you if you continue to employ your own people. It is the poor in the rich countries who will subsidize the rich in
the poor countries. This will have a serious impact on the social cohesion of nations. Another free-trade billionaire, George Soros, said much the same
thing in 1995: The collapse of the global marketplace would be a traumatic event with unimaginable consequences. Yet I find it easier to imagine than the continuation
of the present regime. How much more powerful these statements are if we factor in the environment ! As globalization collapses, what

will happen to people, biodiversity, and ecosystems? With respect to people, the gift of prophecy is not required to answer this question. What will happen
depends on where you are and how you live. Many citizens of the Third World are still comparatively self-sufficient; an unknown number of these will survive the
breakdown of globalization and its attendant chaos. In the developed world, there are also people with resources of self-sufficiency and a growing

understanding of the nature of our social and environmental problems, which may help them bridge the years of crisis. Some species are
adaptable; some are not. For the nonhuman residents of Earth, not all news will be bad. Who would have predicted that wild turkeys (Meleagris gallopavo), one of
the wiliest and most evasive of woodland birds, extinct in New Jersey 50 years ago, would now be found in every county of this the most densely populated state, and
even, occasionally, in adjacent Manhattan? Who would have predicted that black bears (Ursus americanus), also virtually extinct in the state in the mid-twentieth
century, would now number in the thousands (Ehrenfeld 2001)? Of course these recoveries are unusualrare bright spots in a darker landscape. Finally, a few

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ecological systems may survive in a comparatively undamaged state; most will be stressed to the breaking point, directly or indirectly, by many
environmental and social factors interacting unpredictably. Lady Luck, as always, will have much to say. In his book The Collapse of Complex Societies, the
archaeologist Joseph Tainter (1988) notes that collapse, which has happened to all past empires, inevitably results in human systems of lower complexity and less
specialization, less centralized control, lower economic activity, less information flow, lower population levels, less trade, and less redistribution of resources. All of
these changes are inimical to globalization. This less-complex, less-globalized condition is probably what human societies will be like when the dust settles. I do not
think, however, that we can make such specific predictions about the ultimate state of the environment after globalization, because we have never experienced

anything like this exceptionally rapid, global environmental damage before. History and science have little to tell us in this situation. The end of the
current economic system and the transition to a postglobalized state is and will be accompanied by a desperate last raid on resources and a chaotic flurry of
environmental destruction whose results cannot possibly be told in advance. All one can say is that the surviving species, ecosystems, and resources

will be greatly impoverished compared with what we have now, and our descendants will not thank us for having adopted, however briefly, an economic system
that consumed their inheritance and damaged their planet so wantonly. Environment is a true bottom lineconcern for its condition must trump all
purely economic growth strategies if both the developed and developing nations are to survive and prosper. Awareness of the environmental limits that
globalized industrial society denies or ignores should not, however, bring us to an extreme position of environmental determinism. Those whose preoccupations with
modern civilization's very real social problems cause them to reject or minimize the environmental constraints discussed here (Hollander 2003) are guilty of seeing only
half the picture. Environmental scientists sometimes fall into the same error. It is tempting to see the salvation of civilization and environment solely in terms of
technological improvements in efficiency of energy extraction and use, control of pollution, conservation of water, and regulation of environmentally harmful activities.
But such needed developments will not be sufficientor may not even occurwithout corresponding social change, including an end to human population growth and
the glorification of consumption, along with the elimination of economic mechanisms that increase the gap between rich and poor. The environmental and social
problems inherent in globalization are completely interrelatedany attempt to treat them as separate entities is unlikely to succeed in easing the transition to a
postglobalized world. Integrated change that combines environmental awareness, technological innovation, and an altered world view is

the only answer to the life-threatening problems exacerbated by globalization (Ehrenfeld 2003b). If such integrated change occurs in time, it will likely
happen partly by our own design and partly as an unplanned response to the constraints imposed by social unrest, disease, and the economics of scarcity. With respect to
the planned component of change, we are facing, as eloquently described by Rees (2002), the ultimate challenge to human intelligence and self-awareness, those vital
qualities we humans claim as uniquely our own. Homo sapiens will eitherbecome fully human or wink out ignominiously, a guttering candle in a violent storm of our
own making. If change does not come quickly, our global civilization will join Tainter's (1988) list as the latest and most dramatic example of collapsed complex
societies. Is there anything that could slow globalization quickly, before it collapses disastrously of its own environmental and social weight? It is still not too late

to curtail the use of energy, reinvigorate local and regional communities while restoring a culture of concern for each other , reduce
nonessential global trade and especially global finance (Daly & Cobb 1989), do more to control introductions of exotic species (including pathogens), and
accelerate the growth of sustainable agriculture. Many of the needed technologies are already in place. It is true that some of the damage to our environment
species extinctions, loss of crop and domestic animal varieties, many exotic species introductions, and some climatic changewill be beyond repair. Nevertheless,
the opportunity to help our society move past globalization in an orderly way, while there is time, is worth our most creative and passionate efforts. The citizens of the
United States and other nations have to understand that our global economic system has placed both our environment and our society in peril, a

peril as great as that posed by any war of the twentieth century. This understanding, and the actions that follow, must come not only from
enlightened leadership, but also from grassroots consciousness raising. It is still possible to reclaim the planet from a self-destructive
economic system that is bringing us all down together, and this can be a task that bridges the divide between conservatives and liberals. The crisis is here,
now. What we have to do has become obvious. Globalization can be scaled back to manageable proportions only in the context of an altered world view that rejects
materialism even as it restores a sense of communal obligation. In this way, alone, can we achieve real homeland security, not just in the United States, but also in other
nations, whose fates have become so thoroughly entwined with ours within the global environment we share.

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Case
Your Deleuze evidence is talking about real, whips and chains, masochism; the object of his
criticism is the term sadomasochism. His only point is to contrast and separate the terms from
one another, not advocate one over the other.
The affs focus on masochism forever suspends political engagement in favor of self-therapy--accepting some axioms of commonality are necessary to achieve emancipation
Chamsy Ojeili 3, Senior Lecturer School of Social and Cultural Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, Post-modernism, the
Return to Ethics, and the Crisis of Socialist Values, www.democracynature.org/vol8/ojeili_ethics.htm#_edn9
Notably, anarchists have often been charged with this failing by Marxian thinkers.[157] Anarchism does include those suspicious of the demands of association, those who fear the tyranny of the majority and who emphasise
instead the uniqueness and liberty of the individual. Here, the freedom of the creative individual, unhindered by the limitations of sociality, is essential. This second strand shows clearly the influence of liberal ideas. It is also,
in its bohemian and nihilistic incarnation, a child to the malevolent trio of De Sade, Stirner, Nietzsche, that is, those who reject coercive community mores and who recoil from herdish, conformist pressures. The free
individual must create his or her own guiding set of values, exploring the hitherto untapped and perhaps darker aspects of him or herself through an art which chaffs against the standards of beauty and taste of the ordinary
mortal. Given that freedom cannot endure limitations and that all idols have been driven from the world and the mind, for these revolutionaries, all is permitted.[158] This emphasis on individual sovereignty is clear in
Godwin and Stirner,[159] but also in Goldmans suspicion of collective life, in her elevation of the role of heroic individuals in history, and in the work of situationist Raoul Vaneigem.[160] This accent within non-orthodox
socialism has been much criticised. For instance, Murray Bookchin has contrasted social with lifestyle anarchism, rejecting the elevation the self-rule of the individual in the latter to the highest goal of anarchist thinking.

consider, here, the consequences, in the case of Emma Goldman, of the substitution of collective revolutionary change for boheme and for an
intellectualist contempt for the masses. Goldman turned more and more to purely self-expressive activity and increasingly appealed to intellectuals and middle
class audiences, who felt amused and flattered by her individualism and exotic iconoclasm.[162] This egoistic and personalistic turn ignores the essential social anarchist
aspiration to freedom, the commitment to an end to domination in society, the comprehension of the social premises of the individualist urge itself, and the necessity of
moving beyond a purely negative conception of liberty to a thicker, positive conception of freedom.[163] Perhaps, as Bookchin has rather trenchantly asserted, the recent individualist and neosituationist concern with subjectivity, expression, and desire is all too much like middle class narcissism and the self-centred
therapeutics of New Age culture. Perhaps also, as Barrot has said, the kind of revolutionary life advocated by Vaneigem cannot be lived.[164] Further, total freedom for any one individual necessarily
[161] One might

means diminished freedom for others. As La Banquise argue, Repression and sublimation prevent people from sliding into a refusal of otherness.[165] For socialists, freedom must be an ineradicably social as well as an

The whole thrust of libertarian politics is towards a collective project that reconstructs those freedom-limiting structures of
economy, power, and ideology.[166] It seems unlikely that such ambitions could be achieved by those motivated solely by a Sadean ambition to seek satisfaction of their own improperly understood
desires. On this question, Castoriadis is again useful accenting autonomy as a property of the collective and of each individual within society, and
rejecting the opposition between community and humanity, between the inner man [sic] and the public man [sic].[167] Castoriadis ridiculed abstract
individualism: We are not individuals, freely floating above society and history, who are capable of deciding sovereignly and in the absolute about
individual matter.

what we shall do, about how we shall do it, and about the meaning our doing will have once it is done Above all, qua individuals, we choose neither the questions to which we will have to respond nor the terms in which

Rejecting the contemporary tendency to posit others as limitations on our freedom ,

others were in fact premises of liberty, possibilities of action, and sources of facilitation.[169] Freedom is the most vital
object of politics, and this freedom always a process and never an achieved state is equated with the effective, humanly feasible, lucid
and reflective positing of the rules of individual and collective activity.[170] An autonomous society one without alienation explicitly and democratically
they will be posed, nor, especially, the ultimate meaning of our response, once given.[168]
Castoriadis argued that

creates and recreates the institutions of its own world, formulating and reformulating its own rules, rather than simply accepting them as given from above and outside. The resulting
institutions, Castoriadis hoped, would facilitate high levels of responsibility and activity among all people in respect of all questions about society.[171] Castoriadis notion of social transformation holds to the

committed to the free deployment

of the persons creative forces. Just as Castoriadis enthused over the capacity of human collectivities for immense works of creativity and responsibility,[173] so he insisted on the radical creativity of the
goals of integrated human communities, the unification of peoples lives and culture, and the collective domination of people over their own lives.[172] He was also

individual and the importance of individual freedom. Congruent with the notion of social autonomy, Castoriadis posited the autonomous individual as, most essentially, one who legislates for and thus regulates him or herself.

these goals were not

guaranteed by anything outside of the collective activity of people towards such goals, and he insisted that individual autonomy
could only arise under heavily instituted conditions through the instauration of a regime that is genuinely democratic.
[175] Such an outcome could not be solved in theory but only by a re-awakening of politics. Only in the clash of opinions
dependent on a restructured social formation not determined in advance by naturalistic or religious postulates, could a true ethics emerge.[176] This, I
[174] Turning to psychoanalysis, he designated this autonomy as the emergence of a more balanced and productive relationship between the ego and the unconscious. For Castoriadis,

Conclusion I have argued that socialist orthodoxy has been eclipsed as a programme for the good life. On the
one hand, it devolves into a project of pragmatic expediency bereft of a political and ethical dimension, where statist administration submerges both individual freedom
and democratic decision-making. On the other hand, as social democracy the orthodox tradition coalesces into a variety of more or less straightforward liberalism.
Liberalism tends to overstate the conception of humans as choosers, under-theorising and under-valuing the necessity of political community and the social dimension
of individuality and the necessity of a positive conception of freedom. The communitarian critique, however, too readily diminishes the freedoms of the individual,
subordinating people entirely to the horizons of community life and reducing politics to something like a general will. Possessed of both liberal and communitarian
features, post-modernism has been skeptical about the idea of a unitary human essence. It has jettisoned the notion of humans as unencumbered choosers, and it has
underscored the constructedness of all our values. In so doing, post-modernism signals a renewed interest in ethics, in questions of responsibility, evaluation,
believe, is the highpoint of libertarian thinking about ethics and politics.

and difference, within contemporary social thinking. Post-modernism offers a valuable critique of the tendency of socialist orthodoxy to bury the socialist insight as
to the sociality and historicity of values. Nevertheless, advancing as it does on orthodox socialism, post-modernisms radical constructivism and its horror at
the disasters of confident and unreflective modernity can issue in an ironic hesitancy, indicated in particular by an uncritical emphasis on
pluralism and incommensurability that threatens to forever suspend evaluation .[177] One signal of this is the cautious and

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depoliticised obsession with Otherness and the subject as victim of the return to ethics.[178] Further, post-modernism all too often
withdraws from universals and emancipation towards particularist either individualist or community-based answers to questions of
justice and the content of the valuable life. In contrast, those seeking a radical, inclusive democracy must remain engaged and universalist
in orientation. A number of libertarians have not hesitated in committing themselves, most importantly, to the emancipation of humanity without
exception.[179] In fact, politics and ethics seem unthinkable without such universalistic aspirations. Post-modernists themselves have
often had to submit to this truth, smuggling into their analyses universally-binding ethico-political principles and attempting to theorise
the potential linkages between progressive political struggles. However, such linkages do not amount to a coherent anti-systemic
movement that addresses the power of state and capital. In contrast, the universalist commitments of the ethics of emancipation held to
by many libertarians accents both freedom and equality, and the establishment of a true political community, against the dominations
and distortions of state and capital. Against the contemporary obsession with ethics, which is so often sloganistic, depoliticised, defensive,
privatised, and trivial, we should, with Castoriadis, accent politics as primary and as the condition of proper ethical engagement. I have argued
that, in line with Castoriadis strictures, such a political community and the aspiration to truly ethical and political deliberation, can only be attained when socialists free
themselves from belief in the possibility of extra social guarantees other than the free play of passions and needs,[180] and from the expectation of an end to tensions
and dilemmas around questions of social ordering. On these terms, libertarian goals are not contra liberal strictures the negation of aspirations for freedom and
democracy but are rather a collective pressing of these aspirations to the very far limits of popular sovereignty. It is for this reason that the stubborn durability of these
goals may, against all expectations, be an auspicious sign for libertarian utopianism.

Totalized submission without aftercare drags the ego and subject into subspace from which
nothing can be achieved because of withdrawal.
London Fetish Scene 06[Http://www.londonfetishscene.com/wipi/index.php/subspace]
Subspace(also sub space), in the context ofaBDSMscene,is the psychological state of the
submissive partner.Subspace isa metaphor forthe state the submissive's minds and bodies are
in during a deeply involving play scene.Many types of BDSM play invoke strong physical responses
such as extended adrenaline surges that can cause exhaustion.The mental aspect of BDSM also
causes many submissives to mentally separate themselves from their environment as they
process the experience. Deep subspace is often characterized as a state of deep recession and
incoherence.Many submissives require aftercare.

Consent solvency turns:

1 - Legalization of PAS causes mass killing without consents
Marilyn Golden 14, a senior policy analyst with the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, "The danger of assisted suicide
laws," 10-14-2014, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/13/opinion/golden-assisted-suicide/, DOA: 10-21-2014, y2k
My heart goes out to Brittany Maynard, who is dying of brain cancer and who wrote last week about her desire for what is often referred to as "death with dignity." Yet while I have every sympathy for her situation, it is

thousands -- more people who could be significantly harmed if assisted suicide is

legal. The legalization of assisted suicide always appears acceptable when the focus is solely on an individual. But it is important to remember that doing so would have repercussions
across all of society, and would put many people at risk of immense harm. After all, not every terminal prognosis is correct, and not
everyone has a loving husband, family or support system. As an advocate working on behalf of disability rights for 37 years, and as someone who uses a wheelchair, I
am all too familiar with the explicit and implicit pressures faced by people living with chronic or serious disability or disease. But the reality is that legalizing
assisted suicide is a deadly mix with the broken, profit-driven health care system we have in the United States. At less than $300, assisted suicide
is, to put it bluntly, the cheapest treatment for a terminal illness. This means that in places where assisted suicide is legal, coercion is not even necessary. If life-sustaining expensive treatment
important to remember that for every case such as this, there are hundreds -- or

is denied or even merely delayed, patients will be steered toward assisted suicide, where it is legal. This problem applies to government-funded health care as well. In 2008, came the story that Barbara Wagner, a Springfield,
Oregon, woman diagnosed with lung cancer and prescribed a chemotherapy drug by her personal physician, had reportedly received a letter from the Oregon Health Plan stating that her chemotherapy treatment would not be
covered. She said she was told that instead, they would pay for, among other things, her assisted suicide. "To say to someone: "We'll pay for you to die, but not for you to live" -- it's cruel," she said. Another Oregon resident,
53-year-old Randy Stroup, was diagnosed with prostate cancer. Like Wagner, Stroup was reportedly denied approval of his prescribed chemotherapy treatment and instead offered coverage for assisted suicide. Meanwhile,

where assisted suicide is legal, an heir or abusive caregiver may steer someone towards assisted suicide, witness the request, pick up
the lethal dose, and even give the drug -- no witnesses are required at the death, so who would know? This can occur despite the fact that diagnoses of terminal illness are
often wrong, leading people to give up on treatment and lose good years of their lives. True, "safeguards" have been put in place where assisted suicide is legal. But in practical terms,
they provide no protection. For example, people with a history of depression and suicide attempts have received the lethal drugs. Michael Freeland of Oregon

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These risks are simply not worth the price of assisted suicide. Available
data suggests that pain is rarely the reason why people choose assisted suicide. Instead , most people do so because they fear
burdening their families or becoming disabled or dependent. Anyone dying in discomfort that is not otherwise relievable, may legally today, in all 50 states,
receive palliative sedation, wherein the patient is sedated to the point at which the discomfort is relieved while the dying process takes place peacefully. This means
that today there is a legal solution to painful and uncomfortable deaths, one that does not raise the very serious problems of legalizing assisted
suicide. The debate about assisted suicide is not new, but voters and elected officials grow very wary of it when they learn the facts. Just this year alone, assisted suicide bills were rejected in Massachusetts, New
reportedly had a 40-year history of significant depression, yet he received lethal drugs in Oregon.

Hampshire, and Connecticut, and stalled in New Jersey, due to bipartisan, grassroots opposition from a broad coalition of groups spanning the political spectrum from left to right, including disability rights organizations,
medical professionals and associations, palliative care specialists, hospice workers and faith-based organizations. Assisted suicide is a unique issue that breaks down ideological boundaries and requires us to consider those

we should, as a society, strive for better options to address the fear and uncertainty articulated by Brittany Maynard.
if assisted suicide is legal, some people's lives will be ended without their consent, through mistakes and abuse. No safeguards have
ever been enacted or proposed that can properly prevent this outcome, one that can never be undone. Ultimately, when looking at the bigger picture, and not just individual cases, one
thing becomes clear: Any benefits from assisted suicide are simply not worth the real and significant risks of this dangerous public policy.
potentially most vulnerable in our society. All this means that
But

2 - Legalization includes regulations Have to prove consent to regs

Peak 12 Legalizing Prostitution, October 5, 2012, Bethany J. Peak, http://wclcriminallawbrief.blogspot.com/2012/10/legalizingprostitution.html
There are strong opinions on both sides of the fence regarding prostitution. One side thinks that prostitution should be a crime because its immoral and leads to additional criminal activity, as
well as the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. On the other side is a group that believes prostitution should not be a criminal violation and prostitutes should be recognized as workers like

Among those that advocate for non-criminal prostitution, there are those in favor of legalizing prostitution and those in
favor of decriminalization. Legalization entails the state regulating a particular practicehere the practice of prostitution. Decriminalization is
when the state has no laws related to the practice. Proponents of decriminalizing prostitution advocate for the removal of all laws
related to prostitution. There would be no criminal laws under which prostitutes could be punished. This would allow prostitute to
seek legal assistance if cheated or assaulted and would reduce law enforcement costs of policing and prosecuting prostitutes.[1]
everyone else.

3 - Legalizing prostitution spurs increased human trafficking

Cho et al 2013 [SEO-YOUNG German Institute for Economic Research-DIW AXEL DREHER Heidelberg University, Germany
University of Goettingen, Germany CESifo, Germany IZA, Germany KOF Swiss Economic Institute, Switzerland and ERIC
NEUMAYER* London School of Economics and Political Science, Does Legalized Prostitution Increase Human Trafficking?
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.05.023 Pg 67 Accessed 5/24/2014 DMW]
Much recent scholarly attention has focused on the effect of globalization on human rights (Bjrnskov, 2008; de Soysa & Vadlamannati, 2011) and
womens rights in particular (Cho, in press; Potrafke & Ursprung, 2012). Yet, one important, and largely neglected, aspect of
globalization with direct human rights implications is the increased trafficking of human beings (Cho & Vadlamannati, 2012; Potrafke, 2011), one of
the dark sides of globalization. Similarly, globalization scholars with their emphasis on the apparent loss of national sovereignty often neglect the impact that domestic policies crafted at the
country level can still exert on aspects of globalization. This article analyzes how

one important domestic policy choicethe legal status of prostitution

affects the incidence of human trafficking inflows to countries. Most victims of international human trafficking are women and girls.
The vast majority end up being sexually exploited through prostitution (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2006). Many authors
therefore believe that trafficking is caused by prostitution and combating prostitution with the force of the law would reduce
trafficking (Outshoorn, 2005). For example, Hughes (2000) maintains that evidence seems to show that legalized sex industries
actually result in increased trafficking to meet the demand for women to be used in the legal sex industries (p. 651). Farley (2009)
suggests that wherever prostitution is legalized, trafficking to sex industry marketplaces in that region increases (p. 313). 1 In its Trafficking
in Persons report, the US State Department (2007) states as the official US Government position that prostitution is inherently harmful and dehumanizing and fuels trafficking in persons (p.
27). The idea that combating human trafficking requires combating prostitution is, in fact, anything but new. As Outshoorn (2005, p. 142) points out, the UN International Convention for the
Suppression of the Traffic in Persons from 1949 had already called on all states to suppress prostitution. 2 See Limoncelli (2010) for a comprehensive historical overview.

Institutional macro-political engagement is vital to solve

Orly Lobel 7, Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Diego, THE PARADOX OF EXTRALEGAL ACTIVISM: CRITICAL
LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICS, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 120

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transformative
politics that is, attempts to produce meaningful changes in the political and socioeconomic landscapes. The suggested alternatives produce a new image of social and political action. This vision rejects a
shared theory of social reform, rejects formal programmatic agendas, and embraces a multiplicity of forms and practices. Thus, it is described in
Both the practical failures and the fallacy of rigid boundaries generated by extralegal activism rhetoric permit us to broaden our inquiry to the underlying assumptions of current proposals regarding

such terms as a plan of no plan,211 a project of pro- jects,212 anti-theory theory,213 politics rather than goals,214 presence rather than power,215 practice over theory,216 and chaos and openness over order and

the contemporary message rarely includes a comprehensive vision of common social claims, but rather engages in the
description of fragmented efforts. As Professor Joel Handler argues, the commonality of struggle and social vision that existed during the civil rights movement has disappeared.217 There is no unifying
discourse or set of values, but rather an aversion to any metanarrative and a resignation from theory. Professor Handler warns that this move away from grand narratives is self-defeating
precisely because only certain parts of the political spectrum have accepted this new stance: [T]he opposition is not playing that
game . . . . [E]veryone else is operating as if there were Grand Narratives . . . .218 Intertwined with the resignation from law and policy, the new bromide of neither left
formality. As a result,

nor right has become axiomatic only for some.219 The contemporary critical legal consciousness informs the scholarship of those who are interested in progressive social activism, but less so that of those who are interested,
for example, in a more competitive securities market. Indeed, an interesting recent development has been the rise of conservative public interest lawyer[ing].220 Although public interest law was originally associated

This
growth in conservative advocacy is particularly salient in juxtaposition to the decline of traditional progressive advocacy. Most recently, some
exclusively with liberal projects, in the past three decades conservative advocacy groups have rapidly grown both in number and in their vigorous use of traditional legal strategies to promote their causes.221

thinkers have even suggested that there may be something inherent in the lefts conception of social change focused as it is on participation and empowerment that produces a unique distrust of legal expertise.222

Although the new extralegal frames present themselves as apt alternatives

to legal reform models and as capable of producing significant changes to the social map, in practice they generate very limited
improvement in existing social arrangements. Most strikingly, the cooptation effect here can be explained in terms of the most profound risk of
the typology that of legitimation. The common pattern of extralegal scholarship is to describe an inherent instability in
dominant structures by pointing, for example, to grassroots strategies,223 and then to assume that specific instances of counterhegemonic activities
translate into a more complete transformation. This celebration of multiple micro-resistances seems to rely on an aggregate
approach an idea that the multiplication of practices will evolve into something substantial . In fact, the myth of engagement obscures
the actual lack of change being produced, while the broader pattern of equating extralegal activism with social reform produces a false belief in the potential of change. There are few
instances of meaningful reordering of social and economic arrangements and macro-redistribution. Scholars write about decoding what is really happening, as
though the scholarly narrative has the power to unpack more than the actual conventional experience will admit.224 Unrelated efforts become related and part of a whole through mere reframing. At the same time,
the elephant in the room the rising level of economic inequality is left unaddressed and comes to be understood as natural and
inevitable.225 This is precisely the problematic process that critical theorists decry as losers self-mystification, through which marginalized groups come to see systemic losses as
the product of their own actions and thereby begin to focus on minor achievements as representing the boundaries of their willed
reality. The explorations of micro-instances of activism are often fundamentally performative, obscuring the distance between the descriptive and the prescriptive. The manifestations of extralegal activism
the law and organizing model; the proliferation of informal, soft norms and norm-generating actors; and the celebrated, separate nongovernmental sphere of action all produce a fantasy that change
can be brought about through small-scale, decentralized transformation. The emphasis is local, but the locality is described as a
microcosm of the whole and the audience is national and global. In the context of the humanities, Professor Carol Greenhouse poses a comparable challenge to ethnographic studies
from the 1990s, which utilized the genres of narrative and community studies, the latter including works on American cities and neighborhoods in trouble.226 The aspiration of these genres was that each
individual story could translate into a time of the nation body of knowledge and motivation .227 In contemporary legal thought, a corresponding gap opens
between the local scale and the larger, translocal one. In reality, although there has been a recent proliferation of associations and grassroots groups, few new local-statenational federations
have emerged in the United States since the 1960s and 1970s, and many of the existing voluntary federations that flourished in the mid-twentieth century are in decline.228 There is,
therefore, an absence of links between the local and the national, an absent intermediate public sphere, which has been termed the
missing middle by Professor Theda Skocpol.229 New social movements have for the most part failed in sustaining coalitions or producing
significant institutional change through grassroots activism. Professor Handler concludes that this failure is due in part to the ideas of contingency, pluralism, and localism that are
so embedded in current activism.230 Is the focus on small-scale dynamics simply an evasion of the need to engage in broader substantive
debate? It is important for next-generation progressive legal scholars, while maintaining a critical legal consciousness, to recognize that not all extralegal associational life is
transformative. We must differentiate, for example, between inward-looking groups, which tend to be self- regarding and depoliticized,
and social movements that participate in political activities, engage the public debate, and aim to challenge and reform existing
realities.231 We must differentiate between professional associations and more inclusive forms of institutions that act as trustees for larger segments of the community.232 As described above, extralegal activism tends
to operate on a more divided and hence a smaller scale than earlier social movements, which had national reform agendas. Consequently, within critical discourse there is a need to
recognize the limited capacity of small-scale action. We should question the narrative that imagines consciousness-raising as directly
translating into action and action as directly translating into change. Certainly not every cultural description is political. Indeed, it is questionable whether forms of activism that
are opposed to programmatic reconstruction of a social agenda should even be understood as social movements. In fact, when groups are situated in opposition to any form of
institutionalized power, they may be simply mirroring what they are fighting against and merely producing moot activism that settles
for what seems possible within the narrow space that is left in a rising convergence of ideologies . The original vision is consequently
coopted, and contemporary discontent is legitimated through a process of self-mystification.
Once again, this conclusion reveals flaws parallel to the original disenchantment with legal reform.

Legal activism might not be perfect, but its better than the alt
Orly Lobel 7, University of San Diaego Assistant Professor of Law, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal
Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/lobel.pdf

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the extralegal model has suffered from the same drawbacks associated with legal cooptation. I show that as an effort to avoid
the risk of legal cooptation, the current wave of suggested alternatives has effects that ironically mirror those of cooptation itself. Three central types of
difficulties exist with contemporary extralegal scholarship. First, in the contexts of the labor and civil rights movements, arguments about legal cooptation often developed in response
to a perceived gap between the conceptual ideal toward which a social reform group struggled and its actual accomplishments. But,
ironically, the contemporary message of opting out of traditional legal reform avenues may only accentuate this problem. As the rise of
In the following sections, I argue that

informatization (moving to nonlegal strategies), civil society (moving to extralegal spheres), and pluralism (the proliferation of norm-generating actors) has been effected and appropriated by supporters from a wide range of

concepts have had unintended implications that conflict with the very social reform ideals from which they stem .
the idea of opting out of the legal arena becomes self-defeating as it discounts the ongoing importance of law and the possibilities
of legal reform in seemingly unregulated spheres. A model encompassing exit and rigid sphere distinctions further fails to recognize a reality of increasing interpenetration and the blurring of
boundaries between private and public spheres, profit and nonprofit sectors, and formal and informal institutions. It therefore loses the critical insight that law operates in the
background of seemingly unregulated relationships. Again paradoxically, the extralegal view of decentralized activism and the division of society into different spheres
in fact have worked to subvert rather than support the progressive agenda . Finally, since extralegal actors view their actions with romantic
idealism, they fail to develop tools for evaluating their success. If the critique of legal cooptation has involved the argument that legal
reform, even when viewed as a victory, is never radically transformative, we must ask: what are the criteria for assessing the achievements
of the suggested alternatives? As I illustrate in the following sections, much of the current scholarship obscures the lines between the descriptive
and the prescriptive in its formulation of social activism. If current suggestions present themselves as alternatives to formal legal
struggles, we must question whether the new extralegal politics that are proposed and celebrated are capable of producing a constructive theory and
meaningful channels for reform, rather than passive status quo politics. A. Practical Failures: When Extralegal Alternatives Are Vehicles for Conservative Agendas We dont
political commitments, these
Second,

want the 1950s back. What we want is to edit them. We want to keep the safe streets, the friendly grocers, and the milk and cookies, while blotting out the political bosses, the tyrannical headmasters, the inflexible rules, and

A basic structure of cooptation arguments as developed in relation to the labor and civil
rights movements has been to show how, in the move from theory to practice, the ideal that was promoted by a social group takes on
unintended content, and the group thus fails to realize the original vision. This risk is particularly high when ideals are framed in broad terms that are open to multiple
interpretations. Moreover, the pitfalls of the potential risks presented under the umbrella of cooptation are in fact accentuated in current proposals. Paradoxically, as the extralegal movement is
framed by way of opposition to formal legal reform paths, without sufficiently defining its goals, it runs the very risks it sought to
avoid by working outside the legal system. Extralegal paths are depicted mostly in negative terms and as resorting to new alternative
forms of action rather than established models. Accordingly, because the ideas of social organizing, civil society, and legal pluralism
are framed in open-ended contrarian terms, they do not translate into specific visions of social justice reform. The idea of civil society, which has been
the lectures on 100 percent Americanism and the sinfulness of dissent.163

embraced by people from a broad array of often conflicting ideological commitments, is particularly demonstrative. Critics argue that [s]ome ideas fail because they never make the light of day. The idea of civil society . . .

In former eras, the claims about the legal cooptation of

the transformative visions of workplace justice and racial equality suggested that through legal strategies the visions became stripped
of their initial depth and fragmented and framed in ways that were narrow and often merely symbolic. This observation seems
accurate in the contemporary political arena; the idea of civil society revivalism evoked by progressive activists has been reduced to symbolic acts with
very little substance. On the left, progressive advocates envision decentralized activism in a third, nongovernmental sphere as a way of reviving democratic participation and rebuilding the state
from the bottom up. By contrast, the idea of civil society has been embraced by conservative politicians as a means for replacing government-funded programs
and steering away from state intervention. As a result, recent political uses of civil society have subverted the ideals of progressive social reform and
replaced them with conservative agendas that reject egalitarian views of social provision .
failed because it became too popular.164 Such a broadly conceived ideal as civil society sows the seeds of its own destruction.

Reforms are possible and desirable- tangible change outweighs the risk of cooption
Omi and Winant 13 Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias, Michael Omi, Associate Professor at the University
of California, Berkeley, Howard Winant, Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara and Director of the
University of California Center for New Racial Studies, 2013, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36:6, 961-973, DOI:
10.1080/01419870.2012.715177

In Feagin and Eliass account, white racist rule in the USA appears unalterable and permanent. There is little sense that the white racial frame
evoked by systemic racism theory changes in significant ways over historical time. They dismiss important rearrangements and reforms as merely a distraction from
more ingrained structural oppressions and deep lying inequalities that continue to define US society (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21). Feagin and Elias use a concept they call surface flexibility
to argue that white elites frame racial realities in ways that suggest change, but are merely engineered to reinforce the underlying structure of racial oppression. Feagin and Elias say the phrase

If they mean the USA is a contradictory and

incomplete democracy in respect to race and racism issues, we agree. If they mean that people of colour have no democratic rights or
political power in the USA, we disagree . The USA is a racially despotic country in many ways, but in our view it is also in many respects a racial
democracy, capable of being influenced towards more or less inclusive and redistributive economic policies, social policies, or for
that matter, imperial policies. What is distinctive about our own epoch in the USA (post-Second World War to the present) with respect to race and racism? Over the past decades
racial democracy is an oxymoron a word defined in the dictionary as a figure of speech that combines contradictory terms.

there has been a steady drumbeat of efforts to contain and neutralize civil rights, to restrict racial democracy, and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities in different

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institutional sites employment, health, education persist and in many cases have increased. Indeed, the post-2008 period has seen a dramatic increase in racial inequality. The subprime
home mortgage crisis, for example, was a major racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected by predatory lending practices; many lost their homes as a result; racebased wealth disparities widened tremendously. It

would be easy to conclude, as Feagin and Elias do, that white racial dominance has been continuous and
unchanging throughout US history. But such a perspective misses the dramatic twists and turns in racial politics that have occurred
since the Second World War and the civil rights era. Feagin and Elias claim that we overly inflate the significance of the changes wrought by the civil rights movement,
and that we overlook the serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of huge racial inequalities (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its wake. We do not. In Racial Formation
we wrote about racial reaction in a chapter of that name, and elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias devote little attention to our arguments there; perhaps because they are in
substantial agreement with us. While we

argue that the right wing was able to rearticulate race and racism issues to roll back some of the gains of
the civil rights movement, we also believe that there are limits to what the right could achieve in the post-civil rights political
landscape. So we agree that the present prospects for racial justice are demoralizing at best. But we do not think that is the whole story .
US racial conditions have changed over the post-Second World War period, in ways that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or
neglect . Some of the major reforms of the 1960s have proved irreversible ; they have set powerful democratic forces in motion. These
racial (trans)formations were the results of unprecedented political mobiliza- tions, led by the black movement, but not confined to
blacks alone. Consider the desegregation of the armed forces, as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the Voting
Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act (Hart- Celler), as well as important court decisions like Loving v. Virginia that declared
anti- miscegenation laws unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his interest convergence hypothesis effectively
explains all these developments. How does Lyndon Johnsons famous (and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964 We have lost the South for a
generation count as convergence? The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways. As Antonio Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorpora- tion of
opposition (Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime under movement pressure was exercising its
hegemony. But Gramsci insists that such reforms which he calls passive revolutions cannot

be merely symbolic if they are to be effective: oppositions

must win real gains in the process. Once again, we are in the realm of politics , not absolute rule. So yes, we think there were important
if partial victories that shifted the racial state and transformed the significance of race in everyday life. And yes, we think that further
victories can take place both on the broad terrain of the state and on the more immediate level of social interaction: in daily interaction, in the human psyche and
across civil society. Indeed we have argued that in many ways the most important accomplishment of the anti-racist movement of the 1960s in the USA was the politicization of
the social. In the USA and indeed around the globe, race-based movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially defined others and the democratization of structurally racist societies,

broadened and deepened democracy

itself. They facilitated not only the democratic gains made in the USA by the black movement and its allies, but also the political advances towards equality, social
justice and inclusion accomplished by other new social movements: second- wave feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist
and anti-war movements among others. By no means do we think that the post-war movement upsurge was an unmitigated success. Far from it: all the new social
movements were subject to the same rearticulation (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. xii) that produced the racial ideology of colourblindness and its variants; indeed all
these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that arose from the political right to counter them. Yet even their incorporation and containment,
even their confrontations with the various backlash phenomena of the past few decades, even the need to develop the highly contradictory ideology of colour- blindness,
reveal the transformative character of the politicization of the social. While it is not possible here to explore so extensive a subject, it is worth noting that it
but also the recognition and validation by both the state and civil society of racially-defined experience and identity. These demands

was the long-delayed eruption of racial subjectivity and self-awareness into the mainstream political arena that set off this transformation, shaping both the democratic and anti- democratic
social movements that are evident in US politics today.

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2nc

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Overview
Our interpretation promotes a model of debate as a dialogue- this looks at the resolution as an
invitation to a dialogue about a particular set of ideas. Normative restrictions are key to effective
dialogue- ensuring full clash over a stable axis point
There are two net benefits to this modelFairness- topical advocacy best preserves predictable limits and neg ground. This is a prior
question because we must agree what we are debating about before we debate it. Debate is a
game and people wont start if the game seems rigged.
Decision-making skills- debate is a laboratory for skills development. It does not seek to establish
a propositional truth but just to have an in-depth dialogue. These skills are best fostered under a
stasis point, discussing political issues and a switch-side debate format. These skills are necessary
in daily life and are solve complex existential problems.

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A2: Role of Ballot

Role of ballot claims are self-serving- just vote for the team that did the better debating. Any
alternative to the yes/no question of the resolution links to all our offence.
Speice and Lyle 3 Traditional Policy Debate: Now More Than Ever, Patrick Speice, Wake Forest University, and Jim Lyle,
Debate Coach, Clarion University, 2003, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm

In addition to the affirmative-inclusive advocacy, language critiques and performance critiques

have led to contention about the role of the judge in a debate.

The judges job is to evaluate the participants
arguments and render a decision in favor of one of the teams at the conclusion of the debat e. While this may seem like a trite observation, the role of the
judge has far-reaching implications for the desirability of non-traditional debate practices. In TPD, the judge is asked to evaluate which team did the better
debating , and the source of such a determination is the way that the judge answers the yes/no question that is posed by the resolution.
The plan serves as an example that proves the resolution true by answering the question of the resolution in the affirmative. The method for making such
an evaluation is generally understood as a cost-benefit analysis of the desirability of the policy proposed by the affirmative, made by
evaluating all of the arguments for and against the plan, in relation to any competitive policy alternatives (including the status quo). While some
Initially, it is important to note that every debate takes place with at least five participants four debaters and a judge.

criticize the cost-benefit analysis method of evaluating a debate as subjective (for example, how does one weigh the people that may be saved by a plan against the immorality of the action),
the role of the judge is much more clearly defined than in a debate about language and performance. In TPD, the

teams are able to make weighing arguments that

guide the judge in evaluating competing claims. For example, teams will regularly argue that even if an action is immoral, it is justified in order to save lives. This type of
argument fits neatly into the formula for evaluating a TPD because it seeks to weigh the impact of an argument against the plan and the impact of an argument for the plan. Weighing
impacts is much easier in a round where the plan is the focus of the debate because the judge must simply determine what the largest
impact is before determining whether or not the plan is a good idea. If morality is more important than lives, the plan would be rejected in the above example; if
preserving life is more important than acting morally, the plan would be endorsed. In a round focused on language and performance, the team advocating a critical position
will usually attempt to divorce the judges decision from a topical plan-focus. The role of the judge is not to make a cost-benefit calculation that seeks to
determine the desirability of a policy, but instead the judge is placed into a realm where his or her decision is based on some other criteria . If the plan
seeks to answer the resolutional question in the affirmative, how does one evaluate a round in which the plan is not the focus of the debate? There is no obvious yes/no question that the judge
can answer when attempting to evaluate which team did the better debating (Smith, 2002). A number

of questions arise when one considers how a judge may evaluate a round in
if each team interprets a
performance differently? What makes one performance better than any other? What if the negative re-reads the 1AC with more emphasis or emotion? What if
one team gives their speech more quickly or more slowly that the other? What if a performance that is aesthetically pleasing to one person is offensive to
another? These questions all point to the lack of criteria that exist for evaluating a non-TPD round around a single yes/no question
(Smith, 2002). Without clearly defined criteria, judges will be likely to make subjective decisions about which team does the better
debating. For example, what would happen if the 1AC spoke of the racism that is inherent in US foreign policy and read narratives to that effect and asked the judge to vote for the
which questions of performance replace the plan as the focus of the debate. For example, does the judge listen the same way as each team does? What

performative effects of their speaking out against racism? What if the negative did the same sort of performance, but spoke only of sexism? Both performances are good, so how could the judge
ever reconcile those competing claims? What if the judge fundamentally disagrees with the ideas presented in the affirmatives performance? Should

the judge intervene and

vote against a performance they dont like, even if the negative fails to highlight those shortcomings that the judge perceives? There is
no method for evaluating two good performances against one another, even assuming criteria exist for differentiating between a good and bad
performance. Moreover, teams that run arguments focused on the effects of language will frequently call on the judge to vote for them as a means of political activism. That is, a team will argue
that the judge should vote for their arguments to make a particular political statement that could affect the real world. Some judges may feel uncomfortable endorsing a position that they do
not personally agree with, even if a team wins their argument. If

voting for a certain argument requires the judge to take an overtly political action, they
may intervene in the debate and vote against the team who won the argument because they do not agree with the politics of the
argument in question. This notion of intervention is related to the lack of criteria for evaluating language and performance critiques. It is not clear if the judge
can or should continue to be an objective critic of argument when the team advocating the critique changes the focus of the debate to one of personal preferences. But why does it matter if the
judge has a clearly defined role in the debate? If

the judge is unable to determine what the criteria are for evaluating a debate, and subjective
decisions will therefore be made about which performance or whose language the judge thinks is most valuable, debate would cease to be an educationally
rewarding enterprise . Hard work and research would not be rewarded with competitive success. While the debate would not be slanted in one
particular direction (save for that of the judges political biases), those that worked hard to research new positions and hone their skills would not be rewarded. In this sense, non-TPD rounds
make the game less fun, as the better team would only have a 50% chance of winning any given round, despite the quality of their debating. The TPD format avoids this problem by

predictability stems from requiring the affirmative to

advocate and defend a topical plan as the focus of the debate. Accordingly, the negative is able to use the resolution as a guide to predict
what the likely affirmative cases will be. The affirmative has reciprocal predictability in knowing that the negative can only seek to argue against their plan by advocating that
the status quo or a competing policy option is superior to the plan based on a cost-benefit analysis. This framework for evaluating debates reduces judge
intervention . Accordingly, TPD is a better game than non-TPD, because it affords each team a realistic chance to emerge victorious by making the game fair for both teams.
establishing clear criteria for evaluating a debate that are known to both teams prior to entering a debate. This

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Case o/v
Ethical policymaking must be grounded in consequences
Isaac 02
(Jeffrey, Professor of Political Science and Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life director, Ends, Means, and Politics,
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/ends-means-and-politics, Accessed 8-26-13, LKM)
Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part,
involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are

necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond moral- ity. It is to say
that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding
concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it
suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of ones intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends.
Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such
tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean con- science of their supporters; (2)
it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerless- ness; it is often a form of
complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politicsas opposed to religionpacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically
repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as
much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most
significant. Just as the alignment with good may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of good that generates evil. This is the
lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that ones goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always,
to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral
absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political
effectiveness.

Util is inevitable
Greene 02
(Joshua Greene, Department of Psychology, Princeton University. A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY IN
CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY NOVEMBER 2002. http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/GreeneDissertation.pdf)
Some people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take priority over which. If thats what we mean by 302 balancing rights, then we are wise
to shun this sort of talk. Attempting

to solve moral problems using a complex deontological algorithm is dogmatism at its most esoteric, but dogmatism
all the same. However, its likely that when some people talk about balancing competing rights and obligations they are already thinking like
consequentialists in spite of their use of deontological language. Once again, what deontological language does best is express the thoughts of people struck by
strong, emotional moral intuitions: It doesnt matter that you can save five people by pushing him to his death. To do this would be a violation of his rights!19 That is why angry protesters
say things like, Animals Have Rights, Too! rather than, Animal Testing: The Harms Outweigh the Benefits! Once again, rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and
absoluteness of the answer. But sometimes rights talk persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has faded. One thinks, for

example, of the thousands of children

whose lives are saved by drugs that were tested on animals and the rights of those children. One finds oneself balancing the rights on both
sides by asking how many rabbit lives one is willing to sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so on, and at the end of the day ones underlying thought is as
thoroughly consequentialist as can be, despite the deontological gloss. And whats wrong with that? Nothing, except for the fact that the deontological
gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth that there really are rights, etc. Best to drop it. When deontological talk gets sophisticated, the thought it represents is either dogmatic
in an esoteric sort of way or covertly consequentialist.

Extinction outweighs
Bostrom 2
Nick Bostron, Department of Philosophy, Yale University, 2002, Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,
http://www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html

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Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error . There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach see
what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new
types of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions. We cannot
necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with
managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply
because we have never yet witnessed such disasters.[5] Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat. Reductions in existential risks are
global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the
international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk. If we take into account the
welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how much
we discount future benefits [15,16].

All lives are infinitely valuable

Cummisky 96
(David Cummisky, Professor of Philosophy @ Bates College. 1996. Kantian Consequentialism. 145-146. )

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract social entity. It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for
some elusive overall social good. Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that to use a
person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has. But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do
not save through our failure to act? By

emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to sufficiently respect and take
account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a
conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that
rational nature exists as an end in itself (GMM 429). Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If

one truly believes that all rational beings have

an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many
rational beings as possible (chapter 5). In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1,
however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kants normative theory is based on an
unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of
rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of
value? If

I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings.
Persons may have dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth that transcends any market value (GMM 436), but persons also have a
fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others (chapters 5 and 7). The concept of the end-in-itself does not
support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal
consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many.

Extinction is unethical because it sacrifices things like Cultural Evolution that will make future
generations happy
McMahan 86
(Jefferson, Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University, Nuclear Deterrence and Future Generations in Avner Cohen and Steven Lees Nuclear Weapons and the
Future of Humanity: The Fundamental Questions , Google Books http://books.google.com/books?
id=gYmPp6lZqtMC&pg=PA331&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false, PG 332-333 Accessed 6-15-14, LKM)

These are undoubtedly important reasons for ensuring the existence of future generations. Again, however, if the force of these points is only that it would be worse for existing people if there
were to be no future generations. Then these points will contribute nothing to the larger argument against nuclear deterrence that is not already provided by premises lb and lc. it is, however,
equally plausible to suppose that there

is independent value in, say. the evolution of our culture, so that it is important for our culture to continue to
develop quite apart from the fact that our lives would be impoverished by the belief that the evolution of our culture were at an end . If
this further claim is accepted, we have a reason for ensuring the existence for future generations that is independent of the interests of existing
people. Another and perhaps stronger argument for the claim that it is morally important to ensure the existence of future generations also makes no
appeal to the interests of existing people. This argument moves from the claim that there is a principle of non-maleticence that provides a moral reason not to bring a person
into existence if his life would be worse than no life at all, or "worth not living," to the claim that there is a principle of beneficence that provides a moral reason to bring a person into existence
if his life would, on balance, be worth living. The argument takes as its first premise the claim that it would be wrong, other things being equal, to bring a person into existence if his life would
predictably be worth not living. This seems uncontroversial. But how can we best explain why it would be wrong? It is tempting to appeal to side-effects, to the fact that it is normally worse for

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existing people if a person who is utterly wretched comes to exist. But this explanation is excluded by the ceteris paribus clause. And in any case the appeal to side-effects could provide only a
partial explanation of why it would be wrong to bring a miserable person into existence. For it is only contingently true that it is worse for existing people when miserable people come into
existence. There could be cases in which this would be better for existing people.

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Law
Law is inevitable- rather than expel the law- we should recognize it can be used strategically as a
tool of resistance
Scoular 10 What's Law Got To Do With it? How and Why Law Matters in the Regulation of Sex Work, Jane Scoular, The Law
School, University of Strathclyde, JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY VOLUME 37, NUMBER 1, MARCH 2010 ISSN:0263323X, pp.1239
Rather than expel law, we need a more complex analytical framework to understand its contemporary relevance . Such a framework
can be developed by applying insights from theories of governmentality to the studies on the regulation of sex work . This offers a
fuller appreciation of the wider legal complex, and its role in regulating and authorizing the spaces, norms, and subjects of
contemporary sex work. It also explains law's role in maintaining the systems of governmentality, across legal systems, that exacerbate these injustices and forms of bare life that
have become hallmarks of late- industrial capitalist societies. In arguing for the continued relevance of law I do not intend to reinstate an imperialist,
uncritical positivist position. I argue instead for its strategic use in order to `pursue a deconstructivist agenda within legal arenas and
discourses'.117 This requires an acute understanding of law as a mode of regulation as well as an understanding of how it could be how
harnessed as a tool of resistance . As Tadros notes: rather than the structure or fabric which constitutes our society, the law is a machine which oils the modern structures
of domination, or which, at best achieves a tinkering on the side of justice. 118 In order to tinker more on the side of justice rather than
domination, one has to be critically aware of how modern forms of governance and control operate . This article, it is hoped, begins this process as
it allow us to see that law does matter in the regulation of sex work and could matter , albeit in a different way than was thought before.

Operating outside of the state destroys possibilities for reorientation

Krause et al. 97 (Ketih. Keith Krause is an Oxford philosophy professor. Critical security studies: concepts and cases, xvxvi) 6/19/14 RK

These and other critical

perspectives have much to say to each other in the construction of a critical theory of international relations and, in turn, to
studies. While elements of many approaches may be found in this volume, no one perspective dominates. If anything, several of the contributions to this volume
stand more inside than outside the tradition of security studies, which reflects our twofold conviction about the place of critical perspectives in contemporary scholarship. First, to stand too
far outside prevailing discourses is almost certain to result in continued disciplinary exclusion. Second, to move toward alternative
conceptions of security and security studies, one must necessarily reopen the questions subsumed under the modern conception of sovereignty
and the scope of the political. To do this, one must take seriously the prevailing claims about the nature of security. Many of the chapters in this volume thus retain a
concern with the centrality of the state as a locus not only of obligation but of effective political action. In the realm of organized
violence, states also remain the preeminent actors. The task of a critical approach is not to deny the centrality of the state in this realm
but rather, to understand more fully its structures, dynamics and possibilities for reorientation. From a critical perspective, state action is
flexible and capable of reorientation, and analyzing state policy need not therefore be tantamount to embracing the statis assumptions
orthodox conceptions. To exclude a focus on state action from a critical perspective on the grounds that it plays inevitably within the
rules of existing conceptions simply reverses the error of essentializing the state. Moreover, it loses the possibility of influencing what
remains the most structural capable actor in contemporary world politics
contemporary security

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1nr

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1NR

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Permutation
You should not allow them to have a permutationtopicality is a referendum on whether this
debate should have ever happenedits a theoretical reason why the AFF is illegitimate which
means it cant be permuted since it has to include the plananything else is severance which is a
voting issue because it skirts negative ground and makes clash impossiblethe terminal impact
to that was in the 2NC
Still links to all of our offensewe have presented an alternative model of debate which should
be idealized universallyinclusion of AFFs that allow for the negation of the resolution hurt
dialogue and deliberation
Also they cant win on the permutation because it means that T version is able to include the
multiplicity of views OR the permutation cant solve- theres also no net benefit to the
permutation in the 2AC- dont allow new 1AR analysis

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Switch Side
Switch side debate solves ALL of their offense- reading your 1AC on the negative includes for the
epistemology and performance of the aff in these spaces- switch side is the ONLY way to change
how students orient themselves towards legal structures- thats Bile
Flow

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CTP
Nobody cares about your ivory tower criticism- your movement wont take hold
Mohr 95 (Richard D. January. Richard D. Mohr is a Professor of Philosophy at the U. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The Perils
of Postmodernism. The Harvard Gay & Lesbian Review. Pg. 9-13. JSTOR.) 6/8/14 RK

The price of postmodernity is high-too high, I believe. It

eliminates privacy rights, equality rights, and free speech rights. Ironically it turns out that
post-moderns themselves, when they deign to descend from their ivory towers, also believe the price of postmodernity is too high. When
confronted with the real world and the need to act politically, they resort to what they call "strategic essentialism"; essentialism here is a code word
for the presumptions about human nature embedded in liberal individualism.36 Post-moderns recognize that their own sort of relativismladen, relativism-leaden talk will not get them anywhere in the real world and that they will have to resort at least to the strategies, styles, and
cant of the arguments used by liberal humanists if gay progress is to be made. But bereft of the substance and principles of liberalism which are its
real tools and which postmodernism sup- poses it has destroyed, liberal strategies will hardly be effective. Further, despite postmodernism's thick
jargon and tangled prose, there is no reason to suppose that the courts won't eventually see through the postmodern bluff and, like Toto, pull
back the curtain of postmodernity's liberal guise to reveal machinery that conservative justices can effectively use to further restrict rights.
After all, two can play the game, if that is all the courts are-a game. I can imagine, for instance, gay analogues to the Sears case in which a conservative federal judge
used the cant of feminist "difference" to uphold, against civil rights challenge, employment patterns that leave women trapped in low-paying jobs.' The judge
rationalized the result by noting that even feminists believe women are different and want different things than men want. Who then should be surprised, the judge
concluded, when women, acting on their "difference' end up differently situated? It is not too difficult to imagine a scenario in which Justice Scalia signs off on a
Schenck-Dennis-style opinion38 upholding the mass arrest of gay Marchers on Washington, by block quoting Stanley Fish: "In short, the name of the game has

always been politics, even when (indeed, especially when) it is played by stigmatizing politics as the area to be avoided [by legal restraints]."

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AT No Laws
Alternatives to legal restraints result in mass violence
Scheuerman 6
(William E., Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib, Constellations, Volume 13,
Issue 1)

Yet this argument relies on Schmitts controversial model of politics, as outlined eloquently but unconvincingly in his famous Concept
of the Political. To be sure, there are intense conflicts in which it is nave to expect an easy resolution by legal or juridical means. But
the argument suffers from a troubling circularity: Schmitt occasionally wants to define political conflicts as those irresolvable
by legal or juridical devices in order then to argue against legal or juridical solutions to them. The claim also suffers from a
certain vagueness and lack of conceptual precision. At times, it seems to be directed against trying to resolve conflicts in the courts or
juridical system narrowly understood; at other times it is directed against any legal regulation of intense conflict. The former argument
is surely stronger than the latter. After all, legal devices have undoubtedly played a positive role in taming or at least minimizing
the potential dangers of harsh political antagonisms . In the Cold War, for example, international law contributed to the peaceful
resolution of conflicts which otherwise might have exploded into horrific violence, even if attempts to bring such conflicts before an
international court or tribunal probably would have failed.22 Second, Schmitt dwells on the legal inconsistencies that result from
modifying the traditional state-centered system of international law by expanding protections to non-state fighters. His view is that
irregular combatants logically enjoyed no protections in the state-centered Westphalian model. By broadening protections to include
them, international law helps undermine the traditional state system and its accompanying legal framework. Why is this troubling?
The most obvious answer is that Schmitt believes that the traditional state system is normatively superior to recent attempts to modify
it by, for example, extending international human rights protections to individuals against states. 23 But what if we refuse to endorse
his nostalgic preference for the traditional state system? Then a sympathetic reading of the argument would take the form of
suggesting that the project of regulating irregular combatants by ordinary law must fail for another reason: it rests on a misguided
quest to integrate incongruent models of interstate relations and international law. We cannot, in short, maintain core features of the
(state-centered) Westphalian system while extending ambitious new protections to non-state actors. This is a powerful argument, but it
remains flawed. Every modern legal order rests on diverse and even conflicting normative elements and ideals, in part because human
existence itself is always in transition. When one examines the so-called classical liberal legal systems of nineteenth-century
England or the United States, for example, one quickly identifies liberal elements coexisting uneasily alongside paternalistic and
authoritarian (e.g., the law of slavery in the United States), monarchist, as well as republican and communitarian moments. The same
may be said of the legal moorings of the modern welfare state, which arguably rest on a hodgepodge of socialist, liberal, and Christian
and even Catholic (for example, in some European maternity policies) programmatic sources. In short, it is by no means selfevident that trying to give coherent legal form to a transitional political and social moment is always doomed to fail . Moreover,
there may be sound reasons for claiming that the contemporary transitional juncture in the rules of war is by no means as incongruent
as Schmitt asserts. In some recent accounts, the general trend towards extending basic protections to non-state actors is plausibly
interpreted in a more positive and by no means incoherent light.24 Third, Schmitt identifies a deep tension between the
classical quest for codified and stable law and the empirical reality of a social world subject to permanent change: The tendency to
modify or even dissolve classical [legal] conceptsis general, and in view of the rapid change of the world it is entirely
understandable (12). Schmitts postwar writings include many provocative comments about what contemporary legal scholars
describe as the dilemma of legal obsolescence. 25 In The Partisan, he suggests that the great transformations and modifications in
the technological apparatus of modern warfare place strains on the aspiration for cogent legal norms capable of regulating human
affairs (17; see also 4850). Given the ever-changing character of warfare and the fast pace of change in military technology, it
inevitably proves difficult to codify a set of cogent and stable rules of war. The Geneva Convention proviso that legal combatants must
bear their weapons openly, for example, seems poorly attuned to a world where military might ultimately depends on nuclear silos
buried deep beneath the surface of the earth, and not the success of traditional standing armies massed in battle on the open field. Or
what does the requirement mean of an insignia visible from afar in night battle, or in battle with the long-range weapons of modern
technology of war? (17). As I have tried to show elsewhere, these are powerful considerations deserving of close scrutiny; Schmitt is
probably right to argue that the enigma of legal obsolescence takes on special significance in the context of rapid-fire social change.26
Unfortunately, he seems uninterested in the slightest possibility that we might successfully adapt the process of lawmaking to our
dynamic social universe. To be sure, he discusses the motorization of lawmaking in a fascinating 1950 publication, but only in order

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to underscore its pathological core.27 Yet one possible resolution of the dilemma he describes would be to figure how to reform
the process whereby rules of war are adapted to novel changes in military affairs in order to minimize the danger of anachronistic
or out-of-date law. Instead, Schmitt simply employs the dilemma of legal obsolescence as a battering ram against the rule of
law and the quest to develop a legal apparatus suited to the special problem of irregular combatants.

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T-Version
Framing issue- I dont have to give them a T-version that solves the 1AC- only one that solves
their offense on framework
Extend T version- Topical Version of The Aff The United States should legalize all of the
following in the United States: marihuana, online gambling, physician-assisted suicide,
prostitution, and the sale of human organs.
Solves all of their offense- allows for a different conception of the way that we relate ourselves to
the law- we dont say that you have to say that the United States or the law is good- you just have
to defend something stable that we can debate
Doesnt reinscribe the law- your aff could take the angle that it deconstructs institutions- you
could legalize a topic area and not have ANY regulations to decrease state engagement or control
of our bodies
Extend Kinsella- technical legal debates are critical to teaching us the ins and outs of how
inevitable institutions work and how we can change them to our benefit

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Agency Debate
Political simulation creates a deliberative active-learning environment
Hanghoj 8 PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming, Thorkild Hanghj, PhD Dissertation
Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies University of Southern Denmark, 2008,
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHang
hoej.pdf

The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of

dramatic rehearsal , which assumes that social actors deliberate by projecting and
choosing between various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in
Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action... [ It] is an experiment in finding out what the
various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of
actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal . It is
retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). 85 This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an
imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the possible competing lines of action
rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Deweys concept of

are resolved through a thought experiment. Moreover, Deweys compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical
exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of
dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schutz, who praises Deweys concept as a fortunate image for understanding everyday rationality (Schutz, 1943: 140).
Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Ronsson, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points
out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes duties and contractual
obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of crystallizing
possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a thought experiment will be
successful. But what it can do is make

the process of choosing more intelligent than would be the case with blind trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006:
educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry
into domain-specific scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate acts, which implies an irrevocable difference between acts that are
8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding

tried out in imagination and acts that are overtly tried out with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require
participants to inquire into and resolve scenario-specific problems (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a striking difference between moral deliberation and educational game
activities in terms of the actual consequences that follow particular actions. Thus ,

when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out,
but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a
difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only play at or simulate the stakes and 86 risks that characterise the serious nature of moral
deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game.
At the same time, the

lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning
environment , where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to
provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse
particular competing possible lines of action that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of
games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the right answers, but more a question of exploring the contingent
outcomes and domain-specific processes of problem-based scenarios.