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been quashed or the sentenced reduced to less than one year, the Lord
Speaker must issue a certificate which nullifies the original certificate.
Under s.4, a person who ceases to be a Member may no longer attend
the House. The former Member is no longer disqualified from voting at
elections to the House of Commons or being elected to the House of
Commons.
the Scottish Parliament will be able to set rates of Income Tax, but
not National Insurance Contributions, Inheritance Tax, Capital
Gains Tax, Corporation Tax and all aspects of taxation of oil and
gas receipts
Some issues remain for future discussion. Not least of these is the
English question, namely, how to provide for matters relating solely to
England to be decided only by MPs representing English constituencies.
move will take effect from 2016, providing for the next election to take
place in 2021 and so avoid a clash with elections to the UK Parliament.
This brings Northern Ireland in line with elections to the Scottish
Parliament and Welsh Assembly.
The Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2014 also amends
the Northern Ireland Assembly Disqualification Act 1975 (NIADA).
Sections 3 and 4 end the practice of Members of the Northern Ireland
Assembly being able also to sit as Members of the House of Commons
(subject to the exception discussed below) or as Members of the Dail
Eireann, the lower house of the Irish Parliament. The exception relates
to a person who is already a Member of the UK Parliament and who
wishes to stand for election to the Assembly. If elected to the Assembly,
he or she may then choose whether to sit in the UK Parliament or the
Assembly. Sections 3 and 4 provide that a person is not disqualified
during the eight day period following a persons election to the
Assembly or Parliament, thereby providing adequate time to make the
choice between the two legislatures.
rationality, legality and procedural propriety and that once the court
was satisfied that the decision fell within the range of decisions that
could lawfully be made, the Court was not required by proportionality
to go further. This, the Supreme Court ruled, was the wrong approach.
According to Lord Kerr JSC the process stated in Aguilar Quila [2012]
1 AC 621 applied. The questions which had to be asked were:
1. Is the objective sufficiently important to justify limiting a
fundamental right?
2. Are the measures which have been designed to meet it rationally
connected to it?
3. Are they no more than are necessary to accomplish it?
4. Do they strike a fair balance between the rights of the individual
and the interests of the community?
In conducting this exercise, the Court must exercise its own judgment.
It is for the Court, not the decision-maker, to decide that the measures
are no more than is required to achieve the objective and that a fair
balance has been struck (i.e. that it is proportionate) (at para.137).
On the issue of institutional competence and deference, the Supreme
Court ruled that where the executives decision was based on factors
where the court did not have the evidence, experience and institutional
legitimacy to form its own view with confidence, its interference could
only be justified in exceptional circumstances. In this case international
relations, economic and diplomatic interests and the potentially harmful
effects on the safety of individuals were matters which were entrusted to
the executive which had the specialised experience, range of source
material and the institutional competence to enable it to reach a decision
which should be given great respect by the courts.
The question of whether or not a body had acted in breach of its
statutory duty arose in R (Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board [2014]
EWCA Civ 1276. The regulatory objectives of the Quality Assurance
Scheme for Advocates (QASA), a body established to oversee the
quality of advocacy at the Bar, were set out in s.1 of the Legal Services
Act 2007. The claimants sought judicial review of the decision of the
Legal Services Board to approve the introduction of QASA on the
ground that the combined effect of elements of the scheme was such as
to undermine the independence of the advocates. The Court of Appeal
disagreed: neither individually nor cumulatively did those elements
undermine the independence of advocates. On the correct test to be
applied to review, the Court ruled that the heightened Wednesbury
principles applied. Since the scheme did not involve any interference
with fundamental human rights or constitutional principles,
proportionality was not the correct test. Moreover, the Legal Services
Board was the regulator given power by Parliament to assess advocacy
quality and had a substantial margin of discretion. It was not for the
Court to substitute its own decision for that of the Board.
Improper purpose
Improper purpose was central to R (Core Issues Trust) v Transport for
London [2014] EWHC 2628. In 2012 Transport for London (TfL)
decided not to allow an advertisement placed by Core Issues Trust to
appear on the side of London buses. The Advertising Policy of TfL
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