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LEGAL PROFESSION NOTES

Rule 138 - Attorneys and Admission to the Bar
Section 1. Who may practice law. - Any person heretofore
duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as
such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is
in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Bar Matter No. 702, May 12, 1994
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION TO AUTHORIZE SHARIA'H
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES TO APPOINT SHARI'A
LAWYERS AS NOTARIES PUBLIC, ATTY. ROYO M.
GAMPONG, PETITIONER.
FACTS: Petitioner, a member of the Sharia Bar, filed an
instant petition praying that this Court to issue an order
authorizing all Shari'a District Court Judges to appoint
Shari'a Lawyers who possess the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications as notaries public within their respective
jurisdictions.
On the theory that Shari'a District Courts are co-equal with
the regular Regional Trial Courts in the hierarchy of the
Philippine Judicial System, petitioner claims that by analogy,
Shari'a District Court Judges may be authorized to appoint
the members of the Philippine Shari'a Bar. Petitioner further
argues that, being a special member of the Philippine Bar
and a practicing Shari'a lawyer, notarial work is
indispensable and imperative in the exercise of his
profession; therefore, he is qualified to be appointed as
notary public by Shari'a District Judge.
ISSUE: WON Sharia Courts are authorized to appoint
Notaries Public.
WON Sharia lawyers are qualified to be appointed
as Notaries Public.
RULING: Shari'a District Courts do not form part of the
integrated judicial system of the Philippines. Shari'a Courts
are not included in the courts enumerated in Section 2 of
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. The fact that
judges thereof are required by law to possess the same
qualifications as those of Regional Trial Courts does not
signify that the Shari'a Court is a regular court like the
Regional Trial Court. The latter is a court of general
jurisdiction, i.e., competent to decide all cases, civil and
criminal, within its jurisdiction. A Shari'a District Court, is a
court of limited jurisdiction, exercising original only over
cases specifically enumerated in Article 143 PD 1083. In
other words, a Shari'a District Court is not a regular court
exercising general jurisdiction within the meaning of Section
232 of the Notarial Law. Furthermore, the qualifications for
appointment of a Shari'a Court judge are different from
those required of a judge of a Regional Trial Court.
The authority thus conferred by the Notarial Law upon
judges of the Court of First Instance, now RTC, in their
respective provinces to appoint notaries public cannot be
expanded to cloth the judges of the Shari'a District Court
with the statutory authority that provided their respective
qualification. The authority to appoint notaries public and the
corresponding supervising authority over them require the
qualifications and experience of an RTC Judge.
It must be made clear in this regard that since a person who
has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination is not a regular fullfledged member but is only a special member of the
Philippine Bar, he is not qualified to practice law before the
regular laws and furthermore lacks the necessary
qualification to be appointed a notary public.
Bar Matter No. 850, Oct. 2, 2011
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Implementing
Regulations
Section 11: Determination of Lawyer's Compliance
a) The Committee shall maintain current records of continuing
legal education for every lawyer to whom the Rules and these
Implementing Regulations apply. Pursuant to Committee
policy, these records shall be made available to the lawyers
concerned at a time and place convenient to the Committee.

b) The continuing legal education requirement must be

completed by the end of the compliance period. Every lawyer
not exempt under the Rules and these Regulations shall report
to the Committee the credit units earned by him during the
compliance period duly certified by the providers.
c) A lawyer whose report shows full compliance with the
continuing legal education requirement shall be issued a
compliance card by the Committee.
Section 12: Compliance Procedures
a. Each member not otherwise exempt under the Rules or
whose exempt status the Committee may take judicial notice
of, shall secure from the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card
before the end of his compliance period. He shall complete the
card by attesting under oath that he has complied with the
education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying the
nature of the exemption. Such Compliance Card must be
returned to the Committee not later than the day after the end
of the member's compliance period.
b. Each member shall maintain a sufficient record of
compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE
Committee. The record or certificate issued by the provider to
all participants identifying the time, date, location, subject
matter and length of the activity shall be a sufficient record of
attendance at such participatory activity. A record of nonparticipatory activity shall also be maintained by the member.
c. If a lawyer fails to comply with any requirement under the
Rules, the Committee will send him/her a notice of noncompliance on any of the following deficiencies:
1) Failure to complete the education requirement within the
compliance period;
2) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
3) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance
(including evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed
period;
4) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish
evidence of such compliance within sixty (60) days from
receipt of a non-compliance notice.
5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing
or intended to circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE
requirements.
d. A member failing to comply with the continuing legal
education requirement will receive a Non-Compliance Notice
stating his specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days
from the receipt of the notification to explain the deficiency or
otherwise show compliance with the requirements. Such notice
shall be written in capital letters as follows:
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE
JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR
PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE
REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM
RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE, SHALL BE A
CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT
MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO
PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS
ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS
RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.
The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his
compliance with the MCLE requirement. Credit units earned
during this period may only be counted toward compliance with
the prior compliance period requirement unless units in excess
of the requirement are earned, in which case the excess may
be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.
e. A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the
compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee of
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P1,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the
IBP by the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation
of the MCLE Committee, in which case Rule 139-A of
the Rules of Court shall apply.
Section 13: Reinstatement
a) Involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be
terminated when the member submits proof of full compliance
to the IBP Board of Governors. While he is on inactive status,
he may earn the necessary credit units to complete the
requirement for the period of non-compliance. These credit
units may not be counted toward meeting the requirement of
the current compliance period. Any excess credit units earned
by him to satisfy the prior compliance period requirements,
shall be counted towards meeting the requirements of the
current compliance
b) The MCLE Committee shall be notified by the IBP Board of
Governors of the reinstatement of a delinquent member.
c) Upon reinstatement, the member shall pay the IBP a
reinstatement fee in the amount of P1,000.00.

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years in any of said courts, that such practice began before
July 4, 1946, and that they have never been suspended or
disbarred, may, in the discretion of the Court, be admitted
without examination.
Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. All
applicants for admission other than those referred to in the two
preceding section shall, before being admitted to the
examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly
studied law for four years, and successfully completed all
prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially
approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The
affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from
the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of
such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless
he has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law
school or university duly recognized by the government: civil
law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and
private international law, political law, labor and social
legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.

Section 14: Reporting Period After Reinstatement

The compliance period for a member who is reinstated to
active status following his/her suspension, disbarment or
resignation shall start on the date of reinstatement and shall
end at the conclusion of the next compliance period.
Section 2-6. Requirements for applications for admission
to the bar
Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the
bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar
must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years
of age, of good moral character, and resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed
or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the
United States of America. Citizens of the United States of
America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed
members of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in the courts
of the Philippines and in good and regular standing as such
may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the Supreme
Court, be allowed to continue such practice after taking the
following oath of office:
I. . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the
practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear
that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic
of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and
obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and
will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best
of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose
upon myself this voluntary obligation without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
God.
Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other
jurisdictions. Applicants for admission who, being Filipino
citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the
Supreme Court of the United States or in any circuit court of
appeals or district court therein, or in the highest court of any
State or Territory of the United States, and who can show by
satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at least five

Section 6. Pre-Law. No applicant for admission to the bar

examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate
that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he
began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized university or
college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a
four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed
therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of
the following subjects as major or field of concentration:
political science, logic, english, spanish, history and
economics.
BAR MATTER NO. 914, OCTOBER 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE
BAR, VS. VICENTE D. CHING, APPLICANT.
FACTS: In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at
the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually
passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show
proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to
take his oath. Apparently, Chings father was a Chinese
citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents
were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935
Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a
foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign
parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered
himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant
a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as
a councilor in a municipality in La Union. The SolicitorGeneral commented on the case by saying that as a
legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should
have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; that under prevailing jurisprudence, upon reaching
the age of majority is construed as within 7 years after
reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years old
because he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution
was in place). Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only
did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14
years after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the
Solicitor General recommended that the rule be relaxed due
to the special circumstance of Ching.
ISSUE: WON Ching should be allowed to take the lawyers
oath.
RULING: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino
citizenship. The Supreme Court cannot agree with the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years
had lapsed and its way beyond the allowable 7 year period.
The Supreme Court even noted that the period is originally
3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it cant be
extended any further). Chings special circumstances cant
be considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life
that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public
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officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship
are in place. Further, Ching didnt give any explanation why
he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess
its simply because he never thought hes Chinese not until
he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry.
Chings unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his
election cannot be simply glossed over. The Court Resolves
to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the
Philippine Bar.

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examination and consideration, evidence that he may be
now regarded as complying with the requirement of good
moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to
the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn
certifications from responsible members of the community
who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually
known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered
by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he
has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless
student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words,
submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different
person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to
the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Good Moral Character

Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the
bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar
must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years
of age, of good moral character, and resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed
or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR
AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT
AL C. ARGOSINO, PETITIONER.
FACTS: Argosino was charged with the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The
death of Camaligan stemmed from the affliction of severe
physical injuries upon him in course of "hazing" conducted
as part of the university fraternity initiation rites. Eleven (11)
days after the accused was consequently sentenced, Mr.
Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for
probation with the lower court. The application was granted.
The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted
from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer
assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the
bar exam. He was allowed and he passed the exam, but
was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
Argosino then filed a petition to allow him to take the
attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice of law. He
averred that his probation period had been terminated. It is
noted that his probation period did not last for more than 10
months.
ISSUE: WON Argosino is of good moral character to
practice law.
RULING: All aspects of moral character and behavior may
be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the
Bar. The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied
by those who would seek admission to the bar must of
necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public.
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing"
activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of
good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely
accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical
injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate
Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws
on the part of those who inflicted such injuries.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial
court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de
novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has
purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character
referred to above. Good moral character is a requirement
possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the
time of application for permission to take the bar
examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of
application for admission to the bar and to take the
attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its

Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997

Re: Petition for Al Argosino to take Lawyers Oath
FACTS: Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar
examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his
oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
While he was in prison, the trial court granted herein
petitioner's application for probation. The trial court issued
an order approving a report submitted by the Probation
Officer recommending Argosino's discharge from probation.
Argosino filed before the SC a petition to be allowed to take
the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from
probation. The Court then issued a resolution requiring
petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence
that he may now be regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those
seeking admission to the bar. In compliance, Argosino
submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters
executed by 2 senators, 5 trial court judges, and 6 members
of religious orders. He likewise submitted evidence that a
scholarship foundation had been established in honor of the
hazing victim.
ISSUE: WON Argosino be allowed to take his lawyers oath
after release?
RULING: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to
those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the
effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the
sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who
have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law
but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from
taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the
public image of lawyers which in recent years has
undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted
all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial
notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is
NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every
lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to
the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's
oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according
to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly
be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is allowed to take the
lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the
Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal
profession.

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A. M. No. 545-SBC December 26, 1974
PURISIMA BARBA, complainant,
vs. HECTOR S. PEDRO, respondent.
FACTS. Hector S. Pedro, is a successful bar candidate in
the 1956 examinations but he is deferred to take the
lawyers oath because of a complaint for immorality filed
against him by Purisima Barba. Hector S. Pedro had
amorous relations with the complainant resulting in the birth
of a child. He failed, however, to marry her, having
thereafter chosen another woman for his bride.
ISSUE: WON Hector Pedro is of good moral character to
practice law.
RULING: He had committed a transgression, if not against
the law, against the high moral standard requisite for
membership in the bar. He had proven false to his word.
What is worse, he did sully her honor. This on the one side.
On the other hand, eighteen years had gone by from the
time of the 1956 examinations. He was a successful bar
candidate but because of this lapse from moral propriety, he
has not been allowed to take the lawyer's oath. It likewise
appears, from the testimonials submitted, that he has
behaved rather well. At least, no other misdeed has been
attributed to him. There is no affront to reason then in ruling
that the punishment, while deserved, has lasted long
enough. He has sufficiently rehabilitated himself. Retribution
has been exacted, He has expiated for his offense. It is
understandable that the bitterness in the heart of
complainant cannot easily be erased, but that should not
prove decisive. Even the most heinous of crimes prescribe
after a certain period. 5 Moreover, as the transgression
resulted from the frailty of flesh, the sociologist MacIver
referring to it as "so powerful an appetite," an imperative of
life closely associated with the "recklessness and the
caprice of desire," 6 this Court feels that all the years he has
been denied the privilege of being a lawyer would satisfy the
requirement that failure to live up to the requisite moral
standard is not to be taken lightly. It could also be said that
in offenses of this character, the blame hardly belongs to the
man alone.
It must be impressed on respondent Hector S. Pedro,
however, that while his plea to take the lawyer's oath is to
be granted, it is indispensable, if he expects to be a member
of the bar in good standing, that he complies with the moral
and legal obligation incumbent upon him as the father of the
child born out of wedlock as a result of his relationship with
complainant Purisima Barba.
Respondent Hector S. Pedro is allowed to take the lawyer's
oath as was provided in the February 26, 1969 resolution.
Application under Section 4 of Rule 138
Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions.
Applicants for admission who, being Filipino citizens, are
enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of
the United States or in any circuit court of appeals or district
court therein, or in the highest court of any State or Territory of
the United States, and who can show by satisfactory
certificates that they have practiced at least five years in any of
said courts, that such practice began before July 4, 1946, and
that they have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the
discretion of the Court, be admitted without examination.
BAR MATTER No. 419 November 1989
In Re: Petition of Ramon Quisimbing for Admission to the
Bar,
FACTS: Ramon Quisumbing earned his law degree in
Washington. Hes been admitted to the practice of law in
various jurisdictions in the US and the Federal Supreme
Court. He is now applying for admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines without need for taking the bar exams.
ISSUE: WON Petitioner may be admitted to the Philippine
Bar.
RULING: No. Discretion to admit to the bar may only be
exercised only after it is shown that the applicant was

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complied with all the requirements thereunder. The Rules of
Court has the sole power to promulgate rules concerning
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, makes no
provision for admission to the bar on the basis of reciprocity.
The court held that Filipino citizens who obtained their law
degree abroad are required to take and pass the bar
examinations for admission to the Philippine bar.
Sections 7-16 Application, Examinations and Passing
Average
Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. All
applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of the Supreme
Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least
fifteen (15) days before the beginning of the examination. If not
embraced within section 3 and 4 of this rule they shall also file
within the same period the affidavit and certificate required by
section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4 they shall
exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their admission to
practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not been
revoked, and certificates as to their professional standing.
Applicants shall also file at the same time their own affidavits
as to their age, residence, and citizenship.
Section 8. Notice of Applications. Notice of applications for
admission shall be published by the clerk of the Supreme
Court in newspapers published in Pilipino, English and
Spanish, for at least ten (10) days before the beginning of the
examination.
Section 9. Examination; subjects. Applicants, not otherwise
provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected
to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and
Social Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law
(Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers);
International Law (Private and Public); Taxation; Remedial Law
(Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal
Ethics and Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and
Conveyancing).
Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and
in writing. Persons taking the examination shall not bring
papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The
questions shall be the same for all examinees and a copy
thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to each
examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally
without help from anyone.
Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his
penmanship is so poor that it will be difficult to read his
answers without much loss of time, the Supreme Court may
allow such examinee to use a typewriter in answering the
questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be
used.
The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as
are necessary to prevent the substitution of papers or
commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their
names on the examination papers. No oral examination shall
be given.
Section 11. Annual examination. Examinations for
admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take place
annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days
to be disignated by the chairman of the committee on bar
examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows: First
day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and
Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law
(morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law
(morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial
Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises
(afternoon).
Section 12. Committee of examiners. Examinations shall be
conducted by a committee of bar examiners to be appointed
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LEGAL PROFESSION NOTES

by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a
Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and
who shall be designated by the court to serve for one year, and
eight members of the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold
office for a period of one year. The names of the members of
this committee shall be published in each volume of the official
reports.
Section 13. Disciplinary measures. No candidate shall
endeavor to influence any member of the committee, and
during examination the candidates shall not communicate with
each other nor shall they give or receive any assistance. The
candidate who violates this provisions, or any other provision
of this rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the
same to count as a failure against him, and further disciplinary
action, including permanent disqualification, may be taken in
the discretion of the court.
Section 14. Passing average. In order that a candidate may
be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all
subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subjects. In
determining the average, the subjects in the examination shall
be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent;
Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15
per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political and International
Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per
cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent.
Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination
papers. Not later than February 15th after the examination,
or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the committee
shall file its report on the result of such examination. The
examination papers and notes of the committee shall be filed
with the clerk and may there be examined by the parties in
interest, after the court has approved the report.
Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course.
Candidates who have failed the bar examinations for three
times shall be disqualified from taking another examination
unless they show the satisfaction of the court that they have
enrolled in and passed regular fourth year review classes as
well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law
school.
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO
FACTS: Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant of 1971 Bar
Examinations, brought the examination notebooks of
Galang, back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation
and/or re-checking that eventually resulted in the increase
of his average, ultimately enabling him to be admitted as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
ISSUE:
HELD:
94 Phil 534 March 18, 1954
IN RE: CUNANAN
FACTS: The Bar Flunkers Act was enacted, a law that fixes
the passing marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 to 1955.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking
its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of
their examination papers were still pending also invoked the
aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission.
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a general
average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to
1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and
those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in
1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar,
notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general
average of 75 per cent.
ISSUE: WON Bar Flunkers Act is unconstitutional.

HELD: The law is unconstitutional.

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit candidates who
failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who are
certainly inadequately prepared to practice law. It deprives
the Supreme Court the opportunity to determine if they are
already prepared to become members of the Bar. This is a
manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility
of the Supreme Court, who has the ultimate decision on
who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of
law according to existing rules.
2. Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal,
alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar.
3. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the
title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and
being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire
law is void.
4. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of
article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said
part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in
those years, shall continue in force.
Sections 7-19 Admission and Oath, Certificate, Attorneys
Roll (July 3 1996)
Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. An
applicant who has passed the required examination, or has
been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar,
shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the
corresponding oath of office.
Section 18. Certificate. The Supreme Court shall thereupon
admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all the courts of
the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that
effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be
given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his
authority to practice.
Section 19. Attorney's roll. The clerk of the Supreme Court
shall kept a roll of all attorneys admitted to practice, which roll
shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his
certificate.
Sections 21-26, 31-37 Authority to appear, Compensation,
Attorneys Lien
Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. an attorney is
presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in
which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required
to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the
presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any
attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce
or prove the authority under which he appears, and to
disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the
person who employed him, and may thereupon make such
order as justice requires. An attorneys wilfully appear in court
for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the
court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court
who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to
represent client on appeal. An attorney who appears de
parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to
continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a
formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate
court.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys
have authority to bind their clients in any case by any
agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking
appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But
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LEGAL PROFESSION NOTES

they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's
litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but
the full amount in cash.
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees.
An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his
client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of
the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound
by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the
proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and
base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A
written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt.
When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his
client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for
contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his
official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall
not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Section 26. Change of attorneys. An attorney may retire at
any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written
consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any
time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent
of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and
attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be
allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the
attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the
court in place of the former one, and written notice of the
change shall be given to the advance party.

Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. A court may

assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to
any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the
party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that
the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of
justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty
of the attorney so assigned to render the required service,
unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient
cause shown.
Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. Subject to
availability of funds as may be provided by the law the court
may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as
counsel de oficio to be compensates in such sum as the court
may fix in accordance with section 24 of this rule. Whenever
such compensation is allowed, it shall be not less than thirty
pesos (P30) in any case, nor more than the following amounts:
(1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2) One hundred pesos
(P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in
grave felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five Hundred
pesos (P500) in capital offenses.
Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear
for Government. Any official or other person appointed or
designated in accordance with law to appear for the
Government of the Philippines shall have all the rights of a
duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in
which said government has an interest direct or indirect.
Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a
justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
the purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar.

Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. No judge or

other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office
of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.
Section 36. Amicus Curiae. Experienced and impartial
attorneys may be invited by the Court to appear as amici
curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it.
Section 37. Attorneys' liens. An attorney shall have a lien
upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which
have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the
same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid,
and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall
also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of
such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his
client, from and after the time when he shall have the caused a
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the
records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution, and shall have the caused written notice thereof to
be delivered to his client and to the adverse paty; and he shall
have the same right and power over such judgments and
executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and
secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.
Authority to bind clients
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys
have authority to bind their clients in any case by any
agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking
appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But
they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's
litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but
the full amount in cash.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.

A.C. No. 2473 February 3, 1993

AURORA M. GUIANG, petitioner,
vs. ATTY. LEONARDO B. ANTONIO, respondent.
FACTS: This is a petition for suspension and disbarment
against the respondent on the ground of negligence and
malpractice for the respondent neglected to file an appeal
on time.
Petitioner retained the services of Atty. Antonio as her
counsel in connection with a civil case then on appeal with
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals had rendered a
decision adverse to the petitioner. The Court of Appeals
granted Atty. Antonio's Motion for Reconsideration on April
22, 1981 and giving petitioner up to May 27, 1981 to file the
motion.
On
May
26,
1981,
Atty. Antonio filed another motion for extension which was
granted. On June 26, 1981, respondent filed the Motion for
Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied on July
27, 1981. Respondent failed to file the appeal within the 15day period from receipt of the denial by the Court of
Appeals. The adverse decision of the Court of Appeals
became final.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Antonio compromised his clients
litigation.
HELD: Atty. Antonios negligence in filing the appeal on time
constitutes malpractice. If it were true that the records
furnished by the Citizens Legal Affairs Office counsel,
respondent should have requested for copies of the missing
records from the Court of Appeals.
Added to this offense are the highly improper statements in
respondent's pleadings describing his client's case as
"hopeless or beyond legal remedy" after neglecting to file
the appeal on time.
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LEGAL PROFESSION NOTES

G.R. No. 94457, March 18, 1991
VICTORIA LEGARDA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
FACTS: A civil case was filed against the petitioner for her
failure and refusal to sign and execute the lease contract
between petitioner and New Cathay House, Inc. Petitioner
engaged the services of counsel to handle her case. Said
counsel failed to file the answer within the extended period
he prayed for. The court declared the petitioner in default.
Accordingly, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of New
Cathay. Petitioners counsel did not take any action on said
decision, thus it became final and executory. A writ of
execution was issued, and the property of the petitioner was
auctioned and sold to Cabrera (happened to be New
Cathays representative). Petitioner failed to redeem her
property within the one year redemption period, thus, the
property was transferred in the name of Cabrera.
Upon learning of this unfortunate turn of events, petitioner
prevailed upon her counsel, to seek the appropriate relief
from the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered
an adverse decision affirming the decision of the trial court,
dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment, and
holding Legarda bound by the negligence of her counsel.
Said decision was served on her counsel, but counsel did
not file a motion for reconsideration or appeal.
Petitioner secured services of another lawyer and filed a
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court seeking
annulment of the decision rendered by the RTC and CA,
and the sheriffs sale for they are attributable to the gross
negligence and efficiency of her previous counsel, Atty.
Antonio Coronel, who happened to be a well-known
practicing lawyer and a dean of a law school.
The SC First Division rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner. Cathay was duty bound to return the subject
property to Legarda. The Court finds that the negligence of
counsel in this case appears to be so gross and
inexcusable. This was compounded by the fact, that after
petitioner gave said counsel another chance to make up for
his omissions by asking him to file a petition for annulment
of the judgment in the appellate court, again counsel
abandoned the case of petitioner in that after he received a
copy of the adverse judgment of the appellate court, he did
not do anything to save the situation or inform his client of
the judgment. He allowed the judgment to lapse and
become final. Such reckless and gross negligence should
not be allowed to bind the petitioner. Petitioner was thereby
effectively deprived of her day in court.The order of
reconveyance was premised on the alleged gross
negligence of Legardas counsel which should not be
allowed to bind her as she was deprived of her property
without due process of law.
Respondent New Cathay filed a Motion for Reconsideration
to the SC En Banc alleging that reconveyance is not
possible because Cathay neither possessed nor owned the
property so it is in no position to reconvey the same; and,
even if it did, ownership over the property had already been
validly transferred to innocent third parties at the time of
promulgation of said judgment.
ISSUE: WON counsels negligence were to bind his client.
HELD: As a general rule, the client is bound by the
negligence of his counsel however, the client is exempted if
such negligence is gross. In this case, the Supreme Court
set aside the decision of the First Division because
reconveyance is no longer feasible considering that the
property concerned was sold to purchasers-in-good faith
and for value.

Page 7 of 7
gross negligence of Legardas counsel. If she may be said
to be innocent because she was ignorant of the acts of
negligence of her counsel, with more reason are
respondents truly innocent. As between two parties who
may lose due to the negligence or incompetence of the
counsel of one, the party who was responsible for making it
happen should suffer the consequences. This reflects the
basic common law maxim, so succinctly stated by Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, that . . . (B)etween two innocent parties, the
one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should
be the one to bear the resulting loss. In this case, it was not
respondents, Legarda, who misjudged and hired the
services of the lawyer who practically abandoned her case
and who continued to retain him even after his proven
apathy and negligence.
The Gancayco decision makes much of the fact that
Legarda is now consigned to penury and, therefore, this
Court must come to the aid of the distraught client. It must
be remembered that this Court renders decisions, not on the
basis of emotions but on its sound judgment, applying the
relevant, appropriate law. Much as it may pity Legarda, or
any losing litigant for that matter, it cannot play the role of a
knight in shining armor coming to the aid of someone, who
through her weakness, ignorance or misjudgment may have
been bested in a legal joust which complied with all the
rules of legal proceedings.
SC En Banc affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
G.R. No. 94457 June 10, 1992
VICTORIA LEGARDA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
FACTS: Atty. Antonio Coronel was required to show cause
why he should not be held administratively liable for his
gross negligence and omissions which resulted in grave
injustice to the petitioner.
On the tenth day from his receipt of his copy, Atty. Coronel
filed a motion for extension of thirty (30) days within which
to file his explanation, alleging as a reason pressure of
work. The same was granted.
A day after the expiration of the 30-day extended period,
Atty. Coronel filed another motion for extension on the
ground that he had been confined at the St. Lukes Hospital.
The motion was denied.
The Court considers his failure to show cause as a waiver of
his rights to be heard and to due process.
ISSUE: WON counsel is administratively liable
HELD: The facts of the case clearly show that Atty. Coronel
violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence." He failed to observe
particularly Rule 18.03 of the same Code which requires
that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable."
Atty. Antonio P. Coronel is hereby found GUILTY of gross
negligence in the defense of petitioner Victoria Legarda in
Civil Case No. Q-43811 and accordingly SUSPENDED
G.R. No. 100485 September 21, 1994
SMC vs Laguesma

Neither Cathay nor Cabrera should be made to suffer for the

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