LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC: LOC & Jerry P.

Treas assailing the

constitutionalityofthesubjectCityhoodLaws
FACTS: Duringthe12thCongress,CongressenactedintolawRepublicActNo.
9009(RA9009),whichtookeffecton30June2001.RA9009amendedSection
450oftheLocalGovernmentCodebyincreasingtheannualincomerequirement
forconversionofamunicipalityintoacityfromP20milliontoP100million.The
rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel,themadrushofmunicipalitiestoconvertintocitiessolelytosecurea
larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are
incapableoffiscalindependence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th
CongressadoptedJointResolutionNo.29,whichsoughttoexemptfromtheP100
millionincomerequirementinRA9009the24municipalitieswhosecityhoodbills
were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended
withouttheSenateapprovingJointResolutionNo.29.Duringthe13thCongress,
the House of Representatives readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
ResolutionNo.1andforwardedittotheSenateforapproval.However,theSenate
again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors,
individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision
exemptingallthe16municipalitiesfromtheP100millionincomerequirementin
RA 9009. On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the
cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007,
exceptthatofNaga,Cebuwhichwaspassedon7June2007.Thecityhoodbills
lapsedintolaw(CityhoodLaws)onvariousdatesfromMarchtoJuly2007without
the Presidents signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold
plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality
approveoftheconversionoftheirmunicipalityintoacity.Petitionersfiledthe
presentpetitions todeclaretheCityhood Lawsunconstitutionalfor violation of
Section 10, Article X oftheConstitution,as wellas for violation oftheequal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal
Revenue Allotmentbecause more cities willshare the same amountofinternal
revenuesetasideforallcitiesunderSection285oftheLocalGovernmentCode.
ISSUE:WONCityhoodLawsUnconstitutional
HELD: We grantthepetitions. The CityhoodLaws violateSections 6and10,
Article X oftheConstitution,andarethusunconstitutional. 1) theConstitution
requiresthatCongressshallprescribeallthecriteriaforthecreationofacityinthe
LocalGovernmentCodeandnotinanyotherlaw,includingtheCityhoodLaws.2)
theCityhoodLawsviolateSection6,ArticleXoftheConstitutionbecausethey
preventafairandjustdistributionofthenationaltaxestolocalgovernmentunits.
3) the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amendedbyRA9009,forconvertingamunicipalityintoacityareclear,plainand
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. 4) the intent of
membersofthe11thCongresstoexemptcertainmunicipalitiesfromthecoverage
ofRA9009remainedanintentandwasneverwrittenintoSection450oftheLocal
GovernmentCode.5)thedeliberationsofthe11thor12thCongressonunapproved
billsorresolutionsarenotextrinsicaidsininterpretingalawpassedinthe13th
Congress.6)eveniftheexemptionintheCityhoodLawswerewritteninSection
450oftheLocalGovernmentCode,theexemptionwouldstillbeunconstitutional
forviolationoftheequalprotectionclause.
YSMAELV.CA
Facts:PobtainedjudgementintheirfavorforasumofmoneyagainstDin1980.
Decisionremainedunexecuted. In1989,Pfiledacaseforrevivalofjudgement
whichwasgrantedbytheRTC.Writofexecutionwasissued.Dsparcelsofland
wereleviedonexecution.Pboughtthelandsin25July1995,subjecttoa1year
periodofredemptionfromdateofregistrationofcertificateofsale. On16July
1996,DwrotePtoexerciserightofredemption.Pdidnotreply.Dbelievedthat
1yearperiodendedon25July1996.WhenDtriedtotenderpaymenttoP,Pwas
alwaysnotavailablesoDconsignedtheamounttotheCourton26July1996. P
claims12monthperiodforredemptionhasalreadyexpiredon19July1996.RTC
&CAruledforD
Issue:Whendidthe12monthperiodexpire?
Held:Consideringthat1996wasaleapyear,the12monthperiodexpiredon19
July 1996 (on the 360th day). However, D committed an honest mistake on a
questionoflawbecausethecertificateofsalestatedthattheperiodofredemption
willexpire1yearfromthedateofregistration(hence,25July1996).Further,D
informedPgavenoticeofintentiontoexerciserighton16July1996(within12
monthperiod).Further,Dtriedtotenderpaymentanduponfailure,consignedthe
amounttotheCourt.Thetenderofpaymentmadeon25July1996isconsideredas
anaffirmationoftimelynoticetoredeem,evenifsuchtenderwasmade6days
afterexpirationofredemptionperiod. Theruleonredemptionmustbeliberally
construedinfavoroftheoriginalowneroftheproperty.
MONTAJESVSPEOPLE
FACTS:Alfredo(Montajes)waschargedandconvictedforDirectAssaultagainst
BarangayCaptainJose(Rellon)whenheallegedlytriedtohitthelatterwithabolo

whenhestoppedabenefitdancewhichalreadyexceededthetimeallowedforit.
TheMunicipalTrialCourtofBuenavistaAgusandelNorteconvictedhim,andhis
appealtotheRegionalTrialCourtwasalsodenied,hence,Josefiledapetition
(motion) for extension of time to file a Petition for Review with the Court of
Appealsfor15days,countedfromMay21,2007oruntilJune5,2007.Itappears
that he received the copy of the RTCs order denying his motion for
reconsiderationonMay4,2007.HethenfiledhisPetitionforReviewonJune5,
2007.CAnotedthatJosereceivedthecopyoftheRTCorderdenyinghismotion
for reconsideration on May 4, hence he had 15 days within which to file the
petitionforreview.ConsideringthatMay19,2007fellonaSaturday,itwaserror
forJosetocomputehisextensionoftimeonthefirstworkingdayafterthedeadline
(Saturday,May19),oronMay21,2007sincewhenapartyisgrantedanextension
of time, the 15day reckoning period should start from the last day which is
Saturday, Sunday or holiday, according to the CA. Here, the last day of the
reglementaryperiodwithinwhichtofilethesaidpetitionforreviewwiththeCA
fellonaSaturday,thus,thelastdaytofilethepetitionwasmovedtothenext
working day which was May 21, 2007, Monday. Hence, he was not wrong in
askingtheCAtogivehim15daysfromMay21,2007tofilethepetitionandnot
fromMay19,2007,Saturday.
ISSUE:WhetherthePetitionforReviewwasfiledontime.
HELD:Wegrantthepetition.
Section1,Rule22oftheRulesofCourtrelieduponbypetitionerprovides:
Section1.Howtocomputetime.Incomputinganyperiodoftimeprescribedor
allowedbytheseRules,orbyorderofthecourt,orbyanyapplicablestatute,the
dayoftheactoreventfromwhichthedesignatedperiodoftimebeginstorunisto
beexcludedandthedateofperformanceincluded.Ifthelastdayoftheperiod,as
thuscomputed,fallsonaSaturday,aSunday,oralegalholidayintheplacewhere
thecourtsits,thetimeshallnotrununtilthenextworkingday.
WethenclarifiedtheabovequotedprovisionwhenweissuedA.M.No.00214
SCdatedFebruary29,2000(Re:ComputationofTimeWhentheLastDayFallson
a Saturday, Sunday or a Legal Holiday and a Motion for Extension on Next
WorkingDayisGranted)whichreads:
xxxx
Whereas,theaforecitedprovision[Section1,Rule22oftheRulesofCourt]applies
inthematteroffilingofpleadingsincourtswhentheduedatefallsonaSaturday,
Sundayorlegalholiday,inwhichcase,thefilingofthesaidpleadingonthenext
workingdayisdeemedontime;
Whereas,thequestionhasbeenraisediftheperiodisextendedipsojuretothenext
workingdayimmediatelyfollowingwherethelastdayoftheperiodisaSaturday,
Sundayoralegalholiday,sothatwhenamotionforextensionoftimeisfiled,the
periodofextensionistobereckonedfromthenextworkingdayandnotfromthe
originalexpirationoftheperiod.
NOWTHEREFORE,theCourtResolves,fortheguidanceoftheBenchandthe
Bar,todeclarethatSection1,Rule22speaksonlyofthelastdayoftheperiodso
thatwhenapartyseeksanextensionandthesameisgranted,theduedateceasesto
bethelastdayandhence,theprovisionnolongerapplies.Anyextensionoftimeto
filetherequiredpleadingshouldthereforebecountedfromtheexpirationofthe
period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday.
Shouldapartydesiretofileanypleading,evenamotionforextensionoftimeto
fileapleading,andthelastdayfallsonaSaturday,Sundayoralegalholiday,he
maydosoonthenextworkingday.Thisiswhatpetitionerdidinthecaseatbar.
However,accordingtothesamecircular,thepetitionforreviewoncertiorariwas
indeedfiledoutoftime.Theprovisionstatesthatincaseamotionforextensionis
granted,theduedatefortheextendedperiodshallbecountedfromtheoriginaldue
date,notfromthenextworkingdayonwhichthemotionforextensionwasfiled.In
Luzv.NationalAmnestyCommission,wehadoccasiontoexpoundonthematter.
Inthatcase,weheldthattheextensiongrantedbythecourtshouldbetackedtothe
originalperiodandcommencesimmediatelyaftertheexpirationofsuchperiod.
In the case at bar, althoughpetitioners filing ofthe motion for extensionwas
withintheperiodprovidedbylaw,thefilingofthepetitionitselfwasnotontime.
Petitionerwasgrantedanadditionalperiodof30dayswithinwhichtofilethe
petition.Reckonedfrom theoriginalperiod,heshouldhavefileditonMay8,
2006.Instead,hedidsoonlyonMay11,2006,thatis,3dayslate.
BasedonSection1,Rule22oftheRulesofCourt,wherethelastdayoftheperiod
fordoinganyactrequiredbylawfallsonaSaturday,aSunday,oralegalholiday
intheplacewherethecourtsits,thetimeshallnotrununtilthenextworkingday.
Inthiscase,theoriginalperiodforfilingthepetitionforreviewwiththeCAwason
May19,2007,aSaturday.Petitionersfilingofhismotionforextensionoftimeto
fileapetitionforreviewonMay21,2007,thenextworkingdaywhichfollowed
thelastdayforfilingwhichfellonaSaturday,wasthereforeontime.However,
petitionerprayedinhismotionforextensionthathebegranted15daysfromMay
21,2007oruptoJune5,2007withinwhichtofilehispetition.Hethenfiledhis
petition for review on June 5, 2007. The CA did not act on the motion for
extension,butinsteadissuedaResolutiondatedSeptember21,2007dismissingthe
petitionforreviewforbeingfiledoutoftime.
Thus,counting15daysfromtheexpirationoftheperiodwhichwasonMay19,
2007,thepetitionfiledonJune5,2007wasalreadytwodayslate.However,we
findthecircumstancesobtaininginthiscasetomerittheliberalapplicationofthe

ruleintheinterestofjusticeandfairplay.
Courtsshouldnotbesostrictaboutprocedurallapsesthatdonotreallyimpairthe
properadministrationofjustice.Afterall,thehigherobjectiveofproceduralruleis
toinsurethatthesubstantiverightsofthepartiesareprotected.Litigationsshould,
as muchas possible, be decidedonthemeritsand notontechnicalities. Every
partylitigant must be afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just
determinationofhiscase,freefromtheunacceptablepleaoftechnicalities.
VANDORNv.ROMILLO
FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while Richard
UptontisacitizenoftheUnitedStates.VanDornandUptonweremarriedin
Hongkongin1972andaftertheirmarriage,theyestablishedtheirresidenceinthe
Philippines. Their marriage begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and
December18,1975respectively.Thecouplesubsequentlyobtainedadivorcein
Nevada, United States in 1982. Van Dorn remarried in Nevada, this time to
TheodoreVanDorn.InJune8,1983,UptonfiledsuitagainstVanDornatthe
PasayCityRegionalTrialCourtstatingthatpetitioner'sbusinessinErmita,Manila,
(theGalleonShop)isaconjugalpropertyoftheparties.Heaskedthatpetitionerbe
orderedtorenderanaccountingofthatbusiness,andthatprivaterespondentbe
declaredwithrighttomanagetheconjugalproperty.VanDornsoughttodismiss
thecaseonthegroundthatthecauseofactionisbarredbypreviousjudgmentin
the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledgedthatheandpetitionerhad"nocommunityproperty"asofJune11,
1982.VanDorncontendsthatUptonisestoppedfromlayingclaimonthealleged
conjugalpropertybecauseoftherepresentationhemadeinthedivorceproceedings
beforetheAmericanCourtthattheyhadnocommunityofpropertyandthatthe
GalleonShopwasnotestablishedthroughconjugalfunds,andthatrespondent's
claimisbarredbypriorjudgment.UptonmaintainsthattheDivorceDecreeissued
bytheNevadaCourtcannotprevailovertheprohibitivelawsofthePhilippinesand
itsdeclarednationalpolicyandthattheactsanddeclarationofaforeignCourt
cannot,especiallyifthesameiscontrarytopublicpolicy,divestPhilippineCourts
ofjurisdictiontoentertainmatterswithinitsjurisdiction.
ISSUE:DoesUpton(therespondent)havethelegalstandingtosueas(VanDorn)
petitionershusbandnotwithstandingthedivorcedecreeobtainedinNevada?
RULING:NO.NotwithstandingthenationalityprincipleenshrinedinArticle15of
theNewCivilCode,aliensmayobtaindivorcesabroadandsuchwillberecognized
inthePhilippinesprovidedtheyarevalidaccordingtotheirrespectivenationallaw.
Thepurposeandeffectofadecreeofdivorcefromthebondofmatrimonybya
court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
relationofhusbandandwife,andtofreethembothfromthebond.Themarriagetie
whenthusseveredastooneparty,ceasestobindeither.Ahusbandwithoutawife,
orawifewithoutahusband,isunknowntothelaw.Whenthelawprovides,inthe
natureofapenalty.thattheguiltypartyshallnotmarryagain,thatparty,aswellas
theother,isstillabsolutelyfreedfromthebondoftheformermarriage.Inlinewith
this,Upton,therespondent,nolongerhasthelegalstandingtosueforentitlement
toexercisecontroloverconjugalassets.Asperhisnationallaw,heisnolongerthe
husbandofthepetitioner.HeisboundbytheDecisionofhisowncountry'sCourt,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
assertinghisrightovertheallegedconjugalproperty.
CATALANVSCATALAN
FACTS:PetitionerFelicitasAmorCatalanmarriedrespondentOrlandoonJune4,
1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of
America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of
marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. Two months after the
divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Meropein Calasiao,
Pangasinan.ContendingthatsaidmarriagewasbigamoussinceMeropehadaprior
subsistingmarriagewithEusebioBristol,petitionerfiledapetitionfordeclaration
ofnullityofmarriagewithdamagesintheRTCofDagupanCityagainstOrlando
andMerope.Respondentsfiledamotiontodismissonthegroundoflackofcause
ofactionaspetitionerwasallegedlynotarealpartyininterest,butitwasdenied.
Trialonthemeritsensued.OnOctober10,2000,theRTCrenderedjudgmentin
favorofthepetitioner.Amotionforreconsiderationwasfiledbytherespondent
beforeappellatecourtandruledinfavorofherreversingthedecisionofthetrial
court.Petitionerfiledamotionforreconsiderationbutthesamewasdismissedby
the appellate court. Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the
respondents,whichbroughtembarrassmenttoherandherchildren,confersupon
heraninteresttoseekjudicialremedytoaddresshergrievancesandtoprotecther
familyfromfurtherembarrassmentandhumiliation.SheclaimsthattheCourtof
Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring the marriage void despite
overwhelming evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral
marriages.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the
declarationofnullityofmarriageoftherespondentsonthegroundofbigamy.
HELD: Withoutthedivorcedecreeandforeignlawaspartoftheevidence,we
cannotruleontheissueofwhetherpetitionerhasthepersonalitytofilethepetition
fordeclarationofnullityofmarriage.Afterall,shemayhavethepersonalitytofile
thepetitionifthedivorcedecreeobtainedwasalimiteddivorceoramensaetthoro;or

the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes
absolute.Insuchcase,theRTCwouldbecorrecttodeclarethemarriageofthe
respondentsvoidforbeingbigamous,therebeingalreadyinevidencetwoexisting
marriagecertificates,whichwerebothobtainedinthePhilippines,oneinMabini,
Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent
Merope,andtheother,inCalasiao,PangasinandatedJune16,1988betweenthe
respondents.However,iftherewasindeedadivorcedecreeobtainedandwhich,
followingthenationallawofOrlando,doesnotrestrictremarriage,theCourtof
Appealswouldbecorrectinrulingthatpetitionerhasnolegalpersonalitytofilea
petitiontodeclarethenullityofmarriage,thus:
Freedfromtheirexistingmaritalbond,eachoftheformerspousesnolongerhas
anyinterestnorshouldeachhavethepersonalitytoinquireintothemarriagethat
the other might subsequentlycontract. x x x Viewed from another perspective,
Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlandos subsequent marriage since the
validity,aswellasanydefectorinfirmity,ofthissubsequentmarriagewillnot
affectthedivorcedstatusofOrlandoandFelicitas.Infine,petitionerspersonality
tofilethepetitiontodeclarethenullityofmarriagecannotbeascertainedbecause
oftheabsenceofthedivorce decreeandtheforeignlawallowingit.Hence,a
remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is
necessarytodeterminewhetherrespondentOrlandowasgrantedadivorcedecree
andwhethertheforeignlawwhichgrantedthesameallowsorrestrictsremarriage.
Ifitisprovedthatavaliddivorcedecreewasobtainedandthesamedidnotallow
respondentOrlandosremarriage,thenthetrialcourtshoulddeclarerespondents
marriageasbigamousandvoidabinitiobutreducetheamountofmoraldamages
from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to
P25,000.00.Onthecontrary,ifitisprovedthatavaliddivorcedecreewasobtained
whichallowedOrlandotoremarry,thenthetrialcourtmustdismisstheinstant
case.
BELLISVSBELLIS
FACTS:AmosBellis,wasbornandacitizenofTexas.Amosexecutedawillin
thePhilippines,inwhichhedirectedthathisdistributableestateshouldbedivided,
intrust,tohisfirstwife,Mary;histhreeillegitimatechildren,AmosJr.,Maria
Cristina,MiriamPalma,orandaftertheforegoingtwoitemshavebeensatisfied,
theremaindershallgotohissevensurvivingchildrenbyhisfirstandsecondwives
inequalshares.AmosBellisdiedaresidentofSanAntonio,Texas,U.S.A.Hiswill
wasadmittedtoprobateintheCourtofFirstInstanceofManila.MariaCristinaand
Miriamfiledtheirrespectiveoppositionstotheprojectofpartitionontheground
thattheyweredeprivedoftheirlegitimesasillegitimatechildrenand,therefore,
compulsoryheirsofthedeceased.
ISSUE: Shouldthenationallawofthedecedentdeterminesuccessionalrightsof
theillegitimatechildren?
RULING:YES.Thepartiesadmitthatthedecedent,AmosBellis,wasacitizenof
theStateofTexas,U.S.A.,andthatunderthelawsofTexas,therearenoforced
heirsorlegitimes.Accordingly,sincetheintrinsicvalidityoftheprovisionofthe
willandtheamountofsuccessionalrightsaretobedeterminedunderTexaslaw,
thePhilippinelawonlegitimescannotbeappliedtothetestacyofAmosBellis.
QUITAVSCA
FACTS:Alicia(2ndwife)LorenzoN.LlorentePaula(1 STwife)Ceferino
Llorente(brother),CrisologoLlorente(son)
1.LorenzoN.LlorentewasanenlistedservicemanoftheUnitedStatesNavyfrom
March10,1927toSeptember30,1957
2.February22,1937:LorenzoandPaulaLlorenteweremarriedbeforeaparish
priest,RomanCatholicChurch,inNabua,CamarinesSurBeforetheoutbreakof
thePacificWar,LorenzodepartedfortheUnitedStatesandPaulastayedinthe
conjugalhome
3. November 30, 1943: Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and
CertificateofNaturalization
4.1945: When Lorenzo was granted anaccruedleave to visithis wife and he
visitedthePhilippines,HediscoveredthathiswifePaulawaspregnantandwas
living in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino
Llorente
5.December4,1945:PaulagavebirthtoaboyregisteredintheOfficeofthe
RegistrarofNabuaasCrisologoLlorentewiththecertificatestatingthatthechild
wasnotlegitimateandthelineforthefathersnamewasleftblank
6.LorenzorefusedtoforgivePaulaandlivewithher
7.February2,1946:thecoupledrewandsignedawrittenagreementwhichwas
witnessedbyPaulasfatherandstepmothertotheeffectthat:
1.allthefamilyallowancesallottedbytheUnitedStatesNavyaspart
of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily
maintenanceandsupportwouldbesuspended
2.theywoulddissolvetheirmaritalunioninaccordancewithjudicial
proceedings
3. they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal
propertyacquiredduringtheirmaritallife;and
4.LorenzowouldnotprosecutePaulaforheradulterousactsinceshe
voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo

peacefully.
November16,1951:LorenzoreturnedandfiledfordivorcewiththeSuperiorCourt
oftheStateofCaliforniainandfortheCountyofSanDiego(final:Dec4,1952)
January16,1958:LorenzomarriedAliciaF.LlorenteinManilaandlivedtogether
ashusbandandwifeandbore3children:Raul,LuzandBeverly,allsurnamed
Llorente
March13,1981:LorenzoexecutedaLastWillandTestamentwherehebequeathed
allhispropertytoAliciaandtheirthreechildren
December14,1983:LorenzofiledwiththeRTC,Iriga,CamarinesSur,apetition
for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo
movedthatAliciabeappointedSpecialAdministratrixofhisestate
ISSUE:W/Nthedivorceisvalidandproven
HELD: YES.PetitionisGRANTED.REVERSESthedecisionoftheRegional
TrialCourtandRECOGNIZESasVALIDthedecreeofdivorcegrantedinfavorof
thedeceasedLorenzoN.LlorentebytheSuperiorCourtoftheStateofCalifornia
inandfortheCountyofSanDiego,madefinalonDecember4,1952.REMANDS
thecasestothecourtoforiginfordeterminationoftheintrinsicvalidityofLorenzo
N.Llorenteswillanddeterminationofthepartiessuccessionalrightsallowing
proofofforeignlawwithinstructionsthatthetrialcourtshallproceedwithall
deliberatedispatchtosettletheestateofthedeceasedwithintheframeworkofthe
RulesofCourt.
UNITEDAIRLINESVSCA
Facts: OnMar.1,1989,PRFontanillapurchasedticketsfrompetitionerUnited
AirlinesinManila.ThecauseofnonboardingoftheFontanillasonUnitedAirlines
makesuptheboneofcontentionofthiscontroversy.AnicetoFontanilla&hisson
claimthatuponarrivalatLosAngelesAirporttheyproceededatUnitedAirlines
counterwheretheywere attendedbyanemployee,Linda;whenthe flightwas
called,theyproceededtotheplanebutthestewardessdidnotallowthemtoboard
becausetheyhadnoassignedseatnumbers;theyweredirectedtogobacktothe
checkincounter.Lindatoldtheminanarrogantmanner,Whodoyouthinkyou
are?YoulousyFlipsaregoodfornothingbeggars.YoualwaysaskforAmerican
aid.AfterwhichsheremarkedDontworryaboutyourbaggage.Anywaythereis
nothing in there. What are you doing here anyway? I will report you to
immigration. You Filipinos should go home. such rude statement was made
infront of other people causing the Fontanillas to suffer shame, humiliation &
embarrassment. However, according to United Airlines, Fontanillas did not
initiallygotocheckincountertogettheirseatassignmentthatiswhytheywere
notallowedtoboard.Lindadeniedthederogatory&resistedwordsattributedto
herbytheFontanillas.TheincidentpromptedtheFontanillastofilefordamages.
ISSUE:1. WONtherewasabreachofcontractinbadfaithonthepartofthe
petitionerinnotallowingtheFontanillastoboardUnitedAirlines?NO
2.WONFontanillaisentitledtodamages?NO
HELD:AnicetoFontanillasassertionthatuponarrivalattheairportat9:45a.m.,
heimmediatelyproceededtothecheckincounter,andthatLindaAllenpunchedin
somethingintothe computeris speciousandnotsupportedbytheevidence on
record.Insupportoftheirallegations,privaterespondentssubmittedacopyofthe
boardingpass.ExplicitlyprintedontheboardingpassarethewordsCheckIn
Required.Curiously,thesaidpassdidnotindicateanyseatnumber.Ifindeedthe
Fontanillascheckedinatthedesignatedtimeastheyclaimed,whythenwerethey
notassignedseatnumbers?AbsentanyshowingthatLindawassomotivated,we
donotbuyintoprivaterespondentsclaimthatLindaintentionallydeceivedhim,
andmadehimthelaughingstockamongthepassengers.
Plaintiffsfailtorealizethattheirfailuretocheckin,asexpresslyrequiredintheir
boardingpasses,istheveryreasonwhytheywerenotgiventheirrespectiveseat
numbers,whichresultedintheirbeingdeniedboarding.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith,
entitlingpassengersconcernedtoanawardofmoraldamages.WhatthisCourt
considersasbadfaithisthewillfulanddeliberateoverbookingonthepartofthe

airlinecarrier.Theabovementionedlawclearlystatesthatwhentheoverbooking
doesnotexceedtenpercent(10%),itisnotconsideredasdeliberateandtherefore
doesnotamounttobadfaith.Whiletheremayhavebeenoverbookinginthiscase,
privaterespondentswerenotabletoprovethattheoverbookingonUnitedAirlines
Flight1108exceededtenpercent.
Fortheplaintifftobeentitledtoanawardofmoraldamagesarisingfromabreach
ofcontractofcarriage,thecarriermusthaveactedwithfraudorbadfaith.
Theprivaterespondentswerenotabletoprovethattheyweresubjectedtocoarse
andharshtreatmentbythegroundcrewofunitedAirlines.Neitherweretheyable
toshowthattherewasbadfaithonpartofthecarrierairline.Hence,theawardof
moralandexemplarydamagesbytheCourtofAppealsisimproper.Corollarily,the
awardofattorneysfeesis,likewise,deniedforlackofanylegalandfactualbasis.
YUCHVSMANILACHRONICLE
FACTS: Thepresentcontroversyarosewheninthelastquarterof1993,several
allegedly defamatory articles against petitioner were published in The Manila
ChroniclebyChroniclePublishingCorporation.Petitionerfiledacomplaintagainst
respondentsbeforetheRTCofMakatiCityunderthreeseparatecausesofaction,
namely:(1)fordamagesduetolibelouspublicationagainstNealH.Cruz,Ernesto
Tolentino,NoelCabrera,ThelmaSanJuan,GerryZaragoza,DonnaGatdula,Raul
Valino,RodneyP. Diola,all members of the editorial staffandwriters ofThe
ManilaChronicle,andChroniclePublishing;(2)fordamagesduetoabuseofright
againstRobertCoyiuto,Jr.andChroniclePublishing;and(3)forattorneysfeesand
costsagainstalltherespondents.OnNovember8,2002,thetrialcourtrendereda
Decisioninfavorofpetitioner.Aggrieved,respondentssoughtrecoursebeforethe
CA. The CA rendered a Decision affirming in toto the decision of the RTC.
RespondentsthenfiledanMR.TheCArenderedanAmendedDecisionreversing
theearlierDecision.Subsequently,petitionerfiledthepresentrecoursebeforethis
Court.OnNovember25,2009,thisCourtrenderedaDecisionpartiallygrantingthe
petition.RespondentslaterfiledaMRdatedwhichtheCourtdenied.Meanwhile,
respondentCoyiuto,Jr.alsofiledaMotionforLeavetoFileSupplementalMR
with Attached Supplemental Motion. On April 21, 2010, this Court issued a
ResolutiongrantCoyiuto,Jr.smotionforleave tofile supplementalmotionfor
reconsideration, and require petitioner to comment on the motion for
reconsiderationandsupplementalmotionforreconsideration.Petitionerfiledhis
Comment. It is apparent that the MR of respondents generally reiterates the
argumentspreviouslyadvancedbyrespondents. However,fromthesupplemental
motion for reconsideration, it is apparent that Coyiuto, Jr. raises a new matter
whichhasnotbeenraisedintheproceedingsbelow.Thisnotwithstanding,basic
equitydictatesthatCoyiuto,Jr.shouldbegivenalltheopportunitytoventilatehis
argumentsinthepresentaction,butmoreimportantly,inordertowritefinistothe
presentcontroversy.
ISSUE: (1)WhetherCoyuito,Jr.,wasCharimanofManilaChroniclePublishing
Corporation when the libelous articles were published, (2) Whether petitioners
causeofactionbasedonAbuseofRightswarrantstheawardofdamages.
HELD:AWARDOFDAMAGESBASEDONABUSEOFRIGHT,PROPER
Aright,thoughbyitselflegalbecauserecognizedorgrantedbylawassuch,may
neverthelessbecomethesourceofsomeillegality.Whenarightisexercisedina
mannerwhichdoesnotconformwiththenormsenshrinedinArticle19andresults
indamagetoanother,alegalwrongistherebycommittedforwhichthewrongdoer
mustbeheldresponsible.ButwhileArticle19laysdownaruleofconductforthe
governmentofhumanrelationsandforthemaintenanceofsocialorder,itdoesnot
providearemedyforitsviolation.Generally,anactionfordamagesundereither
Article 20orArticle 21wouldbe proper.Here, it was foundthat Coyiuto, Jr.
indeedabusedhisrightsasChairmanofTheManilaChronicle,whichledtothe
publicationofthelibelousarticlesinthesaidnewspaper,thus,entitlingpetitioner
todamagesunderArticle19,inrelationtoArticle20.