Shreya Kumar

Student No: 420041793

CISS6004
The Advantages & Disadvantages of using Biological Weapons for Terrorism

Although historical accounts suggest that the use of biological agents as weapons is not a new
concept, the threat of bioterrorism has received a great deal of attention in the past few
decades. The anthrax attacks post September 11, 2001 along with advances in science and
biotechnology, and the breadth of existing Soviet and Iraqi biological warfare programs have
all contributed to bringing the issue of biological weapons into the forefront of security
studies.1 This essay will examine how credible the threat of mass destruction via biological
weapons by extrapolating the advantages and disadvantages of using biological weapons as
compared to more traditional weapons. To begin with, the possible advantages will be
discussed.
Advantages of Using Biological Weapons
The reasons why terrorist groups would be interested in using biological weapons are
plentiful.

Can inflict heavy causalities and can inflict mass panic (RAND 16)

Biological agents more readily available and cheaper than nuclear (rand 17). Less

technological knowledge is required to use certain bio agents than nuclear agents (rand 17)

Undermine the economy of a nation; serious blow to the military of a country

Create a cycle of fear

Koblentz, Gregory. "Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of

Biological Warfare." International Security 28.3 (2004): 84-122. Print.

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Shreya Kumar
Student No: 420041793
CISS6004

Only small quantities are required to cause large and terrifying effects. Another important
factor is that the effects of these types of biological warfare agents are not immediate; as
there is an incubation period, there will be a short or long time delay, which makes it simple
to carry out a covert attack. There could also be dangerous secondary effects, due to the
dramatic overburdening of the healthcare system, demands on other community services, and
the risk of further epidemic spread of the disease. Biological weapons and bioterrorism
preparedness: importance of public-health awareness and international cooperation).

Although the US anthrax incident has caused five deaths and accounts for a great

economic loss, the direct effects are limited. This can be compared to the mass destruction
that B. anthracis would cause if dispersed on a large scale as an aerosol in a city, in the
ventilation system of a large building, or in a metro system. The casualties would then
amount to thousands or even more. The hospital system would be overwhelmed, and large
stocks of antibiotics would be necessary to limit the consequences.

These consequences would be even worse if smallpox virus was used. It should be

noted that the technical problems when producing smallpox virus are greater than those when
producing bacteria such as B. anthracis or Y. pestis. On the other hand, very small quantities
of smallpox virus could initiate an epidemic in todays world, where the population at large is
not vaccinated and limited amounts of vaccines are available [5].

Dual use nature of bio tech. technologies developed for human welfare can be adapted

to create weaponzied agents. Malet last page. Easy accessibility. more immediate concern
because of

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Shreya Kumar
Student No: 420041793
CISS6004

the greater availability of the relevant

dual-use materials, equipment, and
know-how, which are spreading rapidly
throughout the world.
That view was supported by Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee chairman Joe
Lieberman (I-CT) and ranking member Susan Collins (R-ME). Both recognized
that although biotechnology
research and innovation have created
the possibility of important medical
breakthroughs, the spread of the research
and the technological advancements
that accompany innovations have also
increased the risk that such knowledge
could be used to develop weapons.

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Shreya Kumar
Student No: 420041793
CISS6004

Graham and Talent acknowledged

that weaponizing biological agents is
still difficult and stated that government
officials and outside experts
believe that no terrorist group has the

Another supply-side issue is that inputs to biological weapons are inher-ently dual-

use. Unlike special nuclear materials (highly enriched plutonium and uranium), which are
man-made at great expense and effort and produced only at government-sanctioned facilities,
biological agents (with the single ex-ception of variola virus, the causative agent of smallpox)
exist in the environ-ment.24 Pathogens listed by the government as potential agents for
terrorists are used in thousands of clinical and diagnostic laboratories.25 The same equipment
used to produce beer, for example, could be used to produce bio-logical agents. The
underlying research and technology base is available to a rapidly growing and increasingly
international technical community.26 (dreaded risk and control of biological weapons)

Another problem is that the manufacture of biological weapons is relatively easy to

hide. Enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear weapons materials emit chemical signatures
that can be picked up by sensors placed at long distances from the production site. There are
no equivalent, easily identifiable signatures for BW production.

INADEQUATE PREPAREDNESS AGAINST THE TERRORIST THREAT U.S.

efforts to characterize the terrorist threat have entailed assessments of the country's
vulnerability. Exercises in the 1990s tested the U.S. government's preparedness for
responding to WMD attacks. The tests revealed that hospitals were likely to quickly exhaust

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Shreya Kumar
Student No: 420041793
CISS6004

their supplies of antidotes and vaccines; first re-sponders (police, firefighters, and other
emergency workers) were inade-quately trained and likely to succumb themselves; and
coordination among federal, state, and local officials was all but nonexistent. Hospital
laboratories were poorly prepared for biological attacks. Secure communication links among
doctors, veterinarians, and local and federal public-health officials were inadequate. Systems
for ensuring that medication and personnel were distributed appropriately were undeveloped.
The public health infrastructure was-and remains-unprepared for timely response and
containment of out-breaks. Moreover, critics argue that the lack of a fully coordinated global
dis-ease surveillance system could obstruct early response to a bioterrorist attack. Congress
enacted legislation to address some of these shortfalls, but many of these problems remain
unresolved.40 A particularly frightening aspect of biological warfare or terrorism is that it
may be difficult to distinguish from a natural outbreak. Although discerning natural from
unnatural outbreaks proceeds more rapidly than in the past, sus-picions and fears resulting
from such outbreaks can still occur.

On the rare occasions when biological weapons were used or accidentally re-leased,

scientists and government officials often first assumed that the epidem-ics were natural
outbreaks. For instance, when 751 people in Oregon became infected with salmonella in
1984, public health authorities suspected a natural outbreak, not bioterrorism. A year later, an
unrelated law-enforcement investi-gation revealed that the Rajneeshee cult had deliberately
spread pathogens causing the disease.43 And when Robert Stevens, an avid outdoorsman and
a photo editor for the supermarket tabloid The Sun, was found to have con-tracted anthrax,
Florida State health officials initially attributed the source of the disease to a naturally
occurring strain of the bacteria found in some soils.44 Terrorists have yet to employ
successfully biological agents to carry out mass casualty attacks. Most incidents to date have
involved readily available and easily deployed food-borne pathogens, resulting in relatively

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Shreya Kumar
Student No: 420041793
CISS6004

few casual-ties. Although the perpetrator of the fall 2001 attacks used a highly sophisti-cated
powder, the letters in the envelopes identified the material as anthrax and warned recipients to
seek treatment, suggesting that the intention was not to kill people. This could change if a
state chose to sponsor a biological attack or if a group managed to secure assistance from
former government scientists. Moreover, as aerosolization technologies continue to improve,
high-casualty biological attacks will become easier to carry out

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