G.R. No.

L-23482
August 30, 1968
ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-23767
August 30, 1968
CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ALFONSO LACSON, defendant-appellee.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-24259
August 30, 1968
ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON, petitioner-appellant.
Facts:
- Feb 14, 1953 when they got married
- Jan 9, 1963 when Carmen (respondent) left home in Bacolod to go to Manila
- March 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint for custody of children as well as support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila
o Before it pushed through though they reached a settlement where the two eldest kids would go to petitioner Alfonso and the youngest
would stay with Carmen
o This was affirmed by the CFI
- May 7, 1963 respondent filed a motion for the custody of all children be given to her in JDRC since she said she only entered into
agreement to gain custody of her younger children and thus should be given custody of the older ones as well who are all below 7
years old.
- CA: ruled that compromise agreement as relating to custody of children should be declared null and void and as such the execution of
said judgment is void too.
ISSUE: Whether or Not support should be awarded to the wife
HELD: Yes, should have but was filed out of time
- NCC Art 363 - "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for
such measure."
o Older children at that time were 5 and 6 so agreement should have been declared null and void since no compelling reasons were
stated otherwise
o However the children are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old may choose which parent they want to live with (sec. 6, Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court, as long as above ten) already 1968
o Court may also award custody to who they deem more fit through evidence.
Art 356 of the NCC - Every child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development.
- However even if custody should have been null and void, the rest of the agreement is valid with respect to the separation of property
of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership since it had judicial sanction. (art 190/191 of NCC)
Corroborated by already 5-year separation
G.R. No. L-12790
August 31, 1960
JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REMEDIOS CAIZARES, defendant.
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant.
FACTS:
Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Remedios Canizares on the ground that the orifice of
her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ for copulation. It has existed at the time of the marriage
and continues to exist that led him to leave the conjugal home two nights and one day after the marriage. The court summoned and
gave a copy to the wife but the latter did not file any answer. The wife was ordered to submit herself to physical examination and to file
a medical certificate within 10 days. She was given another 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed lack of interest on her part and
therefore rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the testimony of the husband.
HELD:
The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did not avail of the opportunity to defend herself and as such, claim cannot
be convincingly be concluded. It is a well-known fact that women in this country are shy and bashful and would not readily and
unhesitatingly submit to a physical examination unless compelled by competent authority. Such physical examination in this case is not
self-incriminating. She is not charged with any offense and likewise is not compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotence being
an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The case was remanded to trial court.
G.R. No. L-15853
July 27, 1960
FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.
FACTS:
Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo that at the date of her marriage
with the former on December 1954, concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man and sometime in April 1955 or about 4
months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the proceedings to

prevent collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties.
Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence.
CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioners complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by CA thus a petition for certiorari to review
the decisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as would annul a marriage.
HELD:
The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes
fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her
marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was naturally plump or fat. It is
only on the 6thmonth of pregnancy that the enlargement of the womans abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the
roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.
In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and decision complained is set aside.
G.R. No. 138509
July 31, 2000
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner,
vs.
ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.
FACTS:
October 21, 1985, first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Not annulled, nullified or terminated
January 25, 1996, second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis
Third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez
February 25, 1998, Imelda Bobis filed bigamy
Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground
that it was celebrated without a marriage license
Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the
second marriage
*After petitioner sued for bigamy, its just when the respondent filed a declaration of absolute nullity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to
a criminal case for bigamy
HELD:
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.3It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused. Its two essential elements are:7
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed
In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not
be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a
judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents
and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.
Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is,
therefore, not a prejudicial question
*Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to
such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy (Landicho v. Relova)
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
FACTS
Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique a petition for the declarationof the presumptive death of his wife Janet
Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial
Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor General in the case. During trial, Nolasco testified that he was
seaman and that he had first met Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ships port calls. From that chance
meeting onwards, Parker lived with Nolasco on his ship for six months until they returned to Nolascos hometown of San Jose, Antique
in 1980 after his seamans contract expired. On January 1982, NOlasco married Parker in San Jose, Antique. After the marriage
celebration, Nolasco obtained another employment as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in Antique. Sometime in 1983, while
working overseas, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that Parker had left Antique. Nolasco claimed he asked
permission to leave the ship and return home to look for his wife. He testified that his efforts to look for her whenever their ship docked
in England were fruitless, that the letters he sent to Parkers address in England were all returned to him, and that their friends received
no news from Parker. He testified that he had no knowledge of her family background even after the marriage and did not report the
disappearance to the authorities. The petition was granted by lower court and was also affirmed by the appellate court. As such, the
republic appealed to the SC.
Issue
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
Held
The respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would
sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead. In the case at bar, the Court considers that the
investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form
the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of

Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's
contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there. The Court also views respondent's claim
that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal background even after she had married respondent 17 too
convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to
his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified
circumstances.
G.R. No. L-10033
December 28, 1956
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LEONILA GINEZ, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough
leave. Immediately after the marriage, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before he went back to duty. The
couple came to an agreement that Ginez would stay with his sisters who later moved in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the
dwelling of the sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later
on moved to Dagupan to study in a local college.
Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiffs sister-in-law) and some from anonymous writers, which were
not produced at the hearing, informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. He admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a
certain Eliong kissed her. All these communications, prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain who
asked him to consult with the navy legal department.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the house of the defendants godmother. They
proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next day,
they slept together in their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on the information he received but instead of answering,
she merely packed up and left which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation.
ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a ground for dismissal of the action.
HELD:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A single voluntary act of marital
intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation and where the parties live in the same house, it is
presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has
been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.

G.R. No. L-3047

May 16, 1951

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
GUADALUPE ZAPATA and DALMACIO BONDOC, defendants-appellees.