Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
MAERSK LINES vs CA
The heavy seas and rains referred to in the master's report were not caso fortuito, but normal
occurrences that an ocean-going vessel, particularly in the month of September which, in our area, is a
month of rains and heavy seas would encounter as a matter of routine. They are not unforeseen nor
unforeseeable. These are conditions that ocean-going vessels would encounter and provide for, in the
ordinary course of a voyage. That rain water (not sea water) found its way into the holds of the Jupri
Venture is a clear indication that care and foresight did not attend the closing of the ship's hatches so that
rain water would not find its way into the cargo holds of the ship. Art. 1735. In all cases other than those
mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as required in article 1733. Since the carrier has failed to establish
any caso fortuito, the presumption by law of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier applies; and the
carrier must present evidence that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by Article 1733 of
the Civil Code in order to escape liability for damage or destruction to the goods that it had admittedly
carried in this case. No such evidence exists of record. Thus, the carrier cannot escape liability. The
presumption, therefore, that the cargo was in apparent good condition when it was delivered by the vessel
to the arrastre operator by the clean tally sheets has been overturned and traversed. The evidence is clear
to the effect that the damage to the cargo was suffered while aboard petitioner's vessel.
While it is true that common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and to deliver
merchandise, and persons are not vested with the right to prompt delivery, unless such common carriers
previously assume the obligation to deliver at a given date or time, delivery of shipment or cargo should
at least be made within a reasonable time. An examination of the subject bill of lading shows that the
subject shipment was estimated to arrive in Manila on April 3, 1977. While there was no special contract
entered into by the parties indicating the date of arrival of the subject shipment, petitioner nevertheless,
was very well aware of the specific date when the goods were expected to arrive as indicated in the bill of
lading itself.
FGU INSURANCE vs CA
The Court finds that since it is the duty of the defendant to exercise and observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the cargo of the plaintiff, the patron or captain of M/T ANCO, representing
the defendant could have placed D/B Lucio in a very safe location before they left knowing or sensing at
that time the coming of a typhoon. The presence of big waves and dark clouds could have warned the
patron or captain of M/T ANCO to insure the safety of D/B Lucio including its cargo. D/B Lucio being a
barge, without its engine, as the patron or captain of M/T ANCO knew, could not possibly maneuver by
itself. Had the patron or captain of M/T ANCO, the representative of the defendants observed
extraordinary diligence in placing the D/B Lucio in a safe place, the loss to the cargo of the plaintiff could
not have occurred. In short, therefore, defendants through their representatives, failed to observe the
degree of diligence required of them under the provision of Art. 1733 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The Civil Code provides under Art. 1739. In order that the common carrier may be exempted
from responsibility, the natural disaster must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. To be
exempt from liability because of an act of God, the tug must be free from any previous negligence or
misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been occasioned. there was blatant negligence on the
part of M/T ANCOs crewmembers, first in leaving the engine-less barge D/B Lucio at the mercy of the
storm without the assistance of the tugboat, and again in failing to heed the request of SMCs
representatives to have the barge transferred to a safer place, as was done by the othervessels in the port;
thus, making said blatant negligence the proximate cause of the loss of the cargoes.
DSR-SENATOR vs FEDERAL
Fire is not one of those enumerated under Article 1734 which exempts a carrier from liability for
loss or destruction of the cargo. Common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law. Petitioners
failed to overcome it by sufficient proof of extraordinary diligence. Even if fire were to be considered a
natural disaster within the purview of Article 1734, it is required under Article 1739 of the same Code that
the natural disaster must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss, and that the carrier has
exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during or after the occurrence of the
disaster
PHILMAGEN vs CA
In this case, there was indeed delay. 40 days had lapsed. (More than enough time to unload the
cargoes) However, neither parties could be faulted for such delay. Delay was not due to negligence but to
several factors. The cargo having been lost due to typhoon "Saling", and the delay incurred in its
unloading not being due to negligence, private respondent is exempt from liability for the loss of the
cargo, pursuant to Article 1740 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the records also show that before, during and
after the occurrence of typhoon "Saling", private respondent through its shipmaster exercised due
negligence to prevent or minimize the loss of the cargo. (Refer to the facts) The diligence exercised by the
shipmaster further supports the exemption of private respondent from liability for the loss of the cargo, in
accordance with Article 1739 of the Civil Code.
constructively, to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them.Owing to this high degree
of diligence required of them, common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to have been at fault or
negligent if the goods they transported deteriorated or got lost or destroyed. That is, unless they prove that
they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods. In order to avoid responsibility for any
loss or damage, therefore, they have the burden of proving that they observed such diligence. However,
the presumption of fault or negligence will not arise if the loss is due to any of the following causes: (1)
flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) an act of the public enemy in
war, whether international or civil; (3) an act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) the
character of the goods or defects in the packing or the container; or (5) an order or act of competent
public authority. This is a closed list. If the cause of destruction, loss or deterioration is other than the
enumerated circumstances, then the carrier is liable therefor.
SARKIES TOUR vs CA
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them, and this liability lasts
from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for
transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the person who has
a right to receive them, unless the loss is due to any of the excepted causes under Art. 1734. The cause of
the loss was Sarkies Tours negligence in not ensuring that the doors of the baggage compartment of its
bus were securely fastened. As a result of this lack of care, almost all of the luggage was lost, to the
prejudice of the paying passengers.
VALENZUELA HARDWOOD vs CA
Private respondent had acted as a private carrier in transporting petitioners lauan logs. Thus,
Article 1745 and other Civil Code provisions on common carriers which were cited by petitioner may not
be applied unless expressly stipulated by the parties in their charter party. In a contract of private carriage,
the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer, exempting
the ship-owner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the negligence of the ship
captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil Code, such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered
into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy. Indeed, their contract of private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion. We stress that in a
contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce
would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not
involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers
protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a
private carrier. Consequently, the public policy embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a
charter party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in contracts involving common carriers.
The general public enters into a contract of transportation with common carriers without a hand or a voice
in the preparation thereof. The riding public merely adheres to the contract; even if the public wants to, it
cannot submit its own stipulations for the approval of the common carrier. Thus, the law on common
carriers extends its protective mantle against one-sided stipulations inserted in tickets, invoices or other
documents over which the riding public has no understanding or, worse, no choice. Compared to the
general public, a charterer in a contract of private carriage is not similarly situated. It can -- and in fact it
usually does -- enter into a free and voluntary agreement. In practice, the parties in a contract of private
carriage can stipulate the carriers obligations and liabilities over the shipment which, in turn, determine
the price or consideration of the charter. Thus, a charterer, in exchange for convenience and economy,
may opt to set aside the protection of the law on common carriers. When the charterer decides to exercise
this option, he takes a normal business risk.
YOBIDO vs CA
The explosion of the tire is not in itself a fortuitous event. The cause of the blow-out, if due to a
factory defect, improper mounting, excessive tire pressure, is not an unavoidable event. On the other
hand, there may have been adverse conditions on the road that were unforeseeable and/or inevitable,
which could make the blow-out a caso fortuito. The fact that the cause of the blow-out was not known
does not relieve the carrier of liability. There are human factors involved in the situation. The fact that the
tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly
mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand
name noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within five days use. Be that
as it may, it is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence
of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages. A common
carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure or fortuitous event alone. The common
carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or injury resulting from an accident.
Having failed to discharge its duty to overthrow the presumption of negligence with clear and convincing
evidence, petitioners are hereby held liable for damages
EVERRETT STEAMSHIP vs CA
The controlling provisions for the issue of this case would be 1749 and 1750 of the Civil Code.
The shipper, Maruman Trading, had the option to declare a higher valuation if the value of its cargo was
higher than the limited liability of the carrier. Considering that the shipper did not declare a higher
valuation, it had itself to blame for not complying with the stipulations. The trial courts ratiocination that
private respondent could not have fairly and freely agreed to the limited liability clause in the bill of
lading because the said conditions were printed in small letters does not make the bill of lading invalid. In
Ong Yiu vs CA the court said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready-made form
of contract on the other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts not entirely prohibited. A
contract limiting liability upon an agreed valuation does not offend against the policy of the law
forbidding one from contracting against his own negligence. The shipper, Maruman Trading, we assume,
has been extensively engaged in the trading business. It cannot be said to be ignorant of the business
transactions it entered into involving the shipment of its goods to its customers. The shipper could not
have known, or should know the stipulations in the bill of lading and there it should have declared a
higher valuation of the goods shipped. The consignee can still be bound by the contract. private
respondent (Hernandez) formally claimed reimbursement for the missing goods from petitioner and
subsequently filed a case against the latter based on the very same bill of lading, it (private respondent)
accepted the provisions of the contract and thereby made itself a party thereto, or at least has come to
court to enforce it.
SOUHTERN LINES vs CA
The SC held that the contention of Southern Lines with respect to the improper packing is
untenable. Under Art. 361 of the Code of Commerce, the carrier, in order to free itself from liability, was
only obliged to prove that the damages suffered by the goods were by virtue of the nature or defect of the
articles. Under Art. 362, the plaintiff, in order to hold the defendant liable, was obliged to prove that the
damages to the goods is by virtue of their nature, occurred on account of its negligence or because the
defendant did not take the precaution adopted by careful persons. It held that if the fact of improper
packing is known to the carrier or his servants, or apparent upon ordinary observation, but it accepts the
goods notwithstanding such condition, it is not relieved of liability for loss or injury resulting therefrom. NO. The SC noted that Southern Lines failed to plead this defense in its answer to City of Iloilos
complaint and, therefore, the same is deemed waived and cannot be raised for the first time. The SC also
cited the finding of the CA that City of Iloilo filed the action within a reasonable time; that the action is
one for the refund of the amount paid in excess, and not for damages or the recovery of shortage; the bill
of lading does not at all limit the time for the filing of action for the refund of money paid in excess.
COASTWISE LIGHTERAGE vs CA
Pag-asa Sales, Inc. only leased three of petitioner's vessels, in order to carry cargo from one point
to another, but the possession, command mid navigation of the vessels remained with petitioner
Coastwise Lighterage. Coastwise Lighterage, by the contract of affreightment, was not converted into a
private carrier, but remained a common carrier and was still liable as such. The law and jurisprudence on
common carriers both hold that the mere proof of delivery of goods in good order to a carrier and the
subsequent arrival of the same goods at the place of destination in bad order makes for a prima facie case
against the carrier. It follows then that the presumption of negligence that attaches to common carriers,
once the goods it is sports are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, applies to the petitioner. This presumption,
which is overcome only by proof of the exercise of extraordinary diligence, remained unrebutted in this
case. Jesus R. Constantino, the patron of the vessel "Coastwise 9" admitted that he was not licensed.
Coastwise Lighterage cannot safely claim to have exercised extraordinary diligence, by placing a person
whose navigational skills are questionable, at the helm of the vessel which eventually met the fateful
accident. It may also logically, follow that a person without license to navigate, lacks not just the skill to
do so, but also the utmost familiarity with the usual and safe routes taken by seasoned and legally
authorized ones. Had the patron been licensed he could be presumed to have both the skill and the
knowledge that would have prevented the vessel's hitting the sunken derelict ship that lay on their way to
Pier 18. As a common carrier, petitioner is liable for breach of the contract of carriage, having failed to
overcome the presumption of negligence with the loss and destruction of goods it transported, by proof of
its exercise of extraordinary diligence.
them over to the party entitled to their possession. Handling cargo is mainly the arrastre operator's
principal work so its drivers/operators or employees should observe the standards and measures necessary
to prevent losses and damage to shipments under its custody.
GANZON vs CA
There is no dispute that the scrap iron was already delivered to Ganzons carrier and received by
Captain Niza and the crew. By the said act of delivery, the scrap iron was already deemed to be
unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the common carrier and upon their receipt, the
contract of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, petitioner-carriers extraordinary responsibility
for the loss or deterioration of the goods commenced. According to Art 1736 of the NCC, such
responsibility will only cease upon the actual or constructive delivery to the consignee or any person who
has a right to receive the goods. However, in this case, the same is not true since the scrap iron remained
in the custody and control of the carrier, albeit still unloaded. Ganzon may be exempt from liability if the
loss of the scrap iron was due to any of the causes enumerated under Art. 1734 of the NCC. However,
Ganzon was not able to prove the same. The SC cannot sustain Ganzons claim that the cause of the loss
was a caso fortuito considering that in the courts below, his defense was that the loss of the scrap iron was
due to an order or act of a competent public authority. Such change in theory on appeal cannot be
allowed. In any case, the intervention of the municipal officials is not of such character as would render
the fulfilment of Ganzons obligation impossible. According to the SC, the scrap iron could have still
been delivered in accordance with the contract of carriage after the dispute has been settled.
SALUDO vs CA
A bill of lading is a written acknowledgment of the receipt of the goods and an agreement to
transport and deliver them at a specified place to a person named or on his order. According to foreign
and local jurisprudence, "the issuance of a bill of lading carries the presumption that the goods were
delivered to the carrier issuing the bill, for immediate shipment, and it is nowhere questioned that a bill of
lading is prima facie evidence of the receipt of the goods by the carrier. . . . In the absence of convincing
testimony establishing mistake, recitals in the bill of lading showing that the carrier received the goods for
shipment on a specified date controls. However, except as may be prohibited by law, there is nothing to
prevent an inverse order of events, that is, the execution of the bill of lading even prior to actual
possession and control by the carrier of the cargo to be transported. There is no law which requires that
the delivery of the goods for carriage and the issuance of the covering bill of lading must coincide in point
of time or, for that matter, that the former should precede the latter. As between the shipper and the
carrier, when no goods have been delivered for shipment no recitals in the bill can estop the carrier from
showing the true facts . . . Between the consignor of goods and receiving carrier, recitals in a bill of lading
as to the goods shipped raise only a rebuttable presumption that such goods were delivered for shipment.
As between the consignor and a receiving carrier, the fact must outweigh the recital."
MACAM vs CA
It is a standard maritime practice when immediate delivery is of the essence, for shipper to
request or instruct the carrier to deliver the goods to the buyer upon arrival at the port of destination
without requiring presentation of bill of lading as that usually takes time. Thus, taking into account that
subject shipment consisted of perishable goods and SOLIDBANK pre-paid the full amount of value
thereof, it is not hard to believe the claim of respondent WALLEM that petitioner indeed requested the
release of the goods to GPC without presentation of the bills of lading and bank guarantee. To implement
the said telex instruction, the delivery of the shipment must be to GPC, the notify party or real
importer/buyer of the goods and not the PAKISTANI BANK since the latter can very well present the
original Bills of Lading in its possession. Likewise, if it were the PAKISTANI BANK to whom the
cargoes were to be strictly delivered, it will no longer be proper to require a bank guarantee as a substitute
for the Bill of Lading. To construe otherwise will render meaningless the telex instruction. After all, the
cargoes consist of perishable fresh fruits and immediate delivery thereof the buyer/importer is essentially
a factor to reckon with. We emphasize that the extraordinary responsibility of the common carriers lasts
until actual or constructive delivery of the cargoes to the consignee or to the person who has a right to
receive them. PAKISTAN BANK was indicated in the bills of lading as consignee whereas GPC was the
notify party. However, in the export invoices GPC was clearly named as buyer/importer. Petitioner also
referred to GPC as such in his demand letter to respondent WALLEM and in his complaint before the trial
court. This premise draws us to conclude that the delivery of the cargoes to GPC as buyer/importer which,
conformably with Art. 1736 had, other than the consignee, the right to receive them was proper.
CATHAY PACIFIC vs CA
Cathay failed to deliver his luggage at the designated place and time, it being the obligation of a
common carrier to carry its passengers and their luggage safely to their destination, which includes the
duty not to delay their transportation. It was not even aware that the luggage was left behind until its
attention was called by the Hongkong Customs authorities. It also refused to deliver the luggage at his
hotel and required him to pick it up with an official of the Philippine Embassy. The Cathay employees
were also discourteous, rude, and insulting. He was simply advised to buy anything he wanted with only
$20.00 which was certainly not enough to purchase comfortable clothing appropriate for an executive
conference. Cathays agents only replied, "What can we do, the baggage is missing. I cannot do anything .
. . Anyhow, you can buy anything you need, charged to Cathay Pacific." Further, Cathay contends that the
extent of its liability should be limited absolutely to that set forth in the Warsaw Convention. The said
treaty does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances for declaring a carrier liable for
breach of contract of carriage or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. The Warsaw
Convention declares the carrier liable for damages in the enumerated cases and under certain limitations.
However, it must not be construed to preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It
does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its
passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if wilfull misconduct on the part of the carrier's
employees is found or established, as in this case.
or not defendants were liable for its loss. The validity of the stipulations limiting carriers liability is to be
determined by their reasonableness and their conformity to the sound public policy. It cannot lawfully
stipulate for exemption from liability, unless such exemption is just and reasonable, and unless the
contract is freely and fairly made. The evidence shows that 164 cases were shipped, and that the value of
each case was very near P2,500. In this situation, the limit of defendants liability for each case of silk for
loss or damage from any cause or for any reason would put it in the power of the defendants to have taken
the whole cargo of 164 cases of silk at a valuation of P300 for each case, or less that 1/8 of its actual
value. If that rule should be sustained, no silk would ever be shipped from one island to another in the
Philippines. Such limitation of value is unconscionable and void as against public policy.
SHEWARAM vs PAL
Article 1750 of the NCC provides that the pecuniary liability of a common carrier may, by
contract, be limited to a fixed amount. It is required, however, that the contract must be reasonable and
just under the circumstances and has been fairly agreed upon. In the case at bar, the requirements have
not been met. It cannot be said that the appellee had actually entered into a contract with the appellant,
embodying the conditions as printed at the back of the ticket stub that was issued by the appellant to the
appellee. The fact that those conditions are printed at the back of the tickets stub in letters so small that
they are hard to read would not warrant the presumption that the appellee was aware of those conditions
such that he had fairly and freely agreed to those conditions. The liability of the appellant should be
governed by the provisions of Article 1734 and 1735 of the NCC. It having been clearly found by the trial
court that the transistor radio and the camera of the appellee were lost as a result of the negligence of the
appellant as a common carrier, the liability of the appellant is clear- it must pay the appellee the value of
those articles
CITADEL LINES vs CA
A stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier to the value of goods appearing in the bill of
lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is binding. Further, a contract fixing the sum
that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods is
valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed upon. The
Consignee itself admits in its memorandum that the value of goods shipped does not appear in the bills of
lading. Hence, the stipulation on the carriers limited liability applies.
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. If the goods are lost, destroyed or
deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extra ordinary diligence as required in Article 1733 of the Civil Code. The duty
of the consignee is to prove merely that the goods were lost. Thereafter, the burden is shifted to the carrier
to prove that it has exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. And, its extraordinary
responsibility lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received
by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to
the consignee or to the person who has the right to receive them.
Considering, therefore, that the subject shipment was lost while it was still in the custody of the
CARRIER, and considering further that it failed to prove that the loss was occasioned by an excepted
cause, the inescapable conclusion is that the CARRIER was negligent and should be held liable.
PANAM VS RAPARADAS
The Notice and paragraph 2 of the Conditions of Contract (which provides that carriage is
subject to rules and limitations established by the Warsaw Convention) should be sufficient notice
showing the applicability of the Warsaw limitation. It is not required under the Warsaw Convention that
there be a detailed notice of baggage liability limitation in the passenger ticket. Contracts of adhesion,
such as the one involved here, are not entirely prohibited, unless there are facts and circumstances
showing its one-sided nature. This does not obtain here. Passengers are expected to be vigilant insofar as
his luggage is concerned. If the passenger fails to adduce evidence to overcome the stipulations, he cannot
avoid the application of the liability limitations. Had Mr. Rapadas not wavered in his decision to register
his luggage, he could have had enough time to disclose the true worth of the articles in it and pay the
extra charges or remove them from the checked-in-luggage. Unless the contents are declared, it will
always be the word of a passenger against that of the airline. If the loss of life or property is caused by the
gross negligence or arbitrary acts of the airline or the contents of the lost luggage are proved by
satisfactory evidence other than the self-serving declarations of one party, the Court will not hesitate to
disregard the fine print in a contract of adhesion. Otherwise, the contract would have to be enforced, as it
is the only reasonable basis to arrive at a just award.
BRITISH AIRWAYS vs CA
The nature of an airline's contract of carriage partakes of two types, namely: a contract to deliver
a cargo or merchandise to its destination and a contract to transport passengers to their destination. A
business intended to serve the travelling public primarily, it is imbued with public interest, hence, the law
governing common carriers imposes an exacting standard. Neglect or malfeasance by the carrier's
employees could predictably furnish bases for an action for damages. Admittedly, in a contract of air
carriage a declaration by the passenger of a higher value is needed to recover a greater amount. Article
22(1) of the Warsaw Convention. However, we have held that benefits of limited liability are subject to
waiver such as when the air carrier failed to raise timely objections during the trial when questions and
answers regarding the actual claims and damages sustained by the passenger were asked. Given the
foregoing postulates, the inescapable conclusion is that BA had waived the defense of limited liability
when itallowed Mahtani to testify as to the actual damages he incurred due to the misplacement of his
luggage, without anyobjection. Indeed, it is a well-settled doctrine that where the proponent offers
evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right
to object. However, such right is a mere privilege which can be waived. Necessarily, the objection must
be made at the earliest opportunity, lest silence when there is opportunity to speak may operate as a
waiver of objections. BA has precisely failed in this regard. To compound matters for BA, its counsel
failed, not only to interpose a timely objection, but even conducted his own cross-examination as well.