AHWG Report On Aircraft Tracking Concept of Operations - V5 Final PDF

International Civil Aviation Organization
Adhoc Working Group on Aircraft Tracking

REVISED REPORT
12 June 2015
The material in this report has not been considered by the

International Civil Aviation Organization. The views expressed
therein should be taken as advice of a group of experts to ICAO
but not as representing the views of the Organization.
INTRODUCTION
1.
In May 2014 ICAO convened a multi-disciplinary meeting with States, Industry, chairs and
co-chairs of several ANC panels, and related specialists to reach a common agreement on the first key
steps in making global aircraft tracking a priority, to agree that there is a need to track flights and to
coordinate with Industry Initiatives.
2.
The meeting recommended a draft concept of operations (ConOps) on aircraft tracking be
developed that includes a clear definition of the objectives of aircraft tracking that ensures that
information is provided in a timely fashion to the right people to support search and rescue, recovery
and accident investigation activities, as well as, the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders.
3.
The recommendation that a final high level concept of operations should be delivered to the
ICAO High Level Safety Conference (HLSC 2015, February, Montreal) was approved by the ICAO
Council on the 16th June. (C-DEC 202/3)
4.
ICAO tasked an ad-hoc working group (AHWG) to develop the draft concept of operations,
which presented an initial version to the HLSC 2015 (working paper HLSC/15-WP/2.). The HLSC
endorsed the GADSS concept of operations and requested it be further updated to reflect the outcomes
of the conference. The AHWG was reconvened and has now completed the revision of the document
to reflect the outcomes.
MEMBERSHIP
5.
The following is a complete list of all participants in the development of the revised ConOps:
Mr Henk Hof, Chairperson, ATMRPP (AHWG Chair)
Mr Leifur Hakonarson, Chairperson, OPLINKP
Mr Philippe Plantin de Hugues, Chairperson, FLIRECP
Mr Scott Constable, RCC Chief, Australia
Mr Tai Feng, Air Navigation Commissioner
Mr Declan Fitzpatrick, Air Navigation Commissioner
Mr Einar Hedinsson, Air Navigation Commissioner
Mr Miquel Marin, ICAO Secretariat
Mr Jean-Francois Grout, IATA
DISCUSSION
6.
The ConOps attached as appendix A represents the completion of the AHWG terms of
reference, namely to develop a Concept of Operation on the sequence of events before and after the
occurrence of an accident. It includes all identified phases of such a sequence including detection of an
abnormal situation, alert phase, distress phase and search and rescue activities. The Concept of
Operation builds on the general flow of information between various actors of an incident/accident
event and has sought to gain maximum efficiency in such cases. It also considers the responsibilities
of different actors and vulnerabilities to single-point failures.
Mr Henk Hof
AHWG Chair
Concept of Operations
Global
Aeronautical
Distress &
Safety
System
(GADSS)
Produced by:
Ad-hoc Working Group
on Aircraft Tracking
Version 5.0
Version: 5.0
Title: GADSS Concept of Operations
Date: 12/06/2015
DocumentVersion:
DatePublished:
ApprovedonbehalfoftheAHWG:
5.0
12/06/2015

MrHenkHof,ChairpersonoftheAHWG
AdhocWorkingGrouponAircraftTracking
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Executive Summary
One of the many reasons why aviation maintains a high level of safety is the willingness to learn
important lessons from rare events. The tragedies of Malaysia Airlines flight 370 and Air France flight
447 have highlighted vulnerabilities in the current air navigation system which have hampered timely
identificationandlocalisationofaircraftindistress.Thishassignificantlyhinderedeffectivesearchand
rescueeffortsandrecoveryoperations.
Ontherareoccasionswhenaccidentsoccur,rescuingsurvivorshasthehighestpriority,followedbythe
recoveryofcasualties,thewreckageandtheflightrecorders.Analysisofdatafromtheserecordersis
very important in supporting accident investigation which may, through identification of the cause of
the accident, contribute towards enhancing safety. An effective and globally consistent approach to
improvingthealertingofsearchandrescueservicesisessential.
Theeffectivenessofthecurrentalertingofsearchandrescueservicesshouldbeincreasedbyaddressing
anumberofkeyimprovementareasandbydevelopingandimplementingagloballyintegratedsystem,
theGlobalAeronauticalDistressandSafetySystem(GADSS),whichaddressesallphasesofflightunder
all circumstances including distress. This system will maintain an uptodate record of the aircraft
progress and, in case of a forced landing or ditching, the location of survivors, the aircraft and
recoverableflightdata.
ThefigurebelowgivesahighleveloverviewoftheGADSSandidentifiesthemaincomponents:
AircraftTrackingundernormalandabnormalconditions
AutonomousDistressTracking
FlightDataRecovery
GADSSProceduresandInformationManagement
FollowingtheICAOmultidisciplinary meetinginMay2014,IATAestablishedtheAircraftTrackingTask
Forceaddressingneartermandvoluntaryaircrafttrackingsolutions.Concurrently,ICAOformedanAd
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hoc Working Group on Flight Tracking with the mandate to develop a Concept of Operation on the
sequenceofeventsbeforeandaftertheoccurrenceofanaccidentwhichshouldincludeallidentified
phasesofsuchasequenceincluding:
detectionofanabnormalsituation,
alertphase,
distressphase,and
searchandrescueactivities
Close collaboration between IATA and ICAO has ensured that the IATA solutions fit within the GADSS
ConceptofOperations(ConOps)developedbytheICAOAdhocWorkingGroup.
Theeffectivenessofthealertingandsearchandrescueservicesisonlyasgoodastheweakestlinkinthe
chainofpeople,procedures,systemsandinformation.Itisthereforeofparamountimportancethata
globalperspectivebeadoptedindesigningtheGADSS.Inadditiontothetechnologicalcomponentsof
the system this should include key areas of improvement such as evaluation of existing procedures,
improvedcoordinationandinformationsharingandenhancedtrainingofpersonnelinreactingtorarely
encountered circumstances. Moreover, there is a need to improve communication infrastructure to
reducerelianceoncommunicationsmediathatareparticularlysusceptibletoatmosphericdisturbances
whileensuringglobalcoverage.
ThefullGADSSconceptcanberealisedinanevolutionarymannerthroughtheexecutionofactionsin
theshort,mediumandlongtermwitheachactionresultinginbenefits.Thefirststepsinimplementing
the GADSS can be taken in the short term by implementing the voluntary Aircraft Tracking solutions
proposed by the IATA Task Force for commercial air transport and by addressing the areas of
improvementidentifiedinthisdocument.
Implementation of the GADSS will have an impact on the States and industry. For example, some
aircraftwillrequiremodificationswhilesomeStatesmayneedtoinvestmoreintheimplementationof
itsSARresponsibilities.However,anycostmaybeoffsetbythebenefitofenhancingtheeffectiveness
ofthealerting,search,rescueandrecoveryservices.Moreover,AircraftTrackingwillallowadditional
benefitsinATMandairlineoperationstoberealized.
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Contents
ExecutiveSummary.............................................................................................................................3
1.0 Introduction.................................................................................................................................7
1.1
Background............................................................................................................................8
1.2
ScopeoftheConceptofOperations......................................................................................8
1.3
Definitions..............................................................................................................................9
1.4
AnnexReferences................................................................................................................10
1.5
SequenceofEvents..............................................................................................................11
2.0 ImprovementAreasinCurrentOperatingEnvironment..............................................................14
2.1
AircraftSystems...................................................................................................................14
EmergencyLocatorTransmitters(ELTs).......................................................................17
CarriageoflegacyanalogueELTsanddistressbeacons..............................................18
FlightRecorders...........................................................................................................19
2.2
AirTrafficServices(ATS)......................................................................................................19
ATSinOceanicandRemoteAirspace..........................................................................20
2.3
TheSearchandRescue(SAR)System..................................................................................22
SearchandRescueRegions(SRRs)...............................................................................24
RescueCoordinationCentres(RCCs)...........................................................................24
RoleofAirTrafficServices(ATS)Units.........................................................................25
RCCsAlertingandAircraftPositionInformation........................................................26
ImplementationofSARSystembyStates....................................................................27
NoncoincidentSRRs....................................................................................................28
2.4
InformationManagement...................................................................................................29
ATSunitandRCCrelationshipwithAircraftOperatorsandtheirFOCs.......................31
Aircraftoperatinginthevicinityofanaircraftinastateofemergency......................31
AircraftEmergenciesandRCCResponse.....................................................................31
3.0 HighLevelRequirements............................................................................................................33
4.0 TargetConcept...........................................................................................................................34
4.1
Aircrafttracking...................................................................................................................35
AircraftTrackingPerformanceCriteria........................................................................35
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AircraftTrackingServiceProviders..............................................................................36
4.2
AutonomousDistressTracking............................................................................................37
4.3
FlightDataRecovery............................................................................................................38
AutomaticallyDeployableFlightRecorder..................................................................38
Otheralternativesforflightdatarecovery..................................................................38
4.4
GADSSInformationManagement.......................................................................................40
SystemWideInformationManagement......................................................................40
Informationrepositoriesservices................................................................................42
4.5
GADSSProcedures...............................................................................................................42
General.........................................................................................................................42
Proceduresfordeclaringanemergencyphase............................................................43
Proceduresfortheemergencyphase..........................................................................44
Proceduresforrecoveryfromemergencyphase........................................................50
5.0 ImplementationPlan..................................................................................................................51
6.0 ConceptScenarios......................................................................................................................54
AppendixA:Termsandabbreviations................................................................................................56
AppendixB:RelatedReferenceData..................................................................................................57
AppendixC:ConceptScenario............................................................................................................58
AppendixD:ImpactAssessment........................................................................................................64
AppendixE:CrossReferenceTable....................................................................................................67
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1.0
Introduction
1.0.1 In May 2014 ICAO convened a multidisciplinary meeting with States, Industry, chairs and co
chairsofseveralANCpanels,andrelatedspecialiststoreachacommonagreementonthefirstkeysteps
in making global aircraft tracking a priority, to agree that there is a need to track flights and to
coordinatewithIndustryInitiatives.
1.0.2 Themeetingrecommendedadraftconceptofoperationsonaircrafttrackingbedevelopedthat
includesacleardefinitionoftheobjectivesofaircrafttrackingthatensuresthatinformationisprovided
inatimelyfashiontotherightpeopletosupportsearchandrescue,recoveryandaccidentinvestigation
activities,aswellas,therolesandresponsibilitiesofallstakeholders.
1.0.3 The recommendation that a final high level concept of operations should be delivered to the
ICAOHighLevelSafetyConference(HLSC2015,February,Montreal)wasapprovedbytheICAOCouncil
onthe16thJune.(CDEC202/3)
1.0.4 ICAO tasked an adhoc working group (AHWG), consisting of ANC panel chairpersons, ANC
Commissioners,SecretariatpersonnelandexpertsinthefieldofSearchandRescue,todevelopthedraft
concept of operations. Coordination with IATA ATTF group was ensured through IATA participation in
theAHWG.
1.0.5 TheAHWGcommenceditstaskonthe03June2014utilisingonlineconferencingfacilities.The
first version of the ConOps document was produced within 7 days to assist the IATA Task Force on
aircrafttracking.Theseconddraftversionwasreleasedonthe31July2014afterthegroupsfirstface
toface meeting held in Montreal, expanding on the original version and elaborating further on the
concept. Feedback was sought from various technical experts and over 160 comments on various
aspectsofthedocumentwerereceived.
1.0.6 The AHWG reviewed these comments utilising online conferencing facilities and met for a
second facetoface meeting, held in Dublin 1012th September 2014, to complete the elaboration of
thetargetconceptandconceptstepsandtofinalisethedraftConOpsdocument.
1.0.7 The GADSS was reviewed and endorsed by States at the High Level Safety Conference in
February2015ThisversionoftheConOpsisanupdateincludingoutcomesfromthe2015HighLevel
SafetyConferenceandotherminoramendments.
1.0.8 This version contains an introduction, a review of current areas where improvements may be
achieved;itspecifiesthehighlevelrequirements,providesadetailedexplanationoftheGADSS(target
concept)andprovidesaroadmaponhowtoachieveitsimplementation(implementationplan).
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1.1
Background
1.1.1 The Air France Flight 447 (01 June 2009 Rio de Janeiro to Paris Airbus 330203 FGZCP)
accidenthighlightedvulnerabilitiesintheexistingairnavigationsystemsthathavehinderedthetimely
identificationofanaircraftexperiencingadistresseventandthesubsequentsearchandrescueefforts.
In the investigation reports the BEA recommended that ICAO study the possibility of making it
mandatory for aeroplanes performing public transport flights to regularly transmit basic flight
parameters (for example position, altitude, speed, heading). It also recommended, for aeroplanes
makingpublictransportflightswithpassengersovermaritimeorremoteareas,assoonasanemergency
situationisdetectedonboardthatICAO:
a)makemandatorythetriggeringofdatatransmissiontofacilitatelocalisation;
b) study the possibility of making mandatory, the activation of the emergency locator
transmitter(ELT);and
c) ensure ATSU acceptance of datalink logons independently of the availability of flight plan
information.
1.1.2 In response to these and other recommendations, ICAO has recently established new
requirements for underwater locator beacons (ULBs) which will come into force in 2018. An expert
groupofICAOiscontinuingtoreviewnewmeansofexpeditingthelocationofaccidentsites,including
deployableflightrecordersandthetriggeredtransmissionofflightdataandthisConOpstakesaccount
of this ongoing work. Responding to engineering requirements, ATSUs were rejecting logons when a
positive correlation with a flight plan could not be made automatically. ICAO has since developed
provisions which instruct ATSUs to resolve such situations to allow logons to be accepted. These
provisionshavebeendevelopedandwillbefullyincorporatedby2016.
1.1.3 The unprecedented circumstances of flight MH 370 have been particularly difficult for civil
aviationtoresolvetothispoint,andthelackofdatafromtheaircrafthasmadethetaskoftheaccident
investigatorspracticallyimpossible.
1.1.4 The preliminary report from the Malaysian MOT recommended that ICAO examine the safety
benefitsofintroducingastandardforrealtimetrackingofcommercialairtransportaircraft.Thereisa
growingconsensusintheaviationcommunitythatmoreneedstobedonetoensurethelocationofan
aircraftanditsflightrecorderswillalwaysbeknown.
1.2
Scope of the Concept of Operations
1.2.1 ThisConceptofOperationsdocumentspecifiesthehighlevelrequirementsandobjectivesfora
Global Aeronautical Distress and Safety System (GADSS). It is intended to apply to commercial air
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transportoperations(Annex6Part1applicability)initially,however,theConOpstakesanoverallsystem
approachand consequently is notrestrictive to a particulartype of operation. Theimplementation of
thistargetconceptwillhaveimplicationsfortheprovisionofservicessuchasairtrafficcontrol,search
andrescueandaccidentinvestigation.
1.2.2 Respondingtotherequirementsandobjectives,theConOpsspecifiesahighlevelsystemwitha
descriptionofusersandusagesofflighttrackinformationduringallphasesofflight,bothnormaland
abnormal flight conditions including timely and accurate positioning of an aircraft in distress. The
ConOpsdoesnotprescribespecifictechnicalsolutionsforAircrafttrackingbutprovidesaframeworkof
scenariosthatcanbeusedtoverifywhetheraspecificsolutioncomplieswiththeConcept.TheConOps
includesaroadmapoutliningthestepsnecessarytomovefromtodayssystemtothetargetconcept.
1.3
Definitions
1.3.1
Thefollowingdefinitionsapplyinthecontextofthisdocument.
Abnormalevent.Aneventduringflightwhichmaytriggeranemergencyphase.
AircraftTracking.Agroundbasedprocessthatmaintainsandupdates,atstandardisedintervals,
arecordofthefourdimensionalpositionofindividualaircraftinflight.
Airnavigationsystem.AgenerictermforallsystemsasdetailedintheICAOAnnexesandany
relatedsystemsrequiredtointerfacewiththeseaviationsystems.
Airtrafficservice(ATS).Agenerictermmeaningvariously,flightinformationservice,alerting
service,airtrafficadvisoryservice,airtrafficcontrolservice(areacontrolservice,approach
controlserviceoraerodromecontrolservice).(Annex11)
ATSsurveillancesystem. Agenerictermmeaningvariously,ADSB,PSR,SSRoranycomparable
groundbasedsystemthatenablestheidentificationofaircraft.
Note.Acomparablegroundbasedsystemisonethathasbeendemonstrated,bycomparative
assessmentorothermethodology,tohavealevelofsafetyandperformanceequaltoorbetter
thanmonopulseSSR.(PANSATM)
Alerting service. A service provided to notify appropriate organizations regarding aircraft in

needofsearchandrescueaid,andassistsuchorganizationsasrequired.(Annex11)
Alertingpost.Anyfacilityintendedtoserveasanintermediarybetweenapersonreportingan
emergencyandarescuecoordinationcentreorrescuesubcentre.(Annex12)
AutonomousDistressTracking(ADT).Theaircraftcapabilitytobroadcastfordistresssituations,
independentofaircraftpowerorsystems,aircrafttrackinginformation.
Commercial Air Transport Operation (CATO). An aircraft operation involving the transport of
passengers,cargoormailforremunerationorhire.(Annex6Part1)
CospasSarsat System. A satellite system designed to detect and locate activated distress
beaconstransmittinginthefrequencybandof406.0406.1MHz.(ICAO/IMOIAMSARManual)
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Emergency locator transmitter (ELT). A generic term describing equipment which broadcast
distinctive signals on designated frequencies and, depending on application, may be
automaticallyactivatedbyimpactorbemanuallyactivated.(Annex6)
Emergencyphase.Agenerictermmeaning,asthecasemaybe,uncertaintyphase,alertphase
ordistressphase.(Annex11)
o Uncertaintyphase.Asituationwhereinuncertaintyexistsastothesafetyofanaircraft
anditsoccupants.
o Alertphase.Asituationwhereinapprehensionexistsastothesafetyofanaircraftand
itsoccupants.
o Distressphase.Asituationwhereinthereisreasonablecertaintythatanaircraftandits
occupants are threatened by grave and imminent danger or require immediate
assistance.
Falsealert.analertreceivedfromanysource,includingcommunicationsequipmentintended
for alerting, when no abnormal situation actually exists, and a notification of the alert should
nothaveresulted.
Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC). A unit responsible for promoting efficient organization of
search and rescue services and for coordinating the conduct of search and rescue operations
withinasearchandrescueregion.(Annex11)NOTEThetermRCCisusedinthisdocumentto
apply generically to an aeronautical, maritime or joint (aeronautical and maritime) rescue
coordinationcentre(ARCC,MRCC,JRCCrespectively).
Search and Rescue Region (SRR). An area of defined dimensions, associated with a rescue
coordinationcentre,withinwhichsearchandrescueservicesareprovided.(Annex12)
SurvivalELT(ELT(S)).AnELTwhichisremovablefromanaircraft,stowedsoastofacilitateits
readyuseinanemergencyandmanuallyactivatedbysurvivors.(Annex6)
1.4
Annex References
1.4.1 ThissectionbrieflyoutlineswhichAnnexestotheChicagoConventionhaveprovisionsrelatedto
this ConOps. Appendix A includes the detailed text of the most pertinent Annex provisions for
convenience.AllICAOAnnexandPANScanbeaccessedthroughtheICAONET.
Annex2providesprovisionsforflightplans,distressandurgencysignals.
Annex 6 Part I provides provisions for aircraft operators. Some specific examples include
requirementsforELTsandflightrecorders,inflightfuelmanagement,andcommunicationand
navigationequipment.
Annex8providesprovisionforthedesign,productionandmaintenanceofaircraftincludingthe
requirementforsafetyandsurvivalequipment.
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Annex11Chapter5detailstheprovisionsforanAlertingService.
Annex12detailstheoperatingproceduresforSearchandRescue
Annex 13 provides the provisions for accident investigation, including the availability and
protectionofinformationrelatedtoanincidentoraccident.
PANSATM details procedures including those for the filing of flight plans, position reporting,
ATSsurveillanceserviceandspecificproceduresrelatedtoemergencies,communicationfailure
andcontingenciesaswellasalertingservices.
PANSOPS details procedures including the use of secondary surveillance radar transponder
operation, phraseology, voice communication procedures and controller pilot data link
communicationsoperation.
1.5
Sequence of Events
1.5.1 Thecurrentsystem,thatallowsidentificationofanaircraftexperiencinganabnormaleventor
distress, relies predominantly on the aircraft communicating a distress signal through either voice or
datacommunications.Anumberofaircraftsystemsmaybeavailabletocommunicatetoground,prior
to an accident, including VHF, HF and SATCOM voice communication or data communication through
VHF,HForsatellitelink.Somedatacommunicationmaybeautomatedandnotrequireinputfromthe
flightcrew.ThisincludesADSC,ATSsurveillancesystemsandsystemswhichmayautomaticallytransmit
maintenance messages to the operator. The protocols for the aircraft system to send data may be
predefinedbytheaircraftoperator.
1.5.2 Aircraftareequippedwithanautomatedsystemtoactivateadistresssignalintheeventofan
accident,namely,anemergencylocatortransmitter(ELT).AnELTmaybemanuallyactivatedbeforeor
afteranaccident.TherequirementsforthecarriageofELTsarecontainedinAnnex6.Intheeventthe
aircraftbecomessubmergedtheflightrecorderisfittedwithanunderwaterlocatorbeacon(ULB).ICAO
has recently introduced new provisions for the installation of an additional ULB on the airframe as
distinctfromtheflightrecorder.
1.5.3 Theexistingcapabilityofgroundbasedsystemstoidentifyanaircraftexperiencinganabnormal
or distress event has limitations. Air traffic control services may identify an aircraft experiencing an
abnormal event when it deviates from its assigned flight path, when continuous surveillance is lost,
when normal voice and data communication is lost, when the aircraft fails to report at a specific
waypointorfailstoarriveasplannedintoaregionwhereATSsurveillanceservicesareprovided.
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1.5.4 When an air traffic service unit identifies an aircraft experiencing an abnormal event it will
followstandardsascontainedinAnnex11andproceduresforairnavigationservicescontainedinPANS
OPSandPANSATM.
1.5.5 Thecommencementoftheuncertaintyphase,thealertphaseandthedistressphase,after
theaircraftexperiencesanabnormalevent,dependsonanumberofcriteriaincluding,butnotlimited
to,theabilitytodirectlycommunicatewiththeflightcrew.Forexample,lackofcommunicationwillfirst
initiatetheuncertaintyphasewhiledirectcommunicationcanleadimmediatelytoadistressphase.In
some regions the activation of an ELT will lead to the alert phase and will progress to the distress
phaseonceconfirmedbycorroboratingdatawhileinotherregionsitleadsdirectlytoadistressphase.
1.5.6 Figure 1a below illustrates a simplified scenario for an aircraft which experiences a loss of
controleventoutsidesurveillancerangeandconsidersthetimelineforalertingwherecommunications
isavailableandonewherecommunicationisnotavailable.Communicationwiththeaircraftallowsfora
muchearlieridentificationofthedistressphase,allowingquickerinitiationofsearchandrescue.
Figure1a:timelineforalertingSARwithorwithoutaircraftcommunicationfromaGroundperspective
1.5.7 In controlled airspace with surveillance, the position of the aircraft should be continuously
knowntotheATSunitatalltimes,however,delaysmayoccurincommencingsearchandrescuedueto
complexitiesincoordination.Figure1bprovidesanexamplescenariowheretheaircraftexperiencesa
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lossofcontrolinflightattheboundaryofoneATSunit(ATSU),deviatesintoATSU2beforeleavinginto
ATSU3.
1.5.8 WithcommunicationfromtheaircrafttheATSU1ismadeawareofthesituationandmayraise
an ALERFA and monitor the aircraft on surveillance radar. Without communication the ATSU1 may
recognise the abnormal event due to deviation from flight path and loss in altitude. It may raise an
INCERFApendingconfirmationofwhytheaircrafthasdeviatedfromitsflightplan.
1.5.9 WhentheaircraftdepartstheFIRitishandedovertoATSU2.Thisrequiresdirectcoordination
betweenATSUs.Likewise,whentheaircraftdepartsintoATSU3furthercoordinationisrequired.
Figure1b:timelineforalertingSARwithfullsurveillance&multipleATSunitsinvolved
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2.0
Improvement Areas in Current Operating Environment
2.0.1 Theobjectiveofthischapteristoprovideanoverviewofthecurrentoperationalenvironment
and to identify and analyse any areas for potential improvement in the systems and processes. The
chapter groups the identified issues under four headings: Aircraft Systems, Air Traffic Services, the
SearchandRescuesystemandInformationManagement.
2.0.2 It is recognised that other areas for improvement may exist, particularly in the area of
equipmentusage.
2.0.3 Most of the current operational environment is dependent on the correct operation of the
related system on the aircraft while others, such as flight planning and primary radar operate
independently of aircraft systems. Much of the current ANS relies upon groundbased infrastructure,
although increasing use is being made of GNSS, SATCOM data link and SATVOICE capabilities for
navigationandcommunications.Inthesamemannerthatlongrangecommunicationsandnavigation
have benefitted from Satellite constellations, surveillance over oceanic and remote areas can be
enhancedusingthatframework.ATSsurveillancecouldbeenabledthroughsatellitereceptionofADSB
signals.
2.1
Aircraft Systems
2.1.1
Themainareasforpotentialimprovementidentifiedare:

2.1a
Improvement Areas
Reduction in the reliance on
EmergencyLocatorTransmitters(ELT)
(lack of system redundancy) to
identifyaccidentsite
2.1b
Improvement in
activationofELTs
2.1c
Ensure operators are meeting the

406MHzELTequipagerequirement.
2.1d
Improvement in the robustness and

rangeoflocationdevices
the
(timely)
Analysis
In regions where no surveillance is available and the
aircraft is not using an aircraft tracking system the
onlysourceofaccidentlocationwillbetheELTwhen
it activates correctly. ELTs were not designed to
operateinnonsurvivableaccidents.
From analysis of large transport aircraft accidents,
there is a low activation rate of ELTs. Typically, they
are damaged in the crash and/or are not activated
either automatically or manually prior to or post an
impact.
Aircraftmay stillbeusingjust121.5MHzELTs.These
are no longer detected by COSPASSARSAT and will
only be detected by VHF radios tuned to the
frequencyandwithinrange.
Wreckage and flight recorders can be difficult to
locateandretrieve,particularlyinremoteandoceanic
regions.
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2.1e
2.1f
2.1g
2.1h
2.1i
2.1j
Improvement Areas
Improvement in the existing systems
to ensure the accident investigation
authority can always retrieve
adequatedatatoallowdetermination
ofprobablecauses.
Ensure existing Emergency and

Abnormal operating procedures
maximise the potential of the ELT to
perform effectively and provide a
distresssignal.
Improvement in the overall
registrationof406MHzELTs
Analysis
Current technology limited in ability to trigger and
download FDR data. Civilian applications of
deployableflightrecordersnotcurrentlyavailable.
Some SOPs only call for activation of ELTs after the

accidente.g.ditchingprocedure.
DistressbeaconregistrationallowsRCCstodetermine
beacon identification details including emergency
contacts. ThisallowsRCCs to contactbeaconowners
or their emergency contacts when a beacon is
activatedtoobtainfurtherdetails.
The distress beacon registration emergency contact
information for the owner/operator of an aircraft
subjecttoanELTalertmaybedifferenttotheactual
operator for that flight. To avoid delays in RCC
response, it is essential to enable RCCs to readily
identifytheoperatoroftheaircraftatthetimeofthe
distressalert.
AlthoughnotmandatedbyICAOSARPsmanyaircraft
Improvement in the level of carriage
of 406MHz survival ELTs (ELT(S)) for
may still carry legacy 121.5/243 MHz ELT(S) beacons
overwateroperations
as part of their emergency equipment, such as slide
rafts, which are no longer detected by the COSPAS
SARSATsystem.
Increaseaircraftequipagefor
Notallaircraftoverflyingremoteoroceanicairspace
transmittingtheir4Dpositionand
areequippedwithlongrangecommunicationsystems
identity.
forregulartransmissionof4Dposition.However,most
transportcategoryaircraftareequippedwithModeS
transponderswhichare,inaccordancewithAnnex10,
ADSBoutcapable.IfthatADSBoutsignalcanbe
receivedandprocessedviaSatellite,noadditional
equipagewouldberequired.
Increasetheuseofcurrentaircraft
AircraftoperatorsarenotusingADSCcapabilitytothe
capabilitytotransmittheir4D
degreepossible.
positionandidentityforaircraft
trackingpurposes.
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2.1k
2.1l
Improvement Areas
Analysis
Expansionofspaceandground
TheADSBgroundinfrastructurecouldbe
basedinfrastructuretoachieveglobal supplementedwithspacebasedADSBtoprovide
coverageduringallphasesofflight.
globaltrackingcapability.SpacedbasedADSBis
scheduledtobeavailablein2017.NonGeostationary
satellitesystemshavecompletecoverageoftheGlobe,
aparticular benefit forpolarrouteoperations.
ReducerelianceonHFassolemeans TheunreliablenatureofHFcommunicationsleadsto
ofcommunicationsoverremoteand
relativelyfrequentoccurrencesofsituationswarranting
oceanicareas.
thedeclarationoftheuncertaintyphase.Thefrequency
ofsuchoccurrencesmayleadtocomplacencywhich
canresultinadelayedSARresponsetoagenuine
emergency(e.g.AF447).Carriageofsatellite
communicationsequipmentasasecondarymeansto
HFwillassisttoconfirmthesafetyofanaircraft,or
otherwise.CPDLCandSATVOICEarepotentialoptions.
2.1.2 The ability to identify the location of an accident site in a timely manner, for the most part,
relies on communication with the aircraft, whether it is direct voice or data communication, the
availability of surveillance data and/or the COSPASSARSAT MCC providing location information
determinedfromanELTactivatedontheaircraft.
2.1.3 Thepotentialforafailureof all aircraft communicationsystemsisremote.Largercommercial
aircraft are typically equipped with 2 or 3 independent VHF systems, one or more HF system over
oceanic regions, and some satellite based communication capabilities. Likewise the aircraft will be
typicallyequippedwithtwoormoreindependentModeStransponders(whichalsoprovideanADSB
OUT function) to provide adequate levels of redundancy. It should be noted that in remote airspace
where HF is the sole source of communications propagation issues may prevent communications for
extendedperiods.
2.1.4 In todays global operations, ATS surveillance does, in fact, provide a large number of
commercial operators with the capability to track their aircraft during operations, particularly in high
densityairspace.Inaddition,themajorityoflonghaulaircraftarefittedwithsystemsthatallowthemto
transmit their position to the ground. Many airlines currently track their fleet through their FOC. But
therearestillcaseswhere,althoughfitted,theequipmentisnotusedeitherbytheairlineortheATS
unit.Finally,overremoteoroceanicairspacesthecommunicationlinkissatellitebasedandthemajority
of the communications rely on geostationary satellites that do not provide coverage for the polar
routes.
2.1.5 Figure 3 is included for illustrative purposes only and provides a simplistic fault tree for an
accidentlocationunknownscenario,highlightingwhatwouldneedtofailtoresultinasituationwhere
knowledgeoftheflightlocationisunknown.
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Figure3:SimplisticFaultTreeforAccidentLocationUnknown
Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs)
2.1.6 Itmustbehighlightedthat,inregionswheresurveillancecoverageisnotavailable,thetimely
identificationoftheaccidentsitelocationmaybecompletelydependentontheactivationofanELT.
2.1.7 ELTs are transmitters that can be tracked in order to aid in the detection and localization of
aircraftindistress.TheyareAeronauticalradiobeaconsthatinterfaceworldwidewiththeinternational
COSPASSARSAT satellite system for Search and Rescue (SAR). When activated and under satellite
coverage, such beacons send out a distress signal, which, if detected by satellites, can be located by
trilateration in combination with triangulation or a more accurate and timely location if the ELT can
provideaGNSSderivedposition.
2.1.8 Inthecaseof406MHzELT,whichtransmitadigitalsignal,thebeaconcanbeuniquelyidentified
almostinstantly(ifregistered).Frequently,byusingtheinitialpositionprovidedviathesatellitesystem,
SARaircraftandgroundsearchunitscanhomeinonthedistresssignalsfromthebeaconandlocate
theconcernedaircraftorpeople.
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2.1.9 ICAO mandated that ELTs will operate on 406 MHz, and 121.5 MHz for the homing, from 1
January2005.ThisappliestoallaeroplanesandhelicoptersrequiredtobefittedwithELTsaccordingto
the provisions in Parts I, II and III of Annex 6. Since 2009, the 121.5 signal is no longer received by
COSPASSARSAT.
2.1.10 TheCOSPASSARSATSystemhasbeenhelpfulforsearchandrescueteamsinnumerousaircraft
accidentsona worldwide basis. Despitethesesuccesses,thedetection of ELT signals after an aircraft
crash remains problematic. Several reports have identified malfunctions of the beacon triggering
system, disconnection of the beacon from its antenna or destruction of the beacon as a result of
accidents where aircraft were destroyed or substantially damaged. Even when the beacon and its
antenna are functioning properly, signals may not be adequately transmitted to the COSPASSARSAT
satellitesbecauseofphysicalblockagefromaircraftdebrisobstructingthebeaconantenna,orwhenthe
antennaisunderwater.
2.1.11 ELTs can be activated manually or automatically by the shock typically encountered during
aircraft crashes. It is possible for Flight crew to manually activate the ELT, however, existing flight
operating procedures do not call for activation of the ELTs until after the incident has occurred.
Activationbypilotspriortoaforcedlandingorditchingmaymitigatetheriskofnolocationinformation
fromanELTbeingavailableaftertheforcedlandingorditching.
2.1.12 Possibleimprovementstotheperformanceof406MHzELTsduringaircraftaccidentshavebeen
impairedbysomeofthelimitationsofthecurrentCOSPASSARSATLEOSARandGEOSARsystems.These
combined systems do not provide a complete coverage of the Earth at all times. As a consequence,
beacons located outside the areas covered by the LEOSAR and GEOSAR satellites at a given moment
cannot be immediately detected, and must continue to transmit until a LEOSAR satellite passes
overhead.
Carriage of legacy analogue ELTs and distress beacons
2.1.13 A recent incident involving a widebody airliner revealed, although it was fitted with a fixed
406MHz digital ELT which was not detected, it was also carrying legacy analogue (non406MHz)
portabledistressbeaconsinitssliderafts.
2.1.14 As briefly mentioned earlier, the global distress beacon detection system, COSPASSARSAT no
longer detects 121.5MHz distress beacon signals. Only 406MHz digital distress beacons (ELTs, EPIRBs
andPLBs)arenowcapableofdetectionbysatellite.Analoguebeaconsignalsmaybereceivedbyother
aircraft within VHF range but there may not be such aircraft a) within range at the time of beacon
transmissionandb)monitoring121.5MHz.
2.1.15 It is difficult to determine whether there is widespread carriage of legacy analogue, non
406MHz distress beacons in the current worldwide aircraft fleet and it is a possible issue which may
contributetoeffectiveSARresponse.
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Flight Recorders
2.1.16 Besidesthewreckageitself,amajortoolintheinvestigationofanyaccidentistheavailabilityof
flight recorder information, namely the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder. The
recorders provide the accident investigators with knowledge of the flight conditions and cockpit
environmentandareoftenessentialtodeterminingtheprobablecauseofanaccident.
2.1.17 When accidents occur in oceanic regions it can be difficult, lengthy and costly to recover the
current mandated flight recorders, particularly where they have sunk in deep waters. To assist the
recoveryoftherecordersinwatertheyarefittedwithunderwaterlocatorbeacons,however,theymay
notsurvivetheimpact(certifiedupto1000G)andarelimitedintheirunderwaterrangeandduration.
2.1.18 ICAOannex6wasamendedin2012toincreasethedurationofULBtransmissionfrom30days
to90daysandtomandatetheinstallationofalowfrequencyULBattachedtotheairframe.
2.2
Air Traffic Services (ATS)
2.2.1
Themainareasofpotentialimprovementidentifiedare:

2.2a
Improvement Areas
ImprovementinexistingATScapabilities
wherevoiceistheonlymeanstoensure
the timely identification of abnormal
events experienced by aircraft, where
voice is the only means of position
reporting.
2.2b
ImprovementinexistingATSprocedures
toensure,onaworldwidebasis,thatthe
location of an accident site will be
identified to a degree of accuracy, in a
timeframe and to a level of confidence
acceptabletothestakeholders
Improvements in Airspace coordination

to prevent any compromise in the
mechanism for ensuring receipt of
overduepositionreports
2.2c
Analysis
Outside ATS surveillance airspace the absence of
position reports for a set period is the only
indication of an abnormal event. Regular
communication
problems
and
related
complacency may even extend this period in
practice. Other than using ADSC, there is no
airborne and/or ground ATS capability to detect
an abnormal event based on defined and
measurabletriggers.
The current provisions for position reporting
(frequency and information contents) in remote
and oceanic areas are not based on the accuracy
requirementsforaccidentsitelocation.
Lack of clarity on the responsibility to ensure all

position reports including those from an aircraft
thathasexitedtheairspaceorareaofjurisdiction.
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2.2d
2.2e
Improvement Areas
Improvements by ANSPs in consistently
sharing data with other ANSPs and
operators
Increasedexperienceinusingemergency
procedures
preventing
decreased
proficiencywhenrequired
2.2f
Reduction in complacency due to

normalisedlackofHFcommunications
2.2g
Improvedcivil/militarycoordination
andinformationsharinginsupportof
emergencysituations
ImprovedICAOSARPsforraisingofan
INCERFA
2.2h
Analysis
Thereiscurrentlynointernationalrequirementfor
sharingpositiondata.SomeANSPssharethisdata
withoperatorswhileothersdonot.
The extremely low frequency of emergency
situations with an accident risk necessitates
regular drills and exercises to be held to ensure
that proficiency with applicable procedures,
cooperationbetweenallactorsanduseofsystems
ismaintained.
Aircraft routinely unable to report their position
(and be unreachable by the ATS unit) can lead to
complacencyandsubsequentfailuretofollowthe
prescribedprocedures
There is no consistent sharing of relevant
informationbetweencivil/military.
ICAO SARPs which use a time based (waiting 30
minutes after scheduled reporting time before
raising an INCERFA) gate mechanism to avoid
spuriousorunnecessaryreportscompromisesthe
need for quick identification of an event. The
periodof30minuteshasbeensetin1960andmay
nolongerbeadequate.
Some States have reduced the 30 minutes period
to15minutes.
2.2.2 In general the current operational ATS environment has the means to adequately react in
emergencysituations,inaccordancewiththeprovisionsinAnnex11andAnnex12.Theextremelylow
frequencyofemergencysituationswithanaccidentrisknecessitatesregulardrillsandexercisestobe
heldtoensurethatproficiencywithapplicableprocedures,cooperationbetweenallactorsanduseof
systemsismaintained.
2.2.3 Globally,differencesexistintermsofqualityandreliabilityofsurveillanceandcommunication
systems and effectiveness in timely sharing of critical information for the execution of relevant
procedures.ThesedifferenceshaveanimpactontheperformanceofATSunitAlertingandSAR.
ATS in Oceanic and Remote Airspace

2.2.4 WheresurveillancetoolssuchasradarandADSBarenotavailable(suchasoceanicandremote
airspace),proceduralmethodsareusedtoensureseparationincontrolledairspace,orflightinformation
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services outside controlled airspace. Procedural methods are based on aircraft position reports and,
dependingonairspace,thesemaybeprovidedsolelybyvoiceorbyamixtureofvoiceanddatalink.
2.2.5 Voice communications are primarily effected via high frequency (HF). While HF provides an
acceptable means of communications under most conditions, there are times when atmospheric
conditionsmakeitveryunreliable.Theextentofsuchdisruptionsvariesfromregiontoregion,andcan
beaffectedbythetimeofday,solarflareandthunderstormactivity.Thereisalsoconsiderableseasonal
anddiurnalvariation.ThereareoccasionswherelackofHFcommunications,sometimesforextended
periods,becomesthenormratherthantheexception.
2.2.6 Another means of voice communications which has become increasingly available is satellite
telephony, commonly referred to as "SATvoice". All aircraft equipped with FANS1/A data link (see
below) possess this capability, as do many business aircraft that do not have data link. There are
howevercertainrestrictions,firstlynotallsatellitesofferglobalcoverage(theareanearthepolesbeing
outsidetheserviceareaofgeostationarysatellites)andnotallaircraftoperatorshaveenabledtheuse
oftheequipmentforATSpurposes.
2.2.7 With air/ground voice communications, under these circumstances, being fairly complicated
theyaresometimesoperatedseparatelyfromairtrafficmanagement,eitherbyadifferentdepartment
orevenbyadifferentagency.ThereareevencaseswhereATMandair/groundvoicecommunications
within the same airspace are provided by different States. This arrangement has been referred to by
many names, the term "thirdparty communications" being one. It is worth noting that many of the
"aeradiostations"operatedforthispurposehaveinplaceagreementswithaircraftoperatorswhereby
allpositionreportsarerelayedtotheoperatorforflightfollowingpurposes.
2.2.8 Asanalternativetovoice,datalinkisattractiveforanumberofreasons,onebeingitslackof
sensitivity to the propagation issues with which HF voice communication has to contend. The
percentage of datalinkequipped aircraft undoubtedly varies from region to region but is steadily
increasing,amonglonghaulairlinersitisestimatedabove75%.Thisdoesnot,however,tellthewhole
story. The ATS unit has to provide the appropriate datalink service and not all ATS units have yet
completed implementation of systems with that capability. There are also strict requirements for
correlationoftheinformationpresentedbytheaircraftuponinitiationofadatalinkconnectionswitha
flightplanheldbytheATSunitandlapsesintheFPLdisseminationprocessmaythereforepreventdata
linkcommunications.ThisissueisbeingaddressedbyICAO.
2.2.9 WherevoicepositionreportsarerelayedtoATSunitsbyradiooperatorstheywillnormallyalso
be sent to the aircraft operator. When datalink replaces voices reporting such forwarding typically
ceases though in theory the service would remain feasible, albeit at the cost of some system
development.
2.2.10 The responsibility for monitoring the safety of aircraft under their jurisdiction rests with ATS
Units.Thestepwiseelevationofthestateofurgencywhendoubtexistsastothesafetyofaflightis
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detailedinAnnex11Chapter5.Thiscoversbothsituationswhereinformationastothesafetyofaircraft
ismissingandwhenpositiveinformationisreceivedindicatingthepossibleimpairmentofanaircraft's
safety. This process has shown its worth on numerous occasions where aircraft have been lost in
accidentsandalertinghasresultedinatimelyandefficientsearchandrescueeffort.However,thereare
conditionswheretheprocessisimpaired,especiallywhereitisthelackofinformation,ratherthanthe
receiptthereof,whichisconcerned.Someofthechallengesaredescribedbelow.
2.2.11 Whenitbecomesaroutineoccurrenceforaircrafttobeunabletoreporttheirposition(andbe
unreachablebytheATSunit)thereisadangerofcomplacencysettinginandtheprescribedprocedures
not to be followed. Aircraft emerge safely from the area of impaired communications and repeated
elevationofthestateofalertisseenascounterproductiveandlabourintensiveandmaythereforenot
bedone.
2.2.12 Anotherfactorwhichfurthercompoundstheproblemsassociatedwithfrequentlackofposition
updates is the frequent transition between the areas of responsibility of ATS units. Should a position
reportbefoundmissing,theincentivetoobtainitisreducedoncetheresponsibilityfortheaircrafthas
passedtoadifferentunit.Thisisnotsomuchaweaknessofthesystem(theATSunitisresponsiblefor
ensuringthatthealertisraisedattheappropriatetimeevenwhentheaircrafthaspassedtoanother
unit)asitisanotheropportunityforhumanerrortooccur.
2.3
The Search and Rescue (SAR) System
2.3.1

Improvement Areas
2.3a Improvement by States to ensure
Aeronautical Search and Rescue regions
arealwaysalignedwiththeFIRs.
2.3b Improvement by States to ensure

Aeronautical Search and Rescue regions
arealwaysalignedwithmaritimeSRRs.
Analysis
Differences in boundaries increases coordination
complexityandresponsetime
Differences in boundaries increases coordination

complexityandresponsetime
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Improvement Areas
2.3c Improved Compliance by States with
ICAOAnnex12obligationsinrelationto
SAR.
2.3d Improved ability for RCCs to quickly

determine the actual geographic air
traffic picture within its area of
responsibility.
2.3e Improved
understanding
of
responsibilitiesandcoordinationforthe
transitionofAnnex12toAnnex13
2.3f
Increased experience in using SAR

procedures preventing decreased
proficiencywhenrequired.
2.3g Improvement and definition of the co

ordination of InFlight Emergency
Response(IFER)
Analysis
Many States do not meet the requirements of
Annex 12 toprovide SAR capabilities in their State,
and/or between States, often where there is high
density overflight traffic. Existing deficiencies may
resultin:
Delayedand/orinadequateSARresponse
Higherriskoflossoflife
Lack of coordination, cooperation and
communication between RCCs, between ATS units
andRCC,andbetweencivil andmilitaryauthorities
andotherstakeholders
RCCs with this facility would benefit from an
enhanced situational awareness, not only for
aircraft subject to an emergency, but also other
aircraft in the area that may be able to assist
(diversion, communications relay, etc). Integration
of GIS information such as airspace, terrain, etc
wouldenhancethis.
In the existing SARPS of Annex 12 and Annex 13
transitionfromrescuetorecoveryresponsibilitiesis
not clearly defined. (i.e.: who is responsible for a
rescue operation and when that phase ends, so it
becameprimarilyarecovery/investigationoperation
underAnnex13).
The extremely low frequency of SAR situations in
some SRRs necessitates regular drills and exercises
tobeheldtoensurethatproficiencywithapplicable
procedures,cooperationbetweenallactorsanduse
ofsystemsismaintained.
ItisnotclearinthissituationwhetheranATSunitor
RCChascoordinationresponsibilityofanemergency
foranaircraftwhilstitisstillinflight,orwherethe
coordination
responsibility
begins/ends.
Management of InFlight Emergency Response
(IFER)andtheinterfacebetweenATSandRCCsisan
issuethatwillbeaffectedbyglobaltracking.
2.3.2 The Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for the SAR service are specified within
Annex 12 to the Chicago Convention. Annex 12 is applicable to the establishment, maintenance and
operation of SAR services in the territories of Contracting States and over the high seas, and to the
coordinationofsuchservicesbetweenStates.ContractingStatesarerequiredtoprovideSARserviceson
a24hourbasis.
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2.3.3 Annex12issupplementedby theInternational Aeronauticaland MaritimeSearchandRescue

(IAMSAR) Manual, a joint ICAO/IMO (International Maritime Organization) publication. States are
encouragedtousethismanualtodevelopandimprovetheirSARservices.
2.3.4 Annex11totheConventiononInternationalCivilAviationspecifiestheSARPsapplicabletothe
provisionoftheATS.TheAirTrafficService(ATS)iscomprisedofthreeservices:airtrafficcontrol(ATC)
service,flightinformationservice(FIS)andalertingservice.
2.3.5 TheATSandSARservicesaretoactinsupportofeachotherandoperatecloselytogetherduring
aircraftemergencysituations.RCCsrelyonATSunits(ATSunits)alertingthemtoaircraftemergencies,
althoughthisisnottheonlymethodforRCCstobealerted.
2.3.6 InasimilarmannertoICAO,theInternationalMaritimeOrganization(IMO)overseestheglobal
maritimeSARserviceforvesselsatsea.ICAOandIMOworktogethertoharmoniseglobalaeronautical
andmaritimeSARservices.
Search and Rescue Regions (SRRs)

2.3.7 ThepurposeofhavingSRRsistoclearlydefinewhohasprimaryresponsibilityforcoordinating
SARresponsesineveryareaoftheworld.ThedelineationofaeronauticalSRRsiscontainedwithICAO
Regional Air Navigation Plans (RANPs). Maritime SRRs are published in the IMO SAR Plan, and are
similar,butnotnecessarilyidentical,toaeronauticalSRRs.
2.3.8 Annex 12 recommends that SRRs should, in so far as practicable, be coincident with
corresponding Flight Information Regions (FIRs) and, with respect to those areas over the high seas,
maritimeSRRs.Inreality,manyareasoftheworldhavenoncoincidentaeronauticalandmaritimeSRRs.
ThereareoceanicareasoftheworldtodaywhereaircraftroutinelyflythroughtheaeronauticalSRRof
oneStatebutoverthemaritimeSRRofadifferentState.
2.3.9 SRRs are established to ensure the provision of adequate communication infrastructure,
efficientdistressalertroutingandproperoperationalcoordinationtoeffectivelysupportSARservices.
NeighbouringStatesmaycooperatetoestablishSARserviceswithinasingleSARregion.
Rescue Coordination Centres (RCCs)

2.3.10 RCCs are operational facilities responsible for promoting efficient organization of SAR services
and for coordinating the conduct of SAR operations within an SRR. An RCC coordinates, but does not
necessarilyprovide,SARfacilitiesthroughoutitsdesignatedSRR.
2.3.11 AeronauticalSARresponsibilitymaybemetthroughanaeronauticalRCC(ARCC).CoastalStates
with the added responsibility for maritime SAR incidents may meet this with a maritime RCC (MRCC).
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Therefore it is common for States to have both ARCCs and MRCCs in different locations, in separate
facilitiesandadministeredbydifferentagencies.
2.3.12 Some States combine their SAR resources into a joint RCC (JRCC) with responsibility for both
aeronautical and maritime SAR incidents, or may collocate their ARCCs and MRCCs. ICAO and IMO
encourageStates,wherepracticable,toestablishJRCCsforseveralreasons.
2.3.13 Rescuesubcentres(RSCs)mayalsobeestablishedbyStatestoprovideamoreeffectiveservice.
RSCsnormallyoperateunderdelegationtoaparentRCC.UseofthegenerictermRCCmayapplytoan
ARCC,MRCC,JRCCandRSCs.ARCCsareoftencolocatedwithanATSfacility(suchasanATCcentre/unit,
oraFlightInformation Centre) andmaynotnecessarily always bestaffedona24hourbasis,butare
activatedonlyifrequired.Howevertheremustalwaysbeareliable24hourpointofcontactavailableto
immediatelyactivatetheARCCifrequired,suchasanATSfacility.
2.3.14 Indistressscenariosinvolvingaircraftoveroceanicareas,itisimperativethatARCCsandMRCCs
workcloselytogethertoenablethemostefficientresponse.JRCCsaddressthisissue.
Role of Air Traffic Services (ATS) Units
2.3.15 The ATS alerting service is provided to notify appropriate organizations regarding aircraft in
needofSARaidandassistsuchorganizationsasrequired.ATSunitswhichprovideeitheranATCand/or
FISprovideanalertingservice.
2.3.16 ATSunitsreceiveinformationonmostaircraftflightsandareperiodicallyincontactwiththem.
Reports of an actual or possible emergency will most often come from the aircraft itself reporting
directlytoanATSunit.Anaircraftemergencyanditsdevelopmentisthereforelikelytocometotheir
notice first. It is for these reasons that each ATS unit provides alerting services to all aircraft flights
knownto it; and area control centresand flight information centres serve as a collecting point for all
informationconcerninganaircraftemergencywithinitsflightinformationregion(FIR).
2.3.17 AnATSunitwillnotifyitsassociatedRCCwhenanaircraftisactually,orlikelytobe,inastateof
emergency.(Notewhenthenatureoftheemergencyissuchthatlocalrescuefacilitiescandealwithit,
suchaswhenanincidentoccursatornearanaerodrome,theRCCmaynotbeinformed).
2.3.18 AMaritimeRCC(MRCC)mayalsorequestanATSunittoprovidetheinformationinthecaseof
anaeronautical incident atsea.TheMRCCshouldcommunicatefirstwithalocalATS unit, such as an
aerodrometower.AnAeronauticalRescueCoordinationCentre(ARCC),aFlightInformationCentre(FIC)
or an Area Control Centre (ACC) may also have relevant information, or may be able to assist with
investigationsusingaeronauticalcommunicationsandresources.
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RCCs Alerting and Aircraft Position Information

2.3.19 To enable a rapid and efficient SAR response to be activated to an aircraft emergency, RCCs
needtofirstbealerted.AnydelayinnotificationtoanRCCwilldelaytheSARresponse.WhenanRCCis
alerteditalsoneedstoknowthemostaccurateavailablepositiontoplanitsresponse.
2.3.20 Foraditchingorforcedlandingscenario,theaccuracyoftheactualditchingorforcedlanding
positiondirectlyrelatestohowquicklyrespondingSARunitsmayarriveatthedistresslocation.
2.3.21 Averyaccuratedistresslocationonthegroundorwaterhastheabilitytotakethesearchout
ofsearchandrescueandallowRCCstoconcentrateeffortsmoretowardstherescueresponse.Avery
accurate distress location may be provided, for example, by a GNSS capable 406 MHz ELT, which will
normallyprovidealocationtowithina120metreaccuracy.Inaditchingscenario,afixed406MHzELTis
vulnerabletosinkingunderwateranditisthereforewiseforaircraftwhichoperateoverwatertoalsobe
equippedwithportable406MHzdistressbeaconsforthemarineenvironment(suchasanEPIRB)tobe
carriedbysurvivorsand/orinliferafts.
2.3.22 Even when a distress location is known within a reasonable degree of accuracy RCCs need to
take into account a range of factors when calculating the search area, particularly if the last known
position was airborne. For example, where a last known position of an aircraft is derived from ATC
RADAR,elementssuchasthenavigationerrorapplicabletotheRADARposition,aircraftaltitude,speed,
track,rateofdescentandpossiblepilotactionsoutsideRADARcoverageneedtobeapplied.Overthe
oceanthepilotmaydecidetoaltercoursetotracktothenearestpointofland.
2.3.23 Thedifferencebetweenaforcedlandinglocationonlandandaditchinglocationintheocean
alsoneedstobenoted.Whereasaforcedlandinglocationisfixed,aditchinglocationwillbeaffectedby
oceanicdrift.Foraditchinglocationinaremoteoceanicarea,itmaybemanyhoursbeforeSARunits
canreachthedistresslocationandthesearchareawillnormallyexpandovertime.
2.3.24 Wheretheaircraftspositionisindoubt,RCCswillneedtodevelopasearchplanandarescue
plan. This will involve calculating search areas, despatching search units to search the area and
deployingrescueunitstoperformarescuewhenthedistressaircraftislocated.
2.3.25 WhereRCCsarenotnotifiedinatimelymannerthechancesofsurvivalfordistressedpersons
diminish. For oceanic areas, the search area normally expands commensurate with oceanic drift. The
timeofoperationofanybatterypoweredelectronicemergencysignallingdevicesalsodiminishes,such
asELTsandULBs.
2.3.26 The primary issues related to aircraft tracking where RCCs are required to initiate a SAR
responseare:
1.
2.
EnsuringrapididentificationandalertingofanemergencytotheresponsibleRCC,and
ProvisionofanaccurateaircraftlocationtotheresponsibleRCC.
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2.3.27 ItwillassistRCCstobeprovided,forthelastknowninflightposition,with:
themostaccuratepositionlocationinlatitudeandlongitude
anaccuratetimeforthatposition
theestimateddegreeofuncertaintyofthisposition
aircraftaltitude
aircraftgroundspeed
aircrafttrack(notheading)
Implementation of SAR System by States

2.3.28 ThereisconcernwithintheglobalSARcommunityregardingthecapabilityofICAOContracting
StatestofulfiltherequirementsofAnnex12.
2.3.29 Using the ICAO Asia/Pacific Region as an example, there are large oceanic areas where some
States, having the responsibility to provide SAR services within their agreed SRRs, have known
deficiencies.Agrowingnumberofhighcapacityairlineaircraftflythroughtheseareasonaregularbasis.
2.3.30 ICAOsAsia/PacificRegionalOfficemaintainsdetailsoncompliancewithAnnex12forregional
memberStatesaccordingtowhateachStatenotifiestothatoffice.Statesarerequestedtoprovidea
selfassessmentoftheircurrentcompliance.ThelatestcomplianceisdisplayedinFigure4below.
Figure4ICAOAsia/PacificRegionalSAROverviewofCompliancewithAnnex12.
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(Source:ReportoftheSecondMeetingoftheAsia/PacificRegionalSearchand
RescueTaskForce(APSAR/TF/2)Singapore,2730January2014)
2.3.31 The activation of an aircrafts 406 MHz distress beacon is designed to be detected by the
COSPASSARSATsystemanddeliveredtothenominated24hourSinglePointofContactofStates.RCCs
will receive the detection information and will contact the aircraft operator or nominated emergency
contact provided in its registration details, provided the beacon is correctly registered. In some
instances the 24hour single point of contact is not staffed and therefore the emergency cannot be
relayed.
Noncoincident SRRs
2.3.32 AsbrieflynotedintheSearchandRescueRegion(SRR)sectionearlier,thereareregionsofthe
worldwhereefficiencyofSARcoordinationisinfluencedbynoncoincidentaviationandmaritimeSRRs.
AnexamplefortheSouthWestPacificregionisprovidedbelow.
2.3.33 Figure5displaysanactualexampleofwhereaeronauticalandmaritimeSRRsarenotcoincident.
IAMSARmanual(Ref.VolumeI,2.1.1)statesforaeronauticalpurposesSRRsoftencoincidewithFIRs.
The aeronautical boundaries are defined in the regional air navigation plans. Note also that Australia
and French New Caledonia have overlapping Maritime SRRs. JRCC Australia and MRCC Noumea share
theresponsibilityforSARresponseinthisarea.
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Figure5:ExampleofnoncoincidentaeronauticalandmaritimeSSRs
2.3.34 Tohighlightissuesassociatedwiththecoordinationofaircraftemergenciesintheseareas,two
scenariosarerepresentedasIncident1andIncident2.
2.3.35 ForIncident1, anaircraft isflyingfromthenortheast inboundtoBrisbane,Australiawhenit
experiencesaninflightemergencywhichwilllikelyresultinaditchingatthelocationrepresentedby
theredandblackaircraftsymbol.TheaircraftiswithintheNadi(Fiji)FIRunderthejurisdictionofNadi
ATC but overhead the French New Caledonia Maritime SRR. In this case, Nadi ATC would declare a
Distress phase and both the ARCC in Nadi and MRCC in Noumea will need to be alerted. Both RCCs
involvedwillneedtocoordinatetheappropriateSARresponse.
2.3.36 For Incident 2, an aircraft outbound from Sydney, Australia experiences a distress situation
whereaditchingislikely.ThisaircraftiswithintheNadiFIRbutoverheadtheNewZealandSRR.New
ZealandoperatesaJRCCresponsibleforbothaeronauticalandmaritimeSARresponse.Inthiscase,Nadi
ATCwillneedtoalerttheARCCinNadiandtheJRCCinWellington,NewZealand.BothRCCswillneedto
coordinatetheappropriateSARresponse.
2.3.37 The above example highlights the need for aircraft operators to be able to readily and rapidly
determinewhichATSunitand/orRCCtheyneedtocontact.Similarly,thereneedstobeprovisionfor
the ability of ATS units and RCCs to readily and rapidly determine the correct aircraft operators
emergencypointofcontact.
2.4
Information Management
2.4.1

Improvement Areas
2.4a Improved abilities to identify the responsible
RCC for the region in which the aircraft
experiencestheemergency.
Analysis
There is no worldwide chart(s) publication of
AeronauticalSearchandRescueRegionswhich
allows stakeholders to quickly identify the
relevantRCC(s)tocontact.
There is no automated system support in
correlating the aircrafts position with the RCC
areaofresponsibility
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Improvement Areas
2.4b Improvedabilitytoreachoperationalstaffof
ATSCentres/UnitsandRCCs.
2.4c Improved ability to reach operations staff of

aircraftoperators.
2.4d Improvedgroundcommunicationcapabilities
2.4e Enhance provisions for effective use of

English language by Points of Contact (ATS
unit,RCC,AircraftOperator)
Analysis
There is no consolidated contact list of
worldwide ATS Centres/Units or RCCs to
enable rapid identification and contact
betweenthesestakeholders.
providingcontactdetailsofoperationalstaff
There is no consolidated contact list of
worldwide aircraft operators to enable rapid
identification and contact between these
stakeholders.
providingcontactdetailsofoperationalstaff
The Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunications
Network is quite limited in its capabilities,
especially in terms of interactivity and the
exchangeoflargequantitiesofdata.TheAFTN
islimitedinitscapabilitiesforfutureuseinthe
contextoftheGADSS
Time may be lost due to language issues
between the operational staff of aircraft
operations centres, ATS units and RCCs.
Stakeholder points of contact should be
proficientinEnglish.
2.4.2 The communications arrangements currently in place between aircraft operators and the air
trafficservicesystemarebasedontheAeronauticalFixedTelecommunicationsNetwork(AFTN).Flight
plans are disseminated over this network; subsequent movement messages (flight plan changes,
departureandarrivalreports)andSARalertingmessagesalsoflowovertheAFTN.Thenetwork(which
predatestheinternetbymanydecades)isglobalinextentand,beingdedicatedtoaviation,providesa
robust and faultresistant communications environment. It is however also quite limited in its
capabilities,especiallyintermsofinteractivityandtheexchangeoflargequantitiesofdata.
2.4.3 Furthermore, while ATS units and RCCs are reachable over the AFTN by means of their
standardised address (FIR designator and agency suffix), this presupposes knowledge of the FIR and
SearchandRescueRegion(SRR)withinwhichtheaircraftisoperating.Derivingthisinformationfroma
geographic position requires global knowledge of FIR/SRR boundaries and algorithms for mapping
positiondataontotheappropriateFIR/SRR.
2.4.4 AnotherconsiderationisthecurrentlackoftheabilityforATSunits/RCCstoreachtheaircraft
operator's staff e.g. the flight Operations Centre (FOC). The only addressing information normally
possessedistheAFTNaddressfromwiththeaircraft'sflightplanoriginated;messagestothataddress
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frequently go unanswered. This may have concrete adverse consequences (inability to retrieve
supplementary safety information for the flight) but also greatly restricts the ability for operational
consultationsbetweenairtrafficcontrollers,RCCcoordinatorsandairlineoperationsstaff.
ATS unit and RCC relationship with Aircraft Operators and their FOCs
2.4.5 ATS unitsandRCCswill normally interactwithaircraft operatorsortheir FOC when thereis a
needduetoanemergencyinvolvingoneoftheiraircraft.SomeATSunits/RCCsandaircraftoperators
maycollaborateforemergencyplanningorexercisepurposes.
2.4.6 Whenanareacontroloraflightinformationcentredecidesthatanaircraftisintheuncertainty
orthealertphase,itwill,whenpracticable,advisetheaircraftoperatorpriortonotifyingtheRCC.Ifan
aircraftisinthedistressphase,theRCChastobenotifiedimmediately.Allinformationnotifiedtothe
RCCbyanareacontrolorflightinformationcentrewill,wheneverpracticable,alsobecommunicated,
withoutdelay,totheaircraftoperator.
2.4.7 During aircraft emergency events, where ATS units and/or RCCsneed to contact the aircrafts
operator, this often presents a problem when the aircraft operators contact details are not readily
available.Thesamewilloftenapplywhereanaircraftoperatorwishestoquicklycontacttherelevant
ATSunitand/orRCC.
Aircraft operating in the vicinity of an aircraft in a state of emergency (Annex 11, 5.6)
2.4.8 Current ICAO provisions require data to be shared with other aircraft. When it has been
establishedthatanaircraftisinastateofemergency,otheraircraftknowntobeinthevicinityofthe
aircraft involved are (except in cases of known or suspected unlawful interference) informed of the
natureoftheemergencyassoonaspracticable.Whenitisconsideredsubjecttounlawfulinterference,
noreferenceis madeinATS airgroundcommunicationstothenatureoftheemergencyunlessithas
firstbeenreferredtoincommunicationsfromtheaircraftinvolvedanditiscertainthatsuchreference
willnotaggravatethesituation.
2.4.9 ATS units and/or RCCs may request aircraft to assist such as attempt to communicate with
and/orrelaycommunicationsforthesubjectaircraft,divertandholdoverheadaforcedlanding/ditching
location,monitor121.5MHzforanELT,orrelaycommunicationsforarespondingSARaircraft,etc.ATS
unitsand/orRCCsshouldnotifytheaircraftoperatorwhenthisoccurs.
Aircraft Emergencies and RCC Response

2.4.10 For aircraft emergencies RCCs require the timely alert notification of the emergency, and the
aircraftslocationasaccuratelyaspossible.Thequalityofthesetwocriticalpiecesofinformationallows
RCCstomountthebestavailableresponseanddespatchrescueresourcesdirectlytoadistresslocation.
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2.4.11 WhereRCCsarenotifiedinatimelymanneraboutanemergency,butthepositionisindoubt,a
searchwillneedtobeplannedconcurrentlywitharescueplan.Thiswillinvolvecalculatingsearchareas,
andiflarge,despatchingmultiplesearchassets.
2.4.12 Even when a distress location is known within a reasonable degree of accuracy RCCs need to
takeintoaccountarangeoffactorswhencalculatingthesearcharea.Forexample,wherealastknown
positionofanaircraftisderivedfromATCRADAR,elementssuchasthenavigationerrorapplicableto
the RADAR position, aircraft altitude, speed, track, rate of descent and possible pilot actions outside
RADARcoverageneedtobeapplied.Overtheoceanthepilotmaydecidetoaltercoursetotracktothe
nearest point of land. Therefore, the best available positional information for aircraft subject to an
emergencyisessentialtoenablethebestandquickestRCCresponse.
2.4.13 WhereRCCsarenotnotifiedinatimelymannerthechancesofsurvivalfordistressedpersons
diminish. For oceanic areas, the search area normally expands commensurate with oceanic drift. The
timeofoperationofanybattery powered electronic emergencysignalling devices diminishes,suchas
ELTsandULBs.
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3.0
High Level Requirements
3.1
Thischapterprovideshighlevelrequirementsapplicabletothetargetconcept.The
implementationoftheserequirementsissubjecttoplanningcoveringtheshort,mediumandlongterm.
3.2
ImplementationofthisConceptofOperationwill:
Enhancetheabilitytorescuesurvivors
Provideimmediatenotificationwhenanaircraftexperiencesanabnormalevent
Ensurethatthelocationofanaccidentsitecanbeidentifiedtoadegreeofaccuracy,ina
timeframeandtoalevelofconfidenceacceptabletothestakeholders
Functionworldwide
Bespecifiedusingperformancebasedstandardsandindependentofanyoneprescriptive
technology
Besufficientlyflexibletoaccommodatediverseregionalneeds
NotcausedegradationofthebaselineSARservice
BeseamlessacrossATSunitboundaries
3.3
AsaconsequenceoftheabovehighlevelrequirementstheGADSSwill:
Provide enhanced capability to provide RCCs with timely notification of an emergency
eventtogetherwithaccuratelocationinformation
LeveragethebenefitforroutineATMandFOCpurposes
Ensurerelevantstakeholdersarecontactablewhenrequired
Ensurethesystem,includingallprocesses,areregularlytested
Becapableoftransmittingaircrafttrackingdatafromtheaircraftunderallcircumstances
Assist the accident investigation authority in locating the wreckage and flight data
recorders
3.4
Inassessingthepossiblesolutionsthefollowingwillbeconsidered:
Impactonoverallsafetylevel
Robustnessofsystemtoonboardtechnicalfailures
Airworthinesscertificationrequirements
Theeffectsofhumanfactorsthatmayaffectperformanceofthesystem
TheeffectsonFlightCrewworkload
Thecosteffectivenessofthesolutions
Informationsecurityandconfidentiality
Maximisingtheuseofexistingsystemsandinfrastructure
Anylimitationsonitsgeographicalapplication
Applicabilitybyretrofitorfornewbuildaircraft
CompliancewiththeconceptsoftheGlobalAirNavigationPlan
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4.0
Target Concept
4.0.1 Thischapterdetailsthekeycharacteristicsneededtodeliveronthehighlevelrequirementsof
theGlobalAeronauticalDistressandSafetySystem(GADSS).
4.0.2 TheTargetConceptdescribeshowGADSSenablesefficientandeffectiveATSunitalertingand
SARoperationsduringtheemergencyphases.Thenotionoftargetreferstoanidealendstage,setting
adirectionformoreshorttermandconcreteConceptStepsprovidedinthenextchapter.
4.0.3 The efficiency and effectiveness of ATS unit Alerting and SAR services rely on timely and
accurate information. GADSS operates on a worldwide scale for all flights that meet the applicable
criteria as defined in standards/regulations to provide incremental position and other relevant flight
information.
4.0.4
TheGADSSconsistsofthefollowingmainsystemcomponents:
AircrafttrackingSystemand
AutonomousDistressTrackingSystemand
FlightDataRecovery.
andisenabled(initsendstate)by:
SystemWideInformationManagementand
Informationrepositoryservice
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4.0.5 Thischapterisstructuredtofirstdetailthetargetconceptfortheaircraftcentricsystemsand
thenthegroundcentricprocedures,recognisingthatallareinterdependentwhenfulfillingtheoverall
requirementsoftheGADSS.WhiletheGADSSconceptmayapplytoallaircraft,itisintendedthatthe
aircraftcentricprovisionswillonlyapplytocommercialairtransportintheshorterterm;thisisreflected
intheimplementationplaninChapter5.
4.1
Aircraft tracking
4.1.1
Theaircraftoperatorwillensurethatitsaircraftaretrackedthroughouttheirareaofoperations.
4.1.2
Theaircraftspositionshouldbereportedatleastevery15minutes.
4.1.3 Thetrackingcapabilityrequirestheaircraftoperatortoensuretheaircraftistracked,butisnot
required to know the aircraft position, if air traffic control uses ATS surveillance services or ADSC to
obtainanaircraftpositionatleastevery15minutes.Havingconfirmedtheairtrafficservicessatisfythis
requirement,anaircraftoperatordoesnotneedtoindependentlytrackitsaircraft.
4.1.4 To facilitate aircraft operators in determining where they need to track aircraft, ANSPs shall
makeavailabledetailsoftheairtrafficservicesprovided.
4.1.5 Inresponsetounanticipatedoperationalevents,e.g.altitudedeviationsorchangestopotential
areaofoperation,theremaybeaneedforthereportingratetobeincreased.Foraircraftoperatorswho
receivetrackinginformationdirectlyfrom theaircraft theywillneedtoensurethatprocedures arein
placetorespondtoinstancesofmissedreporting.Iftheconditionsthatledtoincreasedreportingrate
ceasetoexistthenthereportingmayreverttotheoriginalrate.
4.1.6 Keystakeholdersinroutineaircrafttrackingdependontheoption(s)selectedbytheindividual
aircraftoperatorandcaninclude:
Theaircraftoperatorsflightoperationsorflightplanningorganization;
The airline Operations Control Center, or Mission Control Center or Rescue Coordination
Centers(RCCs);
AirNavigationServiceProviders;
Otheraircrafttrackingserviceprovidersselectedbytheoperator;
Communicationserviceprovider(s)
Aircraft Tracking Performance Criteria
4.1.7 This section provides the performance criteria to describe a baseline for aircraft tracking
functionality.Thesecriteriamustbeconsideredintheirentiretybyaircarrierswhenimplementingor
enhancingaircrafttrackingcapabilities:
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a. The aircraft tracking function should track aircraft within potential areas of operation
andrange;
b. Theaircrafttrackingfunctionalityshouldbeavailableandoperatingwhiletheaircraftis
airborne;
c. The information required for aircraft tracking should include the aircraft 4D position
(latitude,longitude,altitudeandtime)andaircraftidentification;
d. Whentransmittedbytheaircraft,thetrackingaccuracyofthepositionreportshouldbe
within 1 NM, however, may be greater than 1NM depending on the aircrafts existing
navigationsystemcapability;
e. Theaircrafttrackingfunctionshouldreportatleastevery15minutes.Inairspacewhere
ATSsurveillanceservicesorADSCidentifiesthepositionoftheaircraftatleastevery15
minutestheaircraftoperatormayrelyonthatsystemfortrackinginformation;
f. Theaircrafttrackingsystemshouldhavetheabilitytoincreaseitsreportingratebased
onestablishedtriggeringparameters;
g. Acommunicationsprotocolmustexistbetweentheairlineandtheairtrafficserviceunit
to facilitate coordination during the alert phase of an event that may be detected
throughaircrafttracking;
h. Operatorswhoreceivetrackinginformationdirectlyfromtheaircraftshouldensurethat
proceduresareinplacetoaddressinstanceswhererequiredreportingdoesnotoccur;
i. Any new airborne equipment or modification to existing equipment shall meet the
appropriateairworthinessrequirements.
4.1.8 These criteria were developed to enable effective, near term implementation and can be
achievedthroughacombinationofexistingtechnologiesandprocedures.Moreelaboratesolutionscan
be developed in the longer term and integrated into global air navigation infrastructure evolution
throughICAOsAviationSystemBlockUpgrades.
Aircraft Tracking Service Providers
4.1.9 Theaircraft tracking responsibility lieswiththeaircraftoperator.However,theservice can be
providedbyathirdpartycontractedbytheaircraftoperatorthroughaformalagreement.
4.1.10 The aircraft tracking service provider is responsible for recording the aircraft tracking
information.Thefullrecordwillbekeptforadurationdefinedinapplicablestandardsandregulations.
4.1.11 Duringanyemergencyphasestheservicemakesavailable,withdefinedintervals,alogwiththe
positionoftheaircraftandotherinformationrelevanttotheemergencyphase.
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4.2
Autonomous Distress Tracking
4.2.1 The Autonomous Distress Tracking system uses on board systems that can broadcast 4D
position, or distinctive distress signals from which the 4D position can be derived, on protected
frequenciesand,dependingonitsapplicationoneachaircraft,shallbeautomaticallyactivatedonboard
or may be manually activated at any time. Aircraft state can be analysed in realtime by onboard
equipmentandtheuseofinflighteventdetectionandtriggeringcriterialogiccanactivatetransmission
ofinformationtolocatetheaircraftindistress.Incaseoffalsealarm(nuisancetrigger)orrecoveryfrom
thedistressphasetheADTneedstodeactivated,however,thedeactivationcanonlybedonebythe
activatingmechanism.
4.2.2
Keydifferencesbetweenaircrafttrackingandautonomousdistresstrackingare:
Thetriggeringlogicforactivationofthetransmission
Autonomyandfailuremodecapabilityofthesystem
ThedeliveryofthedataonthegroundtoSAR
4.2.3 Itmaybenecessarytoincludefunctionalitythatallowsaresponsiblegroundauthorityto(de)
activatetheADTwhenthereisemergencydistressanda(riskof)failureoftheaircrafttrackingsystems
oritisnecessarytodeactivatetheADTafteraconfirmednuisanceactivation.
4.2.4 Automaticinflightactivationwillbetriggeredbyaninflighteventdetectionsystemusingone
ormorecriteria.Thesecriteriashoulddetectawiderangeofsituationsprecursorstoaccidents.Thelist
belowrepresentstheminimumsetofsituationswhichshouldbedetectedbyanalgorithm,individually
and/orincombination,andusedtotriggerthetransmissionofsufficientinformationforthepurposeof
locatinganaccidentsite:
Unusualattitudebeyondwhichtherecoveringofasafeattitudeisunlikely:Thisscenariomay
compriseexcessiverollvalueorexcessivepitchvalueoryawrateorcombinationofroll/pitch
valueandroll/pitchrate.
Unusualspeedconditions:thisscenariomaycompriseexcessiveverticalspeedorstallcondition
orlowairspeedoroverspeedorcombinationofvariousspeedconditions.
UnusualAltitude:Inadvertentclosuretoterrainthat,ifleftuncorrected,wouldlikelyresultinan
accident.
Totallossofthrust/propulsiononallengines.
inflightinhibitionoftheinflighteventdetectionandtriggeringcriterialogic.
Note:Theperformancespecificationsfortheinflighteventdetectionandtriggeringcriteriaaredetailed
onEUROCAEED237document.
4.2.5 AutonomousDistressTracking(ADT)mayalsobeactivatedincaseoffailureorinflightinhibition
oftheeventandtriggeringcriterialogic.
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4.3
Flight Data Recovery
4.3.1 Whenanaccidentoccursoverwateritisbeneficialfortheinvestigationtorecovercriticalflight
data in a timely manner. Once recovered, flight recorders have been highly reliable. However, there
have been instances inwhichthesearchforrecordershasbeenvery long,flight datahasneverbeen
recovered or where data was lost due to damage from exposure to severe fire or underwater
conditions.
4.3.2 To assist the accident investigation authority to obtain timely access to the flight recorder
information and to help locate physical wreckage the aircraft will be equipped with an automatically
deployableflightrecorderoranalternativesolutionforretrievalofflightrecorderinformation.
Automatically Deployable Flight Recorder
4.3.3 Definition for deployable recorder as included on the EUROCAE MOPS ED112A: Any crash
protected recorder (CVR, FDR or other) which is designed to be automatically separated from the
aircraftonlyintheeventofanaccident.
4.3.4 Adeployablerecorderisarecordingmediumhousedinacrashprotectedmemorymodulethat
is automatically deployed (released) from the aircraft at the start of an accident sequence. Its
characteristics have the objective of enabling it to land at low speeds clear of the main aircraft
wreckage, or, in the event of an overwater accident, its flotation characteristics enable it to float on
water.SincetherecorderisnolongerwiththeaircraftitshouldbeequippedwithanELTtolocateit.
4.3.5 Thistypeofrecorderisattachedtotheexterioroftheairframe,andundernormalconditions,
functions in the same manner as a fixed recorder. The Recorder Memory Unit, Beacon Transmitters,
Antennas, Battery Pack and the survival packaging for these units are all an integral part of the
AutomaticDeployablePackage.
4.3.6 ThedeployablePackage incorporatesflight characteristics thatenableittodeployand rapidly
establishaflighttrajectorythatclearstheairframe.
4.3.7 The deployable recorder deploys upon aircraft impact with the ground or water so that the
maximum amount of data is recorded up to the time of the crash. It may also deploy in a midair
collisionorexplosion.Thedeployablerecordershouldnotdeployinanoncatastrophiceventsuchasa
hardlandingortailstrike.
Other alternatives for flight data recovery
4.3.8 Othertechnologiesbasedontransmissionofflightdata,priortoanaccident,maybeusefulto
recover some CVR and FDR data quickly without any search required. Such data streamed from an
aircraft in distress or streamed continuously throughout the flight may enable near real time trend
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analysisonthegroundthatcouldpotentiallyallowearlydetectionandmitigationoffactorsthatmight
leadtoanaccident.Suchstreamingtechnologyisevolvingandalreadyexiststosomedegreeonsome
airframes.Astheperformanceofdatalinktechnologyimproves,thesepracticesareexpectedtobemore
widely adopted due to the potential economic and safety benefits that result from the availability of
nearrealtimeflightdata.
4.3.9 Accident investigators need information, after an accident, as soon as possible to identify
probable causes and issue safety directives as appropriate. In past accidents, where the accident site
tookalongtimetofind,afewparametersthatwereobtainedfromstreamingmaintenancemonitoring
systems allowed investigation agencies to issues corrective safety recommendations based on that
information.Theoverallprobabilityofretrievingflightrecorderinformationneedstoconsiderboththe
immediateandsubsequentneedsofaccidentinvestigation.Thefollowingaretwoexamplesofhowthis
couldbeachievedonanaeroplanethatisrequiredtohavetwocombinationrecorders(FDR/CVR):
Replacingonecombinationrecorderwithameansofmakingthefulldatasetavailableandfor
thesameduration,asitwouldberecordedonacombinationrecorder,inatimelymannerafter
anaccident.
Adding a system autonomously transmitting information for locating an aeroplane in distress
andameansofmakingasetofflightdataavailableinatimelymannerafteranaccident.The
dataset could be limited to a subset of FDR and CVR data because the full dataset will be
availablefromatleastoneofthetwocombinationrecorderswhenrecovered.
4.3.10 Theretrievalofflightrecorderinformationallowsatimelydeterminationoftheprobablecause
ofthe accident to theextentpossible. Regardlessofthe systemused(e.g.ADFR,streaming),inmany
cases the ultimate root cause of an accident can only be definitively determined after physical
examinationofthewreckageanddetailedanalysisofonboardcomputersandflightrecordersdata.
4.3.11 Alternativeflightdatarecoverysystemsshould,withareasonabledegreeofcertainty,ensure
thatthedatabeingtransmittedreachesitsintendeddestinationwiththerequiredlevelofintegrity.The
followinghighlevelperformancecriteriashouldbeconsidered:
a) Selectionofappropriateaudioandflightparameterset
b) Appropriateminimumdurationoftransmittedinformation
c) Accuracyandsamplingofparametersbeingtransmitted
d) Qualityandintegrityofdatabeingtransmitted
e) AudioBandwidthorcapacityrequirementsofcommunicationlink
f) RobustnessofthecommunicationLink,includingtimelyrecoveryafterLinklossduringunusual
attitudes
g) Security(encryption)oftransmitteddata
h) Globalcoverage
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4.4
GADSS Information Management
The data supplied by aircraft tracking and autonomous distress tracking must be effectively shared
among all stakeholders as necessary to ensure the effective operation of the GADSS. ATS units are
encouragedtomakeavailableaircraftpositioninformation.Thisinformationisusefulto:
Establishareasofsurveillancecoverage
Provide support for flight management in general to be used by aircraft operators and
commercialserviceproviders
This section outlines the applicable processes necessary, including any related enabling systems or
technologies.
System Wide Information Management
SWIMconsistsofstandards,infrastructureandgovernanceenablingthemanagementofATMrelated
informationanditsexchangebetweenqualifiedpartiesviainteroperableservices.
4.4.1 InaSWIMenvironmentthesharingofaircrafttrackinginformationisenabledbyasetofagreed
andimplementedrules.ItwillforexampleensurethatonlyinEmergencySituationsandfollowingATS
unitconfirmationtheinvolvedsubscribedstakeholders(e.g.ATSunit/RCC/aircraftoperator)willreceive
essentialtrackinginformation.Italsoensuresthatallstakeholderssharethesameinformationonthe
emergencycaseandthattheinformationismaintained.
4.4.2 SWIM contributes to the following benefits to improved decision making by all stakeholders
duringallstrategicandtacticalphasesofflight(preflight,inflightandpostflight)through:
improvedsharedsituationalawareness;
improvedavailabilityofqualitydataandinformationfromauthoritativesources;
increasedsystemperformance;
more flexible and costeffective communications by the application of common standards for
informationexchange;
loose coupling which minimizes the impact of changes between information producers and
consumers;
andsupportofATMServiceDeliveryManagement
4.4.3
ThefigurebelowillustratestheSWIMlayersandhowtheysupportSWIMenabledapplications
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4.4.4 In the target concept the aircraft tracking service makes use of SWIM enabled applications.
Whenanemergencysituationisdetected,theaircrafttrackingserviceproviderstartstobroadcastthe
aircraft tracking information. From that moment it is, in principle, available worldwide but subject to
agreedandimplementedaccessrules.
4.4.5 The position of the aircraft in an emergency situation determines the ATS unit(s) and RCC(s)
who should receive the information. Both are subscribed to information relevant to their area of
jurisdiction.
4.4.6 SWIMenablestherightinformationtobeinstantlyavailabletotherightactorswithouthuman
interventions. It also enables information relevant to the emergency to be augmented and be kept
togethersothatallactorshavethesamesituationalawarenessreducingtheneedfortimeconsuming
humaninteractions.Thisisakeybenefit.
4.4.7 The implementation of SWIM will take place in an evolutionary and benefitdriven manner as
outlined in the ICAO GANP. For the near/medium term aircraft tracking information may be shared
usingdedicatedwebbasedsolutions.
4.4.8 Inprinciple,Aircrafttrackinginformationshouldbeavailableataglobalscalesubjecttoagreed
access and subscription rules. It is important to develop and implement appropriate measures to
minimise the probability of misuse of the system and information. Therefore, cyber security is an
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importantareaofattentionindevelopingandimplementingtheGADSSintheshort,mediumandlong
term.
Information repositories services

4.4.9 AircraftpositioninformationcanbecorrelatedwithATSunitandRCCareasofresponsibilitybya
SWIMenabledInformationrepositoryservice.Thefollowingminimuminformationcanbereturnedby
submittingaposition:
The identification and Point of Contact of the ATS unit and RCC responsible for the area of
jurisdictioninwhichthepositionfits
IncasethepositionisneartoanATSunitboundaryalsotheneighbouringATSunitIdentification
andPointofContactwillbeprovided
In case the position is near to an RCC boundary also the neighbouring RCC Identification and
PointofContactwillbeprovided.
4.4.10 The service will be available 24/7 and its content is subject to a maintenance process that
ensuresthattheinformationisaccurateandcompletetothemaximumextentpossibleandpractical.
4.5
GADSS Procedures

General
4.5.1 Before any active flight the aircraft operator identifies the point of contact for emergency
phasescontactableduringtheexecutionoftheflightintheflightplanifdifferentfromtheinformation
intherepository.Theflightplanmayneedtoincludeadditionalinformation(e.g.GADSScapability)in
supportoftheGADSS.
4.5.2 The aircraft operator or its aircraft tracking service provider should have the capability to
associatetheaircraftspositionwiththeATSUareasofjurisdiction.Thiscapabilitymakesuseofupto
datecentralinformationrepositoriesdiscussedearlier.
4.5.3 Following detection of an abnormal event (e.g. by ATSU or aircraft operator), will lead to
increased reporting rates and information from the Aircraft tracking plus enhanced distribution of
informationtoenableexecutionofproceduresasdefinedinAnnex11. The figure below shows some
(nonexhaustive)examplesoftypeofaircrafttrackingprogression:
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ATN:Aircrafttrackingnormaloperations
ATA:Aircrafttrackinginabnormalsituations
ADT:AutonomousDistressTracking
EOF:EndofFlight
4.5.4 The figure above illustrates the use of aircraft tracking. Case A, starts with aircraft tracking
under normal conditions changing, following detection of an abnormal event, to emergency phases.
AutonomousDistressTracking(ADT)isactivatedasthelastresortfollowingtriggeredactivation.
4.5.5 IncaseBthereisnoaircrafttrackingfornormaloperations(e.g.flightoperatesinaareawith
good surveillance coverage and it is not considered necessary for the airline operation). Following an
abnormaleventtheaircrafttrackingisactivatedandlatertheADT.ItisnotedthatincasesAandBATA
mayoperateconcurrentlywithADT.ExampleCshowsadirectactivationoftheADT.ExampleDshowsa
recoveryfromanabnormalsituationandareturntonormaloperations.
4.5.6 ItshouldbenotedthatcommunicationoftheescalationofanemergencyphasetotheRCCis
performed by the ATS unit and not the commercial air transport operation. This is different for an
activationofanADTwherethedistressalertmaybeforwardeddirectlytotheRCC.
Procedures for declaring an emergency phase

4.5.7 TheATSunitisresponsibleforsettingtheEmergencystatusforflightsinitsjurisdiction.Inan
Emergencystatus,aircrafttrackinginformationmadeavailablemustbeavailabletoallactors.
4.5.8 CommunicationswillbeestablishedbetweentheATSunitandtherelevantaircraftoperatorin
ordertoidentifythenatureofthesituationandanycorrectivemeasuresthatcanbeapplied.Itwillalso
allow identifying situations that can evolve to an emergency, allowing for early preparation. This will
also help eliminate any time lag regarding the establishment of the communications themselves and
analysisbothbytheaircraftoperatorandtheATSunitofactionrequired.
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4.5.8.1 WhentheATSunitdetectsanabnormaleventitwillmonitorthesituationandcommunicate,if
possible,withtheaircraft.TheATSunitmaycontacttheaircraftoperatortoseekadditionalinformation
andifdeemedapplicableinitiateanemergencyphase.Therepositoryservicemaybeusedforobtaining
theAircraftoperatorPointofContact.
4.5.8.2 WhentheaircraftoperatordetectsanabnormaleventitwillcontacttheATSunitcorresponding
withthelatestknownpositionoftheaircraft.TheaircraftoperatorwillprovidetheATSunitany
additionalinformationdeemedrelevantincludingtheeventthatinitiatedtheaircraftoperatoraction.If
atthatpoint,theATSunitisunsuccessfulinestablishingcontactwiththeaircraft,theappropriate
emergencyphaseshouldbeinitiated.TherepositoryservicemaybeusedforobtainingtheATSunitID
andPointofContact.
Procedures for the emergency phase
4.5.9 EmergencyphasesareusedasastandardisedmethodintheATSsystem(ATSunitsandRCCs)
basedonthelevelofconcernforthesafetyofpersonsoraircraftwhichmaybeindanger.
4.5.10 The figure below illustrates the main information and coordination links for an emergency
requiring the sharing of aircraft tracking information. As a result of on board triggers the ADT can be
activatedandtheinformationforwardedbytheMCCtotheFTSPandRCC.TheATSunitmaymakeuse
of additional sources of information and share this with the actors. Other ATS units may also be
subscribedtotheaircrafttrackinginformationforexamplewhenthereisaprobabilitythattheflightwill
entertheirareaofjurisdiction.
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4.5.13 Thefigurebelowillustratesthemaininformationandcoordinationlinksincasetheaircraft
operatorreliesoninformationtobeprovidedbyathirdparty(e.g.ATSunit).Althoughnotshownthe
aircraftoperatormayhavethecapabilitytocommunicatebyvoicewiththea/c.Theproceduresas
describedbeforearethesame.
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4.5.11 Uponinitialnotification,asearchandrescue(SAR)incidentisclassifiedbythenotifiedRCCor
ATSunitasbeinginoneofthreeemergencyphases:Uncertainty(INCERFA),Alert(ALERFA),orDistress
(DETRESFA).Theemergencyphasemaybereclassifiedasthesituationdevelops.Thecurrentemergency
phaseshouldbeusedinallcommunicationsabouttheincidentasameansofinformingallinterested
parties of the current level of concern for the safety of persons or craft which may be in need of
assistance.
4.5.12 Annex11categorisesemergencyphasesasfollows:
a)Uncertaintyphasewhen:
1) no communication has been received from an aircraft within a period of thirty
minutesafterthetimeacommunicationshouldhavebeenreceived,orfromthetime
anunsuccessfulattempttoestablishcommunicationwithsuchaircraftwasfirstmade,
whicheveristheearlier,orwhen
2) an aircraft fails to arrive within thirty minutes of the estimated time of arrival last
notifiedtoorestimatedbyairtrafficservicesunits,whicheveristhelater,exceptwhen
nodoubtexistsastothesafetyoftheaircraftanditsoccupants.
b)Alertphasewhen:
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1) following the uncertainty phase, subsequent attempts to establish communication

withtheaircraftorinquiriestootherrelevantsourceshavefailedtorevealanynewsof
theaircraft,orwhen
2) an aircraft has been cleared to land and fails to land within five minutes of the
estimated time of landing and communication has not been reestablished with the
aircraft,orwhen
3) information has been received which indicates that the operating efficiency of the
aircrafthasbeenimpaired,butnottotheextentthataforcedlandingislikely,except
whenevidenceexiststhatwouldallayapprehensionastothesafetyoftheaircraftand
itsoccupants,orwhen
4)anaircraftisknownorbelievedtobethesubjectofunlawfulinterference.
c)Distressphasewhen:
1)followingthealertphase,furtherunsuccessfulattemptstoestablishcommunication
with the aircraft and more widespread unsuccessful inquiries point to the probability
thattheaircraftisindistress,orwhen
2)thefuelonboardisconsideredtobeexhausted,ortobeinsufficienttoenablethe
aircrafttoreachsafety,orwhen
3) information is received which indicates that the operating efficiency of the aircraft
hasbeenimpairedtotheextentthataforcedlandingislikely,orwhen
4)informationisreceivedoritisreasonablycertainthattheaircraftisabouttomakeor
hasmadeaforcedlanding,exceptwhenthereisreasonablecertaintythattheaircraft
anditsoccupantsarenotthreatenedbygraveandimminentdangeranddonotrequire
immediateassistance.
4.5.13 NotificationbyATSunitstoRCCswillcontainsuchofthefollowinginformationasisavailablein
the order listed: (NOTE the information below is a consolidated list from Annex 11 and the IAMSAR
Manual)
a)INCERFA,ALERFAorDETRESFA,asappropriatetothephaseoftheemergency;
b)agencyandpersoncalling;
c)natureoftheemergency;
d)significantinformationfromtheflightplan,including:
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Aircraftcallsignandtype;
pointofdepartureanddeparturetime;
routeofflight;
destinationandestimatedtimeofarrival(ETA);
numberofpersonsonboard;
endurance;
colouranddistinctivemarkings;
survivalequipmentcarried;
dangerousgoodscarried;
telephonenumberofpilotincommand;
e)unitwhichmadelastcontact,timeandmeansused;
f)lastpositionreportandhowdetermined(course,speed,altitude);
i)anyactiontakenbyreportingoffice;
j)anydirectionfinderequipmentavailable;and
j)otherpertinentremarks.
4.5.14 InformationwhichisnotavailableatthetimenotificationismadetoaRCCshouldbesoughtby
anATSunitpriortothedeclarationofadistressphase,ifthereisreasonablecertaintythatthisphase
willeventuate.FurthernotificationtotheRCCwill,withoutdelay,befurnishedbyATSunitswith:
a)anyusefuladditionalinformation,especiallyonthedevelopmentofthestateofemergency
throughsubsequentphases;or
b)informationthattheemergencysituationnolongerexists.
NoteThecancellationofactioninitiatedbytheRCCistheresponsibilityofthatcentre.
4.5.15 Duringemergencyphasesadditional(fromaircrafttrackinginformation)sourcesofinformation
for locating and tracking aircraft may be used. Any relevant information will be made available as
neededtoinvolvedactors.Flightinformationcentresorareacontrolcentresarethefirstresponsibleto
act as central point for collecting all information relevant to the state of emergency of an aircraft
operating in its area of jurisdiction (ref Annex 11, 5.1.2). Coordination and information sharing
agreementsandproceduresshouldbeestablishedbetweencivilandmilitaryauthoritiestoensurethat
allpossiblemeansandinformationcanbemadeavailablewithoutdelayincaseofemergencysituations.
RCC Actions during Emergency Phases

4.5.16 BasicproceduresmaybeadoptedforeachphaseofemergencybyRCCs.Theseproceduresare
notrestrictivetoRCCswhoshouldactwithflexibilityasrequiredtosuitespecificcircumstances.Afull
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descriptionof proceduresisoutlinedwithintheICAO/IMOIAMSARManual, howeverthelevel of RCC

responseisguidedbythecurrentemergencyphase.
4.5.17 At the Uncertainty phase, RCCs will normally engage in actions such as conducting basic
notifications,gatheringbasicinformationontheaircraftanditsflight,plottingtheaircraftinformation
onachartandcommenceacommunicationsearchtoattemptcontactwiththeaircraftbyallavailable
means, including the aircraft operator. A communications search is supplementary to the initial
communications checks which should have been completed by ATS prior to phase declaration.
Departure,destinationandalternateaerodromeswillalsonormallybealerted.
4.5.18 At the Alert phase, RCCs will start to escalate SAR actions which may include alerting SAR
resourcessuchasSARaircraftandvessels,conductwiderenquirieswithcommunicationsstationswhich
mayhavereceivedtransmissionsfromtheaircraft,checksofpotentialairportswheretheaircraftmay
have diverted, plotting its most probable position and maximum range from the last known position,
plotting known aircraft and ships known to be in the vicinity and initiate search planning and
calculations.
4.5.19 At the Distress phase, RCCs undertake actions with the aim of rapidly locating and rescuing
survivors. Many concurrent actions will be undertaken including detailed search action planning and
despatch SAR aircraft and vessels to the planned search area. The search action plan will include on
going development of search plans, allocation and coordination of search assets, a rescue plan,
communicationsplan,intelligencegatheringplan,mediaresponseplanandsooncommensuratewith
therequirementsappropriatetothesituation.
4.5.20 Notethatontheinitialalert,RCCsmaygodirectlytotheAlertorDistressphaseifappropriateto
the situation and initiate a SAR response accordingly. For example, a MAYDAY call will immediately
triggeraDistressphaseandthedespatchofSARunits.
ATS and RCC relationship with Aircraft Operators and Flight Operations Centres (FOCs)
4.5.21 ATSunitsandRCCswillnormallyinteractwithaircraftoperatorsorFOCswhenthereisaneed
due to an emergency involving one of their aircraft. Some ATS units/RCCs and aircraft operators may
collaborateforemergencyplanningorexercisepurposes.
ATS information to the aircraft operator (Annex 11, 5.5)
4.5.22 Whenanareacontroloraflightinformationcentredecidesthatanaircraftisintheuncertainty
orthealertphase,itwill,whenpracticable,advisetheoperatorpriortonotifyingtheRCC.Ifanaircraft
isinthedistressphase,theRCChastobenotifiedimmediately.AllinformationnotifiedtotheRCCbyan
area control or flight information centre will, whenever practicable, also be communicated, without
delay,totheaircraftoperator.
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Procedures for recovery from emergency phase

4.5.23 TheemergencystatusismonitoredbytheATSunit.TheEmergencyphasemaybeclosedasa
resultofdetectionofafalsealarmordisappearanceofthecauseoftheemergency.Confirmationneeds
tobereceivedfromthecrew,ATSunit,aircraftoperatorandRCCifapplicable.
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5.0
Implementation Plan
5.0.1 This chapter provides an initial overview of relevant tasks necessary to fully implement the
targetconcept.
5.0.2 Allthenecessarytasksidentifiedaredetailedinthetablebelow.TheBlock0,Block1,Block2
referred to in the timeline relates to the timelines outlined in the ICAO Global Air Navigation Plan
(GANP)seehttp://www.icao.int/sustainability/pages/GANP.aspx.TheICAOBlockUpgradesrefertothe
targetavailabilitytimelinesforagroupofoperationalimprovements(technologiesandprocedures)that
willeventuallyrealizeafullyharmonizedglobalairnavigationsystem.Bywayofexample,Block0(2013)
featuresmodulescharacterizedbyoperationalimprovementswhichhavealreadybeendevelopedand
implementedinmanypartsoftheworldtoday.Itthereforehasaneartermimplementationperiodof
20132018.
Task
Block
Lead
DueDate
Status
Notes
Aircraft
tracking
AT.01ResolveADSCtracking
initiationissueslinkedtoFPL
correlation.
AT.02Assessandidentify
possiblemeansofcompliance.
Block0
CP
Nov14
Complete
InAnnex10proposal
fromOPLINKP
Block0
ATTF
Sep14
Complete
AT.03Developandimplement Block0
basicprovisionsforAircraft
tracking.
ICAO
Nov16
InProgress
AT.04Developandimplement Block1
revisedprovisionsforaircraft
trackingbasedonoperational
experience.
FLTOPSP
Nov18
NotStarted
ProposedSARPS
publishedinState
LetterAN11/1.1.29
15/12issued25
February2015
Pendingcompletionof
AT.03andindustry
experience
AT.05Assessextending
applicabilitytootheraircraft
operations.
Block2
FLTOPSP
Nov22
NotStarted
PendingCompletionof
AT.04
ADT.01Developand
implementperformancebased
StandardsforAutonomous
DistressTracking.
Block0
FLTOPSP
FLIREC
WG
Mar16
InProgress
ADT.02Assessandidentify
possiblemeansofcompliance.
Block0
ICAO/
INDUSTRY
Mar16
InProgress
ProposedSARPS
publishedinState
LetterAN11/1.1.29
15/15issued15May
2015
ADT.03Specificationforflight
eventdetectionandtriggering
criteria.
ADT.04Specificationfornew
generationELTs
Block0
EUROCAE
Feb16
InProgress
Block0
EUROCAE/
RTCA
April17
InProgress
ADT
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Task
Block
Lead
DueDate
Status
Notes
ADT.05Assessissueofnon
carriageand/ornon
registrationof406ELTsand
takenappropriatemeasures.
Block0
ICAO
Nov15
InProgress
PIRGSand
COSPAS/SARSATto
provideinformation
ADT.06Rationalisationof
existingELTSARPs.
Block1
Late
Existingjobcard
addressesthisissue
ADT.07Assessextending
operations.
ADT.08SpecificationsforADT
Block2
FLTOPSP
FLIREC
WG
FLTOPSP
FLIREC
WG
EUROCAE/
RTCA
Nov18
NotStarted
Mar18
NotStarted
Requiresdevelopment
ofMOPSforADT
FlightData
Recovery
ADFR.01Developand
standardsforautomatic
deployableflightrecorders.
Block0
FLTOPSP
FLIREC
WG
Mar16
InProgress
ADFR.02Developand
standardsforalternative
meansofflightdatarecovery
ADFR.03Assessextending
operations.
Block1
FLTOPSP
FLIREC
WG
Mar18
NotStarted
ProposedSARPS
publishedinState
LetterAN11/1.1.29
15/YYissuedXXMay
2015
Requiresdevelopment
ofMOPSforstreaming
offlightrecorderdata
Block2
FLTOPSP
FLIREC
WG
Nov21
NotStarted
Pendingcompletionof
ADFR.01
SWIM.01DevelopGADSS
InformationManagement
frameworkincludingdata
formatstakingaccountof
informationownership,
securityandconfidentiality.
SWIM.02DevelopGADSS
Communicationframework
includinganalysisof
communicationneedsand
constraintsofcurrent
communicationinfrastructures.
SWIM.03IdentifyFFICE
informationelementsin
supportofGADSS(e.g.to
associateADTmessagestothe
aircraftoperator).
Block1
IMP
Mar18
NotStarted
Block1
IMP
Mar18
NotStarted
Block2
ATMRPP
Mar20
NotStarted
Info
repository
services
IRS.01SetupGADSS
repository(includingPointof
Contactinformationandareas
ofjurisdiction).
Block0
ICAO
Sep16
NotStarted
SWIM
Block1
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Task
Block
Lead
DueDate
Status
Notes
GADSS
Procedures
PROC.01Assessthe
shortcomingsincoordination
andinformationsharing
betweenANSPsandbetween
Civil/Militaryinsupportof
emergencyandSARsituations.
Block0
ICAO
NotStarted
Circ330toberevised.
PROC.02Assessmentofthe
impactofFIRandSRR
boundaries(noncoincidental,
overlappingandgaps).
Block0
ICAO
NotStarted
Secondedexpertfrom
Australia
PROC.03Assessmentof
compliancetoexistingAnnex
12standardsanddevelopment
ofanactionplan.
Block0
ICAO
NotStarted
Secondedexpertfrom
Australia
PROC.04ReviewofStandard
OperatingProcedures(SOP)for
inflightactivationofELTs.
Block0
FLTOPSP/
INDUSTRY
NotStarted
PROC.05ReviewofAnnex11
Chapter5(emergencyphases
andtimesequenceincluding
initial30minuteperiod).
Block0
ICAO
NotStarted
Secondedexpertfrom
Australia
PROC.06Developguidance
materialoninitialand
recurrentinflightemergency
trainingforATSunits.
Block0
ICAO
NotStarted
PROC.07Explorewaysto
enhanceSatVoiceusabilityin
distresssituations(see
INMARSATC).
Block0
ATMOPSP
NotStarted
PROC.08Assesscurrentstatus
(inventory)oftheworldairline
fleetscarriageofdistress
beaconsotherthanfixedELTs
(legacy121.5MHzversus406
MHzbeacons).
Block0
ICAO/
COSPAS
SARSAT
NotStarted
Secondedexpertfrom
Australia
ICAO/IATA
NotStarted
Secondedexpertfrom
Australia
ICAO
NotStarted
PROC.09Raiseawareness
Block0
amongairlinesoftheimpact
carriageoflegacy121.5
beacons(thatarenolonger
detectedbytheCOSPAS
SARSATsystem).
PROC.10Assessfeasibilityof
Block0
newprovisionstorequire
ANSPstoshareaircraftposition
data.
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Task
Block
Lead
DueDate
Status
Notes
PROC.11Reviewandassess
thecoordination
responsibilitiesduringthe
transitionofoperationsfrom
Annex12toAnnex13.
Block0
AIGP
NotStarted
FirstAIGPmeetingin
Spring2015
PROC.12ReviewATSandSAR
procedurestotakeaccountof
aircrafttrackingand
AutonomousDistressTracking.
Block0
ATMOPSP
NotStarted
OTHER
OTHR.01Ensurespectrum
protectionoffrequenciesused
intheGADSS(e.g.frequency
usedbyspacebasedADSB)
Block0
FSMP
Inprogress
ITUWRC2015
OTHR.02UpdateoftheGANP
Block0
ICAO
Apr16
Inprogress
OTHR.03Resolvedatalink
deliveryassurancefor
downlinkmessages(ATN
baseline2deployment)
Block2
CPOPLINK
Inprogress
Needstoinclude'ASBU'
onGADSS

6.0
Concept Scenarios
6.0.1 AnimportantelementofanyConOpsistoanalysehowthetargetconceptwilloperatefromthe
usersperspective.Todothis,variousoperationalscenariosaredevelopedthatwilltesttheproposed
solutionandhelpidentifyanyshortcomings.
6.0.2 Scenarios may also be used to validate and further develop the target concept and to test
possible solutions. The set of scenarios used should be designed to test all elements of the system
includingequipmentdesign,humaninterfaceandoperationalprocesses.
6.0.3 AppendixCprovidessometypicalexamplescenarios.Italsoincludesabasicanalysisoffourof
the scenarios, provided as guidanceonhowtodocumenttheanalysisof aproposedsolutionagainst
eachscenario.
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Appendix A: Terms and abbreviations
Thefollowinglistisprovidedtohelpexplaintermsandabbreviationsusedinthisdocument.
TERM
Explanation
ADT
AHWG
ARCC
ATC
ATM
ATS
ATSU
ELT
FFICE
FIC
FIR
FIS
FOC
FPL
HF
ICAO
IMO
JRCC
MRCC
RCC
RSC
SAR
SOP
SRR
SWIM
ULB
VHF
AutonomousDistressTracking
Aeronauticalrescuecoordinationcentre
AirTrafficControl
AirTrafficManagement
AirTrafficServices
AirTrafficServiceUnit
EmergencyLocatorTransmitter
FlightandFlowInformationforaCollaborativeEnvironment
FlightInformationCentre
FlightInformationRegion
FlightInformationService
(Airline)FlightOperationsCentre
FlightPlan
HighFrequency
InternationalCivilAviationOrganisation
InternationalMaritimeOrganisation
JointRescueCoordinationCentre
Maritimerescuecoordinationcentre
RescueCoordinationCentre
Rescuesubcentre
SearchandRescue
StandardOperatingProcedures
SearchandRescueRegion
Systemwideinformationmanagement
UnderwaterLocatorBeacon
VeryHighFrequency
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Appendix B: Related Reference Data
Detailsontheinitialaircrafttrackingmeetingincludingworkingpapersandrecommendationsmaybe
foundontheICAOwebsiteat:
http://www.icao.int/meetings/GTM/Pages/default.aspx
Possibletrackingsolutionspreviouslyidentifiedbyaninternationalworkinggroupestablishedbythe
FrenchBEAmaybeviewedat:
http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/flight.data.recovery.working.group.final.report.pdf
BEAanalysisontriggeringmaybeviewedat:
http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/triggered.transmission.of.flight.data.pdf
DetailsoftheworkperformedbyEurocontrolintheOPTIMIprojectmaybeviewedat:
http://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/srcpositionpapersreviewreports
DetailsofResearchoneffectivenessofELTsconductedbytheAustralianTransportSafetyBoardmaybe
viewedat:
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2012/ar2012128.aspx
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Appendix C: Concept Scenario

Thefollowingaresometypicalexamplescenarios:
Event Summary
1
Aircraftexperiencesaninflightabnormaleventandrecovers
1.1
LossofcontrolinFlight(LOCI)withrecovery
The aircraft suddenly pitches nose down while in the cruise at Flight Level (FL) 330. Within 27
seconds, theaircraft lost 4,440feet,beforethe selfprotectionsysteminitiated a recoveryback
towards controlled flight. The aircraft diverted to an airport and lands safely. The resulting
negative g forces are sufficient for almost all of the unrestrained passengers and crew to be
throwntowardstheceiling,resultinginanumberofminorinjuries.
1.2
Enginefailureinflight
Astheaircrafttakesoff,thefancowldoorsfrombothenginesdetached,puncturingafuelpipe
ontherightengine,damagingtheairframe,andsomeaircraftsystems.Theflightcrewelectsto
return to the departure airport. On the approach to land an external fire develops on the right
engine.Theleftenginecontinuestoperformnormallythroughouttheflight.Therightengineis
shut down and the aircraft lands safely. The emergency services extinguish the fire in the right
engine. The passengers and crew are evacuating the aircraft via the escape slides. Subsequent
investigation revealed that the fan cowl doors on both engines were left unlatched during
maintenanceandthiswasnotidentifiedpriortoaircraftdeparture.
1.4
Failureofcommunicationsystem,failuretoreportpositionoroperationalstatus
TheaircraftwasdispatchedwithVHF1unserviceableforreturntoitsmainbase.Duringtheflight
the aircraft experienced a communication systems fault which resulted in loss of all VHF
communication,withnoalternativevoicecommunicationsystemavailable.Theaircraftfollowed
standardproceduresforlossofcommunicationsandlandedsafely.
1.5
SystemComponentFailure(nonpowerplant)
Whiletheaircraftisincruiseat37,000feet,oneoftheaircraft'sthreeairdatainertialreference
units started outputting intermittent, incorrect values (spikes) on all flight parameters to other
aircraft systems. Two minutes later, in response to spikes in angle of attack (AOA) data, the
aircraft's flight control primary computers commanded the aircraft to pitch down. Many
passengers and crew members were injured. The flight crew recovered the aircraft and landed
safely
1.6
Fuelrelated(FUEL)
WhileenrouteatFL390overoceanicarea,thecrewbecomesawareofafuelimbalancebetween
theleftandrightwingmainfueltanks.Fiveminuteslaterthecrewisconcernedaboutthelower
thanexpected fuel quantity indication, and decides to divert to a diverting Airport. When the
crew ascertains that a fuel leak could be the reason for the possible fuel loss, an emergency is
declaredtoOceanicControl.At85nmfromdivertingairportandatanaltitudeofaboutFL345,
the second engine flames out. An enginesout visual approach is carried out and the aircraft
landedsafely.
2
Aircraftexperiencesaninflightabnormaleventwhichleadstoanaccident
2.1
LossofcontrolinFlight(LOCI)
The aircraft is at its cruising altitude of FL330. The speed begins to steadily decrease. The
horizontal stabilizer is moving nose up during this deceleration. The flight crew is discussing
weatherconcernsthatincludedpossibleicingconditionsandthepossibleneedtoturnonengine
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2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
andairfoilantiice.TheflightcrewrequestspermissiontodescendtoFL310,whichwasapproved.
The autopilot is disconnected and the airplane starts to descend. As the airplane is descending
past about FL315, the airspeed continued to decrease and the engine EPR decreased to about
flight idle. A few minutes later a further descent to FL240 is requested. In the meantime, the
altitudealertwarningisactivated,followedbythestickshakerandtheauralstallwarningalert.
Theairspeedisreachingaminimumofabout150indicatedairspeed(IAS)knotsataboutFL250.
Theaircraftdescendsat7000ft/min,andfinallycrashed.TheentiredescentfromFL330hastaken
approx.3minutesand30seconds.
MidAirCollision(MAC)
Twoaircraftareflyingatthesamealtitudeonthesamerouteonoppositedirection.Thecrewsof
both aircraft received a Resolution Advisory (RA)command from their TCAS. One of the crew
complieswiththeorderandinitiatesadescent.Atthesametimetheothercrewistryingtodeal
with the conflicting descent (by ATC) and climb (TCAS) instructions. The crew then decided to
followtheATCcontroller'sinstructions.Justpriortothecollision,bothcrewsdetectedtheother
aircraft, and reacted to avoid the collision by attempting appropriate flight maneuvers.
Nevertheless,bothaircraftcollide.
Inflightbreakup
TheaircraftisflyingatacruisingaltitudeofFL350.Anexplosiononboardcausestheaircraftto
crash. The explosive device is located in the cargo hold. The device is most probably hidden in
baggage.
Powerplantsystem/componentfailureormalfunction(SCFPP)
After takeoff as the aircraft is reaching an altitude of 3000 feet the crew sees a formation of
Canadageese.Severalloudthudsareheard.Theingestionoflargebirdsintoeachengine,results
inanalmosttotallossofthrustinbothengines.Thecrewdecidesthattheywouldnotbeableto
landsafely.Thecrewdescendsovertheriveruntilitditches.
Fire(F)
Theaircraftisflyingincruiseoveroceanicarea.Thepilotsdetectanunusualodorinthecockpit.
Theydeterminethatsomesmokeispresentinthecockpit.FourminuteslateraPanPanradiocall
ismade.Thepilotsreportthatthereissmokeinthecockpitandrequestanimmediatereturntoa
convenientairport.TheATCcontrollerimmediatelyclearstheaircrafttodescendtoFL310.Atthis
time, the pilots are using their oxygen masks. The controller clears the aircraft to descend to
10000 feet. The aircraft is descending through approximately FL210 when the pilots decide to
dumpfuel.Theflightisvectoredtodumpfuel.ThepilotsdeclareEmergency.Lastradiocontactis
lostoneminutelater.Thefirehadpropagated,causingseveredisturbancesoftheelectricsystem.
CFIT
DuringanapproachtheaircraftdescendedbelowMinimumDescentAltitude(MDA),andthecrew
waslosingvisualcontactwiththeairfieldduetoweatherconditions.Thecrewthendecidednot
tofollowthepublishedprocedures,thustransgressingoutoftheprotectedairspace.Thecrewdid
notrespondtomorethan20EGPWSwarningsrelatedtoapproachingrisingterrainandpullup.
Theairplaneflewintothesideofamountain.
AircraftcommunicationsystemFailure
Whileonrouteatcruisingaltitude,allcommunicationwiththeaircraftislost.Theaircraftnever
reachesitsfinaldestinationanddisappearsfromcivilianandmilitaryradars.
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Theanalysisoftheconceptshouldbeconductedinaconsistentmannertoallowobjectivecomparison
ofalternativesolutions.Theswimlanemethodologyisoneapproachthatmaybeappropriateforthis
ConOpsandisusedbelowforillustrativepurposes.
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Appendix D: Impact Assessment
New SARP / PANS Proposal
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
1.Whatistheproblemthatthisproposalisdesignedtosolve?
PleaseincludereferencetoJobcard/ASBU/workprogrammeitem,asapplicable
Ensurethatinformationisprovidedinatimelyfashiontotherightpeopletosupportsearchandrescue,recoveryandaccident
investigationactivitiesasoutlinedintheConceptofOperationsforaGlobalAeronauticalDistress&SafetySystem(GADSS)
2.WhatalternativestoSARPs/PANswereconsideredtosolvetheproblem?
None
Circular
Manual
Policy
Other(pleaseexplain)
VoluntaryimplementationofAircrafttrackingbyindustry
3a.WhatistheimpactofthisproposalonaState?
Theimpactofthisproposal
representsalargefinancialcost
totheState(rulemaking,hiring,
training,oversight,capital,etc)
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Largecost
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Negligible cost
Rationale:
TheimplementationoftheGADSSwillrepresentacosttoStatestoimplementthenewprovisionsinnationallawandsomepossiblechangestothe
StatesprocessesforSAR,however,theprovisionswillbeimplementedaspartofthenormalICAOAnnexamendmentcycleoverthenext6years.
TheimplementationofGADSSwillenablemoreefficientsearch,rescueandrecoveryoperations,reducingcosttoStates
Implementingthisproposalwill
haveapositivesafetyimpact
Increasedsafety
Reducedsafety
Rationale:
TheimplementationoftheGADSSwillimprovetheabilityofSARtoefficientlydetermineanaircraftisinadistressphaseandtolocateandrescue
survivors.Itwillalsoensureflightrecorderdatacanberetrievedeffectively,allowingearlieridentificationofanypossiblesafetyrelatedissues.
Furthermore,duetoGADSSabilitytoprovideareducedsearchareaitreducesthescaleofSARoperationsandhencereducestherisktoSARcrews.
haveapositivesecurityimpact
Enhancedsecurity
ReducedSecurity
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Rationale:
TheimplementationoftheGADSSwillimprovetheabilityofaStatetorecognisewhetheranaircraftisasecuritythreatornot.ADTwillallowthe
locationoftheaircrafttobecontinuouslysentindependentlyoftheotheraircraftsystemsandpowersupply.
haveapositiveenvironmental
impact(reductionin
atmosphericorsurface
pollutants,noise,etc)
Reduced
Environmental
Impact
Increased
Environmental
Impact
Decreasedefficiency
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Negligible cost
Rationale:
Anyimpactisconsiderednegligible.
haveapositiveimpactonthe
efficiencyoftheair
transportationsystem
Increasedefficiency
Rationale:
Anyimpactisconsiderednegligible.
3b. Do the benefits of this proposal justify the cost of implementing the proposal?
Yes
No
Not sure
Not applicable
4a.WhatistheimpactofthisproposalonIndustry?
Theimpactofthisproposal
representsalargefinancialcost
toindustry(compliance,new
equipment,training,etc)
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Largecost
Rationale:
TheimplementationoftheGADSSwillrepresentacosttoairlines.ItisenvisagedthattheinstallationofthecompleteGADSSrequiresinstallationof
newequipmentonnewlydeliveredaircraftafter2020,however,thiscostshouldbemitigatedbyaconsolidationofotherequipmentrequirements
inAnnex6andotherpossiblebenefitsthataircrafttrackingmayprovide.Theongoingoperationalcostofaircrafttrackingwilldependonthe
individualsolutionsadoptedbyairlines.ATSUswillberequiredtoimplementSWIM,however,theGADSSisonlyoneofthefunctionsofSWIMand
shouldnotbeconsideredtheprimaryreasonforcapitalinvestment.Therewillbeprocessandtrainingrelatedcostsforindustry.
haveapositivesafetyimpact
Increasedsafety
Reducedsafety
Rationale:
TheimplementationoftheGADSSwillimprovetheabilityofanoperatortoquicklyrecogniseifanaircraftisindistressandtoimplementits
emergencyplansasnecessary.TheGADSSwillimproveATSUknowledgeofflightswheresurveillanceisnotavailable,allowingearlierdetectionof
thenecessaryemergencyphase.
haveapositivesecurityimpact
Enhancedsecurity
ReducedSecurity
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Rationale:
TheimplementationoftheGADSSwillimprovetheabilityofanairlineoranATSUtorecognisewhetheranaircraftisasecuritythreatornot.ADT
willallowthelocationoftheaircrafttobecontinuouslysentindependentlyoftheotheraircraftsystemsandpowersupply.
Reduced
Environmental
impact
haveapositiveenvironmental
impact(reductionin
atmosphericorsurface
pollutants,noise,etc)
Increased
Environmental
Impact
Decreasedefficiency
Rationale:
Anyimpactisconsiderednegligible
Increasedefficiency
haveapositiveimpactonthe
efficiencyoftheair
transportationsystem
Rationale:
Anyimpactisconsiderednegligible
4b. Do the benefits of this proposal justify the cost of implementing the proposal?
Yes
No
Not sure
Not applicable
5.HowlongwouldittakeforStatesandIndustrytoimplementthisproposal?
Already
implemented
01yrs
12yrs
25yrs
510yrs
morethan10
yrs
Aircraft
Tracking
SWIM
ADT&ADFR
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Appendix E: Cross Reference Table

2.1a
2.1b
2.1c
2.1d
2.1e
2.1f
2.1g
2.1h
2.1i
2.1j
Area of Improvement
Primary High Level

Requirement
Reductionintherelianceon
EmergencyLocator
Enhancetheabilityto
Transmitters(ELT)(lackof
rescuesurvivors
systemredundancy)to
identifyaccidentsite
Improvementinthe
Enhancetheabilityto
(timely)activationofELTs
rescuesurvivors
Ensureoperatorsare
Enhancetheabilityto
meetingthe406MHzELT
rescuesurvivors
equipagerequirement.
Improvementinthe
Enhancetheabilityto
robustnessandrangeof
rescuesurvivors
locationdevices
Improvementintheexisting
Ensurethatthe
systemstoensurethe
locationofanaccident
accidentinvestigation
sitecanbeidentifiedto
authoritycanalways
adegreeofaccuracy,in
retrieveadequatedatato
atimeframeandtoa
allowdeterminationof
levelofconfidence
probablecauses.
acceptabletothe
stakeholders.
EnsureexistingEmergency
andAbnormaloperating
proceduresmaximisethe
Enhancetheabilityto
potentialoftheELTto
rescuesurvivors
performeffectivelyand
provideadistresssignal.
Improvementintheoverall Enhancetheabilityto
registrationof406MHzELTs
rescuesurvivors
Improvementinthelevelof
carriageof406MHzsurvival Enhancetheabilityto
ELTs(ELT(S))foroverwater
rescuesurvivors
operations
Increaseaircraftequipage
Enhancetheabilityto
fortransmittingtheir4D
rescuesurvivors
positionandidentity.
Increasetheuseofcurrent
aircraftcapabilityto
Enhancetheabilityto
transmittheir4Dposition
rescuesurvivors
andidentityforaircraft
trackingpurposes.
Target Concept
Concept Steps
ADT
ADT.01ADT.03
ADFR.01ADFR.02
ADT
ADT.03
ADT
ADT.04
ADT
ADT.03
ADFR
ADFR.01ADFR.02
ADT.05ADT.06
ADT
PROC.04
ADT
ADT.04
ADT
PROC.08,PROC.09
AT
AT.02,AT.03,
OTHR.01
AT
AT.01,PROC.07
OTHR.02
OTHR.03
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2.1k
2.1l
2.2a
2.2b
2.2c
2.2d
2.2e
Area of Improvement
Expansionofspaceand
groundbased
infrastructuretoachieve
globalcoverageduringall
phasesofflight.
ReducerelianceonHFas
solemeansof
communicationsover
remoteandoceanicareas.
ImprovementinexistingATS
capabilitieswherevoiceis
theonlymeanstoensure
thetimelyidentificationof
abnormalevents
experiencedbyaircraft,
wherevoiceistheonly
meansofpositionreporting.
ImprovementinexistingATS
procedurestoensure,ona
worldwidebasis,thatthe
locationofanaccidentsite
willbeidentifiedtoa
degreeofaccuracy,ina
timeframeandtoalevelof
confidenceacceptableto
thestakeholders
ImprovementsinAirspace
coordinationtopreventany
compromiseinthe
mechanismforensuring
receiptofoverdueposition
reports
ImprovementsbyANSPsin
consistentlysharingdata
withotherANSPsand
operators
Increasedexperiencein
usingemergency
procedurespreventing
decreasedproficiencywhen
required
Primary High Level

Requirement
Target Concept
Concept Steps
Functionworldwide
AT
AT.02AT.04
OTHR.01
Provideimmediate
notificationwhenan
aircraftexperiencesan
abnormalevent
AT
AT.02
Provideimmediate
notificationwhenan
abnormalevent
AT
AT.02AT.05
Ensurethatthe
locationofanaccident
sitecanbeidentifiedto
adegreeofaccuracy,in
GADSSProcedures
atimeframeandtoa
levelofconfidence
acceptabletothe
stakeholders.
PROC.05
Provideimmediate
notificationwhenan
abnormalevent
GADSSProcedures
PROC.02
Provideimmediate
notificationwhenan
abnormalevent
GADSSProcedures
SWIM.01
SWIM.03
PROC.10
Provideimmediate
notificationwhenan
abnormalevent
GADSSProcedures
PROC.06
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Area of Improvement
2.2f
Reductionincomplacency
duetonormalisedlackof
HFcommunications
2.2g
Improvedcivil/military
coordinationand
informationsharingin
supportofemergency
situations
2.2h
ImprovedICAOSARPsfor
raisingofanINCERFA
2.3a
2.3b
2.3c
2.3d
2.3e
ImprovementbyStatesto
ensureAeronauticalSearch
andRescueregionsare
alwaysalignedwiththe
FIRs.
ImprovementbyStatesto
ensureAeronauticalSearch
andRescueregionsare
alwaysalignedwith
maritimeSRRs.
ImprovedComplianceby
StateswithICAOAnnex12
obligationsinrelationto
SAR.
ImprovedabilityforRCCsto
quicklydeterminetheactual
geographicairtrafficpicture
withinitsareaof
responsibility.
Improvedunderstandingof
responsibilitiesand
coordinationforthe
transitionofAnnex12to
Annex13
Primary High Level

Requirement
Provideimmediate
notificationwhenan
abnormalevent
Target Concept
Concept Steps
GADSSProcedures
PROC.05
Provideimmediate
notificationwhenan
abnormalevent
GADSSProcedures
PROC.01
Provideimmediate
notificationwhenan
abnormalevent
GADSSProcedures
PROC.05
Enhancetheabilityto
rescuesurvivors
GADSSProcedures PROC.02PROC.03
Enhancetheabilityto
rescuesurvivors
GADSSProcedures
PROC.02
Functionworldwide
GADSSProcedures
PROC.03
Enhancetheabilityto
rescuesurvivors
AT/SWIM
SWIM.01SWIM.03
Notcausedegradation
ofthebaselineSAR
service
GADSSProcedures
PROC.11
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2.3f
2.3g
2.4a
2.4b
2.4c
2.4d
2.4e
Area of Improvement
Increasedexperiencein
usingSARprocedures
preventingdecreased
proficiencywhenrequired.
Improvementanddefinition
ofthecoordinationofIn
FlightEmergencyResponse
(IFER)
Improvedabilitiesto
identifytheresponsibleRCC
fortheregioninwhichthe
aircraftexperiencesthe
emergency.
Improvedabilitytoreach
operationalstaffofATS
Centres/UnitsandRCCs.
Improvedabilitytoreach
operationsstaffofaircraft
operators.
Improvedground
communicationcapabilities
Enhanceprovisionsfor
effectiveuseofEnglish
languagebyPointsof
Contact(ATSU,RCC,Aircraft
Operator)
Primary High Level

Requirement
Target Concept
Concept Steps
Functionworldwide
GADSSProcedures
PROC.06
Notcausedegradation
ofthebaselineSAR
service
GADSSProcedures
PROC.12
Provideimmediate
notificationwhenan
abnormalevent
Information
Repository
IRS.01
FunctionWorldwide
Information
Repository/
SWIM
IRS.01
FunctionWorldwide
Information
Repository/
SWIM
IRS.01
FunctionWorldwide
SWIM
SWIM.01
SWIM.03
FunctionWorldwide
GADSSProcedures
SWIM.01
SWIM.03
Page70

AHWG Report On Aircraft Tracking Concept of Operations - V5 Final PDF

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International Civil Aviation Organization

Adhoc Working Group on Aircraft Tracking

The material in this report has not been considered by the

Scope of the Concept of Operations

Alerting service. A service provided to notify appropriate organizations regarding aircraft in

Improvement Areas in Current Operating Environment

Ensure operators are meeting the

Improvement in the robustness and

Ensure existing Emergency and

Some SOPs only call for activation of ELTs after the

Air Traffic Services (ATS)

Improvements in Airspace coordination

Lack of clarity on the responsibility to ensure all

Reduction in complacency due to

ATS in Oceanic and Remote Airspace

The Search and Rescue (SAR) System

2.3b Improvement by States to ensure

Differences in boundaries increases coordination

2.3d Improved ability for RCCs to quickly

Increased experience in using SAR

2.3g Improvement and definition of the co

2.3.3 Annex12issupplementedby theInternational Aeronauticaland MaritimeSearchandRescue

Search and Rescue Regions (SRRs)

Rescue Coordination Centres (RCCs)

RCCs Alerting and Aircraft Position Information

Implementation of SAR System by States

2.4c Improved ability to reach operations staff of

2.4e Enhance provisions for effective use of

Aircraft Emergencies and RCC Response

High Level Requirements

Autonomous Distress Tracking

Flight Data Recovery

GADSS Information Management

Information repositories services

Procedures for declaring an emergency phase

1) following the uncertainty phase, subsequent attempts to establish communication

RCC Actions during Emergency Phases

descriptionof proceduresisoutlinedwithintheICAO/IMOIAMSARManual, howeverthelevel of RCC

Procedures for recovery from emergency phase

Appendix A: Terms and abbreviations

Appendix B: Related Reference Data

Appendix C: Concept Scenario

Appendix D: Impact Assessment

New SARP / PANS Proposal

Appendix E: Cross Reference Table

Primary High Level

Primary High Level

Primary High Level

Primary High Level

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