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Phenomenalism
FromWikipedia,thefreeencyclopedia

Phenomenalismistheviewthatphysicalobjectscannotjustifiablybesaidtoexistinthemselves,but
onlyasperceptualphenomenaorsensorystimuli(e.g.redness,hardness,softness,sweetness,etc.)
situatedintimeandinspace.Inparticular,someformsofphenomenalismreducetalkaboutphysical
objectsintheexternalworldtotalkaboutbundlesofsensedata.

Contents
1History
2Criticisms
3References
4Bibliography
5Externallinks

History
Phenomenalismisaradicalformofempiricism.Itsrootsasanontologicalviewofthenatureof
existencecanbetracedbacktoGeorgeBerkeleyandhissubjectiveidealism,uponwhichDavidHume
furtherelaborated.[1]JohnStuartMillhadatheoryofperceptionwhichiscommonlyreferredtoas
classicalphenomenalism.ThisdiffersfromBerkeley'sidealisminitsaccountofhowobjectscontinueto
existwhennooneisperceivingthem(thisviewisalsoknownas"localrealism").Berkeleyclaimedthat
anomniscientGodperceivedallobjectsandthatthiswaswhatkepttheminexistence,whereasMill
claimedthatpermanentpossibilitiesofexperienceweresufficientforanobject'sexistence.These
permanentpossibilitiescouldbeanalysedintocounterfactualconditionals,suchas"ifIweretohavey
typesensations,thenIwouldalsohavextypesensations".
Asanepistemologicaltheoryaboutthepossibilityofknowledgeofobjectsintheexternalworld,
however,itisprobablethatthemosteasilyunderstandableformulationofphenomenalismistobefound
inthetranscendentalaestheticsofImmanuelKant.AccordingtoKant,spaceandtime,whicharethea
prioriformsandpreconditionsofallsensoryexperience,"refertoobjectsonlytotheextentthatthese
areconsideredasphenomena,butdonotrepresentthethingsinthemselves".WhileKantinsistedthat
knowledgeislimitedtophenomena,heneverdeniedorexcludedtheexistenceofobjectswhichwere
notknowablebywayofexperience,thethingsinthemselvesornoumena,thoughheneverprovedthem.
Kant's"epistemologicalphenomenalism",asithasbeencalled,isthereforequitedistinctfrom
Berkeley'searlierontologicalversion.InBerkeley'sview,thesocalled"thingsinthemselves"donot
existexceptassubjectivelyperceivedbundlesofsensationswhichareguaranteedconsistencyand
permanencebecausetheyareconstantlyperceivedbythemindofGod.Hence,whileBerkeleyholds
thatobjectsaremerelybundlesofsensations(seebundletheory),Kantholds(unlikeotherbundle
theorists)thatobjectsdonotceasetoexistwhentheyarenolongerperceivedbysomemerelyhuman
subjectormind.
Inthelate19thcentury,anevenmoreextremeformofphenomenalismwasformulatedbyErnstMach,
laterdevelopedandrefinedbyRussell,Ayerandthelogicalpositivists.Machrejectedtheexistenceof
Godandalsodeniedthatphenomenaweredataexperiencedbythemindorconsciousnessofsubjects.
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Instead,Machheldsensoryphenomenatobe"puredata"whoseexistencewastobeconsideredanterior
toanyarbitrarydistinctionbetweenmentalandphysicalcategoriesofphenomena.Inthisway,itwas
Machwhoformulatedthekeythesisofphenomenalism,whichseparatesitfrombundletheoriesof
objects:objectsarelogicalconstructionsoutofsensedataorideaswhereasaccordingtobundle
theories,objectsaremadeupofsets,orbundles,ofactualideasorperceptions.
Thatis,accordingtobundletheory,tosaythatthepearbeforemeexistsissimplytosaythatcertain
properties(greenness,hardness,etc.)arebeingperceivedatthismoment.Whenthesecharacteristicsare
nolongerperceivedorexperiencedbyanyone,thentheobject(pear,inthiscase)nolongerexists.
PhenomenalismasformulatedbyMach,incontrast,istheviewthatobjectsarelogicalconstructionsout
ofperceptualproperties.Onthisview,tosaythereisatableintheotherroomwhenthereisnoonein
thatroomtoperceiveit,istosaythatifthereweresomeoneinthatroom,thenthatpersonwould
perceivethetable.Itisnottheactualperceptionthatcounts,buttheconditionalpossibilityof
perceiving.
Logicalpositivism,amovementbegunasasmallcirclewhichgrewaroundthephilosopherMoritz
SchlickinVienna,inspiredmanyphilosophersintheEnglishspeakingworldfromthe1930sthroughthe
1950s.ImportantinfluencesontheirbrandofempiricismincludedErnstMachhimselfholdingthe
ChairofInductiveSciencesattheUniversityofVienna,apositionSchlickwouldlaterholdandthe
CambridgephilosopherBertrandRussell.Theideaofthelogicalpositivists,suchasA.J.Ayerand
RudolfCarnap,wastoformulatethedoctrineofphenomenalisminlinguisticterms,soastodefine
referencestosuchentitiesasphysicalobjectsintheexternalworldoutofexistence.Sentenceswhich
containedtermssuchas"table"weretobetranslatedintosentenceswhichreferredexclusivelytoeither
actualorpossiblesensoryexperiences.
20thcenturyAmericanphilosopherArthurDantoassertedthat"aphenomenalist,believ[es]that
whateverisfinallymeaningfulcanbeexpressedintermsofourown[sense]experience.".[2]Heclaimed
that"Thephenomenalistreallyiscommittedtothemostradicalkindofempiricism:Forhimreferenceto
objectsisalwaysfinallyareferencetosenseexperience...."[3]
Tothephenomenalist,objectsofanykindmustberelatedtoexperience."JohnStuartMilloncespokeof
physicalobjectsasbutthe'permanentpossibilityofexperience'andthis,byandlarge,iswhatthe
phenomenalistexploits:Allwecanmean,intalkingaboutphysicalobjectsornonphysicalobjects,if
thereareanyiswhatexperienceswewouldhaveindealingwiththem...."However,phenomenalism
isbasedonmentaloperations.Theseoperations,themselves,arenotknownfromsenseexperience.Such
nonempirical,nonsensualoperationsarethe"...nonempiricalmattersofspace,time,andcontinuitythat
empiricisminallitsformsanddespiteitsstructuresseemstorequire...."[3]
SeeforcomparisonSensualism,towhichphenomenalismiscloselyrelated.

Criticisms
RoderickChisholmcriticizedthelogicalpositivistversionofphenomenalismin1948.[4]C.I.Lewishad
previouslysuggestedthatthephysicalclaim"Thereisadoorknobinfrontofme"necessarilyentailsthe
sensoryconditional"IfIshouldseemtoseeadoorknobandifIshouldseemtomyselftobeinitiatinga
graspingmotion,theninallprobabilitythesensationofcontactingadoorknobshouldfollow".[5]
Chisholmobjectedthatthestatement"Thereisadoorknob..."doesnotentailthecounterfactual
statement,forifitweretodoso,thenitmustdosowithoutregardtothetruthorfalsityofanyother
statementbutsupposethefollowingstatementwastrue:"Iamparalyzedfromtheneckdownand
experiencehallucinationssuchthatIseemtoseemyselfmovingtowardthedoor".Ifthisweretrue,
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Chisholmobjected,thentherecouldbeadoorknobinfrontofme,Icouldseemtomyselftoseea
doorknob,andIcouldseemtomyselftobeperformingthecorrectsortofgraspingmotion,butwith
absolutelynochanceofhavingasensationofcontactingthedoorknob.Likewise,heobjectedthatthe
statementthat"Theonlybookinfrontofmeisred"doesnotentailthesensorystatement"Redness
wouldprobablyappeartomewereItoseemtomyselftoseeabook",becauserednessisnotlikelyto
appearunderabluelightbulb.Somehavetriedtoavoidthisproblembyextendingtheconditionsinthe
analysandum:insteadof"Thereisadoorknobinfrontofme"onecouldhaveitthat"Thereisa
doorknob,andIamnotparalyzed,etc."Inresponse,Chisholmobjectsthatifonecomplicatesthe
analysandum,onemustalsocomplicatetheanalysansinthisparticularcase,thatonemustanalysein
purelysensorytermswhatitmeansnottobeparalyzedandsoon,withrespecttowhichthesame
problemswouldariseleadingtoaninfiniteregress.
Anothercommonobjectiontophenomenalismisthatintheprocessofeliminatingmaterialobjectsfrom
languageandreplacingthemwithhypotheticalpropositionsaboutobserversandexperiences,itseemsto
commitustotheexistenceofanewclassofontologicalobjectaltogether:thesensibiliaorsensedata
whichcanexistindependentlyofexperience.Indeed,sensedatahavebeendismissedbysome
philosophersofmind,suchasDonaldDavidson,asmythologicalentitiesthataremoretroublesomethan
theentitiesthattheywereintendedtoreplace.
Athirdcommonobjectionintheliteratureisthatphenomenalism,inattemptingtoconvertpropositions
aboutmaterialobjectsintohypotheticalpropositionsaboutsensibilia,postulatestheexistenceofan
irreduciblymaterialobserverintheantecedentoftheconditional.Inattemptingtoovercomethis,some
phenomenalistssuggestedthatthefirstobservercouldbereducedbyconstructingasecondproposition
intermsofasecondobserver,whoactuallyorpotentiallyobservesthebodyofthefirstobserver.Athird
observerwouldobservethesecondandsoon.Inthismannerwewouldendupwitha"Chinesebox
seriesofpropositions"ofeverdecreasingmaterialcontentascribedtotheoriginalobserver.Butifthe
finalresultisnotthecompleteeliminationofthematerialityofthefirstobserver,thenthetranslational
reductionsthatareproposedbyphenomenalistscannot,eveninprinciple,becarriedout.
Anothercriticismisthatthephenomenalistcangivenosatisfactoryexplanationofthepermanent
possibilitiesofexperience.Thequestioncanbeasked,"Whatarethecounterfactualconditionalswhich
groundtheexistenceofobjectstrueinvirtueof?"Oneanswergivenbyphenomenalistsisthatthe
conditionalsaretrueinvirtueofpastregularitiesofexperience.However,criticsobjectthatthisanswer
leadstocircularity:firstouractualexperiencewasmeanttobeexplainedbythepossibilityof
experience,andnowthepossibilityofexperienceismeanttobeexplainedbyouractualpastexperience.
Afurtherobjectiontothephenomenalistansweristhatgenerallyspeaking,conditionalsarenottruein
virtueoftheirpastoccurrences.Thisisbecauseitseemsthataconditionalcouldbetrueevenifitnever
actuallyobtained,andalsopastoccurrencesonlyconfirmthataconditionalistrue,butnevermakeitso.
RoderickFirthformulatedanotherobjectionin1950,stemmingfromperceptualrelativity:White
wallpaperlookswhiteunderwhitelightandredunderredlight,etc.Anypossiblecourseofexperience
resultingfromapossiblecourseofactionwillapparentlyunderdetermineoursurroundings:itwould
determine,forexample,thatthereiseitherwhitewallpaperunderredlightorredwallpaperunderwhite
light,andsoon.Onwhatbasisarewetodecidewhichofthehypothesesisthecorrectoneifweare
constrainedtorelyexclusivelyonsensibilia?[6]

References
1. "Phenomenalism".CatholicEncyclopedia.NewYork:RobertAppletonCompany.1913.
2. Danto,Arthur,NietzscheasPhilosopher,Ch.3,VI,Macmillan,1965
3. Danto,Arthur,ConnectionstotheWorld,Ch.27.Harper&Row,1989,ISBN006015960X
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4. Chisholm,R."TheProblemofEmpiricism",TheJournalofPhilosophy45(1948):5127.
5. C.I.Lewis,AnAnalysisofKnowledgeandValuation(LaSalle,Illinois:OpenCourt,1946),pp.240,2489.
6. Firth,R."RadicalEmpiricismandPerceptualRelativity",PhilosophicalReview.1950

Bibliography
FenomenismoinL'EnciclopediaGarzantidiFilosofia(eds.)GianniVattimoandGaetano
Chiurazzi.ThirdEdition.Garzanti.Milan,2004.ISBN8811505151
Berlin,Isaiah.TheRefutationofPhenomenalism.TheIsaiahBerlinVirtualLibrary.2004.
Bolender,John.FactualPhenomenalism:aSupervenienceTheory,inSORITESIssue#09.April
1998.pp.1631.

Externallinks
Phenomenalism(http://philpapers.org/browse/phenomenalism)atPhilPapers
Phenomenalism(https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/idea/436)attheIndianaPhilosophyOntology
Project
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