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Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No.

135385, December 6, 2000

Isagani Cruz v. Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources,
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically
enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may
include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an allencompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might
even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said
law violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and
reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since
there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was
sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources somehow
against the regalian doctrine.
Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner, v. AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO
JOSE R. DELA PAZ, Respondents
Peralta, J.:
Respondents filed a case to register a parcel of land covering almost 25,800 square
kilometres situated in Taguig. They alleged that they came into the possession of
the land thru their parents who have been continuous, uninterrupted, open, public,
adverse possession of the same, in the concept of owner since 1987. The Republic
(Petitioner) opposed the application on the ground that they have not been in
continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the
concept of owner, but the RTC ruled in favour of the Respondents. The Republic
interposed an Appeal to the CA, but it was also denied, the court reasoning that
Respondents have established their right to the parcel of land.
Petitioner then appeals to the Supreme Court.
1. Whether or not the continuous, uninterrupted, open, public and adverse
possession was sufficiently established by evidence.

2. Whether the land is part of the alienable part of public domain.

No. It has not been sufficiently established.
Civil Law: Land Registration
1st Issue:
Respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under abona fideclaim of ownership
from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Respondents have not presented tangible proof to establish this kind of possession.
At best, they have only given a tax declaration on 1949, but this is merely indicia of
2nd Issue:
To overcome this presumption,incontrovertibleevidence must be established that
thelandsubject of theapplication (or claim) isalienable ordisposable. To support this,
Respondents have merely relied on the survey plan of a geodetic engineer. This is
insufficient under the law. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the
proper government agency to establish that the subject land are part of the
alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
Andamo vs. IAC
Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
Fernan, C.J.
Doctrine: It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing cannot
make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. SIC
Facts: Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of land situated in Biga Silang,
Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent corporation, Missionaries of
Our lady of La Salette, Inc. Within the land of the latter, waterpaths and
contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly
inundated and eroded petitioners land, caused a young man to drown, damagaed
petitioners crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the
livesofthepetitioners and their laborers and some other destructions.
This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal action for destruction by means
of inundation under Article 324 of the RPC and a civil action for damages.

Issue: Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction
caused by respondents waterpaths and contrivances on the basis of Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
Held: Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil
action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the
elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff,
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he
must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioners complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There
is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven
constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without limitations. Article
431 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in
such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM
NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties
which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to
infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of
an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed
and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to
adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If
the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person,
the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Case Digest: Ortigas & Co. vs Feati Bank & Trust Co.
On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills
Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles.
The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of
payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the
lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This was annotated in the
Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5
directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963,
Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking
purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to
stop construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being
constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27
declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial
zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.

Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an

industrial and commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the
Transfer Certificate of Titles.
Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the
Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that
implied power of the municipality should be liberally construed in its favour, to
give more power to the local government in promoting economic conditions, social
welfare, and material progress in the community. This is found in the General
Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the
legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard
health, safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality
as it would not be a conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic,
pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial
Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 134269, July 7, 2010
Leonardo-De Castro, J.:
While it would be a violation of the principle of separation of powers for the courts
to interfere with the wordings of a statute, there would be no violation of said
principle for the court to merely affirm the correction made by the same entity
which committed the error.
A parcel of land was sold to spouses Alfonso with an annotated Deed of
Restrictions, which states that the property shall be exclusively used for the
establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory school. However, spouses
Alfonso opened on the same lot The Learning Child Center Pre-school (TLC) which
was later expanded to include a grade school program. AAVA filed with the RTC an
action for injunction against TLC and the spouses Alfonso, alleging breach of
contract. RTC rendered its Decision in favor of AAVA.
TLC and the spouses Alfonso filed a Motion for Reconsideration and while pending,
the Municipality of Muntinlupa, through its Sangguniang Bayan, passed Resolution
No. 94-179 correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of a parcel of
land under the heading "Institutional Zone" in Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-39,
adjusting the description "Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V, Ayala Alabang" to "Lot 25, Block
3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang."

According to the HLURB, Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is not a case of a mere
correction of an error but an actual rezoning of the property into an institutional
area, and therefore remanded the same to the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa for
the conduct of the required public hearings. The Municipality of Muntinlupa, TLC and
the spouses Alfonso appealed the HLURB Resolution to the Office of the President
which held that Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is a mere rectifying issuance and
need not comply with the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing. CA
affirmed with modifications.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Decision of the Office of the
President that Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 was merely a rectifying issuance
and not a rezoning enactment
No. The authority of the HLURB is certainly subordinate to that of the Office of the
President and the acts of the former may be set aside by the latter. Furthermore,
while it is true that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies, it
should be noted that the HLURB and the then MMC were both tasked to regulate the
rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila area. The then Municipality of Muntinlupa
submitted Resolution No. 94-179 to both the HLURB and the MMC for their
appropriate action. The MMC approved Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179, and this
approval should be given more weight than the disapproval of the HLURB since it
was the MMC itself which issued the Uniform Guidelines for the Rezoning of the
Metropolitan Manila Area (MMC Resolution No. 12, Series of 1991), the issuance
alleged by AAVA to have been violated by the Municipality of Muntinlupa.
G.R. No. L-65425 November 5, 1987IRENEO LEAL, JOSE LEAL, CATALINA
APPELLATE COURT (4th Civil Cases Division), and VICENTE SANTIAGO
(Substituted by SALUD M. SANTIAGO), respondents.
FACTS: -Reversal of IAC in its Resolution dated Sept. 27, 1983 of the earlier decision
dated June28, 1978 penned by Justice Paras of the Court of Appeals, in the same
case, affirming thetrial courts dismissal of the private respondents
complaint.March 21, 1941: Vicente Santiago and Cirilio Leal entered into a contract
which was called theCompraventa where V. Santiago sold to the latter three
parcels of land. Cited in the contractwas: En caso deventa, no podran
vender a otrosdichos tres lotes de terrenosino al aquirendedor Vicente
Santiago, o los herederos o sucesores de estepor el niismo precio de P5,600siempre
y cuando estos ultimos pueden hacer la compra.1960-1965: Parts of the properties
were mortgaged or leased to the co-petitioners or to thirdparty1966-1957: V.
Santiago offered re-purchase of the properties but the petitioner refused the
offerAugust 2, 1967: V. Santiago instituted complaint for specific performance. The
trial court (Courtof First Instance in Q.C.) rendered its decision dismissing the case

for it was thought to be apremature case or that there was no sale at all. The
respondent was not contented at all that hefiled another complaint in the Court of
AppealsJune 28, 1978: Justice Paras of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
courts dismissal ofrespondents complaint. Included in the decision was
the order for the cancellation of theannotations at the back of the Transfer
Certificates of Title issued which prohibits the petitionerto sell the land to the
third party. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and
anopposition to the petitioners(Leal) motion to amend but the incidents were not
resolved sincethe Court of Appeals was abolished and was replaced by the IAC.Sept.
27, 1983: The June 28, 1978 decision of the CA was reversed. The petitioners were
toaccept P5,600 for re-purchase of Land and they should pay rental of P3,087.50 as
rental from1967-1968 and the same amount every year after. The Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42535was ordered to be in the names of V. Santiago & Luis
Santiago and to issue another TCT to S.Santiago.
ISSUE/S:Whether or not it is quoted in the Compraventa that the private
respondent has the right of re-purchase.Whether the annotations of the prohibition
to sell at the back of the TCTs should be cancelled.
HELD:The Resolution dated Sept. 27, 1983 was SET ASIDE and the Decision
promulgated on June 28, 1978 is Reinstated. The annotations of the prohibition to
sell at the back of TCT Nos. 138837-138842 were cancelled cost against
respondent.For the following reasons:-In IACs resolution : repurchase was given
birth by the phrase siempre y cuando ultimos pueden hacer la compra (when the
buyer has money to buy). Under Article 1508 (2nd Paragraph) there is agreement as
to the time, although it is indefinite, therefore the right should be exercised within
ten years, because the law does not favor suspended ownership.-The right to
redeem must be expressly stipulated in the contract of sale in order that it may
have legal existence. Under Article 1606 of the Civil Code of the Philippines the
right to redeem or repurchase, in the absence of an express agreement as to time,
shall last four years from the date of contract.-Prohibition to sell the lots to persons
other than the vendor (back of TCT) will be cancelled or deleted since the
prohibition to alienate should not exceed 20 years otherwise there would be
subversion of public policy.-Civil Code of the Phil. Art. 1306 includes that contracting
parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy. Public order signifies the public weal public policy.
Essentially, therefore, public order and public policy mean one and the same thing.
One such condition which is contrary to public policy is the present prohibition toself
to third parties(or perpetual restriction to the right of ownership specifically the
owners right to freely dispose of his properties