G.R. No.

26795 July 31, 1970

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO
QUIMIGUING
and
JACOBA
CABILIN,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case
No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another
order denying amendment of the same pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the
court below. In her complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors
in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao,
although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff
several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a
result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by
defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at
P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action
since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after
hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and
dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result
of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court,
sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable,
since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the
plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.

We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived

child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to
support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose
paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even
if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child,
even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of
the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may
result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the
testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the
testator Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may
be accepted by those persons who would legally represent them
if they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator,
the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code
declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children
"does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40
aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of
Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child
shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further
"provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following
article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition
precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of
Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his
Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil
Code, clearly points this out:

Los
derechos
atribuidos
al nasciturus no
son
simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico que la
moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen
un caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de
pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas
por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos
(que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho
que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married
man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the
original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of
his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused.
Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying,
plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the
complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action
was doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the
case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable
to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-16439

July 20, 1961

ANTONIO
GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano
H.
de
A.P. Salvador for respondents.

Joya

for

petitioner.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband
of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages
from physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by
respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio
Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the
evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo
and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as
damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court
of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a majority
vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting
opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the
first time in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she
became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally
married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting
on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant.
After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As
she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by
the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again
became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the
defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where
the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a
two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos,
Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of

Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did

not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this
action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we
granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in
the sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article
2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the
said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a
person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with
personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no
alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no
nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho
Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action
for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on
account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on
behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death,
since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical
personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is
no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child
(conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that
same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the
condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be
born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present
case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its
mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is
generally held that recovery can not had for the death of an unborn child
(Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton,
52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR,
(2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at
all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as

distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his
right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either
help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be
limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of
thespes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish
attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations
(Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances
should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of
moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the
previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly
indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes
and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of
the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the
second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the
first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have
taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the
punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third
abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the
administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern
appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money
payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's
fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was
clearly exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously
feels outraged by the abortion which his wife has deliberately sought
at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than
mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it that the
medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than
turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind
to press either the administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or
both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages
of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of
appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and
morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the

consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the
immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that,
under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered
dismissed. Without costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the
Board of Medical Examiners for their information and such investigation and
action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad,
JJ., concur.
Concepcion,
J., took
no
part.
De Leon, J., took no part.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 6085
AN ACT AMENDING COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED
FORTY-TWO REGULATING THE USE OF ALIASES.
Section 1. Section one of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred fortytwo is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio
or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of
pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of
the local civil registry, or with which he was baptized for the first time, or, in
case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration
upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court: Provided, That persons, whose births have not been
registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have
one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in
the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic
name and one or two surnames."
Section 2. Section Two of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred fortytwo is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor
in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a
change of name, and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial
authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the
person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil
registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if
he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the
reason or reasons for the use of the desired alias. The judicial authority for
the use of alias the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be
recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name
or names other, than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly
recorded in the proper local civil registry."
Section 3. Section three of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred
forty-two, is hereby amended to read as Follows:
"Sec. 3. No person having been baptized with a name different from that with
which he was registered at birth in the local civil registry, or in case of an
alien, registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry, or any person who
obtained judicial authority to use an alias, or who uses a pseudonym, shall
represent himself in any public or private transaction or shall sign or execute
any public or private document without stating or affixing his real or original
name and all names or aliases or pseudonym he is or may have been
authorized to use."
Section 4. Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-two is hereby
amended by the insertion of the following new section to be designated
Section four to read as follows:
"Sec. 4. Six months from the approval of this act and subject to the
provisions of section 1 hereof, all persons who have used any name and/or
names and alias or aliases different from those authorized in section one of
this act and duly recorded in the local civil registry, shall be prohibited to use
such other name or names and/or alias or aliases."
Section 5. Section four of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred fortytwo is hereby amended to read as Section five, as follows:
"Sec. 5. Any violation of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of from
one year to five years and a fine of P5,000 to P10,000."

Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval, and all Acts, rules or
regulations of laws inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
Approved: August 4, 1969.
G.R. No. 157649
ARABELLE
vs.
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
MENDOZA, Respondents.

November 12, 2012

J.
PHILIPPINES

MENDOZA, Petitioner,
and

DOMINIC

C.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her
marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent
spouse's psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to
the time of the marriage.
Petitioner wife appeals the decision promulgated on March 19,
2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City (RTC) declaring her marriage with
respondent Dominic C. Mendoza (Dominic) as null and void.
Antecedents
Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his
employment in Papua New Guinea. They had been next-door neighbors in
the appartelle they were renting while they were still in college she, at
Assumption College while he, at San Beda College taking a business
management course. After a month of courtship, they became intimate and
their intimacy ultimately led to her pregnancy with their daughter whom they
named Allysa Bianca. They got married on her eighth month of pregnancy in
civil rites solemnized in Pasay City on June 24, 1991, 2 after which they moved
to her place, although remaining dependent on their parents for support.
When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow funds from
petitioners best friend to settle the hospital bills. He remained jobless and
dependent upon his father for support until he finished his college course in

October 1993. She took on various jobs to meet the familys needs, first as a
part-time aerobics instructor in 1992 and later, in 1993, as a full-time
employee in Sanofi, a pharmaceutical company. Being the one with the fixed
income, she shouldered all of the familys expenses (i.e., rental, food, other
bills and their childs educational needs).
On his part, Dominic sold Colliers Encyclopedia for three months after his
graduation from college before he started working as a car salesman for
Toyota Motors in Bel-Air, Makati in 1994. 3 Ironically, he spent his first sales
commission on a celebratory bash with his friends inasmuch as she
shouldered all the household expenses and their childs schooling because
his irregular income could not be depended upon. In September 1994, she
discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-employee at Toyota
Motors. Eventually, communication between them became rare until they
started to sleep in separate rooms, thereby affecting their sexual
relationship.4
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday
present. Later on, he asked her to issue two blank checks that he claimed
would be for the cars insurance coverage. She soon found out, however,
that the checks were not paid for the cars insurance coverage but for his
personal needs. Worse, she also found out that he did not pay for the car
itself, forcing her to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of the
car, leaving her to bear the balance of P120,000.00.
To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran
away with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged
with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he was
arrested and incarcerated. After petitioner and her mother bailed him out of
jail, petitioner discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of
whom were even threatening petitioner, her mother and her sister
themselves.5
On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because
petitioner asked him for "time and space to think things over." A month later,
she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit
suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house to live in
another place concealed from him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration
of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological

incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) opposed the petition.
Ruling of the RTC
In the RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness, together with a
psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson, and Professor Marites Jimenez. On his
part, Dominic did not appear during trial and presented no evidence.
On August 18, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and
Dominic an absolute nullity,6 holding in part:
xxx. The result of Dr. Samsons clinical evaluation as testified to by her and
per Psychiatric Report she issued together with one Dr. Doris Primero showed
that petitioner appears to be mature, strong and responsible individual.
Godly, childlike trust however, makes her vulnerable and easy to forgive and
forget. Petitioner also believes that marriage was a partnership "for better
and for worse", she gave all of herself unconditionally to respondent.
Unfortunately, respondent cannot reciprocate. On the one hand, respondent
was found to have a personality that can be characterized as inadequate,
immature and irresponsible. His criminal acts in the present time are mere
extensions of his misconduct established in childhood. His childhood
experiences of separations and emotional deprivation largely contributed to
this antisocial (sociopathic) attitude and lifestyle.
She concluded that respondent had evidently failed to comply with what is
required of him as a husband and father. Besides from his adulterous
relationship and irresponsibility, his malevolent conduct and lack of true
remorse indicate that he is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the role of
a married man.7
The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity, i.e.,
gravity, antecedence and incurability, as set forth in Republic v. Court of
Appeals (Molina),8 were attendant, establishing Dominics psychological
incapacity, viz:
Gravity from the evidence adduced it can be said that respondent cannot
carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered
by any average couple existing under ordinary circumstances of life and
work. Respondent is totally incapable of observing mutual love, respect and
fidelity as well as to provide support to his wife and child. Ever since the start

of the marriage respondent had left all the household concerns and the care
of their child to petitioner while he studied and indulged in night outs with
friends. This continued even when he finished his studies and landed a job.
He concealed his salary from the petitioner and worse, had the gall to
engage in sexual infidelity. Likewise worthy of serious consideration is
respondents propensity to borrow money, his deceitfulness and habitual and
continuous evasion of his obligations which (sic) more often than not had led
to the filing of criminal cases against him.
Antecedence Before the marriage petitioner was not aware of
respondents personality disorder and it was only after marriage that it
begun to surface. Dr. Samson declared that respondents behavioral
equilibrium started at a very early age of fifteen. His dishonesty and lack of
remorse are mere extensions of his misconduct in childhood which generally
attributable to respondents childhood experiences of separation and
emotional deprivations. In fine, his psychological incapacity is but a product
of some genetic causes, faulty parenting and influence of the environment
although its over manifestation appear only after the wedding.
Incurability Respondents personality disorder having existed in him long
before he contracted marriage with petitioner, there appears no chance for
respondent to recover any (sic) ordinary means from such incapacity.
All told, the callous and irresponsible ways of respondent show that he does
not possess the proper outlook, disposition and temperament necessary for
marriage. Indeed, this ultimate recourse of nullity is the only way by which
petitioner can be delivered from the bondage of a union that only proved to
be a mockery and brought pain and dishonor to petitioner.9
Ruling of the CA
The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no showing that
Dominics personality traits either constituted psychological incapacity
existing at the time of the marriage or were of the nature contemplated by
Article 36 of the Family Code; that the testimony of the expert witness, while
persuasive, was not conclusive upon the court; and that the real reason for
the parties separation had been their frequent quarrels over financial
matters and the criminal cases brought against Dominic.10

On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the
judgment of the RTC.11 Specifically, it refused to be bound by the findings and
conclusions of petitioners expert witness, holding:
It has not been established to our satisfaction as well that respondents
condition, assuming it is serious enough, was present before or during the
celebration of the marriage. Although petitioners expert witness concluded
that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated even before the parties
marriage, the Court refuses to be bound by such finding, in view of the fact
that the witness findings, admittedly, were concluded only on the basis of
information given by the petitioner herself, who, at the time of the
examination, interview, was already head strong in her resolve to have her
marriage with the respondent nullified, and harbored ill-feelings against
respondent throughout her consultation with Dr. Samson.12
The CA held the testimonies of petitioners witnesses insufficient to establish
Dominics psychological affliction to be of such a grave or serious nature that
it was medically or clinically rooted. Relying on the pronouncements in
Republic v. Dagdag,13 Hernandez v. Court of Appeals14 and Pesca v.
Pesca,15 the CA observed:
In her testimony, petitioner described her husband as immature, deceitful
and without remorse for his dishonesty, and lack of affection. Such
characteristics, however, do not necessarily constitute a case of
psychological incapacity. A persons inability to share or take responsibility,
or to feel remorse for his misbehavior, or even to share his earnings with
family members, are indicative of an immature mind, but not necessarily a
medically rooted psychological affliction that cannot be cured.
Even the respondents alleged sexual infidelity is not necessarily equivalent
to psychological incapacity, although it may constitute adequate ground for
an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. Nor does
the fact that the respondent is a criminal suspect for estafa or violation of
the B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes a ground for the nullification of his marriage to
petitioner. Again, it may constitute ground for legal separation provided the
respondent is convicted by final judgment and sentenced to imprisonment of
more than six (6) years.16
Hence, this appeal by petitioner.
Issues

Petitioner assails the CAs refusal to be bound by the expert testimony and
psychiatric evaluation she had presented in the trial of the case, and the
CAs reliance on the pronouncements in Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca,
supra. She contends that the report on the psychiatric evaluation conducted
by Dr. Samson more than complied with the requirements prescribed in
Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20)
and Molina. She insists that the CA should have applied the ruling in Marcos
v. Marcos (G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755) to the effect
that personal medical or psychological examination was not a requirement
for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
We consider the CAs refusal to accord credence and weight to the
psychiatric report to be well taken and warranted. The CA correctly indicated
that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards Dominic, which she admitted
during her consultation with Dr. Samson, furnished the basis to doubt the
findings of her expert witness; that such findings were one-sided, because
Dominic was not himself subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation by
petitioners expert; and that he also did not participate in the proceedings;
and that the findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her
expert were solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and
characterizations of him rendered by petitioner and her witnesses.
Moreover, Dr. Samson conceded that there was the need for her to resort to
other people in order to verify the facts derived from petitioner about
Dominics psychological profile considering the ill-feelings she harbored
towards him. It turned out, however, that the only people she interviewed
about Dominic were those whom petitioner herself referred, as the following
testimony indicated:
Fiscal Zalameda
Q: So youre saying that the petitioner have an ill-feeling towards the
respondent? At the time you interviewed?
A: Yes, Sir, during the first interview.
Q: How about during the subsequent interview?

A: During the subsequent interview more or less the petitioner was able to
talk regarding her marital problems which is uncomfort(able), so she was
able to adapt, she was able to condition herself regarding her problems, Sir.
Q: But the ill-feeling was still there?
A: But the feeling was still there, Sir.
Q: Now, considering that this ill feeling of the petitioner insofar as the
respondent is concerned, would you say that the petitioner would only tell
you information negative against the respondent?
A: Yes, may be Sir. But I do try to conduct or verify other people the facts
given to me by the petitioner, Sir.
Q: And these other people were also people given to you or the name are
given to you by the petitioner, Madame Witness?
A: Yes, Sir.17
In fine, the failure to examine and interview Dominic himself naturally cast
serious doubt on Dr. Samsons findings. The CA rightly refused to accord
probative value to the testimony of such expert for being avowedly given to
show compliance with the requirements set in Santos and Molina for the
establishment of Dominics psychological incapacity.
The CAs reliance on Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca was not misplaced. It is
easy to see why.
In Dagdag, we ruled that "Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which
requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist
or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her
husband."18 But here, the experts testimony on Dominics psychological
profile did not identify, much less prove, the root cause of his psychological
incapacity because said expert did not examine Dominic in person before
completing her report but simply relied on other peoples recollection and
opinion for that purpose.
In Hernandez, we ruminated that:

xxx expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise
cause of private respondents psychological incapacity, if any, in order to
show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of
the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as
the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of
the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.19
but the expert evidence submitted here did not establish the precise cause
of the supposed psychological incapacity of Dominic, much less show that
the psychological incapacity existed at the inception of the marriage.
The Court in Pesca observed that:
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the
complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization
of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated
with psychological incapacity.20
Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the absence
of the medical experts testimony alone that was crucial but rather
petitioners failure to satisfactorily discharge the burden of showing the
existence of psychological incapacity at the inception of the marriage. In
other words, the totality of the evidence proving such incapacity at and prior
to the time of the marriage was the crucial consideration, as the Court has
reminded in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical
and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by
psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to
determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of
the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable,
are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not
indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination

of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any
other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely
on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
Petitioners view that the Court in Marcos stated that the personal medical or
psychological examination of respondent spouse therein was not a
requirement for the declaration of his psychological incapacity 22 is not
entirely accurate. To be clear, the statement in Marcos ran as follows:
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by
the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition.
For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of psychologists are not
conditions sine qua non in the granting of petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage, the actual medical examination of Dominic was to be dispensed
with only if the totality of evidence presented was enough to support a
finding of his psychological incapacity. This did not mean that the
presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the
psychological incapacity would have automatically ensured the granting of
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. What was essential, we
should emphasize herein, was the "presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the partys psychological condition," as the Court said in Marcos.
But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity to present the
professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause,
gravity and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity, then the
opinions should be presented and be weighed by the trial courts in order to
determine and decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the marriages.
It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must
always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by

the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their
proceedings.23
We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner insufficient to
prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit to discharge the duties
expected of him as a husband, and that he suffered from such psychological
incapacity as of the date of the marriage. Accordingly, the CA did not err in
dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
We have time and again held that psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must concomitantly be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage that, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, to observe love, respect and fidelity, and to render help and
support. We have also held that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. To qualify as
psychological incapacity as a ground for nullification of marriage, a persons
psychological affliction must be grave and serious as to indicate an utter
incapacity to comprehend and comply with the essential objects of marriage,
including the rights and obligations between husband and wife. The affliction
must be shown to exist at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
Accordingly, the RTCs findings that Dominics psychological incapacity was
characterized by gravity, antecedence and incurability could not stand
scrutiny. The medical report failed to show that his actions indicated a
psychological affliction of such a grave or serious nature that it was
medically or clinically rooted. His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack
of remorse for his dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity. His inability to share or to take
responsibility or to feel remorse over his misbehavior or to share his earnings
with family members, albeit indicative of immaturity, was not necessarily a
medically rooted psychological affliction that was incurable. Emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility did not equate with psychological
incapacity.24 Nor were his supposed sexual infidelity and criminal offenses
manifestations of psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a
ground only for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code.

Finally, petitioner contends that the Courts Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10
rendered appeals by the OSG no longer required, and that the appeal by the
OSG was a mere superfluity that could be deemed to have become functus
officio if not totally disregarded.25
The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The Resolution nowhere
stated that appeals by the OSG were no longer required. On the contrary, the
Resolution explicitly required the OSG to actively participate in all stages of
the proceedings, to wit:
a) The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor,
within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof
of such service within the same period.26
b) The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in
consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their
respective memoranda support of their claims within fifteen days from
the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor
General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest
to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without
leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case
will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.27
c) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by
registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to
appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be
published once in a newspaper of general circulation.28
d) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from
notice to the parties.1wphi1 Entry of judgment shall be made if no
motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the
parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.29
e) An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the
decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of
denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant
shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.30

The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to appear as
counsel for the State in the capacity of a defensor vinculi (i.e., defender of
the marital bond) to oppose petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor of
declarations of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
thereby ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity
of marriages based on psychological incapacity-those sufficiently evidenced
by gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence-would succeed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and
AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on March 19, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No.
68615.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 117209. February 9, 1996]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R.
HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y
NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Indeed, whats in a name, as the Bard of Avon has written, since a rose by
any other name would smell as sweet?
This could well be the theme of the present appeal by certiorari which
challenges, on pure questions of law, the order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 158, Pasig City, datedSeptember 13, 1994[1] in JDRC Case No. 2964.
Said court is faulted for having approved the petition for adoption of Kevin
Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the
change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the
surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent
spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a
petition[2] to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging

therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for
adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as
the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the
aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private
respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to
Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in
keeping with religious tradition, and by which he has been called by his
adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at
private respondents residence.[3]
At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the
relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal
opposition dated May 3, 1995,[4]petitioner reiterated its objection to the
joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a
single proceeding, arguing that these petitions should be conducted and
pursued as two separate proceedings.
After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties,
the trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents in this wise:
WHEREFORE, minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran is freed from all legal
obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural
parents, and for all legal intents and purposes shall be known as Aaron
Joseph Munson y Andrade, the legally adopted child of Van Munson and
Regina Munson effective upon the filing of the petition on March 10, 1994. As
soon as the decree of adoption becomes final and executory, it shall be
recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 99 and Section 6, Rule 103, respectively, of the
Rules of Court, and shall be annotated in the record of birth of the adopted
child, which in this case is in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, where the child was
born. Likewise, send a copy of this Order to the National Census and
Statistics Office, Manila, for its appropriate action consisten(t) herewith.[5]
At this juncture, it should be noted that no challenge has been raised by
petitioner regarding the fitness of herein private respondents to be adopting
parents nor the validity of the decree of adoption rendered in their favor. The
records show that the latter have commendably established their
qualifications under the law to be adopters, [6] and have amply complied with
the procedural requirements for the petition for adoption, [7] with the findings
of the trial court being recited thus:

To comply with the jurisdictional requirements, the Order of this Court

dated March 16, 1994 setting this petition for hearing (Exh. A) was published
in the March 31, April 6 and 13, 1994 issues of the Manila Chronicle, a
newspaper of general circulation (Exhs. B to E and submarkings). x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners apart from being financially able, have no criminal nor derogatory
record (Exhs. K to V); and are physically fit to be the adoptive parents of the
minor child Kevin (Exh. W). Their qualification to become the adoptive
parents of Kevin Earl finds support also in the Social Case Study Report
prepared by the DSWD through Social Worker Luz Angela Sonido, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
Mr. and Mrs. Munson are very religious, responsible, mature and friendly
individuals. They are found physically healthy, mentally fit, spiritually and
financially capable to adopt Kevin Earl Moran a.k.a Aaron Joseph.
Mr. and Mrs. Munson have provided AJ with all his needs. They unselfishly
share their time, love and attention to him. They are ready and willing to
continuously provide him a happy and secure home life.
Aaron Joseph, on the other hand, is growing normally under the care of the
Munsons. He had comfortably settled in his new environment. His stay with
the Munsons during the six months trial custody period has resulted to a
close bond with Mr. and Mrs. Munson and vice-versa.
We highly recommend to the Honorable Court that the adoption of Kevin Earl
Moran aka Aaron Joseph by Mr. and Mrs. Van Munson be legalized.[8]
It has been said all too often enough that the factual findings of the lower
court, when sufficiently buttressed by legal and evidential support, are
accorded high respect and are binding and conclusive upon this Court.
[9]
Accordingly, we fully uphold the propriety of that portion of the order of
the court below granting the petition for adoption.
The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized
mainly as follows: (1) whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the
prayer for the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor
adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2) whether or not there
was lawful ground for the change of name.

I. It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his

jurisdiction when he additionally granted the prayer for the change of the
given or proper name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of
name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are
different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed
by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to both reliefs,
namely, a decree of adoption and an authority to change the given or proper
name of the adoptee, the respective proceedings for each must be instituted
separately, and the substantive and procedural requirements therefor under
Articles 183 to 193 of the Family Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation to
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name, must correspondingly be
complied with.[10]
A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws
and rules on adoption have been observed, but not those for a petition for
change of name.[11] Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is
the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform
with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus
granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper
name, and since this would involve a substantial change of ones legal name,
a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be
instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being
conformably satisfied.[12]
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for
adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2
which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and
vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules
against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two
separate but related causes of action in a single petition. Further, the
conditions for permissive joinder of causes of action, i.e., jurisdiction of the
court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have been met.[13]
Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule regarding
change of name in view of the natural interest of the State in maintaining a
system of identification of its citizens and in the orderly administration of

justice.[14] Private respondents argue otherwise and invoke a liberal

construction and application of the Rules, the welfare and interest of the
adoptee being the primordial concern that should be addressed in the instant
proceeding.[15]
On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that
Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl Bartolome
to Aaron Joseph should not be treated strictly, it appearing that no rights
have been prejudiced by said change of name. The strict and meticulous
observation of the requisites set forth by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is
indubitably for the purpose of preventing fraud, ensuring that neither State
nor any third person should be prejudiced by the grant of the petition for
change of name under said rule, to a petitioner of discernment.
The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely over a year
old. Kevin Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor engaged in any
contractual obligations. Neither can he nor petitioners on his behalf, be
deemed to have any immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for seeking said
cha(n)ge of name. It stands to reason that there is no way that the state or
any person may be so prejudiced by the action for change of Kevin Earls first
name. In fact, to obviate any possible doubts on the intent of petitioners, the
prayer for change of name was caused to be published together with the
petition for adoption.[16]
Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal
effects of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child
of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall
terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the
spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the
adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood
relatives.

Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to
bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It
is the change of the adopteessurname to follow that of the adopter which is
the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed
for by petitioner.
However,
the given or proper name,
also
known
as
the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally
registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does
not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered
Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon
the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of
adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption
proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for
adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used
in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to
hear and determine the same, [17] and shall continue to be so used until the
court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as
recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in ones official or legal
name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the
statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have,
wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of
the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make
its decree recording such change)[18]
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register
is the name appearing therein, If a change in ones name is desired, this can
only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and
procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or
grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the
regional trial court of the province where the person desiring to change his
name resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name
to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the
petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is

filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the
change of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date and
place of hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor General or
the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at
such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the
allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of the causes for the
change of name that the court may adjudge that the name be changed as
prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of said judgment to the
civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the
same in the civil register.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict
compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to
vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication.[19] It is an independent and
discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of
rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To
consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding
would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy
available under our remedial law system.
The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the
subject petition insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee, [20] all
of which taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no
petition sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would
rightfully deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to
employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of
the corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of
imagination and liberality, be justified under the rule allowing permissive
joinder of causes of action. Moreover, the reliance by private respondents on
the pronouncements in Briz vs. Briz, et al.[21] and Peyer vs. Martinez, et al.
[22]
is misplaced.
A restatement of the rule and jurisprudence on joinder of causes of action
would, therefore, appear to be called for.
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is
meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action,
the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. [23] It is the
union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the

basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A

plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands,
controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition. [24]
As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally
not required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder
of separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not
mandatory in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the
causes of action arose from the same factual setting and might under
applicable joinder rules be joined.[25] Modern statutes and rules governing
joinders are intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the
efficient administration of justice wherever this may be done without
prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To achieve these ends, they are
liberally construed.[26]
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party
litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be
joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will
not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the
causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation
between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature
and character.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits
where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting
in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and
litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite
the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be
construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice
to the rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should
be liberally construed, to the end that related controversies between the
same parties may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be made
effectual as far as practicable,[27] with the end in view of promoting the
efficient administration of justice.[28]
The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action
is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve
kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving
a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal
application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal

or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them. [29] While
the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may
have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and
a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction
thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder
is not authorized.[30]
Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso
subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of
parties[31] and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented.
effectively disallows unlimited joinder.[32]
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no
express prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for
change of name, we do not believe that there is any relation between these
two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do
they present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly would
warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the
underlying test of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under
our Rules.
As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General
A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from each
other. Each action is individually governed by particular sets of laws and
rules. These two proceedings involve disparate issues. In a petition for
adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate the proposed adopters fitness
and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee properly
(Prasnick vs. Republic, 99 Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a petition for
change of name, no family relations are created or affected for what is
looked into is the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting
the proposed change of name (Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253).
xxx xxx xxx
x x x Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately assessed
and determined for neither action is dependent on the other.[33]
The rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is clear. Joinder may be
allowed only if the actions show a commonality of relationship and conform

to the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties (Section 5, Rule 2,

Rules of Court).
These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed out in
our Petition (pp. 9-10), an action for adoption and an action for change of
name are, in nature and purpose, not related to each other and do not arise
out of the same relation between the parties. While what is cogent in an
adoption proceeding is the proposed adopters fitness and qualifications to
adopt, a petition for change of first name may only prosper upon proof of
reasonable
and
compelling
grounds
supporting
the
change
requested. Fitness to adopt is not determinative of the sufficiency of reasons
justifying a change of name. And similarly, a change of first name cannot be
justified in view of a finding that the proposed adopter was found fit to
adopt. There is just no way that the two actions can connect and find a
common ground, thus the joinder would be improper.
In contending that adoption and change of name may be similarly sought in
one petition, private respondents rely upon Peyer vs. Martinez and Briz vs.
Briz (p. 4, Comment).
We however submit that these citations are non sequitur. In both cases, the
fact of intimacy and relatedness of the issues is so pronounced. In Peyer, an
application to pronounce the husband an absentee is obviously intertwined
with the action to transfer the management of conjugal assets to the
wife. In Briz, an action for declaration of heirship was deemed a clear
condition precedent to an action to recover the land subject of partition and
distribution proceeding. However, the commonality of relationship which
stands out in both cases does not characterize the present action for
adoption and change of name. Thus the rulings in Peyer and Briz find no
place in the case at bar.
Besides, it is interesting to note that although a joinder of the two actions
was, in Briz, declared feasible, the Supreme Court did not indorse an
automatic joinder and instead remanded the matter for further proceedings,
granting leave to amend the pleadings and implead additional partiesdefendants for a complete determination of the controversy (Briz vs. Briz, 43
Phil. 763, 770). Such cautionary stance all the more emphasizes that
although joinders are generally accepted, they are not allowed where the
conditions are not satisfactorily met.[34]

It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance

will make for a complete determination of all matters pertaining to the
coetaneous grant of adoption and change of name of the adoptee in one
petition. As already stated, the subject petition was grossly insufficient in
form and substance with respect to the prayer for change of name of the
adoptee.The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the
rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is addressed to suits that are
intimately related and also present interwoven and dependent issues which
can be most expeditiously and comprehensively settled by having just one
judicial proceeding, but not to suits or actions whose subject matters or
corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken
up individually.
In Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al. , [35] the Court clarified the rule on
permissive joinder of causes of action:
The rule is clearly permissive. It does not constitute an obligatory rule, as
there is no positive provision of law or any rule of jurisprudence which
compels a party to join all his causes of action and bring them at one and the
same time. Under the present rules, the provision is still that the plaintiff
may, and not that he must, unite several causes of action although they may
be included in one of the classes specified.This, therefore, leaves it to the
plaintiffs option whether the causes of action shall be joined in the same
action, and no unfavorable inference may be drawn from his failure or
refusal to do so. He may always file another action based on the remaining
cause or causes of action within the prescriptive period therefor. (Italics
supplied.)
The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the
Rules under the policy of liberal construction thereof in general, and for
change of name in particular, as proposed by private respondents and
adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be
invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency
or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence
of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance
with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by
harking on the policy of liberal construction.
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers
alike would at times encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative

justice requires correct observance of indispensable technicalities precisely

designed to ensure its proper dispensation.[36] It has long been recognized
that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the
prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of
judicial business.[37]
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may
be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is
important in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights
through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not
intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide
for a system under which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and
manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge
whose authority they acknowledge.[38]
It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own
wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be
administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice,
or whimsicality.[39] We have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot vs. CA,
et al. that:[40]
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of
justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial
proceedings. It is a mistake to propose that substantive law and adjective
law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested, that
enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in
prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true;
the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the
courts is to give both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just
and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of
both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the
source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of
court.
xxx xxx xxx
x x (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most
persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice
not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed. x x x. While it is true that a litigation is not a
game of technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be

ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and
assessment of the issues and their just resolution. Justice eschews anarchy.
Only exceptionally in very extreme circumstances, when a rule deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy such that rigid application thereof frustrates rather than promotes
substantial justice, will technicalities deserve scant consideration from the
court. In such situations, the courts are empowered, even obligated, to
suspend the operation of the rules.[41]
We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private
respondents by following the reglementary procedure for the change in the
proper or given name that they seek for their adopted child. We are hard put
to descry the indispensability of a change of the first name of the adoptee to
his welfare and benefit. Nor is the said change of such urgency that would
justify an exemption from or a relaxation of the Rules. It is the State that
stands to be prejudiced by a wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case,
considering its natural interest in the methodical administration of justice
and in the efficacious maintenance of a system of identification of its
citizens.
The danger wrought by non-observance, of the Rules is that the violation
of or failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by law prevents the
proper determination of the questions raised by the parties with respect to
the merits of the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the first place,
such questions as relate to the form of the action. The rules and procedure
laid down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of
public policy.[42] They are matters of public order and interest which can in no
wise be changed or regulated by agreements between or stipulations by
parties to an action for their singular convenience.[43]
In Garcia vs. Republic,[44] we are reminded of the definiteness in the
application of the Rules and the importance of seeking relief under the
appropriate proceeding:
x x x The procedure set by law should be delimited. One should not confuse
or misapply one procedure for another lest we create confusion in the
application of the proper remedy.
Respondent judges unmindful disregard of procedural tenets aimed at
achieving stability of procedure is to be deplored. He exceeded his

prerogatives by granting the prayer for change of name, his order being
unsupported by both statutory and case law. The novel but unwarranted
manner in which he adjudicated this case may be characterized as a
regrettable abdication of the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law
and jurisprudence.
II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the
petition for change of name without citing or proving any lawful
ground. Indeed, the only justification advanced for the change of name was
the fact of the adoptees baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and by which
he has been known since he came to live with private respondents.[45]
Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert that
upon the grant of adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso facto assumed a
new identification and designation, that is, Aaron Joseph which was the name
given to him during the baptismal rites. Allowing the change of his first name
as prayed for in the petition, so they claim, merely confirms the designation
by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives. This
largely echoes the opinion of the lower court that naming the child Aaron
Joseph was symbolic of naming him at birth, and that they, as adoptive
parents, have as much right as the natural parents to freely select the first
name of their adopted child.[46]
The lower court was sympathetic to herein private respondents and ruled
on this point in this manner:
As adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may freely select the first
name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is
entitled that is fixed by law. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other
purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman
who had all intentions of giving him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron
Joseph by petitioners upon the grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic
of naming the minor at birth.[47]
We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this attenuated
ruling of respondent judge and must thus set it aside.

It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a persons name is a

word or combination of words by which he is known and identified, and
distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal
as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name of
an individual has two parts:
The given or proper name and the surname or family name. The given or
proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to
distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent
to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child,
but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.[48]
By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a persons birth must be entered in the
civil register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil
register. That is his name in the eyes of the law. [49] And once the name of a
person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code
seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his name
or surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised
on the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification.[50]
By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed
legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court.[51] For purposes of an application for change of name under Article
376 of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only
name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil
register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance
with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is
essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity. [52]
It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a
privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the
court which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change
of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a
person can be authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official
name or that which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil

register, he must show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing

reason which may justify such change.[53]
Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being
sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when
the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and
been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.[54]
Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one
was baptized by another name, under which he has been known and which
he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not
sanctioned.[55] For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a
change of name.[56] Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been using a
different name and has become known by it constitute proper and
reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name. [57] A name given to
a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which he is known in the
community - when at variance with that entered in the civil register - is
unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.[58]
The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart from such
rulings of long accepted wisdom and applicability. The only grounds offered
to justify the change of name prayed for was that the adopted child had been
baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping with the religious faith of private
respondents and that it was the name by which he had been called and
known by his family, relatives and friends from the time he came to live with
private respondents.[59] Apart from suffusing their pleadings with
sanctimonious entreaties for compassion, none of the justified grounds for a
change of name has been alleged or established by private respondents. The
legal bases chosen by them to bolster their cause have long been struck
down as unavailing for their present purposes. For, to allow the adoptee
herein to use his baptismal name, instead of his name registered in the civil
register, would be to countenance or permit that which has always been
frowned upon.[60]

The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge, as expressed in his

assailed order that
(a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like other parents may freely select the
first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is
entitled that is fixed by law x x x.
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other
purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman
who had all the intentions of giving him away. The naming of the minor as
Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon grant of their petition for adoption is
symbolic of naming the minor at birth.
and supposedly based on the authority of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Maximo Wong, supra, painfully misapplies the ruling therein enunciated.
The factual backdrop of said case is not at all analogous to that of the
case at bar. In the Wong case, therein petitioner Maximo Wong sought the
change of his surname which he acquired by virtue of the decree of adoption
granted in favor of spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong. Upon
reaching the age of majority, he filed a petition in court to change his
surname from Wong to Alcala, which was his surname prior to the
adoption. He adduced proof that the use of the surname Wong caused him
embarrassment and isolation from friends and relatives in view of a
suggested Chinese ancestry when in reality he is a Muslim Filipino residing in
a Muslim community, thereby hampering his business and social life, and
that his surviving adoptive mother consented to the change of name
sought. This Court granted the petition and regarded the change of the
surname as a mere incident in, rather than the object of, the adoption.
It should be noted that in said case the change of surname, not the given
name, and the legal consequences thereof in view of the adoption were at
issue. That it was sought in a petition duly and precisely filed for that
purpose with ample proof of the lawful grounds therefor only serves to
reinforce the imperative necessity of seeking relief under and through the
legally prescribed procedures.
Here, the Solicitor General meritoriously explained that:
Respondent Judge failed to distinguish between a situation wherein a child is
being named for the first time by his natural parent, as against one wherein,

a child is previously conferred a first name by his natural parent, and such
name is subsequently sought to be disregarded and changed by the adoptive
parents. In the first case, there is no dispute that natural parents have the
right to freely select and give the childs first name for every person,
including juridical persons, must have a name (Tolentino, A., Commentaries
and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, 1987 edition, page 721). In the
second case, however, as in the case at bar, private respondents, in their
capacities as adopters, cannot claim a right to name the minor adoptee after
such right to name the child had already been exercised by the natural
parent. Adopting parents have not been conferred such right by law, hence,
the right asserted by private respondents herein remains but illusory.
Renaming the adoptee cannot be claimed as a right. It is merely a privilege
necessitating judicial consent upon compelling grounds. [61]
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up to adoption
insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of adoption and ensures to
the adopted child the rights and privileges arising therefrom, ever mindful
that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the
adopted child,[62] should be understood in its proper context. It should not be
misconstrued or misinterpreted to extend to inferences beyond the
contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the
proper or given name of the child presupposes that no other name for it has
theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once such name is registered,
regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the
purpose of identification, the same constitutes the official name. This
effectively authenticates the identity of the person and must remain
unaltered save when, for the most compelling reasons shown in an
appropriate proceeding, its change may merit judicial approval.
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized,
guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive
parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of
adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is
unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. To
repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption
and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include
the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal

consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of

concern to the Court.
Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and
is without prejudice to, private respondents privilege to legally change the
proper or given name of their adopted child, provided that the same is
exercised, this time, via a proper petition for change of name. Of course, the
grant thereof is conditioned on strict compliance with all jurisdictional
requirements and satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced
therefor.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of
respondent judge is hereby MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private
respondents shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y
Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with
law. In all other respects, the order is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.