Volume 42

July-August 1974

The Field Artillery Journal is published bimonthly at the US Army Field

Artillery School for the same purpose stated in the first Field Artillery
Journal in 1910:
"To publish a Journal for disseminating professional knowledge and
furnishing information as to the field artillery's progress, development,
and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with the other arms, a common
understanding of the powers and limitations of each; to foster a feeling
of interdependence among the different arms and of hearty cooperation
by all; and to promote understanding between the regular and militia
forces by a closer bond; all of which objects are worthy and contribute
to the good of our country."
Unless otherwise stated, material does not represent official policy or
endorsement by any agency of the US Army.
Funds for the printing of the publication were approved by the
Department of the Army. 1 September 1973.
Requests for subscriptions should be mailed to Bookstore. US Army Field
Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK 73503.
All letters and articles should be addressed to Editor, Field Artillery
Journal, PO Box 3131, Fort Sill, OK 73503.
The Field Artillery is pleased to grant permission to reprint articles. Please
credit the author and the Field Artillery Journal.

Number 4
THE FIELD ARTILLERY
SCHOOL

COMMANDANT
MG David E. Ott

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
BG Vernon B. Lewis
THE FIELD ARTILLERY
JOURNAL STAFF

EDITOR
MAJ Alan A. Word

MANAGING EDITOR
Ms. Jacqueline L. Snyder

CIRCULATION MANAGER
CPT Herman C. Castle

ASSISTANT EDITORS
Mr. Allen Boules
2LT David N. Compton

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT
Ms. LaNelle Murcko

Cover
ART DIRECTOR
The front cover is a photograph of a
Soviet BM 21 multiple rocket launcher
battery in firing position.

SFC Claude L. Vowell

ILLUSTRATOR
Mr. Carl Ewing

TYPIST
Ms. Zoe A. Wright

Articles
Attack of Armored Targets
by CPT Earl Finley

12

The Yale Batteries

by Fairfax Downey

17

Bridgman's Bull Battery

by R. K. McMaster

21

Improved FDC
by MAJ. Robert A. White, et al.

22

Do We Need a Multiple Rocket Launcher?

by LTC Allan R. Stern

25

The Offensive
by A. A. Sidorenko

32

Too Valuable to Lose

by MAJ Robert G. Tetu, Jr.

46

Howitzer Section Test

by LTC Bobby Godwin

51

Inside EES
by CPT David R. Fabian

54

pg. 51

pg. 32

pg. 25

Features
A Word from the editor

Incoming

Yesterday's Journal

View from the Blockhouse

10

Right by Piece

29

Humor by T2

58

Redleg Review

60

Readership Survey

63

pg. 46

pg. 12

a word
from the
editor

Welcome. You are now entering the first anniversary issue of

the Journal! It simply does not seem possible that we have
been publishing for a year, but the covers testify to this most
appropriate "paper" anniversary. We've come a long way from
that first July 1973 issue compiled by our "staff" of two. With the
addition of Mr. Allen Boules to our staff as an assistant editor,
we are now complete. AI was the news editor of the EI Reno
(OK) Daily Tribune for 10 years, and he comes to us from the
Information Branch of the Forestry Service in New Orleans. AI
will give us the capability to generate some of our own material,
and we welcome him aboard along with out new "girl Friday,"
Ms. Zoe Ann Wright. I would take this opportunity to extend my
professional and personal congratulations to the entire staff for
a fine year's labor. Publishing 64 pages every other month is
often hectic, as you might imagine, but with the young,
energetic hard-chargers we have, it is actually a pleasure. We
would also extend a cordial invitation to all Redlegs to visit the
Journal offices whenever they are at Fort Sill. The coffee is
always hot . . . and we enjoy the opportunity to visit with you
and get your opinions on the Journal.
I am happy to report the number of subscriptions is growing by
leaps and bounds, having tripled since the previous issue.
Journal subscriptions make excellent gifts, just the thing for the
Redleg who has collected four or five miniature cannons during
his career. A quick look at the list of subscribers shows the
majority are company-grade or allied officers. We anticipate
that field grade officers and other senior artillerymen will now
begin to respond in greater numbers.
Our first readership survey is included in this issue. In addition
to complying with a TRADOC requirement, we believe this
survey will provide us an excellent opportunity to determine
your desires as Journal readers. Please make an effort to
complete the survey form and return it to us. Our thanks to MAJ
Bill Weske, S3, 214th Group, and the men who tested the
survey.
Our feature article this month is an extract from A. A.
Sidorenko's book "The Offensive." The USSR awarded
Sidorenko, a colonel in the Soviet Army, the degree of Doctor of
Military Science following the publication of this book. This
degree indicates the colonel has successfully defended a
dissertation and is considered an authority in his field. We have
printed the extract in response to requests to publish more
information on foreign military doctrine. We are interested in
learning your reactions to articles of this nature.
2

Our anonymous British friend, "T2", has contributed another most

amusing article and it's a must for all S2 types. MAJ Bob Tetu,
another former contributing author, has provided some excellent
reasons why division artillery commanders should retain control of
their aviation sections. We have two good articles from field
artillery units. LTC Bobby Godwin has written about some
challenging section-level training and testing conducted in his unit,
and MAJ Robert White, CPT Eddie Liles, and LT Bennie Jamerson
have gotten together and highlighted some modifications to fire
direction centers worked up by the Redlegs of the First Cavalry
Division Artillery.
An old friend of the Journal (past and present), Fairfax Downey,
has graciously granted us permission to publish an excerpt from a
recent work of his, "Yale Batteries," an entertaining look at field
artillery training at the university level prior to the beginning of
World War I. Another retired Redleg, Richard K. McMaster, has
written about a one-of-a-kind unit, Bridgman's Bull Battery.
The Enlisted Evaluation System, something of interest to all Field
Artillery officers and enlisted men, has been reviewed exclusively
for the Journal by CPT David R. Fabian, the MILPERCEN
Information Officer. CPT Earl Finley, of the Field Artillery School
Gunnery Department and a former contributor, has outlined current
procedures for conventional artillery attack of moving targets. LTC
Allan Stern, Defense Intelligence Agency, has provided an
overview of the multiple rocket launcher systems of other nations
and added some ideas of his own. As indicated in the editor's note
accompanying that article, we are in the process of preparing an
article for the next issue on the general support rocket system
(GSRS).
We also plan to publish an article highlighting the
cannon-launched guided projectile (CLGP), as is indicated by our
back cover.
Finally, it has been our experience (to paraphrase a legal adage)
that whenever two Redlegs get together their opinions always
differ. Indeed, rampant boredom paired with the demise of creative
thought might well result if all artillerymen were to agree on all
topics, to include the ideas presented by our authors. Through a
review of the last couple of issues, one can find topics seemingly
demanding further discussion. We are holding space in our
"Incoming" feature for just such commentaries. Support your
branch periodical . . . write today.
Enjoy your Journal!
3

editor

letters to the editor

FO Takes Command
Dear General Ott:
I apologize for not writing you
earlier, but I would like to now officially
express my opinion and the opinion of
the officers of the XVIII Airborne Corps
Artillery in regard to the Field Artillery
Journal. The January-February 1974
issue is outstanding in scope and in
format; the articles are interesting and
professionally stimulating.
My organization is, at the present,
trying out the registration procedures
described in "The FO Takes Command."
Such articles not only are interesting but
are indicative of innovative thinking on
the part of the School. My officers and I
would like to see more articles of that
nature in future issues of the Journal.
My personal congratulations to those
who were involved in the publication.
XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery also
hopes to provide the Journal with
articles of interest to members of the
Field Artillery community.
Frank E. Serio
COL, FA
Commander
XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery

Swamp Angel
Dear Sir:
Reference
is
made
to
the
January-February 1974 issue of the Field
Artillery Journal.
After reading 2LT Robert E.
Dunfield's very interesting article entitled
"Swamp Angel," I recalled that there is a
Civil War-vintage cannon called "Swamp
Angel" in Trenton, New Jersey. This
8-inch Parrott rifle is located in
Cadwalder's Park.
The inscription on the plaque affixed
to the cannon's foundation indicates that
this is the original Swamp Angel that
fired on Charleston, South Carolina, on
22-24 August 1863.

Enclosed are several snapshots I

have taken which you may forward to
2LT Dunfield for his information and
personal records on the gun.
David P. Peck
First Sergeant
HHB, 50th Armd Div Arty
NJARNG

well done on the January-February

Journal. Keep up the good work.
In "Firing the Corps" of that issue,
LTC Neil A. Menzies was listed as the
commander of our battalion. However,
LTC Menzies departed on 1 November
1973 and LTC James W. Shufelt took
command.
We hope this information will be
helpful to update your records.
James A. McCarty
CPT, FA
Adjutant
Our records have been updated. Thank
you.Ed.

Truman Cover

Training The Trainer

Dear Sir:
Congratulations and thank you for
publishing the Field Artillery Journal.
Your January-February edition was
passed on to me by a friend, and I hope
never to be without a subscription. The
thorough and objective presentation of
subject matter was very refreshing. By
moving artillery into the limelight, you
seem to avoid the technical dilution and
simplification
that
affects
other
publications, thus producing a resource of
high professional value.
"Training the Trainer," by COL
William L. Hauser, was, in my opinion, a
target hit. I hope other experienced
artillerymen will share their route to
"training that works" versus "training that
looks good."
Kindly honor my subscription request.
G. H. Kerr
1LT, USMC
Camp Lejeune, NC

Commanders List
Dear Sir:
We of the 1st Battalion, 83d Artillery,
extend our congratulations for a job

Dear Sir:
I am most pleased to accept the fine
watercolor portrait of CPT Harry S
Truman by SP4 Nick Long (see cover
March-April Journal) for the Harry S
Truman Library and Museum. The
portrait will be added to our Museum
collection and will be used for exhibit in
the public galleries.
Your cooperation in this matter and
your interest in the Harry S Truman
Library and Museum are most
appreciated.
Benedict K. Zobrist
Director
Harry S Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

AFA for the Corps

Dear Sir:
The March-April Journal contained
an article, "Aerial Field Artillery for the
Corps," by CPT Winn McDougal. While
the article was interesting and thought
provoking, it contained one glaring error,
as follows: "Currently we have . . . an
AFA battery undergoing tests with Project
MASSTER at Fort Hood. . . ." The AFA
battery "undergoing

Oren E. Oeschger
CPT, FA
Commander
Battery D. 1st Battalion (Abn)
509th Infantry
Your Journals are enroute. We are
looking forward to hearing more from the
airborne Redlegs of the 509th BCT.Ed.

tests" with Project MASSTER is Battery

F (Aerial), 79th Field Artillerythe Blue
Max, organic to the Red Team (Division
Artillery) of the First Team (1st Cavalry
Division) and should be referred to
accordingly.
Charles L. Fulton
MAJ, FA
Assistant S3,
1st Cavalry Division
Our apologies to the officers and men of
the Blue Max. A check reveals you are on
our mailing list. Let us hear more from
you.Ed.

Congratulations
Dear Sir:
I think the Field Artillery Journal
is an outstanding publication. It is well
read by members of the 12th Marines.
We look forward to each issue.
Congratulations on a job well done.
J. L. Miller
MAJ, USMC
Hq Btry, 2d Bn, 12th Marines

And More
Dear Sir:
Congratulations on your resurrection
and vast improvement of the Field
Artillery Journal. Our staff considers
your March-April 1974 issue a first-class
effort. You have achieved a remarkable
content balance of technical and general
interest articles.
If the Army Administrator staff can
ever be of any assistance, please let us
know.
Terry Olbrysh
1LT, AGC
Editor, Army Administrator

Sound Ranging

2,000 pounds hand winch for lifting the

howitzer trails. The lunette self-centers
on the pintle.
Since we only have one or two men
at a Guard Armory, moving guns has
been a problem. Now, with the
bracket/hand winch attachment and the
small cart, both designed by Sergeant
First Class Moye, the guns can be moved
around and hitched up easily by 2 or 3
men.
Alan W. Bourne
MAJ, FA
Wyoming Army National Guard

No Hitches

Dear Sir:
SFC Kenard E. Moye, Chief of
Firing Battery, A Battery, 1st Battalion,
49th Field Artillery in Gillette, Wyoming,
has done it again! As you recall (see July
1973 Journal, pg. 38), using scrap
material, he constructed a simple
two-wheel cart which facilitated moving
the unit's howitzers.
Now, he's come up with a
bracket/hand winch attachment for a
one-man hitch-up of the 155 M115's to a
prime mover. The bracket mounts over
the tailgate allowing hookup of a small

No Journal
Dear Sir:
Believe it or not, but we are not at
present receiving the Field Artillery
Journal.
We need it. Tucked away as we are
in Italy in the Army's Airborne Infantry
Battalion Combat Team, people tend to
overlook us.
We are proud field artillerymen and
we look forward to receiving our
Journal. Can you help us?
Thank you in advance.

Dear Sir:
Late is never better than not at all!
The foregoing applies to the state of the
hostile battery-locating capability of the
field artillery. My pique was charged by
reading MAJ Glen Coffman's outstanding
article "Sound RangingDead or Alive?"
in the March-April Journal. I am
confident that sound ranging is an answer
to the dilemma of instituting a viable and
passive counterbattery system, but maybe
not
in
the
ultrasophisticated,
sensor-supported way outlined in the
article and a companion piece telling of the
acoustic artillery location system (AALS).
If you will permit, I will tell a short
war story. On 17 August 1972, after
serving as an assistant S3 with the 3d
Brigade (SEP), 1st Cavalry Division,
and subsequently as commander of Task
Force GARRY OWEN Artillery (which
fired the last First Team artillery round
of the Vietnam War), I was inserted into
the city of An Loc, which was still
surrounded and under siege by elements
of the 7th and 9th NVA Divisions. There
I joined MACV Advisory Team 87 as
the G3/artillery advisor to the 18th
ARVN Division. The friendly artillery
situation was extremely precarious, with
only four operational 105-mm howitzers
and two 4.2-inch mortars available to
support four, admittedly understrength,
regimental-size elements: the 43d, 48th,
and 52d Regiments of the 1st Cav
Division and the 5th Ranger Group plus
a smattering of province and district
units. Since the beginning of the siege in
April, two friendly batteriesone
155-mm battery and one 105-mm
battery had been lost to enemy
counterattacks. The NVA had us
outgunned, both in range and in tube
count, their strength being variously
described as from four to eight 155-mm
howitzers and from six to ten 105-mm
howitzers. To try to even the odds a bit,
the division artillery officer, the division

G3, and the advisors had established a

sound bearing system comprised of three
observation posts. The system, which was
initially a suicide mission for the FO, was
as follows:
The FO's were placed in relatively
exposed positionsone on a small hill just
outside our northern perimeter, one on top of
a water tower (with only three of its four
legs still standing) in the southeast sector of
the city, and one on the western perimeter
adjacent to the road to Duc Minh and Tonle
Chan. From these positions the FO's
wouldyou guessed itLISTEN. Contrary
to popular belief, even through the
cacophony of battle, hostile artillery can be
heard when firing. The FO's would call
SHOT to our command post in an old
Japanese dungeon in the center of town, and
5 to 7 seconds later the rounds would hit. In
the meantime, each FO would give us a
direction to where he thought the sound
came from, and we would plot the azimuths
on a map and determine an approximate
location. We would then make a map
inspection for likely artillery positions and
begin a one-gun zone fire of the area (since
all ammunition was either airdropped or
hooked in, we used it sparingly) while some
brave souls ventured outside for crater
analysis. If the area was out of range, we
would call one of our FAC's and bomb the
grid square.
Was our system successful? I don't
know. On the other hand, I don't know that
it wasn't. At least the NVA stopped firing,
and on days when we were taking upwards
of 300 rounds of artillery (not to mention
uncounted mortar, recoilless rifle, and
rocket fires) in an area about 5 city blocks
wide and 7 to 8 city blocks long, one
fire-free hour seemed an eternity.
The upshot of this disseration is that
we need a credible counterbattery
capability NOW, not later. We need a
simple system NOW, not a system
dependent on telemetry and complicated,
vulnerable data links later. We need a
$5,000 system NOW, not a $50,000 system
later. We need a system accurate to 50 meters
NOW, not a 5-meter accuracy later. (Look in
your firing tables sometime at probable
errors in range for your weapon; at any rate,

letters to the editor

I'd zone fire a hostile battery regardless of the
accuracy of location.)
The ideal system, as I see it, would be a
piece of equipment about the size of a coffee
can containing a discrete directional
microphone. The "coffee can" would be
carried into battle by the FO and emplaced
every time he stopped. In this way, three FO's
on a linear battlefield could hear a hostile
battery, get an azimuth readout, and send to
the FDC the azimuths intersect and SHOOT.
No complicated microphone grid, no
complicated computer system. Three
deflections5 mils, three quadrants3 mils.
Think about it. Keep it simple, field it NOW.
William C. Parnell III
MAJ, FA
S3, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery

Target Acquisition
Dear Sir:
The emphasis being placed on target
acquisition in the Field Artillery Journal is
appreciated by all those interested in this
important, but often overlooked, role of the
field artillery. The members of the
Wolfpackthe 1st Battalion, 25th Field
Artillery (Target Acquisition) are gratified
by the Journal's effort to impart the
requirement for improvement in the target
acquisition effort. However, contrary to the
opinion shared by COL (Ret) Arthur R. Hercz
(see "Incoming," March-April Journal) and
MAJ Glenn Coffman (see "The Gap in Target
Acquisition," Journal, July 1973), the sound
rangers of the Wolfpack are not undertrained
and their equipment is in operational order. It is
true that the equipment is somewhat
antiquated, but the addition of the FADAC has
enabled the sound rangers to provide artillery
locations in a relatively short time.
Since July 1973, the Wolfpack has
placed increased emphasis on locating
artillery weapons by all sources available to
the target acquisition battalion. With
concentrated effort on the acquisition of
targets, as opposed to adjustment of artillery,
the units have been deployed during numerous
field exercises to locate field artillery and
mortars firing into the Fort Bragg impact areas.
Such training has proved highly beneficial as
the accuracy and frequency of location has
steadily improved. During the last FTX,

(conducted in late April) every firing

element was located. It should be pointed
out that in these exercises the radial error
was predominantly less than 400 meters.
The majority of the locations were within
100 meters of the firing element and several
were within 50 meters. The accuracy of
sound ranging has persisted throughout these
exercises, proving that it is still an effective
target locator.
The Wolfpack is looking forward to the
receipt
of
the
new
AN/TNS-10
(transistorized GR-8) and hopefully a
proportionate decrease in maintenance
problems. With the advent of long-range
artillery, as was available to the North
Vietnamese during the latter stages of the
Vietnam
War,
the
idea
of
an
observer-activated sound ranging system is
probably pass. The new sound ranging
system, the acoustic artillery locating system
(AALS), as discussed in Major Coffman's
article, should be pursued vigorously, as
should other techniques not reliant upon a
sound observer.
Our radar platoons have also continued
their success in locating firing weapons.
Emphasis should continue in the
improvement of new radar systems. Again,
with the advent of long-range direct support
artillery, corresponding acquisition elements
must come to the surface in order to counter
the threat.
Flash ranging at Fort Bragg is difficult
when oriented away from the impact area, as
observation is severely impaired by the
relatively flat terrain and dense foliage in the
surrounding maneuver areas. Undaunted, the
Wolfpack has continually employed flash to
locate "enemy" artillery during training
exercises. Targets have been found with
increased accuracy, frequency, and speed.
Battlefield information has been pushed
through intelligence channels, and this
significantly aids in providing support data
for the determination of weapon locations.
Normally, one of the two flash platoons is
either adjusting artillery or supporting an
ORTT during an FTX, thus demonstrating
the flexibility of flash ranging as well as its
importance to the counterbattery effort.
Coordination of the target acquisition
effort is another area requiring further
study.
The
processing
of
target
information into intelligence at the
battery, battalion, and finally corps
artillery levels, prior to putting steel on
the target makes for a slow and redundant
system. Consequently, the 1st Battalion, 25th

Field Artillery, has realized the idea of

passing targeting data to the XVIII
Airborne Corps Artillery S2 as rapidly as
possible by relaying the data with
minimal processing to the battalion S2
who is collocated with the corps artillery
S2. This does not preclude the battery
processing section from refining their
data and forwarding a correction at a later
time, if necessary. With the improved
artillery technology realized after World
War II, speed is essential for US artillery
to remain the King of Battle.
Several innovative ideas have been
put forth at Fort Bragg during the past
year to retain interest in target
acquisition. For example, the technique
of integrating the Mohawk OV-1 aircraft
system with the target acquisition
battalion and the vectoring of aerial field
artillery by counterbattery radar have
been successfully attempted. In addition,
the battalion is scheduled to receive
searchlights, which are programmed for
employment during field training this
fall. The members of the Wolfpack
believe the target acquisition innovations
are limited only by equipment
availability. The Wolfpack is definitely
alive and well at Fort Bragg, proud
members of the XVIII Airborne Corps
Artillery.
Kenneth A. Kleypas
LTC, FA
Commander
1st Bn, 25th FA

Mailing
Dear Sir:
We would appreciate it very much if
you could include this office on your
mailing list for two copies of the Journal.
The
1st
Armored
Division
Information Office has sent news releases
to the Field Artilleryman in the past and
we will continue to send releases to you.

If at all possible, please send us two

copies of the March-April 1974 edition.
Please feel free to call on us for any
assistance and thank you in advance for
cooperation.
Charles R. Crescioni
MAJ, GS
Division Information Officer
1st Armored Division
Your letter and the Journals have
crossed in the mail. We just recently
forwarded copies of the Journal to all
division and post Information Officers.
Thank you for your continued support.
Ed.

Dear Sir:
We compliment you on the fine job
you have done in bringing back the Field
Artillery Journal. The members of the
1st Battalion, 77th Field Artillery,
enthusiastically received your initial
issues.
At present our battalion is not
receiving the Field Artillery Journal on a
regular basis. We received our initial copies
from division artillery and sister units.
There are presently 30 officers and
301 enlisted men in this battalion.
Request that we be placed on your
mailing list and that we be sent a
generous number of copies of all
subsequent issues. Also, we would
appreciate copies of back issues you may
have available.
Ronald B. Travis
CPT, FA
1st Bn, 77th FA
1st Cavalry Division
A check revealed that your unit is, in fact,
on our mailing list. Unit adjutants and
mail clerks are advised that battalion and
higher field artillery units receive their
Journals in one envelope addressed to
each specific organization.
Ed.

For The Record

Dear Sir:
Needless to say, my wife and I
thoroughly enjoyed the March-April
issue of the Journal and appreciate
having both of our articles appear in the
same issue. If you have a couple of extra
copies I would certainly appreciate
having them.
Additionally, I want to mention the
picture on page 17. This photo has
appeared several times in various
publications because it is a good combat
picture, but it is never identified,
probably because no one knows its
origin. For the record, it is a picture of
Battery C, 2d Battalion, 9th Field
Artillery, commanded by CPT R.
Morales. The battalion was part of the 3d
Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry
Division. The picture was taken in early
June 1966 at Landing Zone 10 Alpha (10
kilometers north of Duc Co), while the
battery was firing in support of elements
of the 1st Cavalry Division, which was
making a combat assault during
Operation Paul Revere.
The story of the LZ would be an article
in itself, and I may find it worth writing one
of these days in my "spare time."
I enjoyed seeing you last month and
highly recommend that the editor get out to
the field. Try visiting Fort Hood as a start!
William H. Schneider
LTC, FA
Commander
1st Battalion, 77th Field Artillery
The requested Journals are on the way,
and we are eagerly awaiting your
article.Ed.

of wing signals that has been worked out and used very
successfully by the field artillery in Hawaii.

Airplane Shoots
Via Signals
by MAJ Carlos Brewer
Since observation of artillery fire from airplanes will
probably be one of the principal methods of conducting fire in
future wars, it is important that every means of
communication between plane and battery be developed.
Visual communication is certainly the simplest and surest
means and it is believed that some standard set of signals
should be adopted by the field artillery. Below is a set

By use of these signals it was possible to locate a

target and adjust fire on it very promptly without the use
of any other means of communication. It was possible to
fire considerably faster by using these signals than by
radio. This was due to the fact that the plane worked
directly with the battery and could be sure that the signal
was received instantly at the battery. This fact made it
unnecessary for the plane to fly back to a point where it
could see the panel, because the battery was sure to be
ready to fire twenty seconds after the signal. Thus the
plane remained over the target and gave the signal to fire
the next salvo about thirty seconds after reporting on the
preceding salvo. If for any reason the battery did not fire
when the plane gave the command, the plane would
repeat the command once, and then if the battery did not
fire, the observer would fly back and take a look at the
panel. This, however, was seldom necessary. Messages
from the plane to the battery, other than those for which
signals are prescribed, were sent by means of dropped
messages.
The method of locating the target is as follows: The
airplane flies over the battery and straight toward the
target. The battery commander follows the plane with
his battery commander's telescope, keeping the
cross-hairs on it. When the plane arrives directly over
the target, it zooms (ascends sharply) and turns. At this
instant the battery commander ceases tracking the plane
and notes the angle in mils subtended by the wings of
the plane. The telescope is now laid in the direction of
the target, and the deflection to the aiming point can be
measured. The plane indicates the target a second time to
make sure the battery commander gets it and to give him
the mean of two observations, if possible. The range is
now computed by dividing the wing span of the airplane
(approximately 15 yards, in case of the DH-4) by the
angle in mils as read at the time the plane was directly
over the target. If a map is available, the target is now
located on the map by means of the deflection and range,
and firing data is computed in the usual way.
Continued on Page 62

leaving the School

BG Koch
Departs
It was with great reluctance
that the Field Artillery community
bade farewell to General
and Mrs. Koch.
MG David E. Ott, Commandant, presents the Ancient
Order of St. Barbara to BG Robert J. Koch, left,
Assistant Commandant.

BG Robert J. Koch, Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery

School at Fort Sill for almost 2 years, is now Deputy Director of J-5 (Plans
and Policies), U.S. Readiness Command, McDill Air Force Base, Tampa,
Florida.
While the general's accomplishments are many, this staff feels his
efforts in reviving a professional magazine, the Field Artillery Journal,
deserve special recognition and are exemplary of his endeavors while
serving as assistant commandant. Because of his perseverance, the
Department of the Army granted permission to publish the Journal in the
summer of 1973.
General Koch's contributions to the training
establishment, and the resulting benefits to the
capabilities and readiness of the Field Artillery, are just
as far reaching. With aggressive leadership and
guidance, he achieved his goal of making the Field
Artillery School the leader in instilling professionalism
in all Redlegs. The pyramiding effect of General Koch's
achievements will positively enhance the capability of
Field Artillery units worldwide and, thus, the stature of
the entire US Army.
Among General Koch's accomplishments are:
A 5-day field trip by Officer Advanced Course
students to two Air Force bases and the Naval Amphibious
Warfare School during which students take part in live
training exercises to gain expertise in the coordination of
air and naval fire support.
The "Student Highlights of Training" (SHOT)
exercise to give Officer Basic Course students an overall
preview of the course on their first day at Fort Sill.
Participation by officer students' wives in academic
and field exercise training so they may obtain better
insight into the multifaceted career of the military officer.

A revised Faculty Advisor Program.

A pilot program to produce a new operator's
manual for the self-propelled howitzer M109/M109A1.
A training extension course (TEC) program.
General and Mrs. Koch were recognized for their
contributions to the community at a farewell dinner in
their honor 10 June. The general was presented the
Ancient Order of Saint Barbara medallion by MG David
E. Ott, Commandant, Field Artillery School.
Tribute was paid to Mrs. Koch as she was awarded
the Artillery Order of Molly Pitcher. General Ott made
the presentation in recognition of Mrs. Koch's
contributions to community life. The order derives its
name from the inspirational recounting of Molly
Pitcher's gallantry in the Revolutionary War.
Mrs. Koch was on the executive board of the Officers
Wives' Club, served as the Teen Club advisor, and was
also an advisor to the Board of Governors of the Thrift
Shop. She was active in the Church Women's Guild,
Parent-Teachers Association, Artillery Hunt, and the
Lawton-Fort Sill Arts and Humanities Council.
9

Notes from the School

used, as the panoramic telescopes are more visible to the

student.
Current usage of the room calls for an instructor to
orient the student by having him read the general and special
situations, which include an azimuth of fire and an azimuth
to the end of the orienting line. Then the instructor requires
the student to level and orient the aiming circle and to lay the
battery by using proper procedures and commands. While
the student reads the deflections to the weapons, the
instructor acts as a gunner on each of the six weapons and
sets off announced deflections on the scales of the control
wheels mounted on the righthand side of the table (see inset
below).
If the student is having trouble orienting the aiming
circle and getting started on the requirement, a taped
program with slides (displayed in a viewer installed below
the table) can be started by the instructor. The program
begins where the special situation orientation ends and
provides a step-by-step review of the procedures for laying
the battery. In addition, a television monitor and a 29-minute
video tape cassette are available in the room to provide a
more detailed review for the student, should it be required.
To provide a greater challenge, the room also has been

remedial training

Laying the battery

training aid built
A new approach to student remedial training in laying
the battery had been developed by the Firing Battery Branch
of the Materiel and Maintenance Department, US Army
Field Artillery School. For the student who is having
problems mastering the technique of using the M2 aiming
circle in laying the field artillery battery, the facility provides
an opportunity to work under the individual attention of an
instructor, at the student's own pace, and out of the elements.
The prototype training aid is currently set up in a small
soundproof room in Summerall Hall. To add realism to the
layout, Celotex sheets have been used to build up the terrain
in the firing battery area, miniature trees and shrubs have
been included, and a mural has been added as a background.
The end of the orienting line has been located to the left
front of the firing battery, and an aiming circle has been set
up at the left rear of the battery. For the student's orientation,
charts describing general and special situations have been
mounted on the wall. Models of towed howitzers have been

10

equipped with everything necessary to simulate an

occupation during darkness. The end of the orienting line,
certain items on the mural, and the sights of the howitzers
have been painted with a white luminescent paint that
glows when illuminated by a black light mounted on the
rear wall. A night lighting device has been mounted on the
aiming circle tripod. When the instructor gives the student
a new situation requiring him to lay the battery at night, he
turns on the black light and turns off the normal lighting.
Although this training aid is still in the development
stage and is continually being modified on the basis of
comments of students and visitors from field units, the

Firing Battery Branch has a great deal of faith in its

potential as an aid to the instructors in the branch. Plans for
modification in the near future include mounting a magnet
on the base of the aiming circle to attract the magnetic
needle and allow the student to lay the battery by using the
grid azimuth method. Plans are also being formulated to
include the capability of measuring site to crest and
determining the minimum quadrant elevation. Visitors to
the Field Artillery School are cordially invited to see the
training aid in Room 42 of Summerall Hall, and all
comments and suggestions for improvement are welcome.

The FADAC requires 15 digits of data for each target.

The first five digits are the target easting, the second five
are the target northing, and the last five are the target
altitude. (The higher order digits in the altitude field are
filled with zeroes if necessary.) The FADAC stores the
targets in sequence as they are read from the proper tape.
The tape is prepared by using the teletypewriter
reperforator-transmitter TT/76GGC, which is a component
of the AN/GRC-46, AN/GRC-122, and AN/GRC-142 radio
sets.
Details on tape preparation are explained in the
following table, which is derived from U. S. Army Field
Artillery School Fire Control and Coordination
Information Letter, dated June 1973, subject: Field
Artillery Digital Automatic Computer.

AUTOMATIC ENTRY
OF A TARGET LIST
The field artillery gun direction computer M18
(FADAC) using the Revision 5 cannon program can accept
a list of up to 128 targets to be stored for future use. This
list of targets may be entered by using a punched paper
tape and the mechanical tape reader. A significant
operational capability accrues with this added
improvement to the FADAC. Targets that are part of a
contingency plan may now be placed on tape and filed with
the plan. Then, the plan is implemented, the lists of targets
can be entered rapidly with an assurance that there will be
no operator input errors.

TARGET LIST TAPE PREPARATION

Target list

Machine function

Remarks

The list is prepared sequentially starting

with target 1.

Advance the tape 4 to 5 inches

by using the BLANK key or the
advance lever on the TT/76.

The blank portion of the tape is used

to thread the tape into the mechanical
reader.

Easting

Northing

Alt

Cut 15 digits*

Code

43200
38112

54300
51986

410
382

432005430000410
381125198600382

1 CR, 1 LF
1 CR, 1 LF
*
*
1 CR, 1 LF

40900

56250

400

409005625000400

First target
Second target
Target list
Last target
Stop Code

Advance the tape 4 to 5 inches by

using the BLANK key or the
advance lever on the TT/76.

Protects last prepunched data.

CRCarriage return LFLine feed *The 15 digits as follows must be used: 5 digits for easting, 5 digits for northing, 5 digits for
altitude. The higher order digits in the altitude field are filled with zeros if necessary.

11

An interesting and
challenging look at
how the FO can
attack a moving
target and kill it.

fire forces the enemy to "button up." The importance of

this action cannot be taken lightly, since it restricts the
enemy's vision, makes his command and control more
difficult, and increases his vulnerability to other antitank
weapons. Futhermore, fires of sufficient intensity may
demoralize the enemy and break up his attack or force him
to deploy prematurely into attack formations. Indirect
artillery fires can be used to separate accompanying
infantry from armored vehicles and thus make the enemy
armor more susceptible to successful engagement by other
armor-defeating means. These fires can also be used to
canalize enemy armor toward our strongest antitank
defenses or toward the least favorable terrain for armor.
Smoke and WP projectiles can be used to blind or screen
the enemy and possibly ignite fuel spilled as a result of
ruptured fuel tanks. High-explosive shells, both
conventional and dual-purpose ICM, may be used to cause
damage to fire control equipment and/or rupture exterior
fuel tanks. These munitions can also be used to obtain target
"kills" (firepower, mobility, or catastrophic). Obtaining
armor kills with indirect artillery fire is a difficult
12

use of proper amounts and types of ammunition coupled

with accurate delivery techniques will be of little avail if
the target is inaccurately located. The location of stationary
targets is determined by using the procedures detailed in
FM 6-40. These procedures are adequate, and with the
addition of the laser rangefinder, they should prove even
more accurate. However, the problem of engaging moving
targets is another story. Data determined by using the
moving target's location upon acquisition is not satisfactory,
since the target may have moved more than 1 kilometer
during the elapsed time between the call for fire and the
impact of the rounds; even between volleys, the target may
move more than 100 meters. We will, of necessity, be
required to employ target location prediction techniques;
i.e., fire at the point where we believe the target will be
when the rounds impact. With the equipment currently
available in the inventory, the FO is the individual best
suited to make this prediction. He can actually see the
target and make modifications during the course of the
mission to compensate for changes in target speed and
direction of travel. The observer then must understand and
employ techniques that are peculiar to moving target
engagements.
The observer must make maximum use of the time
available to plan in advance for the attack of moving
armored targetsthe more time he has available, the better.
The FO procedures that follow are predicated on time being
available for advance planning, modifications will be
required when time does not permit such planning.
Upon occupation of position, the FO must determine
the most likely avenues of approach for enemy armor,
select checkpoints along those avenues, and determine
the distances between successive points. These distances
are recorded for later use in the determination of the
target's rate of speed. The FO selects likely intercept
points (IP, i.e., points at which to engage the moving
target) and transmits to the FDC the location of and OT
direction to each such point. The FDC, in turn, will
assign a target number and maintain continually updated
firing data to each intercept point.

business requiring large expenditures of munitions to do

the job. The capability for kills does exist, though, if we
are willing to pay the price.
In order to pay the smallest possible price, we, as field
artillerymen, must maximize the effectiveness of the
munitions we currently have in our inventory. At the same
time, however, we must strive toward developing new
munitions that will greatly enhance our capabilities. The
ideal means of maximizing the effects of current munitions
is to employ the proper types and amounts of ammunition
with no delivery error to attack stationary surveyed targets.
We must develop techniques that will allow us to closely
approximate these ideals. The sources for selection of the
proper types and amounts of ammunition are manuals of the
FM 6-141 series* and the appropriate Joint Munitions
Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) pamphlets. JMEM pamphlets
for ICM will be published in the near future. Factors to be
considered in the selection are size of the target, target
location error, range from weapon to target, and delivery
technique (met + VE or observer adjusted).
The use of the observer adjustment technique
eliminates most of our delivery errors, but it does provide
the enemy with warning to take cover or evasive action.
Also, in the attack of moving targets, observer adjustment
is not responsive enough; i.e., the target location will have
changed significantly by the time the forward observer is
ready to enter fire for effect. Since armor targets will
normally be moving, predicted fire (met + VE) will be the
primary delivery technique. Registrations, frequent met
updates, accurate muzzle velocity data, and use of the most
accurate computational means available (usually the
FADAC) are the primary means of minimizing the delivery
error.
Since most of our anti-armor indirect fire missions will
be met + VE fire, target location is extremely critical. The

*FM 6-141-1, Field Artillery Target Analysis and

Weapons Employment, in scheduled for publication
in unclassified form in the near future.
13

GO--AA
HO
Feb 74

Observer Rate Card

Time
(Sec)
Distance
(Meters)
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
850
900
950
1000

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

10.0 5.0 3.3 2.5 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.2

20.0 10.0 6.7 5.0 4.0 3.3 2.9 2.5
15.0 10.0 7.5 6.0 5.0 4.3 3.8
13.3 10.0 8.0 6.7 5.7 5.0
16.7 12.5 10.0 8.3 7.1 6.2
15.0 12.0 10.0 8.6 7.5
14.0 11.7 10.0 8.8
16.0 13.3 11.4 10.0
15.0 12.9 11.2
14.3 12.5
15.7 13.8
15.0

45

50

55

60

1.1
2.2
3.3
4.4
5.6
6.7
7.8
8.9
10.0
11.1
12.2
13.3
14.4
15.6

1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
11.0
12.0
13.0
14.0
15.0

.9
1.8
2.7
3.6
4.6
5.5
6.4
7.3
8.2
9.1
10.0
10.9
11.8
12.7
13.6
14.6
15.5

.8
1.7
2.5
3.3
4.2
5.0
5.8
6.7
7.5
8.3
9.2
10.0
10.8
11.7
12.5
13.3
14.2
15.0

65

70

75

80

1.5
2.3
3.1
3.8
4.6
5.4
6.2
6.9
7.7
8.5
9.2
10.0
10.8
11.5
12.3
13.1
13.8
14.6
15.4

1.4
2.1
2.9
3.6
4.3
5.0
5.7
6.4
7.1
7.9
8.6
9.3
10.0
10.8
11.4
12.1
12.9
13.6
14.3

1.3
2.0
2.7
3.3
4.0
4.7
5.3
6.0
6.7
7.3
8.0
8.7
9.3
10.0
10.7
11.3
12.0
12.7
13.3

1.2
1.9
2.5
3.1
3.8
4.4
5.0
5.6
6.2
6.9
7.5
8.1
8.8
9.4
10.0
10.6
11.2
11.9
12.5

85

90

95

100

105

110

115

120

1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0

1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5
2.4 2.2 2.1 2.0
2.9 2.8 2.6 2.5
3.5 3.3 3.2 3.0
4.1 3.9 3.7 3.5
4.7 4.4 4.2 4.0
5.3 5.0 4.7 4.5
5.9 5.6 5.3 5.0
6.5 6.1 5.8 5.5
7.1 6.9 6.3 6.0
7.6 7.2 6.8 6.5
8.2 7.8 7.4 7.0
8.8 8.3 7.9 7.5
9.4 8.8 8.4 8.0
10.0 9.4 8.9 8.5
10.6 10.0 9.5 9.0
11.2 10.6 10.0 9.5
11.8 11.1 10.5 10.0

1.0
1.4
1.9
2.4
2.9
3.3
3.8
4.3
4.8
5.2
5.7
6.2
6.7
7.1
7.6
8.1
8.6
9.0
9.5

.9
1.4
1.8
2.3
2.7
3.2
3.6
4.1
4.6
5.0
5.5
5.9
6.4
6.8
7.3
7.7
8.2
8.6
9.1

.9
1.3
1.7
2.2
2.6
3.0
3.5
3.9
4.3
4.8
5.2
5.7
6.1
6.5
7.0
7.4
7.8
8.3
8.7

.8
1.2
1.7
2.1
2.5
2.9
3.3
3.8
4.2
4.6
5.0
5.4
5.8
6.2
6.7
7.1
7.5
7.9
8.3

L2262 Army Ft. Sill, Okis.

To insure accuracy of fire, the FO should adjust fire or

conduct registrations on as many IP's as possible. The
importance of this adjustment (registration) cannot be
overemphasized, as it will significantly increase the
probability of effective fire. The observer should
periodically fire check rounds to insure that current firing
data are accurate and should apply corrections as necessary
to place the rounds on target.

AN/GVS-5 Laser Rangefinder

Once a moving target is acquired by the observer, time

is of the essence. Tubes may have to be shifted, so the FO
must rapidly determine the target's probable route, select an
IP for target engagement, and transmit the call for fire.
Selection of an IP should not, however, delay transmission
of the following data to the FDC:
Identification of observer;
Warning order;
General location of the target (grid square and
proximity to some known point); and
Nature of target.
Notification that the target is moving signifies to the
FDC that a delay will ensue and that data for an "at my
command, fire for effect" mission will follow. It also
notifies the FDC that time of flight (TF) must be provided
the observer. The indicated target size will aid the fire
direction officer in his selection of the units to fire and in a
determination of whether to request additional fires; e.g.,
from division artillery. An example of this alert order to the
FDC is: REDLFG 18, THIS IS REDLEG 24, FIRE
MISSION, VICINITY TARGET AF7002, THREE TANKS
MOVING.
Once the observer has selected an IP, he sends the
complete fire mission to the FDC with AT MY
COMMAND, FIRE FOR EFFECT as the method of fire
and control. Now the observer must determine the time
to fire; i.e., he must command firing so that the target
and the fire-for-effect rounds arrive simultaneously at
14

the IP. This determination of when to command firing is

extremely critical. Consider the following case: The
observer is engaging a moving target, target radius (TR) of
75 meters, which is traveling at a rate of 30 kilometers per
hour. If the observer estimates the proper time to command
firing, then the target will arrive at the IP (assuming the FO
has correctly determined the target's route of travel)
simultaneously with the initial volley of rounds. This in
effect means that the observer obtains a target location
error (TLE) of 0 meters. Achieving a small TLE is
extremely important for obtaining effective fires. But what
if the observer makes an error in determining the time to
fire, either too early or too late? A 15-second error (target
speed of 30 km/hr) results in a TLE of 125 meters, a
30-second error results in a TLE of 250 meters, a
45-second error results in a TLE of 375 meters, and a
1-minute error results in a TLE of 500 meters. Errors in
estimation on the magnitude of +15 seconds, then, will
severely degrade and in most cases completely nullify
effective fires. Past experience indicates that errors of this
magnitude are easy to make. To eliminate or at least
minimize these errors, the observer must be well trained in
the techniques of conducting moving target missions and
specifically in determining the time to command firing.
The first element of information required for the
observer to determine the time to fire is the target's rate of
speed. Guessing the speed of a moving target is too
inaccurate for moving target engagements. To determine an
accurate rate of speed for the target, the observer must use
the checkpoints that he selected along the route of
approach. If he has not previously done so in the
preparation phase, the observer determines the distance
between two of these points through which the target will
pass. He then records the time required for the target to
pass between the two points. Using the distance between
the two points and the time required for the target to pass
between these points, the FO determines the target's speed
by using either formula R = D/T (rate = distance/time) or
the observer's rate card.

AN/TPS-58A Moving target location system

The target speed in meters per second is given at the
intersection of the appropriate time column and distance row.
For example, the FO determines that a tank platoon
will travel between checkpoints A and B. The distance
between the two points along a road is 300 meters. The
time required for the lead tank to travel between the two
points is 38 seconds. The FO enters the rate card with a
distance of 300 meters and a time of 40 seconds (nearest
listed value). He determines the target speed to be 7.5
meters per second (27 kmph).
The observer must now determine the appropriate time
to command firing. There are two methods the observer may
use to determine the time to fire. First, he can give the time
to fire as the engagement time plus travel time; e.g.,
ENGAGEMENT TIMETF PLUS 2 SECONDS. The
engagement time is the time the target is to arrive at the IP and
is equal to the time a known point was crossed plus the time
required for the target to travel from the known point to the IP.
The time required to travel this distance can be determined by
using either the rate card or formula T = D/R (time =
distance/rate). The observer enters the rate card with the
listed value nearest to the distance determined above (from
known point to the IP) and looks across this row until he
finds the rate closest to the target speed he has determined.

Using formula R = D/T is often too time consuming

and too complex for combat conditions. The observer rate
card, a pocket-sized card based on formula R = D/T, was
developed to aid the FO in his determination of target
speed and time to fire. The rate card lists target speed in
meters per second as a function of distance (m) and time
(sec). The card lists distances from 50 to 1,000 meters, in
50-meter increments and times from 5 to 120 seconds in
5-second increments. To determine the target's speed, the
observer enters the card with the listed value nearest to the
distance between the two checkpoints and the time taken to
travel between the two points. (The FO could visually
interpolate to obtain greater accuracy.)
15

The time column in which this rate is listed denotes the

approximate time it will take the target to travel this distance.
Thus, having kept track of the time the target crossed the
known point the FO knows when he wants the rounds on
target. Subtracting the announced TF + 2 seconds (allowed
for transmission time) from the time that he wants the
rounds on target, the observer now knows when to command
firing.
Second, the FO can give the command to fire when the
target is a distance from the IP corresponding to TF + 2
seconds; i.e., when the target is the distance from the IP that
it will travel during the projectile's time of flight + 2 seconds.
Using the observer rate card, the FO enters the card at the
listed value nearest to TF + 2 seconds and looks down the
column until he finds the rate closest to the target speed he
has determined. The distance row in which this is listed
denotes the distance the target will travel during TF + 2
seconds. The FO then subtracts this distance value from the
IP along the target's route of march and visually determines a
point on the ground. When the target reaches this point, the
observer gives the command to fire. This method of
determining when to fire is more flexible than the first, but
the observer may not always be able to use it; e.g., when the
point corresponding to a distance of TF + 2 seconds is not
visible to the observer.
If the fire is not effective because the target was not at
the IP on projectile impact, because the projectiles did not
impact on or near the IP, or because an insufficient number
of rounds were fired, the fire for effect must be adjusted.
First, the FO determines the correction, if any, required to
place the bursts on the original IP and, second, he determines
a new predicted point as the target takes evasive action. Very
simply, we are making the assumption that the factors which
caused the mean point of impact of the rounds to miss the
first IP will act in the same direction and magnitude on the
second IP; therefore, the necessary corrections to bring the
rounds onto the first IP are applied to the second IP by using
the direction to the first IP. In effect, the FO will be shooting
at an offset point. Once the FO has transmitted this data to
the FDC, he determines a new time to fire in the same
manner as he did previously.
The keyword for the FO is "flexibility." The observer
must remain flexible, since changes in target speed and
direction may occur at any time. He must react quickly to
such changes or the target will be lost. The procedures I have
presented are only a starting point for the observer; as he
gains experience, he may modify these procedures or
develop procedures of his own.
The FO procedures I have covered, to include use of the
rate card, are the first steps toward gaining an improved
indirect fire capability against moving armored targets. More
sophisticated hardware and munitions are being developed

to provide this improved capability. The moving target

location system AN/TPS-58A will enter the Army inventory
in the near future. The operator of this radar will be able to
adjust fire onto a moving target from within his shelter. With
the 58A, we will be able to make straight-line projections as
to where the moving target will be at a given time; i.e., the
58A will predict an IP. The FO will soon be equipped with a
laser rangefinder to aid him in the location of targets. With
the laser rangefinder, the FO will be able to locate IP's much
more accurately. The Army is also developing the
cannon-launched guided projectile (CLGP), a weapon that
will give the field artilleryman a single-shot kill capability
against moving armored targets. The CLGP is a terminally
guided projectile fired to the vicinity of a moving or
stationary hard point target. This target is "illuminated" by a
laser designator operated by an observer. The reflected laser
energy is sensed by the CLGP, and the round manuevers to
the target and obtains the kill. The CLGP will not solve all
our problems by any means, nor will it allow the observer to
become sloppy in his determination of target location. When
a CLGP is fired, it is limited in both the area that it can "see"
and the area within which it can manuever; i.e., if we shoot a
CLGP into the wrong grid square, then when the seeker
comes on, it may not be able to pick up the reflected energy
or it may not be able to manuever that far even if it sees the
target.
The Human Engineering Laboratory Battalion Artillery
Tests (HELBAT) III and IV were conducted at Fort Hood
and Fort Sill, respectively, to identify sources of observer
error during the attack of moving targets and to test new
procedures for the engagement of moving targets. The data
from these tests will be used to refine current observer
procedures, identify requirements for new equipment, and
determine the best means of using planned and/or projected
equipment. (See "HELBAT" in the May-June issue of the
Journal.Ed.)
Artillery can be used now to effectively engage enemy
armored units with indirect fires. The challenge to us as
artillerymen is to maximize our current capability, identify
areas in this capability for improvement, and then develop
new procedures and equipment to strengthen our capability
to effectively engage moving armored targets with indirect
artillery fire.

CPT Earl W. Finley, FA, received his MA in

mathematics from the University of Michigan.
He has served in Germany and Vietnam and is
currently assigned to the Gunnery Department
of the Field Artillery School. Captain Finley's
first article, "Modular FDC," appeared in the
January-February 1974 JOURNAL.
16

Photo courtesy of Prentice-Hall Inc.

The
Yale
Batteries
by
Fairfax Downey

In the fall of 1915, the president of Yale University, Arthur Twining

Hadley, largely through his own determination and persistence obtained
authorization to form a headquarters and four field artillery batteries as
components of the 10th Connecticut Field Artillery, part of the Connecticut
National Guard. The following summer (1916), the batteries trained at Camp
Summerall, Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania. Although the Yale Batteries did not
serve as units in World War I, it is significant that Yale provided more than 5
percent of all Field Artillery officers that did serve in that war.
Fairfax Downey, noted author and historian, a regular contributor to the
Field Artillery Journal, has chronicled the history of these batteries in his
excellent work entitled The Yale Batteries. The book has been privately
printed by the Yale University Press and is copyrighted. We have printed this
excerpt on the training of the Yale batteries at Camp Summerall with the
expressed permission of the author.
Those Redlegs interested in obtaining the complete work may do so by
writing to George D. Vaill, Office of the Secretary, Yale University, New
Haven, Connecticut 06520.Ed.
Tents Minus Ivy

1971 by Fairfax Downey

Author's permission required to reprint

The artillery picks its training area not for natural charm
but for maneuver space and firing ranges. The Yale Batteries,
detraining at Tobyhanna, agreed it was no Garden of Eden.
There were no Eves for miles around, and any tempting
serpents that showed would have been disciplined and thrown
in the guardhouse. True, at some distance from military
goings-on there was a summer resort and hotel. It might be
rarely reached for relaxation by a Redleg able to get a pass
and not too weary to use it.
Sergeant Harry A. Torson, '16, put on his rose-tinted
glasses when he wrote a description for the Yale Alumni
Weekly.
17

whom Yale men would serve in France, was fully manned.

Besides the 10th Connecticut, batteries from Maryland and
New Jersey were in training. The area teemed like a hill of
large khaki ants. Arrival of horses doubled and redoubled the
activity.

"Camp Summerall is a beautiful place. It is located in

Pennsylvania, midway between the Delaware Water Gap and
Scranton. A series of ridges, which form part of the Pocono
Mountains, runs north and south with deep valleys between.
The federal artillery camp of instruction where we are now
encamped occupies a portion of one of these ridges, the top
of which is comparatively flat. A drill ground, where
calisthenics are also held, lies to the north end of the camp
proper, while a north-and-south road divides the row of
officers' tents from the battery mess halls and battery streets.
These latter, along which the tents of the enlisted members
of the batteries are pitched, run at right angles to the main
camp road. The ground is exceedingly rocky and very well
drained.
"Scattered over the 18,000 acres which are included in
Camp Summerall are five artillery ranges. All of them afford
opportunity for target practice with the 3-inch field pieces
which constitute the complement of guns assigned to this
division of field artillery. These guns, of which each battery
has four, have a range of 6,500 yards. The altitude of the
camp is approximately 3,000 feet above sea level. A half
mile away is the highest point on the Delaware and
Lackawanna Railroad, where the heavy engines can be seen
from camp, pulling and puffing to top a point which rises
3,200 feet above sea level."
Batterymen who read the rhapsody would snort and
shrug, "What of it?" They could take it. They made like Boy
Scouts and pitched tents in rain whose frequency enhanced
the value of shelter. A competent hospital corps took good
care of the few who answered sick call; a fine health record
would be set for the summer. The guardhouse would hold
even fewer Yale occupants than the hospital; only one stood
courtmartial, and the charge was carelessness, not
insubordination or disobedience of orders.
The inner man was well sustained in the messhalls.
Battery C boasted it ate best under the auspices of Mess
Sergeant Walter Toole, '16, experienced in provender at his
father's summer hotels. Kitchens and kitchen police
functioned smoothly except for the occasion when Sergeant
A. R. Bellinger, '17, was chased around the Headquarters
Company tables by a cleaver-wielding, supernumerary cook
who had drunk up the supply of lemon extract. Fred
[Bellinger], as agile on his feet as with Greek and Latin
verbs, escaped handily.
Days were duty-crammed. At 5:15 a.m. the band made
the circuit of the camp, blasting its loudest. Batterymen,
wrenched out of sound sleep, cursed and understood why the
West Point band, performing a similar function, was called
"The Hellcats." Then it was on with the gruelling schedule,
and let toil be unconfined.
Sundays were (quotes) days of rest (end quotes), with
Church Call sounding. Otherwise there was nothing to do
but attend to the usual fatigues, stables, and so on.
Camp Summerall, named for a top artilleryman under

Stand to Horse
The Field Artillery bestowed two horses on each driver
to have and to holdif he could. He rode the near one and
guided it and the off one at its side with a handful of reins.
Lead, swing, and wheel pairs, increasing slightly in size to the
rearmost, they were hitched in column to limbers to which
gun carriages and ammunition carriers were hooked. Duly
mounted, drivers urged their charges forward at the command
to march and, barring balking, the battery rolled onwalk,
trot, even gallop. Field Artillery going into action looked
wonderful on recruiting posters, and the Yale units had
visualized themselves furnishing a reasonable facsimile.
They had yet fully to realize the necessary preliminaries.
Besides the care and feeding of his own pair, that of the
mounts of the officers and noncoms devolved upon drivers.
Although reluctant cannoneers, grumbling that horses were
none of their business, were sometimes drafted to help, the
lot of the driver was an onerous one.
Some drivers, like Walt Leonard, '16, who had ridden
since the age of 10 when his father gave him a stiff, old race
horse, even asked for assignment as a stable orderly,
preferring having a foot stepped on by a hoof to its being
rolled over by a gun wheel. He and his stable sergeant,
"Brose" Moss, '16, with their counterparts, presided over
grooming and the intricacies of harnessing and hitching,
which inspired a neophyte to verse in The Recall, the paper
brought out by Yale Record editors and other Tobyhanna
men.
"Oh, the driver's existence is careless and free
As the life of a bird in the air;
There's nothing on earth that can worry me.
I've naught on my mind but my hair.
If the bridle's too tight or the traces too long,
It's nothing in my life, and this is my song:
I don't give a damn if the whole thing is wrong!
Hurray, I'm a driver.
"It's true with the Sergeants I'm always in Dutch,
And their attitude toward me is acid.
Does it weigh on my conscience? I answer, 'Not
much.'
I'm perfectly patient and placid
I put collar 340 on horse 83.
If they see it and change it, it's nothing to me;
For the next time I put it on backward, you see.
Hurray, I'm a driver."
18

Even at the New Haven armory it had dawned on

batterymen that horse sanitation was an unending duty,
with no Hercules showing up to cleanse the like of Augean
stables, surely his toughest labor. It was up to the drivers,
their efforts constantly inspected, and the memory of their
toil lingered for years. At his 50th reunion Ellsworth
Bunker, '16, that redoubtable ambassador at large,
complained, "When I was a driver in the Yale Batteries, my
sergeant (he grinned at a classmate) was always putting me
on stable police. I've been shoveling it internationally ever
since."
That still more tribulations lay in store had become
evident when boxcars full of horses first arrived at
Tobyhanna.
Their
freight's
appearance
aroused
apprehensions when instructors emphasized to drivers that
they must cherish these creatures till death did them part.
Frequently, from the looks of not a few sorry nags, it
would.
Thousands of sound American horses were being
provided for the British and French and expanding US
forces, yet numbers of those shipped to the Yale Batteries
were afflicted with distemper, colds, and other ills and
were not long for this world. While it may be conceded that
an encamped National Guard outfit could not expect
priority, the supply of animals was so ample that there was
no excuse for foisting unfit ones on the 10th Connecticut
FA. Thorough training demanded capable motive power.
As it proved, time spent in doctoring the ailing and burying
the dead (though both came under the head of experience)
was at the expense of more important tasks.
Without realizing what they were in for, drivers,
supervised by veterinarians, stable sergeants, and orderlies,
detrained coughing, rheumyeyed animals and led them to
sheds.
Sitting up with a sick friend is a kindly act. Sitting up
with a sick horse is Army regulations (presently underlined
by self-interest). Stable sergeants and orderlies were busy
giving treatments prescribed by the veterinarians. Repeat
medications may have inspired Henry W. Hobson, '14,
presently battalion sergeant major and subsequently a
bishop, wryly to quote the Scriptures.

Week after week equine obsequies took place daily. It

was a lucky day when only one burial detail was called out.
Batterymen tagged envied comrades assigned to such
comparatively light tasks as kitchen police or burning out
latrines. The unfortunates, who already had engaged in
strenuous morning setting-up exercises, shouldered picks
and shovels and marched to the growing burial ground.
They hacked catacombs, 6 feet deep as Army regulations
demanded, out of the obdurate ground while they sweltered
under the sun for hours. One weary squad conceived the
bright idea of sawing off a dead animal's legs so that only 4
feet down sufficed for decent interment. Regrettably,
Lieutenant Reginald Field, '16, a stickler for discipline,
strolled up and measured the depth of the hole into which
the corpus delicti had been lowered.
"Take him out," came the stern order. "Dig down to the
regulation 6 feet." And he stood by to see it done.
Steve Bent, '19, who was to write John Brown's Body,
was preoccupied with horse carcasses like his comrades. He
would vent his spleen in a Yale Record verse ending
"Evil-eyed horses that died of the glanders.
God, next vacation pray send me to Flanders,
Not Tobyhanna."
It was a far cry from the groves of Academe and
delights of the good old summertime but prime practice for
digging in, in the fields of France.
Colonel Danford cast a veteran's eye on the horse
shipments and shook his head. It took a great deal to
disturb him, but this situation portended trouble, including
a visitation by General Leonard Wood, former Indian Wars
surgeon, first colonel of the Rough Riders in the
Spanish-American War, and presently commander of the
Eastern Department, US Army.
"The horse story of the Yale Batteries at Tobyhanna
has never been told nor will it ever be," Danford wrote (in
a letter to the author), but his recollections shed much light
on it. "One of General Wood's favorites was a

"Hast thou given the horse strength?

Hast thou clothed his neck with thunder?
Canst thou make him afraid as a grasshopper?
The glory of his nostrils is terrible."
But not when said nostrils of poor, wheezing beasts
had to be frequently swabbed out with Kreolin solution.
Horses died by tens and scores. Regulations decreed
burial in deep, roomy graves without regard to the hard fact
that Tobyhanna terrain, except for a foot of topsoil, was
flinty and rocky as a first sergeant's heart.
19

cavalryman who I believe was in the Rough Riders with

him. This man was in charge of the purchase of animals
which came to us at Tobyhanna. He was assisted by a
man I had known as a cadet at West Point, but one who
had never served a day in the cavalry or field artillery
but was a coast artilleryman. Horses that are sound and
well can never be put in a boxcar and unloaded a few
hours later badly afflicted with shipping fever unless
they were sick when they were put in the car. I saw at
once what was happening (for I had purchased
government horses myself) and I let out a yell to General
Wood. He sent various officers to the camp to inspect us,
and these included the two who had purchased them!

"His response was simply,

'Uh-uh-uh ., . . ."
"At dinner that evening I told him that as he was the
country's main apostle of preparedness, I wanted him to
talk to our men about it. That suited him exactly, and he
made a great hit with the men that evening. And that
pleased him greatly. He departed early the next day after
he had stayed all night (occupying my tent and bunk).
When I took him to the station and bade him goodby, he
said to me, 'You need not worry, Danford. I see the
situation. Everything is all right!' I never heard another
word about the horses at Tobyhanna and I doubt if anyone
else ever did. Years later, however, after I was Chief of
Field Artillery, I had an opportunity to review my
efficiency file. I found that the General had forgotten to
change his derogatory report about me and my Tobyhanna
horses. So there it is to this day, interesting no one and
causing me no worry."
It was during the night of the general's visit that he
set out on a personal inspection. Knight Wooley, '17, was
on duty as a stable guard when a lantern-bearing party
approached. Expecting the veterinary, the sentry
challenged, "Halt. Who's there?" Back came the startling
answer: "Commanding General of the Eastern
Department." Wooley gasped and managed, "Advance
and be recognized." None other than General Wood, stars
glittering on his shoulder straps, stepped into the stable
light and was rigidly saluted.
"Sentry," the General demanded, "what would you do
if, while you were on duty, one of those horses was taken
sick?"
Wooley, fracturing military formality, burst out,
"Jesus, General, they're all sick!"
Hale horses and recovered invalids were mustered,
harnessed, and hitched. Bugles sounding "drivers and
cannoneers, mount," the men swung up onto saddles and
carriage seats. "Forward, march," and the batteries moved
out, red guidons fluttering. Wheels rumbled, hoofs
clicked, and toggle chains rattled as the teams leaned into
their collars and drew the traces taut. Sun gilded the dust
clouds that swirled behind. Batterymen told themselves
that they made a gallant sight. Except for firing on the
range, they were Field Artillery. And they were living up
to the song, as the caissons went rolling along.

"A day or two after these officers had left, I received

a two-page telegram from General Wood literally
blistering me. Information had reached him (he wired)
that the horses were in bad condition in my camp due to
utter neglect on my partinadequate care, feeding,
watering, grooming, etc.and he wound up by giving me
detailed instructions to put horse care at the very top of my
duty requirements! He ended with the sentence, 'Will be up
on the next train to inspect your work myself.' This last
sentence pleased me tremendously, for my thought was
that nobody could fool him, and he would see the whole
trouble.
"When I met him at the station the next day, he burst
forth in severest tones: 'Danford, what is wrong up here?
What is wrong with you and your horses?' To this I
replied, 'I ask you to reserve your judgment in this matter
until you see what I have to show you.' He went at once
from the railroad station to the horse lines. I had all the
descriptive lists which showed each animal's branded
hoof number, followed by the color, markings, and other
details. I had the animals led past us in single file while
we examined each as he stood before us, checking from
his descriptive list. One never saw so great a mixup! One
description called for a bay gelding with black points, 16
hands high and weighing 1,275 pounds, but there stood
before us a chestnut animal of 15 hands weighing barely
900 pounds. The government was paying $250 for a
wheel horse that weighed 1,200 pounds or over but only
$150 for a lead horse under the weight of 1,200 pounds. It
was noticeable that the proportion of 'wheel horses' was
much too great. There were various other discrepancies.
The government paid for many wheelers which failed to
survive Tobyhanna.
"General Wood could not fail to see the situation. And
he saw a lot of Yale boys swabbing out nostrils and
otherwise caring for sick animals under strict supervision.
His response was simply, 'Uh-uh-uh.' He saw Yale boys
burying dead horses in almost solid rock. It was my belief
that he got his eyes more than filled.

20

Bridgman's
Bull Battery
by
MAJ R. K. McMaster (Ret.)
Major McMaster served with the US 2d Field Artillery,
Horsedrawn and Porte and Pack, from 1926 to 1931. His
first contribution to the Journal was a letter to the editor
(see January-February 1974 issue). The author's father,
then Second Lieutenant Richard H. McMaster, is referred to
in the text as commander of Bridgman's Mountain Platoon.
Major McMaster's father served at Fort Sill as a private and
corporal with the 10th Infantry from 1895 to 1898. He went
on to serve as commander of the post as a captain (27
May-14 July 1911) and as a colonel (25 July- 25 October
1919). He retired 31 December 1938 with 43 years
service.Ed.
Light Battery, 6th US Artillery, was organized,
equipped, and horsed at Fort McHenry, Maryland, on 23
March 1898. The 6th Regiment of Artillery had been
authorized by Act of Congress on 8 March of that year.
First Lieutenant Harry L. Hawthorne commanded the
battery until 24 April when Captain Victor H. Bridgman
assumed command.
The battery left station for the Philippine Islands on 20
June 1898 and arrived at Manila Bay on 21 August aboard
the SS Peru, dropping anchor in the midst of Dewey's fleet,
the Oregon, the Olympia, and the Baltimore being only
about one-half mile distant from the Peru. They were also
in plain sight of the half-submerged Spanish fleet for
several days before they were placed in camp on the
Lunetta.
After a period of provost duty, Light Battery G was
sent to Iloilo on the Island of Panay. The battery was
equipped with six 3.2-inch field guns, drawn by 6-bull
teams, and a platoon of four 1.65-inch Hotchkiss mountain
guns. Two of the field guns were sent to the nearby island
of Cebu where some fighting was going on. In late October
the bulls were returned to the Quartermaster and the battery
received 40 mules as replacements. At this time the Right
Platoon was commanded by First Lieutenant Earle D.
Pearce, the Left Platoon by First Lieutenant Louis Ostheim,
and Mountain Platoon by Second Lieutenant Richard H.
McMaster.
In a letter to one of his former lieutenants, Major
Bridgman, then retired, wrote: "In matters of transportation
alone, no US outfit ever had or would ever have such an

experience. Starting bare, it was organized, equipped, and

beautifully horsed, and reported as fully prepared for active
service in less than three months. Stripped it went abroad,
landed with man-power to pull the guns. Then came the
little horses with rope harness, a period when detachments
were pulled by water buffalo, the hundred odd little
bullstrottingdiffering only in color from the sacred
bulls of India, and which were trained to the bugle call and
on more than one occasion did efficient horse service. Then
the big mules and the pack mules for the mountain guns.
Complete and truthful histories of such rare happenings
should find lodgement with the Adjutant General at
Washington as well as with local and central Headquarters.
Eons hence they would interest our successors."
In November the battery took part in the fall campaign
on Panay Island with the 18th Infantry, 19th Infantry, and
26th Volunteer Infantry, marching over 400 miles in the
process. The battery was in action in 30 battles and
engagements, among them the Battle of Jaro, the Battle of
Tide Water Creek, engagements at Jolo, Pavia, Santa
Barbara, Cebu, San Blas, Alimondion, and the Battle of
Antipue. Sergeant Lowe was killed, and First Sergeant
England and Private Murphy were wounded in the action at
Jaro. Captain Bridgman was awarded the Silver Star
Citation for the conduct of the battery in the Battle of Jaro.
On 16 July 1900, Captain Charles W. Foster relieved
Captain Bridgman. Up to this date the battery had been
known as "Bridgman's Bull Battery," as it was then
equipped with the native bulls in the absence of other draft
animals. On 16 April 1901, the name of the battery was
changed to 13th Battery, Field Artillery, and on 1 June
1907, the designation became Battery E, 5th Field Artillery.
After service on the Mexican border in 1916, and in France
with the 1st Division during 1917 and 1918, Battery E was
deactivated in 1922 at Camp Bragg, North Carolina.

21

Improved

FDC

The January-February issue of the Journal included an article entitled

"Modular FDC" that discussed several possible modifications to the
M109 and the M577 FDC's. Comments and suggestions were solicited
from units in the field, and three Redlegs from the 1st Cavalry Division
Artillery have responded with some ideas that we believe are worth
passing on. As always, your comments and suggestions are
welcome.Ed.

by
MAJ Robert A. White,
CPT Eddie W. Liles,
and
ILT Bennie B. Jamerson

The information contained herein is a consolidation of the

recommendations from the 1st Battalion, 6th Artillery, and the
1st Battalion, 77th Artillery, concerning FDC improvements in
self-propelled units, FDC improvements in airmobile units, and
general improvements in FDC computational equipment.
To standardize battery FDC's that use the M557A1 organic
to self-propelled field artillery batteries, the charts are modified
by removing the trestles and installing the chart tables with a
lightweight alloy angle iron against one side of the tent
extension frame. The angle iron is hinged so that the tables may
be folded against the vertical supports for installation, removal,
and access to the plotting sets and footlocker under the tables.
Overall working space in the FDC is increased by using the
modified chart tables, as there is much less elbow-to-elbow
work. The FADAC is placed next to the vertical chart, since the
vertical chart operator (VCO) is also the FADAC
22

operator (only one chart is used when FADAC is in

operation). The computer is placed next to the FADAC so
that eye contact is maintained between the computer and the
FADAC operator. The fire direction officer can exercise
supervision over all aspects of the FDC with this
configuration, including monitoring the FADAC operator's
input into the FADAC.
Certain additions and improvements to the basic
M557A1 would enhance its use as a command post and/or
FDC vehicle. A leveling platform and four leveling screws
may be installed in the 4.2-kilowatt generator mount to level
the generator when the vehicle is placed on uneven terrain. A
hand-cranked telescoping antenna mast (preferably one that
holds two RC-292 antennas) may be installed on the rear of
the track. The mast section should swing out to the side of
the vehicle, away from the tent extension, before being
raised. The shelf on which radios are mounted may be
lowered to increase air flow and to ease radio
maintenance/repair without removing the radios. Brackets
may be installed on top of the vehicle in the vicinity of the
ballast brackets to mount one 3-kilowatt, 400-cycle
generator for use with the FADAC. The vehicle mapboard
may be constructed of a lighter weight material. As an
alternative to using the M557A1 as an FDC vehicle, use of
the 2-ton van M109 would enhance firing battery
operations. The semipermanent installation of charts, the
FADAC, radios, telephones, etc., would considerably
decrease the amount of time required to set up an FDC.
Although a 2-ton truck is not as mobile as a tracked
vehicle and it presents a larger profile, the firing battery
depends on similar vehicles for mess, maintenance, supply,
and ammunition. One more truck would not make the
battery any less mobile or any more conspicuous.
The battery FDC configuration presented represents an
excellent use of available vehicles and equipment, while
modifications to the M577A1 or its replacement with a
2-ton van M109 would improve FDC operations by using
equipment currently available to the US Army.
Pop-up camper trailers have been used as FDC vehicles
by some airmobile units for approximately 1 year.
(Previously, any type of FDC had proved unsatisfactory due
to the requirement for rapid displacement.) The pop-up
camper trailers are of civilian design and require alterations
to make them suitable for military use. Some of these
modifications include painting the trailers and waterproofing
the canvas. (See the March-April issue of the Journal.)
During their use, the following disadvantages have been
noted.
A heavier, stronger body siding and frame are needed to
support this type of vehicle. A heavier trailer would not alter
it's air-mobility, since the trailer, the jeep that tows it, and
nine personnel are all that are transported on the FDC CH-47

sortie. If Super Chinooks are used, it would still be possible

to sling the base piece and carry the FDC (with a skeleton
crew) simultaneously. A stronger frame extending through
the tongue of the trailer would also enable the use of sturdier
extensions on the ends of the trailer. These extensions would
better support the weight of the FADAC and radios without
damaging this equipment.
The trailer needs more ground clearance, and this could
be obtained by the use of larger tires and perhaps a new
suspension system. There is little question that larger tires
are needed for the trailer to operate effectively in rough
terrain. If the trailer is used solely in an airmobile role, a new
suspension system may not be needed. However, to insure
minimal damage to stowed materials or to the trailer itself, a
suspension system would be needed if towing this trailer
with an army vehicle was the only means of moving it.
The trailer is issued without on-vehicle material (OVM).
A technical manual along with an assortment of tools is
necessary for performance of first-echelon maintenance. Tire
repair is a special problem, since no equipment is issued
with which to perform this task.
Light discipline is difficult to maintain and a heavier,
darker material is required for the side curtains to prevent
excessive light from showing through.
The light systems are difficult to emplace and maintain
inside the trailers. If batteries were permanently mounted on
a reinforced tongue, then it would be possible to plug in the
DC light system as well as the radios. This would accelerate
the employment of radios operated from the batteries.

Improved FDC with charts mounted to the

trailer extension frame.

23

The trailer offers no rest or sleep area. In keeping with

the airmobile concept of traveling light, some type of
vestibule or attachable lean-to is needed to eliminate the
need for carrying an extra tent during periods of adverse
weather. The vestibule would work best on the door side of
the trailer. A tent has been used in this manner with
success.

RC-292's (when needed). When given a warning order, the

section can load all items of equipment (except the radios)
without losing fire capability. Once a march order is given,
the section can dismount radios, put down the top, and be
ready for loading in 5 to 10 minutes.
Certain modifications of present equipment and/or the
development of new equipment to replace or to improve
present systems is considered desirable. To speed
computations, pocket-sized electric calculators with
trigonometric functions and a floating decimal point
capability (e.g., the Hewlitt Packard HP-35, which is in use
at the Arctic Test Center) could be obtained to replace
GFT's, GST's, and slide rules in the FDC and the survey
section. Computers could also be developed to replace the
graphical effects tables to aid the fire direction officer in
selecting the best method of engaging a target. The
FADAC could be modified to make it lighter and more
compact. The MWO authorization procedures could be
changed to allow commanders to approve alterations
consistent with their mission requirements. Guidelines
would have to be established to prevent modifications to
the basic vehicle structure. The TOE could be modified so
that radios and associated communications equipment
would be assigned to the FDC to allow mounting in
accordance with requirements instead of issuing such
equipment as part of a vehicle's OVM or TOE.

Though many improvements should be made in

strength and additions to the trailer, it still offers
advantages not before experienced by airmobile artillery
FDC's.
Compactness. Efficient loading plans allow room
for a FADAC (or a 1.5-kilowatt DC generator and 10
gallons of gas, if the FADAC is not used), two firing charts,
a computer's chest, a table and two chairs, a commo box
with wires and handsets, two RC-292's, a situation map, a
tool bag, and other small items. When set up, the area inside
the trailer allows working space for five persons.
Ease of movement. Instead of requiring a large
vehicle for transporting, the pop-up FDC is hooked up to the
CO's jeep and towed onto the CH-47. At the new location, it
is backed off and towed into position without loading and
unloading other vehicles.
Speed of set up and march order. When moving
from one firing position to another, a unit having the use of
this trailer can establish communications and be completely
ready to conduct fire missions in the same amount of time it
formerly required to set up the chart. March order is very
rapid also, even during periods of adverse weather, since the
FDC is self-contained except for the generator and

The division artillery will continue to review FDC

providing procedures and physical equipment with a view
toward providing additional information on ways to
improve the overall system.

MAJ Robert A. White, a 1961 graduate of Texas A&M

University, has served in Korea, Germany, and Vietnam. He is
now S3 of the 1st Battalion, 77th Field Artillery, 1st Cavalry
Division. Fort Hood, Texas. CPT Eddie W. Liles formerly
commanded a self-propelled 155-mm battery and subsequently
served as S3, 2d Battalion, 19th Field Artillery, 1st Cavalry
Division. He is a graduate of the Field Artillery Officer
Advanced Coruse and has served in Vietnam. Captain Liles is
now enrolled in the Universty of Nebraska at Omaha
undergraduate program. ILT Bennie B. Jamerson is executive
officer of Battery A, 1st Battalion, 6th Field Artillery, 1st
Cavalry Division. He has a degree in business administration
from the University of Arkansas and graduated from the Field
Artillery Officer Basic Course in 1972.

24

Do we need a

by
LTC Allan R. Stern

robably more than any other decade, the

gy in
1960's can be called the age of technology
the US Army. The 1960's saw the deployment
of highly complex missiles, the greatly expanded use
of computers, and the advent of the helicopter as a
weapon system. These developments, however,
created sizeable problems, two of which were an
increase in costs and an increase in the technical
skill required of Army personnel. As we enter the
mid-1970's and a period of economic austerity, we
must look for systems that can be used in both
limited and general wars, are relatively inexpensive
and easy to operate, and require fewer personnel in
their operation.
Although the Soviet Army has had numerous
multiple rocket launcher (MRL) systems for more
than 30 years, the US Army does not have a modern,
general purpose
25

This article is our second on multiple

rocket launchers. Although these
articles do not reflect the current
School approach, they are presented
in consonance with our forum concept
of giving all Redlegs the opportunity
to be heard. The Journal staff is
preparing an article on the general
support rocket system (GSRS), a
project currently under study by the
School.
Ed.

Multiple Rocket Launchers of the Warsaw Pact Nations

Designation

BM-21
BM-13-6
RPU-14
BM-14-16
BM-14-17
BMD-20
BM-20
BM-24T
BM-25
M1972

Caliber
(mm)

Rounds per
launcher

122
132
140
140
140
200
240
240
250
122

40
16
16
16
17
4
12
12
6
40

Weight
(lbs)

140
93
87
87
87
201
240
240
1,000
140

Maximum
range
(km)

Reload
time
(min)

Crewmen

20.5
9.0
9.8
9.8
9.8
20.0
10.2
10.2
30.0 +
20.5

10
5-10
4
3-4
1.5-2
6-10
3-4
3-4
Unknown
5

6
6
5
7
6
6
6
6
Unknown
6

Mobility

SP (wheel)
SP (wheel)
Towed
SP (wheel)
SP (wheel)
SP (wheel)
SP (wheel)
SP (track)
SP (wheel)
SP (wheel)

Table 1.
MRL system in its inventory. Two of the main arguments
against the MRL have been that its fires are less accurate
and it is not a cost-effective system when compared to tube
artillery. The first argument is a limiting factor only with
respect to very small targets and targets close to friendly
troops. For area targets not in contact with friendly troops,
an MRL system with a relatively predictable dispersion
pattern would be highly desirable and better than tube
artillery. The second argument, pertaining to cost
effectiveness, is also true for certain types of targets but is
not true, or at least is highly debatable, for many other
types of targets. The types of targets for which the MRL
system is the most efficient and least expensive are
discussed in detail in the following paragraphs. Although
these targets fall into categories that could be attacked by
either direct support or general support

artillery, the MRL should be considered only as general

support artillery weapon because of its accuracy limitations
and longer reload time.
In discussing the primary targets against which the
MRL system could be best used, two categories will be
considered: targets found primarily in limited wars and
targets found primarily in general wars. Targets in the first
category include entrapped enemy forces (encirclement
operations), known or suspect enemy infiltration routes and
base areas, suspect ambush locations (reconnaissance by
fire), and landing zone or riverine landing sites
(preparation fires). Targets in the second category include
area targets (preparation and defensive fires), H and I zone
targets (harassing and interdiction fires), and targets of
opportunity. Each of these targets in both categories could
be attacked more efficiently and less expensively with an
MRL system than with tube artillery or tactical air. In spite
of the MRLs accuracy limitations and longer reload time,
it can deliver a far greater volume of fire in a shorter period
of time than tube artillery, and it does not have the weather
limitations of air support.
Because of the MRL's capability for a high volume of
fire, one might expect that ammunition resupply would be
a major problem. However, on the basis of the ammunition
weights and average consumption rates for the tube
artillery (as presented in FM 101-10-1) and assuming that
an MRL battery would have six launchers of 32 tubes each
with each rocket weighing 115 pounds and each launcher
firing all its rockets four times a day, an MRL battery
would use fewer tons of ammunition per day than any tube
artillery battery except the 105-mm howitzer battery.
Another consideration is personnel requirements.
Compared to tube artillery batteries, an MRL battery would

Soviet RPU-14 multiple rocket launcher

26

Conceptual design of FRG 280-mm Multiple Rocket Launcher

require fewer personnel. Assuming that an MRL section

would require six men (which should be an adequate
number of sustained operations, the MRL battery should
require about 18 fewer men than a 105-mm howitzer
battery, excluding forward observers. Compared to the
155-mm and 203-mm howitzer batteries, the MRL battery
would require about 24 and 28 fewer men, respectively. In
addition, because the MRL battery is nonnuclear, the
battery would not have the security problems attendant to
155-mm and 203-mm howitzer batteries.
Before proceeding further, it would be worthwhile to
examine the MRL systems currently in use. The Federal
Republic of Germany is building a new MRL system that
employs a 110-mm rocket fired from a 36-tube
self-propelled (wheeled) launcher. Instead of spin
stabilization, the German MRL system has aerodynamic
stabilization, which allows a much longer 110-mm rocket
than would normally be possible and thus results in
increased range with equivalent spin stabilization accuracy.
The major drawback to a rocket system with aerodynamic
stabilization is that it will probably cost more than a system
with spin stabilization. The Federal Republic of Germany
also has a six-tube, 280-mm multiple rocket launcher,

which is presently being field tested. The system's

482-kilogram rocket will propel a 216-kilogram warhead to
a range of 60 kilometers. It is envisioned that the system
will be employed at division artillery level. Japan, as well
as many other Western European countries, is also building
MRL systems.
The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies have an entire
family of MRL systems, the characteristics of which are
presented in Table 1. It is clear that they place heavy
reliance on the MRL. It is of interest that the newest MRL's,
the Soviet BM-21 and Czechoslovakian M1972 and the
Soviet RPU-14, are the smallest caliber (122-mm) and the
only towed version, respectively, currently in their
inventory.
Now let us outline the general characteristics for a US
Army MRL system. The rocket should have
interchangeable HE fragmentation and WP warheads.
Fuzing options should include quick, delay, and, if possible,
VT. The minimum and maximum ranges of the system
should be about 1 kilometer and 20 kilometers. The caliber
of the rocket should be between 110-mm and 130-mm, and
the MRL should use the same fire control system as tube
artillery. The rate of fire should be a full salvo in 10
27

seconds or less for fuze quick and delay warheads and

probably a slower rate of fire for fuze VT warheads.
Launcher emplacement should be achieved in less than 5
minutes, completely loading in 8 to 10 minutes, and
march order after firing in less than 2 minutes. Ideally,
the launcher should be capable of travel with rockets
loaded, at least for short distances, both overland and by
helicopter. In the author's opinion, the desired accuracy
of the system should be a CEP of 100 meters. However,
depending on the types of targets the MRL would be
expected to attack, a CEP of 200 meters at extreme
ranges might even be acceptable. These CEP's are within
the present state of the art.
The launcher itself should contain about 36 tubes
(four rows of 9 tubes each) and be mounted on a 2-ton
or 5-ton truck. Although a launcher mounted on a
tracked vehicle would allow greater mobility, the
additional cost and maintenance problems involved
would outweigh the advantages to be gained, since the
MRL is a general support weapon. The basic launcher
should be easily removable from the bed of the truck for
airmobile operations; in the helicopter-transportable
version, the empty launcher plus required undercarriage
should weigh no more than 1,500 pounds.
Since the MRL is proposed to supplement rather
than replace tube artillery, the basis of assignment might
be one 6-launcher battery per division and one
18-launcher battalion per corps. If a tradeoff were
required, the divisional MRL battery could replace one
of the 155-mm howitzer batteries in the divisional
155-mm/203-mm howitzer battalion. At corps level, the
MRL battalion could replace one of the corps artillery
155-mm howitzer battalions. Although building and
deploying the system would be expensive, the MRL
would cost much less than a helicopter gunship, for
example, and would be less vulnerable to destruction
than a helicopter. Once deployed, the MRL system
would be a relatively inexpensive system to maintain
and would require no more (and possibly less) special
training of personnel than a tube artillery system.
It is realized that the MRL cannot deliver the
accurate fire of tube artillery and therefore the system
should not be used as a direct support weapon.
Obviously, the system has limitations; however, it is
suggested that every system has limitations. The perfect
all-purpose system has not been and probably never will
be invented. The limitations of a system can be
minimized by proper methods of employment. Against
an area target, the fires of one MRL battery for 10
seconds would equal the fires of 32 batteries of 155-mm
howitzers for the same time period. For this reason, the
MRL would be an ideal weapon system for use against
area targets when a high volume of fire is required in a
brief time period.

Soviet BM-25 multiple rocket launcher

In a nonnuclear war, massed artillery, massed tactical air

strikes, or B-52 strikes are the only means of providing large
volumes of fire. However, in terms of cost effectiveness,
efficiency, all-weather reliability, and minimum diversion of
resources, the MRL appears to be the best system. The
helicopter-transportable version of the MRL would give the
commander great flexibility, since one CH-47 could carry a
launcher, its six crewmen, and the basic load of MRL
ammunition. A 5-ton truck could carry three full salvos for
one self-propelled MRL.
We need an MRL system because its unique capabilities
would be of use in both general and limited wars. The system
should be as simple and inexpensive as possible. The
characteristics outlined above should be well within the
current state of the art, and a minimum amount of research
and development should be required in light of the extensive
scientific data available on rockets.
The fact that the Soviet Army has MRL units in every
division, the fact that in recent years the Warsaw Pact
nations have fielded three new MRL systems, the fact that
Japan and our NATO allies are developing MRL systems,
and the fact that many uses were made of rockets in Vietnam
and in the Yom Kippur War provide strong indications and
arguments that there are definite uses and a need for an MRL
system in the US Army.
LTC Allan R. Stern, FA, is chief of the Scientific
and Technical Intelligence Branch, Soviet-Warsaw Pact
Area Division, Defense Intelligence Agency. He received
his BS degree from Purdue University in 1956 and
completed the Guided Missile Systems Officer Course
in 1962 and the Field Artillery Officer Advanced
executive officer of an Honest John battery (Korea) and
General Staff College, Colonel Stern has served as
executive officer of an Honest John battery (Korea) and
a Nike Hercules battery, has served two tours in
Vietnam (1965-66, 1972-73), and has served as battalion
commander with the 1st Armored Division and the 1st
Cavalry Division (TRICAP) at Fort Hood.

28

Old Marker Dedicated

1-17 FA Ceremony
The return of Delta Battery as an Honorary Firing
Battery in the 1st Battalion, 17th Field Artillery, was
commemorated at Fort Sill 17 April with the unveiling of
the battery's World War I unit marker. Found in late 1973
by LTC Herbert J. Hedrick at Fort Bragg, North Carolina
(See Jan-Feb Journal, "Right by Piece"), the marker was
brought to its new home through the efforts of Lieutenant
Colonel Hedrick, LTC Henry Taylor, former commander,
LTC George Krausz, present commander, the 82d
Airborne Division, and the US Air Force. The marker was
originally laid to note the return of Battery D, 17th Field
Artillery, from Europe at the end of WWI. The unit,
established in May 1917 as a horse-drawn heavy artillery
unit, was the only American artillery battery to win the
Fourragere, one of France's top unit heroism awards.

1-17th FA dedicates marker.

Airborne Unit Tries

ABCA Registration
FORT McCLELLANSeveral firsts in division
artillery were obtained by the 1st Battalion (Airborne),
320th Field Artillery, 82d Airborne Division, as the unit
underwent its recent ORTT.
29

The Citadel, Charleston, SCCadet Edwin

C. Haskell of Greenville, South Carolina,
holder of a 2-year Army ROTC scholarship,
gets his introductory flight in an AH-1G
Cobra from the 4th Battalion (Aerial), 77th
Field Artillery, 101st Airborne Division,
during a recent stopover at The Citadel
campus. Fourteen Citadel cadets in the class
of 1974 have selected Field Artillery.
The ABCA (Australia, Britain, Canada, and America)
Registration was used with satisfactory results. The
registration is a system seeking a universal method of
standardization to improve firing data. The overall goal is
to foster usage of common language (calls, terms,
procedures) to allow one ABCA nation to call for fire
from another. (See the Jan-Feb Journal, "The FO Takes
Command.") In addition to the registration, an actual
Improved Conventional Munitions mission was fired and
ammunition drawn from different lots was shot,
effectively engaging the targets.
The test was initiated with a callout of all batteries from
an alert status. The batteries from the 320th entered the
airhead using the new tridimensional parachute concept,
which allows the men, using maneuverable parachutes, to
jump immediately after their heavy equipment has been
dropped.
At the conclusion of the test, SSG James A. Wine and
his gun section distinguished themselves in the direct fire
excercise through rapid engagement and first-round hits
on numerous targets.
The battalion successfully completed the excercise
and was declared combat ready.

US Army photo by PFC Brader

AFA Battalion Takes ORTT

at Ft. Stewart
FORT CAMPBELLThe 4th Battalion (Aerial), 77th
Field Artillery, under the command of LTC Ronald C. Perry,
returned to Fort Campbell on 29-30 April after successfully
completing its first annual operational readiness training test
(ORTT) at Fort Stewart, Georgia.
The "En Garde" battalion had deployed from Fort
Campbell on 9-11 April, marking the first time an aviation
unit of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) had deployed
to another military reservation for an ORTT.
Disassembling the Cobra helicopters was the first step
in moving the battalion. The "snakes" were then loaded onto
C-141 cargo jets and transported to Charleston Air Force
Base, South Carolina, for reassembly. Following reassembly,
the Cobras were flown to Fort Stewart for the ORTT. This
movement constituted phase 1 of the battalion ORTT and
was described by MAJ James R. Martin, Assistant S3, 101st
Airborne Division Artillery, as "outstanding."
On 15 April, a series of 2-day ORTT's, one for each
firing battery in the battalion, began. The batteries were
rated in several areas, including response to missions,
mission planning and control, tactical displacement and
security, and general military subjects, such as code of
conduct, intelligence, CBR protective measures, and field
sanitation. According to CPT Robert Ehlers, battalion S1,
"Each battery passed its ORTT satisfactorily. They were
judged combat ready."
Phase 2 of the battalion test began 22 April when
Batteries A, B, and C moved to the range and set up
operation. The following day, Headquarters and Service
Battery also moved to the range to support the battalion.
The battalion was rated on mission planning and control
of the three firing batteries by the battalion tactical
operations center, responsive and accurate delivery of fire
missions by the batteries, tactical operations and technical
proficiency of Headquarters and Service Battery, and
communications and maintenance during the exercise.
When the ORTT had terminated, LTC Lewis W. Wright
III, chief evaluator for the battalion ORTT and division
artillery executive officer, said, "The overall rating for the
battalion is that it is combat ready. The 4-77th is to be
commended for an outstanding performance over the last 25
days. It shows the battalion has professional and
well-qualified soldiers."
Throughout the exercise, the En Garde battalion was
provided excellent training facilities and equipment support
by Fort Stewart. The 196th Aviation Company, XVIII
Airborne Corps, also gave the battalion a helping hand when
they sent two Chinook cargo helicopters to transport the
batteries to the range for the ORTT.

A Cobra helicopter with the 4th Battalion,

77th Aerial Field Artillery, fires on target during
the battalion's first operational readiness
training test at Fort Stewart, Georgia.
SFC Foster Sexton, a platoon leader in Headquarters
and Service Battery, commented, "I think Fort Stewart has
the best training area on the east coast for Cobras."
The return trip was made by three different modes of
travel. All the battalion's wheeled vehicles returned by
convoy, the Cobras were flown back, and more than 140 of
the battalion members returned by C-141. Colonel Wright
said, "The unit gained valuable training in cross-country
navigation and motor-marching during the return trip."
Members of the world's only aerial field artillery
battalion will long remember their 1-month stay at Fort
Stewart, but most of them are glad to be back at Fort
Campbell.

Ft. Bragg Troopers

Test "Dune Buggy"
FORT BRAGGThe troopers who have been testing it
call it the "Dune Buggy." Officially, it is a 105-mm howitzer
M102 modified with dual (4) wheels and the troopers are
from Battery B, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 321st Field
Artillery, 82d Airborne Division.
The dual-wheel howitzer is being tested to determine if
the weapon's maneuverability in deep sand, mud, and

the "Dune Buggy"

30

US Army photo by Cecil Green

rough terrain is improved by the additional wheels.

Although the test is incomplete at this time, SGT George
Huntley, a gun chief on the modified howitzer, feels the
Dune Buggy is successful: "The howitzer rides better over
rough terrain and doesn't rock or bounce nearly as much
with the additional wheels. So far we have experienced no
problems."
The troopers of the battalion anticipate that the
smoother ride may also reduce the maintenance associated
with two-wheel howitzers.

Cobra Firing Systems

Tested at MASSTER
FORT HOODResearchers at MASSTER (Modern
Army Selected Systems Test Evaluation and Review) are
closely examining a new electronic system that may make
the Cobra helicopter gunship a more versatile weapon. The
test actually involves an evaluation of two different
control systems that were developed by two civilian firms.
The two systems are basically alike in their
purposesboth give a Cobra pilot a wide variety of ways
to select, arm, and fire his load of 2.75-inch rockets.
Under maximum conditions, a Cobra can carry 76
rockets loaded in four pods that are carried under two
pylons attached on either side of the aircraft. However,
according to the test project officer, " . . . the current
weapons control system on a Cobra is somewhat limiting.
A pilot now can fire his rockets only in pairs, with a time
of 167 milliseconds between each pair firing." In
addition, ". . . a pilot is limited because each pair of
rockets must be fired from either the two outside pods or
the two inside podsthey cannot be fired from both an
inside pod and an outside pod at the same time."
The fuze settings on the rockets, which determine
whether they are to burst in the air or explode after
penetration, now must be set on the ground when the
Cobra is being armed. With either of the newly developed
electronic control systems, a Cobra pilot can flip a few
switches on a control panel while in flight and
dramatically change the capability of his gunship. For
example, depending on the target that is available, the
pilot can quickly change the fuze settings on his rockets
and cause them to explode either in the air or after
penetrating the target.
In addition, the new electronic circuitry allows the
pilot to select the manner in which he wants the rockets to
be firedeither individually, in pairs, in series of four, or
in other combinations of up to 19 at one time. When the

Nelson Foley, left, a civilian inventor, explains the

working of a new weapons control system panel to
WO2 William Sorenson, of F Battery (Aerial), 79th
Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division.

various combinations of rockets are fired, the pilot has a

choice of selecting any specific rocket in any of the four
pods to be fired with any of the other rockets. Thus, the
number of combinations of rockets that can be fired from
the four pods is greatly increased.
The rate of fire can also be remotely controlled by the
pilot. Instead of the standard 167-millisecond interval, the
pilot can select one of three rates of fire with different time
intervals between firingsfast (70 milliseconds),
intermediate (110 milliseconds), and slow (170
milliseconds).
The project officer feels that having these different rates
of fire could be very significant, because the effects of
changing the rate of fire from the standard in use now are
not known. Such an action may change the pattern in which
the rockets impact, or it may affect the tuck of the aircraft
(the dip of the aircraft's nose) after each burst. It may also
bring a number of other factors into consideration, all of
which could affect future tactics, doctrine, and concepts
concerning employment of the Cobra.
The two control panels involved in the test feature a
new inventory system that tells the pilot how many rockets
he has remaining in each pod and what type of rocket each
is; e.g., high explosive or armor piercing. This inventory
count system, coupled with the different selector switches,
enables the pilot to assess his total firepower at any time.
Cobra pilots from Battery F (Aerial), 79th Field
Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division Artillery, will be testing the
two control systems on Fort Hood firing ranges in both day
and night operations.

31

the
OFFENSIVE

The

following article is composed of extracts from

The Offensive, by Colonel A. A. Sidorenko, a noted Soviet
academician who is highly regarded in Russia as a
military theorist. This manuscript, originally published in
Moscow in 1970, was translated into English and
published in this country in October 1973. The Journal
offers this reprinting to acquaint readers with what is
considered to be the thrust of current, Soviet military
theory. Prefaced by the comments of the US Air Force
editor, the extracts are presented here in three parts:
Colonel Sidorenko's concept of the history of the offensive;
his view of fire support of the offensive; and his
perception of the destruction of tactical means of nuclear
attack.Ed.
33

"...it is recommended that wide use be made of the

direct fire of individual guns . . . ."

American Editor's Comments

The Offensive is the first in a series of significant and
representative recent Soviet military writings to be
translated and published under the auspices of the United
States Air Force. The series is designated as "Soviet
Military Thought."

1969 Frunze Prize award.

Sidorenko discusses the characteristic features of the
offensive in nuclear war. The most important is
decisiveness, which is influenced by the political content of
a future war. Decisiveness in achieving the goals of
offensive battle is based on the possibility of swiftly
defeating the enemy with nuclear weapons and by taking
advantage of the mobility and maneuverability of troops.

The study of history shows that in armed conflict

victory over the enemy can best be achieved through
offensive actions. It is the offensive that assures complete
defeat of the enemy and seizure of important objectives
and regions.

Some of the characteristics of contemporary tactics, as

stated by Sidorenko in The Offensive, together with his
emphasis, are the following:

This is the view expressed by Colonel A. A. Sidorenko,

Doctor of Military Science and faculty member of the
Frunze Military Academy, in The Offensive. His work,
published by the Military Publishing House, Moscow, in
1970, subsequently was listed as recommended reading in
"The Soldier's Bookshelf" section of the annual Calendar
of a Soldier. The book is intended for reading "by officers
of the Soviet Army, students in higher military schools and
reserve officers."

The offensive will take on great spatial size because

of the decisiveness of goals. It will be conducted night and
day, in any weather, without letup until the enemy is
defeated.
The question of massing forces and means in attack
will be solved in a new way. Maneuver with nuclear
weapons will assure the achievement of surprise.
Another important feature will be the highly
maneuverable, dynamic character of the modern offensive.
Again, this will be a result of the use of the nuclear weapon.

When The Offensive was published in 1970, Colonel

Sidorenko was listed as a Candidate of Military Science. In
March 1973, the Military Historical Journal published his
article "The Development of Ground Force Armaments in
1945-1953." This referred to him as a Doctor of Military
Science, a relatively rare degree in the Soviet Union. The
award of this degree and the time in which The Offensive
appeared suggests this book could have been based upon
his doctor's dissertation.

Nuclear weapons also will cause the waging of the

offensive on broad axes. This is because troops cannot
concentrate, under nuclear conditions, for the offensive on a
narrow, solid front. They must be dispersed.
Because of waging the offensive along different axes,
different degrees of defeat of the enemy and of enemy
resistance, there will be uneveness of development of the
offensive. Even the term "frontline" will be rejected for "the
line of fighting contact of troops."

Colonel Sidorenko is a well-known Soviet military

spokesman with many credits to his name. He was a
contributor and the composing editor for the 1966 book
Tactics, which was one of the landmark books of the
"Officer's Library" series. This book, written by a group of
officers from the Frunze Military Academy, was acclaimed
at the time for being the first Soviet work on tactics since
the three-volume work, General Tactics, published in
1940-1941. There was one major difference between the
two: the 1966 book on tactics dealt only with the tactics of
nuclear missile war. Tactics, along with the third edition of
Military Strategy, was one of five books nominated for the

Mutual use of nuclear weapons, high troop mobility,

and saturation of the battlefield with tanks will lead to rapid
and acute changes of circumstances in the course of the
offensive. Another feature of nuclear war will be the
conduct of operations in conditions of wide zones of
contamination, destructive fires, and floods. There will be
great expenditures of materiel, massive losses of troops and
equipment.

34

The increased mobility and shock action of armies

found expression first in the rapid growth of their
motorization and mechanization and the continuous
increase in the number of tanks, airplanes, guns, and
motor transport among the troops.
The growth in the fire capabilities of the armies found
expression in the continuous increase in the number of
firearms of various types among the troops, and first of all,
of the artillery as the main carrier of the firepower of the
ground troops as well as in raising its combat
effectiveness.
The proportion of artillery among the troops also
increased sharply. In 1805-1806, Napoleon had one gun
for 330 infantrymen. In the First World War, in the armies
which were best equipped with artillery there was now
one gun per 20-25 attacking soldiers, and in the biggest
operations of the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War
[World War II] there was one gun per four-five attacking
soldiers. In this, the practical rate of fire and range of fire
of guns of the basic types in comparison with the guns of
the period of Napoleonic wars increased 10-15 times.
The most important reasons for the increase in the
rates of attack and the depth of the operations were the
increase in the number of tanks and their mass
employment on the decisive directions, the increase in the
number of artillery and its mobility, the strengthening of
aviation and the increase in the quantity of motor
transport among the troops, and the improvement in
methods of attack.
The experience of past wars is evidence that since the
time of the acquisition of firearms, the role of fire
increased continuously in the battle and operation. In
essence, all big changes in the characteristics and
methods of combat operations of troops in the past were
connected with this very trend. Fire led to the
disappearance of columns from the battlefield as a result
of their great vulnerability and caused the transition of the
troops to actions in rifle skirmish lines. The appearance of
the approach as a special stage of the offensive, rushes,
digging-in on the battlefield, the broad use of
fortifications, the occupation of an attack position by the
troops in direct contact with the enemyall this was also
linked first with the increase in the power and role of fire in
the battle and operation.
In two world wars, the firepower of the attacker and
its skillful application had a direct influence on the
success of the breakthrough of the defense, its
development, and the rates of attack. From a means of
preparing the decisive blow by sidearms, fire, beginning
with the second half of the 19th century, was converted
into the main means for launching a blow and destroying
the enemy on the battlefield.
One of the most important indices of the continuous

GLOSSARY
In the translation, several Russian words are
used in their original transliterated form. These are:
Ob"yedineniyea Soviet term which refers to
a major field force, such as a front or an army.
Soyedineniyea term used by the Soviets to
refer to a corps, a division, or a brigade. The
components may be from a single arm or from
various arms and services. The term also is used
loosely for an army.
Chast'a Soviet term which designates any
unit of regimental or smaller size that is
administratively self-contained and separately
numbered. Examples of this are a rifle regiment, an
engineer battalion of a rifle division, and a corps
signal battalion.
Podrazdeleniyethe Russian term for
"subdivision." It is used to refer to a subordinate unit
of a chast'. It is any unit which cannot be fully
identified numerically except by reference to the
larger unit of which it is an integral part: battalions,
companies, and platoons of a rifle regiment; the
battalions and batteries of an artillery regiment; the
companies of an engineer or signal battalion.

Basic Trends In The Development

Of The Offensive
Consideration of the combat experience of past wars
and the trends in the development of the offensive has
tremendous significance in studying modern offensive
combat and operations. It goes without saying that the
appearance of nuclear missile weapons and other latest
armament and combat equipment introduced fundamental
changes in the forms and methods of armed conflict.
Therefore, we cannot mechanically transfer the
experience of past wars to a new situation; this can bring
only harm. However, even under these conditions a
profound study of the military experience of the past
permits understanding the present better and foreseeing
the future.
The state of the productive forces of society and the
economic capabilities of states have a direct influence on
the development of armed forces which proceed along the
line of a continuous growth in the massivity, mobility, and
fire and shock power. The centuries-old history of armed
conflict and especially of wars of recent times confirms
this principle.

35

increase in the role of fire in the battle and operation can be

provided by the increase in the losses inflicted on the
enemy by various fire weapons. Thus, prior to the second
half of the 18th century losses in troops from firearms
comprised about 20 percent and from sidearms about 80
percent. During the period of the Napoleonic wars losses
from rifle and artillery fire reached 40 percent and from
sidearmsabout 60 percent. In the Franco-Prussian War, in
connection with the acceptance of rifled firearms in the
inventories of the army, losses in personnel from fire now
comprised 90 percent and in the two world warsabout 100
percent. In this, there was a sharp increase in losses from
artillery fire (table 1).

The strength of the fire and the necessity to neutralize

the defending enemy by fire before the First World War
and at the beginning of it were underestimated and the
sharply increased fire capabilities of the troops did not find
proper reflection in views on the offensive. The preparation
of the attack by arillery fire was not conducted. "Artillery
does not prepare the attacks," reads the French field
regulation of 1913. "It supports them. . . . There is no
individual act of a preliminary preparation of the attack by
the artillery and the infantry and artillery operate
simultaneously." The main means of attack was considered
to be the infantry, its breakthrough capability was
measured by the strength of a bayonet strike, and there was
no accompanying artillery in the combat formations of the
infantry. All this leads to fruitless and unsuccessful attacks
and tremendous losses.
The disregarding of fire as a consequence of the
underestimation of its might was also peculiar to other
armies. Therefore, by the end of 1914, the trained infantry
of all the warring armies was almost completely put out of
action.
Soviet military theory in the period between the two
World Wars as a whole correctly determined the role of fire
in the attainment of the goals of battle. Then M. V. Frunze
pointed out that "in modern battle fire is the decisive factor
and main force. Only with the help of fire can one attain
dominance over the enemy. . . . Therefore, any group of
troops and any type of weapon should appear before the
enemy, that is on the battlefield, assuring itself a
superiority in fire." At the same time, a certain
underestimation of the role of fire in neutralizing the
defending enemy also occurred in individual offensive
battles of the Soviet Army during the first months of the
Great Patriotic War when the infantry went into the
offensive without sufficient artillery support. Such actions,
as is known, did not lead to the attainment of the desired
results.
The firing capabilities of the attacker had a direct
influence on the success of the entire operation. This was
caused by the continuous increase in the density of artillery
on the breakthrough sectors. If, at the beginning of the First
World War, the density of artillery on the most important
directions was about 20 guns per kilometer of front, at the
end of it it had reached 150-180 and by the end of the
Great Patriotic War 250-300 guns and mortars per
kilometer of front and sometimes even more.*

Table 1. Distribution of Losses by Types of Weapons in

Various Wars (in percent)

War

From From Altogether

small artillery
from
From
arms fire
firearms sidearms

Remarks

Franco-Prussian War
1870-1871
(according to
data of the
German Army)

82.5

7.5

90

10

Only wounded

Russo-Turkish War
1877-1878
(according to
data of the
Russian Army)

94.4

2.5

96.9

3.1

The same

Russo-Japanese War
1904-1905
(according to
data of the
Russian Army)

82.6

14

98.6

1.4

The same

First World War

1914-1918
(according to
data of the
German Army
for the entire
war)

53.5

49.5

99.4

0.6

The same
(including 3
percent wounded
by gas)

Great Patriotic War of

the Soviet Union
1941-1945
(according to
data of the
Soviet Army):

The same
(including those hit
by aviation, the
number of which in
individual
operations
reached 6.6
percent)

During the
first year of
the war

49

About About 100

51

During the
fourth year of
the war

39

About About 100

61

_________
* The greatest artillery density in the First World War was
188 guns per kilometer of front (the operation of the 6th
French Army at Malmaison in October 1917), and in the
Great Patriotic War375 guns (when forcing the Tel'tov
Canal by the 3d Guards Tank Army on 23 April 1945).
36

Because of this, a tendency to raise the rate of

destruction and density of fire was constantly observed. It
was manifested especially clearly in the reduction of the
duration of the artillery preparation of the attack from
several days in the First World War to one-two hours and
then even to 25-30 minutes in some operations of the Great
Patriotic War (Vislo-Oder, Berlin, and others).
Along with the reduced duration of the artillery
preparation of the attack, the proportion of massed fire
(artillery attacks) continuously grew in its organization
with the simultaneous reduction of deliberate fire. If, in the
offensive operations of the Soviet Army in 1942-1943, fire
attacks occupied 10-20 percent of the time allotted to the
artillery preparations, in the operations of 1944 they
already occupied up to 45 percent of the entire time or
more. In some operations of 1945, the artillery preparation
consisted completely of one fire attack with a duration of
25-30 minutes.
The tendency to increase the density of fire and rate of
destruction also found its expression in the massed
employment of aviation. It was one of the basic reasons for
the gradual squeezing out of the rifle by the
submachinegun, the automation of the process of firing
guns and mortars, and the rapid growth in rocket field
artillery, which, in its capability to create massed fire of
high density, had no rivals. Thus, the salvo of a battalion of
BM-13 and BM-31 rocket launchers fired 144-192 rounds
while the salvo of a battalion tube artillery did not exceed
12-16 rounds. Due to this quality the number of rocket
artillery (appearing in July 1941 in the form of individual
batteries) reached, toward the end of the war, the same
number of 122-mm howitzers contained in the inventory of
the RVGK (Supreme Command Reserve). In this, the
proportion of ammunition expenditure of rocket artillery
increased continuously and, in the most important
operations of the Soviet Army, comprised 25-30 percent on
the average and sometimes even more than 45 percent.
The necessity for the simultaneous neutralization of
the enemy defense through the entire depth of its
organization was disclosed back in the First World War.
However, then the warring sides did not have the means
necessary for the successful solution of this problem. The
range of the effective fire of the basic mass of artillery did
not exceed 4 kilometers, aviation did not possess sufficient
power, and the tanks which appeared in the course of the
war were few in number and they had weak armament, low
shock power, and low maneuverability. Therefore, the
depth of the enemy defense was outside the influence of
the attacker and the method of the successive "gnawing"
through the positions to the depth of the range of effective
artillery fire was employed for its breakthrough. After the
breakthrough of one position, the defender opposed the
attacker with a second position for the breakthrough of

Soviet BM-21 multiple rocket launcher

which new forces and a new artillery preparation were
required. The time which was needed for the preparation
of a new blow was so considerable that the defender
succeeded in accomplishing the maneuver of reserves and
preparing a new zone behind the one being attacked. Thus,
instead of a breakthrough a unique "dent" was formed in
the enemy defense.
Naturally, such a method for the breakthrough could
not satisfy the attacker. Therefore, in the course of the First
World War continuous searches were conducted for various
ways to overcome the enemy's defense. One of them was
the increase in the depth of its simultaneous neutralization
which first required the further development of artillery.
The artillery received further development in the
postwar period. New models of guns, mortars, rocket
launchers, and various types of ammunition for them were
created and some former artillery systems were also
modernized. All this permitted a significant increase in the
power and accuracy of fire, range, rate of fire, and
maneuverability of artillery systems.
Thanks to the employment of new explosives, the
power of shells increased considerably in comparison with
shells employed in the last war. The improvement in
technology for the production of guns, shells, and charges
as well as the perfection of fire control instruments assured a
substantial improvement in the grouping and accuracy of fire.

". . . it is very important to have a part of the

artillery
directly
in
the
combat
formations . . ."

37

"Modern rocket artillery...is not inferior to tube

artillery in its accuracy of fire."

The range of fire of the basic artillery systems was

increased. This expanded the possibilities for destroying
the enemy objectives located to a considerable depth:
means of nuclear attack, artillery and mortars, reserves,
control posts, rear area objectives, and others.
An important quality of modern artillery is its high
mobility and maneuverability. This is attained primarily by
the introduction of new prime movers which assure the
towing of the guns at great speeds under various road
conditions as well as by the increased proportion to
self-propelled artillery.
Already in the last war, our rocket artillery was
distinguished by remarkable combat properties. During the
postwar years, it received further development. The range
of fire, power of shell, and number of launching racks
increased, the close pattern of the firing was improved, the
time for loading was reduced, and the maneuverability of
the launchers was increased. Modern rocket artillery can be
employed especially effectively for the sudden destruction
of targets located in the open on large areas. It is not
inferior to tube artillery in its accuracy of fire.
Artillery and its grouping formed for combat also
comprises an independent element of the combat formation.
The experience of two world wars has shown that creation
of artillery groupstemporary ob"yedineniya of several
podrazdeleniya or chasti under one command for
accomplishment of missions in combatare a possible
form of grouping artillery in the offensive.
Artillery groups appeared for the first time in World
War I in connection with the need for centralized
employment of artillery on a sector of breakthrough to
accomplish the most important fire missions. In the
Russian Army artillery groups were created in corps
depending on the types of guns and nature of missions to
be performed in preparing the breakthrough. Light artillery
was used for making passages in wire entanglements,
heavy and howitzer artillery for destroying fortification,
bunkers, and observation posts and for suppressing
machinegun nests, and heavy artillery was used to combat
enemy artillery.
Before the Great Patriotic War, Red Army Regulations
recommended the formation of artillery groups by mission:

PP (podderzhka pekhoty; infantry support) artillery groups

in divisions; DD (dal'nego deystviya; long range) artillery
groups and AR (artilleriya razrusheniya; counterbattery
artillery) groups in corps.
PP groups were created from organic and attached
artillery of the division according to the number of
regiments of the first echelon. [See "FA Division," FA
Journal, May-June 1974.] They were designed to
accomplish missions in the interests of the division as a
whole. However, these groups met the demands of
commanders of supported regiments only if they were not
engaged in performing missions assigned by the senior
artillery commander.
In the course of the Great Patriotic War questions of
grouping of artillery underwent essential changes. War
experience showed that narrow specialization of artillery
groups by mission was not completely convenient. Very
often it was necessary to bring in groups to help each other.
This was particularly necessary to deliver massed strikes in
a particular period against important targets. Because of
this, the specialization of groups by mission began to
disappear. This was also facilitated by the circumstances
that each combined-arms commander attempted to have
artillery (a group) at his immediate disposal in order to
influence the course of combat with its fire and give
assistance to subordinate podrazdeleniya (chasti
soyedineniya). All this then served as the basis for a
transistion from artillery groups formed according [to a]
principle of accomplishment of fire missions (destruction,
counterbattery combat, general purpose, etc.) to artillery
groups formed according to a tactical principle, where each
command echelon from rifle regiment to army had its own
artillery group directly subordinate to it.
The transition to a new principle of formation of
artillery groups ensured more flexible control of artillery
fire, closed coordination of artillery with attacking troops,
and great independence of chasti and soyedineniya in
combat. In the course of an attack the artillery group did
not fall apart as before, but existed until the given chast' or
soyedineniye took part in combat. The senior combined
arms commander, who possessed an artillery group, could
always give help to a subordinate by concentrated fire
38

without waiting for his formal request. It is important to

stress also that commanders of artillery groups (chasti,
podrazdeleniya) were situated together with the
corresponding combined arms commanders. At the latter's
instructions, they could open fire opportunely in the
interests of attacking rifle and tank podrazdeleniya and
more effectively support their actions by fire.
Such employment of artillery facilitated to a great
degree the successful accomplishments of missions in the
attack. Provision of close and continuous coordination of
artillery with motorized rifle and tank podrazdeleniya has
particularly great significance in modern combat, where
the requirement for rapid destruction of enemy weapons,
especially tactical nuclear weapons, has grown
considerably. In the course of the offensive, artillery must
be able in all cases to support the unhindered advance of
troops, immediately destroy enemy means of nuclear attack
and his control points, and combat radio-electronic means.

enemy weapons prior to the start of the offensive and, even

more so, when they are dispersed, camouflaged, and under
cover to the depth of artillery preparation. At the same time
even individual unneutralized machineguns had a very
strong influence on the attacking infantry. As the advance
moved into the depth of the enemy's defense, his effect and
resistance were intensified. Therefore it was required to
support the attacking troops continuously with artillery fire
and air strikes right up to the accomplishment of the
assigned combat missions. This requirement remains in
effect under contemporary conditions, too. Its satisfaction
is attained by fire supportthe consistent neutralization
and destruction of the enemy by concentrated fire by the
artillery and air strikes to assure the advance of the attacking
troops at high rates.
The fire support, just as the fire preparation, is
conducted with the employment of conventional means of
destruction in combination with nuclear strikes. It is begun
immediately after the fire preparation without any pause
with the arrival of the attacking tank and motorized rifle
podrazdeleniye at a safe distance from the shell bursts of
friendly artillery in the course of their advance to the
enemy FEBA.
During the fire support of the offensive the artillery
is assigned the following basic missions: to destroy the

Fire Support of the Offensive

The experience of two world wars shows that however
well the artillery and aviation preparation of the attack was
conducted, it is impossible to discover and neutralize all

39

the Bobruysk operation of the 1st Belorussian Front in

June 1944 and then it was widely employed in the
Yassko-Kishinev, Vislo-Oder, Berlin, and other operations.
Two groups of artillery were created for the conduct of a
double barrage: one group conducted fire, just as in a
single barrage, on all basic and intermediate lines
beginning with the first basic line, and the other group
conducted fire on the basic lines alone beginning with the
second basic line. Transfers of fire from the basic lines
were conducted simultaneously on one signal. The first
basic line of a barrage was designated, as a rule, on the
enemy main line of resistance (first trench). When it was
impossible to designate the first line along the main line of
resistance, it was designated 200-250 meters beyond it. In
this case, the transfer of artillery from the main line of
resistance to the first basic position for the barrage was
performed in bounds 100 meters in size to sweep through
the strip of terrain between the main line of resistance and
the first basic barrage line.

enemy tactical means of nuclear attack as they are

discovered and to neutralize newly discovered artillery
batteries, tanks, and antitank means, control points, and
radio-technical stations; to prevent the enemy's withdrawal
and his consolidation on new positions; and to defeat
counterattacks, support the commitment of second
echelons (reserves) to battle, and support their actions in
the course of the offensive.
The methods for the fire support by the artillery may
vary, depending on the nature of the enemy defense and the
completeness of information on it, the degree of
destruction of the defense by nuclear weapons, the number
of weapons involved, the availability of ammunition, and
the time available to prepare fire.
During the years of the Great Patriotic War, when
breaking through a prepared enemy defense the Soviet
troops made wide use of such methods of artillery support
as barrage fire (single or double), successive concentration
of fire, concentration of fire on call, and their combination.
As our artillery grew quantitatively and qualitatively, the
development of methods of artillery support proceeded
along the path of the gradual transition from concentrated
fire on call and the successive concentration of fire to the
single and double barrage fire. In the course of the
development of the offensive in the depth, the
accompaniment of the infantry and tanks consisted of
continuous, powerful fire influence against enemy
objectives located immediately in front of the attacking
troops, on the flanks, and in the depth of the defense.

The artillery's requirement for laying down a single

barrage (per kilometer of front) was determined on the
basis of the artillery's fire capabilities. A battalion
consisting of three batteries (12 guns) received a barrage
sector: 76-mm and 85-mm guns180-200 meters, 122-mm
guns250 meters, 152-mm guns300 meters.
Consequently, four battalions of 122-mm guns were
required per kilometer of front of a single barrage. In
addition, the successive concentration of fire in the barrage
system envisioned another one or two battalions and just as
many to fire on the flanks of the barrage zone, altogether 6-8
artillery battalions. The artillery requirement increased for a
double barrage. Approximately 3-4 hours were required to
organize a barrage.

Barrage fire was employed in several soyedineniye of

the Leningrad Front in the autumn of 1941, in the
Stalingrad counteroffensive (65th Army, January 1943),
and on the broadest scale on the Bryansk Front in July
1943. From that time, when the enemy had continuous
trenches echeloned in depth, the barrage was considered
the main method for the artillery support of the attack. It
consisted of neutralizing enemy weapons and personnel by
artillery fire by the successive shifting of fire of high
density from one basic line to another in front of the
combat formation of the attacking troops in combination
with fire on intermediate lines (between the basic lines of
the barrage) and with the concentration of fire on the most
important enemy strong points in the zone of attack and on
the flanks.

The depth of the barrage and its type (single or double)

were determined depending on the nature of the enemy's
defense, terrain conditions, and the quantity of artillery and
ammunitions available to the attacker. A single barrage
usually had a depth of up to 3 kilometers and, in individual
cases even more. In this, its depth continually increased:
from 700-1,000 meters in 1943 to 2-2.5 kilometers in 1944
and up to 3 kilometers in 1945. In the Berlin operation, a
barrage was planned to a depth of 4 kilometers.
Of course, the double barrage assured the support of
the attack by the infantry and tanks more dependably than
the single barrage since it permitted the simultaneous
neutralization of enemy resistance to a depth of up to 500
meters from the forward podrazdeleniye of the attacking
troops. It was usually employed to the depth of the most
compact disposition of the enemy's personnel and
weapons; i.e., approximately to a depth of 1.5-2
kilometers (the first position). Further, the density of
the defense was reduced as a rule and the support of the

The basic lines of the barrage were designated within

limits of 200-500 meters depending on the character of the
enemy defense and the disposition of his strong points,
trenches, personnel, and weapons. Intermediate lines were
designated every 100-200 meters to sweep through the
terrain between the basic lines of the barrage.
The double barrage was first employed on an
operational scale in the course of the Great Patriotic War in
40

attack could be accomplished by a single barrage or by the

successive concentration of fire alone.
The duration of the conduct of fire on each basic line
of the barrage depended on the time required by the
attacking infantry and tanks to cross the space between the
basic lines of the barrage with consideration of the safe
distance of the attacking infantry from the shell bursts of
friendly artillery. The change from the last fire onslaught of
the artillery preparation to the laying down of the barrage
was accomplished on order of the division (corps)
commander. The subsequent signals for the shifting of fire
were given on order of the commanders of the first-echelon
regiments as the infantry and tanks reached each basic
barrage line. It should be noted that at first the shifting of
fire from one basic line to another was accomplished
according to time alone but in a number of cases, this led to
the lagging of the infantry and tanks behind the movement
of the barrage. Therefore, subsequently the shifting of fire
on the signal of the infantry and tanks, depending on their
advance rather than by time, was adjudged more acceptable.
The shifting of fire to the next intermediate line was
accomplished for time with consideration of the rate of
advance of the infantry and tanks.
The successive concentration of fire (PSO) was a
method for the artillery support of the attack in which
enemy personnel and weapons were successively
neutralized on individual sectors and in strong points to the
front and flanks of the atacking troops. It was employed in
those cases where there was a clearly expressed system of
strong points in the enemy defense which were not
connected to each other by trenches or communication
trenches as well as when there was insufficient artillery for
the conduct of barrage fire. The PSO sectors were
designated for previously reconnoitered targets (platoon
strong points, weapons, control points, and other important
objectives). Fire was opened and closed on them on the
signals of the commanders of the first-echelon regiments
(battalions).
Under contemporary conditions, in the attack of
podrazdeleniye without the employment of nuclear
weapons the successive concentration of fire and barrage
fire which justified themselves in the past, perhaps, will be
employed. If the offensive is conducted with the
employment of nuclear weapons, then seemingly these
methods of fire support will not always be acceptable. With
the localized nature of the defense, for example, the
employment of a barrage is inexpedient and, what is more,
it requires the concentration of great densities of artillery,
the expenditure of considerable time for organization, and
assumes the linear advance of the troops from line to line.
Therefore, in many armies new methods for the fire
support of the troops are being sought.

In any method of fire support, it is recommended that

wide use be made of the direct fire of individual guns,
platoons, and batteries and of fire from indirect fire
positions for the neutralization and destruction of weapons
and personnel hindering the advance of the attacking
podrazdeleniye.
In the development of the offensive in the depth, as the
experience of past wars shows, it is very important to have
a part of the artillery directly in the combat formations of
the attacking podrazdeleniye and to displace the remaining
artillery which is used for fire support from indirect firing
positions in good time.
In the First World War, horse-drawn troop artillery was
incapable of accompanying the infantry and was located at
a distance from it which would assure it timely and
sufficient fire support. In the very first battles, the artillery
suffered large losses in horses, as a result of which it lost
its mobility and lagged behind the infantry greatly. The
infantry deprived of artillery support could not cope with
the defense's machineguns, suffered tremendous losses,
and was quickly worn down. The unsatisfactory solution of
the task of accompanying the infantry with artillery fire
was one of the basic reasons for the failures of many
attacks and the development of the offensive in the depth
during the First World War.
In the Second World War, the means and methods for
the fire support of the attacking troops received further
development. Self-propelled artillery was created, troop
artillery was motorized, specially detailed accompanying
artillery was located in the infantry combat formations in
addition to the infantry direct support tanks, and the troops
were supported from the air by aviation.
The experience of the Great Patriotic War showed that
fire should precede the strike of the advancing troops and
accompany them into battle. Each gun, each tank, mortar,
and other weapons which are part of the attacking group
41

"A substantial shortcoming of armed helicopters is

admitted to be their vulnerability to the fire of the
enemy's ground weapons."
In the interests of the attacking troops, aviation can
accomplish a wide span of missions. The most important of
them is the destruction of the enemy's means of nuclear
attack. This mission will be accomplished under any
conditions. As formerly, an extremely important mission
for air support remains the destruction of enemy weapons
and personnel which are directly hindering the successful
advance of the podrazdeleniye and chast'. Aviation will
also accomplish such missions as the destruction of control
points, reserves, and radio technical means and will also be
used for the conduct of aerial reconnaissance and to cover
the troops. The results of the accomplishment of these
missions will have direct influence on the success of the
offensive by the combined arms chast' and podrazdeleniye.
In the last war, air support was accomplished by
comparatively large groups of attack aircraft which were
located directly over the battlefield. Thus, for example, it
was necessary to have up to two groups of attack aircraft of
8-12 airplanes each for the continuous air support of the
attacking troops in a zone 6 kilometers wide. They could
be over the battlefield for about 15 minutes; consequently
it was necessary to plan for 96 airplanes for an hour of
battle (24 x 4). If the main zone was overcome in 3-4 hours,
288 airplanes (96 x 3) were required altogether or nine
regimental sorties.
Under contemporary conditions, in connection with the
increased effectiveness of air weapons, aviation has
become capable of accomplishing many missions with a
smaller number of airplanes than formerly. The main trend
in the employment of aviation abroad for the support of the
attacking troops is considered to be the transfer to the
actions of small groups of airplanes on call after detection
of the objectives for the strikes. Military specialists of
various countries have expressed the thought that in a
future war aviation will operate primarily in small groups
and as individual planes. In their opinion, this will be
facilitated by flight at great speeds, will permit the wide
use of low altitudes to overcome the enemy's antiaircraft
counteraction, and, in the last analysis, will further the
effective destruction of targets. In addition, the actions in
small groups and individual airplanes assures the broad
maneuver of forces and creates conditions for their
redirection. For example, on some exercises of foreign
armies support aircraft were employed singly, in pairs, or
in flights. Although they did not "hang" continuously over
the troops, they destroyed simulated targets immediately
after their discovery. In this, the actions were conducted, as
a rule, from low altitudes.

were envisioned as being in those places from which they

could dependably destroy the enemy with their fire,
assuring an uninterrupted offensive. The main mass of the
troop and attached artillery was intended to support the
advance of the entire attacking force by fire from indirect
fire positions. To attain continuity of this type during the
years of the last war, in the Soviet Army a procedure was
envisaged in which two thirds of the artillery conducted
fire on the enemy and only one third displaced. Actually,
however, in a number of cases and especially with the poor
organization of the displacement of the artillery, more than
half the guns and mortars were in motion. If there were few
roads or they turned out to be destroyed, then that artillery
which could displace only over roads (and this was the
majority) jammed the roads, traffic jams were created on
them, and the planned displacement of firing positions was
frustrated. As a result, the direct accompaniment of the
infantry and tanks with their advance into the depth
weakened and this led to unjustified losses and a reduction
in the rates of advance.
The experience of the war showed that attention should
be constantly devoted to the direct fire accompaniment of
the attacking troops. The artillery accompaniment should be
capable of moving directly in the combat formations of the
attacking podrazdeleniye and opening fire from the march.
The artillery, firing from indirect firing positions, justifies its
designation if it makes maximum use of its range of fire in
order to neutralize the enemy at the greatest possible depth.
Very important missions are assigned to aviation
during the fire preparation. With the appearance of nuclear
weapons, the capabilities of aviation for the independent
accomplishment of a number of missions connected with
the destruction of enemy forces, his nuclear weapons, and
other objectives grew sharply. Meanwhile, as evidenced by
the experience of the last war, aviation is an extremely
effective combat means in supporting combat actions from
the air with the employment of conventional means of
destruction, too.
The capability of aviation to appear quickly over the
field of battle, to destroy small and mobile targets with
great effectiveness, conduct the search independently, and
launch strikes against discovered targets makes it an
irreplaceable means of fire support of the attacking troops.
Contemporary combat actions have the highest degree of
maneuver character; therefore, various mobile targets will
appear on the field of battle considerably more often and in
a larger number than formerlytank and motorized
infantry podrazdeleniye and others.
42

using free areas unoccupied by the enemy, devastated

terrain, and gaps between enemy troops;
close with the enemy closely;
accomplish fire onslaughts with surprise;
destroy enemy tanks which have broken through;
cover the flanks of attacking ground chast' and
podrazdeleniye;
protect transport helicopter chast' by accompanying them
in flight.
For this, in their opinion, the combat helicopter should
meet the following requirements: it should be small in size,
maneuverable, and have low vulnerability; it should
possess high maneuverability at the very surface of the
ground; it should have light armor; it should permit being
equipped with various systems of armament; and it should
be capable of accomplishing long flights for the
accomplishment of tactical missions.

At the present time, the air support of attacking troops

is connected with the involvement of fighter-bomber
aviation first of all. The main objectives of its actions are
considered to be nuclear missile and firing weapons,
tactical reserves, control points, tanks, and motorized
infantry of the enemy which are located beyond the field of
fire of the artillery. At the same time, the military
theoreticians of a number of countries express the desire to
have special airplanes operating directly with the ground
troops in addition to the fighter-bombers. It is believed that
such airplanes should not only provide great combat
effectiveness, but they should also have a strong effect on
the morale of the enemy as occurred, for example, in the
last war with the operations of the attack aircraft.
The NATO military specialists are devoting more and
more attention to the employment of armed or combat
helicopters for the support of the ground troops. For
example, combat helicopters have been created which are
equipped with 20-mm cannon, 38-, 70-, and 127-mm
rocket launchers for air-to-ground rockets, 40-mm rocket
launchers, and 7.62- and 12.7-mm machineguns with 1,200
rounds. It is intended to employ such helicopters in groups
to accomplish various missions in the fire support of the
ground troops. The US Army is conducting wide combat
tests of armed helicopters in the aggressive war in Vietnam.

Some Western military specialists believe that the

combat helicopter, representing a flying armored weapon,
will change the appearance of the ground forces. Great
firepower will be combined in it with considerable speed
and with independence of terrain conditions. In their
opinion this makes the helicopter a dangerous element on
the battlefield, especially on broken and covered terrain. It
will operate much more effectively than artillery and will
be able to break up and crush the enemy's defense and pin
down his large forces. The armed combat helicopter
combines an observation post and firing position. In all this,
it will compete with the fighter bomber. The latter is too
expensive, fast, and operates at high altitudes; therefore,
they believe that it is inexpedient to employ it for the
accomplishment of missions which the helicopter can
accomplish.

A substantial shortcoming of armed helicopters is

ad-milted to be their vulnerability to the fire of the enemy's
ground weapons. For example, the following information
was presented in the foreign press: One of the army
aviation companies in South Vietnam (16 helicopters) lost
13 helicopters to ground fire during 138 sorties during
which it was subjected to fire from the ground; 15 hits by
7.62-mm bullets are sufficient to shoot down an H-34
helicopter; a helicopter can be shot down in 3 seconds by
the fire of a 14.5-mm machinegun from a distance of 800
meters.
To reduce the vulnerability of armed helicopters,
intensive work is being conducted in armoring their
vulnerable places as well as in looking for the most
effective methods of combat employment of helicopters.
US specialists recommend: prior to takeoff, dispose the
helicopters in safe areas in readiness for immediate takeoff
into the air; where necessary, in fire support from the air,
call the helicopters to the battlefield by radio, approach the
objective at low altitudes (close to the objective zoneat
an altitude of less than 20 meters), and cover the last 3
kilometers in low-level flight.
Based on the experience in Vietnam, the Western
military theorists believe that the combat helicopter can
also find wide application in war in Central Europe since it
is capable of accomplishing the following missions:

Soviet 152-mm gun-howitzer D20

43

The Destruction of Tactical Means of

Nuclear Attack
In the last war, artillery guns and batteries that were
detected in preparation of the offensive were not always
destroyed immediately. Often, they were intersected, the
targets were "accumulated," and data were prepared on
them with the intention to neutralize them during the
period of the artillery preparation of the attack. And at the
same time this was justified because the results of their fire
for effect in case of opening fire on the attacker could not
have a decisive influence on reducing the combat
efficiency of the chast' and soyedineniye and the change in
the relation of forces. It was not so dangerous if the enemy
artillery was also destroyed after it opened fire. Moreover,
frequently the artillery guns and batteries were intersected
and then destroyed from these very rounds; sound ranging
was also based on this.
The situation has changed radically under contemporary
conditions. A delay in the destruction of means of nuclear
attack will permit the enemy to launch the nuclear strikes
first and may lead to heavy losses and even to the defeat of
the offensive. The "accumulation" of such targets as nuclear
weapons and waiting with the intention of destroying them
subsequently is now absolutely inadmissible. Each rocket
launcher and each artillery piece capable of employing
nuclear ammunition will be destroyed immediately after its
detection to prevent them from launching nuclear strikes.
Consequently, the battle against means of nuclear attack is
conducted continuously. These means are destroyed
immediately wherever they may bein assembly areas, on
the march (when moving out and displacing), and at firing
and launch positions. Along with the means for employing
nuclear weapons, nuclear ammunition is also destroyed
without delay at any place that it is discoveredduring
transportation, at warehouses, and at places for assembly,
filling, and storage.

data in good time not only about the location of the means
of nuclear attack but also of the presence of nuclear
ammunition with them. Of course, this is a difficult task
but its accomplishment is necessary and possible.
In order to conduct the reconnaissance of tactical
means of nuclear attack successfully, it is necessary to
know their tactical and technical characteristics,
reconnaissance signs, organization of the podrazdeleniye
and chast', and the enemy's views on the procedure for the
placement of these means in position areas and
employment on combat.
Each type of means of nuclear attack has its own
inherent reconnaissance signs. Common reconnaissance
signs of tactical means of nuclear attack at the firing
positions and close to them are considered to be: the
presence, in the position area or close to it, of camouflaged
guns (self-propelled or towed), launchers, and missiles; a
large number of special-purpose vehicles, vehicles of
various types, prime movers, and trailers; the preparation
and disposition of firing positions at a distance of 4-12
kilometers from the FEBA; the preparation of cover for the
sections; the presence of approach routes to the firing
positions, and a large number of radios and the special
character of their operation.
In foreign armies, great attention is being devoted to
the camouflage of the means of nuclear attack and
warehouses of nuclear ammunition as well as to deceiving
the enemy with respect to their locations. The possibilities
of deceiving the enemy in this field are numerous and
varied. Thus, under the cover of a strict counterintelligence
mode, dummy premises can be constructed for the storage
of nuclear weapons. Some quantity of normal items of
supply may be transported under reinforced security with
the introduction of restrictions on the movement of the
civilian population in this area in order to create the
appearance of transporting nuclear ammunition. Such
measures may deceive the enemy with regard to which
points for the storage of ammunition or launch positions
are actual and which are dummies.

The success of the battle against enemy tactical nuclear

means depends first of all on the timely discovery of them
by intelligence. Intelligence has the mission of establishing
the places of disposition of means of nuclear attack,
discovering the system for controlling them, disclosing
warehouses for nuclear ammunition and points for their
assembly, and checking on their destruction. Special
trustworthiness and accuracy are required of intelligence
data on means of nuclear attack.

Good results in combating enemy tactical means of

nuclear attack may be attained by the artillery. The
immediate destruction of enemy means of nuclear attack
which have been discovered is now the artillery's primary
mission. All artillery without exception must be constantly
ready for its accomplishment.

It is known that the soyedineniye of US ground forces

have a large number of means of nuclear attack. However,
this does not mean that each launcher or gun can have and
employ a nuclear weapon at each given moment. The
enemy may have considerably fewer such weapons than
guns and launchers capable of delivering these weapons to
the target. Therefore, it is very important to receive reliable

In the past, depending on the mission, a battery or

platoon was assigned to destroy an enemy artillery piece
and two batteries or a battalion were designated to destroy
a battery. In combating means of nuclear attack, these
average norms, seemingly, will be increased with
consideration of the necessity for the maximum reduction
in the duration of fire for effect in order to deprive the

44

enemy of the capability to fire a nuclear strike. An

especially urgent mission in combating enemy means of
nuclear attack will arise in the course of the offensive battle.
The 155-mm and 203.2-mm howitzers spend 5-6 minutes
in deploying and preparing to fire. In this short time, it is
necessary to reconnoiter, determine exact coordinates,
prepare initial firing data, send the command to the firing
positions, and fire the onslaught. Clearly, this can only be
accomplished with well-organized intelligence and high
mobility in controlling artillery fire.
On the whole, it should be said that combating enemy
means of nuclear attack in combined arms combat has now
become the basic content of combat actions and has
become a function of all commanders without exception.
Combating enemy tactical means of nuclear attack
includes the neutralization of their organs of control
(command and observation posts, guidance stations, and
fire control posts, as well as communications centers and
radio and radar stations). Radio is the main means for
controlling the podrazdeleniye and chast' for tactical
nuclear weapons. Thus, there are from 20 to 40 radios in
each missile and artillery battalion of the NATO armies and
up to 10 radios in each battery. In a combat situation, all
commands and orders will be transmitted primarily by

radio. Consequently, the disruption of the control of these

means also comprises an important element of the
combating of enemy means of nuclear attack.
It should be assumed that it is not possible to
accomplish completely the mission of destroying enemy
means of nuclear attack. The experience of the last war
shows that in hitting various objectives with weapons it is
impossible to discover and destroy them completely.
Therefore, tank and motorized rifle podrazdeleniye will
also be involved in the accomplishment of this mission.
Penetrating through gaps and intervals in the enemy
combat formations and without getting drawn into
protracted battles, they can quickly reach the areas where
the means of nuclear attack are located and by a surprise
attack and the conduct of fire on the launch and firing
positions, primarily by direct fire, they can destroy the
sections and crews of the launchers and guns as well as the
delivery means themselves.
Thus, combating enemy tactical means of nuclear
attack is one of the most important missions of destruction
by fire. Its successful accomplishment can be attained only
by the combined use of all available forces and means.

COMMANDERS UPDATE
Colonel Leo S. Comish
XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery
Colonel John S. Crosby
1st Cav Division Artillery
Colonel Robert L. Schroeder
2d Armored Division Artillery
Colonel Robert W. Sennewald
4th Infantry Division Artillery
Colonel Jack L. Zorn
9th Division Artillery
Colonel Robert L. Schweizer
8th Infantry Division Artillery
Colonel John G. Kloke
210th Field Artillery Group
Colonel Lynwood B. Lennon
4th Missile Command
Colonel Leo J. Fitzgerald
TUSLOG Detachment 67
Colonel Edward A. Kelley, Jr.
FA School Brigade
LTC Thomas L. Kelly
1st Battalion, 3d Artillery
LTC Keith Painter
2d Battalion, 4th Artillery

LTC Laurence R. Peate

2d Battalion, 5th Artillery
LTC Harold D. Farmer
4th Battalion, 4th Artillery
LTC Joe J. Breedlove
2d Battalion, 6th Artillery
LTC Robert D. Banning
1st Battalion, 8th Artillery
LTC James E. Thomas
6th Battalion, 9th Artillery
LTC Henry S. Larsen
1st Battalion, 10th Artillery
LTC David D. Dantzscher
6th Battalion, 10th Artillery
LTC John P. Joyce
2d Battalion, 11th Artillery
LTC Neal A. White
6th Battalion, 14th Artillery
LTC Donald A. Ladner
1st Battalion, 22nd Artillery
LTC Rodney C. Byers
2d Battalion, 28th Artillery
LTC Donald B. Leary
3d Battalion, 34th Artillery
45

LTC Harry E. Soyster

6th Battalion, 37th Artillery
LTC Walter Urbach, Jr.
1st Battalion, 38th Artillery
LTC William J. Emacio
1st Battalion, 40th Artillery
LTC William R. Farquharson, Jr.
1st Battalion, 76th Artillery
LTC Frederick R. Daly
1st Battalion, 82d Artillery
LTC Thomas H. Miller
1st Battalion, 84th Artillery
LTC Robert T. Basha
1st Battalion, 319th Artillery
LTC Raphael J. Hallada
2d Battalion, 321st Artillery
LTC John A. Raymond
1st Battalion, 333d Artillery
LTC Kennard S. Vandergrift
Staff & Faculty Battalion
Fort Sill, OK
LTC John J. Berner
11th Aviation Battalion

". . . the portion of our Army resources being devoted to keeping our artillery equipped to do its job on the modern
battlefield is pitifully small. We have lost our general officer in the division and also at army headquarters. We are losing
our free rocket and may not have a nonnuclear missile for attack of large targets. Our target acquisition capability has
declined. The new TRICAP test division has less artillery than a current division."

BG Toffler, MAJ Miller

div arty aviation

Too Valuable to Lose

46

In the November issue of Army magazine, BG Alan R.

Toffler and MAJ Robert B. Miller, Jr., lamented the fact
that the Field Artillery has not fared too well in recent
years with regard to current versus past personnel and
equipment authorizations.
The foregoing is indeed a startling revelation, and
their comments, taken collectively, paint a bleak picture of
the recent history of the field artillery. I hesitate to add to
the trepidation generated by their comments, but I feel
that it is necessary to discuss a prime division artillery
asset that may be lost in the not-too-distant futurethe
division artillery's organic aviation section.
Very few commanders who served in an infantry
division in Vietnam will contest the claim that the
division's aviation assets were, on many occasions, vital to
the successful accomplishment of a multitude of missions.
Whether aviation support came from the division combat
aviation battalion, organic aviation within divisional
units, or outside sources, it was critical to a majority of
operations. But only an individual who has experienced
the effect of a responsive organic aviation section can
appreciate how essential that organization can be to the
accomplishment of a unit's mission. With regard to the
artillery, the purpose of the division artillery aviation
section is to provide the division artillery commander with
a vitally needed capability to extend observation and
command and control throughout the battle area. This
purpose has remained unchanged in recent years and, in
fact, conforms to ARCSA (aviation requirements of the US
Army) studies conducted from 1965 to 1967. Those who
have commanded or employed an organic artillery
aviation unit realize that the helicopters of this unit
provide the division artillery with more than can be
perceived from a simple statement.

by
MAJ Robert G. Tetu, Jr.

The purpose of this paper is to emphasize a few of the

basic advantages of organic aviation support in the form
of the division artillery aviation section. It includes a
discussion of the arguments presented most often by those
who favor nonorganic aviation support at the expense of
aviation sections currently in existence.
47

As an artilleryman and an aviator, I have had the

opportunity to see division aviation elements employed in
a variety of ways. In recent years I have detected a growing
trend, at least in thought, toward the consolidating of
aviation headquarters (such as the combat aviation
battalion) and the stripping of section aircraft from such
units as the division artillery and the infantry brigade. On
two occasions I have been personally involved with such a
planonce when artillery battalion aviation sections were
to be consolidated at group level and again when a
significant portion of the division artillery assets were to be
given up to division for a specific period of time. Neither
plan came into being, but the arguments advanced by those
favoring consolidation seemed, at the time, incontestable.
Before a comparison of the relative merits of either
system can be discussed properly, it is best to review the
organization of the two aviation units specifically under
considerationthe division combat aviation battalion and
the division artillery aviation section.
The infantry division combat aviation battalion (CAB)
consists of a headquarters and headquarters company, an
assault helicopter company, and an aviation general
support company. Authorized personnel include 37 officers,
57 warrant officers, and 236 enlisted men. Aircraft organic
to the unit are: AH-1G6, OH-6A4, and UH-1H27.
The mission of the battalion is to provide aviation support
for the division headquarters, DISCOM, and other
divisional units without organic aircraft. In addition, the
battalion provides general support and reinforcement to
units possessing organic aircraft and an aviation special staff
for the division headquarters. The assault helicopter
company provides tactical airlift, and the aviation general
support company handles the bulk of administrative
aviation support. Further breakdown of the battalion is not
too important here except for notation that the battalion's
size gives it a significant maintenance support capability.
The division artillery aviation section is authorized 6
officers, 7 warrant officers, and 15 enlisted men. Organic
aircraft are nine OH-6A's and two UH-1H's. The aviation
authorization of the division artillery headquarters has not
changed in recent years. In fact, the only difference
between the 1963 TOE authorization and the current
authorization (TOE 6-100H, 30 Nov 70) is the addition of
two UH-1H helicopters.
As stated previously, the mission of the aviation
section is to provide command and control and
reconnaissance to the division artillery commander. The
section has no staff as such; each officer performs as a pilot
and the enlisted personnel are strictly oriented toward
maintenance. Although small, the unit has sufficient size
and flexibility that the aviation officer can organize and

employ it to his advantage.

What makes the division artillery aviation section so
distinctive that its services could not be provided from an
element of the divisional aviation battalion if that unit had
centralized control of greater aviation assets? The answer is
simply that the aviation section has the ability to respond
immediately to the needs of the supported artillery units.
There are virtually no request channels, blade-time
restrictions, or other stifling requirements from another
headquarters that limit the division artillery commander's
use of his aviation elements. All of the commissioned
pilots in the section are field artillerymen and as such
understand the overall urgency of the mission of the field
artillery. (A sense of urgency is, on many occasions,
difficult to establish when one is dealing with the assets of
someone else. Here, the commander has no problem.) This
advantage in response and flexibility is well known and
need not be emphasized further; however, it must never be
played down under the false argument that another
headquarters can be just as responsive. It simply does not
work in "real life."
An area in which the field artillery should place
increased emphasis when justifying aviation equipment
requirements for future TOE's is the use of the helicopter
for logistical repair and resupply. Without a doubt, the
artillery commander's use of his helicopters to deliver spare
parts for howitzers and other critical equipment during the
Vietnam war was instrumental in providing adequate fire
support to the infantryman. The artillery unit depends
primarily upon its howitzers in providing support to the
maneuver unit. If these howitzers break down, the
maneuver unit suffers; therefore, it is imperative that the
howitzers be kept in action. A request for a replacement
part for a howitzer carries with it a tremendous degree of
urgency to an artillerymanmuch more so than to others.
In Vietnam, the aviation general support company of the
aviation battalion, although helpful in many instances, could
not respond to immediate requests. Even when it could
respond, it took too much time because it was committed to
serving too many headquarters. The advantage to an
artillery commander of using his aviation elements for
logistical support of his howitzers and other critical
equipment without having to follow divisional request
procedures for aircraft support cannot be measured. The
field artillery is unique in its dependence upon its equipment.
We should capitalize on the success we enjoyed in Vietnam
in keeping this equipment operational through the use of
organic aviation by insuring that this capability is strongly
emphasized in justifying current and future TOE's.
The foregoing comments tell what organic aviation
is all about; it is not necessary to delve into the myriad
48

other missions these helicopters provided for so many

commanders. Then why should there be any action in the
future to consolidate all of the divisional aviation assets at
one headquarters? Simply because there are several
arguments that, taken collectively, indicate a definite
advantage to be gained by such a move. Taken individually,
they are not incontestable. The "consolidation" argument
can be broken down into the following areas:
Manpower and fiscal constraints.
Aircraft maintenance.
Flexibility in numbers.
Needs of units in reserve.
Current aviator attitudes.

additional manpower: If the aviation section were to

emphasize maintenance training and work closely with the
TAM company, local policies could be worked out so that
the section would be authorized to perform those tasks
listed in the maintenance allocation charts (usually
restricted to second echelon maintenance). This procedure
could be very effective, and if the section maintenance
program were truly outstanding, the maintenance
disadvantage factor would become negligible. Aviation
sections must always seek maintenance responsibility
commensurate with their maintenance potential and never
pass off the responsibility for mediocrity to supporting
elements.

Manpower and Fiscal Constraints

Flexibility in Numbers

The question here is, "What is the attitude of many of

today's force structure planners who are required to plan
under the auspices of a tight budget and the restrictions of a
small volunteer Army?" I would suspect that in the force
structure planners' zeal to reduce manpower and equipment
costs, their pencils could arbitrarily slice through existing
TOE's like knives through butter. Some of us who have
suffered through manpower surveys will attest that
manpower survey teams are not always "tuned in" to the
needs of the commander. That a spare part can be delivered
rapidly to a howitzer by using organic aviation assets may
not be so important if it costs more for a division to operate
separate aviation units. (Of course, consolidation of many
duplicate positions and tasks could result in cost savings.)
The only defense against this argument is that flexibility
and the ability to accomplish a particular mission outweigh
the cost. Simply stating that the division artillery
commander needs his helicopters to extend his command
and control is not enough; a more detailed justification is
required.

Experience in Vietnam indicates that pure aviation

units (such as companies) have a higher mission success
ratio with regard to missions requested (allocated) versus
missions completed by aircraft. For example, if a
maintenance problem develops on an aircraft slated for
support of a given unit, the aviation battalion usually can
provide a substitute aircraft from the battalion assets and
the mission can be completed. On the other hand, if a
section aviation officer has a problem, the section does not
have sufficient assets to allow him to provide the supported
unit a substitute aircraft. Although this argument has merit,
it can be countered. Because of the relatively small number
of aircraft available in an aviation section, there may be a
tendency to ignore proper management procedures with
regard to allocation of aircraft and to simply commit and
fly the helicopters until one or all are grounded due to
requirements for scheduled or unscheduled maintenance. In
the long run, this type of use does not lend itself to
maximizing the effectiveness of the unit. In Vietnam this
condition probably existed when inexperienced aviation
officers were unable to convince commanders that sound
management procedures would not only give them the
flexibility they desired but, on the whole, better support for
the command. Let us not forget that aviation companies
and battalions had the benefit of a great deal of staff
expertise unavailable to the section commanders. In the
future, however, both aviation officers and commanders
must manage their aviation assets effectively in order to
maximize the use of their helicopters.

Aircraft Maintenance
This is the most obvious and incontestable
consolidation argument. As equipment becomes more
complex, maintenance requirements increase (in spite of
modern component replacement technology). The combat
aviation battalion has a much more extensive aircraft
maintenance capability than the division artillery; therefore,
when the division artillery must continually seek support
from the divisional transportation aircraft maintenance
(TAM) company, the aviation battalion performs a much
greater portion of its maintenance in house. There is no
doubt that this factor causes the division artillery to lose
operational readiness time, and thus effectiveness, in this
area. There is, however, a solution that does not require

Needs of Units in Reserve

Many who advocate the consolidation of aviation
elements would strip the divisions of all aviation beginning
at the corps level. This they justify with the argument
49

that a division in reserve has little, if any, need for aviation

support while a committed division may need more support.
This argument may have merit; however, artillery units are
seldom in reserve and their aviation support must continue.
Who is to say that future wars will be "conventional" and
that we will, in fact, have reserve divisions?

difficult to complain about misuses when the aircraft you

were flying belonged to the misuser.) The result is that, in
the end, there are not as many aviation ears sympathetic to
the cause of organic aviation as there should bea
situation that does not aid the field artillery's position in the
least.
The field artillery is in a tenuous position today with
regard to its organic aviation elements. My biggest fear is
that although the artillery commander appreciates the need
for his helicopters, he may, under a barrage of factual data
and false premises, relent and lose a primary asset. Should
this occur, the field artillery will be forced to list another
item next to those outlined by General Toffler and Major
Millera tragic end indeed, and a crippling blow to the
field artillery mission of supporting the combat soldier.

Aviator Attitudes
A vast majority of aviators currently on active duty
probably served in Vietnam in aviation companies. Many
of these aviators may lack an appreciation of a ground
commanders problems because, compared to aviation
section support, support for this individual was provided on
a relatively formal basis. Many units were allocated "blade
time," especially with regard to resupply missions, and
once that blade time was exhausted, the helicopter crews
returned home without really knowing (or caring about) the
problems of the soldier he supported. This method of
support is understandable, but unfortunately it did not
acquaint thousands of aviators (especially warrant officers)
with the inherent advantage of organic section aviation. In
fact, many aviators disdained the way their machines were
"abused" or "misused" by units they were supporting.
(Aviation company aviators were not alone in displaying
this attitude; the problem of section aviators was that it was

MAJ Robert G. Tetu, Jr., FA. attended the US

Naval Test Pilot School at Patuxent River,
Maryland, following his graduation from the Field
Artillery Advanced Course in 1972. He served as
the 23d Infantry Division aviation officer in
Vietnam from July 1970 to May 1971. This article
is Major Tetu's second contribution to the
JOURNAL
(see
October-November
1973
JOURNAL, "Aerobics").

50

Number 2, Aiming Point

This Instrument.

Number 2, Aiming Point

Identified.

Number 2, Deflection
2647.

Deflection 2647, 2 Mils, Number 2

Ready For Recheck.

Number 2, Deflection
2647.

Deflection 2647, 0 Mils.

Number 2 Is Laid.

by
LTC Bobby Godwin

This sequence is familiar to all field artillerymen, but recently

it held a special significance for SSG Gary A. Bosse, Section
Chief, Section 2, Battery B, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 321st Field
Artillery, 82d Airborne Division. Sergeant Bosse and his men
were "under the gun," but the battery executive officer and chief
of firing battery were not present to assist or supervise.
It all began about 6 weeks earlier when the battalion
commander and the S3 decided to go back to basics and
concentrate on howitzer section training. An examination
51

of methods was made to encourage

cohesiveness within the section and
give the howitzer section chief a
personal stake in the results of the
training. Naturally, the desire to foster
competition among sections was an
ever-present factor in designing the
training program. It soon became
apparent that some type of training
test would be necessary to place
unmistakable emphasis on the
training and, at the same time,
provide a basis for ranking the
sections.
Infantry units have conducted
squad and platoon ATT's for years,
and the infantry views these tests as
an important part of the preparation
for larger unit exercises and
operational training tests. Moreover,
infantry commanders have long
realized that small-unit training may
well determine the outcome of any
battle.
For Sergeant Bosse and the other
section chiefs, the howitzer section
test provided the opportunity for each
to develop and test his leadership
ability as well as prove to others how
well his section could function as a
team. Prior to the tests Sergeant
Bosse stated, "I have always liked
competition, and I know my section is the best in the
battalion. Now I have the opportunity to prove it."
The howitzer section test that was designed to allow
the sergeant to "prove it" was administered and graded by
four most demanding professionalsthe battalion
operations sergeant and three chiefs of firing battery.
Officers were allowed to participate only as safety officers
and observers. The chiefs of firing battery, led by the
battalion operations sergeant, SFC Waddell J. Timpson,
devised the test and developed a detailed grading checklist
with an objective scoring system based on numerical points.
As noted by Sergeant Timpson, "The chiefs of firing battery
decided to emphasize those items on the checklist
associated with proper field artillery procedures and give
less weight to those items concerned with speed. This was
done by manipulating the points awarded for each event."
Each section chief was provided instant feedback on
his section's performance by a detailed critique conducted
immediately after termination of the tests. Later, the test
scores were published and awards and recognition were
given to the winning section.

For Sergeant Bosse and Section 2,

the test began when the section reported
to SSG Fredrick G. Stanley, Battery B
Chief of Firing Battery, at a
predetermined assembly area. Sergeant
Bosse was briefed on the tactical
situation and the conduct of the test, and
he then briefed his troops. The section
equipment was checked by graders, the
gun and prime mover were given
thorough maintenance inspections, and
ammunition was issued. The section gun
guide, SP4 Raymond L. Brown, was
transported by a test team member to a
new position area where he was briefed
on the gun position, initial deflection,
direction of fire, and so forth. Specialist
Brown said, "I was nervous about being
selected as gun guide. I knew that the
section was depending on me to have
things squared away when they arrived."
Sergeant Bosse later said, "The time
spent in the assembly area was the
hardest part of the test. I knew that once
we hit the new position, I would be too
busy to worry."
On order, the section conducted a
road movement and tactically occupied
the new position. The grader at this
location, SFC James Walker, Battery C
Chief of Firing Battery, recorded the total
time required to lay the piece and get the
section fully in order (section equipment laid out,
boresighting completed, etc.). After Sergeant Bosse
reported that Section 2 was fully in order, Sergeant Walker
conducted a detailed inspection of the howitzer and the
section equipment and stated, "The M102 howitzer should
be ready to fire in less than 4 minutes, and the section
should be fully in order within 20 minutes." Section 2 was
laid in 1 minute 5 seconds and was fully in order in 7
minutes 9 seconds. The average times for the 18 competing
howitzer sections were 1 minute 15 seconds to be ready to
fire and 7 minutes 30 seconds to be fully in order.
Sergeant Walker deducted 3 points because of the gun
guide's failure to dig in the commo wire and deducted 2
points because one anxious trooper jumped out of Sergeant
Bosse's gamma goat before it stopped. Sergeant Walker
observed, "Safety sometimes tends to be neglected during
timed competitions. We therefore stressed safety during the
test and deducted points for unsafe acts."
After the grading was completed, Section 2 was tested
by Sergeant Walker on a series of live fire missions. The
first was a low-angle dry fire mission that served as a
52

At the end of the day, Section 2 received a detailed

critique of its performance. The graded checklists were later
returned to Sergeant Bosse for review and correction of
shortcomings. The men were tiredboth physically and
emotionallybut they were confident that they were the best.
However, other sections also performed well on the test, and
Section 2 finished fourth of 18 sections in the battalion with a
score of 364 points of a possible 376.
In practicing for the test, it had been determined that due
to past emphasis on battalion- and battery-level training, the
section chiefs were not fully prepared to operate
independently. For this reason, each section was administered
a graded practice 1 week before the actual test. Sergeant
Timpson, NCOIC, stated, "All of the sections improved
significantly during the week of training between the practice
and the actual test."
Sergeant Bosse and the other section chiefs learned
another valuable lessonthat the gun guide is a vital member
of the section. The occupation of position by those sections
with good gun guides invariably went smoothly, and these
smooth occupations enabled the sections to build a much
needed momentum that lasted throughout the test. Sergeant
Bosse admitted, "Prior to the section test I picked my gun
guide by the 'hey you' system. I now carefully selectand
trainmy gun guide."
This test generated splendid response and enthusiasm in
both the section members and the section chiefs. Challenges
and bets are already being made by the men on the guns
concerning the winners of any future section tests.

warmup exercise. The second mission, also a low-angle dry

fire mission, tested the section's ability to change from using
the collimator to using aiming posts. Misfire procedures were
also tested. After the dry fire missions were completed, two
live fire missionsone low angle and one high anglewere
conducted to test the section for speed and accuracy. To make
the test equitable, changes in data and the number of shifts in
these live fire missions remained fairly uniform from section
to section. Forward observers and a fire direction center were
used during this portion of the test.
Sergeant Bosse's section performed flawlessly in the fire
missions.
The standard times used to grade the sections were those
outlined in paragraph 28-12, FM 6-40. At the completion of
the fire missions, Section 2 was briefed on a new tactical
situation; shortly thereafter, the section march ordered and
began moving to a new firing position. The march order was
almost perfect, except that one round of ammunition was not
put back in its fiber container. That mistake cost the section 3
points.
For the next portion of the test, Section 2 was on the road
again.

YELLOW SMOKE!
Sergeant Bosse quickly scanned the terrain and identified
a knoll 30 meters to the right of the road. He recognized the
yellow smoke as the prearranged signal to conduct a hasty
occupation for an indirect fire positionthe "hipshoot" so
familiar to all field artillerymen. Following the hasty
occupation, the grader at this location, SSG Mitchell L.
Hargett, Battery A Chief of Firing Battery, initiated an indirect
live fire mission. Scoring of this mission was similar to that of
missions fired in the previous position.
Following the indirect fire mission, Sergeant Bosse was
assigned a defensive sector of fire. To prepare for action, he
briefed the section, prepared a terrain sketch, assigned
individual sectors of fire, and identified left and right direct
fire limits to the gunner, SGT Vincent C. Joiner.
Approximately 15 minutes after the occupation, Sergeant
Hargett identified a targeta dug-in "enemy" machinegun
nest. Section 2 quickly engaged the target and recorded four
direct hits out of six rounds fired on the machinegun
emplacement.

LTC Bobby J. Godwin graduated from Officer

Candidate School in 1959, the Field Artillery Officer
Advanced Course in 1964, and Command and
General Staff College in 1969. He served two tours
in Vietnamas advisor to a Vietnamese artillery
battalion (1962-63) and as S3 of the 4th Infantry
Division Artillery (1967-68). More recently,
Lieutenant Colonel Godwin has served as S3 of the
82d Airborne Division Artillery and as commander
of the 2d Battalion (Airborne). 321st Field Artillery.

53

by
CPT David R. Fabian

Neither the individual

soldier nor his commander
can afford to overlook the
wide-ranging significance
of the Enlisted Evaluation
System (EES).

The EES is the heart of enlisted personnel

management. It impacts on virtually every enlisted
personnel management decision, to include
identifying those soldiers who deserve promotions
and proficiency pay, those who are eligible to
reenlist, and those who warrant consideration to
attend either civil or higher level military
schooling.
The systemwhich is actually a composite
evaluation based on annual PMOS test scores and
Enlisted Efficiency Reports (EER) checks the
soldiers knowledge, training, and ability in several
ways. The written MOS tests, for example, usually
contain 125 questions that involve actual job
situations and require application of MOS
knowledge for their solution. In other words, these
MOS test results indicate what the soldier is
capable of doing on the job. The EER, on the other
hand, is the immediate supervisor's assessment of
how the soldier
54

actually fares in executing his duties and responsibilities.

For certain MOS's, the written tests and EER's are
supplemented by performance tests, which are "hands on"
or manual proficiency demonstrations of MOS skills (e.g.,
typing, court reporting, Morse Code reception, etc.).
Since the introduction of the EES in 1959, the system,
its components, and its uses have withstood careful
scrutiny and extensive reevaluation at various intervals.
The EES continues to enjoy high credibility among DA
enlisted career managers as a valid personnel management
device, and because of its long-standing importance in the
dynamic area of enlisted career management, it merits the
increasing attention of individual soldiers and their
commanders.
Under the current EES, every soldierregardless of
pay gradewho is serving an enlistment commitment
requiring a total of 3 or more years of active duty must be
tested initially in his primary MOS (PMOS) upon
completing 16 months of active service. Thereafter, he is
evaluated every year in his PMOS and every other year in
his secondary MOS (SMOS).
The written MOS tests are regulated administratively
on a calender year, quarterly basis. Listings of MOS's
scheduled for evaluation each quarter are announced in an
annual DA circular, which is distributed down to unit level.
Normally, specific MOS's are evaluated during the same
test month each year (February, May, August, or
November), so soldiers are seldom surprised when they
learn they are due for yearly testing.
Testing is controlled in the field on a decentralized
basis under the supervision of a formally appointed test
control officer (TCO), who is the commander's principal
staff advisor on all matters related to the Enlisted
Evaluation System.
Working with the commander, the TCO initiates plans
to test all eligible soldiers. He must requisition appropriate
tests and study guides in advance, insure test security,
arrange local scheduling, and reserve adequate test sites
and facilities. The TCO also appoints test examiners to
assist in administering the tests. Meanwhile, the
commander, after coordinating with the TCO and
identifying the MOS positions in his unit that are scheduled
for evaluation, prepares and sends a complete roster of
test-eligible soldiers (to include those attached to his unit)
to the TCO. From then on, the commander must keep his
TCO informed on the changing status (PCS, TDY,
hospitalized, promoted, reclassified into new MOS's) of
those soldiers whose names were reported on the roster and
must add names of newly assigned members who are
eligible for the testing. In addition, he must set up MOS
study programs and group sessions for unit members and
must help them get the study materials they need to prepare
for their tests. Likewise, he must not overlook the
importance of timely EER submissions on test-eligible unit
members. If new members are assigned to the unit as test

time draws near, the commander should review their

records to see if EER's prepared by former organizations
are available.
Approximately 90 days before the scheduled PMOS
test date, the TCO distributes standard MOS Evaluation
Test Study Guides to help soldiers "bone up." Once in a
soldier's hands, the guide is an especially valuable
document. It lists study references from which test
questions have been drawn for his particular test and
identifies the newest MOS-related correspondence courses
he has time to enroll in and complete prior to taking the
test.
Between receipt of the study guide and scheduled test
time, the soldier is, generally speaking, on his own. To be
sure, his MOS test will encompass all of the major duties
and responsibilities assigned under his PMOS code. Some
of the questions will be general, others quite specific. Some
may deal with MOS-related equipment. Equipment test
questions are designed so that any well-qualified soldier
can reasonably be expected to provide the answers by
applying a combination of his knowledge of related
equipment and knowledge he has obtained by the reference
material listed in the study guide. Thus, should a soldier's
current duties be limited to, say, a particular weapon
system, he can use his study time to review other weapon
systems that are covered in his MOS code but that he may
never see in his daily assignment.
Likewise, he should check his past evaluation scores
recorded on his earlier Enlisted Evaluation Data Report
forms (USAEEC Form 10). Results shown on the forms
indicate how well or how poorly he may have fared in each
major area of past MOS tests.
Above all, the soldier must remember that his
preparation for testing is, in essence, synonymous with
maintaining PMOS proficiency. As a minimum, he will be
presumed to possess the basic skills and knowledge of his
primary MOSnothing more, actually, than what was
required at the time it was awarded to him. Theoretically,
then, he should be ready for annual testing if he has honed
his MOS code skills continually throughout the year.
Realistically, though, this is not always the case.
Present policy, for instance, allows a commander certain
flexibility in using a soldier in an MOS other than his
primary. In such cases, it is the commander's
responsibility to insure that this practice does not get out
of hand. Common sense remedies work best. For
instance, if the commander foresees that one of his
soldiers will be utilized outside his PMOS for an
indefinite period, he should initiate action either to
redesignate the man's secondary or duty MOS as his
PMOS or to reassign the soldier to a position in which
his PMOS knowledge and skill can be best exercised.
Otherwise, the soldier is denied the opportunity to "practice
his trade" and to be tested on an equitable basis with

55

his contemporaries who are working in their PMOS's.

Once a soldier completes his written MOS test, the
TCO will notify the appropriate commander, see that the
action is noted in the soldier's records, and forward the
man's test form to the US Army Enlisted Evaluation Center
for centralized scoring. There, the scored results will
eventually be combined with the soldier's EER scores, the
second major component of the Enlisted Evaluation
System.
An EER, as previously mentioned, is an evaluation of
duty performance that takes into account a soldier's
personal characteristics and advancement potential. It is
prepared by the soldier's immediate supervisora person
in grade E6 or higherand normally reviewed by a
warrant or commissioned officer in the soldier's direct line
of supervision.
EER preparation guidance is specific. A rater is
expected to remain objective and to avoid awarding an
inflated score so that the Army is provided with the best
possible means of distinguishing between soldiers on a
"performance of duty" basis. A reviewer, in turn, must
insure the accuracy of the report; if a reviewer judges that
the rater's evaluation does not comply with regulations or
seems unfair to either the soldier or the Army, he is
responsible for initiating the appropriate corrective action.
All completed EER's, like completed MOS tests, are
forwarded to and retained on file at Fort Benjamin
Harrison's Enlisted Evaluation Center, where the soldier's
annual overall MOS evaluation score is computed.
In arriving at raw evaluation scores, the soldier's
annual MOS test result is weighted 60 percent, while his
EER weighted average (EERWA) counts 40 percent toward
his overall annual MOS evaluation score. It should also be
noted that the standard 60 percent/40 percent scoring
formula is adjusted to insure that consideration is given for
performance testing, if required. Raw scores are then
converted to a composite numerical evaluation score
between 40 and 160.
A specific evaluation score within this range reflects
the soldier's relative knowledge, skill, and ability to
perform MOS duties in comparison with all soldiers who
have been examined in the same MOS, pay grade, and skill
level. Attempts to compare scores of soldiers evaluated as,
say, 13B20's with those tested as 13B40's or 13E40's will
prove nothing. The scores will differ simply because test
questions and major subject areas for these MOS's and skill
levels differ significantly.
Another important point to realize when interpreting
evaluation scores is that to qualify in or verify a PMOS, the
soldier must achieve a minimum amount of technical
knowledge (measured by the MOS test), a minimum
amount of personal qualification and duty performance

(measured by the EERWA), and if appropriate, a minimum

degree of demonstrable proficiency (measured by the
performance test). No degree of proficiency in any one of
these areas, however, can counterbalance or make up for a
serious deficiency in one or both of the other areas.
Minimum scores ("hurdles") are set for each of these EES
components, and a soldier who fails to achieve higher than
the minimum score on any one of these is judged
unqualified and receives an MOS evaluation score of 40.
Considering these hurdles, to qualify in his MOS at a
particular grade and skill level, a soldier must attain a
minimum evaluation score of 70. An evaluation score of
100 denotes that he is about average and is qualified for
promotion with a waiver. The soldier is in the top one-third
of his peer group and is promotion-qualified without need
of a waiver if he scores 110 or higher. A score of 120 to
129 places him in the top 20 percent of his peer group, and
a score of 130 or higher means that the soldier is in the top
10 percent of his peer group.
In addition to verifying or indicating the level of the
soldier's overall MOS qualification, results of the Enlisted
Evaluation System have wide-ranging applications that
benefit the Army, the commander, and the individual
soldier.
The Army invariably looks toward the PMOS as the
principal means to manage, control, and distribute enlisted
assets to meet force requirements. Hence, annual PMOS
evaluation enables career managers to keep track of skilled
soldiers (and their degrees of skills) and to exercise greater
flexibility and versatility in assigning soldiers Army-wide.
That's what enlisted personnel management is all
aboutgetting the right soldier with the right skill and
proficiency in the job where he's needed most. Furthermore,
EES affords, within each MOS, objective and reasonably
current assessments of quality that allow not only career
managers but also promotion selection boards to identify
readily higher caliber soldiers and to determine which of
these soldiers should be assigned greater responsibilities.
The commander's interest in and support of the
Enlisted Evaluation System will not go unrewarded. The
commander can glean from the system some very telling
and very valuable feedback that he can exploit to promote
and improve both individual and unit training. The Enlisted
Evaluation Data Reports tell him how well each unit
member has done, while the MOS Evaluation Test Profile
Summary Report furnished to major commands indicates
the status of training within the command. These data, in
terms of PMOS qualification, reflect individual and unit
readiness posture in the event of limited or full
mobilization.
Doubtlessly, to the soldier, the most tangibleand
therefore the most generally recognizeddividend of the

56

One final point merits emphasis. Over the past 15

years, the Enlisted Evaluation System has evolved in sync
with the Army's dynamic Enlisted Personnel Management
System. Changing trends may well dictate future
modifications to sustain the value of the EES as an
objective and credible management tool used by DA-level
enlisted career managers. Nonetheless, the continued
objectivity and credibility of the Enlisted Evaluation
System will depend largely on how well soldiers and their
commanders understand and support a system designed to
serve their best interests.

EES is the system's effect on his receipt of superior

performance (proficiency) pay, which is awarded monthly
to a percentage of enlisted soldiers who have either combat
or combat support MOS's and who meet or surpass
predetermined annual MOS evaluation scores. Currently,
combat troops scoring in the top 20 percent of their peer
group (scores of 130 or higher) are awarded extra pay for
their high degree of MOS proficiency.
Lesser known effects of the EES, however, are equally
important to the soldier. The Enlisted Evaluation System
Assists in the determination of grades and MOS's for
enlistment of warrant and commissioned officers who
revert to enlisted status.

CPT David R. Fabian, AG, is currently

serving as Information Officer, US Army
Military Personnel Center. A 1963 graduate of
Gannon College, Erie, Pennsylvania, he
received his MA from Rutgers University in
1966. Captain Fabian attended the Armor
Officer Basic Course in 1968 and the Adjutant
General Officer Course in 1971. He has served
as executive editor of TIPS, the Army personnel
magazine, and as editor-in-chief of two other
military quarterly magazinesEsprit (Vietnam)
and Your Individual Training (HQ. CONARC).

Assists in the determination of qualification for

reclassification into and utilization in selected MOS's.
Assists in
eligibility.

the determination of reenlistment

Assists in the screening of individuals under the

Qualitative Management Program.
Assists DA NCOES selection boards in identifying
soldiers who deserve additional higher level military
training.

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57

humor by "T2"

Notes for Young

Intelligence
Officers
(Internal Security Operations)
It is absolutely essential to be quite clear about your
aim. This is to convey the impression that you know a very
great deal about the organization, equipment, and future
intentions of the enemy but are unable to reveal these at
any given time in case your agents and informers are
compromised. It is, of course, necessary to conceal the fact
that you have no agents or informers, let alone any
knowledge whatsoever about the enemy.
It is most important to have a well-laid-out office. This
must contain a large safe, and the door should have at least
two locks. The walls should be covered with maps, which
should be liberally plastered with coloured pins. It is
desirable to connect up a number, but not all, of these pins
with coloured string. If possible, some of these strings
should run from one map to another and back again,
perhaps via a third map of a completely different part of
the world. If asked what any of this means, shake your
head and mutter something about "movement of arms" or

"enemy orbat" [order of battle] and change the subject. If

you really wish to perplex a persistent caller, on occasion
clear your maps completely, except possibly for one very
large and brilliantly coloured pin stuck in the top of the
most inaccessible piece of high ground you can find. If
asked what this means, you should say that you are not
quite in a position to brief your visitor yet, but that he will
soon find out. This should send him off to inspect his men's
feet and get their boots studded. If later asked why no
operation took place, you merely hint that the whole plan
was compromised and that you'll know better than to tell
anyone anything next time.
You require some form of notebook to consult when
pressed for information. This always impresses people
and, more important, gives you time to think. A millboard
[clipboard], though useful as a visible sign of great
industry, is not recommended as it is all too easy for
the curious to discover what rubbish is written thereon.

58

The author strongly advises a notebook fitted with a small

padlock, which is sure to impress your superiors as much
as it irritates your contemporaries. You should also keep
ostentatiously a large account book full of three-figure
entries for your imaginary expense account. (Advice will
be forwarded on request under Top Secret cover to any
young Intelligence Officer who has actually succeeded in
getting his hands on a real expense account.)
When visited in your office, first of all apologize for
keeping your caller waiting, then lock up your wastebasket
in the safe. Dial a nonexistent telephone number, use an
imaginary codeword, and say "Yes" seven times at
intervals, then arrange to meet "at the usual place at 0300
hours" the following day. Lock the office door and turn to
your visitor, saying, "Now we can speak freely." The effect
is heightened if your caller has only come to ask it you'd
like a game of hockey or to suggest it's time you paid your
mess bill.
When stopped by the military police in an
out-of-bounds area, driving a WD [War Department] hired
civilian car with your latest girlfriend but no work [trip]
ticket, the correct procedure is to tell the patrol that you
can't discuss what you are doing but will interview their
officer on the morrow. At 0805 hours the following day
you should storm into the office of the APM [Assistant
Provost Marshal] and bitterly complain that your best agent
has been "blown" and is likely to be "knocked off" at any
moment, your car has been compromised, and your safe
house rendered useless, and will he please ensure that his
policemen do not interfere with your movements again.
This will only work once. You must change forthwith either
your car, your girlfriend, or both.
It is essential that you cooperate with any other young
Intelligence Officer in your area. You should arrange to
meet several times a week in a public place, (e.g., the
local Ops room) and surreptitiously pass each other
messages in plain sealed envelopes. You should
frequently be seen engaged in whispered conversations,
occasionally breaking off and leaving the room to talk
"more privately." Should a third person join your group,
either become completely silent until he withdraws,
ostentatiously change the subject, or discuss some
imaginary future operation by mysterious innuendos.
There is, however, one golden rule. You must never pass
on any genuine information to the other young
Intelligence Officer as he would then know as much as
you do, which would be fatal.
At times you may be pressed by your superiors to
forecast future enemy intentions. Useful expressions of
these occasions are:
"We believe that the other side have not yet made up
their minds how to react to this situation." (Always say

"we" and not "I". It is useful to hint at nonexistent

colleagues, and this also gives you a good personal
alibi if you are wrong.)
"There are indications that they will do so-and-so. On
the other hand, there is a report from a previously
reliable source that they may well do such-and-such."
(At this point frown and perhaps suck your pencil in a
perplexed fashion, as if trying to weigh the merits and
demerits of these alternatives from the enemy's point
of view. With any luck, some senior officer will then
offer his own misconceived and prejudiced opinions,
and you will be spared giving a positive answer to this
dilemma. Whatever the enemy then do, you will later
be able to claim that you forecast their intentions.)
If you are forced into giving a firm forecast and are
later proved wrong (this will happen often since on the law
of average "tails" will only come up 50 percent of the time),
useful excuses are:
"I'm afraid they changed their plans at the last moment,
and the new decisions didn't reach us until it was too
late." Or better:
"It seems that the rank and file are somewhat out of
control of the leaders at the moment."
Finally, when your contemporaries see through your
various deceptions and evasions (you must hope your
superiors never do), you then darkly hint that your
behavior is deliberately idiotic, designed as a cover for
your other (nonexistent) undercover activities.

This article has been reproduced from the

BRITISH ARMY REVIEW by permission of
the Controller, Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
This is the third in a series of articles by "T2", a
retired major of the Durham Light Infantry, to
be reprinted by the JOURNAL.

59

another? One deterrent, of course, is the prospect of

retaliation. Would a resultant counterattack be worth the
advantage of initiating a preemptive nuclear strike? The
authors delve into this area with excellence.
Obviously, deterrence involves both military might and
threat. Both America and Russia possess the military might;
however, when apparent parity was achieved by the Soviet
Union in recent years, a psychological tug-of-war ensued.
Readers interested in the political rhetoric generated during
this time period should consult Cold Dawn: The Story of
SALT, by John New-house; otherwise, the quantitative and
qualitative aspects of nuclear deterrence have been covered
quite well.
The authors have attempted to give the reader a
simplified graphical analysis of deterrence. Holding to
their promise to keep it simple, they start with a very basic
graph comparing American and Russian missiles. Then,
they methodically explain how the Soviets and Americans
have arrived at a stable mutual deterrencea marvelous
segue for their final chapters on arms control and SALT
(Strategic Arms Limitation Talks).
While total disarmament is generally considered to be
an unattainable goal for modern peacemakers to strive
toward, establishing some sort of control on offensive and
defensive weapons seems to be the most pragmatic
alternative. The authors have shown how these controls
took shape, from the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in
1959 to the conclusion of SALT I in 1972. They include an
especially fine discussion on the Nuclear Weapons
Nonproliferation Treaty, which received varied comments,
mostly critical, when it was signed in 1970. An analysis of
that treaty in this review would be unfair due to space
limitations; however, let it be said that it did please the
nations involved and it has been a factor in the continuance
of negotiations.
Much has been written on SALT I. The talks have
evoked mixed reactions from United States military
personnel, and it is generally conceded that, numerically,
the USSR gained the upper hand. The authors do not
discuss just how that occurred; they do, however, imply
that it is not their intention to discuss the box score of
SALT I. They feel the important first step has been taken,
and they believe the initial negotiations were easier to
handle than the followup. They observe that qualitative
aspects will be the most important issues discussed in
SALT II, and this should prove to be quite demanding to
the negotiators.
In The Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance, the authors
intended to help the reader fight his way through the maze
of material written on this subject, and they have
succeeded admirably. Although the title seems to imply
that a balance exists, alas, it does not. Where and when
equilibrium will be achieved is anyone's guess. Advances

THE DYNAMICS OF THE NUCLEAR

BALANCE, by Albert Legault and George
Lindsey, Cornell University Press, Ithaca
(NY) and London, 1974, 263 pages, $14.50.
During the past 2 decades, the United States and the
Soviet Union have maintained a skillful balance of terror
and deterrence. However, in the early 1960's, as weapon
technology advanced in quantum leaps, it became quite
obvious that a slowdown of the weapons race was
necessary for both the belligerents and the remainder of the
world. The result was a series of bilateral and multilateral
treaties that have barely sated the onerous appetites of the
main characters.
The preface of Dynamics specifically states the
intentions of the authorsthat is, to present a text that will
be easily understood by the defense dilettanteand they do
this in a very commendable manner.
The book begins with a discussion on nuclear
explosives and then moves on to discuss the present
American and Soviet offensive and defensive systems. This
discussion covers a very broad area, yet it is quite
necessary for the uninformed reader. The authors have
gone further than the rudiments in explaining the various
systems. However, it is not a "tour" of military hardware
but a fine treatment of the characteristics, advantages,
disadvantages, and probable negotiable value of each
weapon system.
If deterrence is the sine qua non of balance, just what
does deter one superpower from initiating an attack on
60

in offensive systems beget advances in defensive systems

and vice versa; therefore, balance is now a question of
quality and intent.

themselves. The hearings were held in 1969-70.) The third

section of the book concerns some general observations
and conclusions (also developed from the investigations by
the subcommittee) that are not related to specific countries.
Of interest in relation to the methodology used to
collect the data for the book is the fact that members of the
subcommittee, in their hearings on and investigations in
each country, talked to senior American diplomats and
military officers as well as other people inside and outside
the official American community. Because of this approach,
the information presented in this book is more
comprehensive, precise, and reliable than that in most other
sources available to the general public. In short, Mr. Paul
has written, not a broad theoretical study, but a book about
the real world of foreign policy.
The professional soldier should read this book to gain
the "big picture" of United States military commitments in
the world today. Of additional value is recognition of the
criticisms presented by the author with regard to
duplication of effort in certain areas. A specific point on
this subject is concerned with some duplicated
headquarters in Europe. In view of our current efforts to
reduce headquarters, he had made a point. On the other
hand, he paints a rather rosy picture of both our nuclear
and our nonnuclear capabilities in NATO, which leads to
my major criticism of the bookthat the author has failed
to understand the employment and use of tactical nuclear
weapons.
In the final section of his book, Mr. Paul discusses four
general topics that were developed by the subcommittee
investigations but are not related to particular countries: (1)
the respective roles of the State Department and the
Defense Department in foreign policy, (2) the relationship
between individual American commitments abroad and the
size of the defense budget, (3) the influence of the United
States on its various allies, and (4) some economic
considerations of the electronic intelligence-gathering
program.
With regard to the purpose of his book, Mr. Paul has
presented an accurate summary of American military
commitments and has presented it in very readable form.
He has presented some conclusions about commitments in
certain areas and some general conclusions that suggest not
only foreign policy courses of action in the future but some
which are being implemented today (e.g., troop reduction
in Thailand). He has also shown some excellent clarifying
insights into political processes of foreign policy with
respect to interactions between the legislative and
executive branches of our government.

CPT Ralph J. Paduano, Tactics/Leadership

Department, USAFAS

AMERICAN
MILITARY
COMMITMENTS ABROAD, by Roland
A. Paul, Rutgers University Press, New
Brunswick, NJ, 1973, 237 pages, $10.00.
What is commitment? According to Senate Resolution
85, 25 June 1969, it involves ". . . the use of the Armed
Forces of the United States on foreign territory, or a
promise to assist a foreign country, government, or people
by the use of the Armed Forces or financial resources of
the United States either immediately or upon the happening
of certain event . . ." That this is not a particularly precise
definition is quite clear. Mr. Paul suggests that a
commitment is ". . . any preexisting relationship between
this country and another that would significantly tend to
lead this country toward the use of force even if, at the
moment of crisis, it were not otherwise American policy to
use it." While this definition is obviously more clear and
concise, it is not without problems, as the author proceeds
to point out in considering the general problems of
definitions.
Mr. Paul, a lawyer and former chief counsel to the
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on United States
Security Agreements Abroad (Senator Stuart Symington,
Chairman), has done an exceptional job of discussing
American military commitment in very objective,
meaningful terms. Mr. Paul's purpose in writing this book
is threefold: (1) to provide an accurate summary of
American military involvements and commitments
overseas, (2) to offer some conclusions based on these
commitments that he hopes will suggest future courses of
action in foreign policy, and (3) to provide some insight
into the processes of foreign policy and the way in which
the legislative and executive branches deal with each other
in this field.
This book can be informally divided into three basic
parts. The first is a general discussion of commitments, to
include a listing of and specific comments on the current
major commitments of the United States. The second
section comprises case studies describing the American
military presence in the NATO alliance and 12 specific
countries in the Far East, Europe, and Africa. (These
studies were developed from information collected by the
author on fact-finding investigations he conducted to
provide a basis for the Symington Subcommittee hearings
and from information developed by the hearings

MAJ Peter T. Zielenski, Target Acquisition

Department, USAFAS
61

military-industrial-complex variety that emerged in the

1920's and popularized itself in the Cold War era. From
this strain, the Hobbesian personification of the "military
mind" emerges as the fascistic, brutal Army officer trained
to "Prussianistic" perfection and, unless checked or
delegitimized, likely to make life "nasty, brutish, and short"
for everyone else. Since the aftermath of World War I,
except for initial periods of subsequent conflict that briefly
eclipsed most criticism, counterimages have either tended
toward defensive response rather than rational appraisal or
were lost in the general peacetime antipathy of the country
towards its army. Certainly the Second World War
provided a spate of hero stereotypes, but, institutionally,
they have had only a transitional effect. Limited accolades
for "special types"from the manager of the Berlin Airlift
to the US astronauthave surfaced, but, by and large, the
officer corps, as "the brass," has had increasingly rough
sledding in intellectual circles. The direct criticism has
increased to all but drown out the defenders of military
professionalism, and the popular images, diverse but
conditioned, react accordingly. Kemble warns of even
more difficult times ahead and pleads for a dispassionate
understanding of the role of the soldier as an officer in
society. For the civilian concerned with his military
institution and for the officer concerned with his
institutional image. Kemble provides the kind of thoughtful,
balanced historical analysis that can help to promote this
understanding. Lessons aside, it is a well-written book full
of intrinsic gems of wit and fact. The burden of today's
emerging professional company grade officer should
certainly lighten with the knowledge that "by 1891, there
was not a single artillery captain under forty."

THE IMAGE OF THE ARMY OFFICER

IN AMERICA: BACKGROUND FOR
CURRENT VIEWS, by COL (Ret) C.
Robert Kemble, Greenwood Press,
Westport, Connecticut, 1973, 289 pages,
$10.75.
"America has long had a tendency to reduce its
military men to stereotypes." So Colonel Kemble
introduces his work, which is number 5 in a 5-volume
series entitled Contributions in Military History. Colonel
Kemble then proceeds to introduce the reader to every
major stereotype in the uniform of an American Army
officerfrom the birth of the nation to the presentin an
exhaustively researched document. Sketching perceptions
of the officer corps of "gentlemen" ranging from Jacksonian
citizen-soldiership to patrician virtue, he leads the reader to
the transition from the idealized ethic of cavalier combat
leadership to the harsh realities of mechanistic,
depersonalized mass war experienced in the Civil War and
reinforced by the Franco-Prussian War. Thus, by 1885, the
divergence of thought clearly followed the "modernization"
of war and the emergence of liberal intellectualism in the
United States. The pattern of conflicting images rooted in
18th and 19th century stereotypes emerges in the 20th
century to reflect a polarity of perceptions between "military
professionalism" and "professional militarism." It is the
socioeconomic consequence of industrialization with its
concomitant bureaucratization, mass society urbanization,
and progressive alienation and class consciousness that
reinforces these poles of thought in ever more intricate
adaptations. Colonel Kemble points out that the logical
extension of the "Jacksonian-populist-progressive" critique
has
been
the
co-conspirator
theory of
the

CPT Winn McDougal, Army-Wide Training

Support Department, USAFAS

Yesterday's Journal

Continued from Page 8

Adjustment is obtained by means of the bracket method

in both range and deflection, using a four-fork range
bracket and a 20-mil deflection bracket. The plane reports
the centre of impact of each salvo with reference to the
gun-target line by means of the following visual signals:

Centre of impact: Signal.

Over, deflection correct: Zoom.
Over and right: Turn to right and zoom.
Over and left: Turn to left and zoom.
Short, deflection correct: Dive.
Short and right: Turn to right and dive.
Short and left: Turn to left and dive.
Right (left), range correct: Turn to right (left).
Lost: One turn in spiral over panel.
Not understood or repeat: Flip rudder.
Understood: Flip elevators.
Sheaf too wide: Figure-of-eight across line of fire.
Sheaf too narrow: Figure-of-eight along line of fire.
62

Annual Readership Survey

IN ORDER TO INSURE WE ARE MEETING THE NEEDS OF
OUR READERSHIP, THE STAFF OF THE FIELD ARTILLERY
JOURNAL ASKS THAT YOU TAKE A FEW MINUTES AND FILL
OUT THIS READERSHIP SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE.
ED.
READERSHIP SURVEY
1. Military status:
_______Active Duty
_______USAR
_______NG
_______Retired
_______Other __________

2. Service:
_____ US Army
_____ US Marine Corps
_____ Allied
_____ Other _____________

3. Current Grade:
_____E1-E4
_____E5-E9
_____Officer
_____Warrant
_____DAC
_____Civilian

4. Reader geographical location:

_______APO NY
_______APO SF
_______APO SE
_______CONUS

7. When
there:
_____
_____
_____
_____

5. I am currently assigned to:

8. Of each issue, I read:

_____ All
_____ Most
_____ More than half
_____ Less than half

_______Howitzer unit
_______Missile/rocket unit
_______Staff section
School (ROTC, service or civilian school,
etc.)
_______Other ____________________________
6. How do you get your copy of the Journal?

_______Subscription
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_______Library

your unit/section receives the Journal, are

Not enough copies
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Comments ________________________

9. I rate the information in the Journal as

_____ Very useful
_____ Somewhat useful
_____ Of little use
_____ Of no use
63

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DOD 314

Field Artillery Journal

P. O. Box 3131
Ft. Sill, Okla. 73503
FOLD ON THIS LINE AND STAPLE

10. The standard features of the Journal I read

most are (check as many as you wish):
______Incoming (Letters to Editor)
______Yesterday's Journal (FA History)
______Trooping the Line (Enlisted Notes)
______Molly Pitcher (Distaff Notes)
______View from the Blockhouse (Notes
from the School)
______Right by Piece (Notes from the Field)
______Firing the Corps (Officer Notes)
______Redleg Review (Book Review)
11. I would like to see more articles featuring:
______History
______FA Tactics, Techniques, Organizations
______Strategy
______Maintenance
______Administration
______Opinion
______Foreign Armies and Equipment
______Career Info and Guidance
______Future Concepts
______Other Branches/Services
______Humor
______Other ________________________
12. After reading the Journal, I:
______ Pass it on
______ Retain it for reference
13. The Journal is mailed in the second month
of the issue (i.e., Mar-Apr mailed in first
two weeks of Apr.) I received my copy:
______ Within the month mailed
______ One month later
______ Two months later

14. I rate the Journal as:

______ Essential reading for professional
Artillerymen
______ Valuable source of FA information
______ Somewhat
valuable
source
of
information about FA
______ Source of little valuable information
about FA
15. Other military magazines I read are:
______ Armor
______ Infantry
______ Army Magazine
______ Soldiers
______ Other __________________________
16. Do you think you could contribute to the Journal?
______ Book review
______ Article
______ Feature
______ Other
______ No ____________________________
17. One of the goals of the Journal is to become a
forum for all Field Artillerymen. Is the Journal
making progress toward this goal?
______ Yes
______ No
______ Comments ______________________
18. My one recommendation to improve our Field
Artillery Journal is:
______________________________________
______________________________________
______________________________________
Thank you for your time and effort in answering
this questionnaire. With your assistance, we will
continue to publish a viable forum for all Field
Artillerymen, worldwide.
64
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1974779451/4