Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Alan
Sinkin
Tx.
Bar
#18438675
P.
O.
Box
944
Hilo,
Hawaii
96721
(808)
936-4428
lanny.sinkin@gmail.com
Counsel
for
Plaintiff
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
FOR
THE
DISTRICT
OF
HAWAII
)
Frank
Kamealoha
Anuumealani
Nobriga,
)
Civ.
No.
15-cv-00254
)
Plaintiff
)
PLAINTIFFS
OPPOSITION
TO
)
MOTION
TO
DISMISS
AND
)
JOINDER;
EXHIBITS
1
13;
)
CERTIFICATE
OF
SERVICE
Vs.
)
)
)
David
Y.
Ige,
et
al.,
)
DATE:
OCTOBER
16,
2015
)
TIME:
9:30
A.M.
Defendants
)
JUDGE
DERRICK
K.
WATSON
_________________________________________________)
PLAINTIFF
NOBRIGAS
MEMORANDUM
IN
OPPOSITION
TO
MOTION
TO
DISMISS
AMENDED
COMPLAINT
FILED
JULY
24,
2015
OF
DEFENDANT
STEPHANIE
NAGATA,
IN
HER
OFFICIAL
CAPACITY
AS
DIRECTOR
OF
THE
OFFICE
OF
MAUNA
KEA
MANAGEMENT,
AND
IN
HER
PRIVATE
CAPACITY,
AND
DEFENDANT
DONALD
STRANEY,
IN
HIS
OFFICIAL
CAPACITY
AS
CHANCELLOR,
UNIVERSITY
OF
HAWAII
AT
HILO,
AND
IN
HIS
PRIVATE
CAPACITY
AND
OPPOSITION
TO
STATE
OF
HAWAII
DEFENDANTS
SUBSTANTIVE
JOINDER
IN
UNIVERSITY
OF
HAWAII
AT
HILO
DEFENDANTS
[SIC]
MOTION
TO
DISMISS
AMENDED
COMPLAINT
FILED
JULY
24,
2015
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION
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1
II.
RULE
12
STANDARDS
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3
III.
ANALYSIS
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4
A.
NOBRIGA
CLAIM
IS
NOT
MOOT.
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4
B.
RELIEF
SOUGHT
DOES
REDRESS
INJURY
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7
C.
INJURY
TO
PLAINTIFF
IS
REAL
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10
D.
IMMUNITY
IS
NOT
AVAILABLE
TO
NAGATA
AND
STRANEY
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19
E.
THE
CONSPIRACY
ALLEGATION
IS
BASED
ON
FACTS
THAT
PLAUSIBLY
ENTITLED
PLAINTIFF
TO
RELIEF
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25
F.
PLAINTIFF
HAS
A
VALID
FIRST
AMENDMENT
CLAIM
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27
G.
PLAINTIFF
HAS
A
VALID
FIFTH
AMENDMENT
CLAIM
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28
H.
PLAINTIFF
HAS
A
VALID
FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
CLAIM
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29
I.
PLAINTIFFS
AMENDED
COMPLAINT
SATISFIES
THE
PLEADING
REQUIREMENTS
TO
ESTABLISH
JURISDICTION
FOR
THIS
HONORABLE
COURT
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29
J.
ADDITIONAL
RESPONSE
TO
STATE
JOINDER:
PREFACE
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31
K.
STATE
DEFENDANTS
MOTION
DOES
NOT
ADDRESS
MOST
OF
PLAINTIFFS
ALLEGATIONS
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33
L.
THE
CONSPIRACY
ALLEGATIONS
AGAINST
STATE
DEFENDANTS
ARE
SUFFICIENTLY
SPECIFIC
AND
THE
ALLEGED
FACTS
PLAUSIBLY
SUPPORT
THE
ALLEGATION
OF
CONSPIRACY
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34
M.
STATE
DEFENDANTS
ARE
NOT
ENTITLED
TO
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY
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36
IV.
CONCLUSION
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37
ii
TABLE
OF
AUTHORITIES
CASES
Aguiar
v.
Hawaii
Hous.
Auth.,
55
Haw.
478,
522
P.2d
1255
(1974)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
21
Alcoa
Inc.
v.
Bonneville
Power
Admin,
698
F3d
774
(9th
Cir.
2012)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
6
Ariz.
Right
to
Life
Political
Action
Committee
v.
Bayless,
320
F.3d
1002
(9th
Cir.
2003)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
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.
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.
12
Brown
v.
Board
of
Education,
347
U.S.
483
(1954)
.
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.
29
Burwell
v.
Hobby
Lobby
Stores,
134
S.
Ct.
2751
(2014)
.
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.
18
Cal.
Pro-Life
Council
v.
Getman,
328
F.3d
1088
(9th
Cir.
2003)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
12
Citizens
United
v.
Federal
Election
Commission,
558
U.W.
310
(2010)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
31
City
of
Los
Angeles
v.
Lyons,
461
U.S.
95
(1983)
.
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.
7
Doe
v.
Madison
Sch.
Dist
No
321,
177
F.3d
789
(9th
Cir.
1999)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
6
Employment
Div.
v.
Smith,
494
U.S.
872
(1990)
.
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18
Harlow
v.
Fitzgerald,
457
U.S.
800
(1982)
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.
19
Herrera
v.
Medical
Ctr.
Hosp,
241
F.
Supp.
2d
601
(ED
La.
10010
.
.
.
.
.
.
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.
.
.
20
Hishon
v.
King
&
Spalding,
467
U.S.
69
(1984)
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.
.
33
Hospital
Bldg.
Co.
v.
Trustees
of
Rex
Hosp.,
425
U.S.
738
(1976)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
33
Love
v.
U.S.,
915
F.2d
1242
(9th
Cir.
1989)
.
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.
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.
.
33
Lyng
v.
Northwest
Indian
Cemetery
Protective
Assn,
485
U.S.
439
(1988)
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.
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.
.
passim
Malley
v.
Briggs,
475
U.S.
335
(1986)
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.
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.
.
.
.
.19,
36
Mitchell
v.
Forsythe,
472
U.S.
511
(1985)
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.
19
Scheuer
v.
Rhodes,
416
U.S.
232
(1974)
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.
19
Wood
v.
Strickland,
420
U.S.
308
(1975)
.
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.
.
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.
19
iii
iv
Complaint
Filed
July
24,
2015
of
Defendant
Stephanie
Nagata,
in
her
Official
Capactiy
as
Director
of
the
Office
of
Mauna
Kea
Management,
and
in
her
Private
Capacity,
and
Defendant
Donald
Straney,
in
his
Official
Capacity
as
Chancellor,
University
of
Hawaii
at
Hilo,
and
in
his
Private
Capacity
(hereinafter
N/S
Mot.)
The motion to dismiss by Nagata and Straney is remarkable for the issues not
addressed:
(1)
the
process
used
to
adopt
the
rules
in
question
and
(2)
the
substantive
content
of
those
rules.
These omissions are best explained by the total absence of any process
visible
to
the
public
and
by
the
obviously
unconstitutional
content
of
the
rules.
With that foundation, the motion by Nagata and Straney cannot offer a basis
The motion by the State Defendants is also remarkable for what it does not
address.
State
Defendant
Case,
Chair
of
the
Board
of
Land
and
Natural
Resources,
is
alleged
to
have
participated
in
a
conspiracy
to
issue
a
set
of
rules,
entirely
separate
from
the
rules
at
issue
regarding
Nagata
and
Straney,
that
similarly
operated
to
suppress
spiritual
practices
and
the
movement
to
prevent
desecration
of
the
sacred
site
by
construction
of
the
telescope.
Amend.
Compl.
at
135
165.
1
State
Defendants
refer
to
the
first
motion
at
issue
as
filed
by
University
of
Hawaii
at
Hilo
Defendants.
The
motion
is
actually
filed
by
the
Defendant
Nagata,
who
is
Executive
Director
of
the
Office
of
Mauna
Kea
Management,
and
Defendant
Straney,
who
is
the
Chancellor
of
the
University
of
Hawaii
at
Hilo.
2
Because
the
rules
permit
Plaintiff
to
respond
to
the
joinder
in
a
separate
pleading,
Local
Rule
7.9,
and
because
Plaintiff
is
responding
to
the
original
motion
and
the
joinder
in
this
one
pleading,
the
rules
allow
Plaintiff
a
total
of
sixty
pages.
Plaintiff
will
use
far
fewer.
While the allegations of conspiracy apply to all named defendants, the Nagata
and
Straney
motion
is
based
on
separate
factual
allegations
from
those
forming
the
basis
for
suit
against
the
State
Defendants.
The
joinder
is
ineffective
in
relying
on
the
Nagata
and
Straney
arguments
to
seek
the
same
relief.3
The State Defendants motion does not address either the procedural or
substantive
issues
raised
by
Plaintiff
Nobrigas
challenge
to
that
second
set
of
rules.
Id.;
State
Mot.
To
Dismiss
at
4
5.
With the joinder ineffective, the State Defendants motion seeks only the
dismissal
of
the
conspiracy
allegation
against
the
State
Defendants
and
dismissal
based
on
a
qualified
immunity
defense.
Id.
Because the State Defendants Motion does not address the rules issued by
the
BLNR
and
does
not
seek
to
dismiss
the
allegations
based
on
the
procedural
and
substantive
challenges
by
Plaintiff
to
those
rules,
Plaintiffs
opposition
will
not
address
those
allegations.
II.
RULE
12
STANDARDS
Motion
to
Dismiss.
3
While
there
may
be
similar
legal
challenges
that
the
State
Defendants
could
join,
e.g.
jurisdiction
of
this
court,
there
are
also
challenges
that
are
specific
to
the
facts
related
to
Nagata
and
Straney
and
not
the
State
Defendants,
e.g.
the
absence
of
any
process
in
adoption
of
the
Nagata/Straney
rules
and
the
emergency
declaration
by
State
defendants.
The
joinder
makes
no
effort
to
distinguish
which
legal
and/or
factual
arguments
in
the
Nagata/Straney
pleading
apply
to
the
State
Defendants
and
which
do
not.
III.
ANALYSIS
this
case
was
filed
as
support
for
finding
the
issues
raised
by
the
rules
to
be
moot
and
not
falling
within
the
mootness
exception
for
capable
of
repetition,
yet
evading
review.
N/K
Mot.
at
25.
which
the
rules
were
adopted
nor
the
contents
of
the
rules.
Ibid.
at
24
26.
Accepting the allegations in the Amended Complaint as true, the rules were
specifically
targeted
one
spiritual
practice.
Amend.
Compl.
114
124.
Because
there
was
no
visible
process
in
adopting
those
restrictions,
there
is
no
record
of
the
reasons
for
adopting
the
rules.
There
is,
therefore,
no
way
for
this
Court
to
determine
whether
similar
rules
would
be
adopted
in
the
future.
happen. The rules were in place for a short period of time, during which this suit
was
filed,
and
rescinded
before
the
issues
raised
in
this
suit
could
be
resolved.4
The rules were in place for less than two weeks, which was not sufficient
time
to
fully
litigate
either
the
process
(or
lack
thereof)
by
which
they
were
adopted
or
their
substantive
content
and
impact.
Nagata and Straney completely evade any discussion of the contents of the
rules
and
offer
no
justification
for
the
adoption
of
such
rules.
This
Court,
therefore,
has
no
record
from
which
to
determine
whether
similar
rules
might
be
adopted
in
the
future.
The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the status quo in place at
this
time
would
not
foreclose
the
TMT
from
pursuing
continued
construction.
http://www.buzzfeed.com/mbvd/hawaii-governor-says-telescope-construction-
will-continue-on#.hh8NK7N17
(The
Thirty
Meter
Telescope
got
a
boost
in
April
when
Hawaii
Gov.
David
Ige
announced
that
construction
of
the
giant
telescope
had
a
right
to
proceed
during
the
court
challenge
and
that
the
state
would
support
it.)
4
After
the
successful
blockade
prevented
TMT
personnel
from
reaching
the
construction
site
on
June
24,
2015,
the
University
announced
it
was
closing
the
Mauna
Kea
Access
Road/John
Burns
Way.
http://www.bizjournals.com/pacific/news/2015/06/25/rocks-removed-but-
hawaii-access-road-to-thirty.html
Based
on
information
and
belief,
the
Nagata/Straney
rules
went
into
effect
on
July
1,
2015.
Those
rules
applied
only
to
practitioners
of
the
traditional
Hawaiian
faith
and
not
to
others
using
the
road.
Amend.
Compl.
at
124.
This
lawsuit
was
filed
on
July
6,
2015.
The
University
of
Hawaii
reopened
the
Mauna
Kea
Access
Road/John
Burns
Way
on
July
13,
2015.
http://bigislandnow.com/2015/07/13/mauna-kea-summit-
access-road-fully-reopened/
Based
on
information
and
belief,
the
Nagata/Straney
rules
were
rescinded
on
July
13,
2015.
At
that
point,
the
new
BLNR
rules
went
into
place.
Id.
Nor does the status quo foreclose the Protectors of the Mountain from
Thus, the conditions that may have prompted the adoption of the challenged
The State actors have also repeatedly refused to respond to a proposal for
peaceful
resolution
of
the
current
controversy,
at
least
until
the
Hawaii
Supreme
Court
can
rule.
See
Exhibit
1.
petitioner
would
again
face
the
same
alleged
invasion
of
rights,
N/W
Mot.
at
26
citing
Alcoa,
Inc.
v.
Bonneville
Power
Admin.,
698
F.3d
774,
787
(9th
Cir.
2012),
the
failure
of
the
agency
to
provide
any
basis
for
the
invasion
the
first
time
makes
it
impossible
to
determine
whether
the
agency
would
take
the
same
action
again.5
The complete absence of any public process for adoption of the challenged
rules
is
certainly
an
extraordinary
situation
qualifying
this
case
for
the
exception
to
the
mootness
rule.
N/K
Mot.
at
26
citing
Doe
v.
Madison
Sch.
Dist
No.
321,
177
F.3d
789,
798
(9th
Cir
1999).
The agency cannot benefit from its total lack of transparency and legal
process
by
having
that
violation
of
law
serve
as
a
basis
for
Plaintiff
being
denied
review
and
relief.
5
This
case
does
not
fall
into
a
category
of
cases
that
can
be
litigated
at
some
time
in
the
future.
Doe
v.
Madison
Sch.
Dist
No.
321,
177
F.3d
789,
798
(9th
Cir
1999)
(challenge
to
school
prayer).
Nor
is
the
issue
in
this
case
impossible
of
repetition.
Ibid.
(forced
to
participate
in
prayer
at
high
school
graduation).
N/S
Mot.
at
22-24.
They
cite
City
of
Los
Angeles
v.
Lyons,
461
U.S.
95
(1983).
Ibid.
at
23.
because
the
court
in
Lyons
found
that
the
behavior
causing
the
injury
was
unlikely
to
be
repeated.
Id.
Again, the absence of any explanation for why the Nagata/Straney rules
issued
forecloses
this
court
making
a
determination
on
the
likelihood
of
the
same
action
being
repeated.
The circumstances of the continued intention to build the TMT and the
The very absence of any process is prima facie evidence of an agency and its
Executive
Director
and/or
an
institution
and
its
Chancellor
willing
to
act
in
a
lawless
fashion
to
further
the
construction
of
the
TMT.
The true goal of the motion to dismiss is to remove any possible limitation or
oversight
that
would
prevent
their
return
to
such
lawless
behavior.
They
seek
license
from
this
Court
for
their
lawless
behavior.
Injunctive
relief
is
the
remedy
best
suited
to
inform
Nagata
and
her
agency
and
Straney
and
his
institution
of
the
constitutional
and
statutory
requirements
which
govern
their
rule
making
processes
and
the
substantive
rules
that
they
adopt.
Nagata and Straney attempt to redefine the actual injury and the remedy
Nagata and Straney argue that Plaintiffs fundamental claim is against the
building
of
the
telescope
on
Mauna
Kea.
N/S
Mot.
at
23.
They
argue
that
Plaintiffs
injury
claim
is
the
desecration
of
the
sacred
Mountain.
Id.
They
argue
that
the
remedy
Plaintiff
seeks
is
a
court
order
stopping
the
construction
of
the
telescope.
Id.
They
argue
that
the
injury
alleged
ultimately
is
the
illegal
overthrow
of
the
Kingdom
of
Hawaii
Government.
Ibid.
at
24.
All of these arguments ignore the plain wording of the Amended Complaint,
to
wit:
to
prevent
violations
of
the
constitutional
rights
of
traditional
faith
practitioners
and
others
seeking
to
protect
Mauna
a
Wkea
from
desecration.
Amend.
Compl.
at
181
(emphasis
added).
irrelevant
to
the
question
whether
State
officials
engaged
in
and
continue
to
engage
in
a
conspiracy
to
prevent
those
who
are
opposed
to
the
building
of
the
telescope,
including
and
not
limited
to
traditional
practitioners,
from
expressing
that
opposition
in
constitutionally
protected
ways.
This Court can protect the constitutional rights of those opposed to the
telescope
without
reaching
the
merits
of
the
question
on
whether
the
telescope
should
be
built.
the
Court
to
stop
the
TMT,
Nagata
and
Straney
cite
Lyng
v.
Northwest
Indian
Cemetery
Protective
Assn,
485
U.S
439
(1988)
for
the
proposition
that
following
Lyng,
the
Court
could
not
prohibit
the
construction
of
the
TMT
on
public
land.
N/S
Mot.
at
23-24.
Lyng is cited for the wrong proposition. The challenged rules fall within the
1:00
p.m.
If
there
were
more
than
ten
people
present,
only
ten
could
ascend
the
mountain.
The
ten
or
fewer
people
could
go
up
on
the
Mountain
for
one
hour
and
then
had
to
return
to
the
9,000
foot
level.
Amend.
Compl.
at
115
122.
The effect of these regulations was to severely restrict access for some
practitioners
and
bar
access
altogether
for
those
arriving
after
1:00
p.m
or
arriving
after
ten
people
had
already
presented
themselves.
6
The
claim
by
Nagata
and
Straney
that
the
challenged
rules
and
regulations
are
facially
neutral
and
apply
to
all
persons
seeking
access
to
Mauna
Kea,
N/S
Mot.
at
14,
n.
6,
is
simply
false.
Given
the
failure
of
OMKM/University
to
publish
the
rules
anywhere,
the
description
of
the
rules
by
the
Plaintiff
is
the
only
basis
for
making
the
neutral
determination.
That
description
clearly
states
that
the
rules
are
targeted
on
spiritual
practitioners
and
not
others.
Amend.
Compl.
107
124.
nitrogen
trucks,
tourists,
and
others
were
free
to
ascend
the
Mountain
without
any
restrictions.
Ibid.
at
124.
conformance
to
the
statutory
requirements
for
such
an
action,
(2)
prohibited
the
adoption
of
rules
that
specifically
targeted
one
faith,
and
(3)
prohibited
the
adoption
of
rules
that
prevented
spiritual
practitioners
from
accessing
their
spiritual
site,
other
than
by
a
rule
of
general
applicability
adopted
for
compelling
purpose,
e.g.
closing
the
road
during
a
snow
storm,
would
go
a
long
way
toward
redressing
the
injury
alleged
by
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff is the Kahuna of the Temple of Lono. That means that the previous
Kahuna
passed
the
responsibility
for
this
position
to
the
Plaintiff.
As
such
he
is
a
repository
of
the
teachings
and
practices
of
the
traditional
Hawaiian
faith.
Exhibit
2
at
1-8.
Nagata and Straney argue that the placement of severe restrictions on the
practice
of
that
faith
on
Mauna
a
Wkea
does
not
injure
the
Kahuna
in
any
way
because
he
has
not
personally
been
subjected
to
those
restrictions.
N/S
Mot.
at
21-
22.
10
beyond
any
need
to
meet
a
compelling
governmental
purpose,
the
rules
would
also
be
unconstitutional
as
applied.
The OMKM rules in question apply only to the traditional faith of the
Hawaiian
people.
That faith has the same right to practice and the same right to be free of
The argument that the Temple of Lono must meet some other requirement
Yet Nagata and Straney argue that rules issued that are applicable only to the
traditional
faith
of
the
Hawaiian
people
can
only
be
challenged
by
someone
who
first
subjects
himself
to
the
rules
in
order
to
establish
injury.
In
making
that
7
In
an
attempt
to
characterize
the
rules
as
neutral,
Nagata
and
Straney
place
Plaintiffs
faith
in
quotes,
i.e.
traditional
faith,
as
if
Plaintiffs
faith
is
not
real.
N/S
Mot.
at
16,
17.
If
Plaintiffs
faith
is
not
real,
then
rules
appearing
to
target
that
faith
would
arguably
be
neutral.
Nagata
and
Straney
would
not
place
Catholic
in
quotation
marks
unless
they
meant
to
characterize
the
person
described
as
not
truly
following
that
faith.
This
denigration
of
the
traditional
Hawaiian
faith
is
totally
inappropriate.
11
argument,
Nagata
and
Straney
attempt
to
evade
the
obvious
issue
of
the
rules
being
facially
unconstitutional.
Alternatively, Plaintiff did face injury from the rules as applied. While the
OMKM
Rangers
lack
law
enforcement
authority,
the
Amended
Complaint
alleges
that
they
turned
to
law
enforcement
agencies
to
enforce
their
restrictions
on
religious
practice.
Amend.
Compl.
118,
131.
challenge.
Courts
have
long
recognized
the
[o]ne
does
not
have
to
await
the
consummation
of
threatened
injury
to
obtain
preventive
relief.
Cal.
Pro-Life
Council
v.
Getman,
328
F.3d
1088,
1094
(9th
Cir.
2003)
(citation
omitted).
In this case, Plaintiff is alleging a First Amendment injury. The rules for
standing
in
such
cases
are
less
stringent
and
strongly
favor
standing.
Ariz.
Right
to
Life
Political
Action
Committee
v.
Bayless,
320
F3d.
1002,
1006
(9th
Cir.
2003)
As far as injury to the Plaintiff beyond the obvious injury of having the
government
issuing
rules
targeting
his
faith,
and
only
his
faith,
and
severely
limiting
the
practice
of
his
faith,
the
OMKM/University
rules
are
part
of
a
long-standing
pattern
of
official
suppression
of
the
traditional
Hawaiian
faith.
In
seeking
relief
from
the
rules,
the
Plaintiff
is
also
seeking
an
end
to
the
official
suppression
of
his
faith.
12
The United States Park Service refers to the Puuhonua as the City of
Refuge.
When
someone
in
trouble
with
the
high
chief
ran
to
the
Puuhonua
before
being
caught
by
the
Kings
guards,
that
person
was
safe.
http://www.nps.gov/puho/planyourvisit/the-puuhonua.htm
That function of the puuhonua was only one aspect of the institution.
The primary function was as a garden charged with feeding the people. The
Puuhonua
served
as
the
back
up
for
the
entire
island
civilization,
e.g.
when
a
flood
took
the
fruit
trees
in
an
ahupuaa11,
the
people
of
that
district
would
come
to
the
Puuhonua
for
replacement
trees.
The
Puuhonua
was
also
the
site
of
academies
that
8
The
history
of
the
faith
herein
is
provided
by
the
Plaintiff.
Exhibit
2
at
10.
9
King
Kamehameha
I
established
an
altar
dedicated
to
Lono
at
Ahuena.
Today,
Ahuena
is
operated
as
a
tourist
attraction
by
a
non-profit
organization.
10
The
United
States
National
Park
Service
identifies
the
Puuhonua
as
Puuhonua
O
Honaunau.
Honaunau
is
a
district
in
which
part
of
the
Puuhonua
was
located.
Relegating
the
Puuhonua
to
that
district
falsifies
the
true
history
by
diminishing
the
extent
of
the
Puuhonua.
The
boundaries
of
the
Puuhonua
encompassed
the
lands
from
the
Temple
of
Ku
at
Honokahau
Harbor
to
Kealakekua
Bay.
11
The
ahupuaa
was
a
land
division
generally
encompassing
a
land
area
from
the
top
of
the
mountain
to
the
ocean.
The
high
chief
assigned
particular
families
to
steward
such
a
division.
The
Puuhonua
was
a
special
area
set
aside
from
the
ahupuaa
system.
13
taught
skills,
such
as
canoe
making,
net
making,
etc.
This
rich
and
unique
institution
is
reduced
by
the
United
States
National
Park
Service
to
simply
a
sanctuary
for
law
breakers.
After his death in 181912, his successors permitted the missionaries to come
to
Hawaii.
they
also
taught
them
that
the
practitioners
of
the
traditional
Hawaiian
faith
were
agents
of
the
Devil.
known
as
the
Moe
Kolohe
Laws.
Inspired
by
the
missionary
teachings,
these
laws
forbid
ancestor
worship
and
other
critical
aspects
of
the
traditional
faith.
People
violating
the
prohibitions
could
be
sent
to
prison
and
otherwise
persecuted.13
Eventually, the Christian Hawaiians won and the Kahunas of the traditional
In 1978, the United States Congress passed the American Indian Religious
Freedom
Act,
(AIRFA),
Public
Law
No
95-341
(Joint
Resolution),
92
Stat.
469
12
There
is
controversy
as
to
the
precise
year
in
which
he
died.
13
These
laws
have
never
been
rescinded.
14
(August
11,
1978),
42
U.S.C.
1996.
The
purpose
of
the
law
was
to
protect
and
preserve
the
traditional
religious
rights
and
cultural
practices
of
indigenous
people,
including
Native
Hawaiians.
One
of
the
rights
supposedly
protected
was
access
to
sacred
sites.
That
henceforth
it
shall
be
the
policy
of
the
United
States
to
protect
and
preserve
for
American
Indians
their
inherent
right
of
freedom
to
believe,
express,
and
exercise
the
traditional
religions
of
the
American
Indian,
Eskimo,
Aleut,
and
Native
Hawaiians,
including
but
not
limited
to
access
to
sites,
use
and
possession
of
sacred
objects,
and
the
freedom
to
worship
through
ceremonials
and
traditional
rites.14
Based
on
the
promise
of
this
law,
Sam
Lono,
Kahuna
of
the
Temple
of
Lono,15
emerged
publicly
to
restore
the
sacred
seat
of
the
Temple
at
Puuhonua
Lehua
at
Kualoa.
He
brought
back
the
taro
fields,
planted
numerous
other
crops
and
trees,
built
walkways
throughout
the
puuhonua,
and
built
the
Ma
Pele
at
Kualoa
reconnecting
the
site
to
the
spiritual
practice
of
Moe
Uhane
(communicating
with
the
ancestors).
After the puuhonua was fully developed, the State of Hawaii entered with
bulldozers,
destroyed
everything
that
Sam
Lono
had
planted
and
built,
and
arrested
the
Kahuna
for
camping
without
a
permit.16
Sam Lono spent years in United States courts attempting to vindicate his
15
In the end, the State levied a $5.00 fine against the Tahuna for camping
without
a
permit.
Despite facing official repression, Sam Lono continued his work to restore
puuhonua
was
the
youngest
puuhonua.
The
purpose
of
his
visit
included
reestablishing
the
connection
between
the
puuhonua
and
Mauna
a
Wkea.
In
the
nomenclature
of
the
Temple
teachings,
the
Mountain
is
the
triangle
that
stands
for
the
ancestors.
Throughout this period of time, Plaintiff was haumana (student) of Sam Lono.
He
learned
the
history
of
missionary
suppression
of
his
faith
and
watched
the
official
suppression
of
his
faith
continuing
under
the
State
of
Hawaii.
the
Gods
to
intervene
and
prevent
the
building
of
the
Keck
Observatory
outriggers.
The
additional
telescopes
violated
the
sacredness
of
the
Mountain/Triangle/Ancestors.
Amend.
Compl.
33-43.
16
Moe Uhane takes place over an indeterminate period of time. When the King
notified
the
National
Park
Service
of
his
intention,
the
Park
Service
attempted
to
place
restrictions
on
how
long
the
King
could
remain
and
ended
up
essentially
threatening
to
arrest
him,
if
he
overstayed
the
period
that
the
National
Park
Service
would
allow.
Exhibits
3
8.
Plaintiff and the King decided to wait until a later day for the visit when they
17
The
summit
of
Maunakea
was
considered
a
wao
akua,
or
realm
of
the
gods
and
was
therefore
visited
only
rarely
by
humans.
http://www.imiloahawaii.org/60/cultural-significance.
The
heading
Cultural
Significance
should
really
be
Spiritual
Significance.
That
statement
says
that
the
summit
was
considered
to
be
the
realm
of
the
gods.
The
use
of
the
word
was
is
an
attempt
to
characterize
the
spiritual
practice
in
question
as
no
longer
a
practiced
faith.
Officially
pronouncing
the
traditional
faith
as
gone
would
be
the
ultimate
success
for
the
missionaries
and
set
yet
another
precedent
for
the
official
oppression
of
any
attempt
to
practice
that
faith.
Nobriga,
Kahuna
of
the
Temple
of
Lono,
Exhibit
2
and
Exhibits
A
through
C
thereto,
the
traditional
faith
practice
is
alive
and
well,
despite
the
long
running
effort
to
extinguish
the
faith.
demonstrate
some
compelling
purpose
for
placing
such
a
heavy
burden
on
the
practice
of
the
traditional
faith
as
are
found
in
the
restrictions
at
issue.
Amend.
Compl.
114-122.
See
e.g. Employment
Div.
v.
Smith,
,
494
U.S.
872,
878-82
(1990);
Burwell
v.
Hobby
Lobby
Stores,
134
S.
Ct.
2751,
2760-61
(2014).
The burden becomes even higher when the State action is tantamount to
18
The history of the faith is one of suppression and bigotry that continues to
this
day,
with
the
OMKM/University
rules
just
the
latest
chapter.
19-21.
Public officials are subject to suit, if the tests for immunity are not met.
Mitchell
v.
Forsyth,
472
U.S.
511,
520-24
(1985) (rejecting absolute immunity for
cabinet officers and individuals performing national security investigations);
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.W. 800, 808-13 (1982) (high-ranking presidential
aides); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (school officials); Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-49 (1974) (governors, state adjunct generals,
national guard officers, enlisted members, and presidents of state universities).
As argued by Nagata and Straney, the tests are whether the officials are
demonstrably incompetent or knowingly violated the law. N/S Motion at 19
citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
In this case, Nagata and Straney either had no understanding that the
issuance of new rules by OMKM and/or the University required following a
statutory process or they knowingly issued the rules without even attempting to
satisfy the statutory process requirements.
Also in this case, Nagata and Straney either believed that OMKM and/or
the University had the authority to issue rules that severely restricted the time
and place for a particular faith to practice, while not making those rules
applicable to any other faith or the public generally, or they knew the rules issued
violated United States constitutional protections provided to the practice of faith.
19
20
To the extent the challenged rules represented orders, the orders were
never made available for public inspection.
inspection,
the
rules
were
never
effective
and
their
enforcement
was
ultra
vires.18
HRS
91-2.6
(a)
Beginning
January
1,
2000,
all
state
agencies,
through
the
office
of
the
lieutenant
governor,
shall
make
available
on
the
website
of
the
office
of
the
lieutenant
governor
each
proposed
rulemaking
action
of
the
agency
and
the
full
text
of
the
agency's
proposed
rules
or
changes
to
existing
rules.
The
challenged
rules
were
never
posted
on
Lieutenant
Governors
website.
21
Even if Nagata and Straney would like to avail themselves of the emergency
exception
in
this
law,
HRS91-3(b),
they
failed
to
comply
with
even
the
minimal
requirements
in
that
statutory
section.
22
no
record
of
any
such
determination.
Nor
did
they
issue
a
written
statement
containing
the
reasons
for
such
a
finding.
Nor
did
they
post
even
an
abbreviated
notice
in
compliance
with
HRS
91-2.6.
Nor
is
there
any
record
of
how
or
when
the
rules
were
adopted
or
even
who
actually
adopted
the
rules.
Nagata
and
Straney
failed
to
comply
with
any
of
the
provisions
in
HRS
91-3(b)
emergency
process,
the
failure
to
file
certified
copies
of
the
rules
or
to
publish
the
rules
adopted
means
that
the
rules
were
never
legally
in
effect
and
all
enforcement
of
the
rules
was
without
authority.
HRS
91-4.
HRS91-3(c)
The
adoption,
amendment,
or
repeal
of
any
rule
by
any
state
agency
shall
be
subject
to
the
approval
of
the
governor.
There
is
no
record
of
the
Governor
having
approved
the
rules
in
question.
Just
as
there
was
no
process
followed
in
adopting
the
rules,
there
was
also
no
process
followed
when
the
rules
were
repealed.
HRS
91-3(f)
Whenever
an
agency
seeks
only
to
repeal
one
or
more
sections,
chapters,
or
subchapters
of
the
agency's
rules
because
the
rules
are
either
null
and
void
or
unnecessary,
and
not
adopt,
amend,
or
compile
any
other
rules:
(1)
The
agency
shall
give
thirty
days'
public
notice
at
least
once
statewide
of
the
proposed
date
of
repeal
and
of:
23
requirements
regarding
the
adoption
of
rules
was
to
deny
anyone
outside
the
agency
notice
of
the
proposed
action
and
an
opportunity
to
be
heard
on
whether
the
rules
should
be
adopted
and,
if
so,
the
specific
nature
of
those
rules.
HRS
91-3(a)(1),
(2).
This violation of Due Process satisfies the immunity test for actions
Amendment
rights
of
the
practitioners
of
the
targeted
faith.
That
attack
also
satisfies
the
immunity
test
for
actions
that
violate
constitutional
rights.
24
time
Nagata
and
Straney
issued
the
rules
in
question
without
providing
such
notice
and
opportunity.
deliberately
targeting
the
faith
was
also
a
right
clearly
established
at
the
time
Nagata
and
Straney
issued
the
rules
in
question.20
trumps
Plaintiffs
claims,
N/S
Mot.
13-17,
is
irrelevant
and
fails
because
the
OMKM/University
never
articulated
any
purpose
prior
to
adopting
the
rules,
let
along
a
compelling
governmental
purpose.
No
ex
post
facto
rationalizations
can
cure
this
fundamental
defect.
E.
The
Conspiracy
Allegation
is
Based
on
Facts
that
Plausibly
Entitle
Plaintiff
to
Relief.
Nagata
and
Straney
argue
that
the
conspiracy
allegations
against
them
should
be
dismissed
as
conclusory,
vague,
and
general.
N/S
Mot.
at
17.
25
Nagata and Straney argue that Plaintiff fails to specify what acts they
the
issuance
of
the
rules
identified
by
Plaintiff,
Amend.
Compl.
at
114-122,
the
issuance
of
those
rules
without
any
of
the
required
legal
process
for
such
an
agency
action,
Ibid.
at
107-113,
and
the
actions
taken
to
drive
the
Protectors
off
the
Mountain,
even
at
the
expense
of
public
health
and
safety.
Ibid.
at
99-106.21
Nagata
and
Straney
by
the
illegal
actions
of
Nagata
and
Straney.
The
absence
of
any
public
process
prior
to
the
issuance
of
the
rules
attributed
to
OMKM
and/or
the
University
and
the
failure
of
OMKM
and/or
the
University
to
publish
or
otherwise
give
public
notice
of
the
rules
and
their
adoption
prevented
Plaintiff
from
identifying
exactly
who
was
responsible
for
the
preparation,
approval,
issuance,
and
enforcement
of
the
rules.
Similarly, Nagata and Straney argue that Plaintiff must show that Nagata and
Nagata and Straney now seek to use their illegal absence of process to shield
26
Straney,
the
actions
identified
are
prima
facie
evidence
of
an
intent
to
suppress
the
spiritual
practitioners,
who
have
joined
numerous
others
in
seeking
to
protect
the
sacred
Mauna,
and
prevent
further
protest,
the
same
goal
as
the
other
State
defendants
in
this
case
pursued.
Amend.
Compl.
9.
The fact that the Rangers under the authority of OMKM implemented the
new
rules
is
prima
facie
evidence
that
OMKM
is
responsible
for
the
issuance
of
the
rules.
Amend.
Compl.
115-122.
because
their
illegal
actions
prevented
Plaintiff
from
being
adequately
specific
as
to
their
acts
in
furtherance
of
the
conspiracy
would
be
a
manifest
injustice.
F.
Plaintiff
has
a
Valid
First
Amendment
Claim
Congress
shall
make
no
law
respecting
an
establishment
of
religion,
or
prohibiting
the
free
exercise
thereof.
First
Amendment,
United
States
Constitution.
Plaintiff
has
already
discussed
why
the
rules
issued
by
OMKM
and/or
the
Univerisity
were
facially
unconstitutional
because
they
applied
to
only
one
faith
and
prohibited
the
free
exercise
of
that
faith.
Supra.
at
10-12.
When Lyng states that a law prohibiting access to a sacred site would raise a
different
set
of
constitutional
questions,
Lyng,
supra.
at
453,
the
reference
is
clearly
to
the
prohibition
section
of
the
Free
Exercise
clause.
In arguing that Plaintiffs First Amendment claim fails, N/S Mot. at 12-17,
Nagata
and
Straney
characterize
the
rules
in
question
as
facially
neutral
and
apply[ing]
to
all
persons
seeking
access
to
Mauna
Kea,
ibid.
at
14,
n.
6
and
a
valid
and
neutral
law
of
general
applicability,
ibid.
at
16.
27
These characterization are simply false. Amend. Compl. at 107, 114 124.
Nagata and Straney also argue that Lyng requires that the government action
Mauna
for
prayer
at
some
time
other
than
1:00
p.m.
or
after
ten
people
had
already
committed
to
going
up
that
day
would
face
arrest
and
prosecution.
Amend.
Compl.
at
131.
That
governmental
action
would
penalize
religious
activity.
Id.
Rules that severely restrict the practice of the traditional Hawaiian faith to
the
point
of
denying
access
to
a
sacred
site
and
enforcement
of
those
restrictions
with
the
threat
of
arrest
and
prosecution
clearly
violate
the
Free
Expression
Clause
of
the
First
Amendment
to
the
United
States
Constitution.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the rules in question did not on their
face
and
as-applied
violate
Plaintiffs
First
Amendment
rights,
Plaintiff
still
had
the
right
to
be
heard
on
whether
the
rules
should
be
adopted.
HRS
91-3.
Constitutional or not, the rules did affect spiritual practice of the traditional
Hawaiian
faith.
Any
practitioner
of
that
faith
would
have
a
cognizable
interest
in
being
heard
when
rules
are
proposed
that
would
affect
that
practice.
mandates of the applicable statutes, Nagata and Straney are foreclosed from arguing
28
that
Plaintiffs
due
process
rights
were
not
violated
in
the
issuance
of
the
rules.
In
particular,
the
absence
of
any
process
precludes
this
Honorable
Court
from
finding
that
Plaintiffs
liberty
interest
was
adequately
protected
in
the
adoption
of
the
rules
in
question.
H.
Plaintiff
has
a
Valid
Fourteenth
Amendment
Claim
United
States
Constitution,
Amendment
XIV
states:
Section
1.
nor
shall
any
State
deprive
any
person
of
liberty
without
due
process
of
law;
nor
deny
to
any
person
within
its
jurisdiction
the
equal
protection
of
the
laws..
As
just
argued,
the
absence
of
any
process
for
adoption
of
the
rules
addressed
herein
denies
this
Honorable
Court
a
basis
for
determining
that
the
adoption
of
the
rules
did
not
violate
Plaintiffs
constitutionally
protected
liberty
interest.
The fact that the rules applied only to those engaged in practicing the
traditional
faith
of
the
Hawaiian
people
and
did
not
apply
to
any
other
religious
practice
or
to
any
other
people
making
use
of
the
same
access
road
as
the
practitioners
used
denied
practitioners
of
the
traditional
faith
equal
protection
of
the
laws.
provide
equal
protection
under
the
law
to
all
those
within
the
states
jurisdiction.
Brown
v.
Board
of
Education,
347
U.S.
483
(1954).
I.
Plaintiffs
Amended
Complaint
Satisfies
the
Pleading
Requirements
to
Establish
Jurisdiction
for
this
Honorable
Court.
Plaintiffs
Amended
Complaint
alleged
violations
of
18
U.S.C.
242.
Amend.
Compl.
3.
In
support
of
that
allegation,
Plaintiff
alleged
that
the
Defendants
29
22
Plaintiffs
Counsel
also
serves
as
the
Chief
Advocate
(Alii
Manao
Nui)
of
the
Kingdom
of
Hawaii
by
appointment
of
Alii
Nui
Mi
(High
Chief/King)
Edmund
Kelii
Silva,
Jr.
Were
the
Kingdom
in
a
position
to
enforce
its
rulings
against
the
Defendants
in
this
case,
the
Chief
Advocate
would
have
initiated
criminal
proceedings
in
the
Kingdom.
The
responsible
law
enforcement
personnel
within
the
County
of
Hawaii
and
the
State
of
Hawaii
are
joined
in
the
conspiracy
alleged
by
Plaintiff
and
not
available
to
enforce
the
laws
being
broken
by
the
conspiracy.
The
Attorney
General
of
the
United
States
is
on
notice
of
what
is
happening
around
the
sacred
Mauna
and
has
taken
no
action.
See
e.g.
Exhibit
1.
The
Kings
even
suggesting
that
he
might
deploy
Kingdom
Marshals
to
stop
arrests
of
those
seeking
to
enforce
the
law
by
preventing
desecration
of
the
sacred
Mauna
created
a
controversy.
Exhibit
11.
This
Honorable
Court
is
the
remaining
institution
capable
of
effectively
addressing
Plaintiffs
complaints.
23
Should
the
Court
become
convinced
at
some
point
that
the
Kingdom
still
exists
and
treaties
signed
between
the
Kingdom
and
the
United
States
are
still
valid,
jurisdiction
may
be
found
in
the
United
States
Treaty
with
the
Hawaiian
Islands,
December
20,
1849.
Article
XI
of
that
treaty
states:
30
Treating this case as brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 does not make a
new
claim.
Lebron
v.
National
Railroad
Passenger
Corporation,
513
U.S.
374,
379
(1995).
Throughout
the
Amended
Complaint,
Plaintiff
consistently
asserted
violations
of
his
First,
Fifth,
and
Fourteenth
Amendment
rights
related
to
the
free
exercise
of
his
faith.
Citizens
United
v.
Federal
Election
Commission,
558
U.S.
310
(2010)
Slip.
Op.
at
14,
January
21,2010.
(Rather, it isat mosta new
argument to support what has been [a] consistent claim: that [the FEC] did not
accord [Citizens United] the rights it was obliged to provide by the First
Amendment.)
J. Additional
Response
to
State
Joinder:
Preface
For some reason, Counsel for the State Defendants attempts to raise a
It
is
agreed
that
perfect
and
entire
liberty
of
conscience
shall
be
enjoyed
by
the
citizens
and subjects of both the contracting
parties,
in
the
countries
of
the
one
of
the
other,
without
their
being
liable
to
be
disturbed
or
molested
on
account
of
their
religious
belief.
To
the
extent
the
United
States
asserts
jurisdiction
over
the
lands
of
Mauna
a
Wkea
and
those
opposing
the
TMT
for
spiritual
reasons
are
subjects
of
the
Kingdom,
the
harassment,
arrests,
prosecutions,
etc.
by
the
United
States
would
violate
that
treaty.
31
admitted
to
practice
law
in
Hawaii
except
apparently
in
this
court.)
The
complaint
is
not
entitled
to
the
relaxed
scrutiny
afforded
pro
se
litigants.]
When opposing Counsel earlier raised the issue of authorized practice with
Plaintiffs
Counsel,
Plaintiffs
Counsel
explained
that
under
the
rules
in
place
at
the
time
Plaintiffs
Counsel
joined
the
Federal
Bar
in
Hawaii,
there
was
no
requirement
that
an
attorney
be
licensed
in
the
State
of
Hawaii
in
order
to
join
the
Federal
Bar.
Exhibit
12.
Plaintiffs
Counsel
provided
opposing
counsel
the
telephone
number
at
the
Federal
Court
Clerks
Office
where
he
could
confirm
that
Plaintiffs
Counsel
was
in
good
standing.
Exhibit
13.
Why
that
explanation
and
confirmation
has
failed
to
satisfy
opposing
counsel
is
not
readily
apparent.
Certainly,
Plaintiffs
Counsel
has
not
requested
this
court
to
treat
the
Plaintiff
as
proceeding
pro
se,
as
implied
by
opposing
counsels
remark.
There is no basis for such a threat. Plaintiffs counsel is entitled to put forth
in
which
opposing
counsel
participated
and
hopes
the
threat
will
discourage
Plaintiff
or
his
counsel
from
pursuing
that
allegation.
Later
that
month,
[Defendant
Jason]
Redulla
wrote
that
Deputy
Attorney
General
William
Wynhoff
had
informed
him
that
he
believed
the
Land
Board
has
the
authority
to
close
the
state-owned
portion
of
the
roadway
in
the
interest
of
public
safety
and
health.
However,
he
warned
that
the
Hawaii
32
County
prosecutors
office
would
have
to
be
willing
to
accept
arrests
that
are
made
under
the
authority
of
such
a
closure.
On
June
29,
[Defendant]
Deputy
Attorney
General
Linda
Chow
wrote
to
[Defendant
Attorney
General]
Chin
and
outlined
a
proposal
that
Wynhoff
described
in
a
later
email
as
potentially
a
real
home
run.
Chow
said
she
met
with
DLNR
Division
of
Forestry
and
Wildlife
personnel
and
picked
their
brains
about
our
dilemma
of
the
Mauna
Kea
road.
The
acting
administrator
(Scott
Fretz)
said
that
we
might
be
able
to
temporarily
close
or
restrict
access
to
the
road
under
the
Game
Mammal
Hunting
rules,
she
wrote.
Exhibit
14
at
2
(emphasis
added).
Certainly
in
deciding
a
motion
to
dismiss,
this
Court
is
obligated
to
treat
the
allegations
in
the
Complaint
as
true,
however
much
they
may
discomfort
opposing
counsel.
Hishon
v.
King
&
Spalding,
467
U.S.
69,
73
(1984);
Hospital
Bldg.
Co.
v.
Trustees
of
Rex
Hosp.,
425
U.S
738,
740
(1976);
Love
v.
U.S.,
915
F.2d
1242,m
1245
(9th
cir.
1989).
K.
State
Defendants
Motion
Does
Not
Address
Most
of
Plaintiffs
Allegations
Plaintiff
alleges
that
the
Board
of
Land
and
Natural
Resources
issued
rules
and
regulations
separate
from
those
issued
by
OMKM/University
designed
to
further
the
conspiracy
alleged
by
Plaintiff.
Amend.
Compl.
135.
concocted
after
the
planning
to
suppress
the
Protectors
of
the
Mountain
began.
Ibid.
137-139,
142-150.
Plaintiff alleges that the BLNR rules and regulations adversely impacted
33
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ige approved the rules in question. Ibid
165.
The State defendants do not seek to dismiss any of these allegations in their
Instead of discussing the adoption process, purpose, and content of the BLNR
rules
and
regulations,
the
State
Joinder
characterizes
the
State
Defendants
as
only
engaged
in
a
lawful
effort
to
enforce
Hawaii
rules
and
laws
and
simply
following
their
sworn
duty
to
uphold
the
law.
State
Joinder
at
4
(emphasis
added).
L.
The
Conspiracy
Allegations
Against
State
Defendants
are
Sufficiently
Specific
and
the
Alleged
Facts
Plausibly
Support
the
Allegation
of
Conspiracy
The
State
defendants
do
argue
that
Plaintiff
cannot
allege
any
conspiracy
to
harm
Plaintiff.
State
Joinder
at
4-5.
Plaintiff alleges that the development of the BLNR rules took place as part of
State
officials
sought
a
means
of
preventing
the
Protectors
of
the
Mountain
from
conducting
another
successful
blockade
of
the
road,
should
the
TMT
decide
to
resume
construction.
To achieve that end, State officials inappropriately and knowingly used the
regulations
meant
to
address
hunting
to
mask
their
attempt
to
shut
down
the
TMT
oppositions
use
of
the
road.
24
Arrests
pursuant
to
the
BLNR
rules
have
taken
place.
County
Mot.
at
3.
34
The embedding of the new rules into the Game Mammal Hunting rules served
only
to
mask
the
true
intent
of
the
rules
to
regulate
those
protecting
the
Mountain
from
desecration
in
such
a
way
as
to
make
them
ineffective.
Plaintiffs
allegations
of
a
conspiracy
are
supported
by
factual
assertions
25
The
correct
designation
is
Board
of
Land
and
Natural
Resources
(BLNR).
26
The
DLNR
Game
Mammal
Hunting
Rules
typically
deal
only
with
hunting.
Sections
183D-22
and
183D-10.5
provided
the
authority
for
the
department
of
land
and
natural
resources
to
require
payment
of
a
fee
for
a
hunting-related
article
such
as
a
stamp;
however,
since
game
bird
hunting
was
an
activity
permitted
under
chapter
183D,
the
department
was
required
under
183D-3
to
adopt
a
rule
pursuant
to
this
section
when
setting
the
stamp
fees
for
hunting.
117
H.
16
(App.),
175
P.3d
126.
Since
the
addition
of
two
extra
hunting
days
to
each
week
of
the
hunting
season
concerned
"conditions
for
entry
into
game
management
areas,
and
public
hunting
areas
designated
by
the
department
of
land
and
natural
resources"
and
"open
seasons"
for
hunting,
the
express
language
of
183D-3
mandated
that
in
order
to
add
the
two
weekdays
for
bird
hunting,
the
department
had
to
amend
Hawaii
administrative
rule
13-122-4
pursuant
to
chapter
91.
117
H.
16
(App.),
175
P.3d
126.
35
The Plaintiff is alleging that the State defendants declared an emergency they
knew
did
not
exist,
offered
reasons
for
the
adoption
of
the
new
rules
that
they
knew
to
be
pretexts,
sought
to
hide
the
unconstitutional
purpose
of
the
rules
within
an
inappropriately
used
regulatory
framework,
adopted
rules
that
unconstitutionally
impacted
the
free
exercise
of
faith,
and
engaged
in
punitive
actions
against
those
towards
whom
the
rules
are
truly
directed.
established
law.
Malley
v.
Briggs,
475
U.S.
335,
341
(1986).
State
defendants
are,
therefore,
not
entitled
to
qualified
immunity.
36
IV.
Conclusion
For the above and foregoing reasons the Nagata/Straney motion to dismiss
Respectfully submitted,
Dated:
September
25,
2015
37