Pua yi kun vs people

FACTS: Raised as the only issue in this original

petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the
materiality, in an information for Theft, of the identity
of the owner of the stolen property; in other words,
whether or not an accurate identification of the
owner of the stolen property is essential to the
validity of an information for theft. On February 13,
1964, Pua Yi Kun was charged with the crime of theft
before the City Court of Manila (Crim. Case No. E18590; I.S. 64-5062), in an information reading as
follows:
The undersigned (Assistant Fiscal) accuses Pua Yi Kun
of the crime of theft, committed as follows:
That on or about the period from January 10, 1964 to
January 13, 1964, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together with one whose true name and identity are
still unknown and helping each other, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
of gain and without the knowledge and consent of
the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away the
following:
Nine (9) stock certificates of the Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co. and the Consolidated
Mining, Inc., to wit:
Lepanto Shares: Certificates Nos. 44431 30,000
shares; 50372 19,000 shares; 48758 1,351
shares; Consolidated Shares: 45453-B 90,000
shares;
44728-B 100,000 shares; 44562-B 100,000
shares; 43691-B 100,000 share; 43688-B 50,000
shares; 43529-B 90,000 shares,
all valued at P10,335.00, belonging to the aforesaid
mining companies to the damage and prejudice of
said owners in the aforesaid sum of P10,335.00,
Philippine currency.1vvphi1.nt
Contrary to law.
Arraigned on July 15, 1964, the accused entered a
plea of not guilty.

On January 26, 1965, Assistant Fiscal Agapito C.

Magpantay moved for the dismissal of the case
against the accused Pua Yi Kun, on the ground that
reinvestigation and re-examination of the evidence
on hand disclosed that the same would be
insufficient to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. In view of this motion, the
City Judge on January 29, 1965, ordered the dismissal
of the case with costs de officio.
On April 20, 1966, another information for theft of
the same stock certificates was filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila (Crim. Case No. 82120; I.S.
64-5062 &
64-5063), this time charging Pua Yi Kun and Frank
Chou, thus:
That on or about the 10th day of January, 1964, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, take, steal and carry away three (3) stock
certificates of the Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.,
consisting of 50,351 shares, valued at P0.72 a share,
or a total value of P36,252.72, and six (6) stock
certificates of the Consolidated Mines, Inc. consisting
of 530,000 shares valued at P0.085 a share or a total
value of P45,050.00, belonging to the Chiong & Co.,
Inc., to the damage and prejudice of said owner in
the aforesaid sum of P81,302.72, Philippine currency.
The petitioner move to quash the second information
on the ground of double jeopardy, the lower court
sustain the information on the ground that the
petitioner was not convicted under the first
information and does not expose him on double
jeopardy
ISSUE: Whether or not there is double jeopardy ,
whether or not an accurate identification of the
owner of the stolen property is essential to the
validity of an information for theft
RULING: Because in the case at bar the offense
charged is theft, it became essential that the
previous indictment that was dismissed without
consent of the accused, should have expressed all
the requisites of that particular offense. As theft is

defined in paragraph 1 of Article 308 of the Revised

Penal Code to be a felony committed
by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons nor force
upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latter's consent.
the decisions of this Court have ruled that five
elements are essential to constitute the crime: (1)
the taking of personal property; (2) that the property
belongs to another; (3) that the taking was done with
intent of gain; (4) that it was done without the
consent of the owner, and (5) that it was
accomplished without violence or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things (U.S. vs. De Vera, 43
Phil. 1000; People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665; People
vs. Yusay, 50 Phil. 598; People vs. Rodrigo, L-18507,
March 31, 1966, 16 S. C. Rep. Anno. 475).
Now, with particular regard to the taking without the
consent of the owner, it is conceded that the first
information (City Court Case No. E-18590 of Manila)
averred that the stolen certificates belonged to the
mining companies (Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.
and the Consolidated Mines, Inc.). The allegation that
the accused took, stole and carried away the
certificate of stock without the consent of their owner
could only mean that it was done without the
consent of the two companies aforementioned. But
as the motion to quash the second necessarily
assumes the truth of the averment therein that the
true owner was Chiong & Co., then we must conclude
that the first information in the City Court was
insufficient to support a conviction, because the
same did not allege that the taking of the certificates
was done without the consent of the true owner or
possessor (Chiong & Co.). True, that the first charge
did state that the taking was done without the
consent of the mining companies Lepanto and
Consolidated; but as they were not the owners, the
allegation was not only irrelevant, but it did not
import that the act was also done against or without
the consent of the real owner. Such deficiency is fatal
to the sufficiency of the first charge, because the
non-consent of the owner to the taking is essential to
the existence of the crime of theft under the first
paragraph of Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

We are aware that some decisions state that the

crime of theft does not require that the culprit should
know the owner of the thing stolen. Other authorities
declare that it is not necessary for the existence of
the crime of theft that it should appear in a specific
manner who is the owner of the thing stolen, and
that the crime is consummated provided the thing
belongs to another and the same is taken with intent
of gain (Decision, Supreme Court of Spain, Nov. 22,
1898 and October 4, 1905).
By and large, these pronouncements are merely
generalizations designed to cover all varieties of
theft, from the one where the thing stolen is taken
directly from the owner's control to that committed
by "any person who having found lost property, shall
fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to
its owner" which is also theft under Article 308,
paragraph 2(1), Revised Penal Code. The rulings,
therefore, are not fully applicable to the present
case, which does not involve property lost
(extraviada) nor do they warrant the inference that
the non-consent of the owner or possessor can be
excused.
In the ordinary course of events, the owner of the
thing (whoever he should be) would not consent to
the taking of his property without any consideration
or quid pro quo therefor; nevertheless, the possibility
of such consent remains and the law demands that it
be negated in the information. That the owner's lack
of consent can not be dispensed with in charging an
ordinary theft under the first paragraph of Article 308
of the Penal Code, is shown by the express
requirement therein that the taking should be
without the consent of the owner.3 In view of the
clear text of the law, an information or charge that
does not aver this lack of consent is manifestly bad
and insufficient, and may be quashed for failure to
allege an essential element of the delict.
Since the first charge against petitioner in the City
Court was thus deficient in not alleging each and
every element of the offense, and as no evidence
was produced to cure the defect, the Court of First
Instance did not gravely abuse its discretion in
holding that thereunder jeopardy did not attach.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed

and the writ applied for is denied, with costs against
petitioner Pua Yi Kun.
US VS ROSALES
FACTS: This case comes up in consultation of the
judgment of the 18th of February, 1898, rendered in
case No. 13153 of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, for robbery. In that case Balbino Rosales
and Leocadio de Guzman were each convicted as
principals in the crime and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of one year and one day of correctional
imprisonment, with accessories, were condemned to
the payment of a fine of 6,250 pesetas each, and, in
case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment
not to exceed six months. All four were condemned
to pay to the complaining witness damages in the
sum of 55 Mexican pesos, the value of the animals
stolen, together with 10 cuartos, the amount of
damage done to the corral, this obligation being
imposed jointly and severally, in accordance with
law, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. These defendants were also condemned
to pay each one-ninth part of the costs. The
Government in the second instance asks that the
judgment be reversed and that the four accused
convicted by the judge below be acquitted.
ISSUE: whether or not the committed felony is theft
or robbery
RULING: The taking of a bull belonging to Brigido
Bonafe from the corral where he was inclosed on the
night of Saturday, the 7th of November, 1891, and
the destruction of part of the said corral, can not be
properly classified as robbery, but constitutes the
crime of theft, since, as in order to take the animal
away, it was not necessary to destroy the corral or to
cut the stakes driven into the ground. The only thing
that was done was to pull up some of these stakes
for the purpose of making the opening the thieves
required, and so the man in charge found the corral
the next day. The fence opened does not appear to
have been firmly constructed and did not offer the
slightest security against the most insignificant effort
to force an entrance, as appears from the fact that
the thieves, with their hands alone, and without any
other instrument, were able to make the opening and
to take away the bull. In consideration, moreover, of

the fact that the corral was not covered or in any way
connected with an inhabited house, it is
unquestionable that the offense committed was that
of theft, defined and punished by section 3 of article
518 of the Penal Code.
The guilt of the defendants Balbino Rosales and
Leocadio de Guzman as principals, and that of
Ruperto Alse and Julian Dimaculangan (who
subsequently died) as accessories, is established by
the evidence in the case. Therefore, the undersigned
being of the opinion that the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the judgment of the court below
are correct, with the exception of its conclusion with
respect to the classification of the offense, as stated
above, the said findings of fact and conclusions of
law are accepted by the undersigned as the basis of
this decision, notwithstanding the opinion of the
counsel for the Government, with the exception of
the part of the said judgment which refers to the
deceased defendant.
In determining the appropriate penalty the
concurrence of the aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity will be considered. There are no mitigating
circumstances in the case, and therefore the
judgment of the court below should be reversed.
Balbino Rosales and Leocadio de Guzman, guilty as
principals of the crime of theft prosecuted, should be
convicted and sentenced each to six months and one
day of correctional imprisonment, with the
accessories of article 58 of the Code. Ruperto Alse
should be fined 1,250 pesetas, and, in case of
insolvency, should suffer subsidiary imprisonment,
not to exceed one month. All three defendants
should be condemned to the restitution of the stolen
animal, or to indemnify the complaining witness
therefor jointly and severally, in the order established
in article 125 of the Code, the value of the animal
being fixed at 55 pesos, and in case of insolvency
should suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment. Finally, they should be condemned to
pay each one-ninth of the costs of both instances.
The case is, with respect to Julian Dimaculangan,
reversed, with one-ninth part of the costs de oficio.
No decision can be made with respect to the two
absent accused, as to whom the course of the case
was suspended, nor with respect to the three
defendants acquitted below, under section 50 of
General Orders, No. 58. The order declaratory of

insolvency, made in the incident of embargo, is

approved. So ordered.

defined in Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, in

connection with Article 308 thereof.

PEOPLE VS RODRIGO

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.Theft is

committed by any person who, with intent to gain
but without violence against, or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latter's consent.

FACTS: That on or about March 8, 1960, and months

previous at Tubod, Pio A. Corpuz, Masbate, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused deliberately did there and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and criminally
kept in his possession one male horse which is
specifically described under Certificate of Ownership
of Large Cattle No. 4685981, legally belonging to
FELIX MUERTEIGUE, said accused knowing as he does
that the aforementioned horse was stolen from the
ranch of said Felix Muertigue at Casabangan, Pio V.
Corpuz, Masbate, and deliberately failed as he did fail
to deliver the same to the authorities or to its owner.
The value of the aforecited horse is no less than ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P150.00), all to the damage
and prejudice of said owner of the aforementioned
amount.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred on
dismissing the case against Rodrigo
RULING: YES. The only question raised is whether
or not the lower court erred in ruling that the
foregoing complaint is defective because the
element of "intent to gain" is not alleged.
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the defendant; the designation of the
offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the
offense was committed (Section 5, Rule 110, Revised
Rules of Court). The acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary
and concise language without repetition, not
necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the
offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the
court to pronounced his proper judgment (Section
8, Id).
The complaint in question designates the offense
charged as "theft of large cattle." This is the crime

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall
fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to
its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged
the property of another, shall remove or make use of
the fruits or object of the damage caused by him;
and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a
field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to
another and, without the consent of its owner, shall
hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits,
cereals, or other forest or farm products.
Art. 310. Qualified theft.The crime of theft shall be
punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next
preceding article, ... if the property stolen is ... large
cattle.
Under the first paragraph of Article 308 the essential
elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal
property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the
taking away was done with intent of gain; (4) the
taking away was done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished
without violence or intimidation against person or
force upon things (U.S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000).
But under paragraph 2, subparagraph (1), the
elements are (1) the finding of lost property; and (2)
the failure of the finder to deliver the same to the
local authorities or to its owner. In this kind of theft
intent of gain is inferred from the deliberate failure to
deliver the lost property to the proper person, the
finder knowing that the property does not belong to
him.

Appellee contends that since the complaint refers to

a stolen horse it does not fall under said particular
paragraph, "stolen property" not being the same as
"lost property." The argument is without merit. The
word "lost" is generic in nature, and embraces loss
by stealing or by any act of a person other than the
owner, as well as by the act of the owner himself or
through some casual occurrence. If anything, the
finder who fails deliberately to return the thing lost
may be considered more blameworthy if the loss was
by stealing than through some other means.

PEOPLE VS AVILA
FACTS: It appears in evidence that on August 16,
1921, in the municipality of Meycauayan, in the
Province of Bulacan, Lucio Pilares and his family,
composed of his wife, two children and a niece of his
wife, took a carretela to go from the house of his
father-in-law to his own home in said municipality.
Upon said occasion the wife of Lucio Pilares carried,
among other things, a large pocketbook, or purse,
containing paper money, gold coin, and jewels of a
total value of P4,500. Upon arriving at the house of
Lucio Pilares, the family alighted from the vehicle,
but the wife of Lucio Pilares inadvertently failed to
carry with her the purse containing the valuables,
and she left the same in
the carretela.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The driver of the carretela was one Tiburcio de los
Santos, of the age of 50 years; and after his
passengers had alighted, Tiburcio turned to go back,
when his attention was attracted by two girls,
namely, Dolores Orito and Rosario Buing, who were
standing on the street in front of their house and who
indicated that they wanted to embark in
thecarretela. Tiburcio accordingly stopped to pick
them up, but before they had gotten abroad Tiburcio
though well to clean out or arrange the interior of
the carretela. In doing this he saw the purse which
had been left in the carretela by the wife of Lucio
Pilares, and he accordingly picked it up. As the two
girls mentioned climbed abroad the carretela, the
accused in this case, Clemente Avila, who was at the
time a policeman of the municipality, also got in; and
as the three passenger were adjusting themselves in

their seats, Tiburcio handed the purse to Clemente

Avila, and asked him, as a policeman, to deliver it to
Lucio Pilares. The accused received the purse and,
wrapping it in his raincoat, placed the bundle under
his arm.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The said purse, it is now to be stated, has never
come to the hands of Pilares through the person to
whom it was thus confided, nor though any other
channel; but within a very few hours after the
incident above narrated the loss of the purse came to
the attention of the owner and efforts to locate its
whereabouts were begun. To this end complaint was
made to the police authorities; and the cochero,
Tiburcio de los Santos, was arrested. At first he
denied any knowledge of the purse, doubtless
through fear of becoming implicated himself, but
later he admitted that he had picked it up in
the carretela after the Pilares got out and that he had
turned it over to Clemente Avila, with the request
that it should be delivered to its owner. A search
warrant was then procured; and armed with this, two
officials, one of whom was a lieutenant of the barrio,
proceeded to a search of the house of Clemente
Avila, on August 23, 1921, or about a week after the
incident above narrated
occurred.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The result of this search was the finding of a solitaire
stone (diamond) and a locket containing the pictures
of Lucio Pilares and his wife. These objects were
subsequently identified by Lucio Pilares as belonging

to himself and wife and constituting part of the

contents of the lost purse.chanroblesvirt
ISSUE: Whether or not the first finder of the lost
thing is essential on the crime of theft
RULING: In the light of the foregoing discussion the
conclusion seems inevitable that the accused in this
case committed the offense of theft when he
appropriated the purse belonging to Lucio Pilares
under the conditions already stated; and the
circumstances that he received the purse by the
delivery from Tiburcio de los Santos, who was the
actual finder, is
immaterial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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Moreover, it is not necessary for us to formulate any
conclusion as to the exact point of time when the
felonious designs to appropriate the purse was
formed. Upon this point the situation resembles that
involved in larceny by a servant. The properly
converted was at most only in the physical custody
of the accused, and he at no time was vested with
legal possession. The violation of possession,
essential in larceny, was therefore simultaneous with
the actual appropriation or
conversion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The only decision which has been called to our
attention supporting a conclusion in anywise contrary
to that announced above is one noted by Viada
in Question XXIV of his comment on the second
paragraph of article 530 of the Spanish Penal Code,

corresponding to the second paragraph of article 517

of the Code in force in these Islands. It there
appeared that a certain person had found a portfolio
containing papers exclusively of interest to the
owner. Not knowing how to read, the finder delivered
the portfolio to the two accused in order that they
might ascertain to whom it belonged. These
individuals, however, kept the article in their
possession and on that account were afterwards
prosecuted for theft. The trial court held them guilty
of that offense, but the decision was quashed upon
appeal to the Supreme Court. The decision was
based upon the grounds; namely, first, that the two
accused were not the actual finders; secondly, that it
did not appear which of the two had in fact received
it from the finder; and, thirdly, that in view of the
trivial value of the portfolio there was no
appropriation by the accused with intent to
gain.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The decision contains the bare resolution of the court
only, and it is evident that the point now under
discussion; namely, whether one who receives lost or
mislaid property from the hands of a finder can be
guilty of theft in misappropriating the same, was
there involved with other consideration decisive of
the case. Under these circumstances the decision is
entitled to little or no weight upon the point we have
been considering; and as the resolution on the point
referred to is, in our opinion, contrary to the
principles of sound jurisprudence, we are unable to
accept i