FLORENCIO DEUDOR, ET AL vs. J.M.

TUASON
&CO., INC. ET AL
PONENTE: JUSTICE FERNANDEZ
FACTS:
Plaintiff claimed a parcel of land of about 50
"quiones", or 225 hectares, located in Tatalon,
Quezon City, over which J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.,
asserted ownership under the Land Registration Act,
by virtue of an original certificate of title. The
Deudors acknowledged therein the title of J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. and in consideration thereof, J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. undertook to pay them, to be paid
in the manner and under the conditions set forth in
the Compromise Agreement (April 10, 1953). Under
the Compromise Agreement, and subject to its other
terms and conditions, the Deudors are obligated to
deliver the clear and peaceful possession of the
entire 50 quiones to the owners. The first payment
shall be P100,000.00 and shall be made within sixty
(60) days from the date the decision rendered
approving the Compromise Agreement becomes
final; Provided, that within said period the Deudors
shall have effected the delivery to the OWNERS of at
least 20 quiones. The portion of 20 "quiones" was
not delivered by the Deudors until January 14, 1956,
and this was made possible only because the
appellees had agreed to and did advance certain in
sums to defray the expenses necessary therefor. On
April 27, 1956, the appellees filed supplemental
motion and "manifestation" praying that payment of
balance of P79,800.00 to the Deudors "be withheld
until after the additional 129 illegal constructions the
30 'quiones' area shall have been removed". On
February 28, 1957, the Court, therefore, hereby sets
a period of 4 months within which the 'Deudors' shall
deliver possession of the entire 30 quiones to the
owners. Failure of the Deudors to do so will have the
effect of freeing the J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and the
Gregorio Araneta, Inc. from all its obligations under
the Compromise Agreement and judgment. The
Deudors had not delivered the aforementioned
portion of 30 "Quiones", despite the expiration of
the period of 4 months and that, owing to the failure
of the Deudors to make said delivery, the
construction of houses by squatters within said area
had continued so unabated that, as of August 12,
1957, there were 341 constructions therein.
Appellants maintain that the orders are erroneous.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the orders issued by the Court to the
appellants are erroneous.
HELD:
With respect to the period fixed by the lower court
for the delivery of said 30 "quiones" and the effect
of the failure to deliver the same within said period, it
is urged that the order of February 28, 1957,
amounted to an amendment of the Compromise
Agreement, without the consent of the parties
therein, and of the decision of April 10, 1953, long
after the same had become final and executory.
There is no merit in this pretense. Indeed,
considering that the appellees had a Torrens title,
they had no reason to agree on paying the Deudors,
except upon the expectation of delivery of said area
without unreasonable delay. Accordingly, said
agreement is subject to the principle set forth in
Article 1197 of the Civil Code of the Philippines that
If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its
nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that
a period was intended the courts may fix the
duration thereof. Hence, whenever a period is fixed
pursuant to said Article, the court merely enforces or
carries out an implied stipulation in the contract. It
will be noted that under the agreement, the Deudors
are supposed to make delivery of the areas
unconditionally. In fact, the registered owners of the
and made it clear that they were agreeing to the
settlement only because they wanted to obtain early
possession of the whole property. There is no excuse,
therefore, for the failure of the Deudors to deliver the
remaining 30 quiones 4 years and 8 months after
the execution and approval of the compromise
agreement. The failure to deliver and the continued
mushrooming of houses in the area, despite the
compromise, justify the release of J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. from further
obligation under the agreement of March 16, 1953.
Lastly, appellants say that they have as much right
as appellees herein to the execution of the decision
herein, and yet the lower court granted the letter's
motion for a writ of execution thereof and denied a
motion of the former to the same effect. It is not true,
however, that the two (2) motions were identical. It
was proper for the lower court to grant appellees'
motion. It would have been improper for the lower
court to grant appellants' squatters, who are neither
parties in this proceeding nor bound by the

aforementioned decision, and, hence, are beyond the

jurisdiction of the court in this case. Therefore, the
orders appealed from are affirmed by the Court, with
costs against the appellants.
Inchausti & Co. vs. Yulo 34 Phil. 978
PONENTE: CHIEF JUSTICE ARELLANO
Facts: Teodoro Yulo, property owner of Iloilo, has
been borrowing money from the firm of Inchausti &
Company under specific conditions. This money has
been used to cultivate his haciendas in Negros
Occidental. Teodoro Yulo died testate and left his
wife whom have died later and other legitimate
children including the defendant as administrators of
his estates. There remaining of the marriage the
following legitimate children: Pedro, Francisco,
Teodoro, Manuel, Gregorio, Mariano, Carmen,
Concepcion, and Jose Yulo y Regalado. Of these
children Concepcion and Jose were minors, while
Teodoro was mentally incompetent. They held the
property in common and have continued their
current account with the plaintiff under the name
Hijos de T. Yulo. On August 12, 1909, the defendant
in representation of his brothers including his brother
Manuel, and their own behalf Pedro, Francisco,
Carmen and Concepcion, the latter being of age,
ratified an instrument on their indebtedness towards
plaintiff all the documents executed by them before.
In this document, they have severally and jointly
acknowledged and admitted their indebtedness to
the plaintiff at the amount of P253,445.42 with an
interest of ten percent per annum and payable within
five installments. Payment begins on June 30, 19 and
ends on June 30, 1914. Also part of the stipulation
that the abovementioned instrument shall be ratified
by their brother Mariano Yuko Regalado but failed to
do so. Moreover, the brothers and sisters did not pay
the first installment of the obligation. Hence, plaintiff
instituted an action at CFI Iloilo against defendant for
the payment of P253,445.42 plus interest. On May
12, 1911, Francisco, Manuel, and Carmen Yulo y
Regalado executed in favor of plaintiff another
instrument of indebtedness whereby the debt is
reduce to P225,000 with an interest of 6 per centum
per annum payable by eight installments starting on
June 30, 1911 and ends at June 30, 1919. The trial
court ruled in favor of defendant without prejudice to
the plaintiff's bringing within the proper time another

suit for his proportional part of the joint debt. Hence

plaintiff appealed decision; one of the averments is
that the court erred in considering the contract of
May 12, 1911, as constituting a novation of that of
August 12, 1909.
Issue: a) Whether or not plaintiff can sue defendant
alone and by doing that it lost its right by the second
agreement executed; and, b) Whether or not the
contract with the three aforesaid obligors constitutes
novation of the first notarial instrument executed by
6 debtors being the subject matter of litigation.
Held: As to the first issue, the law provides that
obligations in solidum or in conjoint or solidary
obligations, the creditor can bring an action against
any solidary debtors to fulfill the obligation. And even
so the plaintiff stipulated various installments and
conditions as it did with the second instrument of
May 12, 1911, the solidarity stipulated in the
instrument of August 12, 1909 is not broken.
Solidarity may exist even though the debtors are not
bound in the same manner and for the same periods
and under the same conditions (Art. 1140).
With respect to the third issue, the contract of May
12, 1911, does not constitute a novation of the
former one. In order that an obligation may be
extinguished by another which substitutes it, it is
necessary that it should be so expressly declared or
that the old and the new be incompatible in all points
(Civil Code, article 1204). The contract of May 12,
1911 does not expressly provide for the substitution
of the first. There also exist no incompatibility
between the old and the new obligation. As provided
for in the previous cases, the legal doctrine that an
obligation to pay a sum of money is not novated in a
new instrument wherein the old is ratified, by
changing only the term of payment and adding other
obligations not incompatible with the old one.
Although, the contract of May 12, 1911 did not
novate that of August 12, 1909, it has affected the
case filed by plaintiff with respect to the payment for
the sum of P253,445.42. Hence by virtue of
remission, plaintiff can only recover the amount
stated in the second contract granted to the granted
to the three of the solidary debtors. As regards to the
payment, he can pay only P112,500 of which is due
or already matured. Hence, defendant cannot allege

the prematurity of debt since when the lawsuit is

instituted, the obligation for the first installment of
the contract if August 12, 1909 has already matured
and due to the solidarity of the obligation he is liable
to pay the whole obligation. An exception would be
the shares of Francisco, Manuel, and Carmen Yulo,
none of the installments payable under their
obligation, contracted later had yet matured. The
personal defense of Francisco, Manuel, and Carmen
Yulo "as to the part of the debt for which they were
responsible" can be used by Gregorio Yulo as a
defense for paying the whole obligation. The part of
the debt for which these three are responsible is
three-sixths of P225,000 or P112,500, which is not
yet demandable due to the execution of the second
contract. Hence, defendant can only pay the half
portion of the obligation that is demandable at that
time. This is in consonance with Art. 1448 which
states that, The solidary debtor may utilize against
the claims of the creditor of the defenses arising
from the nature of the obligation and those which are
personal to him. Those personally pertaining to the
others may be employed by him only with regard to
the share of the debt for which the latter may be
liable.

respond. Thus PBC filed a suit for the collection of

50,000.

Therefore, defendant cannot be made to pay the

whole obligation because he has been benefited by
remission made by the plaintiff to three of his co
debtors. The judgment appealed has been reversed.

-Petitioner alleged further that five (5) copies of a

blank promissory note were brought to him by
Campos at his office. He affixed his signature thereto
but in one copy, he indicated that he bound himself
only for the amount of P5, 000.00. Thus, it was by
trickery, fraud and misrepresentation that he
was made liable for the amount of P50, 000.00.

INCIONG V CA
257 SCRA 578
Romero J; June 26, 1996
FACTS:
-Petitioner's liability resulted from the promissory
note in the amount of P50,000.00 which he signed
with Rene C. Naybe and Gregorio D. Pantanosas on
February 3, 1983, holding themselves jointly and
severally liable to private respondent Philippine Bank
of Communications (PBC), Cagayan de Oro City
branch. The promissory note was due on May 5, 1983
-Due date came and obligation was left unfulfilled.
PBC sent telegrams to Inciong demanding payment.
It also sent a letter to Nayde. Both obligors did not

- Case was initially dismissed for failure of plaintiff to

prosecute the case. However, the lower court
reconsidered the dismissal order and required the
sheriff to serve the summonses. Lower court also
dismissed the case against defendant Pantanosas as
prayed for by the private respondent herein.
Meanwhile, only the summons addressed to
petitioner was served as the sheriff learned that
defendant Naybe had gone to Saudi Arabia.
-Inciong on his part stated that: he was approached
by his friend Campos who claimed that he was a
partner of the branch manager of PBC, in the falcata
logs operation. Campos also told him that Rene C.
Naybe was interested in the business and would
contribute a chainsaw to the venture. Campos then
persuaded petitioner to act as a "co-maker" in the
said loan.
Petitioner allegedly acceded but with the
understanding that he would only be a co-maker for
the loan of P5,000.00.

-TC and CA ordered Inciong to pay amount. Inciong

appealed.
ISSUE: WON Inciong is liable for the payment of
promissory note

HELD: Yes
*RULING ON PAROL EVIDENCE
-Inciong claimed that since the promissory note "is
not a public deed with the formalities prescribed by
law but a mere commercial paper which does not
bear the signature of attesting witnesses," parol

evidence may "overcome" the contents of the

promissory note.

liability citing Art 2080 of CC. however contention is

invalid.

The first paragraph of the parol evidence rule states:

-the promissory note involved in this case expressly

states that the three signatories therein are jointly
and severally liable, any one, some or all of them
may be proceeded against for the entire obligation.
The choice is left to the solidary creditor to determine
against whom he will enforce collection.
Consequently, the dismissal of the case against
Judge Pontanosas may not be deemed as having
discharged petitioner from liability as well. As regards
Naybe, suffice it to say that the court never acquired
jurisdiction over him.

"When the terms of an agreement have been

reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all
the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors-in-interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of
the written agreement."
- The rule does not specify that the written
agreement be a public document. What is
required is that agreement be in writing as the rule is
in fact founded on "long experience that written
evidence is so much more certain and accurate than
that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it
would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the
terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker
evidence to control and vary the stronger and to
show that the parties intended a different contract
from that expressed in the writing signed by them.
Thus, for the parol evidence rule to apply, a written
contract need not be in any particular form, or be
signed by both parties. As a general rule, bills, notes
and other instruments of a similar nature are not
subject to be varied or contradicted by parol or
extrinsic evidence.
-By alleging fraud in his answer, petitioner was
actually in the right direction towards proving that he
and his co-makers agreed to a loan of P5,000.00
only, considering that, where a parol
contemporaneous agreement was the inducing and
moving cause of the written contract, it may be
shown by parol evidence. However, fraud must be
established by clear and convincing evidence, mere
preponderance of evidence, not even being
adequate. Petitioner's attempt to prove fraud must,
therefore, fail as it was evidenced only by his own
uncorroborated and, expectedly, self-serving
testimony.
*other contentions
-Inciong claimed that since the complaint was
dropped against Naybe, his co-debtor and Pantonasa
the guarantor, he should also be released from

Petitioner, therefore, may only have recourse against

his co-makers, as provided by law.

PBM and Ching on the same day. By way of special

and affirmative defenses they alleged that "although
the trust receipts stipulate due dates, the true intent
and agreement of the parties was that the maturity
dates of the trust receipts were to be extended at the
end of the stipulated dates, as had been the
customary practice of RCBC with PBM."
On 23 September 1981, PBM and Ching moved to
discharge the attachment, which RCBC opposed. On
4 December 1981 the Court issued an Order lifting
the attachment upon their filing of a satisfactory
counter-bond.
Meanwhile, on 1 April 1982, PBM filed a Petition for
Suspension of Payments with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, docketed as SEC Case No.
2250, seeking at the same time its rehabilitation.

RCBC VS CA
PONENTE: JUSTICE MELENCIO- HERRERA
FACTS: AS On 4 May 1979, Alfredo Ching signed a
'Comprehensive Surety Agreement' with Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), binding
himself to jointly and severally guarantee the prompt
payment of all PBM obligations owing RCBC in the
aggregate sum of Forty Million (P40,000,000.00)
Pesos.
Between 8 September to 30 October 1980, PBM filed
several applications for letters of credit with RCBC.
Through said applications, PBM obligated itself,
among other things, to pay on demand for all draft(s)
drawn under or purporting to be drawn under the
credits. Everything being in order, RCBC opened the
corresponding letters of credit and imported various
goods for PBM's account. In due time the imported
goods arrived and were released, in trust, to PBM
who acknowledged receipt thereof through various
trust receipts. All in all, PBM's obligations stood at
P7,982,649.08.
Less than a year later, or on 7 August 1981, RCBC
filed a Complaint for collection of said sum against
respondents PBM and Alfredo Ching with the then
Court of First Instance of Pasig, docketed as CV42333. Upon filing of a bond satisfactory to the
Court, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued
against the assets and properties of respondents

In an injunctive Order, dated 6 July 1982, all actions

for claims against PBM pending before any Court or
tribunal, in whatever stage the same may have been,
were ordered suspended by the SEC in order to give
the Commission the opportunity to pass upon the
feasibility of any rehabilitation plans. And on 26 April
1988, SEC approved the revised rehabilitation plan
and ordered its implementation.
On 14 October 1982, RCBC pursued its claims with
the Trial Court and filed, unopposed, a Motion for
Summary Judgment in CV-42333, a motion for
extension to file said opposition having been earlier
withdrawn. RCBC contended that respondents PBM
and Ching had not denied their indebtedness to RCBC
and, therefore, no genuine issue was raised in the
pleadings.
On 25 November 1982, the CFI rendered such
summary judgment** in RCBC's favor.
On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals,*** ruling
that it was precipitate and improper for the lower
Court to have continued with the proceedings despite
the SEC Order of suspension, set aside the lower
Court Decision and ordered it to hold in abeyance the
determination of the merits invoked in CV-42333
pending the outcome of SEC Case No. 2250. On 6
October 1988, the Appellate Court denied RCBC's
Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: Will a Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC) Order suspending, during
the pendency of a rehabilitation proceeding,
payment of all claims against the principal
debtor bar or preclude the creditor from
recovering from the surety?
RULING: AS Hence, this Petition for Review, to which
we gave due course on 31 May 1989, and required
the filing of Memoranda by the parties, the last of
which was submitted on 27 July 1989.
RCBC takes the position that the SEC injunctive Order
pertains and affects only PBM, the corporation under
rehabilitation, and that its right, as creditor, to
proceed against respondent Ching, as Surety, is not
affected by said Order. In fine, RCBC avers that to
hold the injunctive Order applicable to both
respondents PBM and Ching is to deprive RCBC of its
right to proceed against the Surety based on the
latter's separate and independent undertaking.
PBM and Ching counter that the liabilities incurred by
PBM were corporate in character and, hence, as a
corporate officer, Alfredo Ching cannot be held liable
therefor; that the pendency of SEC Case No. 2250
and the rendition of an Order therein on 26 April
1988 implementing respondent PBM's rehabilitation
plan must necessarily benefit the Surety, inasmuch
as payment of PBM obligations must be made
pursuant to that plan; and that the liability of the
Surety can not be more than what would remain after
payment of all the obligations of the principal.
Moreover, they continue, it is usual for majority
stockholders to act as co-signors with their
respective corporations where promissory notes,
collaterals or guaranty or security agreements are
involved. Respondent Ching's action may, it is
claimed, be classified as a corporate act.
Under the attendant facts and circumstances, we
answer the question earlier posed in the negative.
Where an obligation expressly states a solidary
liability, the concurrence of two or more creditors or
two or more debtors in one and the same obligation
implies that each one of the former has a right to
demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to
render, entire compliance with the prestation (Article
1207, Civil Code). The creditor may proceed against

any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of

them simultaneously (Article 1216, Civil Code).

offers an acceptable explanation finding respondents'

obligation as matured and demandable. Thus:

That there exists a Comprehensive Surety Agreement

between RCBC and respondent Ching is admitted.
There is no escaping the attendant liability that binds
respondent Ching, as Surety. He is charged as an
original promissor by virtue of his primary obligation
under the Suretyship Agreement. That Agreement is
bare of words imputing to respondent Ching any
liability other than that of a Surety who binds himself
to insure a debt in his personal capacity, lacking
consideration therefor notwithstanding (p. 94,
Original Record). That respondent Ching acted for
and on behalf of respondent PBM as part of its usual
corporate procedure is not supported by the
evidence nor the pleadings on record, nor the
Agreement itself .We can not give any additional
meaning to the plain language of the subject
agreement. It is basic that the parties are bound by
the terms of their contract, which is the law between
them. As held in Zenith Insurance Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals (No. L-57957, 29 December
1982,119 SCRA 485), the extent of a surety's liability
is determined only by the clause of the contract of
suretyship. It cannot be extended by implication,
beyond the terms of the contract. Conversely,
liability therefor may not be restricted unless
expressly so stated.

The trust receipts from No. 2042 to 2100 in the

schedule (pages 2 and 3, complaint) shows that the
maturity dates thereof vary from May 12, 1981 at the
latest and February 19, 1981 at the earliest. The
alleged agreement to extend, granting its existence,
obviously would have had a much earlier date than
the maturity dates of the trust receipts and
considering that the instant case was brought on
August 7, 1981, there should have been, to say the
least, representation made prior to the maturity
dates or at least on the dates of maturity thereof. But
it has not even been alleged by defendants that such
representations were made by defendants. It is too
far fetched to rule that the Court will grant an
extension of time to pay, when no such extension
has ever been requested by defendants. The
obligation, therefore, is covered by Article 1193 of
the Civil Code and hence, demandable when the day
comes (pp. 199-200, Original Record).

Neither can respondent Ching seek refuge behind the

SEC injunctive Order. Under Section 3 of P.D. 902-A,
as amended by P.D. 1758, the Commission is given
absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control only
over corporations or associations, which are grantees
of a primary franchise and/or a license or permit
issued by the government to operate in the
Philippines. The SEC injunctive Order can not effect a
suspension of payment of respondent Surety's due
and demandable obligation, it being clear therefrom
that the rehabilitation receivers were limited "to
tak(ing) custody and control over all the existing
assets and property of PBM." Nothing in said Order
puts respondent Ching within its scope.

In fine, the SEC injunctive Order is of no effect as far

as the respondent Surety, Alfredo Ching, is
concerned. He can be sued separately to enforce his
liability as Surety for PBM (Traders Royal Bank vs.
Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 78412, September
26, 1989).

To further avoid payment of their obligation, PBM and

Ching allege a customary extension given by
petitioner in PBM's favor, which, it is averred, must
necessarily benefit the Surety. Suffice it to say that
the summary judgment made by the lower Court

The lower Court correctly found the case to be

without any genuine issue of fact and ripe for
summary judgment. Respondents' bare allegation of
customary extensions is not corroborated by any
documentary evidence but remains plain self-serving
assertions.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals,

dated 30 June 1988, and its Resolution denying
reconsideration thereof, dated 6 October 1988, are
SET ASIDE. The judgment of the lower Court is
hereby REINSTATED and made executory as far as
respondent, Alfredo Ching, is concerned.
Costs against private respondents, Philippine
Blooming Mills and Alfredo Ching.

Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc. v. Continental

Cement Corporation
443 SCRA 522 (November 23, 2004)
PONENTE: JUSTICE PANGANIBAN

Facts:
Lafarge agreed to purchase Continental. On October
21, 1998, both parties entered into a sale of
Purchase and Agreement (SPA) and were well aware
that Continental had a case pending with the
Supreme Court.The parties, under Clause 2 (c) of the
SPA, allegedly agreed to retain from the purchase
price a portion of the contract price to be deposited
for payment to APT.
However, petitioners allegedly refused to apply the
sum to the payment to APT, despite the subsequent
finality of the Decision in GR No. 119712 in favor of
the latter and the repeated instructions of
Respondent Continental.

Continental filed a case against Lafarge stating that

petitioners be directed to pay the APT Retained
Amount referred in Clause 2 (c) of the SPA.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of forum shopping. RTC denied the Motion to
Dismiss, Lafarge elevated the matter to CA. Lafarge
filed their Answer and Compulsory Counterclaims and
prayed by way of compulsory counterclaims against
Respondent Continental, its majority stockholder and
president Lim, and corporate secretary Mariano -- for
the sums of (a) P2,700,000 each as actual damages,
(b) P100,000,000 each as exemplary damages,
(c) P100,000,000 each as moral damages, and
(d) P5,000,000 each as attorneys fees plus costs of
suit.

On May 22, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon

City (Branch 80) dismissed petitioners counterclaims
for several reasons, among which were the following:
a) the counterclaims against Respondents Lim and
Mariano were not compulsory; b) the ruling

in Sapugay was not applicable; and c) petitioners

Answer with Counterclaims violated procedural rules
on the proper joinder of causes of action. In an
amended order dated September 3, 2002.
Issue: Whether Continental has no personality to
move to dismiss petitioners compulsory
counterclaims on Respondents Lim and Marianos
behalf.

Held/Ruling: YES
Obligations may be classified as either joint
or solidary. Joint or jointly or conjoint means
mancum or mancomunada or pro rata obligation; on
the other hand, solidary obligations may be used
interchangeably with joint and several. Thus,
petitioners use of the term joint and solidary is
confusing and ambiguous.

The ambiguity in petitioners counterclaims

notwithstanding, respondents liability, if proven, is
solidary. This characterization finds basis in Article
1207 of the Civil Code, which provides that
obligations are generally considered joint, except
when otherwise expressly stated or when the law or
the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
However, obligations arising from tort are, by their
nature, always solidary. We have assiduously
maintained this legal principle as early as 1912
in Worcester v. Ocampo, in which we held:
General Rule: joint tort feasors are all the persons
who command, instigate, promote, encourage,
advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the
commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is
done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable
as principals, to the same extent and in the same
manner as if they had performed the wrongful act
themselves. x x x
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for
the tort which they commit. The persons injured may
sue all of them or any number less than all. Each is
liable for the whole damages caused by all, and all
together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is

no defense for one sued alone, that the others who

participated in the wrongful act are not joined with
him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that
his participation in the tort was insignificant as
compared to that of the others. x x x
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The
damages can not be apportioned among them,
except among themselves. They cannot insist upon
an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an
aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for
the whole amount. x x x
In a joint obligation, each obligor answers only for
a part of the whole liability; in a solidary or joint
and several obligation, the relationship between the
active and the passive subjects is so close that each
of them must comply with or demand the fulfillment
of the whole obligation. The fact that the liability
sought against the Continental is for specific
performance and tort, while that sought against the
individual respondents is based solely on tort does
not negate the solidary nature of their liability of
tortuous acts alleged in the counterclaims. Article
1211 of the Civil Code is explicit to this point:
Solidarity may exist although the creditors and the
debtors may not be bound in the same manner and
by the same periods and conditions.
*Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders
REVERSED. The court of origin is hereby
ORDERED to take cognizance of the
counterclaims pleaded in petitioners Answer
with Compulsory Counterclaims and to cause
the service of summons on Respondents Lim
and Mariano. No costs.