SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M.

ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District

Court, Marawi City,respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M.
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi
City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted
to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to
the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He
wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro
City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract
void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts
which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the
"grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that
Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I
categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to resort
to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be
annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial
contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the
post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the addressee,
the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, VicePresident, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with
Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which
was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he
said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and
voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner
Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and
fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab
initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation,
fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds
between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996,
April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted
on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on
account thereof.aHe also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the
Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to
stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the
anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the
scheming sales agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to
stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with
Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his)
payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed
with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of
the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage
PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may
properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator,
etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth,"
denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had
been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed
from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with
established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the
Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan,
Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2]
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" [3] in which he questioned the authority of
Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to
"a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the
District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He
also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only
"the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a
scion of a Royal Family **."[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even
obsequious tones,[5] Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order
that he might comment thereon.[6] He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good
faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co.
had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing
monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended
that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded
feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had
been deducted from his salary.[7] He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any
abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a
subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage
PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by
the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent
himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); [8] and as far as he knew, his subordinate
mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were
indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of
an honest mistake.[9]

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim,
adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for
"councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the
mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man
unduly prejudiced and injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi,
a classmate and friend.[11] He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that
she would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided
him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property -subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;[12] He
says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it
the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with
his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as
those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary
deduction, none of which he ever saw.[13]
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless
allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her
complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court
Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated
December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of
June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report
and recommendation.[14]
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and
libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident
bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established
reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to **
(his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit,
fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his)
will," and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in
defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. [16] Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials
and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary
to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest."[17] More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every
official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding
judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum
so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary."[18]
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public
policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however
sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or
virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia
Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or
vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." [19] Righteous indignation, or vindication
of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of
the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more
stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use
language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.[20] As a
judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at
all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated,
but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to
declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine
Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. [21] While one who has been admitted to
the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the

necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in
his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given
to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the
title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record
contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 6317 August 31, 2006
LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint1 was filed by complainant Luzviminda C.
Lijauco against respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and
conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him
despite receipt of payment representing attorneys fees.
According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent sometime in January
2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank,
Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed house
and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered
as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession then pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24
docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.

Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the hearing for the
issuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect her interests in the Compromise
Agreement which she subsequently entered into to end LRC Case No. B-2610.2
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he received
from complainant was payment for legal services for the recovery of the deposit with Planters
Development Bank and did not include LRC Case No. B-2610 pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Bian, Laguna.
The complaint was referred3 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. On September 21, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner
submitted his report finding respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provide:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 9.02 A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons
not licensed to practice law, except:
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latters
death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to the persons
specified in the agreement; or
b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the
plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing arrangement.
In finding the respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Investigating Commissioner opined that:
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must be established by
convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the
exercise by the Supreme Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done
as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated. x x x.
In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent that the Php70,000.00
legal fees is purely and solely for the recovery of the Php180,000.00 savings account of
complainant subsequent acts and events say otherwise, to wit:
1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00 savings deposit is too
high;

2.) Respondent actively acted as complainants lawyer to effectuate the compromise

agreement.
By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other individuals as commission/referral
fees respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons
not licensed to practice law. Worst, by luring complainant to participate in a compromise
agreement with a false and misleading assurance that complainant can still recover after Three
(3) years her foreclosed property respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which says a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.4
The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended:
WHEREFORE, finding respondent responsible for aforestated violations to protect the public
and the legal profession from his kind, it is recommended that he be suspended for Six (6)
months with a stern warning that similar acts in the future will be severely dealt with.5
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the investigating commissioner.6
We agree with the findings of the IBP.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possessed and
continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all
times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and
their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.7
Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct8 and
are mandated to serve their clients with competence and diligence.9 They shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to them, and this negligence in connection therewith shall render them
liable.10
Respondents claim that the attorneys fee pertains only to the recovery of complainants
savings deposit from Planters Development Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he
acted as complainants counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement between the latter
and the bank relative to LRC Case No. B-2610. Respondent admitted that he explained the
contents of the agreement to complainant before the latter affixed her signature. Moreover, the
Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in the
recovery of the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall charge only
fair and reasonable fees.11
Respondents disregard for his clients interests is evident in the iniquitous stipulations in the
compromise agreement where the complainant conceded the validity of the foreclosure of her

property; that the redemption period has already expired thus consolidating ownership in the
bank, and that she releases her claims against it.12As found by the Investigating Commissioner,
complainant agreed to these concessions because respondent misled her to believe that she
could still redeem the property after three years from the foreclosure. The duty of a lawyer to
safeguard his clients interests commences from his retainer until his discharge from the case or
the final disposition of the subject matter of litigation. Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients
cause. The canons of the legal profession require that once an attorney agrees to handle a
case, he should undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion.13
Respondents admission14 that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a referral fee
does not release him from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases.15
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation
of the lawyers oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7)
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority.
In Santos v. Lazaro16 and Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,17 we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal ethics. When a lawyer takes a clients
cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. The failure to
exercise that degree of vigilance and attention makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed
in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal
profession, the courts and society.
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his clients case. Once he agrees to
handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he
is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer should accept only as much cases as he can
efficiently handle in order to sufficiently protect his clients interests. It is not enough that a
lawyer possesses the qualification to handle the legal matter; he must also give adequate
attention to his legal work. Utmost fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees to take the cudgels
for his clients cause.18
In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six months is
warranted. In addition, he is directed to return to complainant the amount he received by way of
legal fees pursuant to existing jurisprudence.19
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and
20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for six (6) months effective from notice, and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will
be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered toRETURN, within thirty (30) days from
notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court
proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as
well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

SPOUSES ROMUALDO and NORA SUAREZ, petitioners, vs. ARSENIO SALAZAR, et

al., respondents.
RESOLUTION
Considering respondents Motion to expunge All Pleadings Filed by Atty. Filemon A.
Manangan with Motion to Hold Him in Contempt of Court and to Dismiss the Petition and said
Atty. Manangans admission at the hearing this morning, September 29, 1999, that he is not a
lawyer entitled to practice law in the Philippines, and that he is the same Filemon A. Manangan
who was found by this Court G.R. No. 82760 (Filemon Manangan v. Court of First Instance of
Nueva Viscaya, Branch 28) decided on August 30, 1990, to be in reality Andres Culanag who is
not a member of the Philippine Bar, but despite these facts he has continued to misrepresent
himself to be an attorney-at-law and has appeared as counsel for petitioners in this case, Atty.
Filemon A. Manangan, who is in reality Andres Culanag, is hereby declared guilty of indirect
contempt of this Court. Wherefore, he is hereby sentenced to three (3) months imprisonment to
be served at the Headquarters of the National Bureau of Investigation, Taft Avenue, Manila, until
further orders from this Court.
SO ORDERED
Halili v CIR (136 SCRA 112)
Facts:
The cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than five hundred bus drivers
and conductors of Halili Transit. The disputes were eventually settled when the contending
parties reached an Agreement where the Administratrix would transfer to the employees the title
to a tract of land in Caloocan, Rizal. The parcel of land was eventually registered in the name of
the Union.
The Union, through Atty. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE) requesting for authority to sell and dispose of the property.

Atty. Espinas, (the original counsel) established the award of 897 workers' claim. When Atty.
Pineda appeared for the Union in these cases, still an associate of the law firm, his appearance
carried the firm name B.C. Pineda and Associates," giving the impression that he was the
principal lawyer in these cases.
Atty. Pineda, without authority from the Supreme Court but relying on the earlier authority given
him by the Ministry of Labor, filed another urgent motion, praying that the Union be authorized to
sell the lot. The sale was finally consummated, resulting in the execution of an escrow
agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Pineda and Arbiter Valenzuela should be held in contempt.
Held:
YES. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such
conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to
interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the
court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice.
The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for
the confidence and trust which characterize the attorney and client relations, and the practice of
law before the courts, or showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as
to render him unworthy of public confidence.
In the case, the expeditious manner by which Arbiter Valenzuela granted Atty. Pineda's motion
for such authority to sell the property makes the entire transaction dubious and irregular.
Significantly Atty. Pineda's act of filing a motion praying for authority to sell was by itself an
admission on his part that he did not possess the authority to sell the property. He could not and
did not even wait for valid authority but instead previously obtained the same from the labor
arbiter whom he knew was not empowered to so authorize.
Atty. Pineda is found guilty of indirect contempt of court for which he is sentenced to
imprisonment and directed to show cause why he should not be disbarred.