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151 SCRA 462

GANCAYCO; June 30, 1987
Petition to review the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena
City (petitioner prays that respondent judge be perpetually enjoined
from enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trail of
petitioner, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and
declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil.)
- Assistant Fiscal Proceso de Gala filed an information for estafa
against Mario Crespo in Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When
the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion to defer
arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for
review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. The
presiding judge (leodegario Mogul) denied the motion through his
- The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for a preliminary writ of injunction. In an order (Aug 17 1977), the CA
restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the
accused until further orders from the Court
- On May 15 1978, a decision was made by the CA granting the writ
and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to
compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Dept of
Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.
- On March 22, 1978, The Undersecretary of Justice Hon Catalino
Macaraig Jr, resolving the petition for review, reversed the resolution
of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move
for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused.
The Provincial Fiscal filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
evidence on April 10, 1978. On November 24 1978, The Judge
denied the motion and set the arraignment
- The accused filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of

prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA. On January

23 1979, a restraining order was issued by the CA against the
threatened act of arraignment of the accused. However, in a decision
of October 25 1979, the CA dismissed the petition and lifted the
restraining order of Jan 23,1979. The motion for reconsideration of
the accused was denied in a resolution.
WON the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case
filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to
grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits
Once an information is filed in court, the courts prior
permission must be secured if fiscal wants to reinvestigate the case.
While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or
not, once the case had already been brought to Court, whatever
disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter
should be addressed for the consideration of the Court.
DISPOSITION Petition dismissed
CARPIO-MORALES; February 12, 2007
- Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of BP 22, otherwise
known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing PNB Check No.
0077133 postdated August 28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000
which was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient
funds. He pleaded not guilty.
- After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for
Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached his
Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he

received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the

element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.
- (2/27/03) The MeTC of Makati, Branch 65 granted the demurrer
and dismissed the case.
The prosecutions motion for
reconsideration was denied.
- Park appealed the civil aspect of the case to the RTC of Makati,
contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include
its civil aspect. The RTC held that while the evidence presented was
insufficient to prove Chois criminal liability, it did not altogether
extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly granted Parks appeal and
ordered Choi to pay him P1,875,000 with legal interest.
- Upon Chois motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set
aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC
for further proceedings, so that Choi may adduce evidence on the
civil aspect of the case. Parks motion for reconsideration of the
remand of the case having been denied, he elevated the case to the
CA which dismissed his petition.
1. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition for not fully
complying with verification requirements
2. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that it
was not accompanied by copies of certain pleadings and other
material portions of the record as would support the allegations of
the petition
3. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition for failure to implead
the People of the Philippines as a party
4. WON the respondent has a right to present evidence on the civil
aspect of the case in view of his demurrer
1. NO
Ratio Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality.
Its import must never be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience
or sheer caprice. For what is at stake is the matter of verity attested
by the sanctity of an oath to secure an assurance that the allegations

in the pleading have been made in good faith, or are true and correct
and not merely speculative.
- Section 4 of Rule 7 of the RoC:
Verification Except when otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
- A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification
based on information and belief, or upon knowledge, information
and belief, or lacks a proper verification shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.
- Park argues that the word or is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence, hence, he chose to affirm in his
petition he filed before the court a quo that its contents are true and
correct of my own personal knowledge, and not on the basis of
authentic documents. On the other hand, Choi counters that the word
or may be interpreted in a conjunctive sense and construed to
mean as and, or vice versa, when the context of the law so
- A pleading may be verified under either of the two given modes or
under both. The veracity of the allegations in a pleading may be
affirmed based on either ones own personal knowledge or on
authentic records, or both, as warranted. The use of the preposition
or connotes that either source qualifies as a sufficient basis for
verification and, needless to state, the concurrence of both sources
is more than sufficient. Bearing both a disjunctive and conjunctive
sense, this parallel legal signification avoids a construction that will
exclude the combination of the alternatives or bar the efficacy of any
one of the alternatives standing alone.
- However, the range of permutations is not left to the pleaders
liking, but is dependent on the surrounding nature of the allegations
which may warrant that a verification be based either purely on
personal knowledge, or entirely on authentic records, or on both
sources. Authentic records as a basis for verification bear

significance in petitions where the greater portions of the allegations

are based on the records of the proceedings in the court of origin,
and not solely on the personal knowledge of the petitioner.
- To sustain petitioners explanation that the basis of verification is a
matter of simple preference would trivialize the rationale and diminish
the resoluteness of the rule. It would play on predilection and pay no
heed in providing enough assurance of the correctness of the
2. NO
Ratio Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to
abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances,
allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was
never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the
rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application
of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes
and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice.
- The materiality of those documents is very apparent since the civil
aspect of the case, from which Park is appealing, was likewise
dismissed by the trial court on account of the same Demurrer. The
Rules require that the petition must be accompanied by clearly
legible duplicate original or true copies of the judgments or final
orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court [Sec
2(d) Rule 42].
- The only duplicate original or certified true copies attached as
annexes to the petition are the RTC Order granting respondents
MFR and the RTC Order denying petitioners MFR. The copy of the
September 11, 2003 RTC Decision, which petitioner prayed to be
reinstated, is not a certified true copy and is not even legible.
Petitioner later recompensed though by appending to his MFR a
duplicate original copy.
- While petitioner averred before the CA in his MFR that the February
27, 2003 MeTC Order was already attached to his petition as Annex

G, Annex G bares a replicate copy of a different order. It was to

this Court that petitioner belatedly submitted an uncertified true copy
of the said MeTC Order as an annex to his Reply to respondents
Comment. The copy of the other MeTC Order, dated May 5, 2003,
which petitioner attached to his petition before the CA is similarly
uncertified as true. Since both Orders were adverse to him even with
respect to the civil aspect of the case, petitioner was mandated to
submit them in the required form.
3. YES
- The MeTC acquitted respondent. As a rule, a judgment of acquittal
is immediately final and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal
the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy. Either the offended party or the accused may, however
appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the
accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in
appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. The
acquittal ends his work. The case is terminated as far as he is
concerned. The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a
decision are the offended party and the accused.
4. YES
- In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the
accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the
demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of
the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between
the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other words,
a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at
the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the
evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime
beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not
insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of
- On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as
proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same
evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For
if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of

the case generally proceed. The only recognized instance when an

acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is
when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to
the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue.
- In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed
the case without any finding that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist. Choi did not assail the RTC order
of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand.
- Park posits that Choi waived his right to present evidence on the
civil aspect of the case (1) when the grant of the demurrer was
reversed on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33, and (2) when
respondent orally opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration
pleading that proceedings with respect to the civil aspect of the case
- Petitioners citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect. Where a
court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of
the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial
jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues
that the law requires it to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal
case being the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, the
governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of
Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the
initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.
- As for petitioners attribution of waiver to respondent, it cannot be
determined with certainty from the records the nature of Chois
alleged oral objections to Parks motion for reconsideration of the
grant of the demurrer to evidence. Any waiver of the right to present
evidence must be positively demonstrated. Any ambiguity in the
voluntariness of the waiver is frowned upon; hence, courts must
indulge every reasonable presumption against it.
Dispositive Petition is DENIED.

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, INC., petitioner

v People of the Philippines, respondent

Ponente: Panganiban
This is a petition for review under rule 45 of the rules of court
assailing resolutions of CA. Petitioner's appeal from the judgment of
the RTC of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was
On July 1994 accused Macadangdang was found guilty and
convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple
homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty. The court ruled that rabbit bus lines
shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused in the event of the
accused insolvency. Evidently, the judgment against the accused had
become final and executory.
Then the accused jumped bail, worth mentioning that rule 8, rule 124
of the rules of court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when
appellant jumps bail. The counsel for accused hired by rabbit bus
lines filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court.
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the
institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Making the
subsidiary civil liability of the bus line becomes conclusive and
Issues: (1) Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in
the defense of its accused-employee may appeal the judgment of
conviction independently of the accused?
Ruling: Petition has no merit.
Appeal in Criminal Cases: Section 1 of rule 122 of the 2000 revised
rules of criminal procedures states "any party may appeal from a
judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double

Appeal by the accused who jumps bail:

Section 8 of rule 124 provides: "the court appeals may also, upon
motion of the appellee dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes
from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
during pendency of the appeal" The accused cannot be accroded
right to apeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the
court or are otherwise arrested within 15days from notice of the
judgment against them. They cannot seek relief from the court, as
they are deemed to have waived the appeal.
Finality of a decision in a criminal case:
Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which we quote:
"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be
modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal,
or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served,
or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has
applied for probation."
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and
refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to
have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him
has become final and executory.
Civil Actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. but
rabbit bus line is not a direct party to the criminal case. While they
may assist their employees, the employer cannot act independently
on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Waiver of constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy:
an appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver and
throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate court.
Effect of absconding on the appeal process: the accused impliedly
withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and he is deemed to have his
right to appeal waived, Thus conviction is now final and executory.

Subsidiary Liability upon finality of judgment: employers liability in a

finding of guilt against its employee is subsidiary.
No deprivation of due process: employer became subsidiary liable
only upon proof of the employee's insolvency and the right to appeal
was lost due to the bail of the accused employee not the court.
Petition denied.
Bun Tiong vs. Balboa, G.R. No. 158177, January 28, 2008
Case Doctrine:
A separate proceeding for the recovery of civil liability in cases of
violations of B.P. No. 22 is allowed when the civil case is filed ahead
of the criminal case.
Facts: Vicente Balboa filed two (2) cases against Sps. Benito Lo Bun
Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng:
(1) A CIVIL CASE for sum of money based on the three (3) postdated checks issued by Caroline in the total amount
of P5,175,250.00. The Regional Trial Court found the spouses liable
and ordered them to pay the amount.
(2) A CRIMINAL CASE for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 against Caroline covering the said three checks. The Municipal
Trial Court acquitted Caroline but held her civilly liable. On appeal,
the RTC modified the MTC Decision by deleting the award of civil
The spouses now comes to court charging Balboa with forumshopping.

Whether or not the Balboa's act of filing civil and criminal cases
constitute forum-shopping.

corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action

separately shall be allowed.


The foregoing, however, is not applicable as the civil and criminal

case were filed on February 24, 1997 and on July 21, 1997,
respectively, prior to the adoption of Supreme Court Circular No. 5797 on September 16, 1997. At the time of filing of the cases, the
governing rule is Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court, to

Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or

proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the supposition that
one or the other court would render a favorable disposition. It is
usually resorted to by a party against whom an adverse judgment or
order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek and
possibly to get a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by an
appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1)
identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the
same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and
relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of facts;
and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata in
the action under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.
In Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix
Corp., the Court ruled that there is identity of parties and causes of
action between a civil case for the recovery of sum of money as a
result of the issuance of bouncing checks, and a criminal case for the
prosecution of a B.P. No. 22 violation. Thus, it ordered the dismissal
of the civil action so as to prevent double payment of the claim.
In the said case, the Court applied Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97
effective September 16, 1997, which provides that "the criminal
action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation
to file such action separately shall be allowed or recognized."
This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit: (b) The criminal action for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the

SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal

action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Since Balboa instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action,
then the civil case may proceed independently of the criminal cases
and there is no forum shopping to speak of. Even under the
amended rules, a separate proceeding for the recovery of civil
liability in cases of violations of B.P. No. 22 is allowed when the civil
case is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules
encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. (Bun
Tiong vs. Balboa, G.R. No. 158177, January 28, 2008)
INC., petitioners,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
[G.R. No. 190696. August 3, 2010]
Petitioner Calang was driving a bus owned by Philtranco when its
rear left side hit the front left portion of a Sarao jeep coming from the
opposite direction. As a result of the collision, the jeeps driver, lost

control of the vehicle, and bumped and killed a bystander who was
standing along the highways shoulder. The jeep turned turtle three
(3) times before finally stopping at about 25 meters from the point of
impact. Two of the jeeps passengers were instantly killed, while the
other passengers sustained serious physical injuries. The
prosecution charged Calang with multiple homicide, multiple serious
physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence
before the RTC. RTC found Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of reckless imprudence resulting [in] multiple homicide, multiple
physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the decision of RTC.
Remedial Law

AAA vs. Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007

Facts: In a rape case, private complainant failed to
appear 4 consecutive orders to take the witness stand
in order to satisfy the judge for the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 for
lack of probable cause on the ground that the
complainant and her witnesses failed to take the
witness stand. He claims that under Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce.
Issue: Is Judge Carbonell correct?


Whether or not factual issues may be raised on petition for

review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of

Remedial Law
(1) No. The finding of negligence on his part by the trial court,
affirmed by the CA, is a question of fact that [the Court]
cannot pass upon without going into factual matters
touching on the finding of negligence. In petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of
fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of
support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts.

(2) No. Judge Carbonell committed grave abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court explained that this constitutional
provision does not mandatorily require the judge to
personally examine the complainant and her witnesses.
Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he
may disregard the prosecutors report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses.
(4) We reiterated the above ruling in the case of Webb v. De
Leon, where we held that before issuing warrants of arrest,
judges merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of
guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de
novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause.
They just personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported

by substantial evidence.
(5) It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the
preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender
should be held for trial or be released. The determination of
probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest
is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper
whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged is the function of
the investigating prosecutor.
(7) True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for
the judges personal examination of the complainant and his
witnesses. But it must be emphasized that such personal
examination is not mandatory and indispensable in the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an
utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of
probable cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report
of the investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise
evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.
(9) Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on
the part of the judge is that he should not rely solely on the
report of the investigating prosecutor. In Okabe v. Gutierrez,
we stressed that the judge should consider not only the
report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit
and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counteraffidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary
investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the
investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. If
the report, taken together with the supporting evidence, is
sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause, it is not
compulsory that a personal examination of the complainant

and his witnesses be conducted. (AAA vs. Carbonell, G.R.

No. 171465, June 8, 2007)
G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010
Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) was, by Information, charged
with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12,
2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Petitioner
was placed under police custody while confined at the Makati
Medical Center. After petitioner posted a bond which the trial court
approved, he was released from detention, and his arraignment was
set. The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the
conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion
praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the
public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct
a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.
Whether or not in cases when an accused is arrested without a
warrant, the remedy of preliminary investigation belongs only to the
No. The Court holds that the private complainant can move for
reinvestigation. All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the

public prosecutor The private complainant in a criminal case is

merely a witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by himself,
ask for the reinvestigation of the case after the information had been
filed in court, the proper party for that being the public prosecutor
who has the control of the prosecution of the case.
Thus, in cases where the private complainant is allowed to intervene
by counsel in the criminal action, and is granted the authority to
prosecute, the private complainant, by counsel and with the
conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion for
reinvestigation. In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the
case may be conducted by the public prosecutor, the permission or
consent of the court must be secured. If after such re-investigation
the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw the information or
otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course of

action may be taken but shall likewise be addressed to the sound

discretion of the court.
Once the trial court grants the prosecutions motion for reinvestigation, the
former is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the
prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought the case back
to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with
wide and far reaching regarding the disposition thereof, subject to the
trial courts approval of the resulting
proposed course of action.