Legal Research

Case Synthesis
Judicial Decisions on Psychological Incapacity
Crazy in Love
Nicole R. Saracho

Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines established a new ground to

assail the validity of a marriage namely psychological incapacity. This provision
of the Family Code states that a marriage may be declared void ab initio when
either of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage 1. The
novelty and apparent vagueness of the provision presented difficulties to the trial
courts and lawyers in interpreting and applying this rule. It has been abused and
misused by couples who wanted to have their marriage annulled. The term
psychological incapacity has been subjected to varied interpretations and since
its effectivity, it failed to provide a clear and unambiguous definition. Interpreted
wrongly, Article 36 may be abused as a kind of divorce, in conflict with the State
policy in the Constitution to strengthen the family and marriage as an inviolable
social institution and should actively promote its total development2.
The Family Code did not provide a specific definition of the term
psychological incapacity. In the case of Leouel Santos vs Court of Appeals3 , the
Supreme Court in deciding the issue at bar gave guidelines and definitions to
contextualize the correct interpretation of Article 36. In the said case, the
Supreme Court looked into the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee it for it might give light as to how the drafters of this Code define the
said term. In the deliberations the members of the Family Code Revision
Committee conceded that the term psychological incapacity defies any precise
definition since psychological causes can be of infinite variety. The book presented
in the said deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee entitled Canons
1 Article 36 of the Family Code provides that marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization
2 Article XV, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that
3 G.R. NO. 112019; 4 January 1995

and Commentaries on Marriage explained what psychological incapacity is. It

explained that:
Psychological incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and
other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is
here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real
inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he
cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the
essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love,
the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of
assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously
does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological
disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II,
Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared
invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted
by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the
moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage
and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.4
In line with what the book provided and the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee it was held that psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive if he basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe mutual
love and respect and render help and support. In addition the law intended to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. The psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.5
4 Gramunt, I., Hervada, J., Wauck, L., 1987. Canons and Commentaries on Marriage.
Liturgical Pr.
5 G.R. NO. 112019; 4 January 1995

Moreover, the case of Leouel Santos v Court of Appeals 6, The Supreme Court
adopted Justice Alicia Sempio-Diys opinion that psychological incapacity as
reiterated in Article 36 of the Family Code shall be characterized by:
(a) Gravity: The incapacity must be grave or serious enough that the party
would be incapabale of carrying out ordinary marital duties and obligations
(b) Juridical antecedence: It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage.
(c) Incurabilty: It must be incurable or even if it is otherwise curable, it
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Similarly, in the case of Republic of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals and
Roridel Molina7 the Supreme Court in consultation with the members of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines
and the Family Code Revision Committee, adopted additional guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. The additional
guidelines are as follows:8
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. The Constitution cherishes and protects the validity of
marriage and the family so any doubt in the proof presented by the
petitioner shall be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
family and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) Medically or clinically identified: The incapacity must be
psychological- not psychical although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical.
(b) Alleged in the complaint,
(c) Sufficiently proven by experts: The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Qualified psychiatrist and
psychologist may give this.
6 Ibid.
7 G.R. NO. 108764; 15 February 1997
8 Ibid at 3

(d) Clearly explained in the decision: The incapacitating

nature and the root cause of the psychological illness may be
explained so as not to limit the application of the provision of
Article 36.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to exist at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
existed when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant in the performance of the essential marital obligations.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. There must be a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential
to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
With the guidelines enumerated in the case of Leouel Santos v Court of
Appeals and Republic of the Philippines v Court of Appeals and Roridel Molina, the
courts may now effectively and correctly apply the provision of Article 36 in

rendering or granting the petition to declare the marriage null and void. The duty
of the State to protect the sanctity of marriage and the family will now effectively
done.
The case of Leonilio Antonio vs Court of Appeals9 and Aurelio v Aurelio10
illustrates on how this guidelines may be effectively used. In the case at bar, the
Supreme Court granted the petition to declare the marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code. In this case, the petitioner satisfied the guidelines
provided for in the case of Molina. First, the petitioner sufficiently proven that the
respondent

was

psychologically

incapacitated.

Second,

the

cause

of

the

respondents psychological incapacity was mentally or clinically identified. Third,

there were evidences that showed that the psychological incapacity of the
respondent

existed

before

the

celebration

of

the

marriage.

Fourth,

the

psychological incapacity of the respondent was found out to be grave. Fifth,

respondents persistent lying made her unable to build love, trust and respect with
her partner. Sixth, the petitioner had obtained an annulment in the Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Church. Seventh, the psychological incapacity was found out to be
incurable for when the petitioner tried to reconcile with the respondent, the
latters behavior remains unchanged. In this case, the guidelines provided by the
Supreme Court were fully satisfied.
Meanwhile on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v Court of Appeals11, the issue on
whether or not the refusal of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife
constitutes psychological incapacity under Article 36. The court ruled that said
refusal constitutes psychological incapacity because under the Family Code one of
the essential marital obligations of couples to procreate based on sexual
cooperation which is the basic end of marriage.
On the other hand, the Court stress that Article 36 of the Family Code
should not be confused and equated with the grounds for legal separation under
Article 55 of the Family Code. The grounds for legal separation is not rooted in
psychological incapacity but on psychical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,

9 G.R. NO. 155800; 10 March 2006

10 G.R. No, 175367, 16 June 2011
11 266 SCRA 324, 16 January 1997

homosexuality, lesbiaism and the like12. In the case of Dedel v Court of Appeals13, it
was held that sexual infidelity does not constitute psychological incapacity. In
Hernandez v Court of Appeals14 and Republic of the Phiippines v Dagdag15, it was
held that habitual alcoholism, gambling, physical violence, affliction of Sexually
Transmitted Disease and being a fugitive from justice also does not constitute
psychological incapacity. In, Republic of the Philippines v Harmano16and Republic
v Encelan17 it was held that abandonment and failure to provide for the family does
not constitute psychological incapacity. In the foregoing cases, the petition to
declare the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code was not
granted. In the following cases, they failed to satisfy the guidelines provided in the
case of Molina. Also, these acts are not manifestations of a disordered personality
which makes the guilty party completely unable to discharge the essential marital
obligations. The psychological incapacity must be the root cause as to why the
party is unable to perform his or her obligations to her partner or family.
In addition, in the case of Zamora v Court of Appeals18, the court ruled
that refusal of a person to bear a child does not constitute psychological
incapacity. In the case of Ferraris v Ferraris19, it was held that epilepsy and mixed
personality disorder does not constitute psychological incapacity. Also, in the case
of Republic of the Philippines v Tanyag-San Jose 20, the Court ruled that Anti-Social
Personality Disorder does not constitute psychological incapacity. In the foregoing
cases, the Court denied the petition to declare the marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code stating the case of Molina, wherein it was laid down
that mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does
not constitute psychological incapacity. It is not enough that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as a married persons; it is essential to be
shown that they were incapable of doing so because of such incapacity.
12 G.R. NO. 112019; 4 January 1995
13G.R. NO. 151867; 29 January 2004
14G.R. NO. 126010; 8 December 1999
15 G.R. N.O. 109975 9 February 2011
16 G.R. N.O. 109975 9 February 2011
17 G.R. NO. 170022, 9 January 2013
18 G.R. N.O. 109975 9 February 2011
19 G.R. N.O. 162368; 17 July 2006
20 G.R. N.O. 1683268; 28 February 2007

In the procedural aspect of Article 36 of the Family Code, the Court ruled
in the case of Marcos v Marcos21 that the petitioner may opt not to present
medical or psychiatric evaluation of the person incapacitated if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Applied in the cases of Toring v Toring22, Mendoza v Republic23 and Ochosa v
Alano24 wherein the evidence presented were just mere narrations from the party
and the results of the psychological test was based only from the statement of the
husband, the Supreme Court ruled in these mentioned cases that such evidences
were not enough basis to annul the marriage due to psychological incapacity. In
the following case of Toring, Alano and Mendoza the testimony of the psychiatrist
did not meet the standard of evidence required to establish psychological
incapacity. Also in the case of Dimayuga-Laurena v Court of Appeals25 wherein the
petitioner presented evidence based on a two-hour session with a petitioner, the
Supreme Court ruled that it is not enough evidence to show that the respondent
has psychological incapacity. The appellate court characterized the testimony as
vague and ambiguous. Even the Social Case Study Report conducted on the party
failed to show that the respondent is suffering from psychological incapacity. Also
in the case of Agraviador v Agraviador26 Baccay v Baccay

27

the totality of the

evidence presented by the petitioner is not enough to grant the declaration of

nullity of marriage under Article 36. The petitioner failed to establish that the
psychological defect of the respondent is grave, serious and incurable. In the
cases provided, while the petitioners established and presented as evidence the
opinion of psychological experts, the Court consistently ruled that the evidence as
a whole must be strong and convincing as to establish the psychological incapacity
of the parties.
In addition to the procedural aspect of Article 36 of the Family Code, the
case of Bolos v Bolos28, the Supreme Court clarified that the phrase under the
21 G.R. N.O. 136490; 19 October 2000
22 G.R. No. 165321, 16 December 2011
23 G.R. NO. 157649, 12 November 2012
24 G.R. NO. 181881, 26 January 2011
25 G.R. N.O., 159220, 22 September 2008
26 G.R. NO. 170729, 8 December 2010
27 G.R. NO. 173138, 1 December 2010
28 G.R. NO. 186499, 10 October 2010

Family Code in Section 1 of Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10 29 refers to

marriages under the Family Code and not to petitions following the rule of verbal
legis. This provision gives a differentiation between marriages before and after the
effectivity of the Family Code. And since the parties in this case were married
before the effectivity of the Family Code, the said provision will not apply to them.
In Camcacho-Reyes v Camacho30 shows that the absence of personal
examination and interview of the respondent by experts does not automatically
terminate the diagnosis of the respondent. Also it does not invalidate said findings
as hearsay and inconclusive. In this case the petitioner presented three medical
experts whose findings are the same and conclusively established that the
respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity that hinders him from
exercising the essential marital obligations. In addition, the Supreme Court ruled
in this case that a recommendation of one of the experts that the respondents
incapacity may be curable because a therapy was recommended to him does not
invalidate the petition for absolute nullity of marriage due to psychological
incapacity.
However on the recent cases of psychological incapacity like in Te v Te31,
Kalaw v Ferndandez32 and Ting V Ting33 the Court noticed that the trial courts are
relying heavily on the Molina guidelines on deciding cases regarding psychological
incapacity and that it disregards Article 36s clear intention that each case is to be
treated differently. The court stated that Molina has become a strait jacket,
forcing all sizes to fit into and bound by it. The Court further explained that there
are ample safeguards against the possible abuse of Article 36. Among which is the
intervention of the state through the public prosecutor so as to prevent collusion
between the parties and fabrication of evidences. In addition it was held that
Article 36s intention is that each case is to be treated differently and that this
provision is to be interpreted on case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines. Hence in the
29 Section 1 of Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10 states that This Rule shall govern
petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
30 G.R. NO. 185286, 18 August 2010
31 G.R. NO. 161793, 13 February 2009
32 G.R.NO. 166357, 14 January 215
33 G.R. NO. 166562, 31 March 2009

following cases, the Court relaxed the stringent Molina requirements and it gave
flexible approach in deciding cases of psychological incapacity. The Court stressed
on the fact that court should approach the issue of nullity of marriage not on the
basis of a priori assumptions but according to its own facts.

The

cases

presented in this synthesis demonstrated that the Courts is strict and judicious in
rendering or granting the petitions to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The Supreme Court enumerated several guidelines in the case of
Santos v CA34 and Republic v Molina35 so as to contextualize the correct
interpretation of the provision of Article 36 and it will not be abused as a kind of
divorce. The Supreme Court in the presented cases in the synthesis emphasized
that the incapacity must be purely psychological (not physical), grave and serious
enough as to render the party incognitive of the basic marital obligations and
duties. The psychological incapacity must be medically proven and identified. The
petitioner cannot present evidence based on hearsay. The totality of the evidence
presented, as a whole must strong and convincing to show that the party is really
suffering from psychological incapacity. While it is true that the trial courts must
be strict in granting the petition for nullity of marriage, it must be taken into
consideration that each case raised in the Supreme Court must be treated
differently and the trial courts shall not be limited with the guidelines presented in
the case of Santos and Molina. The trial courts shall render a decision based on
the facts of the cases guided by precedent cases and findings of psychological
experts. The Courts in granting petitions to nullify marriages must be guided by
the fact that it is always their duty as embodied in our Constitution to protect the
marriage as inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family 36. It is
their mission to strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.

37

34 Ibid at 3
35 Ibid at 7
36 Article XV, Section 2 of the Constitution
37 Article XV, Section 1 of the Constitution