1

ANDHRA PRADESH ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

AT HYDERABAD
MONDAY THE 23RD DAY OF APRIL TWO THOUSAND
AND TWELVE

HONBLE SRI. JUSTICE DR.G.YETHIRAJULU,

CHAIRMAN
HONBLE SRI. SUDHENDER KULKARNI, MEMBER
(JUDL.)
AND
HONBLE SRI. DEEPAK KUMAR PANWAR,
MEMBER (ADMN.)
O.A.NO.3784/2007 AND BATCH

Between :
B. Mangaiah and Others
Vs.
The Government of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep., by its Principal Secretary,
Home Department,
Secretariat, Hyderabad.
And Others

----o----

(ORDER

AS PER HONBLE SRI SUDHENDER KULKARNI,

JUDICIAL MEMBER ON BEHALF OF THE FULL BENCH)
---o--The applicants in these OAs have assailed the legality

and propriety of the orders passed in pursuance to

GO.Ms.No.610, dt.30.12.85, by invoking the provisions of
para-5(2)(c) of the Presidential Order. As a large number of
applications have been filed, the matter is placed before the
Full Bench, as per rules.

That is how, the matters were

heard and are being disposed of by the Full Bench.

2.

These OAs are filed aggrieved by the orders passed by

the Government contained in GO.Ms.No.610 dt.30.12.1985

and GO.Ms.No.674 dt.7.9.2007. In furtherance of the said
GOs, various departments of the State have issued orders
repatriating non-locals to their respective cadres (zones).
The applicants are functioning in various capacities under
the jurisdiction and control of various departments of the
State in as much as 20,000 employees were transferred in
furtherance

of

Go.Ms.No.610

dt.30.12.1985

and

Go.Ms.No.674 dt.7.9.2007. The applicants have filed these

OAs contesting the repatriation orders.

3.

The

genesis

for

issuing

G.O.Ms.No.610

GAD

dt.30.12.1985 is the representation of Telangana NonGazetted Officers Union, wherein it was represented that
certain allotments have been made in violation of the
provisions of the Presidential Order.
violations,

Government

dt.7.9.2007.

issued

In order to rectify the

Go.Ms.No.674

GAD

Thereafter, respective departments have

issued various GOs repatriating the persons who were

appointed in excess of their quota.
4.

It would be appropriate to trace out the history behind

issuance of these impugned orders and the history has been

succinctly traced out by the Division Bench of the Honble
High Court in the matter of
PRADESH,

REP.

BY

GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA

SECRETARY,

SCHOOL

EDUCATION

DEPARTMENT vs. P.VEMA REDDY reported in 2007 (4) ALD

209, which reads as follows:
....in brief, prefatory observations on the scope
and purport of Article 371-D and the Presidential
Order made thereunder.
ARTICLE 371-D CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH
NECESSITATED ITS INTRODUCTION:
(7) State action be it by legislation, plenary or
subordinate, or by an executive order, which denies
citizens equal opportunity and access to public
employment on the ground only of place of birth or

residence, would be invalid qua the provisions of

Article 16(2) of the Constitution of India.

Article

16(3) of the Constitution, which makes an exception

to the limitations under Article 16(2), is confined to
enabling Parliament to prescribe the qualification of
residence in the State as a whole, and not to any
part thereof. No legislation is permissible even by
Parliament making the requirement of residence in
a part of the State for employment or appointment
to a public office in that State. (A.V.S. Narasimha
Rao Vs. State of A.P. [AIR 1970 SC 422], Ch. Raji
Reddy Vs. A.P.S.R.T.C. rep. by its Regional
Manager, Bhagyanagar Region [2003 (4) ALT 36].
(8) It is with a view to enable prescription of
residence in a part of the State for employment or
appointment to posts, and in matters of admissions
in Universities or other educational institutions,
that the Constitution, under Article 371-D, has
made special provisions with respect to the State of
Andhra Pradesh. It is necessary, in this context, to
refer in brief to the events which led to the
introduction

of

Article

371-D

by

the

32 nd

amendment to the Constitution.

(9) The former State of Hyderabad comprised of
three linguistic areas: Telengana, Marathwada and
Karnatak. In 1919, the Nizam issued a Firman
promulgating the Mulki Rules. The Nizam confirmed
these Rules by another Firman issued in 1949.

Those Rules provided, inter alia, 15 years residence

in the State as an essential qualification for public
employment.

In 1955 the Rajpramukh, in exercise

of his powers under the proviso to Article 309 of the

Constitution,

framed

the

Hyderabad

General

Recruitment Rules, 1955 in supersession of all

previous

rules

on

the

subject.

These

rules

prescribed a domicile certificate for appointment to

a state or subordinate service, and the issue of
such certificate depended upon residence in the
State for a period of not less than 15 years.
(10)

On

November

1,

1956,

on

the

States

Reorganisation Act coming into force, the State of

Hyderabad was trifurcated. The Telengana region
became a part of the newly formed State of Andhra
Pradesh, while Marathwada and Karnatak regions
ultimately

became

parts

of

Maharashtra

and

Mysore (presently Karnataka) States. The State of

Andhra Pradesh was constituted of portions of the
territories drawn from the erstwhile States of
Andhra and Hyderabad.
(11) Soon after formation of the State of Andhra
Pradesh,

Parliament

enacted

the

Public

Employment (Requirement as to Residence) Act,

1957 making special provision for requirement as to
residence for public employment and brought it into
force with effect from March 21, 1957. The
constitutional validity of this Act was challenged by
persons employed in the ministerial services of the

Govt. of Andhra Pradesh in A.V.S. Narasimha

Rao2and the Supreme Court held Section 3 of the
Act, insofar as it related to the Telangana area, ultra
vires Article 16 of the Constitution.
(12)

Meanwhile,

there

were

two

widespread

agitations, one in the Telangana area and the other

in the Andhra region of the State between 1969 and
1972,

creating

paralysing

political

State

turmoil

and

virtually

administration.

The

political

leaders of the State, considerably exercised over

this situation, made concerted efforts to find an
enduring solution to this problem. On September
21, 1973 a Six-Point Formula was evolved by the
political leaders to provide for a uniform approach
for

promoting

accelerated

development

of

the

backward areas of the State so as to secure

balanced development of the State as a whole and
to provide equitable opportunities to different areas
of

the

State

in

matters

of

education

and

employment in public services. Point No.3, 4 and 5

thereof read as under:-

(3). Subject to the requirements of the State as a whole, local

candidates should be given preference to specified extent in
the matter of direct recruitment to (i) non-gazeted posts (other
than in the Secretariat. Offices of Heads of Department, other
State level officers and institutions and the Hyderabad City
Police) (ii) corresponding posts under the local bodies and (iii)
the posts of Tahsildars, Junior Engineers and Civil Assistant
Surgeons. In order to improve their promotion prospects,
service cadres should be organized to the extent possible on
appropriate local basis upto specified gazetted level, first or
second, as may be administratively convenient.
(4). A high power administrative tribunal should be
constituted to deal with the grievances of services regarding
appointments, seniority, promotion and other allied matters.
The decisions of the Tribunal should ordinarily be binding on

the State Government. The constitution of such a tribunal

would justify limits on recourse to judiciary in such matters.
(5). In order that implementation of measures based on the
above principles does not give rise to litigation and consequent
uncertainity, the Constitution should be suitably amended to
the extent necessary conferring on the President enabling
powers in this behalf.

(13) Implementation of this Six-Point Formula

envisaged,

inter

alia,

amendment

of

the

Constitution conferring power on the President of

India in order to secure smooth implementation of
the measures based upon the Six-Point Formula
without giving rise to litigation and consequent
uncertainty.

It

was

in

pursuance

of

this

requirement of giving effect to the six point formula

that

Article

371-D

was

introduced

in

the

Constitution by the Constitution (Thirty-second

Amendment) Act, 1973 which came into force with
effect from July 1, 1974.
(14) The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the
Constitution (32nd Amendment) Act, 1972, reads
thus:When the State of Andhra Pradesh was formed in 1956,
certain safeguards were envisaged for the Telengana area in
the matter of development and also in the matter of
employment opportunities and educational facilities for the
residents of that area. The provisions of clause (1) of Article
371 of the Constitution were intended to give effect to certain
features of these safeguards. The Public Employment
(Requirement as to Residence) Act, 1957, was enacted inter
alia to provide for employment opportunities for residents of
Telengana area. But in 1969 [in the case of A.V. S.N. Rao v.
Andhra Pradesh, (1969) 1 SCC 839: (1970) 1 SCR 115], the
Supreme Court held the relevant provision of the Act to be
unconstitutional insofar as it related to the safeguards
envisaged for the Telengana area. Owing to a variety of causes,
the working of the safeguards gave rise to a certain amount of
dissatisfaction sometimes in the Telengana area and
sometimes in the other areas of the State. Measures were
devised from time to time to resolve the problems. Recently

several leaders of Andhra Pradesh made a concerted effort to

analyse the factors which have been giving rise to the
dissatisfaction and find enduring answers to the problems
with a view to achieving fuller emotional integration of the
people of Andhra Pradesh. On September 21, 1973, they
suggested certain measures (generally known as the Six-Point
Formula) indicating a uniform approach for promoting
accelerated development of the backward areas of State so as
to secure the balanced development of State as a whole and for
providing equitable opportunities to different areas of State in
the matter of education, employment and career prospects in
public services. This formula has received wide support in
Andhra Pradesh and has been endorsed by the State
Government.
2. This Bill has been brought forward to provide the necessary
constitutional authority for giving effect to the Six-Point
Formula insofar as it relates to the provision of equitable
opportunities for people of different areas of the State in the
matter of admission to educational institutions and public
employment and constitution of an Administrative Tribunal
with jurisdiction to deal with certain disputes and grievances
relating to public services, The Bill also seeks to empower
Parliament to legislate for establishing a Central University in
the State and contains provisions of an incidental and
consequential nature including the provision for the validation
of certain appointments made in the past. As the Six-Point
Formula provides for the discontinuance of the Regional
Committee constituted under clause (1) of Article 371 of the
Constitution, the Bill also provides for the repeal of that
clause.

ARTICLE 371-D: ITS SCOPE:

(15) The primary purpose of introducing Article
371-D was twofold: (i) To promote accelerated
development of the backward areas of the State of
Andhra

Pradesh

so

as

to

secure

balanced

development of the State as a whole, and (ii) to

provide equitable opportunities to different areas of
the State in the matter of education, employment
and career prospects in public service. To achieve
this primary object, clause (1) of Article 371-D
empowers the President to provide, by order, for
equitable opportunities and facilities for the people

belonging to different parts of the State in the

matter of public employment and in the matter of
education. Clause (2) is complementary to clause
(1) and particularizes matters for which an order,
made under clause (1), may provide. Sub-clause (c)
(i) thereof enables the President to specify in his
Order, the extent to which, the manner in which
and the conditions subject to which, preference or
reservation shall be given or made in the matter of
direct recruitment to posts in any local cadre under
the State Government or any cadre under any local
authority. Sub-clause (c) further makes it clear that
residence for a specified period in the local area,
can be made a condition for recruitment to any
such cadre. (Chief Justice of A.P. Vs. L.V.A.
Dixitulu [1979 (2) SCC 34]; P. Sambamurthy Vs.
State of A.P. [AIR 1987 SC 663].
(16) Article 371-D is a special provision which
makes a departure from the general scheme of the
Constitution. (Govt. of A.P. Vs. A. Suryanarayana
Rao [1991 (6) SLR 56 (SC)]. The area of departure
cannot,

therefore,

extend

beyond

what

is

unmistakably and specifically delineated by the

words employed therein or in the Presidential Order
made thereunder. Article 371-D, in effect, enables
the

President

to

make

an

order

enabling

prescription of residence in a part of the State for

employment or appointment to a public office in
that State.

Clause (10) of Article 371-D gives

10

overriding effect, both to the provisions of Article

371-D and an order made by the President
thereunder,

over

other

provisions

of

Constitution and any other law in force.

the
Thus,

prescription of residence in a part of the State of

Andhra Pradesh is permissible, notwithstanding the
prohibition under Article 16(2), provided such a
prescription has been made under Article 371-D or
the Presidential Order made thereunder. It is also
necessary to note that the scheme of Article 371-D
was held to be valid, intra vires the amending power
of Parliament and as not to militate against the
(Dr. C.

basic structure of the Constitution.

Surekha Vs. Union of India [AIR 1989 SC 44];

Fazal Gafoor Vs. Union of India [AIR 1989 SC
48]; B. Ramesh Vs. University of Health Sciences
[1990 (2) alt 567]; and Devarakonda Rajesh Babu
Vs. NIMS [1997 (6) ALT 290 (FB)]. The provisions
of Article 371-D and the Presidential Order are
insulated from any attack or challenge based on
any other provision of the Constitution or any other
law for the time being in force. It is also not open to
challenge on the ground of violation of Part III or
any other provision of the Constitution,

(Dr. B.

Sudhakar Vs. Union of India [AIR 1995 AP 86

(FB)],

Dr.

Fazal

Ghafoor

Vs. The

Principal,

Osmania Medical College, Hyderabad [1988 (2)

11

ALT 227], since the Presidential Order has been

given overriding effect.
PRESIDENTIAL ORDER: SCOPE AND EXTENT OF
THE POWER OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT
THEREUNDER:

(17)

In exercise of the powers conferred by clauses

(1) and (2) of Article 371-D of the Constitution the

President made, with respect to the State of Andhra
Pradesh, the A.P. Public Employment (Organization
of

Local

Cadre

and

Regulation

of

Direct

Recruitment) Order, 1975, (hereinafter referred to

as the Presidential Order), which was notified in
G.S.R. 524(E) and came into force on 18.10.1975.
Para 2(d) of the Presidential Order defines a local
authority as not include any local authority which
is

not

subject

Government.

to

the

control

of

the

State

Para 2(e) defines local cadre to

mean any local cadre of posts under the State

Government organized in pursuance of paragraph
3, or constituted otherwise for any part of the State.
Under Para 2(2), the General Clauses Act, 1897
applies for the interpretation of the Presidential
order as it applies for the interpretation of a Central
Act. Para 3 relates to organization of local cadres
and,

under

sub-para

(1)

thereof,

the

State

Government was hitherto required, within a period

of twelve months from the commencement of the
Order, to organize classes of posts in the civil
services and classes of civil posts under the State
into different local cadres for different parts of the

12

State to the extent and in the manner hereinafter

provided.

The period of twelve months prescribed

in Para 3(1) was enhanced to eighteen months vide

G.O.Ms. No. 794 dated 12.11.1976 and twenty
seven

months

27.10.1977.

vide

G.O.Ms.

No.

728

dated

The period of twenty seven months

prescribed in Para 3(1), for organizing different local

cadres for different parts of the State, expired on
17.01.1978 and thereafter the State Government no
longer had the power to organize different local
cadres for different parts of the State. With a view
to enable organization thereafter, of different local
cadres for different parts of the State, a proviso was
inserted to Para 3(1), as notified in G.O.Ms. No. 34
dated 24.01.1981, which enables the President,
notwithstanding

the

expiration

of

the

period

specified in Para 3(1), to make an order, whenever

he considers it expedient to do so, requiring the
State Government to organize any classes of posts
in the civil services of and classes of civil posts
under the State into different local cadres for
different parts of the State.
(18) While Para 3(1) ordained the State Government
to organize classes of posts in the civil services of
the State, and classes of civil posts under the State,
into different local cadres for different parts of the
State, the extent to which, and the manner in
which, such classes of posts were required to be so
organized was, specifically prescribed, to be as

13

provided thereafter in the Presidential Order. Thus,

not all classes of posts in the civil services of the
State, and not all classes of civil posts under the
State, were required to be organized into local
cadres, and it was only to the extent provided for in
the

Presidential

Order

itself

was

the

State

Government required to so organize them into local

cadres. Even under the proviso to Para 3(1), it is
only to the extent the President considers it
expedient that he may make an order requiring the
State Government to organize any classes of posts
in the civil services of the State, and classes of civil
posts under the State, to be organized into different
local cadres for different parts of the State.
(19) The object of organizing different local cadres
for different parts of the State is clear from
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Presidential Order.
Under Para 4(1) persons holding posts, required to
be organized into local cadres,were to be allotted to
such cadres by the State Government in accordance
with the principle and procedure specified in the
Presidential Order. Under Para 5(1) each part of the
State, for which a local cadre has been organized in
respect of any categories of posts, shall be a
separate

unit

for

purposes

of

recruitment,

appointment, seniority, promotion, transfer etc.

Once a local cadre was organized under Para 3(1)
each part of the State, for which such a local cadre
was organized, was required to be treated as a

14

separate unit and it is only from amongst persons

allotted thereto was promotions to be effected and
their seniority determined. In view of Para 5(1), a
local cadre is a distinct and separate unit and, for
matters prescribed therein, persons who do not
belong to the said local cadre or those who belong
to other local cadres cannot form part thereof. It is
for this reason that, both in S. Prakasha Rao Vs.
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [AIR 1990
SC 997] and in M. Kesavulu1, the Supreme Court
and the Division Bench of this Court held that a
local cadre, once organized, cannot be meddled
with.
(20) On an analysis of the provisions of the
Presidential Order, it is clear that, having regard to
historical compulsions which led to the introduction
of Art. 371-D, the Presidential Order provides the
framework for intra-state compartmentalization of
certain posts under the rubric of local cadres,
constituted for parts of the State, and protects the
service conditions of members allotted or recruited
to such local cadres.

Local cadres are thus the

result of historical compulsions engendered by

economic and other differentia operating between
parts of the State of Andhra Pradesh and of the felt
grievances of residents of such parts of the State. It
is well to remember the historical compulsions
which led to the making of the Presidential Order,
which is buttressed by the overriding effect given to

15

the provisions of the Presidential Order not only

against the exercise of majoritarian political and
executive choices of the State, but is also made
operative

against

any

other

provision

of

the

Constitution of India (Article 371-D).

5.

The contentions of learned counsel for the applicants

Sri.M.Surender Rao, Sri R.V. Mallikarjuna Rao, M.Ram Gopal

Rao, Seena Kumar, K.Narayana and P.Veerabhadra Reddys
are:

(a)

GO.Ms.No.610 dt.30.12.85 is contrary to Sub-Para-

4, 5 and 6 of Paragraph-4 of the Presidential Order.

According

to

Paragraph-3,

organized

as

district

the

cadre,

posts

have

been

zonal

cadre

and

accordingly allotment is made under paragraph-4 of

the Presidential Order.

The impugned GO.Ms.No.610

dt.30.12.85 intended to review allotments of persons

holding the posts as on the date of issuance of the
Presidential

Order

i.e.,

18.10.75.

Further,

the

impugned GO is not in operation now since the last

date for revision of appointments is 30.6.86 which is
over 20 years back. Therefore, review of appointments
made after issuance of the Presidential Order is

16

contrary

to

the

provisions

of

Paragraph-4

and

Paragraph-13 of the Presidential Order and the ambit

and scope of the impugned GO cannot be enlarged to
override the provisions of the Presidential order itself.
Further, under Paragraph-13 of the Presidential Order,
the State has a limited power.

The impugned GO

meddles with organized cadres under the Presidential

order which is not permissible and the impugned GO is
violative of the Presidential Order.
(b)

Telangana and other Service Associations have no

locus to complain violation of the Presidential Order.

The Government lacks power and jurisdiction to
entertain

any

Associations.

representation

from

the

Service

Therefore, G.O.Ms.No.610, dt.30.12.85,

has to be set aside.

(c)

The State cannot make inroads into Article 371(d)

of the Constitution of India wherein Sub-Clause-10 of

the Article has an overriding effect.
empowered

to

make

any

President alone is

amendments

to

the

Order,

the

Presidential Order.
(d)

According

to

the

Presidential

appointments within the meaning of local cadres can

17

be categorized as : 1) persons who were appointed

before issuance of the Presidential Order i.e., 18.10.75
2) persons appointed between 18.10.75 and upto
organization of certain posts into local cadres and 3)
persons who are appointed after organization of local
cadres.

Para-4 of the Presidential Order deals with the

persons who were appointed before the issuance of the

Presidential Order and how to allot the existing persons
holding posts required to be organized into local
cadres. Sub-Para-4 of Para-4 of the Presidential Order
says that any person aggrieved by an order allotting
him to any local cadre may submit a representation to
the State Government within a period of 60 days from
the date of communication of the order.

According to

Para-4(5) of the Presidential Order, State Government

shall on receipt of such representation and after
consultation with appropriate Committee constituted
under Sub-Para-3 make such order as it deems fit.

It

was provided therein that whenever such order is likely

to result in the change of allotment of any other
person, no such order shall be made without giving any
opportunity to other person to make a representation.

18

According to this para, there is no provision in the

Presidential Order to review the appointments made
before

the

Presidential

Order.

Therefore,

the

impugned action of reviewing the appointments is not

in accordance with para-4 of the Presidential Order.
(e)

According to Paragraph-13 of the Presidential

Order,

appointment or promotion made after the

commencement of the

Presidential Order or order

made in pursuance of the provisions to Para-3 as the

case may be, and before any local cadre is organized
under the provisions,

this order or any order made in

pursuance with the provisions to Para-3, to any post

which is required to be included in such cadre shall be
provisional and shall, within a period of 12 months, of
such

organization

be

reviewed

and

adjusted

in

accordance with the provisions of the order. Therefore,

as no review was made to the appointments made
between the periods within the stipulated period of 12
months, no such review can be taken up at this
distance of time, since the posts were organized into
local cadre way back in the year 1976 itself.

19

(f) According to Para-8(2) of the Presidential Order, 70% of

the posts to be filled by direct recruitment at any rate
in any local cadre under State Govt. , comprising posts
belonging to non-gazetted categories other than those
referred to in item(a ) of Sub-Para 1 and (b) in any
cadre under the local authority comprising posts
carrying a scale of pay, minimum of which are fixed
pay which exceeds the minimum of the scale of pay of
a lower division clerk, but does not exceed Rs.480/- per
month or any amount corresponding to it as specified
in this regard in the successive revisions of pay scales
granted by the State Government from time to time
shall be reserved in favour of local candidates
relation to local area in respect of such cadre.

in
The

Government issued instructions for organization of

local cadres in GO.Ms.No.728 dt.1.11.1975.

According

to Para-4 thereof, a post shall be deemed to be

equivalent to lower than that of Lower Division Clerk, if
the scale of pay of the post or where the post carries a
fixed pay, such fixed pay is equal to or lower than the
minimum of the scale of Lower Division Clerk viz., 240
(vide explanation to para 3(2) of the order). In every

20

subsequent revision, ever since the Presidential Order,

the pay scale of SGT is higher than the pay scale of
LDC / Junior Assistant.

Therefore, in accordance with

the orders in Para-8(2), the ratio of locals and open for

Secondary

Grade

Teachers

and

other

equivalent

categories and higher categories is 70: 30.

Further

the Government issued memo dt.11.12.2009 directing

the Commissioner and Director of School Education,
Hyderabad to review the appointment of teachers for
the period from 18.10.1975 to 31.5.2001 in the ratio of
70:30 in favour of local and open category, and
candidates from 1.6.2001 onwards, it shall be in the
ratio of 80:20 which was in force during the relevant
period.

However,

the

Government

issued

Go.Ms.No.674 dt.7.9.2007 to review the appointments

of SGTs in the ratio of 80% for the locals and 20% for
the open which is contrary to the Presidential Order
and also contrary to the decision of the Honble High
Court reported in 1998 (5) ALT 772 (DB).
(g)

The Government issued G.O.Ms.No.2 dt. 3.1.2002

incorporating S.O.1219 E dt.13.12.2001, which is an

amendment to the Presidential Order.

According to

21

the said orders, in Sub-Para-1 of Para-8, after item-B a

new sub-para is added with effect from 1.6.2001 ,
which reads as follows:
(a) 80% of the posts to be filled by
direct recruitment any time.
a) in any local cadre under the
State
Government
comprising
posts belonging to the category of
lower division clerk or a Category
equivalent to or lower than that
lower division clerk; and
(b) in any cadre under a local
authority comprising post carrying
a scale of pay the minimum of
which, or a fixed pay which does
not exceed the minimum of the
scale of pay or a lower division
clerk, shall be reserved in favour of
local candidates in relation to the
local area in respect of such cadre.
C(i) In any local cadre under the
State
Government
comprising
posts belonging to the categories
of Teachers in the Andhra Pradesh
School
Education
Subordinate
Service and all other similar
equivalent categories of posts of
teachers under any Department of
the State Government; and
(ii) In any cadre under a local
authority or under any such other
management, as may be notified
by the State Government from
time to time carrying a scale of

22

pay of pay equal to that of posts in

the
Andhra
Pradesh
School
Education
Subordinate Service
shall be reserved in favour of local
candidates in relation to the local
area in respect of such cadre.

(h)

Amendments issued in GO.Ms.No.2 dt.3.1.2002

are only prospective w.e.f. 1.6.2001 and therefore,

selections made up to 31.5.2001 are only 70% for
locals and 30% for open category.
Government

issued

GO.Ms.No.674

However,

dt.7.9.2007

to

review the appointments of Secondary Grade Teachers

in the ratio of 80% for locals and 20% for open with
effect from 1975 which is contrary to the Presidential
Order and also the law laid down by the Honble High
Court.

According to Para-11 of the Presidential Order,

the provisions of Presidential Order shall have effect

not withstanding anything contained in any statute,
ordinance, rule, regulation or other orders made before
or after the Presidential Order in respect of direct
recruitment to posts under State Government or any
local authority.

Therefore, the orders issued in

23

Go.Ms.No.674 dt.7.9.2007 have no relevance and as

such said orders are ignorable.
(i) According to the procedure for selection of candidates
in accordance with GO.P.No.763 GAD dt.15.11.1975,
the non locals can be selected at any roster point to
the extent of posts available for open competition.
However,

the

Govt.

issued

GO.Ms.No.8

GAD

dt.8.1.2002 modifying para-3 and 4 and substituting

the following paras:
5. In the said orders, in the Annexure-I(5)
(i)

For paragraphs 3 and 4 the following shall

be substituted namely:
Para 3: The provisional list shall be divided
into two parts.

The first part will comprise

first 20% of the list.

The second part will

comprises the balance 80%.

In case the

provisional list does not contain any nonlocal candidate in the second part, the list
shall be approved.
Para 4: If however on the scrutiny referred to
in para 3 it is found that there are non-local
candidates in the second part of the list,
then these candidates shall be removed and
replaced by local candidates ensuring that
the rule of reservation is followed.

24

(ii)

The

illustrations

thereunder

shall

be

omitted.
From the above, it is clear that non locals can be
selected for the first 20% of the vacancies only w.e.f.
8.1.2002.

These orders cannot be applied for earlier

selections.

However, while repatriating teachers, the

Government

have

strangely

followed

subsequent

orders issued in GO.Ms.No.8 GAD dt.8.1.2002 even

though the said GO is not in operation at the time of
selection and appointment of the applicants.

It would

be relevant to note that accrued rights cannot be

divested

by

retrospectively.

seeking

to

enforce

amendments

Further, executive orders operate

prospectively and no retrospective effect can be given

to executive orders issued under Article 162 of the
Constitution of India.

The power to review the

allotments made should be traced to a relevant

statutory provision.

Paragraph-13 of the Presidential

Order confers a limited power. However, a time limit of

12 months is stipulated to review the allotments made
initially. It is settled law that once the act or statute
prescribes the manner in which things have to be

25

done, it has to be done in that manner alone and not

otherwise.

Therefore, the impugned action of the

respondents in issuing the repatriation orders giving

effect to the amendments issued in GO.Ms.No.8 GAD
dt.8.1.2002 is highly illegal and arbitrary
procedure

of

retrospectively.

selection

cannot

be

as the
amended

On this point, the counsel have relied

upon the Judgments of the Honble Supreme Court in

the following cases:
(i)
In the case of GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA
PRADESH

vs.

MOHD.

GHOUSE

MOHINUDDIN AND OTHERS reported in

2001 (8) SCC 416 (Civil Appeal No.1651
(ii)

and 1652 of 1997)

In N.T.BEVIN KATH etc., vs. KARNATAKA
PUBLIC

SERVICE

COMMISSION

AND

OTHERS reported in AIR 1990 SC 1233.

(iii) A.A.CALTON
EDUCATION

vs.

DIRECTOR

DEPARTMENT

OF
AND

ANOTHER reported in 1983 (3) SCC 33.

(iv) In the case of B.PRABHAKAR RAO AND
OTHERS vs. STATE OF A.P. AND OTHERS
ETC., reported in AIR

1986 SC 210 [A.P.

26

Public Employment (Regulation of age of

Superannuation) Amendment Act 3 of 1985.]
(v)

2010 STPL (Web) 504 SC MD RAISUL

ISLAM VS. GOKUL MOHAN HOZARIKA

(j) The applicants by virtue of their appointments in their

respective districts on the basis of rules and procedure
of selection then in vogue have acquired some vested
rights in respect of their seniority, cadre management,
right to be considered for promotion to the higher
posts basing on their eligibility and qualifications. This
vested right cannot be unilaterally taken away on the
basis of subsequently amended rules by giving the
same retrospective effect.

Moreover, the modified

selection procedure in GO.Ms.No.8 dt.8.1.2002 and

GO.Ms.No.124
instructions

dt.7.3.2002
and

retrospectively.

they

are
cannot

only

executive

be

operated

Further, the President of India is a

delegate of Constitution in exercise of power under

Article-371(d).

Article 371(d) gives the President the

power to issue orders from time to time for localization

of posts of various categories but does not empower
President

to

bring

such

orders

into

operation

27

retrospectively.

Since the Presidential Order

including amending orders if any create substantive

rights and limitations, the power to issue orders
retrospectively cannot be assumed or inferred when it
is

not

provided

implications.

for

explicitly

or

by

necessary

The method of procedure which is

issued in implementation of the Presidential Order is

executive in nature. In the absence of statutory rules,
it is settled law that executive instructions prevail.
Therefore, procedural instructions for selection of
candidates between locals and open category cannot
be effected retrospectively.
(k)

According to the Presidential Order, various posts

under State are organized as district cadre,

cadre, multi zonal cadre posts.

zonal

As such, the holders of

the posts like applicants are liable to be transferred

within the district.

By virtue of the impugned orders,

the applicants are posted out of their local unit which is

against the statutory rules and no one can be posted
outside the local unit without his or her consent.
Further the applicants are all selected and appointed in
the quota of 30% meant to be filled up by open

28

category.
where

They are required to be retained in the unit

they

are

appointed

and

they

cannot

repatriated outside their unit of appointment.

be
The

applicants have distinguished the Judgment rendered

in

WP.No.23391/2009

and

batch

(D.V.V.N.

MALLESHWARI CASE).
(l) All selections to the posts under the State are made by
duly constituted Selection Committees and Andhra
Pradesh

Public

Service

Commission.

The

State

Government being an appointing authority can review

selections

made

by

Selection

Committees/APPSC.

The State Government, vide impugned orders is trying

to recast the selection list which was prepared by duly
constituted
Service

Selection

Committees

Commission.

GO.Ms.No.674

dt.7.9.2007

The

and

AP

Government

has

directed

Public
vide
the

departments of the State to review or recast the

selections made from 1975 onwards.

In this regard,

as per Article 320 (3) (a) of the Constitution, the State

Public Service Commission shall be consulted in all
matters relating to method of recruitment to civil
services and for civil posts.

The Government has also

29

constituted

District

Selection

Committees

through

statutory rules to select candidates for different

categories of posts like teachers.

The Public Service

Commission has made selections to more than one unit

of appointment.

All the selections made by APSPSC

are multiple cadre recruitments.

The procedure to

select the candidates to multiple cadres is prescribed

in

Para-6

of

Annexure-III

of

GO.Ms.No.763

dt.15.11.1975 which is not amended so far.

If the

selections made to the multiple cadres are to be

reduced

or

re-casted,

the

merit

list

of

all

the

candidates and the options exercised by all the

candidates are required.

Therefore, the appointing

authorities and the departments cannot recast or

review the selections made by APPSC or DSCs without
merit list.

The Government through an executive

order vide GO.674 dt.7.9.2007 cannot direct the

department to review or recast the selections made by
the APPSC or District Selection Committees and
repatriate the applicants by transfer to the other units
of appointments which is against law.

30

(m)

In addition to the aforementioned contentions, it

is further contended that no notice and opportunity is

given to the applicants before passing the impugned
orders.

Therefore, the action is violative of principles

of Natural Justice.

(n)

Furthermore, it is contended that the respondent

State could not have invoked Para-5(2)(c ) of the

Presidential Order for passing the impugned order.

6.

Learned Counsel Mr. J.R.

Manohar Rao, submits that

the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.610 dt.30.12.1985.

In

due implementation of the said G.O., repatriation orders are

passed in various G.Os., repatriating certain persons to their
respective zones.

There is no grievance insofar as

G.O.Ms.No.610 dt.30.12.1985 is concerned. After more than

20 years, due to agitation by one of the political parties, the
Government issued G.O.Ms.No.674 dt.7.9.2007, according to
which, the persons who are appointed contrary to the
Presidential Order have to be repatriated.
dispute with regard to the said proposition.

There is no
The main

grievance is regarding the procedure to be followed while

31

deciding the issue regarding recruitment of non locals.

G.O.Ms.No.763 dt.15.11.1975 deals with the procedure to be
followed in the matter of selection of local candidates (for
various categories).
issued

vide

Subsequently, an amendment was

GO.Ms.No.8

GAD

Annexure-I of the said GO.

dt.7.3.2002

was

issued

amending

Similarly, GO.Ms.No.124
amending

GO.Ms.No.763 dt.15.11.1975.
prospective in nature.

dt.8.1.2002

Annexure-III

of

The said amendments are

The question of modifying the

selections made earlier to 2002 does not arise.

The

selections were made and finalized basing on the procedure

in force as on that day.

Now the Government issued

GO.Ms.No.674 dt.7.9.2007, to follow GO.Ms.No.8 dt.8.1.2002

and GO.Ms.No.124 dt.7.3.2002 for reviewing the selections
made prior to 2002.

According to GO.Ms.No.674

dt.7.9.2007, the employees whose selections were irregular

and contrary to the Presidential Order shall be repatriated to
their local cadres by transfer.

It was further stated that

transfer shall be ordered in public interest by protecting the

seniority.

If the person was found ineligible to be

appointed/selected, he has to be discharged from service.

If the Government feels to protect their interest, they can be

32

transferred to other units without protecting the seniority as

those incumbents were not eligible to be appointed
according to the Presidential Order.

Protection of seniority

will affect the rights of employees working in other units .

Therefore, the question of protection of seniority should not
be permitted.

7. Learned Additional Advocate General Sri K.G. Krishna

Murthy, appearing on behalf of the State submitted that
the Government

with a view to rectify the violations

in

implementation of the Presidential Order in zone-V and VI,

issued GO.Ms.No.610 dt.31.12.1985.
be issued

The said GO came to

when the violations were brought to their notice

by various service organizations.

The GO contemplated

repatriation of persons to the respective local cadres for

purpose of effectively implementing the Presidential Order.
The Government constituted One Man Commission under Sri
J.N.Girgilani, IAS (retired) for purpose of implementation of
Go.Ms.No.610 dt.31.12.85. The Committee conducted an in
depth enquiry into the issue and submitted its report to the
State

and

State

decided

to

constitute

committee vide Go.Ms.No.213 dt.4.8.2004.

Cabinet

sub-

Besides this, a

33

decision was taken to constitute an Officers Committee for

the said purpose vide G.O.Rt.No.1878.

Subsequent

development of working on the report by group of Ministers

and accepting the report of the One Man Commission
occasioned in GO.Ms.No.72 dt.4.3.2006.

However,

GO.Ms.No.116 was kept under abeyance and GO.Rt.No.4173

dt.7.8.2006 was issued wherein a decision was taken to
appoint a Committee to examine certain items for early
implementation of GO.Ms.No.610.

Thus, after continuous

discussion,

data

collection

of

basic

regarding

local

candidates and their allotment as contemplated in the

Presidential Order, it has been decided in GO.Ms.No.674
dt.7.1.2007 to review the appointments from 18.10.1975
and

to

repatriate

non-locals

appointed

in

excess

of

percentage to the respective local cadres. This was done in

accordance with the procedure for filling up of vacancies as
substituted vide GO.Ms.No.8 dt.8.1.2002.

Basing on this,

the consequential repatriation orders were issued after duly

taking options from those who are liable to be repatriated.

8.

It is the contention of the State that exercise of power

by State Government is fully within the jurisdiction.

The

34

very purpose of issuing GO.Ms.No.610 dt.31.12.85 was for

rectifying

the

errors

that

crept

in

at

implementation of the Presidential Order.

the

time

of

That being the

situation, the mistakes are to be rectified by resorting to

corrective mechanism,

failure of which would result in

flouting the special provisions contained in Article 311 (d) of

the Constitution of India and Presidential Order.
9.

Learned AG further contended that Go.Ms.No.674

dt.7.9.2007 would protect the interest of the individuals who

are now transferred pursuant to the decision to implement
the Presidential Order in its full spirit.

This factor is evident

from Para-7 of the GO which clearly states that after specific

identification non locals who have been appointed in
deviation shall be repatriated to their respective local
cadres by transfer.

The transfers so ordered shall be in

public interest as provided in Para-5 (2)( c) of the

Presidential Order. In view of this specific provision, Para-8
goes further to state that all the employees so transferred
shall be eligible for TA and protection of seniority as the
transfers are made in public interest.

In view of this, the

contention of the applicants that they suffered prejudice

cannot be accepted.

When an action of the administrative

35

authorities

does

not

visit

the

employees

with

civil

consequences or any way prejudices them, the principles of

natural

justice

need

not

be

followed.

Further,

implementation of the Presidential Order which itself is a

special provision would have to gain paramount importance
and the individual interest will have to give way to the
public interest. On this point, following decisions are relied
upon:
(a)

UNION OF INDIA VS. MUSTAFA

AND NAJIBAI TRADING COMPANY

reported in 1998(6) SCC 79.
(b)

ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY

vs. MANSOOR ALI KHAN reported in

2000 (7) SCC 529.
(c)

COMPETITION COMMISSION OF

INDIA VS. SAIL reported in 2010 (10)

SCC 744
10.

Further learned Advocate General contended

that G.O.Ms.No.8 dt.8.1.2002 can be given retrospective

effect.

The provisions of the GO would make it clear that

Para-3 and

of

the

Annexure

to

GO.Ms.No.763

36

dt.15.11.1975 have been substituted by new provision.

It is settled principle of statutory interpretation that the
substitutions made to the statutory instruments would
have to date back to the date of giving effect to the main
provision.

The Go.Ms.No.763 dt.15.7.75 details the

procedure now stands

GO.Ms.No.8

substituted by the provisions of

dt.8.1.2002,

appointments

must

be

as

such

the

governed

by

procedure

of

GO.Ms.No.763

dt.15.7.1975 as substituted by GO.Ms.No.8

dt. 8.1.2002

On this point, he submits that he is fortified by the

decision of the Honble Supreme Court rendered in the
following cases:
(a)

JOSE DA COSTA vs. BASCORA

SADASIVA

SINAI

NARCORNIM

reported in 1976 (2) SCC 917.

(b)

GURBACHAN

SINGH

VS.

SATPAL SINGH reported in 1990 (1)

SCC 445.
(c)

DIRECTOR OF HEALTH OF AP,

HYDERABAD

AND

DR.P.VEERABADHRA

OTHERS
RAO

vs.
AND

37

OTHERS

reported in 2008 (4) ALT

744.

11. It is the further contention of the learned Advocate

General

that law relating to interpretation of statutes is

that provisions which have the nature of supplying an

obvious

omission

clearing

of

doubts

and

curative

amendments would have to be considered as retrospective.

(VIJAY vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA reported in 2006
(6) SCC 289. The said decision buttresses his contention
as in the case on hand, the procedure which was adopted
results

in

the

implemented.

Presidential

Order

not

being

properly

This is an obvious error which frustrates the

very scheme of the special provision and this was sought to

be cured by specifying a procedure which would help in
furtherance

of

the

avowed

object

for

which

the

constitutional amendment was made by inserting Article

371 (d).

This came to be done by issuing GO.Ms.No.8

dt.8.1.2002, according to which open category vacancies

have to be filled up in the first instance which may also
include meritorious local candidates besides non local
candidates. In a given situation, it could also result in all

38

the open seats being filled up by meritorious local

candidates.

In contra distinction to this procedure, filling

up of local candidates at the first instance would result in

meritorious open candidates being left out of consideration
and that hits the equitable distribution contemplated in the
Presidential

Order.

The

procedure

substituted

by

G.O.Ms.No.8 dt.8.1.2002 which has cured this malady and in

accordance with Law is to be given effect from the date on
which the Presidential Order has been given effect to that is
from 18.10.1975.
12. Learned Advocate General also contended that another
principle of interpretation consistently followed is that there
is a general presumption of prospectivity in favour of the
legislative instruments unless expressly provided that it
would have prospective effects.

Such a presumption is

liable to be made only in cases of statutes and amendments

thereto which are of substantive nature.

Such a

presumption does not exist in respect of procedural

amendments.

Assuming for the sake of arguments that

amendment has to be presumed to be prospective, in the

present scenario, the amendment being only procedural in

39

nature, such a presumption cannot be pressed into service.

On this point, he submits that he is fostered by the decision
rendered by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of
ARAVIND KUMAR VS. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
reported in 2007 (12) SCC 681 and in the case of
RAJENDRA KUMAR VS. KALYAN reported in 2000 (8)
SCC 99.
13. In

fact,

GO.Ms.No.2

dt.3.1.2002

and

GO.Ms.No.8

dt.8.1.2002 through which the procedure and percentage in

respect of local candidates suffered a change was subject
matter of litigation before the Full Bench of this Tribunal in
OA.562/2002 and batch.

The Full Bench did formulate the

issue whether the amendments issued as per GO.Ms.No.2

dt.3.1.2002 and GO.Ms.No.8 dt.8.1.2002, are prospective or
retrospective in operation.

However, the Full Bench did

not consider the issue relating to prospectivity of the GO,

but held that as per the existing law, the ratio of 80:20
between the local and non local candidates is to be
followed.

The Full Bench further concluded that both

GO.Ms.No.2 dt.3.1.2002 and GO.Ms.No.8 dt.8.1.2002 were

valid.

A judicial review of the said order was sought by

40

filing Writ Petition, but even the Honble High Court did not
deal with the issue relating to prospectivity or otherwise of
the GO as that was not the question before the Honble High
Court.

Therefore, the applicants cannot rely on the orders

of the Full Bench.

Another judgment of the Full Bench dealt

with the issue as to the selections which were made by the

District Selection Committee in 1998 need to be reviewed
and the percentage of local candidate that is liable to be
treated as reserved is 80% as against 70% followed then.
This Full Bench also never dealt with the question of
operation of GO.Ms.No.8 dt.8.1.2002,

more importantly as

to whether it was prospective or retrospective in its

operation.

In view of this, the contentions of the

applicants that the GO must be prospective in operation

cannot be accepted by this Tribunal.
14. For

another contention that has been raised by the

applicants that the question of repatriation is alien to the

facts of the present case as it is not a case of deputation,
learned AGP contends that
the

scrutiny

of

this

this submission cannot stand

Tribunal

as

the

allotments

and

appointments have been made in respect of the posts liable

to be thrown open to all i.e., local and non local have not

41

been filled up, on account of which, the provisions of the

Presidential Order and the purpose for which it has been
framed would get defeated.

The corrective mechanism

adopted by the State Government cannot be legally assailed

by the applicants.

Further, this aspect of the matter has

been considered by the Division Bench of the Honble High

Court

in

the

case

of

GOVERNMENT

OF

AP

vs.

B.V.N.MALESWARI in W.P.NO.23391/2009 and batch.

15. Leaned Advocate General further contended that
impugned order does not call for interference as it is a
policy matter.

The Courts interference with regard to the

policy matters has been clearly spelt out in following

decisions:
(a)

DILIP KUMAR GARG VS. STATE OF

U.P. reported in 2009 (4) SCC 753.

(b)
VS.

DELHI

DEVELOPMENT

JOINT

ALLOTTEE

OF

ACTION

AUTHORITY
COMMITTEE,

SFS FLATS reported in

2008 (2) SCC 672 AT PAGE 672

16. In view of the legal position, impugned orders have
been passed as a matter of policy to implement the
mandates of the Presidential Order in its true spirit.

It does

42

not fall within any of the permissible grounds on which the

said policy decision can be interfered with by this Tribunal in
exercise of its power of judicial review.
17. Learned Advocate General further contended that the
main contention of the applicants that on account of
repatriation their promotional prospects would be adversely
affected,

cannot

be

accepted

because

it

is

settled

proposition of law that mere chances of promotion are not

conditions of service and the fact that there is reduction in
chances of promotion do not tantamount to changing
conditions of service.

On this point, he relies on the

following decisions:
(a)

STATE

OF

CHANDRAKANTH

MAHARASTRA

vs.

ANANTH

KULKARNI reported in 1981 (4) SCC

130.
(b)

R.S. DEODHAR vs. STATE OF

MAHARASHTRA reported in (1974) 1

SCC 317.
(c)

STATE OF MYSORE vs. G.N.

PUROHIT reported in 1967 SLR SC

753.

43

(d)

MOHD. SHUJAT ALI vs. UNION

OF INDIA reported in (1975) 3 SCC

76.
(e)

MOHD.BHAKAR vs. Y. KRISHNA

REDDY reported in 1970 SLR 768 SC.

(f) RESERVE BANK OF INDIA vs. C.T.
DHIGE reported in (1981) 3 SCC 545.
(g)

RESERVE BANK OF INDIA vs.

C.N.

SAHASRANAMAN

reported in

(1986) Suppl SCC 143.

(h)

PALURU RAMAKRISHNAIAH vs.

UNION OF INDIA reported in (1989)

2 SCC 541.
(i)K. JAGADEESAN

vs. UNION OF

INDIA reported in 1990 (2) SCC 228.

18.

Heard both sides. Perused the material on record.

19. After hearing the counsel appearing on behalf of the

applicants and the learned Advocate General, the following
points arise for consideration:
1. Whether Go.Ms.No.610 dt.30.12.1985
and

Go.Ms.No.674

dt.7.9.2007

in

particular para-5 , violate the provisions of

the

Presidential

Order

contained

Go.Ms.No.674 dt.20.10.1975?

in

44

2. Whether the amendments issued by way

of substitution as per

GO.Ms.No.8 Edn.,

dt.8.1.2002 and GO.Ms.No.124 dt.7.3.2002

are

prospective

or

retrospective

in

operation?
3. Whether the Government invoke the
provisions

contained

in

Para-5

of

the

Presidential Order for effecting transfers in

furtherance

of

GO.Ms.No.610

dt.30.12.1985

and

GO.Ms.No.674

dt.7.9.2007 and whether the action of the

respondents is in violation of principles of
Natural Justice?
4.

Whether the action of the respondent

Government in issuing the repatriation

orders

amount

rankings
authorities

to

assigned
like

tinkering
by

Andhra

the

with

the

selecting

Pradesh

Public

Service Commission and District Selection

Committees?
5. Whether the vested right of promotion
of the applicants is sought to be taken
away?
20. POINT NO.1:
In order to decide the first point, it would be
appropriate to extract G.O.Ms.No.610 GAD dt.30.12.1985

45

and G.O.Ms.No.674 dt.7.9.2007. G.O.Ms.No.610, dated

30.12.1985, read as follows:
GO.Ms.No.610
1.
2.
3.
4.

Dated:30.12.1985
Read the following:

GO.Ms.No.674 G.A. (SPF.A) Dept., dated:20.10.1975.

GO.P.No.728 G.A. (SPF.A) Dept., dated: 1.11.1975.
G.O.P.No.729 G.A. (SPF.A) Dept., dated:1.11.1975.
From the President, Telangana Non-Gazetted Officers
Union letter Dated:5.12.1985.
...

ORDER:

The GO.1st read above, which is generally known as

Presidential Order contains principles regarding Organization of
Local Cadres allotment of personnel of the various
departments to the various local cadres to method of direct
recruitment to the various categories, inter-local cadre in
transfers etc., of the employees holding those posts. In the
GOs 2nd and 3rd read above clarificatory instructions were
issued regarding procedure for implementation of the various
provisions of the Presidential Order.
In accordance with the provisions of the Presidential Order,
local cadres have been organized to the various categories of
posts in all Government Departments and allotment of
personnel was made as per the guidelines contained in
paragraph-4 of the said order.
In the representation 4th cited, the President, Telangana NonGazetted Officers Unions has represented that certain
allotments have been made in violation of the provisions of the
Presidential Order.
The Government after carefully examining the issues raised
in the representation and after having vide ranging discussions
with the representatives of the union have entered into an
agreement with the Telangana Non-Gazetted Officers Union on
7.12.1985.
As per the terms of agreement the following Orders are
issued:
(1) The employees allotted after 18-10-1975 to
Zones V to VI in violation of zonalisation of local cadres

46

under the Six Point Formula will be repatriated to their

respective
zones
by
31.03.1986
by
creating
supernumerary posts wherever necessary.
(2)
In Respect of Jurala, Srisailam Left Canal and
Sriramsagar Project Stage II, all the staff in the NonGazetted categories both technical and non-technical
including Asst. Executive Engineers (formerly J.Es) coming
under zonalisation of local cadres under the Presidential
Order of 1975 who were posted to the Projects from
outside zones V and VI after 1-3-1983, will be retransferred to their respective zones and posted either in
existing vacancies in supernumerary posts where
vacancies are not available. Towards this the Government
will also move the Government of India for seeking
amendment to Government of India's notification GSR
525-E dated 28-6-1985 to give retrospective effect to this
order with effect from 1-3-1983.
(3)
(a)
In respect of appeals filed against orders of
allotment made under paragraph 4 of the Presidential
Order of 1975 to the competent authority in time and
where such appeals are still pending disposal, all such
cases where details are furnished by the T.N.G.O's Union
or individuals, shall be disposed of by 31.3.1986.
(b)
As a result of the above exercise,
consequential vacancies if any, arising shall be filled up as
per the procedure laid down under the Presidential Order.
(4)
In respect of first level Gazetted posts in certain
Departments which are outside the purview of the
Presidential Order, action should be taken to review the
question of inclusion of such posts also in the scheme of
localization and the matter should be taken up review the
question of inclusion of such posts also in the scheme of
localization and the matter should be taken up with the
Government of India for suitable amendment to the said
order.
(5)
The posts in Institutions/Establishment notified in
GSR No. 526 (E) dated : 18-10-1975 shall be filled up by
drawing persons on tenure basis from different local
cadres on an equitable basis as per the orders issued in
the G.Os. 3rd read above.
(6)
Provision in Para (5)2(c) of the Presidential Order
relating to inter-local cadre transfers shall be strictly
implemented and such transfers shall b effected only
under exceptional circumstances in public interest.

47

(7)
Action will be initiated in the concerned
departments in cases brought to their notice regarding
bogus registration in Employment Exchanges.
(8)
On receipt of complaints, if any, made by the TNGOs
Union relating to irregular allotments of candidates
particularly to Zone V and VI in the category of Village
Assistants the concerned Department shall take up the
matter with the A.P. Public Service Commissioner and take
such measures as may be necessary to rectify the
irregular allotments made if any.
(9)
The possibility of allotting persons from within the
same zone multi-zone against non-local vacancy in a
particular local cadre will be examined in consultation
with the APPSC.
(10) The T.N.GOs. Union will furnish to Government the
service categories where for want of trained personnel,
non local candidates are being appointed in zones. V and
VI so that Government can provide training facilities in
respect of such services/categories with a view to
providing adequate opportunities for recruitment and
appointment of local candidates in zones V and VI
(11) The Departments of Secretariat shall complete the
review of appointments/promotions made under the
Presidential Order as required under Para 13 of the said
order, by 30.06.1986
(12) (a)
Immediate action will be taken to finalise the
common Gradation list in respect of former Assistant
Engineers (Present Dy. EES) as on 01.11.1956, following
the prescribed procedure under the S.R. Act. 1956.
(b)
In respect of former Junior Engineers (Present
Asst E.E.s) the common gradation list published by the
Government was quashed by the A.P. Administrative
Tribunal and the Government had gone in appeal to the
Supreme Court. Effective measures will be taken for the
disposal of the matter before the Supreme Court,
Expeditiously.
(13) The matter relating to allotment of 7 non-local
personnel in the cadre of Inspector of Local Funds Audit
belonging to zones 1 to IV, will be considered by the
Department concerned keeping in view the provisions of
the Presidential order.

48

(14) The question of repatriation of 13 Deputy Executive

Engineers of the Public Health Department working in the
city of Hyderabad to zones I to IV be considered by the
Department concerned keeping in view the provisions of
the Presidential Order.

G.O.Ms.No.674 GAD dt.07.09.2007 read as follows:

GO.Ms.No.674

1. Circular

Date:7.9.2007
Read the following:

Memo

No.9543/MC/2007-11,

General

Administration (MC) Department, dated 2.7.2007.

2. Circular
Memo
No.9543/MC/2007-13
,
General
Administration (MC) Department, Dated: 2.7.2007.
ORDER:
The Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Organization
of Local Cadres and Regulation of Direct Recruitment)
Order, 1975 provides for reservation in the matter of
direct recruitment for Local Candidates in the different
categories of post specified therein.
2. In 1985 Government had issued Go.Ms.No.610 in order
to rectify certain deviations in the implementation of
the provisions of the Presidential Order in Zones V and
VI and again in 2001 Government constituted the One
Man Commission (The Girglani Commission) to receive
representations and sort out the anomalies in the
implementation
of
the
Go.Ms.No.610
General
Administration (SPF-A) Department, dated 30.12.1985
and take up follow up action for the rectification of
defects,
anomalies
and
irregularities
in
the
implementation of the Presidential Order and to
suggest remedial actions in matters relating to the
Public Employment and it submitted report on
2.9.2004.
The recommendations
of the Girglani
Commission were considered and accepted by the
Government and in pursuance thereof, Government
directed that a review be conducted for direct
recruitments made from 1975 onwards in order to
ensure that the provisions of the Presidential Order,
1975 are strictly implemented.

49

3. Government had issued GO.Ms.No.763 General

Administration (SPF-A) Department Dated.15.11.1975
laying down the procedure to be followed in the
manner
of
selections
of
local
candidates.
Subsequently, Government revised the procedure of
selection of local candidates and issued Go.Ms.No.8
General
Administration (SPF-A) Department, dated
8.1.2002 and also decided that the revised procedure
should be made applicable to all direct recruitments in
the State.
It was also noticed that in some direct
recruitments, the reservation for locals was reduced to
70% as against the originally provided 80%.
4. The procedure required to be followed for filling up the
posts for open competition, consistent with the
provisions of the Presidential Order is that all the
candidates will be considered adhering to the roster
points as applicable and these should be filled first on
the basis of merit.
After filling these posts, the
remaining posts are to be reserved for Local
Candidates (80% , 70% or 60 % , as the case may) and
shall be filled up exclusively by local candidates.
5. By following this procedure and adhering to the
prescribed percentages, the review of appointments
conducted has shown that the appointment of nonlocals made in certain Units of appointment in the
recruitment conducted in specified years has not been
strictly in accordance with the percentages and
procedures as prescribed.
6. Government have now decided that the non-local
candidates appointed in deviation of the Presidential
Order, as identified by the respective departments by
reviewing the direct recruitments made from 1975
onwards be repatriated to their respective local cadres
to which the candidates would otherwise belong to.
7. After such specific identifications, non-locals who had
been appointed in deviation shall be repatriated to
their respective local cadres by transfer. The transfers
shall be ordered in public interest as provided under
Para 5(2)(c ) of the Presidential Order.
8. The employees covered by such transfers shall be
eligible for TA and protection of seniority since the
transfers are made in public interest.

50

9. Illustration: In District Selection Committee 2000

recruitment for the post of Secondary Grade Teacher
(SGT), Telugu medium, 1340 vacancies were notified.
Out of these, 1185 vacancies were filled up which
comprised of 834 vacancies for Government Schools
and 351 vacancies for Zilla Parishad Schools.
The
vacancies meant for open competition in this selection
are 167 for Government Schools and 75 for Zilla
Parishad Schools. The remaining vacancies reserved
for local candidates of Mahboobnagar District
comprised of 667 vacancies for Government Schools
and 276 vacancies for Zilla Parishad School. The list
showing details of this selection is annexed to this
order for the sake of clarity and uniformity.
10.
It is advised that the respective Departments
should prepare statements as shown in the illustration
such that process can be implemented through
transparent manner.
It is further raised that the
statements as shown in the illustration should be made
available in the Web. Copies should be displayed in
the Notice Board and also be made available to those
who wish to have them.
11.
The Ban on transfer of employees address are not
applicable to transfers effected in pursuance of these
orders, as per para 3(11) of Go.Ms.No.154 Finance
(W&M) Department, Dated:4.7.2007.

12.

The orders shall be issued by the concerned

Secretary to government since it is an inter local cadre
transfer.

21. On a plain reading of the aforesaid GOs, it is seen that

certain allotments have been made in violation of the
provisions of the Presidential Order.

There was hue and cry

by the Telangana Non Gazetted Officers Union and other

Unions and the Government have issued G.O.Ms.No.610
dt.30.12.1985, at the first instance and subsequently, One
Man Commission was constituted (Girglani Commission) to

51

receive the representations and to take up follow up action

for rectification of defects and anomalies and irregularities
in the implementation of the Presidential Order and to
suggest remedial actions in the matter.

The Committee

had wide ranging discussions and recommended that a

review of the direct recruitments made from 1975 onwards
be conducted, in order to ensure that provisions of the
Presidential

Order,

1975

are

strictly

implemented.

Thereafter, Go.Ms.No.674 dt.7.9.2007 was issued accepting

the recommendations and worked out modalities.
22. The basis for contention that the impugned GOs are
violative of Presidential Order is based on Paragraph-3 and 4
of the Presidential Order, which reads as follows:
3. Organization of local cadres: (1) The State
Government shall within a period of *twenty-seven
months from the commencement of this Order,
organise classes of posts in the civil services of
and classes of civil posts under the State into
different local cadres for different parts of the
State to the extent and in the manner, hereinafter
provided.
(*Vide
GO.Ms.No.728,

G.A.

(SPF.A)

Dept,

dt.27.10.1977).
Provided that, notwithstanding the expiration of
the said period, the President may by order,
require the State Government, whenever he
considers it expedient so to do, to organise any

52

classes of posts in the civil services of and clauses

of civil posts under the State into different local
cadres or different parts of the State.
(Vide GO.Ms.No.34 G.A. (SPF.A) Dept.,

date

24.1.81)
(2) The posts belonging to the category of lower
division clerk and each of the other categories
equivalent to or lower than that of a lower division
clerk in each department in each district shall be
organised into separate cadre.
Explanation:- For the purposes of this subparagraph, sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 6 and
sub-paragraph(1) of paragraph 8 a category shall
be deemed to be equivalent to or lower than that
of a lower division clerk if the minimum of the
scale of pay of a post belonging to that category
or where the post carries a fixed pay, such fixed
pay is equal to or lower than the minimum of the
scale of pay of a lower division clerk.
(3) The posts belonging to each non gazetted
category, other than those referred to in subparagraph (2), in each department in each zone
shall be organized into a separate cadre.
(4)

The

posts

belonging

to

each

specified

gazetted category in each department in each

zone shall be organised into a separate cadre.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in subparagraph (3) and (4), the State government may
where it considers it expedient so to do and with
the

approval

of

the

Central

Government,

organised the posts belonging to any of the

categories referred to therein, in any department,

53

or any establishment thereof, in two or more

contigeous zones into a single cadre.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub
Paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5), the Central
Government; may notify the departments in which
and the categories of posts for which a separate
cadre has to

be organised for the City of

Hyderabad and on such notification, the posts

belonging to each such category in each such
department in the said City (other than those
concerned with the administration of areas falling
outside, the said City) shall be organise into a
separate cadre and the posts so organised in
pursuance

of

this

paragraph

or

Constituted

otherwise and comprising posts belonging to the

category in that department.
(7) In organising a separate cadre in respect of
any category of posts in any department for any
part of the State, nothing in this Order shall be
deemed to prevent the State Government from
organising or continuing more than one cadre in
respect of such category in such department for
such part of the State.
(8) Where the Central Government is satisfied that
it is not practicable or expedient to organise local
cadres under this paragraph in respect of any non
gazetted category of posts in any department, it
may, by notification, make a declaration to that
effect and on such declaration the provisions of
this paragraph shall not apply to such category of
posts.
4.Allmotment of Persons: -

54

(1)

Persons holding posts required to be

organised into local cadres shall be allotted to

such cadres by the State Government or any
officer or authority authorised by it in this behalf
in accordance with the principles and procedure
hereinafter specified.
(2)

In allotting persons to local cadres due

regard shall be had to all or any of the following,

namely:
(a)the administrative needs of the posts in the
local cadres:
(b)the need for the composition of balanced
local cadres
with reference to age and seniority groups;
(c)the length of service of the persons
concerned in the
part of the State for which the local cadre is
organised.
(d)knowledge of the persons concerned of the
language
spoken and the law in force in the part of the
State for
which the local cadre is organised:
(e)preference of the persons concerned for
allotment to
any local cadre, where feasible.
(3)
The State Government
respect of different

may,

in

departments and different

categories of posts, constitute committees to

advice on the allotment of persons to local cadres.
(4)

Any

person

aggrieved

by

an

order

allotting him to any local cadre may submit a

representation to the State Government within a
period

of

sixty

days

communication of the order.

from

the

Date

of

55

(5)

The State Government shall on receipt of

such representation and after consultation with

the appropriate committee constituted under subparagraph(3) make such order as it deems fit.
Provided that wherever such an order is likely to
result in the change of allotment of any other
person, no such order shall be made without
giving an

opportunity to that other person to

make a representation.
(6)

Every

order

passed

by

the

State

Government under sub-paragraph (5) shall subject

to the provisions of clause (3) of article 371-D of
the Constitution of India, be final.

23. The Pragraph-3 deals with organization of local cadres

and the paragraph-4 deals with allotment of persons. The
impugned GOs in the present batch of cases is neither
concerning Organization of the local cadre nor the allotment
of personnel to the local cadres.

Certain aggrieved service

unions felt that there is fallacy in implementation of the

provisions of the Presidential Order.

GO.Ms.No.763

dt.15.11.1975 prescribed the procedure of selection of local

candidates.

If the said procedure is followed where

hundred posts were to be filled up and the reservation in

respect of locals is 80%, the procedure that has been
followed would stop at the merit list at 100.

The test

prescribed in GO.Ms.No.763 dt.15.11.75 would apply, it is

56

found to satisfy the requirement as contemplated in

Annexure-I of the said GO, the list would become final and
the appointments would be made as per the said list.

The

reasoning of this procedure is that in a given case, persons

who are non locals are found in the merit list commencing
from 80 to 100, they would have to be selected.

By virtue

of this procedure, the non-locals who cannot be said to be

meritorious would still be appointed and thereby the locals
in whose favour the Presidential Order provides for a
reservation would be denied the benefit of the same, this
would be violative of the same.

If the Presidential Order

is followed strictly for achieving the purpose for which it has

been made, local candidates ranking from 101 to 120 in the
merit list would be deprived of being appointed and in other
procedure for the purpose of appointment would render the
Presidential Order nugatory and this fallacy has been
corrected by issuing the

impugned orders.

In fact, the

appointments which were made right from 1975 were not in

consonance with the letter and spirit of the Presidential
Order.

The error which has crept-in in the implementation

of the Presidential Order is being rectified and the exercise

57

of power by the State is not at all contrary to the provisions

of the Presidential Order.
24. It is a settled proposition of law that a common merit
list

will

have

to

be

prepared

irrespective

of

caste,

community, creed or region, from which a person comes

from, would have been accommodated in the general merit
quota.

It has been held that merely because persons

belonging to such streams earn a superior merit, the

percentage of reservation would not be diminished.

The

contentions of the applicants that GO.Ms.No.763 would

satisfy that 80% be filled up first is a statement without any
legal basis and a reading of the said GO would make it very
clear that that contention is not at all tenable. In support of
this contention, Sri Mr. Surender Rao, Counsel, relied upon
the Judgment of the Honble Single Judge in the case of
PADMANABHA REDDY VS. STATE reported in AIR 1984
AP 129 and argued that this Judgment would be the last
word on the controversy, which reads as follows:
16.

Now, the Presidential Order defines local

area and local candidates and also provides for

reservation in favour of local candidates, at the
same time providing for the President, requiring
the

State

Government

to

issue

appropriate

directions for the purpose of giving effect to the

Presidential Order.

The State Government has,

58

accordingly, issued the directions contained in

G.O.P.No.646, dated 10.7.1979.

These instructions

not only reiterate the definitions of local area and

local candidates, but also prescribe the manner of
implementation of reservation in favour of local
candidates provided in the Presidential order.
Annexure-III to G.O.P.No.646 expressly sets out the
manner of implementation of reservation.

It must,

therefore, follow that these instructions contained

in Annexure-III must prevail, and must be followed
even in case the Rules of Admission contained in
G.O.Ms.No.549 say to the contrary, in any respect.
The fact that the Rules of Admission contained in
G.O.Ms.No.549 are statutory, has no relevance,
because these Rules must also be read consistent
with, and subject to the Presidential Order, and the
directions issued by the State Government in
pursuance thereof, so long, of course, as the
directions given by the State Government are
within the four-corners of the Presidential Order. In
the face of the instructions contained in AnnexureIII to G.O.P.No.646, it is not possible to say that the
method suggested by Mr.H.S.Gururaja Rao should
be followed in the matter of making selections.
17.

Mr. Gururaja Rao sought to contend that the

State Government is empowered to give directions

only in the matter of implementation of reservation
in favour of local candidates, but is not empowered
to lay down how the 15% of the un-reserved seats
should be filled up and that, therefore, the
directions of the State Government in Annexure-III
cannot apply in the matter
15% seats.

of filling up the said

A moments scrutiny would expose

59

the fallacy in the argument.

What the State

Government has done is to specify the manner in

which the reservation in favour local candidates
should be worked out; the State Government has
not purported to lay down the method of filling up
the 15% unreserved seats.

It is not also

suggested that, by following the formula contained

in Annexure-III, the rule of reservation in favour of
local candidates is in any manner being defeated,
or curtailed.

25. We

have

perused

the

Judgments.

The

States

contention now made was already rejected by the Honble

High Court dealing with the AP Educational Institution
(Regulation of Admissions) Order, 1974.

The said judgment

is not at all applicable to the facts and circumstances

obtaining in the present case.

The contention before the

Court in that case was that the rules made regarding

admission contained in GO.Ms.No.549 would have to be
followed

and

the

procedure

as

contemplated

in

GO.Ms.No.646 is not in consonance with the statutory rules

of admission.

Under such circumstances, the Honble High

Court held that the orders passed in pursuance of the

Presidential Order deal with admissions will have to prevail.
The supremacy of the Presidential Order was upheld.

The

60

validity of GO.Ms.No.646 was not adjudicated.

Therefore,

the said judgment is of no avail to the applicants.

26. The applicants contended that the impugned GOs are
issued without any direction either from the Central
Government or the President.

It is also contended that

following of GO.Ms.No.763 dt.15.11.75 was not in proper

implementation of the Presidential Order, was not even the
finding of any judicial forum as well, and as such there was
no necessity to change the procedure established in the
said GO.

The scheme of the Presidential Order was also

sought to be pressed into service to state that the State had

no role to play except in consonance with the directions of
either the Central Government or the President.

This

argument seems to be not a plausible one. It is an admitted

fact that Presidential Order has neither prescribed any
procedure

for

ensuring

the

reservation

contemplated

therein is correctly implemented nor did it authorize any

agency to do that.

Obviously, the Presidential Order has

not thought it necessary to do so as it deals with the

recruitment to the Civil Services of the State.

The

Presidential Order has left the power to the State to decide

and workout the modalities of recruitment and to implement

61

the

Presidential

Order

in

its

true

letter

and

spirit.

Therefore, the contention that GO.Ms.No.763 is issued

without the directions of the President and same cannot be
said to be the part of the Presidential Order, does not hold
water.
27. Another contention is also raised that since the
President has not required the State to issue direction as
contemplated under Para-10,

GO.Ms.No.763 itself would

not have been issued by the State Government.

This

argument virtually cuts through the main argument that

appointments made in accordance with GO.Ms.No.763 have
attained finality and it cannot be reviewed now.

Since this

argument would run contrary to the main argument , no

credence can be given to this point.
28. We have perused the following judgments relied upon
by the learned counsel for the applicants on this point:
(a)

In the case of S.PRAKASHA RAO VS.

COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAX

AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1990 SC
997.
(b)

In the case of

M.KESHAVULU vs.

STATE OF A.P. reported in 2003 (6) ALD

522.

62

(c)

In

the

case

of

GOVERNMENT

OF

ANDHRA PRADESH vs. P. VEMA REDDY

reported in 2007 (3) ALT 287.
(d) In the case of V.JAGANNADHA RAO
AND OTHERS vs. STATE OF AP AND
OTHERS reported in AIR 2000 (2) SC 77.
(e) In the case of M. SHYAM SUNDER vs.
STATE OF A.P. TR & B DEPARTMENT
reported in 2001 (6) ALD 87.

29. The Honble Supreme Court has decided the case of

S.PRAKASHA

RAO

VS.

COMMISSIONER

OF

COMMERCIAL TAX AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1990

SC 997 in the back drop of factual aspects obtaining in that
case and held as follows:
6.

Thus, it is seen that pursuant to thepower

given under

cls . (1)

&

President had issued

(2) of Art. 371-D the

the

order

local cadres and zone consists

Warangal,

Karimnagar

revenue districts.
cadres. The
district

of
and

post of

and

Adilabad ,
Khammam

It is the local area for the local

the Junior Assistant is the

cadre post and the post

Assistant

organising

Assistant

of

Commercial

Officers, etc. are the zonal posts.

Senior
Taxes

The

State

Government is empowered under the Presidential

Order to organise the local cadres within a period
of twelve months from
pursuance

thereof

the

October 20,
State

1975.

In

Government

in

63

Commercial

Taxes Department issued order

G.O.Ms. No. 581

organising

dated May

zones

Commercial

for

Taxes

the

and
of

Karnool,

of

namely,

Krishna,

Guntur,

Warangal, Hyderabad - 1

Hyderabad-II.
revenue

1976

purpose

Department,

Visakhapatnam, Kakinada,
Triputhi,

24,

Warangal zone consists

districts

of Adilabad,

Karimnagar,

Warangal and .Khammam. Thus, the Warangal

zone of Commercial Taxes Department
purpose

of

for the

recruitment, seniority, promotion,

transfer, etc. of

local cadres is co-terminus with

the zone V of the Presidential Order. The Junior

Assistant in

each

revenue

Warangal

zone is a separate

but

for

the purpose

post

of

Senior

district
district

of promotion

Assistants

in

post ,
to

the

and Assistant

Commercial Taxes Officers, which are zonal posts

common
Senior

seniority
Assistants

of

the

working

Junior Assistants,
in

all

the four

revenue districts shall have to be maintained and

promotions made in accordance with Ministerial
Service Rules or the

Commercial

Taxes

Subordinate Service Rules issued under proviso

to Art. 309 of the

Constitution as the case may

be.

It would be subject to rule of reservation

for

local candidates as adumbrated in para 8

of

the

Order

and

the general rule of

reservation made in Rule 22 in Andhra Pradesh

State and Subordinate Service Rules.
7.

It

would

appear

from

the

record

that the Government intended to reorganise, for

the purpose of efficient administration of the

64

Commercial Taxes Department

separate

divisions

issued

within

and

the

create

zones

and

through G.O.Ms. No. 1900 dated

December 22, 1981 carving out

Adilabad and

Karimnagar as Adilabad division

and Warangal

and Khammam

Warangal

division

with

control

of

the

as

the administrative
concerned

Dy. Commissioner of Commercial

Taxes at Adilabad and Warangal. As a follow up

action options have

been called

for

from

the employees and they have been allotted

in

G.O.Ms. No. 1648 dated November 22, 1982 to

the respective divisions.
the allotment

It is not disputed that

and transfer were not made in

terms of Para 4 of the Order.

As stated earlier

this action had given rise to

the

above .

Representation Petitions and the orders passed by

the Tribunal

and the results ensued thereunder.

8. Dr. L.M. Singhvi, the learned Senior Counsel for

the appellants, contends
the Order

that paragraph 3(7) of

empowers the

State Government to

create a zone within the Warangal zone for

the

purpose of recruitment, seniority and promotion.

The State Government
in that regard. There
in that

regard

has
is

in the

no

inherent

power

express prohibition

order. The phrase 'or

constituted otherwise' engrafted in the definition

of local cadre in paragraph 2(e) read with
paragraph 3(7) gives

ample power to the State

Government

organise

within

to
the

Taxes Department.

zone
The

for

any local cadre

the Commercial

action thus, taken by

the State Government is clearly within its power.

65

The

contra finding recorded

is illegal. He placed strong

by the Tribunal

reliance

decision of a single member Tribunal

on a
made

in

R.P. No.

101 of 1982 and batch dated April 1,

1982.

He

maintaining

further
harmony

contended that in
in

Centre-State

relationship,

the State Government

continue to

have

its inherent

shall
power

to

organise its local cadre to meet the exigencies

of its administrative needs. The prior approval or
concurrence

of

the

Central

Government

is

redundant. We find no force in these contentions.

It is already

seen that in exercise of the power

under paragraph 3(1) of the

Order

the

State

Government shall, within a period of twelve

months from the date of the commencement of
the Order, organise

class or classes of posts in

the civil services of, and class or classes of civil

posts, under the State into different local
for

different

parts of the State in the manner

therein provided.
through G.O.
in fact

cadres

It

is

already

seen

that

Ms. No. 581, the State Government

had

organised

the

Commercial

Taxes Departments by constituting different local

cadres and Warangal zone comprised of the

four

revenue districts, namely, Adilabad, Karimnagar,

Khammam and

Warangal

local area for local

Having

done

cadres

so,

was

declared

as

of the Department.

the question

emerged

whether the State Government has further power

to

reorganise the

local cadre within the zone.

In our considered view, we have no hesitation to

hold

that

organised

once
the

the
class

State

Government

has

or classes of posts in the

66

civil services of and class or classes of civil posts,

under the State as local cadres, it ceases to have
any power to bifurcate or reorganise a zone within
a zone, cadre or

cadres

therein. In

the power under proviso to

exercise of

paragraph

3(1), it

is for the President notwithstanding the expiry of

the period of twelve months prescribed in subparagraph (1) of paragraph 3, by
require

the

an

order

State Government whenever he

considers it expedient so to do to have the power

under paragraph 3(1)
clear that
to

exercised. Thereby, it is

the State Government shall have

place

necessary

President; the President

is expedient

material
shall

before the

consider

that it

to organise any class or classes of

573 posts in the civil services of and class or

classes of civil

posts, under the State into a

further local cadre within the local

cadre in the

zone already prescribed and to pass an order in

that regard requiring the State Government to so
organise it. It is made clear that for the purpose of
efficient

administration or convenience, the

State Government may create division/divisions

within the local area or local
the

cadre.

But

for

purpose of recruitment, seniority, promotion,

discharge, etc. the local cadre once organised

under

para 3(1) shall be final and continue to

be operative until action is taken under proviso to

subparagraph (1) of

paragraph

When we

the learned counsel for the

enquired

3 of the Order.

State, Shri Madhava Reddy candidly conceded

that no order of the President, as provided under
the proviso, was made. Therefore, the action
taken by the State Government in issuing G.O.Ms.

67

No. 1648 dated November 20, 1982 is clearly

illegal and invalid contravening the proviso

to

sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 3, undoubtedly it

contravened para 4

30.

of the Order.

It was contended that for promotion from the post of

Senior Assistant to the post of Assistant Commercial Tax

Officer, zonal seniority of Warangal local area comprising of
Warangal, Khammam, Karimnagar and Adilabad is the
criteria.

Adilabad Division consisting of Adilabad and

Karimnagar districts of Commercial Tax department cannot

be treated to be a zone and divisional seniority prepared by
the department is bad in law.

The Honble Supreme Court

has held that creation of a Division

and maintaining

separate seniority of Junior Assistants and Senior Assistants

for Adilabad and Warangal Division are illegal and contrary
to the orders issued in GO.Ms.No.581 and the AP Public
Employment (Organization of local cadres and Regulation of
Direct Recruitment) Order, 1975.

The State had attempted

to meddle with organized zonal cadre and intended to carve

out zone within a zone.

Under these circumstances, the

Honble Supreme Court held that State has no power to

meddle with the posts organized under the Presidential
Order. No such attempt is made in the case on hand.

68

31. The Government of AP intended to bring out a unified

cadre of teachers in the government, Mandal Parishad and
Zilla Parishad schools.

In fact, in the earlier round of

litigation i..e, in the case of M.KESHAVULU vs. STATE OF A.P.

reported in 2003 (6) ALD 522 and in the case of
GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH vs. P. VEMA REDDY
reported in 2007 (3) ALT 287,

the Honble High Court

interfered with the matter and the matter is carried in

appeal to the Honble Supreme Court and pending before
the Honble Supreme Court.

The Honble High Court has

struck down Act.27/2005 which intended to integrate cadres

of teachers and other employees in Government, Mandal
Parishad and Zilla Parishad schools.
32. It further held that Section 3(1) and 4(1) of the Act
27/2005 in effect abolish local cadres through a circuitous
process of abolishing cadres which were organized into local
cadres and in effect abolishing the local cadres themselves.
33. These Judgments cannot be of any relevance. It is a
settled principle in the law of precedents that judgments are
to be read in the context in which they have been rendered.
Phrases and sentences cannot be picked up and read in

69

isolation.

Thus, these two Judgments would also be of no

avail to the applicants.

34. Further, the applicants placed reliance on the decision
in the case of V.JAGANNATH RAO AND OTHERS vs.
STATE OF AP AND OTHERS reported in AIR 2000 (2) SC
77 wherein it has been held as follows:
14.

In Sadanandam s case, while considering

the legality of amended provisions of the

Rules

framed by the State Government and in sustaining

the same, this Court was of the opinion that as the
aforesaid rules had been framed under Section (3)
of the Andhra Pradesh Ordinance 5 of 1983 read
with

paragraph 5(2)(a) of the Presidential Order,

the conclusion of the Tribunal in striking down the

rule is erroneous.

The Court was of the opinion

that mode of recruitment and category from which

the recruitment to a service should be made are
policy matters exclusively within the purview and
domain of the executive and it would not be
appropriate for judicial bodies to sit in judgment
over the wisdom of the executive in choosing the
mode of recruitment or the categories from which
the recruitment should be made. In our considered
opinion,

both

the

aforesaid

reasons

do

not

constitute a true interpretation of the provisions of

the Presidential Order.

At the outset, it may be

noticed that Article 371-D (10) of the Constitution

unequivocally indicates that the said Article and
any order made by the President thereunder shall
have effect notwithstanding anything in any other
provision of the Constitution or in any other law for

70

the time being in force. Necessarily, therefore, if it

is construed and held that the Presidential Order
prohibits consideration of the employees from the
feeder category from other units then such a rule
made by the Governor under the proviso to Article
309 of the constitution will have to be struck down.
Then again in exercise of powers under paragraph
5(2)

of

the

Presidential

Order

if

the

State

Government makes any provision, which is outside

the purview of the authority of the government
under para 5(2) of the Order itself, then said
provision also has to be struck down.

Having

construed the rules framed by the Governor under

proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution from the
aforesaid stand point, the conclusion is irresistible
that the said rule to the extent indicated by the
Tribunal

is

constitutionally

invalid

and

its

conclusion is unassailable. In the case in hand, the

impugned provisions do not appear to have been
framed in exercise of powers under paragraph 5(2)
of the Presidential Order and as such the same
being a rule made under proviso to Article 309 of
the Constitution, the Presidential order would
prevail, as provided under Article 371-D (10) of the
Constitution.

Even fit is construed to be an order

made under Paragraph 5(2) of the Presidential

Order, then also the same would be invalid being
beyond the permissible limits provided under said
paragraph. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal
rightly held the provision to the extent it provides
for consideration of employees of the Factories and
Boilers units to be invalid, for the purpose of
promotion to the higher post in the Labour unit and
as such we see no justification for our interference

71

with the said conclusion of the Tribunal and the

earlier judgment of this Court in Sadanandam s
case(supra) must be held to have not been
correctly decided. As a consequence, so would be
the case with Satyanarayana Rao s case (supra).
15.

Notwithstanding our aforesaid conclusion, it

would be in the interest of the administration to

have a channel of promotion for every service, so
as to avoid stagnation at a particular level, subject
however to the condition that the incumbents of a
service are otherwise qualified to shoulder the
responsibilities

of

the higher promotional post.

The appropriate authority of the Government,

therefore, should bear this in mind and consider
the feasibility and desirability of continuing the
supernumerary

posts already

created in the

Boilers and Factories Department on a permanent

basis, so that the employees from the lower
echelon in the said Department have a promotional
channel or, to make suitable promotional avenue
at least upto some level, so that there would not be
any discontentment amongst the employees in the
concerned Department.
The appeals are without any merit and are
accordingly dismissed.

35.

In the above case, the Honble Supreme Court was

considering the validity of the rule which provided for

transfer of employees from the subordinate officers to the
Heads

of

the

Departments

contemplate promotion

under

the

rule

which

in the form of appointment by

72

transfer. It was in that background, the Honble Supreme

Court held that giving a wider meaning to the term transfer
as

contained

in

Para-5

(2)

Presidential Order nugatory.

would

be

rendering

the

This is not the position in the

present case.
36. The matter in the case of SHYAM SUNDER vs. STATE
OF AP. TR & B DEPARTMENT reported in 2001 (6) ALD
87 pertains to the question of determination of seniority of
the Engineers in the

AP Roads and Buildings Engineering

Service, wherein it has been held as follows:

42.

FURTHER more, those DEEs belonging to

other zones

who want to be impleaded in these

Writ Petitions were not before the tribunal and they

did not choose to file any such petitions before the
tribunal.

This is another distinction from Vittals

case (supra) and this case. Be that as it may we

allowed the learned counsel for the proposed
respondents to make their submissions and also
file written submissions.

We have considered

these submissions and they have no bearing on the

points we have

framed for consideration.

We

accordingly decide Point No.1 in favour of the writ

petitioners and against the proposed respondents
holding that the proposed respondents are neither
necessary

parties

nor

proper

parties.

The

miscellaneous petitions, filed for impleadment are

dismissed. In Re Point Nos.2 and 4:
43. WHETHER the government is not justified in
reviewing the seniority list of DEEs in Zones V, VI

73

and VII, issued in G.O.Ms.No.314, dated 29.11.1994

purporting to act on the directions issued by the
Division Bench of this court in W.P.No.5834 of
1994?
44. WHAT is the scope and power of para 13 of A.P.
Public Employment (Organisation of Local Cadres
and Regulation of Direct Recruitment) Order, 1975
and Rule 36 of the

A.P. State and Subordinate

Service Rules?
45. THESE two points can be considered together.
Before the tribunal it was contended on behalf of
the Government that earlier on a premise known
that the cadre strength in zones V, VI and VII have
not been properly filled G.O.ms.Nos.259 and 260
and G.O.Ms.No.18 were issued. These two orders
were upheld by the Tribunal.

Though the S.L.P.

against that judgment was dismissed, no order on

merits was passed and therefore, the Government
has power to review the panels, which was already
modified/reviewed in the two government orders.
It was also the submission that final seniority list in
G.O.Ms.No.314 was issued based on the earlier two
Government

orders

which

were

not

correct.

Therefore, after the judgment of the Full Bench in

O.A.No.41796

of 1997

and

batch

which

was

modified by this court in W.P.No.5834 of 1998 the

government thought it fit that it is now permissible
to rectify the mistakes and review/revise the
seniority list which is not illegal nor contrary to
Special rules or general rules. The same position is
reiterated before us.

Sri P.Balakrishna Murthy,

however, submits that G.O.Ms.Nos.259 and 260

were issued in exercise of power conferred in

74

paragraph

13

of

the

Presidential

Order

and

therefore it is not permissible for the government

to resort to review for second time.

It is further

contended that as the Tribunal has confirmed the

validity of the G.Os.259 and 260 it is not open to
the Government to again revise the final seniority
list issued in G.O.Ms.No.314 dt.29.11.1994.
46. THE seniority list of DEEs from 1.4.1965 to
31.12.1982 and thereafter till 31.12.1987 has been
subject-matter of litigation. At no point of time till
issuance of G.O.Ms.No.314 there was seniority list,
which could be called final. When the matter was
pending

at

various

stages

of

litigation,

Presidential Order came into force.

supra

clause(10)

of

Article

the

As noticed

371-D

of

the

Constitution of India gives an overriding effect to

Article 371-D as well as any order made by the
President thereunder.
Order

insofar

as

Therefore, the Presidential

recruitment,

appointment,

discharge, seniority, promotion and transfer and in

respect of such other matters, as may be specified
by the State Government, has overriding effect.
Indeed, para 5 of the Presidential Order says that
each part of the state for which local cadre has
been organized

shall be separate unit for the

purpose of conditions of service referred to herein.

As a necessary corollary, even in matters of
appointment, promotion and seniority, Presidential
Order alone shall prevail. The Special Rules had
not contemplated the method and manner of
preparing the seniority list and only general rules
deal with the same.

When there is overlapping

between the General rules and the Presidential

75

Order, the presidential Order alone shall have to be

given full effect.
47. AS required

under para 3 of the presidential

Order, the State Government within a period of 18

months

from

the

commencement

of

the

Presidential Order i.e., from 18.10.1975 shall have

to organized classes of posts in the civil service
into different local cadres in different parts of the
State. If the local cadres are not organized under
para 3 of the Presidential Order within a period of
18 months, then what would happen? The proviso
to

para

expiration

states

of

the

that
period

notwithstanding

the

of

the

18

President may require the State

months,

Government to

organize any classes of posts into civil services and

classes of civil posts in the State into different local
cadres for different parts of the State.

This aspect

of the matter was considered by a three-Judge

Bench of the Supreme Court in Prakash Rao
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes.
observations are as follows:..

v.

The relevant

In our considered

view, we have no hesitation to hold that once the

State government has organized the class or
classes of posts in the civil services of and class or
classes of civil posts, under the State as local
cadres, it ceases to have any power to bifurcate or
reorganize a zone within a zone, cadre or cadres
therein. In exercise of the power under proviso to
paragraph

3(1),

it

is

for

the

President

notwithstanding the expiry of the period of twelve

months

prescribed

in

sub-paragraph

(1)

of

paragraph 3, by an order require the State

Government whenever he considers it

expedient

76

so to do to have the power under paragraph 3(1)

exercised.

Thereby, it is clear that the State

Government shall have to place necessary material

before the President; the President shall consider
that it is expedient to organize any class or classes
of posts in the civil services of and class or classes
of civil posts, under the State into a further local
cadre within the local cadre in the zone already
prescribed and to pass an order in that regard
requiring the State government to so organize it. It
is made clear that for the purpose of efficient
administration

or

convenience,

the

State

government may create division/divisions within

the local area or local cadre. But for the purpose
of recruitment, seniority, promotion, discharge etc.,
the local cadre once organized under para 3(1)
shall be final and continue to be operative until
action is taken under proviso to sub-paragraph (1)
of paragraph 3 of the Order.

37.

Though an issue as to what is the scope and extent

of power under

paraghraph-13 of the Presidential Order

was framed, this case will not be applicable as it is not a

case of State Government that the appointments made from
18.10.75 were provisional.

Thus, this Judgment cannot be

pressed into service when factually this Tribunal is called

upon to deal with an issue totally different from what was
considered by the Division Bench of the Honble High Court.
It is the case of all the parties here-to that Presidential Order

77

is supreme. Therefore, the aforesaid Judgments which were

rendered in factually different context cannot be made
applicable to the present case.
38. The next contention that para-8 of the Presidential
Order cannot be imported in para-5 is also not acceptable.
Paragraph-5 would

deal with the consequence of being

appointed to a local cadre and transfer of persons from one

cadre to the other, whereas para-8 deals with reservation
to the local candidates.
paragraph-5
ensuring

in the present case for the

that

the

implemented in the
Order.

The respondents have invoked

Presidential

Order

purpose of
is

properly

letter and spirit of the Presidential

Reservation is undoubtedly provided in para-8 but

the modalities for ensuring that is made in consonance with

the Presidential Order and any order issued for the purpose
of

setting

right

the

maladies

that

occurred

in

implementation of the same would undoubtedly be in the

public interest.

As per Para-5(2)(c ) of the Presidential

Order, transfer of persons from one local cadre to another

local cadre is permissible.

This power vested in the said

clause cannot be curtailed by reading only a part of it. We

have examined the provisions of G.O.Ms.No.610 dt.30.12.85

78

and G.O.Ms.No.674 dt.7.9.2004. The provisions of the said

GOs do not violate the provisions of the Presidential Order.
Therefore, this point is held against the applicants.
39. POINT NO.2:

On perusal of GO.Ms.No.8 dt.8.1.2002

and GO.Ms.No.124 dt.7.3.2002, it is clear that provisions

contained

in

para-3

and

of

the

Annexures

to

GO.Ms.No.763 dt.15.7.1975 have been substituted by new

provisions.

It

is

settled

principle

of

statutory

interpretation that substitutions made to the statutory

instruments would have to date back to the date of giving
effect to the main provision.
which

details

procedure

now

GO.Ms.No.763 dt.15.11.75
stands

substituted

by

GO.Ms.No.8 and as such the procedure of appointments

must be governed by the provisions of GO.Ms.No.763
dt.15.7.1975 as substituted by GO.Ms.No.8.
40. There are plethora of decisions of
Court on this point.

Honble Supreme

The Honble Supreme Court in the case

of GOVT. OF INDIA vs. INDIAN TOBACCO ASSOCIATION

reported in 2005 (7) SCC 396 has held as follows:
2. Interpretation of the expression "substitute"
falls

for determination in this appeal which arises

out of a judgment

and order dated 30.01.2004

passed by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High

Court in Writ Petition No.21674 of 2002.

79

15.

The word "substitute" ordinarily would mean "to

put (one) in place of another"; or "to replace". In

Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, at

page 1281,

the word "substitute" has been defined to mean "To

put in the place of another person or thing". or "to
exchange". In Collins English Dictionary, the word
"substitute" has been defined to mean "to serve or
cause to serve in place of another person or thing"; "to
replace (an atom or group in a molecule) with (another
atom or group)"; or "a person or thing that serves in
place of another , such as a player in a game who
takes the place of an injured colleague".
16. By reason of the aforementioned amendment no
substantive right has been

taken away nor any

penal consequence has been imposed. Only

an

obvious mistake was sought to be removed thereby.

41. In the case of ZILE SINGH vs. STATE OF HARYANA

AND OTHERS reported in (2004) 8 SCC 1, it has been held
as follows:
4. It took more than six months for the State
Legislature to realise its error.

The Haryana

Municipal (Second Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act 15

of 1994) was enacted by the legislature which
received the assent of the Governor of Haryana on
3.10.1994 and was published in the Haryana
Gazette (Extraordinary) dated 4.10.1994. Section
2 of the Second Amendment reads as under:
2. In the proviso to clause (c) of sub-section (1) of
Section 13-A of the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973
(hereinafter called the principal Act), for the word
after, the word upto shall be substituted.
.

80

8. At

the

very

outset

we

may

state

that

the

retrospectivity in operation of the text as amended

by the Second amendment came up for the
consideration of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in
Sunil Kumar Rana v. State of Haryana [(2003) 2
SCC 628].

This Court held that the legislative

intent to compute the period of one year under the

proviso is from the commencement of this Act
meaning thereby from the date of coming into
force of Haryana Act 3 of 1994 and not Haryana
Act 15 of 1994 which merely substituted the word
after by the word upto.

The result of the

substitution was to read the provision as amended

by the word ordered to be substituted.

14.

The

operation

presumption
is

not

against

applicable

retrospective

to

declaratory

statutes In determining, therefore, the nature of

the Act, regard must be had to the substance
rather than to the form. If a new Act is

to

explain an earlier Act, it would be without object

unless construed retrospectively.

An explanatory

Act is generally passed to supply an obvious

omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of
the previous Act. It is well settled that if a statute
is curative or merely declaratory of the previous
law retrospective operation is generally intended
An

amending Act may be purely declaratory to

clear a meaning of a provision of the principal Act

which

was

already

implicit.

clarificatory

amendment of this nature will have retrospective

effect.

81

15. Though retrospectivity is not to be presumed

and

rather

there

is

presumption

against

retrospectivity, according to Craies (Statute Law,

7th Edn.), it is open for the legislature to enact laws
having retrospective operation.

This can be

achieved by express enactment or by necessary

implication from the language employed.

It is a

necessary implication from the language employed

that the legislature intended a particular section to
have a retrospective operation, the courts will give
it such an operation.

In the absence of a

retrospective operation having been expressly

given, the courts may be called upon to construe
the provisions and answer the question whether
the legislature had sufficiently expressed that
intention giving the statute retrospectivity.

Four

factors are suggested as relevant: (i) general scope

and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought
to be applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and
(iv) what it was the legislature contemplated.

The

rule against retrospectivity does not extend to

protect from the effect of a repeal, a privilege
which did not amount to accrued right.
17.

Maxwell states in his work on

interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) that the rule

against retrospective operation is a presumption
only, and as such it may be overcome, not only by
express words in the Act but also by circumstances
sufficiently strong to displace it. If the dominant
intention of the legislature can be clearly and
doubtlessly spelt out, the inhibition contained in
the rule against perpetuity becomes of doubtful
applicability as the inhibition of the rule is a

82

matter of degree which would vary secundum

materiam.

Sometimes, where the sense of the

statute demands it or where there has been an

obvious mistake in drafting, a court will be
prepared to substitute another word or phrase for
that which actually appears in the text of the Act.
18.

In a recent decision of this Court in

National Agricultural Coop. Marketing Federation of

India Ltd. V. Union of India {2003) 5 SCC 23 , it has
been held that there is no fixed formula for the
expression

of

legislative

intent

to

give

retrospectivity to an enactment. Every legislation

whether prospective or retrospective has to be
subjected

to

the

competence.

question

of

legislative

The retrospectivity is liable to be

decided on a few touchstones such as: (i) the

words used must expressly provide or clearly imply
retrospective

operation;

(ii)

the

retrospectivity

must be reasonable and not excessive or harsh,

otherwise it runs the risk of being struck down as
unconstitutional;

(iii)

where

introduced to overcome a

the

legislation

is

judicial decision, the

power cannot be used to subvert the decision

without

removing

the

statutory

basis

of

the

decision.

There is no fixed formula for the

expression

of

legislative

intent

retrospectivity to an enactment.

to

give

A validating

clause coupled with a substantive statutory change

is only one of the methods to leave actions
unsustainable
undisturbed.

under

the

unamended

statute,

Consequently, the absence of a

validating clause would not by itself affect the

83

retrospective operation of the statutory provision, if

such retrospectivity is otherwise apparent.

42. In the case of JOSE DA COSTA AND ANOTHER vs.

BASCORA SADASIVA SINAI NARCORNIM AND OTHERS
reported in (1976) 2 SCC 917, it has been held as follows:
31.

Before ascertaining

enactments

the

aforesaid passed

effect of
by

the

the Central

Legislature on pending suits or appeals, it would

appropriate
principles.

be

to bear in mind two well-established

The

first

is that while provisions of

statute dealing merely

with

matters

of procedure

may properly, unless that construction be textually

inadmissible, have

retrospective effect attributed

to

them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the

passing of the statute are not to
retrospectively in
the absence of

express

enactment

be
or

applied
necessary

intendment
The

second

is that a right of appeal being a

substantive right the institution of a suit carries with it

the implication that all successive appeals available
under the law then in force

would be preserved to the

parties to the suit throughout the rest of the career of

the suit. There are two exceptions to the

application

of this rule, viz (1) when by competent enactment such

right

of appeal is taken away expressly or impliedly

with

retrospective

effect and (2) when the Court to

which appeal lay at the

suit
N.

stands

abolished

commencement
(Garikapati

Subbiah Choudhary :

Veeraya

v.

AIR 1957 SC 540 and

Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving :

369).

of the

1905 AC

84

43. In the case of GURBACHAN SINGH vs. SATPAL

SINGH AND OTHERS reported in (1990) 1 SCC 445, it
has been held as follows:
37.

The provisions of the said Section do not create any

new offence and as such it does not create any substantial

right but

it is merely a matter of procedure of evidence

and as such it is retrospective and will be applicable to

this case. It is profitable to refer in this connection to Halsbury's Laws of England, (Fourth Edition), Volume 44 Page
570 wherein it has been stated that:
"The general rule as mat all statutes,
other than those which are merely declaratory
or which relate only to matters of procedure or
of evidence, are prima facie prospective, and
retrospective effect is not to be given to them
unless, by express
words or necessary
implication,
it appears
that this was the
intention of the legislature....
38. It has also been stated in the said volume of Halsbury's
Law of England at page 574 that:
"The presumption against retrospection does
not apply to legislation concerned merely with
matters

of procedure or of evidence;

on the

contrary, provisions of that nature are to

construed as retrospective unless there is

be
a

clear indication that such was not the intention

of Parliament."

44. The aforesaid decision is followed in the case of

ARVIND KUMAR AND ANOTHER vs. STATE OF MADHYA
PRADESH reported in (2007) 12 SCC 681.

85

45.

In the case of RAJENDRA KUMAR vs. KALYAN

(DEAD) BY LRS. reported in (2000) 8 SCC 99, it has been

held as follows:
22.
The law thus
seems to be well settled that no
person has, in fact, a vested right in procedural aspect one
has only a right of prosecution or defence in the manner as
prescribed by the law for the time being and in the event of any
change of procedure by an Act
of Parliament
one cannot
possibly have any right to
proceed with the pending
excepting as altered by the new legislation and as such
we need not dilate on the issue any further.

46.

The Division Bench of the Honble High Court in the

case of DIRECTOR OF HEALTH, A.P., HYDERABAD AND

OTHERS vs. DR.P.VEERABHADRA RAO AND OTHERS
reported in 2008 (4) ALT 744 considering the Judgments of
the Honble Supreme Court in the case of GOVT. OF INDIA
vs. INDIAN TOBACCO ASSOCIATION reported in 2005
(7) SCC 396, in the case of WEST U.P. SUGAR MILLS
ASSOCIATION vs. STATE OF U.P. reported in (2002) 2
SCC 645, in the case of UNION OF INDIA vs. C. RAMA
SWAMY reported in (1997) 4 SCC 647 has held that an
amendment to State and Subordinate Service Rules by way
of substitution would date back to the date on which the
main instrument was given effect to.
47. Another reason on which the theory of prospectivity
and retrospectivity cannot be pressed into service is that

86

provisions in the nature of clarifications or supplying an

obvious

omission

must

be

considered

as

being

retrospective. On this principle, the Honble Supreme Court

in the following cases has held as follows:
(a) In the case of Jose Da Costa
Another v.Bascora

and

Sadasiva

Sinai

Narcornim and Ors reported in 1976 ( 2)

SCC 917 , it has been held as follows:

31.
Before ascertaining the effect of
the
enactments
aforesaid passed
by
the Central
Legislature on pending suits or appeals, it would
be
appropriate
to bear in mind two well-established
principles.
The first is that while provisions of a
statute dealing merely with matters of procedure
may properly, unless that construction be textually
inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to
them, provisions which touch a right in existence at
the passing of the statute are not to be applied
retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or
necessary intendment

The

second

is that a right of appeal being a

substantive right the institution of a suit carries with

it the implication

that all

successive

available under the law then in

force

appeals
would be

preserved to the parties to the suit throughout the rest

of the career of the suit. There are two exceptions
to

the

application

of this rule, viz (1) when by

competent enactment such right of appeal is taken

away expressly or impliedly with

retrospective effect

and (2) when the Court to which appeal lay

commencement of the suit
(Garikapati

stands

at the
abolished

Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhary : AIR

1957 SC 540 and Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v.

Irving : 1905 AC 369).

87

(b) In the case of GURBACHAN SINGH vs.

SATPAL SINGH reported in (1990) 1 SCC
445, it has been held as follows:
37. The provisions of the said section do not create any
new offence and as such it does not create any
substantial right but it is merely a matter of procedure
of evidence and as such it is retrospective and will be
applicable to this case.

It is profitable to refer in this

connection to Halsburys Laws of England, Fourth

Edition, Volume 44 page 570 wherein it has been stated
that:
The general rule is that all statutes, other than those
which are merely declaratory or which relate only to
matters of procedure or of evidence, are prima facie
prospective, and retrospective effect s not to be given to
them unless, by express words or necessary implication,
it

appears

that

this

was

the

intention

of

the

legislature

48. Thus, it is a settled proposition of law relating to

interpretation of statutes that provisions which have the
nature of supplying an obvious omission, clearing of doubts
and curative amendments would have to be considered as
retrospective.

In the case on hand, procedure which was

adopted resulted in the Presidential Order not being

properly implemented.

This error which frustrates the very

scheme of the special provision, was sought to be cured by

specifying a procedure which would help in furtherance of

88

the avowed object for which constitutional amendment was

made by inserting Article 371(D).

The mistake has been

cured by issuing GO.Ms.No.8 dt.8.1.2002 according to which

open category vacancies were to be filled up in the first
instance

which

may

also

include

meritorious

candidates besides non local candidates.

local

In a given

situation it would also result in all the open seats being filled
up by meritorious local candidates.

Any contra distinction

to the said procedure while filling up of local candidates at

the

first

instance

would

result

in

meritorious

open

candidates being left out of consideration and that hits the

equitable distribution contemplated in the Presidential
Order.

The procedure substituted by GO.Ms.No.8 has cured

this illness and in accordance with law it is to be given effect

from the date on which the Presidential Order has been
given effect to i.e., 18.10.1975.
49. Any principle of interpretation consistently followed by
the court is that, that is a general presumption of
prospectivity in favour of legislative instruments unless
expressly
untenable.

provided

that

it

would

be

retrospective

is

Such a presumption is liable to be made only

in cases where statutes and amendments thereto which are

89

of substantive nature.

Such a presumption does not exist

in respect of procedural amendments.

Assuming for the

sake of argument that amendment has to be presumed to

be prospective, in the present case the amendment being
only procedural in nature, such a presumption cannot be
pressed into service in the light of following dicta of the
Honble Supreme Court:
(a) In the case of ARVIND KUMAR vs. STATE
OF M.P. reported in (2007) 12 SCC 681,
wherein it has been held as follows:
15. The contention of the learned counsel for the
accused that the presumption enumerated under
Section 113-A of the Evidence Act is not attracted
in the present case does not merit acceptance.

It

is well-settled law that presumption with respect to

the procedural matters is normally to be construed
as prospective (sic retrospective).

Section 113-A

does not create any new offence or makes it

punishable. It only deals with presumption which
the court may draw in particular fact situation.
This court in Gurbachan Singh held in Air para 36
as under:

37[36]. The provisions of the said section do

not create any new offence and as such it does not
create any substantial right but it is merely a
matter of procedure of evidence and as such it is
retrospective and will be applicable to this case. It
is

profitable

to

refer

in

this

connection

to

90

Halsburys Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume

44 page 570 wherein it has been stated that:
The general rule is that all statutes, other than
those which are merely declaratory or which relate
only to matters of procedure or of evidence, are
prima facie prospective, and retrospective effect s
not to be given to them unless, by express words
or necessary implication, it appears that this was
the intention of the legislature

(b) The Supreme Court relied on its earlier

decision in the case of

RAJENDRA

KUMAR

vs. KALYAN reported in (2000) 8 SCC 99,

wherein it has been held as follows:
21.
Still
later
this
Court
in Gurbachan
Singh v. Satpal Singh & Others
( AIR 1990
SC 209)
expressed in the similar vein as regards the element of
retrospectivity. The English Courts also laid that the rule
that an Act of Parliament is not to be given retrospective
effect applies only to statutes which affect the vested
rights:
It does not apply to statutes which alter the
form of procedure or the admissibility of evidence, or the
effect which the courts give to evidence:
If the new
Act affects matters
of procedure only, then, prima
facie, it applies to all actions pending as well as future
(see in this context the decisions of the House of Lords
in the case of Blyth v. Blyth (1966)1 All ER 524: A.G. v.
Vernazza: (1960) 3 All ER). In Halsburys Laws of
England (4th Edition: Vol.44: para 925 page 574) upon
reference to Wright v. Hale (1860) 6 H & N
227 and
Gardner v. Lucas (1878) 3 Appeal Cases 582 along with
some later cases including Blyth v. Blyth (supra) it has
been stated:
The presumption against retrospection does
not apply to legislation
concerned merely
with matters of procedure or of evidence; on
the contrary, provisions of that nature are to be
construed as retrospective unless there is a

91

clear indication that such was not the intention of

Parliament.
22.
The law thus
seems to be well settled that no
person has, in fact, a vested right in procedural aspect
one has only a right of prosecution or defence in the
manner as prescribed by the law for the time being and in
the event of any change of procedure by an Act of
Parliament one cannot possibly have any right to proceed
with the pending excepting as altered by the new
legislation and as such we need not dilate on the issue
any further.

50. Even though the issue relates to criminal trial and the
procedure adopted for correction of evidence, the principle
laid down is that amendments to procedure would not affect
a vested right. In the case on hand, by virtue of changing
the procedure, no person who has been appointed would be
terminated and thus, vested right of employee is not
adversely affected.

However, no employee can validly be

heard to plea that he would have a vested right to serve at

a particular place more importantly when it would be
violating the implementation of the Presidential Order.
Thus, the ratio of the aforesaid judgments would justify the
stand of the State that amendment which modify the
procedure can be retro-active. In this connection, it would
be necessary to recall the decision of the Full Bench of this
Tribunal rendered in OA.562/2002 and batch. The issue was

92

framed by the Full bench which did not consider the same
relating to retrospectivity of GO.Ms.No.8

dt.8.1.2002 but

held that as per existing law, ratio of 80:20 between local

and non-local candidates is to be followed and Full Bench
held that GO.Ms.No.2 and 8 were held valid.

The

respondents cannot rely upon the Full Bench decision which

will not come to their rescue. However, judicial review of
the said orders passed by the Full Bench was before the
Honble High Court but Honble High Court also did not
decide the issue of relating to prospectivity or otherwise of
GO.Ms.No.8 dt.8.1.2002.
51. It would be necessary to recall another judgment of Full
Bench which deals with the issue as to selections which
were made by District Selection Committee in 1998 need
not be reviewed and the percentage of local candidates that
is liable to be treated as reserved is 80% as against 70%
followed then.

This Bench also never dealt with the

operation of GO.Ms.No.8 whether it is prospective or

retrospective in its operation.

In view of this, the

contention of the applicants that GO.Ms.No.8 dt.8.1.2002 is

prospective in operation, cannot be accepted by this
Tribunal as it is a fact that GO has been issued for the

93

purpose of correcting an erroneous procedure stipulated in

GO.Ms.No.763 retro activity is evident by implication.
52. It is also settled principle of law that legislative and
rule making authority can correct such errors.

It is also a

constitutionally recognized principle that executive power is

co-terminus with that of legislature and what can be done
in the form of legislation could also be done through
executive instructions.

The only embargo is that field

should not have been occupied either by a statute or by

statutory instruments like the rules.

In the present case

there is neither a statute nor the rules and the Presidential

Order is silent about the same. This power exercised by the
State cannot be construed as violative of the provisions of
the Presidential Order. Earlier, the procedure was evolved
by the Government in GO.Ms.No.763 and the same has been
substituted by GO.Ms.No.8 which cannot be found fault with.
Therefore,
dt.8.1.2002

we

un-hesitatingly

and

hold

GO.Ms.No.124

that

GO.Ms.No.8

dt.7.3.2002

are

retrospective in operation and the action of the State in

reviewing the appointments made right from 18.10.1975 till
to date are not illegal.
53. POINT NO.3:

94

As far as invocation of power contained in para-5 of the

Presidential Order is concerned, GO.Ms.No.674 dt.7.9.2007
would protect the interest of the individuals who are now
transferred like applicants

pursuant to the decision to

implement the Presidential Order in its full spirit. On perusal

of para-7 of the said GO which states that after specific
identification of non-locals who have been appointed in
deviation shall be repatriated to their respective local
cadres by transfer.

The transfer so ordered shall be in

public interest as provided in paragraph-5(2)(c ) of the

Presidential Order.

Further more, paragraph-8 of the GO

goes to state that all the employees so transferred shall be

eligible for TA and protection of seniority as transfers have
been made in public interest.

It is a settled proposition of

law that when action of an administrative authority does not

visit the employee

with civil consequence or any way

prejudices him, no notice need be given. The paramount

importance

of

the

State

is

implementation

of

the

Presidential Order in its true letter and spirit. Under such

circumstances, private interest will have to give room to the
public interest.

Following decisions will support the

contention of the respondent State:

95

(a)

In the case of UNION OF INDIA vs.

MUSTAFA & NAJIBAI TRADING CO., reported

in (1998) 6 SCC 79, wherein it has been held as
follows:
Insofar as the rule of audi alteram partem is
concerned, the position is well settled that an order
passed in disregard of the said principle would not
be invalidated if it can be shown that as a result of
denial of the opportunity contemplated by the said
rule, the person seeking to challenge the order has
not suffered any prejudice.

(b)

In

the

case

of

ALIGARH

MUSLIM

UNIVERSITY vs. MANSOOR ALI KHAN (2000)

7 SCC 529, it has been held as follows:
21.
As pointed recently in M.C. Mehta Vs. Union
of India (1999 (6) SCC 237), there can
be certain
situations
in which an order passed in violation of
natural justice need not be set aside under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. For example where
no prejudice is caused to
the person concerned,
interference under Article 226 is not necessary.
Similarly, if the quashing of the order which is in
breach of natural justice is likely to result in revival
of another order which is in itself illegal
as
in
Gadde Venkateswara Rao vs. Government of Andhra
Pradesh [1966 (2) SCR 172 = AIR 1966 SC 828], it is
not necessary to quash the order merely because of
violation of Principles of natural justice.
22.
In M.C.Mehta it was pointed out that at one
time, it was held in Ridge vs. Baldwin ( 1964 AC 40)
that breach of principles of natural justice was in
itself
treated as prejudice and that no other
'defacto' prejudice needed to be proved. But, since
then the rigour of the rule has been relaxed
not
only in England
but also in our country. In S.L.

96

Kapoor Vs. Jagmohan ( 1980 (4) SCC 379), Chinnappa

Reddy, J. followed Ridge vs. Baldwin and set aside
the order of supercession of
the New Delhi
Metropolitan Committee rejecting the argument
that there was no prejudice though notice was not
given. The proceedings were quashed on the
ground of violation of principles of natural justice. But
even in that case certain exceptions were laid down to
which we shall presently refer.
23.
Chinnappa Reddy,J. in S.L.Kapoor's case, laid
two exceptions
(at p.395)
namely, " if
upon
admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion
was possible", then in such a case, the principle that
breach of natural justice was in itself prejudice, would
not apply. In other words if no other conclusion
was possible on admitted or indisputable facts, it
is
not necessary to quash the order which was passed
in
violation of natural justice. Of course, this
being an exception, great care must be taken in
applying this exception.
24.
The principle that in addition to breach of
natural justice, prejudice must also be proved has
been developed in several cases.
In K.L. Tripathi Vs. State Bank of India (1984(1) SCC
43), Sabyasachi Mukherji, J. ( as he then was) also
laid down the principle that not mere violation of
natural justice but de facto prejudice (other than nonissue of notice) had to be proved. It was observed:
quoting Wade Administrative
Law, (5th
Ed.PP.472-475) as follows: ( para 31)
"....it is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to
when principles of natural justice are to apply,
nor as their scope and extent ....There must have
been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is
no such thing as a merely technical infringement of
natural justice. The requirements of natural justice
must depend on the facts and circumstances of the
case, the nature of the inquiry,
the rules
under
which the tribunal is acting, the subject matter to be
dealt with and so forth".
Since
then,
this Court has consistently
applied
the principle of prejudice in several
cases. The above ruling and various other rulings
taking the same view have been
exhaustively

97

referred to in State Bank of Patiala Vs.S.K. Sharma

( 1996(3) SCC 364). In that case, the principle
of
'prejudice' has been further elaborated. The same
principle has been reiterated again in Rajendra Singh
Vs. State of M.P. ( 1996(5) SCC 460).

(c)
In the case of COMPETITION COMMISSION
OF INDIA vs. SAIL reported in (2010) 10 SCC 744,
it has been held as follows:
However,
the
exclusion of the principles of
natural justice is also an equally known
concept and
the legislature has the competence to enact laws
which specifically exclude the application of principles
of natural justice in
larger public interest and for
valid reasons.
68.
Generally, we can classify
compliance or
otherwise, of these principles mainly under three
categories. First, where application of principles of
natural
justice
is
excluded
by specific
legislation; second,
where
the law contemplates
strict
compliance to the provisions of principles of
natural justice and default in compliance thereto can
result in vitiating not only the orders
but even
the proceedings taken against the delinquent; and
third, where
the law requires compliance to these
principles of natural justice, but an irresistible
conclusion is drawn by the competent court or forum
that no
prejudice
has been caused to the
delinquent and the non-compliance is with regard to
an action of directory nature. The cases may fall in any
of these categories and therefore, the Court has to
examine the facts of each case in light of the Act
or the Rules and Regulations in force in relation to
such a case. It is not only difficult but also not
advisable to spell
out any straight jacket formula
which can be applied universally to all cases without
variation.

(d)

The Division Bench of the Honble High Court in

W.P.No.23391/2009 between Government of A.P.

represented by its Principal Secretary, Education
Department , Secretariat, Hyderabad and others

98

and B.V.N. Malleshwari and Others

has

held as

follows:
30. With respect to the contention of the learned
counsel for the respondent that the said impugned
GO violates the principles of natural justice, as
countenanced by the learned Additional Advocate
General by stating that all the earlier GOs which are
referred to are, in fact, covered by the policy decision
of the State under G.O.Ms.No.610 dated 30.12.1985,
which in turn is based upon the Presidential Order.
The implementation of the said policy, therefore, is
not required to be preceded by any notice. WE are
also of the view and it is now well settled that
principles of natural justice cannot apply in
straightjacket formula in each and every situation.
Even if a prior notice had been given in the present
case, the fact situation being the admitted
appointment of the respondent against a reserved
local post, no useful purpose would have been served
as the said factual aspect, as stated above, is not
controverted even in the OA nor could have been
controverted by the respondent in the reply to such a
notice, if it had been given. The formality of notice
would have been wholly redundant and unnecessary
on the facts and circumstances of the present case.
The contention of the respondent, therefore, that the
principles of natural justice are violated is also liable
to be rejected.

Thus, the Division Bench of the Honble High Court has

held that the various GOs issued are covered by policy
decision of the State Government under GO.Ms.NO.610
dt.30.12.1985 which is again based upon the Presidential
Order.

It is a policy decision which is not required to be

preceded by any notice while issuing the consequential

repatriation
Government

orders.
was

The
to

bring

endeavour
the

of

the

appointments

State
totally

inconformity with the provisions of the Presidential Order.

99

Therefore, the action of the respondent State in exercising

the powers conferred under para-5 of the Presidential Order
is not violative of principles of natural justice.
54. Therefore, the respondent State has rightly exercised
the power conferred under para-5 of the Presidential Order,
it cannot be construed as illegal.
55. POINT NO.4:
The impugned GOs do not tinker with the rankings
assigned by the selecting agencies like APPSC and District
Selection Committees.

It is a well known principle that

selection agencies carried out conducting of selections and

preparing a merit list.
have no role to play.

After preparation of merit list, they

The respondent State has not

tampered with the merit list prepared either by PSC or DSC.

As the list is available with the State, the State has to give
effect to the merit list in accordance with the Presidential
Order.

Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that

respondent State has tampered with the merit list prepared

by the selecting agency and it is not necessary for the State
to consult the selecting agencies.
answered in favour of the State.
56. POINT NO.5:

Therefore, this point also

100

All the counsel have also argued that promotion is a

vested right and it is sought to be taken away.

The

applicants have challenged the validity of repatriation

orders on the ground that their promotional prospects would
be adversely affected. This ground cannot be accepted by
this Tribunal as it is a settled proposition of law in catena of
decisions of the Honble Supreme Court that mere chances
of promotion are not conditions of service and the fact that
there was

reduction in chances of promotion do not

tantamount to a change in the conditions of service.

The

principle has been reviewed by the Honble Supreme Court

extensively in the case of CHANDRA GUPTA, I.F.S. v.
SECY., GOVT. OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT
& FORESTS reported in (1995) 1 SCC 23, wherein it has
been held as follows:
It is well settled in law that no employee has a
right or vested right to chances of promotion as
held by this Court in Ramchandra Shankar
Deodhar vs. State of Maharashtra.
It is now well settled by the decision of this
Court in State of Mysore v. G.N. Purohit that though
a right to be considered for promotion is a
condition of service, mere chances of promotion
are not.
promotion

A rule which merely affects chances of

cannot

be

condition of service.

regarded

as

varying

In Purohit case the district

101

wise seniority of Sanitary Inspectors was changed

to State wise seniority, and as a result of this
change the respondents went down in seniority
and became very junior.

This, it was urged,

affected their chances of promotion which were

protected under the proviso to Section 115, subsection (7).

This contention was negative and

Wanchoo, J., speaking on behalf of this Court

observed:
It is said on behalf of the respondents that as
their chances of promotion have been affected
their conditions of service have been changed to
their disadvantage.

We see no force in this

argument because chances of promotion are not

conditions of service.
26. The same principle is reiterated in the following
cases:
27. In MOHD. SHUJAT ALI vs. UNION OF INDIA ,
this Court held thus:
It is true that a rule which confers a right of
actual promotion or a right to be considered for
promotion is a rule prescribing a condition of
service. This proposition can no longer be disputed
in view of several pronouncements of this Court on
the

point

and

particularly

the

decision

in

MOHAMMAD BHAKAR vs. Y.KRISHNA REDDY

where this Court, speaking through Mitter, J., said:
Any rule which affects the promotion of a
person relates to his condition of service.
But when we speak of a right to be considered
for promotion, we must not confuse it with mere
chance of promotion the latter would certainly
not be a condition of service.

102

Again, in RESERVE BANK OF INDIA VS. C.T.

DIGHE this Court held thus:
It is well settled that a rule which affects the
promotion of a person relates to his condition of
service but this is not so if what is affected is a
chance of promotion only.

This Court in Mohd.

Shujat Ali vs. Union of India held:

But when we speak of a right to be considered
for promotion, we must not confuse it with mere
chance of promotion the latter would certainly
not be a condition of service.. that though a right
to be considered for promotion is a condition of
service, mere chances of promotion are not.
In SHUJAT ALI

case, the respondents went

down in seniority and it was urged that this

affected their chances of promotion.
Again,

in

State

of

Maharashtra

vs.

Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni, this Court

held

thus:
Mere chances of promotion are not conditions
of service and the fact that there was reduction in
the chances of promotion did not tantamount to a
change in the conditions of service.

A right to be

considered for promotion is a term of service, but

mere chances of promotion are not.
Again, in Reserve Bank of India v. C.N.
Sahasranaman, this Court held thus:
This Court had also observed that the right of
promotion should not be confused with mere
chance of promotion.

Though the right to be

considered for promotion was a condition of

103

service, mere chances of promotion were not. See

Mohd. Shujat Ali v. Union of India. See also in
this connection the observations in R.S. Deodhar
vs. State of Maharashtra and Reserve Bank of
India vs. C.T. Dighe.
Again, in Paluru Ramkrishnaiah vs. Union of
India, this Court held thus:
In

the

Deodhar

case
the

of

Ramchandra

petitioners

and

other

Shankar
allocated

Tehsildars from ex-Hyderabad State had under the

notification of the Raj Pramukh dated 15.9.1955 all
the vacancies in the posts of Deputy Collector in
the ex-Hyderabad State available to them for
promotion

but

under

subsequent

rules

of

30.7.1959, 50 per cent of the vacancies were to be

filled by direct recruitment and only the remaining
50 per cent were available for promotion and that
too on divisional basis. The effect of this change
obviously was that now only 50 per cent vacancies
in the post of Deputy Collector being available in
place of all the vacancies it was to take almost
double the time for many other allocated Tehsildars
to get promoted as Deputy Collectors.

In other

words it resulted in delayed chance of promotion:

It was, inter alia, urged on behalf of the petitioners
that the situation brought about by the rules of
30.7.1959 constituted variation to their prejudice in
the conditions of service applicable to them
immediately prior to the reorganisation of the State
and the rules were consequently invalid.

While

repelling this submission, the Constitution Bench

held:

104

All that happened as a result of making

promotions to the posts of Deputy Collectors
division wise and limiting such promotions to 50
percent of the total number of vacancies in the
posts of Deputy Collector was to reduce the
chances of promotion available to the petitioners.
It is now well settled by the decision of this Court in
State of Mysore v. G.B. Purohit that though a right
to be considered for promotion is a condition of
service, mere chances of promotion are not. A rule
which merely affect chances of promotion cannot
be regarded as varying a condition of service. In
Purohit case the district wise seniority of Sanitary
Inspectors was changed to State wise seniority,
and as a result of this change the respondents
went down in seniority and became very junior.
This, it was urged, affected their chances of
promotion which were protected under the proviso
to Section 115, sub-section (7).

This contention

was negative and Wanchoo, J., speaking on behalf

of this Court observed.
It is said on behalf of the respondents that as
their chances of promotion have been affected
their conditions of service have been changed to
their disadvantage.

We see no force in this

argument because chances of promotion are not

conditions of service.
It is therefore, clear that
30.7.1959,

nor

the

neither the rules of

procedure

for

making

promotions to the posts of Deputy Collector

division wise varies the conditions of service of the
petitioners to their disadvantage.

105

Again in K.Jagadeesan vs. Union of India this

Court held thus:
A right to be considered for promotion is a term
of service, but mere chances of promotion are not.

Thus, this point is also held against the applicants.

57.

Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the

cases
i)

and for the foregoing reasons, it is held as follows:

G.O.Ms.No.610 dt.13.12.1985 and G.O.Ms.No.674
dt.7.9.2007 and the consequential repatriation
orders passed by the respondent State are not
violative

of

any

of

the

provisions

of

the

Presidential Order.
ii)

The amendments issued by way of substitution as

per GO.Ms.No.8 dt.8.1.2002 and GO.Ms.No.124
dt.7.3.2002

are

undoubtedly

retrospective

in

operation.
iii)

Invoking the provisions of paragraph-5 of the

Presidential Order need not be preceded by any
notice or observance of principles of natural
justice.

iv)

The

action

of

the

respondents

in

issuing

consequential repatriation orders in furtherance

106

of GO.Ms.No.610 dt.30.12.85 does not amount to

tinkering with
selecting
Service

the ranking assigned by the

bodies

like

Commission

Andhra
or

any

Pradesh
other

Public

selection

committees.

v) Finally, the right of promotion is not at all a vested

right.
58.

In the result, the applications are dismissed.

interim orders shall stand vacated.

The

VMAs allowed, M.As.

and CAs. stand closed. No orders as to cost.

Sd/- P.SUBBA RAO
DY. REGISTRAR
//TRUE COPY//

ASSISTANT REGISTRAR