STUDIEN UND TEXTE ZUR GEISTESGESCHICHTE DES MITTELALTERS JOSEF KOCH PAUL WILPERT und ALBERT ZIMMERMANN HERAUSGEGEBEN VON JAN A. AERTSEN IN ZUSAMMENARBEIT IT. ‘TZOTCHO BOTADJIEV, KENT EMERY, JR., ANDREAS SPEER und WOUTER GORIS (Manacin Eprror) BAND LXXV PASQUALE PORRO (ro, ‘THE MEDIEVAL CONCEPT OF TIME, NEGry 2 6 % 2 1583 hriye THE MEDIEVAL CONCEPT OF TIME STUDIES ON THE SCHOLASTIC DEBATE AND ITS RECEPTION IN EARLY MODERN PHILOSOPHY EDITED BY PASQUALE PORRO- ey, EGro, oth 5, aeeac a) % ne 1683 BRILL LEIDEN - BOSTON * KOLN 2001} 1 7 f TIME AND TEMPORALITY IN THE ‘GERMAN DOMINICAN SCHOOL, OUTLINES OF A PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE BETWEEN NICOLAUS OF STRASBOURG, DIETRICH OF FREIBERG, SKHART OF HOHEIM, AND IOANNES TAULER Niklaus Largier (Berkeley) Ulrich of Strasbourg devoted a part of his work De summo bono to the philosophical problem of time; Dietrich of Freiberg wrote two :exts, De mensuris and De natura et proprietate continuorun, addressing the ‘question of time; Nicolaus of Strasbourg compiled a long treatise on. time, De tempore, as a part of his philosophical handbook for novices, land he also wrote a short text on time and eternity in vernacular; Meister Eckhart discussed the relation of time and eternity in bibl ‘cal commentaries and vernacular sermons; Ioannes Tauler talked about time and eternity in his sermons; and Berthold of Moosburg wrote about time and eternity in a part of his extensive commentary on the Elementatio theologia of Proclus. ‘We would certainly go too far if we were to suggest that these texts, written between 1270 and 1350, should be taken as proof for 1 unique interest of the ‘German’ Dominicans in the problem of time, The so-called ‘Dominican School of Cologne’, where some of these authors taught or studied, did not specialize in the philosophi- ‘eal or theological research on time, and several other authors of the thirteenth century, most of them in their commentary on Aristotle's Physics, have dealt with this topic as well. However, the texts of Ulrich, Dietrich, Eckhart, Nicolaus and Berthold do express a strong interest in the question of time. As we will see, they also emphasize certain specific aspects of the theory of time, These are mainly the question of whether time is in anima or exira animan, and the question of how temporality fits into a hierarchical view of the unfolding of being. The first problem refers to a philosophical back ground, where Aristotle's definition of time in his Piysic, Averroes’ reading of Aristotle and of his commentators, and ~ as we will see especially in the case of Dietrich ~ Augustine's meditation on time in the eleventh book of his Confessions play a major role. The second222 NIKLAUS LARTER problem refers to a more ‘platonic’ tradition, namely the emanation Of tempus, acon, and aeterias - representing a strong element already in Albert's and Ulrich’s thought - where we encounter among other sources Boethius, Proclus, Dionysius the PsAreopagite, and the Liber de causts. ‘These two ‘traditions’ ~ the ‘platonic’ and the ‘aristotelian’ orien: tation are obviously heuristic terms here, rather than historical for- mations ~ will appear in most of the texts that will be discussed in the following pages. However, these traditions represent but one shared element among the texts and authors cited above. The texts also mutually reflect and discuss certain positions, they mirror and criticize each other in a way that makes us think of a lively debate!, and they let us discover a transformation of the philosophy of time around 1300, Dictrich’s attempt to come up with an elaborate philosophical theory of time in two independent treatises ~ ie. not as part of a commentary on Aristotle's Phuics or of a Summa - clearly holds a key position in the cultural context of this debate and of the “Dominican School of Cologne’ It does not stand isolated, however. Rather, Dietrich’s text responds co other theories, for example to Averroes, to Albert and to Thomas. On the other hand Nicolaus of Strasbourg, Meister Eckhart, and Berthold of Moosburg mirror Dietrich’s position ~ at least partially in their texts and in their dis cussions of the concepts of ue and eternity. There is no clear line of continuity that links these authors, however, but rather a frag- mentation and reconfiguration that happens in the course of the uptake and circulation of ideas. Thus none of these authors is a fol lower of rich’s theory in a literal sense, Eckhart seems to have accepted Dietrich’s solution, but there are only slight textual proofs that he fully agreed with him, Furthermore, it seems that in Eckhart’s eyes the question of time and the specific emphasis had already changed, In his discussion of temporality nearly everything is looked at from a different angle, and a new, specific interest in time appears, adapting some ideas and formulating a new concept not so much of time as of the convergence of time and eternity. ' GE B. Mojssch ~ A. de Libera, “Binleinung”, int Ulricus de Argentina (Ulsich af Strashoverg), De sme ono, Liber J, ed. By Mojpschy Tamang, 1989 (Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medit Aevi [=CPTMAI, I). p. xxi | “TIME IN THE- GERMAN DOMINICAN SCHOOL’ 223, “Tauler, who represents the next generation, responds to this, and Berthold does the same in his specific way, quoting extensively from Dietrich but developing at the same time his own point of view and his own theories?. Nicolaus of Strasbourg, on the other hand, crit: cizes Dietrich’s ideas harshly and offers a solution to the problem of time that is close not to Albert the Great or to Thomas Aquinas, but to Hervaeus Natalis, Indeed these authors ~ although they share their dependency ‘mainly on Aristotle's definition of time, on Averroes’ commertary and on a narrow corpus of additional sources ~ do not have a unique and common theory of time, but in their thoughts about time and in their philosophical analysis of time we can uncover a set of common questions and answers, tensions and interests that, inspired the discussions about the concept of time in the late thit- teenth and the early fourteenth century. 1, Nicotaus oF Srrassoure anp His Treatise. De remrore smastrum, mame s, tempus angelorum, acvum, aeternitas: these are Caan ee Nisin of Serabeang deals with in his treatise De tempore, a part of the second book of his Summa This text ~ discovered by ‘Martin Grabmann® and formerly known as Summa pilosa - is a compendium of philosophy, written for the education of younger monks in the sfudia of the Dominican order. As recent research has shown, it is a compilation of older cexts', mainly based on long excerpts from Aegidius Romanus, Albertus Magnus, and Hervaeus Natalis. Nicolaus is not an original or very talented mind ~ Denifle called him, using once again a quite inadequate term, a “Plagiator”® ~ , 2 For Bertholdus Maisberchensis (Berthold of Moosburg) see N. Largier, a umn tect ho tery 2 es Beg dae ye a Dee enn, Hanns on es a tr, Men snr nn Wt dea My Mae Suan crores ay heuer a a Philosophie und Theologie 32 (1985), pp. 155-233. Pita ae Pragaor Niklas vem Sess”, Anh Titra rege des Miers (1888), pp. 312329.224 [NIKLAUS LARGIER but he had nevertheless a clear plan of what novices should be taught and what traditions they should follow. Philosophy here ‘means the philosophy of the most significant philosopher, Aristotle (egregius philosophorum princeps Aristoteles"), whose heritage Nicolaus tries to defend in a time of decay and of a lack of books (“defectus librorum”)®. He follows the intellectual tradi ion of “the doctors of my order and especialy the two most venerable scholars brother Thomas Aquinas and master Alber”, bue in a mote didac te fashion, However, his Sima x not only a date work, bat at © same time a project uf unified corpus of knowledge, represent: ing the ‘thomistc steam’ within the specific cultural context of the ‘Dominican School of Cologne". Comparing Nicolaus of Strasbou to other authors of his time and of his cultural context for whom the project of such a Summa might have seemed already obsolete and too old-fashioned, we are tempted to call his work a project of restora. tion, perhaps directed against che temptations of newer philosophical coneeps oF perhaps intended o restore a cra intelectual coher ence in a time of the unruly theo ee) rly theological and philosophical debates Meister Eckhart and Dietrich of Freiberg, two other the tradition ofthe ‘Dominican School of Coogee and nheee teen ries we will discuss in the cortext of the question of time, played major role in these debates. In the Summa they ate criticized or elfen. ent levels. Nicolaus refutes Dierich’s theories of time in along ques tion regarding Zmpus naam, and he criticizes Meister Eckhart with ©. Wages, Mars in Mia iin un rah Se 1) ds Nicolaus de Argentina (Nicolaus of Strasbourg), Stomma, Prologus totius on 5, eited after I:bach and Lindblad, *Compilatio" (cf. supra, n. 4), p. 199, free 1 gaucho Sl ed loving a as the introductions to the single volumes of the Cor forum Teatro ed des (CPTMA). Fs Sicsson of cone te Wn {Di “tite Dominance Za Poblenack cies hope conzepts”, in Gristedeben im 13. Jahriundert, ed. J.A. Aertsen ~ Speer berlin Noy Yrk 200 Miedo Seder, 7) ppaiaaiae” SP Poin ack lnich edocs Bima, Dr Mal ne il hs ego Nae 198s eM. Shmae Sar Econo pr sits L Sree, Mester Eek Wetemahen, Vanch ter Bin fir, ta, on fu es Noe “ws gm aur tare eH Suro ci rear 102 Dako, pp. 1183 “TIME IN THE GERMAN DOMINICAN SCHOOL’ 225 regard to his theory of the accidents and of the analogy of being” This does not mean, however, that Nicolaus was an enemy of Eckhart, although to be sure he was not a friend at least of some of Eckhart’s theories. In the trial against Meister Eckhart, which was initiated in 1326 by the Archbishop of Cologne, Heinrich of Virne- burg, Nicolaus appears as an advocate of Eckhar’s cause. This, in fact, provoked Nicolaus’ own accusation as an “impeditor inquisitio nis” and concomitant problems that extended from 1325-1331. Nicolaus had nevertheless an outstanding reputation, and his career within the Dominican order proved to be exemplary. In 1325 he was nominated curate general, and in 1327 he represented the province ‘Teutonia at the general chapter of the order in Perpignan. “Together with Henry of Liibeck, John Picardi of Lichtenberg, and John Sterngassen, he was one of the strongholds of the ‘thomistic tradition’ in Cologne where he taught. ‘Tiziana Suare2, the editor of Nicolaus’ treatise De tempore, has spoken of “a specific cultural sensibility toward the problem of time”! which shows in the texts of the authors we count 2s the “Dominican School of Cologne’. And, indeed, as I pointed out above, together with Dietrich ‘and Eckhart, Tauler and Berthold of Moosburg, Nicolaus belongs to an intellectual culture where specific aspects of the philosophy and the theology of time seem to have played an important role, We do indeed encounter a lively debate'*, where ~ in and through the discussion of the question of time ~ other philosophical theories and theological designs are acually implicitly at stake as well or even above all. Thus, we might have to see in the use Nicolaus makes in his De fempore of the thought of ‘Albert, of Dietrich, and of Hervaeus Natalis an attempt to criticize rot only certain theories about time but also a specific tradition within the ‘Dominican School of Cologne, namely that represented WL, Sturlese, “Eekhare, Teodorico ¢ Picard nella Suna pailphiae &. Nicola ai Stasinrgo™, Goma eric dela la lina (1982), pp. 183-206, expecially pp. 195-198. IT, Suarez Nani, Tempo d ere nell domo del meno. I! De tempore di Nila ‘di Stashngo el eibtito sla natura ed senso del tempo agli del XIV seal, ‘Amsterdam 1989 (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie, 13), p. 177: “Ul De empore & Gungue il portavoce di una sensibiitaculturale determinaca al problema de tempo, filrata cuttavia dal opera di Nicola quale sceneggiatore del dibaio”. Wy" Guaree Nam, “Binleung’, in Nicolaus de Argentina, Summa, Lite 1, “Tratats 8-14, ed T. Suarez Nani, Hamburg 1990 (CPTMA V, 2,3), p. 0226 NIKLAUS LARGIER by Dietrich of Freiberg, as we will see. Referring to the criticism of Dietrich’s theory by Hervacus Natalis and likewise turning elements of Albert’s theory of time against Dietrich, Nicolaus may have intended to suggest that the connection between Dietrich and Albert is not as obvious as it seems". This might have been a way to ques. tion @ certain picture of the ‘Dominican School of Cologne’ and to restore a more ‘thomistic’ line. It might have been an attempt as well ‘o picture Dietrich’s position as more isolated than it really was. Although Nicolaus of Strasbourg's treatise on time is not a very original work - as for example Dietrich’s theory of time and Eckhart's thoughts about time ~ it nevertheless represents the status {quaestions in a most interesting way. Moreover it seems to be one of the most extensive treatments of the problem of time in the Middle ‘Ages! Time is indeed the topic which is most broadly discussed in Nicolaus’ Sienna, and there can be no doubt that he tried to portray as many different positions and theories about specific questions and aspects of the philosophical problem of time as possible. In the only surviving version of the manuscript the treatise De fempore consists of the following divisions: De tembore nostro, De nunc tempors, De tempore angelorun, De azvo, De actrnitate. From a more systematic point of view, Nicolaus’ treatise De tempore can be divided into wo parts, the analysis of human time ~ ‘empus nasum - and of the instant ~ nue ‘emporis ~ on one hand, the analysis ofthe different types of temporal duration, i.e. the hierarchy of fempus, tempus angelorum, aevum and acterntas on the other hand. Although this bipartite structure of the treatise does imply to a certain degree a separation between an Aristotelian and a Platonic perspective, an epistemological and an ontological perspective, an analysis of time and movement on one hand, and a philosophy of the emanation of relative temporalities on the other, Nicolaus’ understanding of time nevertheless has its ground in’ Aristotle's analysis of time (Physics TV, 11, 219 b 1-2). Time is always to be con- ceived as the “measure of movement”, numerus motus, be it with regard to humans (measured by lempus contnn) ot, for example, to the operations of angels (measured by tempus dscreton). Movement is State Nani Tonpo ed exert p, 159; Sturlse, “Eckhart, Teodoro ¢ Picardi..”. pp. 191-192. Grabmann, New aufgeinden ltciniche Werke... p. 59. “TIME IN THE GERMAN DOMINICAN SCHOOL 227 in this context not to be understood as movement in space alone, but as including all possible forms of change and variation that char- acterize beings, ie. as the expression of the specific actus essendi and of the ontological status of beings. From this point of view, the dis- cussion of temporality is inseparable from ontology. Tempus, aevum, and acteritas cannot, therefore, be understood in terms of a purely logical or epistemological difference, but rather in terms of an “essential difference” (nas quacrimas divestatem esentilem istaram men surarun)'5, which is able to comprehend the different forms of actual- ity eapressed by the three terms, ” Or tke omer hand, the epistemological and gnoseological dlscus- sions concerning the proper understanding of the Aristotelian delini tion of time (lempus est mamerus motus secundtn pris e posters) and the part played by the soul in the constitution of time will prove to be a key clement in Nicolaus’ text as well. At stake is the question whether time is outside our mind or only within it ~ a question which is important in Dietrich’s discussion of time and in the texts Dietrich refers to as well as in the texts that refer to Dietrich in the century'®, ae efore we approach the question of the definition of time and the discussion of Dietrich’s position, we should take a clos er look at the basic ontological understanding of the concept of time in Nicolaus. He explains this, atleast partially, in a short ereatise that precedes De fompore. Time as the measure of duration, Nicolaus con: cludes in his teatise De mensuris in communi”, is correlative to the state of actuality of its subject. Temporality depends on the actuality of things measured!*, Time as a measure of duration is thus not only a measure of movement in space, but also an expression of the range of change in a state of being or, in other words, an expression of the state and forms of actualization. Insofar as this range of change expresses an ontological difference the difference between esse and operari that characterizes all created beings ~ temporality is "5 Nicolaus zen Summa Il, wract. 8, q. 3, § 18, ed. Suarez Nani, p. 11. srargaras mel ta pitaierete pe net She Auto nd 13 Joan, tran 0 (Bocher Suen Largier, Ze, Zieh, Ewighet.., p.1-70.228 [NIKLAUS LARGER the genuine state of being of created things'®. The specific temporality of beings that are exposed to permanent and inainds cange wcalod Jompus. As a measure of change itis “continuous time", tompus continu, and it characterizes the actus exendi of all things which “although they stay the same have nevertheless an intrinsic succession, so that their specific duration is constituted by the fact that they continuous ly realize one part after anothe:” (“unus et idem numero existens hhabet in se successionem intrinsecam ita, quod duratio eius consistit in accipiendo continue partem post partem”)**, The most homoge- neous and basic element in this world of change is the movement af the “first heaven” (craulatio primi mobili). This movement is thus, as Aristotle showed?*, the measure of all other movements and the uni- fying key to the measure of time in the world of permanent change. In a short treatise written in Middle High German Nicolaus calls this form of time liplice xi “corporeal time”, “that has its foundation in the movement of the first heaven since it is the most uniform movement” (gefiendieret uf des ersten himels bewegunge, wand si aller eine valtgest i), a second type of actus essmdi, characterized by the lack of intrinsic succession, is measured by a different form of temporali the tempus discetem. This refers to the world of the angels, who do not act within a temporal contiruum but in a discontinuous way. The movement of angels cannot correspond to their form, and thus angelic time can not refer to an intrinsic formal change but only to a movement that concerns angelic operations. Angelic time - in German geist zit? — measures these operations; ie. it measures angelic intellections and affects that do succeed each other but that do not have an intrinsic continuous succession®*. Not all angelic Nila de Argentina, Sum, act 8 9.2 we Se 8.4.2,$7 and 9 3,§ 18, Suarer % Rica de Argentina, Sona, wat 8,93, § 14 ed Sure Nai, p10 2 Nicolaus de Argentina, Sim, I, ect an 2 a wo, Seg Mardy seet 2a 1 § eed Sure 2 Nicolaus de Argentina, “6. Traktat: Uber Zeit und Ewigkeit”, in E. Hillenbrand, Nitolaus von Strassburg. Religie Bewegung und Peco 1H, jarani, Frog Be 108 Hechangen nes chee ei aeschice,21) pp. 15015, here pp. 1501 2 Nias de Argentina, "0 Paki pp. 150151, Nicolas de Algetn, Sima tac’ 43,18, ed Sunrex Nai p. 12 Jn de German teats ee above (0 38) Naa speaks of es set td a ‘en ohch beanie by gah Le byt ees eo a | TIME IN THE GERMAN DOMINICAN SCHOOL 29 operations ~ Nicolaus speaks of five different types in De tempore, of four in his German treatise on time® ~ are necessarily measured by the tempus discretum, since some of them, e.g. the movement of bod- ies, form necessarily a continuous movement that is measured by our continuous time; other angelic operations, e.g. the knowledge of God, on the contrary, are uninterrupted and without movement. ‘Thus, the angels - and angelic “spiritual time” - occupy a very spe cific place in the chain of being, in the ordo rerum. This place is noth ing else than the position of a necessary medium, an element of con- nection by means of which the universe can be understood and seen as a whole”, Mediating between divine atemporality and corporeal temporality, the angelic operations form a bridge of communication between acternitas and tempus, between full infinite actuality and finite beings. Some of the angelic operations are measured by continuous time, some by discontinuous time; some partake in the eternal. Referring to the Liber de cawsis””, Nicolaus states “quod inter rem, ccuius substantia et operatio est in momento aeternitatis, et inter rem, ceuius substantia et operatio est in momento temporis, est res media, ccuius substantia est in momento aeternitatis et operatio in momento temporis™, Since angels, intellects, and souls do have their own time, their own temporality, we can perceive “our time” as an dle- ‘ment within a hierarchy of passages between forms of actuality and the correlative forms of temporality as well. Between the temporal and the eternal are thus the celestial body, the angels, intelligences ~ and the human soul: “Quodlibet ergo istorum «rium habet substan- tiam incorruptibilem et habet operationem ubi cadit successio: In motu enim caeli successio cadit; intelligere etiam nostrae animae est cum discursu, angelus etiam non intellegit omnia simul, sed intellec- tioni unius rei succedit intellectio alterius”. The world of radical change, our world and our time, is thus not absolutely alien to the higher levels, less and less affected by change, but instead it is embedded in a structure of communication which embraces the unfolding of specific actualities and temporalities. Souls, angels, % Nicolaus de Argentina, “6. Traktat..”, p. 153. 2% Cf, Suarez-Nani, Tompo ed sere... p. 41 & » (Anon4}, Liber de caus, prop. 30 (1), § 210; ed. A. Pattin, Tiidehnft wor Fife 28 (1966), separate edition, p. 10. "Nicolaus de Argentina, Sima I, rac. 11,0 1,art. 1, §2, ed Suarez Nani, p96. % Nicolaus de Argentina, Siomna, IE, act. 1, ¢ Lar. 1, §3, ed. Suaree Nan, p. 6.230 NIKIAUS LARGIER intelligences, and celestial bodies belong to this world of mediation, since they are all not fully embraced by the world of endless varia. tion, nor are they one with the One without variation. Our soul belongs to the intermediate world as well, since it has the possibilicy to transcend the purely temporal and to take part in the eternal, The soul is, as another sentence from the Liber de cawsis puts it, “above time and underneath eternity [...] in the horizon of eternity and time” (“Esse vero quod est pest aeternitatem et supra tempus est anima, quoniam est in horizorte aeternitatis inferius et supra tem- pus")"*, Nicolaus does not quote this sentence in his treatise De tem- ‘Pore, but it will become important in Eckhart’s speculation about the dynamic relation between time and eternity. With regard to their being (esse, wesen®) - not to the specific operations measured by the tens divretum discussed above — these creatures, angeli et aninae et corpora caclestia®® are called aevitena, Nico- Jaus comments: Nane autem sic est, quod «st quoddam ens, quod nullo modo est variable nec secundum esse nee secundum operationem ree seca ddum rem nee secundum raionem, sicat Deus. Quaedam sunt vari abla realer et secundum se quantum ad ete quantum ad oper ionem, sicut corporalia vel emporalia. Et sunt quaedam, quae non sunt vali seater per se quantum ad ease, sed amen terathe sunt per alu, sciicet vireut divina et secundum nostrum modum intelligendi quantum ad ess, etrealiter autem et per se sunt variabil Ja quantum ad operationes, ut sunt angel ct alia aeviterna, Et ist medio modo se habent respect diorum priorum, quia primusn totaliter est invariabile, secandum totaliter variabile illud autem aliguo modo invariabile, selcet ad esse, et aliquo modo variable, scilicet quantum ad operationes*™ ° In other words, the middle level of the actus essendi — after empus con- ‘ina and. tempus discentiauem ~ does not involve any succession, nei- ther continuous nor discontinuous. The measure of the mode of being of all the aevitema is the azum, or, as Nicolaus calls it in the > (anon, Lier de eau, prop. 2; ed. Pain, p. 50. For places where Keka and Thomas quote and comment this passage, see Larger, 2, eisien, mie passage, see Lange 2a ehh, "Nis de Ageing, SmI ra 12 91a 2,69, Sure Np 19 1 Nii eH sh & Nicolaus de Argentina, Sona, I tac 13,41, ar. 2,§ 3, 0d, SuarezNani,p- 190 Sednsce ams Sos Se 2 ae 393 See oe TIME IN THE-GERMAN DOMINICAN SCHOOL 21 German text, the “created eternity”, geschaffn ewikei®. The acvitera as such do not move, do not change; they stay permanently ident- cal. They are totwn sind, an intrinsic totality measured by the aewum. However, they are not to be identified with the uncreated eternity of God since they are always and only 2 part of the world, Not the absolute actuality and totality of eternal being, but simultaneity and permanence mark the difference between the aeviternal and the tem: poral. This is the medium between temporality and eternity, since it no longer refers to succession. It is time without succession; it is not in the realit of uovesnent and poceniality but int die reali of simul taneity and stability. However, it includes a beginning, conceding an ontological priority to the eternal, and it allows for an end, since God might decide to annihilate the aevitena, Among the six defini tions of aeowm that Nicolaus inherits from John Damascene and from Dionysius the Ps.Areopagite, he consequently prefers the very broad one, which understands aevum as aeternitas participata’®.Thus, again, the category of the temporal is embedded in a dynamic struc ture of communication. Adternias, finally, is the basic concept that excludes all change and that therefore can be applied only to God: Alius vero est actus, qui est quartus, qui nullo istorum modorun: est terminatus vel inclusus intra terminos durationis vel limites generis vel speciei, nec in se nec in adiuncto expectat aliquid in posteram nee cadit sibi in praeteritum, sed comprehendit in uno simplici acta rationem perfectionis entitatis et operationis intellectionis et voiun- tatis. Er ealis actus mensuratur aeternitate simpliciter dicta, id est ‘mensura simpliciter extra omnes terminos et limites existente”, This means that eternity is a predicate only of God (esse aeterntam sin- pliciter solius Dei proprium es). It is absolutely opposed to time and movement: sicut enim tempus respicit moturn, ita aeternitas immutabilitaem, And it is absolutely beyond change: “Quia ergo solus Deus totaliter est invariabilis, omnis enim creatura aliqualiter est variabilis™*, With ‘Thomas Aquinas — and, it might be added, with everyone else in the Middle Ages ~ Nicolaus refers here to the definition given by Boethius 85 Nicolaus de Argentina, “6. Trak..." p. 150 © Nicolaus de Argentina, Summ I rac 12, q. 1, am 1, § 4 ed. Suarez Nani, p. 128, Nicolaus de Argentina, Simmel, tact. 8 q.3,§ 16, ed. Suares Nani, p. IL Nicolaus de Argentina, Sinn, Il, tact 13, q,un.,§ 2, ed. Suarez Nani, p. 199.232 [NIKLAUSLARGIER in his De consolatione philosophiae, “aeternitas est interminabilis vitac tota simul et perfecta possessio”, “ime is the full and perfect posses- sion of infinite life". However, Nicolaus does not insist on a sec- ‘ond important element of Boethius' concept of eternity, namely its emanation into time and its structure of life, vita, which will be at the core of Eckhart’s theory of the relation between the temporal and the eternal". 2. Tue Discussioy or Dicrmict’s Titrory oF Tine Time, tempus nostrum, lies on the opposite side of this scale of the expressions of actuality which culminate in the fullness of divine presence. Time refers to the world of permanent change where everything is finite, where everything is always ‘mixed up’ with potentiality. Time is, as Aristotle defined it and as Nicolaus repeats it with the commentator on Aristotle and the scholastic authors, mea- sure of movement and of change with regard to before and after- wards, mumerus motus secundum priu: et posterus. On the basis of this Aristotelian definition of time, Nicolaus addresses in his treatise on “our time” the following questions: (1) an tempus sit, (2) quod sit quidam mumerus, (3) quod sit numerus brioris et posteriori in motu, (4) quod solum sit passio primi motus et non mukiplicetur ad maltplcatinem motu, (5) ponenda sunt circa eis quiditatem et inguirendum, an tempus sit primus mots vel prima sphaera, vel tantum habet esse in anima, (6) utrum sit quant- as divreta vel continua, et quare potas sit in genere quantitatis quam motu, cam tamen contiuitatem a motu partiet, et de proprietatibus evs, quae com pet ef tam gratia continuiatis quam grata diveretionis As Tiziana Suarez has shown, :he sources for Nicolaus’ discus- sion of these questions are mainly Aristotle and the commentaries to the Plysi by Albert the Great and Giles of Rome. We cannot follow the whole exposition of the problem of time by Nicolaus here, but ‘we will focus on the fifth question of the first chapter, which con- tains a long discussion of the position of Dietrich of Freiberg, This question regards the intramental or extramental status of time, a question that was discussed extersively by the commentators of % Nicolaus de Argentina, Siouna, Il, tract. 13, q. un. § 5, ed. Suarez-Nani, p 180, Bocthius, De ansolaine plaaaphiar Vp 6 WCE Larger, Ze, Zeid, Evighet., pp, 241-242. TIME tN THE-GERMAN DOMINICAN SCHOOL 233 Aristotle since late antiquity and that was a key issue among the medieval authors in the thirteenth century as well'!. Nicolaus indeed knew this discussion very well, and we must suppose that he had Dietrich’s text or an outline of it (by Hervaeus Natalis?) in front of him while he wrote his refutation, Nicolaus starts the argument with a summary of three waditional positions: The first identifies time with the movement of the first heaven, the second with the first sphere, the third one denies that time exists outside the soul (“sciendum, quod de quiditate temporis fuerunt ues opiniones. Prisna Gait, quod tempus esse auutus pris mobilis. Secunda, quod esset prima sphaera. Teta fuit, quod tempus nihil esset extra animam’)", The first opinion had been ascribed to Plato, the second one to Pythagoras, the third most likely refers to Galen and Augustine, whose opinions Albertus Magnus had refuted ‘with the remark that “neither Galen nor Augustine really understood the nature of things” (quod nec Galenus nec Augustnus sciverant bene nati- ras rerun), With arguments that are taken from Albert's commen: tary on Aristotle's Piysics Nicolaus refutes these opinions as well. In agreement with Albert he concludes that the third thesis would make time a pure fiction, comparable to a chimera. This is “obviously impossible” since movement does exist outside the soul and therefore time, which can be called an attribute of movement, does so as wel Nicolaus states that we have to suppose that time has a reality that 's independent from the soul, but that at the same time this reality reccives a formal complement from the soul which counts anteriority and posteriority with regard to movement. This, he concludes, is the opinion of Aristotle and of Averroes' Nevertheless, he goes on, “some” (quidan) did not find this thesis sufficient. Albert the Great cured toward a more ‘realist’ direction, introducing the concept of a munerus formalis which exists “outside the soul”. Thus, although the soul is the efficient cause with regard to time, materia numerata and numerus formalis do exist outside the soul and constitute time as matter and form independently from the 4. Gof Jeck, rts contra duguatinum .. cf pra, note 16), Nicolaus de Argentina, Sima, I tract 9, set 1, 4-5, § 1, ed. Suarer Nani, p. 92 © Albertus Magnus, fa Phys, IV, tract. 3, ©. 4; Pipsiconam libri VII, ed. A Bongnet, Pris 180099, I, p. 312, Nicolaus de Argentina, Sina, 1, tact. 9, Sec. 1, q 9, ar. 3 § 4, ed. Suarer Nani, p. 34,234 [NIKLAUSLARGIER soul. On the other side, Thomas Aquinas offered a different, more ‘subjectivist’ solution. He supposed that time belongs to “those things” that hold a “middle way” hetween extramental and intramen- tal reality (Alii dicunt, quod tempus sit de numero entiuam medio modo se haben- tin), Time has a material extramental reality since it “belongs” to the movement of the primum mobile nd to all other movements, never: theless it needs the formal complement from the numbering soul since it is mumerus motus secundum prias et pasterius and since the existence of number always presupposes a soul that counts, This opinion ~ which obviously leaves room for many questions and discussions — forms the background of the discussion of the positions of Dietrich of Freiberg and of Hervaeus Natalis in Nicolaus’ De lempore. Quidam addunt, “some add” to this, says Nicolaus with Dietrich of Freiberg in mind, that time is constituted by the intellect and that it is a pure ens ab anima which nevertheless is an ens primae intentions, In other words, time is in and through the soul which constitutes its formal being, and it is nevertheless a res realis™”. The presentation of this opinion of Dietrich of Freiberg in Nicolaus’ treatise is the most extensive one, filling thirty-wo columns of the only surviving manu- scripe’® and roughly ten pages in the edition of the Summa", The presentation of the opinion of Thomas Aquinas is dealt with in a couple of lines. As Loris Sturlese has rightly remarked, “thirty-two columns represent a treatise in themselves”, and it is obvious that the refutation of Dietrich’s theory of time not only focuses on this specific question but in a more general sense on Dietrich’s philoso- phy and his theory of the intellect. Nicolaus de Argentina, Sima, , tract. 9, sect. 1, q.5, art. 3, § 4, ed. Suarex: Nani, p34 © Nicolaus de Argentina, Sima, , tect. 9, sect. 1,4. 5, art. 4 § 1, ed. Suarez: Nani, p. 34 # Nicolaus de Argentina, Sumin, I, tract. 9 sect. 1, 4.5, art. 5,§ 1; ed. Suarez- Nani, p. 35, Nicolaus refers to: Theodoricas Teutonicus (Dieerich of Freiberg), De ongine rerum pracdiamentalion, ed. L. Starlese, in Opera ora, ed. K, Flasch et al, Hamburg 1977-1985 (CPTMA I, 1-9, I, pp. 137-201. In the discussion of time hae copies extensively from Dietrich's De natura et ropriette continuoram, ed. R Reh, ‘in Opera omnia I], pp. 251-273. However, Nicolaus does not refer to Dietrch’s rea tise De mensas (ed. R. Rehn, in Opera omnia I, pp. 215-239), © God. Vat. Lat. 3091, 186ra:194rb, © Nicolaus de Angentina, Summa, Il, tract 9, sect. 1, q. 5, art 5, §§ 1°92, ed Suaree Nani, pp. 35-45. © scurlese, “Eckhart, Teodonco e Pica...” (cf. supra, n. 10), p. 186, "TIME IN THE GERMAN DOMINICAN SCHOOL 235 Dictrich’s contribution to the theory of time around 1300 is beyond doubt the most original and interesting. A couple of years older than Meister Eckhart and Nicolaus, he wrote three treatises that must here be taken into account. De mensuris and De natura et proprietate contimuorum address specific questions of a philosophy of time, while De origine rerum praedizamentalium discusses the status of predication ‘with regard to the intellect. As I have pointed out, Nicolaus attempts to refute one key clement in Dietrich’s theory of time, namely the thesis that “time is only in the soul”. This is indeed not only a central concept of Dietrich’s philosophy of time, but it also reflects an imper- tant element of his theory of the intellect. Already in his early treatise De origine rerum praedicamentalium Dietrich had written: ‘Atestatur autem propositae intentioni hoc, quod invenicur aped philosophos de causalitate quorundam entium, quae secundum cos per actum intellectus constituuntur. Videtur cnim fuisse intentio Philosophi, et Commentator sus manifeste hoc exponit de tempoce in TV Phyiconan, Augustinus etiam hoe plane et late determinat XI Coyfesionum, Boethis etiam in libro De Triniat dict de numero, quod numerus non sit aliqua res naturae. Et si tempus est tale secundum opinionem philosophorum, quale erit ipsum quando, “quod ex adiacentia temporis relinguitur® ‘This synthesis of Aristotle, Averroes, and Augustine will be at the center of Dietrich’s analysis of the meaning of the Aristotelian defin- ition of time in De natura et proprietate continuorum as well®?, Udo Jeck has shown that the main source of Dieirich’s understanding of the relation between time and soul is to be seen in his interpretation of Aristotle's definition of time, in his reading of Averroes’ commen- tary, and in his reading of Albert's interpretation of Averroes®. In Dietrich’s view Aristotle's understanding of time (tempus eit rumerus smotus secindu prius et paserius) does converge with Augustine's thco- ry of time (“time”, “future” and “past” are based on a distentio anim % Theodoricus Teutonicus de Freiberg, De origine rerum pracdicanentalion, 5.2, cd, Sturese, p. 181.1219, ® For Dietich’s theory of ime see: Jeck, Aridnices contra Augustnum.... pp. 428 444: N. Largier, Ze, Zeiiceit, Fuighet; R. Rehn, “Quomodo temps sit? Zur Frage nach dem Sein der Zeit bei Aristotcles und Diewich von Freiberg”, in Ven Mester Dietrich xu Meister Eithart, ed. K. Flasch, Hamburg 1984 (CPTMA, Behe, 2h pp it PB jcc, ride cna Angus. p. 498236 [NIKLAUSLARGIER, Dietrich concludes: Since time is the number of movement it exists only insofar as movement is counted. This presupposes that some- thing is counting. If there is no soul ~ or no intellect ~ which counts, number is not, and thus time is not as well. Augustine's explanations in book XI of his Confess complement these thoughts. They ‘explain not only the constitution of time within the soul that counts movement, but also the constitution of past and future. Thus we might say that the concept of the “extension of the soul”, its expan- sion through memory and expectation, is at the basis of Dietrich’s understanding of the Aristotelian definition of dime and of Averroes’ commentary. Time is seen as the actualization of a potential time within the experience of the soul. This actualization happens in the form of the numbering by which the soul measures its own exten- sion, Time is the form movement takes in the soul that is affected by change. Hence it is indeed a res primae intentionis et res realis, not a res secundae intentionis. Ic is a reality that is constituted by the intellect with regard to our experience of raovement. In this theory, the foun- dation of time and its subject are stil the circular and uniform move ‘ment of the heaven, but time receives its specific character, the form that constitutes its being, only through the activity of the intellect ‘with regard to the fact that itis affected by this movement. Thus we hhave to conclude “quod tempus non est aliquid reale extra animam, sed per acturn animae constituitu: et determinatur circa res"®5. The intellect constitutes the essence of time, which is expressed in its defi- nition, insofar as it determines the number of movement with regard to before and afier. Nicolaus gives a quite adequate outline of Dietrich’s arguments™, He makes it clear from the beginning that he is interested not only in Dietrich’s treatise on time, but also in the broader context of his theory of the intellect. Thus he introduces this part of his treatise ‘with a reference to Dietrich’s theory of the intellect: * For Augustines discussion of time ef: K. Fasch, Was i Zeit? Augustin von Hipp, Das XE Buk dr Cosine. Horsch phloophhe Sui. Tet ~ Ubenetang ~ onnendar, Frankfurt a. M. 1990; J. Kreuzer, Pulchrtudo. Von Eskewen Gute bei “Augutin, Bonerkungen ou den Bicher LX, ted XI der Confessiones, Minchen 1995, pp. 105.205. © Theodoricus Teutonicus de Freiberg, Dera. cin 5.1, ed. Ren, p. 265, © CA Suatex Nani, Tenpo ed ese. pp. 158105; Sturlese,"ckhar,eodorico « Picard,.", pp. 186193, “TIME IN THE GERMAN DOMINICAN SCHOOL 237 Et addunt quidam, quod tempus propter hoc non debet dici res secundae intentions, sed cst res primae intentionis et res reals, « ‘quod intellectus speculativus possit causare res primae intentionis Secundum, quod tempus quantum ad esse suum formale dependect ab anima. [...] Primo igitur, quod intellectus speculativus possit cor: stituere res primae intentionis, probant sic: Certum est, quod inte! lectus practicus potest constituere res primae intentions et res reales sicut nummus, qui hodie non est precum, cras fit pretium; hoc fact intellectas practicus et multa talia similia, ct esse pretium est esse quid reale. Exgo patet, quod intellectus speculativus non est minor's cffcaciae et virtutis quam practicus. Ergo, si potest practicus, potent ‘etiam speculatvus, mmo ct plus poterit quam practicus” On the following pages he copies extensively from Dietrich’s De nala- 1a et fropritate cmtinuorum, and he summarizes Dietrich's thoughts: It is indeed impossible to perceive time if we do not perceive or imagine movement and if we do not experience a transition from before io after, And since the movement of the first heaven is the reason for all the other movements, it is also the reason for all the movements wwe experience. Thus, this movement is the first and principle eff- cient cause of time. But our imagination, through which we experi ence our mutations that are caused by the first heaven, is a closer effective cause. The intellect finally, which counts prior and poster or moments and apprehends the distance (distensionem) between them, completes the causes of time with regard to its origin. The intellect is thus the formal cause of time. “Other” philosophers - Nicolaus means Hervaeus Natalis, with whom he agrees ~ prove the contrary, namely “quod tempus secun- dum totum suum esse sit res naturae, nec secundum esse formale nec secundum esse materiale dependet ab anima”’. As Tiziana Suarez. has shown, Nicolaus’ own refutation of Dictrich’s arguments is based on the criticism of Dietrich by Hervaeus Natalis™. Departing Nicolaus de Argentina, Stnne, UL, eract 9, sect 1, q. 5, ant. 5, §§ 12, ed Suarez Nani p35. Nicolaus de Argentina, Stonna, I, tract. 9, sect 1, q. 5, ar. 5, § 26, Suarez Nani, pp. 43-44. CE Theodoricus Teutonicus de Freiberg, De nt cmt, 5.3, ced. Reha, pp. 264-267 5 Nicolaus de Argentina, I, ect. 9, sect 1, q.5, art 6,§ 1, ed Suarez Nani, 45 P'S Tiziana Suarer Nani, “Noterelle sulle font albetine del De tonpre di Nisa at suasburgo", Prabuger Zeta fy Thibephic ind Thong 82 (1085), pp. 25 247. Suaree Nani, Tempo ed esr». 104.238 [NIKLAUS LARGIER from the solution of Thomas, Hervaeus nevertheless develops a much more ‘realist’ view, radically opposed to Dietrich of Freiberg and quite different from Thomas Aquinas as well, who appears with regard to the question of time t be a precursor of Dietrich’s view. Nicolaus summarizes his own opinion with the words of Hervaeus Natalis: Dicamus igitur et secundum illos, qui sunt de ist opinione et bene: Quantum ad hoc, quod tempus materialiter est, idem est quod [primus motus vel quanttas saccessiva ipsins. Et tempus quantum ad id, quod est formale in eo, nil addit super talem motum nici quan dam rationem vel habitudinem, scilicet rationem mensurae vel rationem numeri, quae ratio nom ponit in numerum. cum motu. quanta ad wtrumgue tempus ext es naturae ees inact seripto intellectu®! ‘This means that time has its material and its formal reality fully out- side the intellect, and that it is an ens naturae which is in no way con- stituted by the intellect alone. Even the solution of a middle way proposed by Thomas Aquinas is excluded here. Indeed, we mij find it difficult to distinguish between the material and the formal aspect of time at this point. ‘This, however, does not scem to irritate Nicolaus. His interest, ‘one might say, consists in the defense of an ontology of time which inscribes time in a ‘realistic view’ of the hierarchy of being, a view that is opposed to a rather ‘idealistic view” ~ if one might say so ~ as it is elaborated in Dietrich’s theory, where the intellect constitutes time as a res primae intentions ‘What does this criticism of Dietrich’s position mean? As we have seen in Nicolaus’ discussion of temporality, the way that leads from time to eternity implies a hierarchical vision of the relation between these terms. Time, temporality in the proper sense of fempus nastram, is nothing else than the reality of dependent, finite existence. It is the intrinsic dimension of the imperiect being which desires perfection and which moves toward an end. In Nicolaus of Strasbourg’s thought, there is no doubt that itis the priority of the ontological level which is expressed by the specific character of temporality: fem- bus is the expression of permanent change, i.e. of being that is sub- Nicolaus de Argentina, Sima Il, wact.9, sect 1, q.5, art 7, 1, ed, Suarer Nani, p. 5. TIME IN THE GERMAN DOMINICAN SCHOOL? 239 ject to alteration, corruption, and transmutation; acoum is the expres sion of permanence and stability, ie. of being that is not subject to continuous intrinsic change but to variation in its operations, te a beginning and a (possible) end; aeternitas is the expression of fall actuality and totality, ie. the fullness of being, Tiziana Suarez speaks of a “mutua ed intima compenetrazione del tempo e dellessere"™, and of the fact that in Nicolaus “essere é divenuto temporale, e¢ il tempo temporaliti®, I would not go that far, however, in my rea ing of Nicolaus. He goes one step in this direction; nevertheless, he seems unwilling to go one step further and to understand time and temporality as a reflection and an expression of the involvement of the soul in this hierarchy of temporalities and in the unfolding of being that includes the life of the soul. Thus time is not understood as a reality that is constituted by the soul with regard to movement, but it is a reality that belongs to an objective order of being and beings, ie. a ‘realistic’ ontology. The criticism against the ‘subjec- tivist’ theory of time in Dietrich of Freiberg is at least in part moti vated by this emphasis on the ontological point of view ~ an empka- sis which goes against the preferred point of view of Dietrich’s theo- ry of the intellect, namely the specific emphasis of his philosophy of the intellect. In a broader sense the arguments of Nicolaus are directed not only against the idea that the intellect constitutes the essence of time but ~ in « more oblique way ~ also against Dietrich’s theory that the intellect by its very essence returns to God and this ‘embraces in its own unfolding the whole realm of temporality and cternity®. The ‘objectivist’ or ‘realist’ view of Nicolaus forbids such © GEN. Largir, "Negaiviit, Miglichket,Freiheit. Zur Dilferenz awischen der Philosophie Diichs von Freiberg und Meister Eckhart, in Divi tot re. Neue Fenpchtiensner Phosphe, Theale und Noturuiieneha ed. Kt Kandler ~ B. Mojsisch ~ FB. Stammkéuer, Amsterdam - Philadelphia 1999 {Bochumer Studien mur Philosophie, 28), pp. 149-168, © CE, Mojssch, Die Theor des ntelets bei Dievich von Freiberg, Hamburg 1977; B, Mojssch, “Averroisische Elemente in der Incllektheore Dictrchs von Freiberg, in deers in Mitelaler, ed. F. Niewobmer ~L. Searese, Zitich 19, pp. 180-186; K-Plasch, "Parr w! brag. Das Hervorgehen des Intellekts aus si nem gotdichen Grund bei Meister Dietrich, Meister Eckhart und Berthold von Moosburg”, in Atendindivke Mutt in Mitlaer. Symposivis Kloster Engelberg 1981, ed. K. Ruh, Stutgare 1086 (Germanitsche Symposion, Devahisbie, 7 pp. 1255184240 IIKLAUS LARGIER an understanding of the intellect that makes it the key element in a dynamic flow of everything from the divine ground and back into this ground. Ie cuts down, as it were, the presuppositions, which in Dietrich’s view allow for the transition from the language of ontol- ogy and of ontotheology to the language of the theory of the intel- lect and of an intellectual union that transcends time. As we will see the stand Nicolaus takes against Dietrich is ~ although in other terms and more implicitly than explicitly - opposed to the point of view of Meister Eckhart's thoughts about time as well. Although Eckhart inherits certain clements of Dictrich’s dheury of time, he nevertheless insists on other aspects of the philosophy of temporality and eternity. Thus his interest shifts toward a present oriented eschatology and a convergence of the eternal and the tem poral, which is meant to overcome the boundaries of ontology and ‘ontotheology as well, but which at the same time chooses another vocabulary than the one used by Dietrich. In Eckhart, the figure of the intellectual return to the divine ground is replaced by the figure of the birth of God in the soul and by the language of the “fullness of time”. However, Eckhart and Dietrich share an attempt to over- tum an ontology of time ~ represented here by Nicolaus of Stras- bourg ~ chat might have seemed too static in their eyes. 3. Tiste, Temporaurry, Erernrry: ‘Tue Discussion or Tis 1N Eexitant’s Works In one of his sermons Toannes Tauler criticizes the followers of Eckhart of Hoheim who ~ as Tauler points out ~ understand Eckhar’s thought “from the point of view of time rather than from the point of view of eternity”: ‘Unser herre sprach: ‘ich bite dich das sti eins werdent alse wir cins sin. [..] Dise einunge enmag die vernunfi nit begriffen, wie daz die sele mit dem libe vereinige ist und wie si weircket und beweget sich in der hant, in dem fusse roch in dinen eigenen gelidern; wie solte denne der mensche goettelche einunge version? Die herin kumment, dic wirkent ussewendig der zit in ewikeit, uss geschaffenheit in uungeschaffenheit, us manigvaltkeit in einvaltiket, ii blibent in friden in unfridesamkeit und sinckent mit cinre minnenclicher begerunge in den grunt und tragent Gote alle ding wider uf, alse es ewedlichen sgewesen in ime ist und er es geminnet tind gemeinet het, Diz ist ncher wan daz gebet, verre neher: herin enmigent mit kummen die in ire i “TIME IN THEGERMAN DOMINICAN SCHOOL 241 nanirlicher vernunfé ufgewachsen sint(.... des enverstont ir mit; er sprach uss der ewikeit, und ir vernement es noch der 2it. (...] Bin hhoch meister der sprach von disem sinne sunder wise und sunder wege, das begeiscen vil hite mit dem ussern sinne und werdent vergiftige menschen, und herumbe ist es hundere werbe besser daz rman mit wisen und mit wegen darauo kumme®, (Our Lord said: ‘Task you to let them be one as we are one’ ...] This tunity can not be grasped by the intellect. Since the intellect can not even understand how the soul is together with the body, how it works in the body and how it moves in the hand, in the foot and in your bother members, how could man be able to understand divine unity? Who gets there does not act in time anymore, but in eternity, not within the realm of the created, but of the not created, not in the mani fold, but in the uniform. They rest in peace in the middle of a world without peace and they sink into the ground in their loving desire and lead everything back to God where it always was and where it was loved and intended to be. This is much more intimate than prayer. ‘And nobody can get there who lives and grows in his natural reason alone [...} you do not understand this correctly. The one who taaght this [Eckhart] spoke from the point of view of eternity but you under stand it from the point of view of time. He also spoke about it as something ‘without ways and without modes’, but many people understand this in a purely external way and get corrupted. Thus itis a thousand times better to get there with ways and modes). Eckhart himself, we might want to add in defense of the people ‘Tauler criticizes here, did not do very much to prevent himself ftom being misunderstood. As many scholars have remarked, his interest in the philosophical problem of time is very limited; and often, expe: cially in his vernacular sermons, the speculation about eternal things is stronger than anything else, above all a rigorous analysis of the concept of time™. Thus, we find the discussion of the points that we Yoannes Taulerus, Sermo 15; Die Predicen Taulrs, ed. F. Vetter, Berlin “910 (Deutsche Texte des Mittelalters, 11), p. 69,11-32. Compare p. 68.28.36: “Devon sprach Cristus: ‘habe alle dinge geton die du mir gebe uo tuonde’. Hette er das sgenomen nach der zit, so enwere es nit aso gewesen, wanne es waz noch vil ange: ‘on; er solte noch do liden und erston, sunder er nante noch der wisen der ewieit, do sine alle ding, alse si ewiglich sint gewesen und ewiglich sin soellent, also sind sib iewe in diseme nu ietze, alse dise hite die hier in reht gerotent, die wurckent alle ire werg ussewendig der zit in ewikeit, st bectent in Gottes geste und lebent unl vwtrkent in ime und sin in selbes gestorben, wanne nieman mag ein anders wer: den, er enmuesse denne entwerden dar er do ist” © See Laugier, Ze, Zeit, Bue... pp. 72-198 and 252299; A. M. Haas, “Meister Eckharis Aulffassung von Zeit und Evigkeit™, Freiburger Zeisc fir242 [NILLAUS LARGIER have encountered in the works of Dietrich and of Nicolaus in only a few places of Eckhar's existing writings. We shall point to these places briefly before we turn to Eckhart’s main interest, the relation between the temporal and the eternal. In one of his Parisian Questions, entitled Ulrwm in corpore Crist ‘orients in oruce remanserint fornae elementorum, Eckhart discusses the ontological status of time and number: --partes non portant esse, sed accipiunt esse. Ideo est tantum unum csse, Nam unitas fundatur in esse. Unde Boethius: ‘omnia pewnt esse. Numerus enim nihil est, quia unum non est. Numerus enim, quia cadit ab uno, cadit ab esse, Tempus etiam, quia numerus, ideo nihil est, quia non est urtam, sed numerus. Ideo ens et unum com vertuntur. Ideo Boethius: ‘omne quod est, ideo est, quia unum numero est, Eckhart repeats the same thought in his commentary on the book of wisdom: Juxta praedicta sollerter advertendum quod tempus hoc ipso et hoc solo non est, quia deus in ipso non est; et ¢ converso, deus non est in tempore propter hoc, et solum propter hoc, quia tempus non est Ratio autem utriusque est, quia tempus numerus est. Numerus enim ct omne numerosum ut sic non est in deo nec deus in illo. Sed nec ipse numerus est, ct ideo non est, quia in deo non est nec deus in ipso, Rurnus ¢converso: deus non estin illo, quia ise numeras non est en This ontological argument refers explicily to Bocthius, who writes in his commentary of Porphyrius that “everything that is, is, insofar as it is one” (omne enim quod est ideirco est, guia unum est)”. With this Phibephiewnd Thelae 27 (1980), pp. 325-355; U. Kern, “Eckhars‘Authebung’ der Ze de ale det Ze” re te fi Php ad Tele 4 8, % Eckhardus de Hoheim (Meister Eckhart), Quarto Parisinsis Vn. 5, LW V 80,12-8144, ~ Editions: Magister Eckhardus, Die deuschen sud latenivhen Werke, Die Deutschen Werke, ed. J. Quint [DW]: Die Lateinichen Werks, ed. J. Koch et al. (LW), Seurgart 1936 i; Magister Eckhardus, Werke, Texts and Translations by J. Quint et al. ed. N. Largier, Frankfurt a. M. 1999 (Bibliothek deutscher Kiassiker, Bibliothek des Minelalters, 20-21) (EW), 1 Fethard de Helin, I Sip. § 295, LW I (68). 680611 ius, gen Porhyn Ic. 10; ed. 8. Brande, Wien - Lei EL 48),p. 1622, ee “TIME IN THE “GERMAN DOMINICAN SCHOOL? 243. argument Eekhart denies the fact that time might exist on its own. If there is time, its being depends fully on God. As everything else, which is subject to time, it only as far as it refers to and panici paves in divine being. Thus, the being of time can be understood only in the way in which Eckhart understands the being of all the other created things, i.e. through an analogy of being that explains the relationship between being and beings” Ina third textual passage ~ an explanation taken from the docu- ‘ments of the proceedings against Eckhart ~ he confirms this point of ‘Quod autem dicitur: deus nichil habet facere cum tempore: verum ‘est, quia deus non est in tempore nec tempore affictur. Ejus autem actio est ipsius substantia, Est autem verior et subsilior intellectus quare deus non est in tempore, nee quidquid habet facere cum tempore, quia tempus non est, ut patet ex Philosopho, Commen tatore et Augustino. Deus ergo non est in tempore sicat esse non est in non ente; deus enim esse est. Quinymo hee est tota ratio quare tempus non est, quia deus, esse scilicet, non est in tempore, sicut nec est in malo, in privatione, in negatione, in peccato, in partibus, que ut sic non sunt preter et extra totum. Talia enim que esse non habent, nesciendo sciuntur secundum illud Matthaei ‘nescio vos’; et in Psalmo dicicur: ‘ad nichilum deductus est in con- spectu cjus malignus’. Sensus est quia malignus sive malus non cadit sub cognitione dei, ‘in conspectu cjus’. Et iterum, quia hoc ipso quod quid a deo non conspicitur, nichil es. Sicut enim quod a calore non conspicitur calidum non est, quod ab esse ipso non con- spicitur, nichil est” In the proper sense ~ Eckhart points this out in his commentary on Exodus as well ~ we cannot say that the past or the future are. God alone is and thus time is not. This does not mean, however, that time is not at all. As in other contexts where Eckhart insists on the fact, that creatures “are not” and that God alone “is”, this means that the being of time and the being of creatures can only be understood in 71 For Eckhart’s concept of analogy see B. Mojsisch, Miser Ecthart. Analg Univositit und Einket, Hamburg 1983; J. Koch, "Zur Analogielehre Meister Eckharts" in J. Koch, Kleine Selif, vol. 1, Rome 1973 (Storia e Letteratura, 127), pp. 367-397, 7 Kekhardus de Hoheim, Press cloniens, H, art. 27, in G. Théry, “Beition critique des pidees relatives au procés d’Eckhart contenues dans le Manuscrit 33 b Ue la Diblivaieque de Soese”, Archives dite doctrinal et Bien du meyer ige 1 (1926/27), pp. 129268, here pp. 231-235.244 [NIKLAUS LARGER relation to the being of God, i. in relation to being itself. In other ‘words, time and everything thet is subject to time, i not in the full and proper sense of the word since its being is finite, since its actuali: ty is limited, and since it is not its own ground but participates in this ground only insofar as it ic At another place this ontological argument is reformulated in epistemological terms: Adhuc autem secundo principaliter notandum ex eodem quod tem pps et umerus in anima es, et in ipsa tantum propric et formalite. Ratio est, quia proprium et formale est animae solius accipere multa simul et ut unum et multa copulare ut unum et in uno, sicut apparet in formando propositiones affirmativas aut relativas, Unum autem ct ens idem, in uno semper sedet esse. Tempus igitur, utpote ‘numerus, naturaliter in anima est et ab anima est; a quo enim quod: bibet ex, im illo et est. Rursus etiam anima ex sui proprietate format propositiones de non ente, puta de praeterito et futuro, de chimera, this veras et per consequens entes. Verum enim et ens convertun: tur sicut unum et ens” From this point of view, time and number are only in the soul. As it seems and as Udo Jeck has tried to show, Eckhart follows Dietrich’s arguments’, Another passage, from his first Parisian question Utrum in deo sit idem exe et intelligee, confirms this observa: tion Veritas autem ad intellectum pertinet importans vel includens rela tionem, Relatio autem totum suum esse habet ab anima et ut sic est praedicamentum reale, sicut quamvis tempus suum esse habet ab anima, nihilominus est species quanttatis realis praedicamenti’. How are we to understand Eckhart's concept of time on the basis of these texts? Insofar as we consider time in epistemological and ® kad de Hobe, f Sip, § 297, LW TI 6 pra, 68) pp 8111-825 Eka gos on: “Sit rgo mula abn oa ttn eH ca in ana sunt ni, sn in este eee in pay pn ee ets in pi eck, ote ra dust, pp. 5400, This incudes a polemical cam against Alber (PTV ace 1c Borge, p. 289), eka conc cs yt Averoes Ur Py IV. 13) ed. Venti 126. 202: “Tempus atu i acu non ere anima in prensa vero ey tt ana noms) and wth “Thomas Aquinss. Cr: Ecards de Hobeim, fe Bs, § 54, EWU py 981.59. *"Eckhandon do Hobe, Quasi Parsons 19 ASW Vs pp de 2. Moje, ser tart dnage p31 | “TIME IV THE-GERMAN DOMINICAN SCHOOL gnoscological terms, time is not outside the soul. Time and number are constituted by the activity of the soul that is affected by change and movement. If we consider time in ontological terms, time belongs to the realm of finite, limited being, which is only as far as it participates in divine being. Time is thus always to be seen and ‘0 be understood in the horizon of the “fullness of time”, of the “full ness of being” on one hand, of the involvement of the soul -n change on the other. Does this mean that we should understand time as a purely “ineellectsal reality”, as Martin Grabmann called it? Rekhart seems to inherit his arguments from Dietrich but he does not seem as decided as Dietrich with regard to an answer to this question. Indeed, time is farmaliter only in anima et ab anima, but time is mater- alter in everything that is subject to time. Thus, we might conclude, time i this moment of continuity that characterizes all created being, and thus temporality is the ontological condition of all created beings that receive their being from the divine ground of being: Deus autem, utpote esse causa est esse omnium, et quantum ad se tota, et extra ipsum nihil est practer nihil. Bt hoc est quod hic dicitar de deo sapientia: ‘in omni loco, etiam in omni tempore assistens cs) Ex his patet quod omnis creatura, quamvis perfectissima, et contin: ‘uc ~ quia non continue et semper actu ~ accipit esse a deo, et suum esse est in continuo fluxu et fieri, secundum illud Gen. 1: “in princi pio creavit deus caclum et terram’. ‘Creavit’ inquit in praeterto, ‘in principio’ quantum ad fieri. Semper enim creatum et esse habet et esse accipit (..)”, In textual passages like this or the following one Eckhart refers to the ontological meaning of time (duratis), which seems to be far 7 CE M, Grabmann, Neuaufeefndone Parer Quaestionen Meer Ecbarts wd tire ‘Sielng in seinem gestigen Entuickhansgange, Mitachen 1927 (Sicrungsberichte cer Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philos-philol. und hist. Kl, 12 Jabrgang, 3. Abhandlung), pp. 9455. “7 Bekhardus de Hoheim, Jn Sap, § 291 ff, LW Il, pp. 626,9027,7. Cf. fn Exit, 6.45, LW I, p. 274,4-10: “Part gitar quod omne ens et de numero entium non hhabet ex se, sed ab alio superiori esse quod sitt, esurit et appett, Propter quod in ipso non figitur nec haeret nec inchoatur esse; nec permanet absente, etiam fer intellectum, ipso superiors, Propter hoc semper site praesentiam sui superius, et potius et proprius accipit continue esse quam habeat fixum aut etiam inchoatums [poum cee, Sie ergo stt et appenit etre omine ens, uepote in se et ax se nudum, scut ‘materia formam ‘et turpe bonum™.246 [NIELAUS LARGIER ‘more important than the epistemological aspects of the problem of ime. {..-] aeternitas et omnis duratio generaliter respicit ipsum esse rerum, Onis autem res tals duraredickur, quemdi suum ese ‘manet. Hine est quod secandum differentiam ipsius esse distinguun tur modi durationum, puta aeternitas esse divinum, aevum esse rerum creatarum intransmutabilium, tempus autem esse rerum mutabilium. Tune sic: duratio respicit per se et primo formaliter jpsum esse. Esse autem rerum creatarum non est ipsa earum essen tia, sed est quid posterius quantum ad ordinem intelligendi. Igicar duratio dei, cuius esse est ipsa substantia, est aliquid prius acterni tate. Quod si prius, et posterius®, ‘Temporality is thus the lowest element in this hierarchy of differentia: tion and distancing. God is the fullness of being and this means a fullness of time that precedes even the concept of eternity. Angels and other aeilema are different frem eternity since their duration is to be understood as aevum and since their affctiones und intlectones are mea- sured by a tempus dscretum. The lowest step, temporality, is character- ized by permanent mutation, alteration, and corruption. It is mea- sured by the éempus continuen®, which refers to all movements that have their origin in the uniform, timeless and aeviternal movement of the sky. Eckhart confirms this view also in his German sermons: “Neither time nor place to touch the heaven. [...] It is not in time and its course is incredibly fast. The masters teach that its course is with- out time and that time has its origine in its course” (“Den himel beriieret noch stat noch 2. [..] Er enist ouch niht in der zit; sin lout ist unglouplich snel. Die meister sprechent, daz sin louf ist sunder zit; mér: von sinem loufe kumet div zit”)#°. Thus, time refers to any mots with regard to prrius et posterius, quae ad motum pertinent and with regard to this uniform movement of the heaven From the point of view of several passages in his works, we might be uncertain whether Eckhart is closer to Dietrich or to Thomas Aquinas. With regard to the understanding of prius et pos- terius and with regard to the emphasis on the fact that time is for- ‘aliter in the soul, Eckhart seems to conclude in a way that is similar Fine nn m5 29 0412 reestade meh RE Ren ecaacenad Sc SSR Aen i lie lil ili iia “ME IN THE ‘GERMAN DOMINICAN SCHOOL a7 to Thomas*, He does not seem to belong to those (quidam) who ~ in the words of Nicolaus of Strasbourg - prove that time is fotaliter ab ‘anima but rather to those ~ i, Thomas Aquinas ~ who say that itis aliquo modo {...] ab anima, set quantum ad ese sum formale®. In sia lar ways Eckhart speaks of the fact that number and time depend formalier on the soul and that this is the reason why they should be ‘considered as an ens in anima®, ‘Nowhere in Eckhart’s works, however, do we find an analysis of the question of time which might be compared to Dietrich’s theory. Icis thus dillicult, if not impossible, to decide whether Eckhart is fol- lowing Dietrich’s theory or not. Some textual passages sugges: a close relation to him, other passages seem to suggest a closer rela- tion to Thomas. It seems as if Eckhart inherited some fragments of the theory of time that circulated in the intellectual world around him, combining - in Dietrich’s way ~ Aristotle, Averroes, and ‘Augustine on one hand, adding ~ at least sometimes ~ the distine- tion that was made by Thomas when he insisted on the fact that time is, liter in the soul. ‘Although Eckhart was not interested in a theoretical clarification that might be compared to Dietrich’s theory, we can nevertheless conclude that he does follow the same line of thought and that he does privilege a ‘subjectivist’ position as well. ‘Thus, he participates in a wadition of thought chat has to be situated between Thomas ‘and Dietrich with regard to the problem of time, and within the realm of their discussions and readings of Averroes and of Albert's interpretation of Averroes. However, Eckhart does not participate in the elaboration of a philosophy of time on the same level. Rather, he seems to have been interested in the relation between the temporal ‘and the eternal, or, as I think we should call it, in the eschatological * ‘Thomas de Aaquino, fx hs IV, lect. 7, §§ 577578 fers psoron Arsh opin cP. M. Mage ‘oran “Rema 1965, pp. 282.288: “Be quia retin ox pase poses, neces ext qd in meu st prs et poss aed nates que sunt licen agen en loo. Bt per conse aacretun in empare et pus ck postr, quia motu et tempus ia Se hunt, Sua craper strom eorum sequiur ad sern [-] quod in motu st prise woe fer coming moti ex ordine pari wagitadins. Sic igtur pris str suntan eum mot, se ifr rane “SN de Argentina, Sma, ace 9 sec 1 5, a0 7, § 6 el Sarr Noi; po 57-58 Fn Aquino, Pls TV, lect 29 § 629, Maggio, p. 308310.248 NIKLAUS LARGIER horizon of temporality and in the position of the soul, which is “on the edge of time and eternity” ®. This means that the philosophical and theological question of the convergence of the temporal and the ternal pushes aside the question of what time and temporality actu- ally means. The ontological argument, concluding that time and temporality are the expression of finite, limited, dependent being, forms the background of this interest of Eckhart’s in a possible con- vergence of time and etemity. However, the privileged position of soul and intellect ~ a specific element of the tradition of the ‘Schoo! of Cologne’ after Albert and Dietrich - does not disappear in this shift. Rather, it is reevaluated in a way that is quite different from Dietrich but coincides with it insofar as it emphasizes the dynamic relation between the intellect, the soul and God. Eckhart thinks about this dynamic relation as well. He does 80, however, from the point of view of his theory of the birth of God in the ground of the soul and based on the observation that the soul is “on the edge between time and eternity”, Temporality, the temporal mode of being of all created, finite, and dependent beings, encounters the atemporal, the fullness that characterises the eternal within man’s soul. The structural element which grants this encounter, the point of possible cransition of the temporal toward the eternal, is Eckhart’s concept of the birth of God in the soul. Both lines of thought - the theory that time is only in the soul, and the theory of the radical ontological dependency of time - converge in this point of transition. ‘This does not only mean that the soul by its very activity transcends © Eakhards de Hobeim, Se 23, DW, p. 405, 1; Some 32, DW Tp, 1334 fs Sem 65, DW Ip i121 kha cs expo ins tue ke tueans Alcor Claraevallons, De pe an, 7, PE 10, col BLL nin eps inter fg varios humara Butts anna, cose wt ceam dem ve Jin vel in sami sceipenstatoneny in solo deneps vel gui vel dolore pores sta Deus etn sumo, mundi no, Deu in eode stats erate ssc pes consis Mundus ear mutase snper nase aan a thus quasi medio cleats quar conditons Sune exelent xcs tt qe dorsum et upended Deum, tetas sone lutem necdom pert vero in gine deorum woman, pr cup immersers, satin per ifias dstasines rapier, ca seme quads divsus disipabur Si vero ab hifi drone quae desu ci ese hace inna deserens aru pala in una se eager secum sxe dice, ‘ano ampli in unum calles, quai mugs cogiane et desde nuts ‘abit donee tarde omni nina se ead lam vera unas ae Sst apud Deu, nmusbaten pervenia, tt perpewe sine aml maabisace Wicstudine Fequseat Ch lo Liber dew prop 3k aps Bh TIME IN THE GERMAN DOMINICAN SCHOOL 249 the realm of time in its knowledge of eternal reasons or ideas. It also does not only refer to a theory of the ‘visio beatifica’ or to a theory of the intellect as conceived by Dietrich of Freiberg. The core of this transition is rather Eckhar’s concept of the “fullness of time”. ‘He writes in his sermon 38: Sant Paulus sprichet: ‘in der viilede der zit sante got shnen sun [Galatans 4 4 Sane Augustin spricher, war dA st villede der at da nimer zit enist, dist ‘villede der zit™, Damne ist der tac vol, als des tages nicmer enist. Daz ist ein ntwarheit: alli zit muoz da be sia, dA sich disiu gebure hebet, wan niht enist, daz dise geburt also sére hinder als zit und créatire. Daz ist ein gewissiu warheit, daz it got noch die séle von natire niht berieren enmac. Mohte diu le vvon zit beriieret werden, so enware niht séle, und mohte got von zit beriieret werden, cr enware nit got. Ware aber, daz. zit die stle beriieren méhte, 6 enméhte got niemer in ir geborn werden, und si ‘enmobte niemer in gote geborn werden. Da got geborn sol wercen in der séle, di muoz alliu rit abegevallen sin, oder si muoz der zit ‘entvallen sin mit willen oder mit begerunge. . Ein ander sin von ‘villede der zt’: der dic kunst hate und dic ‘mat, daz er die 2it und allez, daz in der zit in sehs tlsent jérer ie geschach und daz noch geschchen sol biz. an daz ende, het wider gezichen kiinde in ein gegenwertic nd, daz ware ‘villede der a’. Daz ist daz nti der éwicheit, da diu séle in gote alliu dine niuwe und vriich tund gegenwertic bekennet und in der lust, als diu ich iezuo gegenwer tic hn. Ich las niuweltche in einem buoche - der ez gegriinden Iiinde! , daz got die werlt iezuo machet als an dem érsten tage, dé er dlic werkt geschuof. Hie ist got riche, und daz ist gotes rfche®. {Saint Pant writes: in the fullness of time God sent his sun’, Saint ‘Augustine explains how we should understand ‘fullness of time “where there is no time left, there is fullness of time”. The day is full when there is nothing left of the day. This is indeed true: All time must be gone where this birth [of God's sun in our seul] should take place, since there is nothing that hinders this birth more than time and creature. It is true that time cannot touch God or the soul by its very nature. Could the soul be touched by time, she would not be soul, and if God could be touched by time, he woald not be God. Gould time touch the soul, God could never be born within the soul and the soul could never be born in God. Insofar as * Baxhardos de Hola, Smo 38, DW U, , 230-2824. Compare: Pains xine inelignts, Pa er orgie ec. Pt Snaach 2 edo N. Larger Gi Fourie, Hildeseim 1008 (sche Tess dex Maeahers A), pp- 12 sa Tear250 NIKLAUS LARGIER God should be born in the soul all ime must be el and deste must be ie from ime, mest ciniazed and wl ere is another meaning of ‘fullness of time’: If someone di have the power and the skill to reeollec in one present monet time and everything that happened in time since six thousand years and that will happen until the end, chis present moment would be fullness of time’. This is the moment of eternity, where the soul sees everthing in God as new, fresh and present and in the joy of the Present moment. I read recently in a book ~ who might be able to tnderstand this! = tat God cates the world at this very moment as he did in the first day when he created it. This is God’s richness and tis his kingdom seal. Tiss God is, ‘Most likely Eckhart refers here to a passage from Augustine's Enar- rain it an, weve his clarion ofthe relation beeen ime and eternity comes closer to a passage in Augustine's commen, tary onthe Gospel of John where he saya: "Deniqae abs ven lent tudo temporis} venit et ille qu: nos liberaret a tempore. Likerati enim a tempore, venturi sumus ad aeternitatem illam ubi non est ‘empus, nec dictur ibi: Quando veniet hora; dies est enim semi ‘nus, qui nec pracceditur hesterno nec excluditur crastino”® In these and similar texts the birth of God in the soul is associat ed with a transcendence of time and a liberation from time However, this transcendence should not be understood as a sheer negation of time, ‘Fallness of tne’ is rather the convergence of ere ation and incarnation, or ~ in Eckharts term's ~ of eet ontinva and ‘ncarnato continua that coincide and reveal themselves in eve moment. The mi, the moment where present, past, and fature com. ‘erg dk moment ofthe bch of Godin the sou. This moment as exy it 7 : as Fecha explains nohing eke than the moment of man's ges 5 © Aagutinus, Bharatines in Fas 7,§ 16; Turgut 1956 (CCSL 39), p. 995, oe ® Augustinus, Jn Toh, tract. 31, ¢. 5, PL35, col. 1638. Closest to Eckhart’ ce of lind nor is Agustin, Be Trias TV ot aha ae ‘iso 1968 (CESL 50, p 107.“ Seen ia oe ins ropa consi’ (Sop 727), swt eam imple sancon Anglos Sed co are ‘unde mi an pe epson as Ase at ‘hominibus vel in hominibus, ut antea in Patris erat et in Prophetis, sed ut pom vba fre avo, et hoo Petur Laniars gates ee Sent I, dist 15, ¢ 8, n. 1, S Soi dt 15,6 8, mL, vol 1 ed. PP Coleg 8. Bonaventurae, Grotaterrs TIME IN THE GERMAN DOMINIGAN SCHOOL! 251 “Gelassenheit” and “Abgeschiedenheit”, radical detachment that negates the intentional character of the soul and of its temporal world (the world of “why”, “warumbe”), opens up a freedom within. the world where everything appears in the light of this convergence In other words, Eckhart does not choose to interpret the formula that “man is on the edge of time and eternity” in a dualistic or gnostic way, but rather in terms of the convergence of time and eternity in any act of human life. The birth of God in the soul, the intimacy between God and man, he points out with regard to the exemplary scene of Mary and Martha®®, is unrecognizahle. The transcendence of time within time does not express itself in signs or intentions, ele ments that would reconfigure the finite world of time and change. Rather, the transcendence of time is nowhere else than in the simpic ity of a gesture that is the actual convergence of creation and incarna- tion, ic. the “fullness of time”, The return of the detached soul into its own etemal ground of pure affirmation is chus nothing else chan this gesture of acceptance, this action “without why”, this affirmation ‘without intention. In this affirmation eternity converges with time, and the temporal, which “is nothing”, is affirmed by its transparency toward the eternal. Eternity is not the negation or the exclusion of time, but the ‘other’ of time, which reveals itself in the moment of the gesture of acceptance where everything becomes a gale. The ‘moment of birth’ Eckhart speaks about — which is a struc tural rather than a temporal moment ~ has its place nowhere else than in the paradoxical, since non-intentional, act of “detachment”, the “Lassen’, ie. nowhere else than in a gesture that establishes free- dom. Furthermore, this gesture marks the transformation of both the ontological and the epistemological realm into the ethical. Being and knowing are surpassed ~ or subverted ~ in an act that fully real izes the given and thus conflates time and eternity in an unspectact lar experience of the present. The convergence of time and eternity in the “fullness of time” is nothing else — we might want to conclude * Eekhardus de Hoheim, Sento 70, DW Il, pp. 187-208. Cf. Sono 86, DW I, pp. 481-492. © Cf, Eckhardus de Hoheim, Sermo 39: “Daz worcelin “gift velle in ait; daz ‘wortelin igibe® dene der 2tniht. Gift suochet alle wege daz i an den dingen, aber {gibe ist unde bl6z und alzemale Is alles warumbe (... Sprechent unser meiser, alse verre als sie tragent minne, sO ist ez ein gibes aber gift di ist als cin koufowan lunde hit alle weye warumbe" (Preiigten und Traktat, ed. F. Peiler, Leiprig 1857 [Deutsche Mystiser, 2}, p. 121,2431). CE. Werke [ngra, ». 68), 1, p. 12, and com mentary to p. 1A252 NIKLAUS LARGIER ~ than this gesture of acceptance which transcends the language of ontology as well as the language of epistemology. Thus according to Eckhart the intellect does not return into this divine ground of actual: ity, eternity, and fullness, insofar as it establishes pure actuality within lsself~ this is Dietrich’s thesis ~ but insofar as itis pure receptivity, possibility, a blie istihet, die da beroube ist alles wesens und aller isticei?™ the stage of the event of the evernew. Consequently, Eckhart does not speak of a vision of God, but of a birth, of a gift, in which God, ic. pure affirmation reigns in the soul that has become “nothing” ‘This birth has its ultimate reality ~ as Eckhart shows in his sermon about Martha and Mary ~ in the gestures of pure acceptance “with: out a why”, in any moment where time and eternity converge. Ac this point we should, however, discuss not only the difference between Eckhart and Dietrich. A significant difference between Nicolaus of Strasbourg and Meister Eckhart must be seen in their respective readings of Boethius’ definition of eternity. Nicolaus was interested mainly in the characterization of aeternitas as “endless” (interminabili), as “fully actual’, and as “absolutely simultaneous” (‘ota simul**. Eckhart, on the other hand, was instead interested in the dynamics expressed by the concept of life (vita) that Boethius introduced at this point (aeternitas et interminabis vitae lta simal et per- fica posesso)®. In the terms cf a paradoxical figure of Eckhart’s German works, this inferminabils vitae possess has its reality in the person who is a at che same time a “virgin” and a “wife” in other words, in the figure of a productivity without intention’. Life means thus fullness, presence of the eternal within the temporal, not in the form of a negation of the tempcral but in the form of an affirmation that does not see its ground in the finite, the known, the owned, and the wanted, but in an infinite ~ end thus eternally other and unqual- fied = that precedes and inchides it forever. This affirmation is — seemingly paradoxically ~ nothing else than the gesture of “Lassen”, Eckhardlus de Hobeim, Seno 67, DW Il, p. 133,6 8 ° Suarer-Nani, Tempo ed exer. pp. 87-88, "© Cf, Eekhardus de Hoheim, Smo 38; Sermo 66, DW Ill pp. 123,11-124,5; Jn Joh § 19, p, 904,25-27; and my commentary in Eckhardus de Hoheim, Werke, I ‘commentary to pp. 406,31-408.26 % Eekhardus de Hoheim, Sema 2, DW I, pp. 2445; Sermo 49, DW Il, pp. 427. 451. Cl. commentary in: Eckhardus de Hoheim, Werke 1, and N.'Lavgien, *Reprisentation und Negatvitit, Meister Eckharts Kriik als Dekonstruktion®: i Contemplata ali tradere. Studien zum Verkinis von Literatur wad Spiitualtih, eA" C Brinker et a, Bern 1945, pp. 371-390, TIME IN THE GERMAN DOMINICAN SCHOOL 253 of “Gelassenheit”, that is, of the radical - seemingly ‘libertarian’ — firmation of the finite and of the temporal were whom we quoted at the beginning of this chapter, is aware of the possible consequences of this figure of thought, which can indeed be understood in a radically antinomistc way. Eckhart's ‘ib ertarian’ influence - his thought that there can be no “way” that mediates between the eternal and the temporal ~ has been entized by people other than Tauler in the fourteenth century as well. They suggested that such a concept of freedom and of a unity of man and. God without “ways and modes" - and heyand a clear distinction of temporality and eternity ~ is misleading. Tauler responds exacty to this radical consequence of Eckhart's philosophy of the convergence of time and eternity, since he proposes a return to “ways and modes for those people who do not understand Eckhart correctly. Thus, he turns away ~ at least here - from Eckhart’s concept of an ethics of the fullness of time that should transcend the language of ontological dependency as well as the language of the intellectual vision of God. In Tauler ~ at least in the cautious remarks of his sermon 15 ~ we seem to be brought back to a theoretical point of view where time and eternity are more clearly distinct. This means, as well that the radical and nondescript freedom of Eckhart’s view of the unity between man and God is in Tauler’s texts carefully redefined in terms of a subjectivity that knows of the fact that “there is no way”, but nevertheless understands itself explicitly through its temporal ways and its place in time®®, % Cf, Das Buck vom geisicher Arm, bsher eka als Johann Taulers Nachfolgrng des armen Lis Cre. Dene, Movchen 1877, p 3, 2127 (Pras Ds a rs oN Larger, Ziich st Ssichen 1089, p 8) pee soann Taser, Sm 15,08 Veer, pp. 0033 1.24.252 NIKLAUS LARGIER ~ than this gesture of acceptance which transcends the language of ontology as well as the language of epistemology. Thus according to Eckhart che intellect does not return into this divine ground of actual- ity, eternity, and fullness, insofar as it establishes pure actuality within itself - this is Dietich’s thesis - but insofar as it is pure receptivity, possibilty, a lie itch, die da eroubet ist alles wesens und aller itch! the stage of the event of the evernew. Consequently, Eckhart does not speak of a vision of God, but of a birth, of a gift, in which God, ive. pure affirmation reigns in the soul that has become “nothing” ‘This birth has its ultimate reality — as Eckhart shows in his sermon about Martha and Mary — in the gestures of pure acceptance *with- out a why", in any moment where time and eternity converge. At this point we should, however, discuss not only the difference between Eckhart and Diewich. A significant difference between Nicolaus of Strasbourg and Meister Eckhart must be seen in their respective readings of Bocthius’ definition of eternity. Nicolaus was interested mainly in the characterization of aelernitas as “endless” ({nterminabilis), as “fully actual”, and as “absolutely simultaneous” (tota simu). Eckhart, on the other hand, was instead interested in the dynamics expressed by the concept of life (vita) that Boethius introduced at this point (atotas et inferminabis vitae fota simul et per- Jetta possessio)*®. Tn the terms of a paradoxical figure of Eckhart’s German works, this infermindbils vitae possesio has its reality in the person who is a at the same time a “virgin” and a “wife”, in other words, in the figure of a procuctivity without intention, Life means thus fullness, presence of the eternal within the temporal, not in the form of a negation of the temporal but in the form of an affirmation that does not see its ground in the finite, the known, the owned, and the wanted, but in an infinite - and thus eternally other and unqual- fied - that precedes and includes it forever. This affirmation is ~ seemingly paradoxically ~ ncthing else than the gesture of “Lassen”, © Ekhardus de Hioheim, Sermo67, DW IL, p. 133,6 © Suarez-Nani, Ten ed sere. pp. 87-88 CE Eckhardus de Hoheim, Sime 38; Sermo 66, DW Il, pp. 128,11-124,5; In ‘bk. § 19, p. 5042527; and my commentary in Eekhardus de Hoheim, Werks, 1 commentary to pp. 406,31-408 26, ™ Eckhardus de Hoieim, Sermo2, DW I, pp. 24-45; Sermo 49, DW If, pp. 427 451. Cf, commentary in: Eckhardus de Hoheim, Werks, I, and N. Largier, “Reprisentation und Negatvitit. Meister Eckhars Krik als Dekonstrukion®, in Contonplata als trader. Studien am Perkins von Literatur und Spertaatilt, ed. C. Brinker etal, Bern 1995, pp. 371-390, TTDME INTHE. ‘GERMAN DOMINICAN SCHOOL 258, of “Gelassenheit”, that is, of the radical ~ seemingly ‘libertarian’ - affirmation of the finite and of the temporal Tauler, whom we quoted at the beginning of this chapter, is aware of the possible consequences of this figure of thought, which can indeed be understood in a radically antinomistic way. Eckhart’s ‘lib- crtarian’ influence ~ his thought that there can be no “way” that mediates between the eternal and the temporal ~ has been aoe by people other than Tauler in the fourteenth century as well®. They suggested that such a concept of freedom and of a unity of man and God without “ways and modes” - and beyond a clear distinction of cemporalty and eternity ~ is misleading, “Tauler responds exzctly to this radical consequence of Eckhart’s philosophy of the convergence of time and eternity, since he proposes a return to “ways and modes’ for those people who do not understand Eckhart correctly. Thus, ES turns away ~ at least here ~ from Eckhart’s concept of an ethics of the fullness of time that should transcend the language of ontological dependency as well as the language of the intellectual vision of God. In Tauler ~ at least in the cautious remarks of his sermon 15 - we seem to be brought back to a theoretical point of view where time and eternity are more clearly distinct. This means, as well, that the radical and nondescript freedom of Eckhart’s view of the unity between man and God is in Tauler’s texts carefully redefined in terms of a subjectivity that knows of the fact that “there is no way", but nevertheless understands itself explicitly through its temporal ‘ways and its place in time®®. es GE, Ds Buc ox rier Arn, ide ka Fa Tle Nag ren ses Oa eH. Dee Alone 1677p, 21.27 Tresaion’ Dus ‘Buch en der geutgen Arma, od, Larger, Zich and Msdsen 1989, p. % Joannes Taulerus, Sermo 15, ed. Vetter, pp. 69,33-71,24.