HOOD, Christopher C. MARGETTS, Helen Z.

The Tools of Government in the Digital

Age. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.

Governo como caixa de ferramentas (p. 2)

We can imagine government as a set of administrative tools such as tools of carpentry or
gardening, or any other activity. Government administration is about social control, not
carpentry or gardening. But there is a toolkit for that, just like anything else. What government
do to us its subjects or citizens is to try to shape our lives by applying a set of administrative
tools, in many different combinations and contexts, to suit a variety of purposes.
Podemos imaginar um governo como um conjunto de ferramentas administrativas tais como
ferramentas de marcenaria ou jardinagem, ou de qualquer outra atividade. Administrao de um
governo sobre controle social, no marcenaria ou jardinagem. Porm h um conjunto de
ferramentas para tanto, assim como qualquer outra atividade. O que um governo faz para ns
seus sujeitos ou cidados tentar moldar nossas vidas aplicando um conjunto de ferramentas
administrativas, em vrias combinaes e contextos diferentes, de modo a servir a uma
variedade de propsitos. (Traduo livre)
Vantagens da caixa de ferramentas (p. 12)
Similarly, comparisons become much easier to handle; indeed, much of the fascination of
exploring governments tools is to compare the instruments brought to bear on a certain problem
by different governments or by the same government at different times. The same instrument
may be used for many different purposes.
This is just as well, for if government really had to design a completely new tool for each new
subject in which it became interested, it would require far greater powers of innovativeness and
imagination than governments can in practice be expected to possess. As it is, the same basic set
of tools appears again and again as governments face up to new problems, such as computer
privacy or the regulation of reproductive technology. Only the mixture varies. This means that if
we can grasp the basics of government, officialdom, authority can do in any given case and
what problems they may face.
Similarmente, comparaes ficam muito mais fceis de serem manuseadas; de fato, muito do
fascnio em explorar as ferramentas governamentais comparar os instrumentos utilizados em
certos problemas por diferentes governos ou pelo mesmo governo em pocas diferentes. O
mesmo instrumento pode ser usado para diferentes propsitos.
Tanto quanto, se um governo realmente teve que desenvolver uma ferramenta completamente
nova para cada novo assunto no qual se v interessado, seria necessria uma gigantesca
capacidade de inovao e imaginao muito maior do que os governos possuem. Assim, o
mesmo conjunto bsico de ferramentas aparece de novo e de novo quando os governos encaram
novos problemas, tais como regulao privacidade eletrnica ou regulao da tecnologia
reprodutiva. Apenas a mistura varia. Isso significa que se podemos abarcar o bsico do governo,
oficialidade, autoridade pode ser feito em qualquer caso dado e que problemas possa
enfrentar. (Traduo livre)
Risco politico (p. 13)
It is by applying its tools that government makes the link between wish and fulfilment.
It hardly needs to be said that this link is frequently problematic and highly politicized.
Selecting the right tool for the job often turns out to be a matter of faith and politics rather than

of certainty. Indeed, it is not uncommon to find that the choice of instruments attracts much
hotter political debate than the ends being sought.
aplicando essas ferramentas que o governo faz a ligao entre desejo e realizao. preciso
dizer que essa ligao frequentemente problemtica e altamente politizada. Selecionar a
ferramenta correta para o trabalho se torna mais uma questo de f e poltica do que certeza. De
fato, no incomum constatar que a escolha dos instrumentos atraia muito mais um debate
poltico do que sobre os fins almejados. (Traduo livre)
Resposta crtica (p. 13)
If the operation of governments tools were unproblematic, it could be left to technocrats, and
the rest of us could concentrate on the purposes that government should pursue. Things are not
like that in reality. Knowing something about what is in governments toolkit can at least help us
to think about ways of doing better when as so often happens things go wrong. Such
knowledge enables us to survey the main kinds of implements that might be used to address any
given subject with which government may find itself dealing. If one tool fails to answer the
purpose in any particular case, we can look systematically for other which might do the job.
Se a operao das ferramentas governamentais no forem problemticas, podem ser deixadas
aos tecnocratas, e o resto de ns pode se concentrar nos propsitos que um governo deve
perseguir. As coisas no so assim na realidade. Sabendo alguma coisa sobre o que numa caixa
de ferramentas de um governo pode por fim nos ajudar a pensar sobre modos de fazer as coisas
quando e to frequentemente acontece elas do errado. Tal conhecimento nos permite avaliar
os tipos principais de implementos que podem ser usados para abordar qualquer assunto dado,
com os quais um governo pode lidar. Se uma ferramenta falha em responder o propsito em um
caso particular, podemos olhar sistematicamente para outra que possa realizar esse trabalho.
(Traduo livre)

Realidade complexa (pp. 135-136)

Frequently there are dilemmas involved in the choice of instruments by
government(Hood, 1976; Dunsire, 1978). That is, using one instrument may well bring about
undesirable side effects; but the alternatives may be similarly attended by unwanted byproducts. The more active government becomes (and the more complex the social problems that
arise), the more manifestations of such dilemmas may develop. The way government changes
its approach to policy problems over time, turning from one instrument to another, has been
termed by Guy Peters and Brian Hogwood (1980) as policy succession, to distinguish it from
the entry of government into completely new social territory or, conversely, the total departure
of government from some field of activity. Peters and Hogwood argued plausibly that as
government activities came to embrace more and more aspects of social life, there was less
virgin territory for government to move into. With the ending of the frontier, so to speak,
governments policy space becomes crowded with agencies and programmes. Hence, argued
Peters and Hogwood, government is likely to be increasingly concerned with policy succession.
It will be trying to react to the dilemmas created by unwanted or unanticipated side effects
arising from the use of government instruments in an ever more crowded policy space (Offe,
1975, pp. 88-9; Wildavsky, 1980). It will be searching new packages if instruments to apply to
areas where the set of instruments originally chosen does not seem to answer the purpose.
Peters and Hogwood may have underestimated the extent to which new technology and
social development create new virgin territory for government to deal with (as in cases such as

the internet, biotechnology or new diseases as AIDS and BSE). But in another sense, their
notion of policy succession points to the complexity of the concept of novelty in the sphere of
governments tools. As has already been stressed, most of the generic instruments used by
government have a long ancestry and new instruments of the same order as nodality, treasure
and organization are unlikely to appear. The basic toolkit the NATO tools and combinations
thereof is intended to be exhaustive. But, as we have also seen, it is in a sense true both hat
there is nothing new under the sun and that there is a vast scope for innovation in the use of
governments instruments. Provided there is a mechanism for generating variants mutations or
innovations complex evolutionary processes can operate on the basis of a relatively fixed
population of basic types.
Frequentemente existem dilemas envolvidos na escolha dos instrumentos por um governo
(Hood, 1976; Dunsire, 1978). Isto , o uso de um instrumento pode muito bem trazer efeitos
colaterais indesejados; entretanto as alternativas podem ser similarmente atendidas por
subprodutos no esperados. O governo mais ativo se torna (e mais complexos os problemas
sociais que surgem) mais manifestaes desses dilemas podem se desenvolver. O modo que um
governo muda sua abordagem sobre polticas pblicas ao longo do tempo, mudando de um
instrumento ao outro, tem sido denominado por Guy Peters e Brian Hogwood (1980) como
sucesso de poltica pblica, para distinguir da entrada do governo em um territrio
completamente novo ou, contrariamente, a sada total de um governo de algum campo ou
atividade. Peters e Hogwood argumentaram plausivelmente que se as atividades governamentais
abraam mais e mais aspectos da vida social, existiria menos territrio virgem para o governo se
mover. Com o fim da fronteira, por assim dizer, a poltica espacial do governo fica repleta
de agncias e programas. Consequentemente, argumentam Peters e Hogwood, ogoverno est
continuamente preocupado com a sucesso de poltica pblica. Ele tentar reagir aos dilemas
criados por efeitos colaterais indesejados ou imprevistos que surjam do uso dos instrumentos
governamentais em uma poltica espacial cada vez mais repleta (Offe, 1975, pp. 88-9;
Wildavsky, 1980). Ser procurando novos pacotes de instrumentos para aplicar em reas onde o
conjunto de instrumentos originalmente escolhido no parece responder ao propsito.
Peters e Hogwood parecem ter subestimado a medida em que nova tecnologia e
desenvolvimento social criam novos territrios virgens para o governo lidar (em casos tais como
a internet, biotecnologia ou novas doenas como AIDS e doena da vaca louca). Mas em
outro sentido, sua noo de sucesso de poltica pblica aponta para a complexidade do
conceito da inovao na esfera das ferramentas governamentais. Como j foi salientado, a maior
parte dos instrumentos genricos usados pelo governo tem uma grande ancestralidade e novos
instrumentos da mesma ordem como nodalidade, tesouro e organizao no so suscetveis de
aparecer. A caixa de ferramentas bsica as ferramentas da OTAN e suas combinaes
pretendem ser exaustivas. Porm, como j vimos, num sentido verdadeiro que com tantos
chapus no h nada novo sob o cu e h um vasto espao para a inovao no uso dos
instrumentos governamentais. Desde que haja um mecanismo para gerar variantes mutaes
ou inovaes processos complexos evolucionrios podem operar na base de uma populao
relativamente fixa de tipos bsicos. (Traduo livre)
Citar junto com 1 das 3 hipteses na sequncia. (pp. 136-137)
The interesting question, of course, is what are the mechanisms for generating
innovation in this case? There is now a large and growing literature on innovation in
government (see Cabinet Office, 2003; Black et al., 2005; Hartley, 2005) but broadly, when
noveltry is generated in government instruments, one or all of three things may be happening.
First, and old instrument may be applied in a new context. Deploying of old instruments
for new problems or in different places is something that happens all the time, often through a

process of imitation (Simon et al., 1950, p. 38; Nelson and Winter, 1982). As we see in Chapter
3, government is forever wheeling out old stand-bys such as compulsory registration or
licensing schemes in new contexts.
()
Second, an old instrument may change in salience as a result of technological change.
As discussed in each of the NATO chapters (2-5), digital technologies allow governments tools
to be reshaped and some tool combinations become viable for the first time.
A questo interessante, evidentemente, quais so os mecanismos para gerar inovao nesse
caso? Existe hoje uma grande e crescente literatura sobre inovao no governo (ver Cabinet
Office, 2003; Black et al., 2005; Hartley, 2005) mas amplamente, quando inovao criada nos
instrumentos governamentais, uma ou as trs coisas podem acontecer.
Primeiro, um velho instrumento pode ser aplicado em um novo contexto. A implantao de
velhos instrumentos para novos problemas ou em diferentes lugares algo que acontece a todo
tempo, usualmente por meio de um processo de imitao (Simon et al., 1950, p. 38; Nelson e
Winter, 1982). Como vemos no captulo 3, o governo est sempre atualizando velhas medidas
como registro compulsrio ou esquemas de licenciamento em novos contextos.
(...)
Segundo, um velho instrumento pode mudar na salincia como um resultado de mudana
tecnolgica. Como discutido em cada um dos captulos sobre a OTAN (captulos 2-5),
tecnologias digitais permitem que as ferramentas governamentais sejam reformuladas e algumas
combinaes de ferramentas se tornam viveis pela primeira vez (Traduo livre)
p. 138
()
Third, novelty may mean a combination or mix of instruments different from what existed
before. The ingredients are the same but the recipe is different. It is very common, as we have
already seen, to find government shifting the balance from one tool to another without
abandoning any of them completely.
()
Thus, even with an unchanging repertoire of basic instruments, a powerful potential for
generating novelty is afforded by context, combination and technological form. Of course, it
may take a certain touch of administrative genius to realize this potential to spot a niche or
a new combination or to see how an instrument can be carried over from one context to another.
Not everyone can do it in practice. But at least the process can be understood.
Terceiro, inovao pode significar uma combinao ou mistura de diferentes instrumentos que
existiam anteriormente. Os ingredientes so os mesmos, mas a receita diferente. muito
comum, como temos visto, encontrar um governo deslocando o balano de uma ferramenta para
a outra sem abandonar nenhuma das duas completamente
(...)
Assim, mesmo com um repertrio imutvel de instrumentos bsicos, um potencial poderoso
para gerao de inovao oferecido pelo contexto, combinao e forma tecnolgica.
Evidentemente isso requer certa medida de gnio administrativo para realizao desse
potencial para encontrar um nicho ou uma nova combinao ou para ver como um
instrumento pode transitar de um contexto para o outro. Nem todos podem fazer isso na prtica.
Mas ao menos o processo pode ser compreendido (Traduo livre)
p. 144-145

We discuss in turn four possible requirements for intelligent policy design:

. Deliberative choice: the instrument or mix of instruments used in any given case should be
selected after some examination or alternative possible tools for the job.
. Fitness for purpose: the tool should be matched to the job. Since there is no general-purpose
tool that will serve government effectively in all circumstances, government needs to
understand that circumstances which favour each of the instruments available.
. Economy: effectiveness is not enough the desired effect must be achieved as economically as
possible, with the minimum spending of governmental resources and the minimum burden, in
terms of form-filling, obligations and (except in rare cases, for instance when saturation policing
is intended to reassure) highly visible signs of governmental presence, on the general public.
. Moral acceptability: the choice must not be barbaric; it must satisfy certain ethical criteria,
notably justice and fairness.
()
Moreover, they belong together. Each requirement depends upon and in some cases limits the
others. If government does not have any sense of what alternatives are available for any job, it is
unlikely to know what circumstances favour which instruments. If it does not know the latter, it
has no basis for choosing tools that will be effective, except on the basis of blind trial and error.
And if this condition is not met, government has in turn no basis for achieving economy a
choice of tools that will be effective with minimum deployment of effort. Again, any idea of
bringing ethical criteria to bear presupposes that there is some choice to be made: in other
words, that alternatives can be identified. And if government does not make its choices within
certain ethical parameters, there ceases to be any defensible reason for wanting governments
tools to be applied effectively or economically. On the contrary, we may positively welcome
ineffectiveness and waste of resources in those circumstances.
Discutimos quarto requisitos possveis para um projeto inteligente de poltica pblica:
. Escolha deliberativa: o instrumento ou mistura de instrumentos usados em qualquer caso dado
deve ser selecionado aps algum exame ou ferramentas alternativas possveis para o trabalho.
. Adequao finalidade: a ferramenta deve ser adequada para o trabalho. Desde que no h
ferramenta de propsito-geral que sirva ao governo efetivamente em todas as circunstncias, o
governo precisa compreender quais circunstncias que favorecem cada um dos instrumentos
disponveis.
.Economia: efetividade no o suficiente o efeito desejado deve ser alcanado do modo mais
economicamente possvel, com o mnimo de gastos de recursos governamentais e fardo
mnimo, em termos de cumprimento de formas, obrigaes e (excepcionalmente em casos raros,
por exemplo, quando a saturao da poltica pblica se destina a tranquilizar) sinais altamente
visveis da presena governamental, sobre o pblico em geral.
Aceitabilidade moral: a escolha no deve ser brbara; deve satisfazer determinados critrios
ticos, notadamente justia e equidade.
(...)
Alm disso, eles so indissociveis. Cada requisito depende e em alguns casos limita o outro. Se
o governo no tem nenhuma percepo sobre quais alternativas esto disponveis para algum
trabalho, improvvel que saiba quais circunstncias favorecem instrumentos. Se no sabe isto,
no possui base para escolha de ferramentas que seriam efetivas, exceto na base da tentativa de
erro e acerto. E se essa condio no encontrada, o governo ento no tem a base para alcanar
a economia uma escolha de ferramentas que seja efetiva com o mnimo empenho de esforo.
Novamente, qualquer ideia de se trazer critrios ticos pressupe que h alguma escolha a ser
feita: em outras palavras, aquelas alternativas podem ser identificadas. E se o governo no faz

essas escolhas dentro de certos parmetros ticos, deixa de haver qualquer razo defensvel para
se querer que as ferramentas governamentais sejam aplicadas economicamente ou efetivamente.
Ao contrrio, podemos positivamente dar boas vindas inefetividade e desperdcio de recurso
sob tais circunstncias. (Traduo livre)
Usar na parte prognstica p. 146
Conventionally, a chooser must adopt a quite different approach in the choice is to
qualify as rational. Formally, he or she must; (a) specify the goal(s) to be reached; (b) identify
all the possible ways or means by which the goal might be reached; (c) ascertain the likely
consequences of each alternative; and (d) choose the alternative that is likely to reach the goal(s)
with the greatest certainty, to the greatest extent, or with the minimum of effort.
Convencionalmente, um escolhedor deve adotar uma abordagem bem diferente nas escolhas que
se qualifiquem como racionais. Formalmente, ele ou ela devem; (a) especificar a(s) meta(s) a
serem alcanadas; (b) identificar todos os modos ou meios possveis pelos quais a meta deve ser
alcanada; (c) determinar as provveis consequncias de cada alternativa; e (d) escolher a
alternativa que provavelmente alcance a(s) meta(s) com a maior certeza, com a maior extenso
ou com o mnimo de esforo. (Traduo livre)
Contraponto. As circunstncias importam e conformam o planejamento da rea pblica;
no hermtico. Mas aponta critrios, ajuda a tentar nacionalizar a ao administrativa e o
desenvolvimento (???) de polticas pblicas.
p. 147
In reality, it is common knowledge that choice normally falls far short of this procedural
standard. Perhaps one could say that a choice which at least seriously considers some
alternatives is more rational than a choice which plumps from one instrument without even
considering the possibility that there might be other ways of going about the job. But choosing
among governments instruments cannot be a fully rational process, even in theory.
Na realidade, de saber comum que a escolha normalmente fica muito aqum desse padro
procedimental. Talvez se diga que uma escolha possa por fim seriamente considerar algumas
alternativas seja mais racional que uma recolha que varie de um instrumento ao outro mesmo
considerando a possibilidade de que existam outros modos de realizar o trabalho. Mas a escolha
entre os instrumentos governamentais no pode ser um processo completamente racional,
mesmo em teoria. (Traduo livre)
p. 147
So a key reason why policy-making cannot be dependent upon rational choice alone is huge
number of possible alternative combinations of government instruments.
pp. 147-148
It follows, then, that government cannot examine all feasible alternatives in most cases. The
choice in practice merely lies between examining a greater or smaller number of combinations
of instruments, depending on the circumstances. Certainly, one might expect the search to
intensify when government perceives itself to have failed in tackling some problem. But, even
in that case, the choice of the tool for the job must in practice also rest heavily on intuition,
experience, tradition, faith and serendipity.
Crtica. Carter politico.
p. 148

Given that all feasible alternatives cannot be systematically appraised, it follows that in many
cases politics will play a large part in the selection of tools for the job. The idea of government
coolly and open-mindedly for the job in hand the image with which we began in Chapter 1
is, of course, quite unrealistic. Just some weapons may be eschewed in war for high strategic or
political reasons, so there are typically political or ideological constraints on the use of some of
instruments in governments too-shed to attack domestic policy problems. Governments will use
massive police swoops for fiscal or public-order purposes, but not to enforce such things as
safety-at-work laws. As Schaffer and Lamb (1981, p. 7) put it, searches for alternatives is
neither random nor open-minded.
Crtica, ineficincia poltica
p. 149
The simplistic but beguiling steering not rowing idea that politics is about the big picture,
the broad aims or major goals, and that the delivery or implementation of these goals are
relatively non-political task for technocrats or managers (see Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) is
often the exact opposite of the truth. Commonly, the real politics only begins when it comes to
the choice of means and implements.
p. 149
Effective choice requires more than a review of alternatives, to the extent that such a review is
possible. It also requires some understanding of the policy context, to match instruments to
circumstances, There are some contexts where a specific government tool performs well, others
where the same tool performs badly.
p. 151
In short, intelligent use of governments tools requires effective contextual knowledge.
Cap. 3, prognstico
p. 152
Another possible criterion for judging a good selection of government tools is that of economy.
The real test of policy engineering is to achieve the effect desired with the very minimum of
bureaucratic building materials. Anyone (well, almost anyone) can make a house stand up if, as
our ancestors did, they build enormously thick walls. But building that way is grossly wasteful
or labour, materials and space. It takes the professional skills of the architect or of the trained
builder to construct a strong building with the minimum of the materials. Similarly, it is not
sufficient for the government to find tools that are effective, in the sense that they do the job
required of them. Strictly, to do a good job, the tools must also be efficient, performing the task
in the most economical way.
However, the idea of using the tools sparingly has more than one possible meaning. It could
mean:
(a) Economy in governmental effort: minimizing the effort, expense and staff needed by a
government to perform a certain task; and
(b) Economy in public burden: visiting on the public at large no more trouble, vexation
and oppression, in Adam Smiths (1910, p. 309) classic phrase, than in absolutely
necessary to achieve the aim in view.

p. 156
If government aims to be economical in the second sense, it will prefer precision to nonprecision instruments, and this again is likely to lead to conflict with the implications of
economy in the first sense. Precision tools are those which have the properties of scalability,
directness and non-substitutability, and these are likely to mean a preference for particular
tools that are bureaucracy-intensive in the first sense. Each of these characteristics of precision
will be briefly discussed.
p. 156-157
Scalability
This term denotes the degree to which an instrument can be varied in its intensity.
()
To achieve bureaucratic economy in the second sense, governments effectors should be
scalable, that is, capable of moving smoothly over a wide range of intensities. In this way
government can hit the target just as hard as it needs to be hit, and no more. Like the dimmer
switch that illuminates a room to the precise intensity required, the scalable effector avoids the
trouble, vexation and oppression involved in using a sledgehammer to crack a nut.

p. 158
Directness
In order to avoid visiting more bureaucracy on the population at large than is absolutely
necessary, governments instruments must not only be scalable; they must also be direct.
Directness refers to precision with which an instrument can be directed to a specific
beneficiary or maleficiary.
p. 159
Substitutability or incidence
A third feature of a precision instrument is non-substitutability. Substitutability is closely
related to directness. It refers to the extent to which an implement can be blunted or deflected
from its target even if it is able to reach the target directly. To the extent that this can happen,
there will again be a spillover of bureaucratic impact from the target to others.
p. 161-163
Part of the reason for the hot politics involved in selecting government tools is the uncertainty
of the link between wish and fulfilment in many areas of government activity.
p. 167-168
Among the works of that kind that have been produced over the past twenty years, we can
distinguish at least three main approaches. All of them have earlier antecedents but most are
concerned with questions different from those dealt with in this book. One, contrasting with our
broadly institution-free approach focusing on interactions between individuals and government,
looks at government tools or instruments in terms of the different forms of organization

available to government such as ministerial departments, state-owned enterprises, independent

public authorities, contractors and public-private partnerships. A second well-established
approach, also contrasting with the approach taken in this book, focuses centrally on the politics
of instrument selection, in the sense of the interests or ideas that shape the choice of tools. A
third set of approaches the category in which this book belongs aims to be institution-free
and to focus more on cataloguing the toolkit in a generic way than on the politics of instrument
choice.
Against that background, this chapter aims to do three things. First, it aims to show that the first
two approaches, albeit sometimes portrayed as rival ways of understanding tools, are in fact
answers to questions different from those dealt with in this book, not different ways of
approaching the same question. So no real issue of gladiatorial combat arises, since those
approaches are complementary rather than conflicting. Second, the chapter aims to bring out the
advantages of the toolkit approach set out here relative to other approaches that share its broad
characteristics of being institution-free and generic. Third, picking up a theme that has been
developed in all the previous chapters, we conclude by exploring what kinds of challenges each
of the three broad approaches considered here faces in an age of digital technology.
p. 169-170
If the institution-as-tools approach to thinking about the tools of government links to all those
debates about what detailed forms of organization should be used to provide what kinds of
public services or government functions, a second approach is concerned with the politics that
lies behind the selection of whatever tools governments use, whether conceived as generic
instruments or as forms of organization.
From this perspective, the important thing is to understand the political struggles, ideological
mindsets and cognitive frames of politicians and policy-makers that lead to the pursuit of public
policy through one kind of instrument rather than another. As with the institutions-as-tools
approach, this approach is far from new, though it has traditionally been as much the province
of historians as of political scientists.
p. 170-171
In recent decades, Stephen Linder and Guy Peters (1989, 1992, 1998) have been particularly
associated with the politics-of-instrument-choice approach in the public policy literature. They
distinguish four approaches to the understanding of public policy instrument, contrasting what
they call instrumentalists (those who concentrate on and often seek to champion some
particular tool, such as those economists who see price mechanisms as the answer to every
policy problem), proceduralists (those who see tool selection as a product of political
processes that are so complex and unique to every case that it is impossible to make any general
assessment of appropriateness), contingentists (a rather awkward label for those who see the
appropriateness of tool use as depending on types of task, for instance as between compliance
cultures and cultures of resistance to government policy), and constitutivists (those who see
the appropriateness of tool use as turning on subjective and contested meanings). They say their
own thinking about policy instruments has developed over time away from approaches such as
contingency or instrumentalism towards what they call constitutivism, arguing in postmodern
vein that there is a growing understanding that instrument selection is not a simple mechanical
exercise of matching well-defined problems and equally well-defined solutions. Rather, it is
fundamentally an intellectual process of constituting a reality and then attempting to work
within it (Linder and Peters, 1998, p. 45).
p. 196

In the digital age as in every other, the challenge for governments is to find new ways of using a
limited basic array of tools effectively and creatively, as technology and social patterns change.

Howlett, Michael. Designing Public Policies: principles and instruments, Routledge

Press, 2011.

Cap. 3. Diagnstico p. 22
A design orientation to analysis can illuminate the variety of means implicit in policy
alternatives, questioning the choice of instruments and their aptness in particular contexts. The
central role it assigns means in policy performance may also be a normative vantage point for
appraising design implications of other analytical approaches. More important, such as
orientation can be a counterweight to the design bases implicit in other approaches and
potentially redefine the fashioning of policy proposals. (Linder, S. H. e Peters, B.G., 1990,
Policy Formulation and the Challenge of Conscious Design. Evaluation and Program Planning
13: 304).
Cap. 3. Diagnstico - p. 22
Policy design elevates the analysis and practice of policy instrument choice specifically tools
for policy implementation to a central focus of study, making their understanding and analysis
a key design concern (Salamon 1981; Linder and Peters 1990). Instrument choice, from this
perspective, in a sense, is public policy-making, and understanding and analyzing potential
instrument choices involved in implementation activity is policy design.
Cap. 3. Policy design formulao e implantao (p. 23-4)
This is because, as weve seen, policy design largely takes place at the formulation stage of the
policy cycle and deals with plans for the implementation stage. Thus the key sets of policy
instruments of concern to policy designers are those linked to policy implementation, in the first
instance, and to policy formulation, in the second.
Cap. 3 p. 24
Whether the problem is an architectural, mechanical or administrative one, the logic of design is
fundamentally similar. The idea is to fashion an instrument that will work in a desired manner.
In the context of policy problems, design involves both a systematic process for generating
basic strategies and a framework for a comparing them. Examining problems from a design
perspective offers a more productive way of organizing our thinking and analytical efforts.
Cap. 6 (est escrito algo depois de cap. 6, mas no entendi) - p. 30
This is what Aaron Wildavsky (1979) termed finding and establishing a relationship between
manipulable means and obtainable objectives.
Cap. 6 (est escrito algo depois de cap. 6, mas no entendi). Resposta crtica poltica - p. 30
Politicians in most societies, for example, cannot do everything they consider would appeal to
the public but also ignore popular opinion and public sentiments and still maintain their
legitimacy and credibility.

P. 45
Fazer no cap. 3 esse registro das taxonomias e o avano dos modelos de escolha de ferramentas?
Fazer isso na parte prognstica, ou criar um cap. 1 antes do diagnstico?
Cap. 3. Combinao de ferramentas p. 53
Studies such as Gunningham, Grabosky and Youngs work on smart regulation led to the
development of efforts to identify complementarities and conflicts within instruments mixes or
tool portfolios involved in more complex and sophisticated policy designs (Barnett et al. 2008;
Shore 2009; Buckman and Diesendorf 2010). For them, the key question was no longer why do
policy-makers utilize a certain instrument? as it was for earlier generations of students of policy
instrument choice, but rather why is a particular combination of procedural and substantive
instruments utilized in a specific sector?.
Cap. 3 - p. 57
Current policy design theory is based on the insights developed during this period that while
policy goals are manifold and alter over time, and while the choice of policy means in context
driven and resource contingent, the toolbox with which designers must work is essentially
generic (Majone 1989).
Cap. 3. Prognstico - p. 63
Organizational implementation instruments include a broad range of governing institutions and
personnel to affect policy output delivery and policy process change.
Cap. 3 - p. 101
Financial substantive tools are not synonymous with all government spending, since much of
this goes to fund direct service delivery and also support regulatory agencies (as well as to
provide information, which will be discussed in Chapter 8 below). Rather, such tools are
specific techniques of governance involved in transferring treasure resources to or from other
actors in order to encourage them to undertake some activity desired by governments through
the provision of financial incentives, or to discourage them through the imposition of financial
costs.
Cap. 3. Apresentou todas as ferramentas antes e agora vai selecionar as tendncias p. 128 e
130
Experts in government see the links between these policy components in terms of their intercompatibility and inner coherence and use their positions in policy advisory networks to
develop policy alternatives which combines these elements in more or less consistent ways,
choosing particular tools based on factors such as political, social and economic feasibility,
government capacity and target group structure, and calibrating specific tool components taking
into account factors such as automaticity, cost, intrusiveness, visibility and precision of
targeting. These factors and calculations change over time as the context of policy-making
changes and shift in governance modes and policy regime logics do occur, as globalization and
network theorists rightly noted, leading to changes in overall policy design preferences.
However, these changes occur at different times and with different impacts in each policy sector
and it is a mistake to think that a general macro-level societal movement such as networkization

will manifest itself equally in all areas of state activity. This can be seen from even a
rudimentary examination of the globalization and network literature which, in fact, argue
equally vehemently that such shifts are occurring, but in two different directions: towards either
the general adoption of market governance, or network governance, respectively.
Cap. 3. Intro. Esse o contexto geral de aplicao. Dele que vm as aplicaes diagnstica e
prognstica p. 139
As Stephen Linder, B. Guy Peters, Davis Bobrow, Peter May, Patricia Ingraham, Christopher
Hood, Renate Mayntz and the other pioneers of policy design research in the 1980s and 1990s
argued, like other kinds of design activities in manufacturing and construction policy design
involves three fundamental aspects: (1) knowledge of the basic building blocks or materials
with which actors must work in constructing a (policy) object; (2) the elaboration of a set of
principles regarding how these materials should be combined in that construction; and (3)
understanding the process by which a design becomes translated into reality. In a policy context
this means understanding the kinds of implementation tools governments have at their disposal
in attempting to alter some aspect of society and societal behavior; elaborating a set of
principles concerning which instruments should be used in which circumstances; and
understanding the nuances of policy formulation and implementation processed in government.
Cap. 3 - p. 140
Design is nevertheless a crucial activity in policy-making and considerations of policy success
or failure (Marsh and McConnell 2010; McConnell 2010) since it embodies the lessons learned
from other policy activities at the moment in time when a new policy is being developed or an
old one reformed.
Cap. 3. Usar em que parte? p. 140
As we have seen, theories of policy design and instrument choice have gone through several
generations (Goggin et al. 1990; OToole 2000) as theorists have moved from the analysis of
individual substantive instruments (Salamon 1981; 2002) to comparative studies of procedural
instrument selection (Howlett 1991; Bemelmans-Videc 1998; Peters and Van Nispen, 1998;
Varone 2005; Bode 2006; Howlett et al. 2006). While each generation has increased the
complexity of the analysis, the central assumption of all these generations of theory is that the
policy design process and its outcomes are ultimately shaped by contextual factors related to
state capacity in the face of different levels of social complexity (Atkinson and Nigol 1989).
Cap. 3. Intro. Citar com referncia do Weimer tambm - p. 142
As David Weimer (1992) has argued, Instruments, alone or in combination, must be crafted to
fit particular substantive, organizational and political contexts. (Weimer, David L. 1992.
Claiming Races, Broiler Contracts, Heresthetics and Habits: Ten Concepts For Policy Design.
Policy Sciences 25: 373).
P. 144
As the discussion in the book has repeatedly noted, specific instrument choices are embedded
decisions, existing within a nested, multi-level environment of governance modes, policy
regime logics and tool calibrations, and is heavily context laden. The basic nature of possible
governance regimes, however, is well known and the general implementation preferences they
entail are also quite clear. That leaves the essential design challenge in many sectors as one of

the identification and articulation of specific policy measures, more or less carefully calibrated,
from within each resource category, within an already existing governance mode.
Cap. 3. Diagnstico p. 145
That is, designers should ensure that any new design elements are coherent in the sense they are
logically related to overall policy aims and objectives; that they be consistent in that they work
together to support a policy goal; and that both policy goals and means should be congruent,
rather than working at cross-purposes.
Cap. 3. Diagnstico p. 145
Administrators and politicians involved in policy design need to expand the menu of
government choice to include both substantive and procedural instrument choice to include both
substantive and procedural instruments and a wider range of options of each, and to understand
the important context-based nature instrument choices.
Cap. 3. Diagnstico. Resposta complexidade deve ser nesta linha p. 146
Given the complexity of policy making it is not surprising that many noble efforts by
governments and citizens to create a better and safer world have foundered on poor policy
design. However, while not an optimal outcome, this had led to a greater appreciation of the
difficulties encountered is designing public policies, and the attempt to correct gaps in our
understanding, a process which, albeit slowly, has improved our knowledge of the principles
and elements of the nature of policy instruments and their governance contexts of policy design.
Cap. 3. Diagnstico. Resposta complexidade deve ser nesta linha p. 146
The design process is complex, often internally orchestrated between bureaucrats and target
groups, and usually much less accessible to public scrutiny than many other kinds of policy
deliberations, but this should not be allowed to stand in the way of its further elaboration and
refinement (Kiviniemi 1986; Donovan 2001).

GOODIN, Robert E. Institutions and their design. In: GOODIN, Robert E. The theory
of institutional design, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Cap. 2. Instituies. Para uma sntese da abordagem institucionalista em diversos ramos do

conhecimento p. 19
Drawing together all those diverse disciplinary strands, a consolidated new institutionalism
would serve to remind us, inter alia, of the following propositions.
Cap. 2. Instituies p. 22
Institutionalism has been characterized as the process by which organizations and procedures
acquire value and stability. In an institutionalized setting, behavior is more stable and
predictable. Furthermore, that is not an incidental by-product of institutionalization not merely
the consequence of coming to value a certain organization or procedure for some independent

reasons. Instead, that very stability and predictability is, to a very large extent, precisely why we
value institutionalized patterns and what it is value in them.
Cap. 3. Intro p. 34
In the case of a policy, a well-designed policy is one which fits well with the other policies, and
the larger political/economic/social systems in which it is set. In the case of a mechanism, a
well-designed mechanic is one that works well alongside other features of the social
environment in which it is set, including other mechanisms in play there. Insofar as the
mechanism is one whose internal requirements are compatible with other incentives that
individuals face, rather than offering people incentives for undercutting the goals (characterized
as Pareto-optimality, or whatever) which we were trying to achieve by using the mechanism in
the first place. In the case of a whole system, being well designed means that all the pieces fit
together well in a harmonious whole: being well integrated, being in equilibrium (and perhaps
robustly so, whether homostatically or otherwise).
Cap. 3. Intro. Diagnstico descritivo e prognstico prescritivo (suponho que esteja escrito
isso, mas no tenho certeza) p. 36-7
This seems to be a tough sort of claim to sustain. Government organizations, at least, display
enormous longevity and persist well after their original reasons for existing have passed away.
Insofar as other social institutions are like that, then it seems implausible to postulate any tough
competitive environment that weeds out ill-fitting institutions on anything like a systematic
basis.
In the end, the best analysis of any necessary connection between descriptive and prescriptive
aspects of optimal design theories lodges it squarely in the intentions of social agents. What
theories of optimal design try to do is to give social agents good reasons for shaping institutions
in some ways rather than others. Insofar as they are convinced of those arguments and moved
by those reasons, those social agents will try to act upon those design prescriptions. Insofar as
they succeed, institutions shaped by their actions will end up bearing something of the mark of
those theories of optimal design.
Thus, the connection is there. But the connection comes through effects of the prescriptions on
the intentions of agents, and through the effects of those agents intentions on the social world.
To say that is to claim (or ask) a lot. But any more facile claim that optimal design theories are
unreflectively internalized or automatically enforced through competition in a hostile
environment seems far less tenable. It seems far better to admit forthrightly that the point of
moralizing (which is after all what we are doing is prescribing optimal social arrangements) is
to shape peoples value and preferences and, through them, their actions.
Cap. 6. Experimentalismo (no entendi a obs.) p. 42
Finally, insofar as we are counting on trial-and-error, learning-by-doing processes to perfect our
institutional arrangements, we ought embrace as a central principle of design a desire for
variability in our institutional arrangements. We ought encourage experimentation with different
structures in different places; and we ought, furthermore, encourage reflection upon the lessons
where appropriate. Federalism is sometimes defended on precisely this ground, as a social
laboratory in which different approaches are allowed to emerge in different jurisdictions.
Cap. 2. Instituies p. 43
In a whole raft of policy areas, from tax to regulatory policy, we often see the worst practice
rather than the best being adopted in neighboring jurisdictions. Whether federal institutions, or

other variance-maximizing principles of institutional design, are good ideas thus depends once
again upon a fundamentally political judgment as to which is the most likely consequence.
()
If we are to understand how social life works, and how it might work better, fixing our focus
firmly upon institutions and their reshaping is one crucial step.

PETTIT, Philip. Institutional design and rational choice. In: GOODIN, Robert E. The
theory of institutional design, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Cap. 3 p. 58
The screens which operate on individuals will have the effect, under the ideal institutional
design, of recruiting to certain tasks those individuals who are more likely perhaps inherently
more likely, perhaps more likely in the context of certain sanctions to behave in the manner
that is socially valued.
Cap. 3. Intro p. 61
Rational choice theory can be described, in a phrase I used earlier, as social science by
economistic means (Elster 1986a). It amounts to the attempt to pursue the explanation, not just
of market behavior, but also of behavior outside the market, in an economistic manner. The idea
guiding the approach is that if economics serves us well in the explanation of how agents
behave in more or less marketlike context, then equally it should serve us well in the
explanation of peoples behavior in other areas.

SCHNEIDER, Anne. INGRAM, Helen. Behavioral Assumptions of Policy Tools. The

Journal of Politics, Volume 52, Issue 2 (May, 1990), 510-529

p. 511
One of the most remarkable changes in American politics over the past 50 years has been the
proliferation of tools or instruments through which governments seek to influence citizen
behavior and achieve policy purposes (Salamon 1989; Doern and Wilson 1974; Dahl and
Lindblom 1953). These include such commonly-used techniques as standards, direct
expenditures (subsidies), sanctions, public corporations, contracts, grants, arbitration,
persuasion, education, licensing, and so forth. Dahl and Lindblom (1953, 8) referred to the rapid
intervention of these techniques as perhaps the greatest political revolution of our times. They
attributed both political and economic importance to policy instruments, contending that the
invention and utilization of a variety of tools would enable governments to solve social and
economic problems without the intense cleavages and ideological debates that otherwise might
occur (1953, 6)
p. 512
Public choice scholars also have examined policy tools. One of their contributions is the
emphasis on incentive structures and the recognition that perverse incentives in institutional
arrangements will produce dysfunctional results (Ostrom 1988; Savas 1987).

p. 513. Citar no cap 2, ferramentas e incentivos, ou no subitem de regulao comportamental

The amazing proliferation of policy tools witnessed over the past half century has been
accompanied by an equally amazing explosion of ideas which explore the fundamental ways
through which policy influences behavior. Most of those who are interested in policy content,
tools, and instruments recognize the importance of motivational devices, but none has
developed a classification system based upon the underlying behavioral assumptions.
p. 513
A basic assumption underlying our approach is that public policy almost always attempts to get
people to do things that they might not have done otherwise.
p. 514. Citar no cap 1 ou 2, em itens sobre ferramentas
If people are not taking actions needed to ameliorate social, economic, or political problems,
there are five reasons that can be addressed by policy: they may believe the law does not direct
them or authorize them to make action; they may lack incentives or capacity to take the actions
needed; they may disagree with the values implicit in the means or ends; or the situation may
involve such high levels of uncertainty that the nature of the problem is not known, and it is
unclear what people should do or how they might be motivated. Policy tools address these
problems by providing authority, incentives or capacity; by using symbolic and hortatory
proclamations to influence perceptions or values; or by promoting learning to reduce
uncertainty. Laws, provisions within laws, guidelines, programs, or even the practices and
routines of case workers can be described and analyzed in terms of the types of tools upon
which they rely.
p. 516. Citar no cap 2, em lgica dos incentivos
In contrast with capacity tools, incentives assume individuals have the opportunity to make
choices, recognize the opportunity, and have adequate information and decision-making skills to
select from among alternatives those that are in their own best interests.
p. 525. Citar no cap 6, item de incrementalismo e experimentalismo
Incremental change could be defined as intensification (or desintensification) of a strategy.
p. 525-526. Citar no cap 3, intro
Comparative analysis of the behavioral dimensions of tools will be instrumental in developing
theories of policy participation and in understanding why target populations react as they do to
policy initiatives.
There is much discussion and debate about whether people respond mainly to self-interest,
whether positive incentives are more effective than negative ones, about the role of altruism,
norms, and beliefs in decision making. Much could be learned by comparative studies in which
policies relying upon positive incentives, for example, are compared with those relying upon
sanctions, and where informational campaigns or those where symbolic and hortatory tools are
employed. By holding constant the policy arena, comparative analysis would leave yield
interesting useful information about the effectiveness of alternative tools in particular
circumstances. Experimental studies of cooperation and defection could be broadened to take a
more explicit policy framework and compare the effects of alternative combinations of policy
tools, within different types of institutional frameworks, in producing various types of policy
participation (e.g., Orbell, van de Kraft, and Dawes, 1988).

p. 527. Citar no cap 3, prognostica

The framework we present clusters tools on the basis of their underlying motivational strategies.
Authority tools rely on the inherent legitimacy found in hierarchical arrangements. Incentive
tools assume individuals are utility maximizers who will change their behavior in accord with
changes in the net tangible payoffs offered by the situation. Capacity tools assume individuals
may lack information, resources, skills, and may rely on decision heuristics (shortcuts or rules
of thumb), but that these biases and deficiencies can be corrected by policy. Symbolic and
hortatory tools assume individuals are motivated from within, and that policy can induce the
desired behavior by manipulating symbols and influencing values. Learning tools assume agents
and targets do not know what needs to be done, or what is possible to do, and that policy tools
should be used to promote learning, consensus, building, and lay the foundation for improved
policy.
p. 527 Idem ao anterior
The framework we have proposed brings together the behavioral dimensions of policy
instruments with the concept of policy participation; an important but largely neglected form of
political behavior. By focusing on the behavioral dimensions of policy tools found within policy
designs, political scientists may be able to advance knowledge about the conditions under which
target populations will contribute to preferred policy outcomes.