[G.R. No. L-30070. August 29, 1980.

]
FEDERICO DECANO, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ROMEO F. EDU, as Acting Commissioner of
Land Transportation and CIPRIANO POSADAS, as Acting Registrar, Land
Transportation Commission, Dagupan City Agency, Respondents-Appellants.
FACTS:
the then Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications issued to Federico Decano, herein
petitioner-appellee, a temporary appointment to the position of janitor in the Motor Vehicles Office 1
, Dagupan City Agency. The appointment having been approved by the Commissioner of Civil
Service, the said appointee assumed office and he served therein for almost four years, when herein
respondent-appellant Cipriano Posadas, as Acting Registrar, Land Transportation Commission,
Dagupan City, received a telegram from respondent-appellant Romeo F. Edu, in his then capacity as
Acting Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission (LTC), terminating his (Decanos)
services
effective
as
of
the
close
of
business
on
that
day.
the aggrieved petitioner-appellee died before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a petition for
"Mandamus and Injunction" claiming that the aforementioned officials of the LTC acted without
power and in excess of authority in removing him from the service, and therefore praying of the
court to declare as null and void the order for his removal, to declare him entitled to the position, to
compel his reinstatement and payment of his regular salary, and to enjoin, preliminary, and then
permanently, respondents from disturbing, molesting or otherwise ousting him from his position as
janitor.
As prayed for, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court at the commencement of
the proceedings commanding respondents "to desist and refrain from disturbing, molesting or
otherwise ousting the petitioner from his position as janitor in the Land Transportation
Commission, Dagupan City Agency, and to pay the petitioner his corresponding salary from the date
of notice of said preliminary injunction, until further orders from the Court."cralaw virtua1aw
library
After trial, while agreeing with respondent Edu that petitioners appointment as janitor was
temporary and therefore the latter could be ousted from his position at any time with or without
cause, the lower court nevertheless declared in its judgment that petitioners removal was null and
void upon the ground that under the law, respondent Commissioner of Land Transportation was not
the appointing authority insofar as the position of petitioner and all other minor positions in his
office were concerned; and thus lacking the power of appointment, said respondent had neither the
power
of
removal.
ISSUE:
HELD:
In seeking reversal of the trial courts decision, respondents make capital of the fact that the petition
for mandamus with injunction was filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan while
respondent Edu holds office in Quezon City which, they claim, is beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the said court. Respondents cite the long line of cases from the 1960 case of Acosta v. Alvendia 8
where this Court, pursuant to sec. 44 (h) of the Judiciary Act, jointly or alternatively with sec. 4,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and/or section 2 of Rule 58, ruled that a court of first instance has no
jurisdiction to require or control the execution of an act committed beyond the limits of its territorial

jurisdiction. These cases invariably involved petitions for writs of injunction seeking to
control the actions of courts or officers outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
respondent courts of first instance where said petitions had been filed. The Acosta ruling of
non-jurisdiction

does

not

apply,

however,

to

the

facts

and

circumstances

at

bar.

Here, petitioner seeks primarily the annulment of the dismissal order issued by respondent Edu,
mandamus and injunction being then merely corollary remedies to the main relief sought, and what
is prayed to be enjoined, as in fact the trial court did enjoin by preliminary injunction, is the
implementation of the termination order against the petitioner. It is true that the order of dismissal
was issued by respondent Edu, but it was to be implemented in Dagupan City by his subordinate
officer, respondent Acting Registrar of the LTC stationed at Dagupan City. Insofar, therefore, as
respondent Edu is concerned, the order terminating the services of respondent was a fait accompli
and this he had done without authority, as earlier discussed. The injunction is question,
consequently, must be taken only to restrain the implementation of respondent Edus order by his
co-respondent whose official station at Dagupan City is within the territorial boundaries of the trial
courts
jurisdictional
district.
Thus, in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications v. Aligaen, Et Al., 9 in which the acts sought
to be controlled by "Injunction with Preliminary Injunction" were relative to the establishment of a
local telephone system being done within the territorial boundaries of the judicial district of the
Court of First Instance of Roxas, the Court similarly upheld the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Roxas over the petition, although two of the respondents named therein the Director
of the Bureau of Telecommunications, and the Regional Superintendent of Region IV of the Bureau
of Telecommunications had their official stations at Manila and Iloilo City, respectively, as
follows:chanrobles.com.ph
:
virtual
law
library
". . . In the instant case, the acts relative to the establishment of a local telephone system by
petitioners were being done within the territorial boundaries of the province or district of
respondent Court, and so said Court had jurisdiction to restrain them by injunction. It does not
matter that some of the respondents in the trial court, against whom the injunction order was
issued, had their official residence outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. In the case of
Gonzales v. Secretary of Public Works, Et Al., (G.R. No. L-21988, September 30, 1966, 18 SCRA
296), wherein the only question raised was whether the Court of First Instance of Davao had
jurisdiction to entertain a case the main purpose of which was to prevent the enforcement of a
decision of the Secretary of Public Works who was in Manila this Court held that, inasmuch as the
acts sought to be restrained were to be performed within the territorial boundaries of the province of
Davao, the Court of First Instance of Davao had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case, and to
issue the necessary injunction order. This Gonzales case was an action for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction and/or preliminary mandatory injunction to prevent the demolition of
Gonzales dam in Davao in compliance with the order of the Secretary of Public Works.
"It follows, therefore, that since the acts to be restrained were being done in Roxas City, or within
the territorial jurisdiction of respondent court, the latter had jurisdiction to restrain said acts even if
the office of respondent Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications is in Manila, and that of
respondent Regional Superintendent of Region IV is in Iloilo City."cralaw virtua1aw library
As in the above cited case of Aligaen, the national official stationed at Quezon City, namely,
respondent Commissioner Edu, was impleaded as respondent in the Pangasinan court for a complete
determination of the issues involved, the legality of Edus order of dismissal being the pivotal issue

to determine the merits of the mandamus and injunction aspects of the petition. In other words Mr.
Edu was joined as respondent not for injunction purposes but mainly for testing the legality of his
dismissal order and his transmittal thereof to his co-respondent registrar at Dagupan City to
implement the same and terminate the services of the petitioner in Dagupan City.chanrobles
lawlibrary
:
rednad
"The doctrines invoked in support of the theory of non-jurisdiction are inapplicable, in that those
cases involved petitions for writs of injunction seeking to control the actions of courts or officers
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent courts involved. Here the sole point in issue is
whether the decision of the respondent public officers was legally correct or not, and without going
into the merits of the case, we see no cogent reason why this power of judicial review should be
confined to the courts of first instance of the locality where the offices of respondents are
maintained, to the exclusion of the courts of first instance in those localities where the plaintiffs
reside,
and
where
the
questioned
decisions
are
being
enforced.
"It is easy to see that if the contested ruling of the court below is sustained, the same would result
not only in hardship to litigants of limited means, practically amounting to denial of access to the
courts, but would also unnecessarily encumber the Manila courts whose dockets are already overburdened. Actually, since Ortua v. Singson, 59 Phil. 440, the power of provincial courts of first
instance to review administrative decisions of national officials has been consistently recognized.
"While the petitioner herein also prayed that the land authorities be ordered to reinstate her
original application, such remedy is purely a corollary to the main relief sought; for, as the
allegations now stand, reversal of the questioned administrative decision would necessarily lead to
the
same
result."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
Respondents finally raise a technical point referring to the allegedly defective verification of the
petition filed in the trial court, contending that the clause in the verification statement "that I have
read the contents of the said petition; and that [to] the best of my knowledge are true and correct" is
insufficient since under section 6 of Rule 7, 11 it is required that the person verifying must have read
the pleading and that the allegations thereof are true of his own knowledge. We do not see any
reason for rendering the said verification void. The statement to the best of my knowledge are true
and correct" referring to the allegations in the petition does not mean mere "knowledge, information
and belief." It constitutes substantial compliance with the requirement of section 6 of Rule 7, as held
in Madrigal vs, Rodas. 12 At any rate, this petty technicality deserves scant consideration where the
question at issue is one purely of law and there is no need of delving into the veracity of the
allegations in the petition, which are not disputed at all by respondents. As we have held time and
again, imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure are to be disregarded except where
substantial
rights
would
otherwise
be
prejudiced.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.

[G.R.

No.

L-34761.

January

17,

1974.]

CHAN BROS., INCORPORATED, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FEDERACION OBRERA DE LA

INDUSTRIA TABAQUERA Y OTROS TRABAJADORES DE FILIPINAS, commonly known
as FOITAF & FREE DEMOCRATIC LABOR UNION, LIWAYWAY GAUGAU, DefendantsAppellants.
FACTS:
This appeal on questions of law from a court of first instance decision enjoining acts of illegal
picketing and holding liable for damages Defendant Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y
Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas and its co-defendant, Free Democratic Labor Union, Liwayway
Gaugau, is primarily based on the legal proposition that in an unfair labor practice case, including
other incidents interwoven with it, the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations is exclusive.
Considering its indisputable character, it thus appears that this is one of those suits that a lower
court, if sufficiently mindful of the authoritative and controlling precedents, could have readily
disposed of. For notwithstanding its attention being called to the existence of a labor dispute and the
reminder that it was the labor court that had jurisdiction over the matter, it refused to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction the complaint for injunction and damages for illegal picketing. As a result, there
was added to its docket another action which need not have clogged it. What is worse, there was
imposed on this Tribunal an unnecessary burden involving expenditure of time and energy to pass

upon the appeal. It is fortunate that the absence of jurisdiction is quite apparent, thus entailing a
minimum
of
effort.
We
reverse.
In the very complaint, after referring to the formation of "picket lines in [its] compound and
premises . . .," 1 plaintiff continued: "That the aforesaid picket line formed by and under instigation
of defendants, [is] mainly and solely directed against the Liwayway Gaugau & Coffee Repacking, an
entity whose offices and factory are likewise located in the same premises as the herein-plaintiff
corporation; . . .," 2 It is true it denied its connection with the Liwayway Gaugau and Coffee
Repacking firm with which it was admitted there was a labor controversy, with pending unfair labor
practice cases in the Court of Industrial Relations, but the motion to dismiss predicated on the lack
of jurisdiction of the lower court presented a more accurate version of the matter. Thus: "It is clear
on the face of the plaintiffs Complaint that there exist . . . labor dispute[s] between the herein
plaintiff (as branch and/or sister factory) of the Liwayway Gaugau and Coffee Repacking) and the
defendants which resulted in the strike referred to by plaintiff in paragraph 4 of its Complaint.
Some of these disputes are still pending resolution [in] the Court of Industrial Relations while some
have not reached [a court] of justice. The above-mentioned strike was declared and staged by the
defendant [unions] only because [their] members could no longer endure the ordeal, oppression and
unfair labor practice being committed by the plaintiff. . . . In other words such strike is the
outgrowth and extension of the long standing industrial disputes between the parties herein." 3 To
sustain its plea, defendant Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera referred to the applicable
cases of SMB Box Factory Workers Union v. Victoriano, 4 Consolidated Labor Asso. v. Caluag, 5
Erlanger and Galinger, lnc. v. Erlanger and Galinger Employees Asso., 6 and Associated Labor
Union
v.
Rodriguez.
7
As stated at the outset, the lower court, instead of passing on the merits of the controversy and
ruling against defendant labor-unions which in addition to being enjoined were held liable in
damages,
ought
to
have
dismissed
the
case
for
lack
of
jurisdiction.
1. The latest case in point, decided on September 13, 1972, with Justice Antonio as ponente,
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Quicho, 8 categorically affirms "that a complaint for
injunction does not come under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance where the issue
involved is interwoven with an unfair labor practice case pending before the Court of Industrial
Relations, even if such case involves acts of violence, intimidation or coercion." 9 A rather extended
discussion of the above principle is found in one of the decisions called to the attention of the lower
court, Consolidated Labor Association of the the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion. Thus:
"Pursuant to section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 875, the Court of Industrial Relations shall have
jurisdiction over the prevention of unfair labor practices and is empowered to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice. This power shall be exclusive and shall not be affected by
any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by an agreement,
code, Philippines v. Caluag. 10 The opinion therein was penned by law or otherwise,. . . Construing
this provision, in relation to section 9 of the same Act, regulating the issuance of injunctions in labor
disputes, we have repeatedly held that courts of first instance may not enjoin the picketing staged in
connection with such disputes, and that the jurisdiction to entertain a petition to enjoin said
picketing and to issue the corresponding writ of injunction is vested exclusively in the Court of
Industrial Relations, if charges of unfair labor practice, in relation to said labor disputes, are
pending before the latter court prior to the filing of said petition. Thus, in National Garments and
Textiles Workers Union [Paflu] (Premier Shirts and Pants Factory Chapter) v. Hon. Hermogenes
Caluag, Et Al., L-9104 (September 10, 1956) we said: . . . But, as the record discloses, this labor
dispute is already involved in the two unfair labor cases that were then pending between the same

parties before the Court of Industrial Relations which were instituted much ahead in time than the
instant case. The Court of Industrial Relations, therefore, had already acquired jurisdiction over this
labor dispute when the instant case was instituted, which jurisdiction concerning as it does an
unfair practice, is exclusive of that court (Section 5 [a], Republic Act 875). The language used in
Lakas ng Pagkakaisa sa Peter Paul, Et. Al. v. Hon. Gustavo Victoriano, L-9290 (January 14, 1958)
was: It appearing that in addition to the labor dispute involved herein there were other labor cases
pending between the same parties before the Court of Industrial Relations which had been
instituted prior to the filing of the present case, among them Case No. 548-ULP which involved an
unfair labor practice, it was declared that the court a quo has no jurisdiction to try the instant case
for the same is already involved in those cases which had been submitted to the industrial court for
adjudication. This step is necessary in order to avoid multiplicity of actions. If the purpose of the
action is to obtain some injunctive relief against certain acts of violence of the laborers, the same
can be obtained from the industrial court which is given ample power to act thereon by the Magna
Carta. Verily, the court a quo acted without jurisdiction in the case.. . . We even declared, that when
the acts against which the injunction was obtained constitute unfair labor practices, the application
for injunction would be exclusively cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations and beyond the
jurisdiction of the . . . Court of First Instance, even if no complaint for unfair labor practice had been
filed, as yet, with the Court of Industrial Relations (Reyes, Et. Al. v. Tan, et al, 99 Phil. 880; 52 Off.
Gaz., [14], 6187)." 11 Nor is the reason for the doctrine difficult to discern. As was succinctly
explained by Justice J. B. L. Reyes, speaking for the Court in Erlanger and Galinger, Inc. v. Erlanger
and Galinger Employees Association, 12 likewise cited in the motion to dismiss of defendants: "The
reason for such exclusive jurisdiction is obvious. Since the picketing and strikes may be mere
incidents or consequences of the unfair labor practice, it is but proper that the issuance of injunction
be made by the court having jurisdiction over the main case, in order that the writ be issued upon
cognizance of all revelant facts." 13 Considering that even in the case of a declaratory relief
regarding the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, it was held by this Court in a
1972 decision, Philippine-American Management & Financing Company, Inc. v. Management &
Supervisors Association of the Philippine-American Management & Financing Co,. Inc., 14 that
such power may be exercised by the Court of Industrial Relations, the proposition that the lower
court was devoid of jurisdiction appears to be incontestable. For as therein pointed out:
"Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and
unequivocally, the choice should fall on the Court of Industrial Relations." 15
It

is

crystal-clear

then

that

the

lower

court

erred

in

not

dismissing

the

case.

2. Then there is the matter of picketing. Time and time again, this Court has stressed that peaceful
picketing is a constitutional right 16 embraced in the guarantee of freedom of expression. It is true
that it loses its character as such where acts of violence and intimidation are employed. It is
understandable why it should be thus. For thereby it has been transformed from an appeal for
public support through publicizing the facts of a labor dispute to the commission of anti-social acts
that have no place under a rule of law. Nonetheless, as was made clear by this Tribunal in two
recent cases, 17 it would be inimical to the labor movement fostered by the fundamental law itself 18
if, as it did happen here, efforts of defendant-unions to protect themselves through picketing would
have been rendered nugatory not because acts of violence or intimidation were proscribed, which, if
the matter were within the jurisdiction of the lower court was something fitting and proper, but
because of the seeming ease with which it would hold liable for damages such labor organizations.
For the premise appears to be lack of sympathy for picketing as such. What is more, if a halt is not
called to a propensity to impose pecuniary liability, it is easy to discern the deleterious effects on the
labor union finances, on the whole far from healthy but instead rather anemic. It would appear,

therefore, that even on the assumption that the lower court was possessed of jurisdiction, which it
was not, there was legitimate cause for an appeal as it was less than responsive to the plain dictates
not only of the controlling statutory provisions but also of the requirements of the Constitution.
3. Lastly, it may be observed that the failure of plaintiff as appellee to file a brief must have been
caused
by
the
realization
that
this
appeal
was
indeed
meritorious.
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of October 31, 1967 is reversed. Costs against plaintiff.

[G.R. No. L-17605. January 22, 1964.]

POBLETE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and DOMINGO POBLETE, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and JUDITH ASIAIN, Defendants-Appellees.
Placido C. Ramos, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

1. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION; QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS. The Social Security

Commission, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the Public Service Commission and
the
Courts
of
First
Instance.
2. ID.; ID.; COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH INJUNCTION AGAINST THE SOCIAL SECURITY
COMMISSION. As the writs of Injunction, Certiorari and Prohibition may be issued only by a
superior court against an inferior court, board or officer exercising judicial functions, and as the
Social Security Commission, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the Courts of First
Instance, it is held that the Court of First Instance in the case at bar had no jurisdiction to entertain
the petition for certiorari filed against the aforesaid Commission.
FACTS:
Poblete Construction Co. and Domingo Poblete, its president and general manager, appeal from the
order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing an action for certiorari against the Social
Security Commission hereinafter referred to as the Commission and Judith Asiain and
dissolving
the
writ
of
preliminary
injunction
issued
therein.
In a petition filed with the Social Security Commission Judith Asiain sought to recover from
appellants the death benefits she would have been entitled to receive from the Social Security
System had appellants the employers of her husband reported him to the System for coverage
prior
to
his
death,
as
required
by
law.
Appellants motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the Commission had no jurisdiction
over the case, as appellees husband was not covered by the System, was denied and the Commission
required appellants to answer the claim. Not having done so, the Commission upon motion of
appellee entered an order of default and set the date for the reception of appellees evidence. In view
thereof, appellants filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for certiorari with
injunction to enjoin the Commission from further proceedings in said case. The Court issued a writ
of preliminary injunction restraining the Commission from proceeding with the case pending final
determination
of
the
action
for certiorari.
Instead of filing an answer to the petition for certiorari, appellees moved to dismiss the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction and improper venue. Over appellants opposition, the lower court

issued

the

order

appealed

from.

Appellants now claim that the lower court erred in dismissing the case and in not ruling, after trial,
that the Social Security Commission has no jurisdiction to try and decide the petition filed with it by
Judith Asiain and her minor children, the subject matter of which should have been submitted in an
ordinary
civil
action
before
the
regular
courts.
We

find

the

present

appeal

to

be

without

merit.

In taking cognizance of the petition filed by Judith Asiain (Case No. 78), the Social Security
Commission was exercising its quasi-judicial powers granted by Section 5 (a) of Republic Act
No. 1161, as amended. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the claim aforementioned was
not within the jurisdiction of the Commission, and that it would be proper to issue a writ
of certiorari or injunction to restrain it from hearing and deciding the same, a Court of First
Instance has no jurisdiction to issue either of said writs against the Commission. It must be
observed that in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (c) of Republic Act
No. 1161, as amended, the decisions of said Commission are reviewable both upon law and facts by
the Court of Appeals, and that if the appeal from its decision is only on questions of law, the review
shall be made by Us. It is clear from these provisions that the Commission, in exercising its quasijudicial powers, ranks with the Public Service Commission and the Courts of First Instance. As the
writs of Injunction,Certiorari and Prohibition may be issued only by a superior court against an
inferior court, board or officer exercising judicial functions, it necessarily follows that the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, where appellants filed their petition for certiorari, had no jurisdiction to
entertain
the
same.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.

G.R. No. L-15350

November 30, 1962

MARIANO G. PINEDA, ARCADIO E. YABYABIN and MAXIMINO PIZARRO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. GREGORIO T. LANTIN, District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO., INC. and J. AMADO ARANETA, respondents.
This case raises a question of law heretofore undecided by this Court, to wit:
MAY A COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ENJOIN THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION?
FACTS
petitioner Mariano Pineda, in his official capacity as Securities and Exchange Commissioner,
ordered the investigation of the character and, for that purpose, designated the other petition
Arcadio E. Yabyabin and Maximino Pizarro, as investigators. These last two petitioners were the
Chief Counsel and Chief Examiner, respectively, of the Commission.
Pursuant to the above order, petitioners Yabyabin and Pizarro, addressed a subpoena duces tecum to
respondent J. Amado Araneta as well as to treasurer and secretary of the Bacolod-Murcia. On
receiving the subpoena duces tecum, however, herein respondent corporation and J. Amado Araneta,
thru court filed a "Petition to Reconsider Order and to Set Aside Subpoena Duces Tecum." They
contended that with approval of Republic Act No. 1143 "the power given by law to the Securities and
Exchange Commission to conduct investigations has been qualified and made subject to the
condition that such investigations must be conducted in accordance with the rules adopted by the
Commission." (Sec. 1 [d], Republic Act No. 1143.) And, since the Securities and Exchange
Commission had not till then adopted such rules, it could not proceed with the investigation.

After due consideration, petitioner Mariano G. Pineda denied the above petition filed by the
respondent.
Subsequently, on August 21, 1958, respondents Bacolod-Murcia and J. Amado Araneta filed a
Motion to Quash and Discontinue Entire Proceedings. This was docketed as SEC Case No. 951. The
basis of this motion was principally the same as that recited in the petition to reconsider and set
aside the subpoena duces tecum. In other words, the herein respondents reiterated their contention
that the Securities and Exchange Commission could not proceed with the investigation until after it
shall have promulgated the rules required by Republic Act No. 1143. Furthermore, the respondentmovants alleged that the complaint by the aforesaid minority stockholders "was part of a plot and
conspiracy to harass and oppress the herein respondents at the inspiration or instigation of the
Secretary of Commerce and Industry, the Honorable Pedro C. Hernaez, who has direct supervision
and control over the Securities and Exchange Commission." This motion was found to be without
merit, and was, for that reason, forthwith denied by the Commissioner on October 10, 1958.
After having received a copy of the order denying their motion of August 21, 1958, the respondent
corporation and J. Amado Araneta filed a special civil action for prohibition against the herein
petitioners Yabyabin and Pizarro, and, for the first time, joined Lacson and Lopez as respondents. It
was docketed in the sala of Judge Gregorio T. Lantin of the Manila Court of First Instance as Civil
Case No. 38456.
Having been served with summons in the above civil case, petitioners Yabyabin and Pizarro, on
November 29, 1959, moved to dismiss the same. They argued that writ prayed for would amount to a
review, modify or setting aside of an order of the Securities and change Commission and therefore,
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. According to them, only the Supreme Court
could modify or review an order or decision of the Commission in accordance with Security 1 of Rule
43, Rules of Court and Section 35 of Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic Act 635.
On December 6, 1958, Judge Gregorio T. Lantin is the following order: "Upon consideration of the
motion to dismiss dated November 28, 1958, filed by respondent Arcadio E. Yabyabin and Maximino
B. Pizarro, and objection thereto, let resolution of the said motion deferred until the trial of the case
on the merits." Soon after the issuance of this order, or, on December 26, 1958, herein petitioners
Yabyabin and Pizarro filed an answer to the petition for prohibition. Thereafter, order deferring the
resolution of the motion to dismiss was reconsidered. Instead, the motion to dismiss was denied on
January 31, 1959.
Disagreeing with the above order of denial, herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on
February 19, 1959. They reaffirmed in that pleading their position that only the Supreme Court may
review orders of Securities and Exchange Commission; that when Manila Court of First Instance did
so review, it went beyond its authority and jurisdiction. This was denied again by the respondent
judge, when on February 28, 1959, he issued an order dismissing the motion for consideration.
This case was elevated to this Honorable Court review on a petition for certiorari with prohibition a
preliminary injunction. To that end, it devolved on to resolve the question of law first mentioned
above. Stated in another way, the issue here is:
ISSUE:
WAS THE CIVIL CASE FOR PROHIBITION FILED BY THEREIN RESPONDENTS PROPER
AND WITHIN IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE?

HELD:
This Tribunal holds the view that under the Rules of Court and the law applicable to the case at bar,
a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive reliefs against the Securities and
Exchange Commission. That power is lodged exclusively with this Court.
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides;
SECTION 1. Petition for review. Within thirty days from notice of an order or decision issued by
the Public Service Commission or the Securities and Exchange Commission, any party aggrieved
thereby may file, in the Supreme Court, a written petition for the review of such order of decision.
Furthermore, Section 35 of Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic Act No. 635,
creating and setting forth the powers and functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
provides the following:
SEC. 35. Court review or orders. (a) Any person aggrieved by an order issued by the commission
in any proceeding under this Act to which such person is a party or who may be affected thereby
may obtain a review of such order in the Supreme Court of the Philippines by filing in such court
within thirty days after the entry of such order a written petition praying that the order of the
Commission be modified or set aside in whole or in part. . . .
Beyond doubt, therefore, whenever a party is aggrieved by or disagrees with an order or ruling of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, his remedy is to come to this Court on a petition for
review. He is not permitted to seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction. The two provisions
quoted above clearly pronounce that only this Court possesses the jurisdiction to review or pass upon
the legality or correctness of any order or decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and,
as circumstances might warrant, to modify, reverse, or, set aside the same.
It was urged by the herein respondents that the principal purpose of their action in the lower court
was not to have an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission reviewed but to have the
investigation stopped because of an alleged lack of jurisdiction to proceed with the same. Therefore,
the argument continued, Section 7 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and Section 35 of Court
Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic No. 635, could not have properly applied.
The contention carries no weight. This Court has thoroughly read through the petition for
prohibition with the lower court. But, even a cursory reading would have revealed so fully that its
main aim was have an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission reviewed the order
denying their motion to quash and discontinue the entire proceeding in the Commission More than
anything else, Civil Case No. 38456 was meant to have that order of the Commission ultimately set
aside.
But even assuming for the sake of argument that principal concern of Bacolod-Murcia in filing the
action below was indeed to stop the investigation so that jurisdiction of the investigating body to
conduct the same might first be determined, still this Court holds that action should have been
commenced in this Tribunal. When the Rules of Court and the law provided that orders and
decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are reviewable only by this Court, they could
possibly have excluded within their efficacy the review of incidental orders as the one at bar.
Otherwise, entire philosophy for providing that only this Court review on appeal orders of the
Commission would rendered mute, weak and purposeless. For then, shall be sanctioning what can
not be done directly to be done indirectly.

Finally, herein respondents contended that since questioned order of the Commission was merely in
interlocutory, they could not have come to this Court under Section 1 of Rule 43 because the said
provision refers only to final orders and decisions. This Court, however, finds neither force nor merit
in this argument. We have held already in the case of San Beda v. Court of Industrial Relations,
G.R. No. L-7649, promulgated October 29, 1955, that while the general rule is that interlocutory
orders are not appealable, the same may be so appealed when it is grounded upon lack of
jurisdiction.
The role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in our national economy cannot be minimized.
The legislature has entrusted to it the serious responsibility of enforcing all laws affecting
corporations and other forms of associations not otherwise vested in some other government offices.
Being charged, therefore, with overseeing the operations of those various corporate enterprises from
which our government derives great revenues and income, it cannot afford to be impeded or
restrained in the performance of its functions by writs of injunction emanating from tribunals
subordinate to this Court. If every Court of First Instance can enjoin the Commission from pursuing
its objectives, and, in the premises, substitute its judgment for that of the Commission on what
should or should not be done, then, no one will suffer thereby but the economy of our body politic
and, eventually, this country's citizenry. Certainly, the legislature could never have intended that.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the lower court denying the motion to dismiss
filed by the herein petitioners in Civil Case No. 38456 is hereby set aside and the herein respondents
are prohibited and enjoined from proceeding with the trial and determination on the merits of the
same civil case, with costs

[G.R. No. 93640. January 7, 1994.]

TAY CHUN SUY, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND DEVELOPMENT

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT; SHERIFFS

MINISTERIAL DUTY TO CONDUCT AN AUCTION SALE; SUBJECT TO
LIMITATION. A sheriffs ministerial duty to conduct an auction sale is not without
any limitation. In the performance of this duty, he is deemed to know what is inherently
right and inherently wrong. Nonetheless, Sheriff Reyes, Jr., upon the persistent
proddings of petitioner, proceeded with the auction sale. His poor judgment alone would
not have caused any suspicion of bias. However, his precipitate action taken together with
the anomalous proceedings that ensued, and the haste with which he delivered the
certificate of sale to petitioner in the afternoon of the day of the auction sale lead to the
inevitable conclusion that the whole operation was contrived to benefit petitioner. The
handwritten Minutes of the auction sale clearly indicate the haste with which they were
prepared, a telltale evidence of the anomalous conduct of the proceedings. On its face,
one cannot determine the name of the successful bidder of the vessel. The minutes
became even more vague when Sheriff Reyes, Jr., testified that there were only three
bidders. From the minutes, however, we find that all those present offered bids as there
were amounts placed opposite their names. Significantly, the testimony of Sheriff Reyes,
Jr., to the effect that Atty. Positos did not participate in the bidding was rebutted by the
latter. In view of the ambiguity of the minutes, the trial court was constrained to ask
clarificatory questions from Sheriff Reyes, Jr. The procedure followed by Sheriff Reyes,
Jr., was patently irregular. The unexplained inconsistencies in the minutes and the
certificate of sale are so material as to affect the integrity of the whole proceedings.
Noteworthy, too, is the fact that the Minutes do not mention the request of counsel for
SCHI for deferment of the auction sale. While the request was made prior to the auction
sale, the trial court was correct in its observation that the same should have been
entered in the minutes because of its importance and relevance to the sale. Under these
circumstances, the ruling of the appellate court sustaining the trial court on the nullity
of
the
auction
sale
cannot
be
faulted.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-REGISTRATION OF PROPERTY BOUGHT THEREFROM; NOT
FATAL TO THE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP. Petitioner vigorously maintains that the
failure of DBP to register its title to MV Sta. Clara I with the Philippine Coast Guard is
fatal to its claim of ownership. In G.R. No. 78383, we rejected these arguments in our
resolution of 28 September 1987 - The respondent appellate court correctly held that the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, had jurisdiction over the auction brought
in Civil Case No. 18188 concerning the vessel herein involved which was allegedly
purchased by petitioner in an execution sale, an which execution sale was the result of
the judgment rendered by Branch 12 of the same Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.
15970. Branch 17, Regional Trial Court of Davao City, did not undertake to annul the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 12, jurisdiction to annul
belonging to the Court of Appeals. Respondent appellate court also correctly held that a

certificate of registration of ownership of a vessel is only presumptive evidence that the

registered owner has legal title to the vessel, and that DBPs failure to register with the
Philippine Coast Guard its prior acquisition of the vessel is not fatal to its ownership of
said vessel, vis-a-vis petitioner herein, who similarly failed to register the alleged
subsequent sale of the vessel to itself (sic) in an execution sale.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE COURT TO INTERFERE BY INJUNCTION WITH
THE JUDGMENT OR DECREE OF ANOTHER COURT WITH CONCURRENT OR
COORDINATE JURISDICTION; RULE AND EXCEPTION. At any rate, our ruling in
Santos v. Bayhon (G.R. No. 88643, 23 July 1991, 199 SCRA 525, 528) should put to rest
petitioners doubt as to the jurisdiction of the trial court - The general rule that no court
has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of another court
with concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction possessing equal power to grant injunctive
relief, applies only when no third-party claimant is involved (Traders Royal Bank v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 133 SCRA 142). When a third-party, or a stranger to the
action, asserts a claim over the property levied upon, the claimant may vindicate his
claim by an independent action in the proper civil court which may stop the execution of
the
judgment
on
property
not
belonging
to
the
judgment
debtor.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTION CREDITOR GENERALLY ACQUIRE NO HIGHER OR
BETTER RIGHT THAN WHAT THE EXECUTION DEBTOR HAS IN THE PROPERTY
LEVIED UPON. Further, petitioner contends that he is bona fide purchaser for value
at the auction sale and that he came to know about the acquisition by DBP only upon its
filing of the complaint for annulment of the execution sale. The evidence on record belies
such contention. Before the auction sale started, counsel for petitioner was already aware
of the cloud on the title of SCLC to the vessel. Notwithstanding his knowledge of the
prior claim of DBP, petitioner insisted that the sheriff proceeded with the auction sale.
Under the caveat emptor rule, he assumed the risk of losing the vessel because his right
to it cannot be considered superior to that of DBP. As we held in one case, an execution
creditor generally acquires no higher or better right that what the execution debtor has
in the property levied upon. It follows then that if the judgment debtor had no interest in
the
property,
the
execution
creditor
acquires
no
interest
therein.
5. ID.; ID.; APPEAL; ISSUES NOT BROUGHT UP DURING THE TRIAL COURT
CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME THEREON. Petitioner is estopped
from denying knowledge of the prior claim of DBP to the vessel in the light of his judicial
admission. He asserts that he never admitted that he knew of DBPs prior acquisition at
the time of the execution sale on 16 July 1986. Petitioner never challenged this particular
ruling in his appeal to the Court of Appeals. Hence, he cannot be allowed to ventilate it
now in this proceeding. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately
brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be,
considered by a reviewing Court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
FACTS:

Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc. (SCLC), obtained a loan from private respondent
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). As security for the loan, SCLC mortgaged
some of its properties, among which was a vessel, MV Sta. Clara I. Upon SCLCs failure
to pay the loan, the mortgage was foreclosed. the Clerk of Court and Provincial Sheriff
Ex-Officio of Sultan Kudarat, Aurelio M. Rendon, conducted an auction sale and sold the
vessel to DBP. He thereafter issued a certificate of sale dated in favor of DBP. DBP did
not register with the Philippine Coast Guard the mortgage; neither the foreclosure nor
the
auction
sale.
DBP and Sta. Clara Housing Industries, Inc. (SCHI), entered into a Lease/Purchase
Agreement 2 which provided that DBP should lease some of the former properties of
SCLC, including MV Sta. Clara I, to the latter and transfer actual ownership over these
properties upon completion by the lessee of the stipulated lease/purchase
payment.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
petitioner caused the levy and attachment of the same vessel, MV Sta. Clara I, in order
to satisfy a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court. At the time of the levy, the
coastwise license of the vessel was in the name of Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc.
On the scheduled date of the execution sale, Atty. Necitas Kintanar, counsel for SCHI,
verbally informed Deputy Sheriff Manases M. Reyes, Jr., who was to conduct the sale,
that MV Sta. Clara I was no longer owned by SCLC but by DBP pursuant to a prior
extrajudicial sale. Despite such information, Sheriff Reyes, Jr., proceeded with the sale
and awarded the vessel to petitioner .
MV Sta. Clara I was again levied upon and attached by Deputy Sheriff Alfonso M.
Zamora by virtue of a writ of attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court. the same
court issued an order appointing Philippine Trigon Shipyard Shipping Corporation as
depositary of the attached vessel with authority to operate the vessel temporarily. MV
Sta. Clara I was then taken from the port of Davao City to Cebu City.
Upon being informed of the execution sale to petitioner, DBP filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court, Br. XVII, Davao City, for annulment of the execution sale, recovery
of possession, damages and attorneys fees with prayer for restraining order and
preliminary injunction. 5 Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint for alleged lack of
jurisdiction, cause of action and/or legal personality to sue on the part of DBP. 6
the court denied the motion to dismiss but granted DBPs prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. 7 Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the denial but the motion was
likewise
denied.
8
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
prohibition assailing the Orders of the trial court. the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition.
9

Petitioner appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari, the Third
Division of this Court denied the petition for lack of merit.
the trial court issued a decision which, among other matters, declared that DBP was the
lawful owner of MV Sta. Clara I and that the public auction sale conducted by Deputy
Sheriff Manases Reyes, Jr., and the resultant certificate of sale were null and void.
petitioner sought recourse to the Court of Appeals. the appellate court dismissed his
appeal.
the
motion
to
reconsider
the
dismissal
was
denied.
13
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals erred (1) in finding that the sheriffs auction sale of the vessel did not enjoy the
presumption of regularity; and (2) in affirming the decision of the trial court declaring
DBP as the true and exclusive owner of MV Sta. Clara I. 14

[G.R. No. L-26294. May 31, 1972.]

HON. CARLOS ABIERA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros

Occidental and the SPOUSES MIGUEL DE LA CRUZ AND JOVITA DE LA

CRUZ, Petitioners, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA E.

PUENTEVELLA, as Judicial Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Luis B.

Puentevella, Respondents.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; NO POWER TO INTERFERE BY INJUNCTION WITH

ORDERS OF COORDINATE COURT. No court has power to interfere by injunction
with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having
equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction. The doctrine as thus formulated is
well-settled, and has been adhered to consistently whenever justified by the facts in order
to avoid conflict of power between different courts of coordinate jurisdiction and to bring
about
a
harmonious
and
smooth
functioning
of
their
proceedings.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN APPLICABLE. For the doctrine to apply the injunction issued

by one court must interfere with judgment or decree issued by another court of equal or
coordinate jurisdiction, and the relief sought by such injunction must be one which could
be granted by the court which rendered the judgment or issued the decree.
3. ID.; EXECUTION; RIGHT OF THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT ON LEVIED PROPERTY
ON EXECUTION NOT EXCLUSIVE. The right of a person who claims to be the
owner of property levied upon on execution to file a third party claim with the sheriff is
not exclusive, and he may file an action to vindicate his claim even if the judgment
creditor files an indemnity bond in favor of the sheriff to answer for any damages that
may
be
suffered
by
the
third
party
claimant.
4. ID.; ACTIONS; MEANING AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 17 RULE 39. By "action"
as stated in Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, what is meant is a separate and
independent action, such as was resorted to by the third-party claimants in this case.
5. ID.; COURTS; WHERE JUDGMENT OR INTERLOCUTORY ORDER OF ONE
COURT NOT INTERFERENCE WITH ORDER OF COORDINATE COURT. Under
Section 17 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court a third person who claims property levied
upon on execution may vindicate such claims by action. Obviously a judgment rendered
in his favor, that is, declaring him to be owner of the property, would not constitute
interference with the powers or processes of the court which rendered the judgment to
enforce which the execution was levied. If that be so and it is so because the property,
being that of a stranger, is not subject to levy then an interlocutory order such as
injunction, upon a claim and prima facie showing of ownership by the claimant, cannot
be
considered
as
such
interference
either.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF CABIGAO NOT IN POINT. The case of Cabigao v. Del
Rosario and Lim is not in point. In this case a writ of execution was issued by Branch II,
CFI, Manila to enforce its judgment for a sum of money. After the defendants property
was levied upon he filed a petition in another Court Branch I, praying that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the sheriff from carrying out the execution
on the ground therein alleged. Under these facts, it is quite clear that the preliminary
injunction issued by Branch I was improper, and constituted undue interference with a
decree
of
Branch
II.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF HACBANG NOT IN POINT. The case of Hacbang v. Hon.
Clementino Diaz, Et. Al. is not in point. There judgment was rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Leyte against the Leyte Autobus Co., Inc., in Civil Case No. 2045. A writ
of execution was issued, and a passenger bus was levied upon by the provincial sheriff.
The respondent, Leyte Autobus Co., Inc., claiming that it was the owner of the bus and
that it was not the defendant in Civil Case No. 2045, although it bore the same name,
filed a third party claim. The Leyte court denied the claim and directed that the sale of
the bus be carried out, on the ground that said respondent was the very same company
that was the defendant against whom the judgment had been rendered. Subsequently,

respondent filed another action in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, reproducing
substantially the allegations in its third party claim, and prayed that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the sale of the passenger bus which had been
levied upon and this was granted by said court. This court annulled the writ issued by
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, applying the doctrine laid down in Cabigao v. Del
Rosario
and
National
Power
Corporation
v.
Hon.
Jesus
de
Veyra.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE OF NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, NOT IN POINT.
Where the question raised is whether or not property which has been levied upon a
garnishment proceeding by one court (in Manila) may be subject to the jurisdiction of
another court (in Baguio) in an independent suit impugning the legality of said
garnishment, the reason advanced by the respondent court of Baguio City that it should
grant relief when there is apparently an illegal service of the writ . . . may not be
upheld, there being a better procedure to follow, i.e. a resort to the Manila Court wherein
the remedy may be obtained, it being the court under whose authority the illegal levy
had been made. To allow coordinate courts to interfere with each others judgments or
decrees by injunction would obviously lead to confusion and might seriously hinder the
proper
administration
of
justice.
FACTS:
Jovita De la Cruz and her husband Miguel De la Cruz filed a complaint before Branch VI
of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and alleging that they are the owners
of the buildings occupied by the Southern Negros College as well as the equipment,
books, and supplies found therein, end that the same were levied upon by the Sheriff to
satisfy a judgment rendered by Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental of which said plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. De la Cruz are not parties and,
therefore, not binding on them, obtained from the Presiding Judge of Branch VI of the
same court Honorable Carlos Abiera a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Angelina
E. Puentevella and her co-defendants Sheriff and deputy sheriffs of the Province of
Negros Occidental to refrain from taking possession of the buildings and other
properties mentioned in the depository receipt mark as Exhibit A and the lots wherein
they are situated and from going on with the sale of the properties; and from preventing
the students, instructors and other personnel of the school from entering the school
premises and to remove the barricades from the main gate of the school premises, (until
further orders) from this court."
Puentevella filed a petition for certiorari or mandamus with the Court of Appeals, with a
prayer "that an ex-parte writ of preliminary injunction be issued, enjoining the Hon.
Carlos Abiera from enforcing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by him in Civil
Case No. 293 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and from further issuing
any other writ or process which would in any manner affect the enforcement of the
judgment rendered by Branch II of the same Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
in Civil Case No. 7435; that, after hearing, judgment be declared making the writ of

preliminary injunction prayed for in this case permanent." the Court of Appeals granted
the petition and set aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The
spouses De la Cruz moved to reconsider but the motion was denied in a resolution dated
June 27, 1966. In the same resolution the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining "respondent Judge from further enforcing the injunction issued by
him
in
Civil
Case
No.
293."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
Not satisfied with the said decision as well as with the order denying their motion for
reconsideration, the spouses De la Cruz filed the instant petition for review. On motion of
petitioners We issued, a restraining order to stop the Provincial Sheriff of Negros
Occidental from proceeding with the auction sale and a writ of preliminary injunction for
the
same
purpose,
upon
a
bond
of
P2,500.00.

ISSUE:
whether or not Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental acted with
authority in enjoining the Provincial Sheriff from proceeding with the execution sale of
properties levied upon by him pursuant to a final judgment rendered by Branch II but
claimed by the petitioners herein, the De la Cruz spouses, in the action filed by them in
the court which issued the injunction.
HELD:

G.R.

No.

L-25239.

November

18,

1967.]

EMERITO S. CALDERON, Petitioner, v. HON. JUDGE AMADOR E. GOMEZ, as

Presiding Judge of the Second Branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
ET

AL., Respondents.

1. COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE; COURTS OF CONCURRENT OR COORDINATE

JURISDICTION; INTERFERENCE WITH OTHER BRANCHES. Where Branch VII
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu has already issued a preliminary injunction
against "any or all persons connected directly or indirectly with the public works projects
in the 5th and 6th Congressional districts of Cebu to refrain and desist from
commencing, undertaking or prosecuting any such project in any municipality or city
comprised in the said congressional districts of Cebu, and from making, causing or
authorizing payment of any payroll or voucher in connection with any of the project in
question, or in any manner allowing and causing the disbursement of public funds
earmarked for such projects, upon the filing by the petitioners of a bond in the amount of
TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) to answer for whatever damage may be caused to
the respondents by reason of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction", Branch
II of the same court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to compel the provincial treasurer
and the provincial Auditor of Cebu to pay laborers wages working on the same project for
the period from September 8 to September 16, 1965, for the same subject matter, i.e.,
disbursements of public funds in connection with the questioned projects, is involved in
the first case then pending in Branch VII, otherwise that would render nugatory the
effect
of
preliminary
injunction
issued
by
the
first
court.
2. ID.; ID.; OTHER SPECIAL REMEDIES IN CLASH WITH INJUNCTION
IMPROPER. It is the settled rule that no court has power to interfere by injunction
(mandamus in the case at bar) with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction
(mandamus), as such interference with each others judgments or decrees by injunction
(mandamus) would obviously lead to confusion and might seriously hinder the
administration of justice. (Ongsiaco Et. Al. v. Tan, Et Al., 97 Phil., 330).
FACTS:

Emerito S. Calderon, then independent congressional candidate for the 5th district,
together with then Congressman Manuel A. Zosa of the 6th district and some of the 6th
districts municipal mayors, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch VII) a
verified petition for injunction with preliminary injunction. It was directed against "any
or all persons connected directly or indirectly with the projects in question." Said petition
specifically sought to enjoin or stop further commencement of the questioned public
works and highway projects as well as to enjoin or stop further disbursements of public
funds
earmarked
for
such
projects.
Upon the posting and approval of the necessary bond the writ of preliminary injunction
was
issued
and
served
upon
all
parties
concerned.
petitioner filed a petition for contempt asking the court a quo to cite respondents district
engineer of the 4th Engineering District, the disbursing officer thereof, the highway
auditor and the provincial auditor, to appear before it and show cause why they should
not be punished for contempt for having continuously recruited laborers for the projects
in question and for having authorized the payments or disbursements of public funds in
connection therewith despite the effectivity of the aforesaid writ of preliminary
injunction.
the laborers who had worked in the various road projects in the different towns of the 5th
district filed a verified petition for mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction
before the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch II) presided by respondent Hon. Judge
Amador E. Gomez. The primary object of the suit was to compel the provincial treasurer
and the provincial auditor of Cebu to effect payment of their wages. Respondent Judge
gave due course to the petition and set the hearing which was subsequently re-set.
Calderon immediately instituted the present petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction. we issued an order restraining respondent Judge from taking cognizance of
and taking further action and restraining also the provincial treasurer, provincial
auditor and the Philippine National Bank (Cebu branch) from allowing, causing or
authorizing in any manner payment of any payroll or voucher for public works or
highway projects in the 5th congressional district of Cebu. the restraining order was
extended
by
us
until
further
notice.
Petitioner argues that the cognizance by the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Branch II)
of the mandamus suit (Civil Case No. 9053) constitutes undue interference with the writ
of preliminary injunction issued by another court of co-equal and coordinate jurisdiction
(Court of First Instance, Branch VII). Pursuing his arguments, petitioner points out that
the subject-matter of the mandamus case before Branch II is the payment of payrolls
covering wages of laborers allegedly working in various public works and highways
projects in the 5th congressional district. In the injunction suit filed earlier before Branch
VII, the same subject-matter, i.e., disbursements of public funds in connection with the
questioned projects, is involved. Petitioner maintains that while the mandamus case

before Branch II seeks to compel the provincial treasurer and provincial auditor of Cebu
to pay or allow payment of payrolls of public works laborers, the writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued by Branch VII enjoins the very same acts sought to be
accomplished
by
the
application
for
mandamus.
We find merit in petitioners stand. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by Branch
VII seems clear enough. Among others, it specifically "commands respondents . . . to
refrain and desist . . . from making, causing or authorizing payment of any payroll or
voucher in connection with any of the projects in question, or in any manner allowing and
causing the disbursement of public funds earmarked for such projects." When petitioners
in the mandamus case before Branch II prayed that judgment be rendered to effect
payment of (their) wages, they were obviously trying to render nugatory the effect of the
preliminary injunction. Under the guise of a separate suit, petitioners in the mandamus
suit would want a declaration in their favor and thereby avoid compliance with the writ
of
preliminary
injunction.
If Branch II were permitted to take cognizance with the mandamus case and thereafter
should render judgment granting the relief prayed for, it would amount in effect to the
setting aside of the writ of preliminary injunction. This situation should not be permitted
to
arise
at
all.
"It is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that no court has power to interfere
by injunction with the judgments or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction.. The various
branches of the Court of First Instance (of Manila) are in a sense coordinate courts and
to allow them to interfere with each others judgments or decrees by injunctions would
obviously lead to confusion and might seriously hinder the administration of justice."
(Onsingco,
Et
Al.,
v.
Tan,
Et
Al.,
97
Phil.
330)
"The principle has been announced that a judge of a branch of one court should not annul
the order of a judge of another branch of the same court (meaning the same judicial
district) because both of them are judges of the same category who act coordinately and
independently of each other except, of course, if the second judge acts in the place of
the first judge in the same proceeding." (Mas v. Dumara-og, G.R. No. L-16252, September
29,
1964."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
The same principle which legally prevents a court of justice from interfering, by means of
injunction, with the judgment or decree of another court of concurrent and coordinate
jurisdiction, applies with equal logic in a case where another provisional remedy, other
than injunction, is resorted to. The basic reason for disallowing interference is to avoid
confusion and to enable the administration of justice to go unhindered. This fundamental
objective is definitely disregarded when a provisional remedy proceeding from one court
is utilized to defeat a co-equal and coordinate courts lawful processes. Jurisprudence and
existing
laws
do
not
justify
such
a
course
of
action.

Reference is made to the fact that the 1965 elections, the event which largely influenced
the filing of the suit below, are a thing of the past and that the instant case has become
moot and academic as a result. We do not think so. As correctly pointed out by the
petitioner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The present petition . . . was filed before this Honorable Tribunal primarily for the
purpose of preventing the illegal, immoral, and scandalous disbursement and wastage of
public funds, amounting to approximately P800,000.00.
"The fact that payrolls and vouchers covering these funds are padded and falsified,
however, has not been cured or rendered moot by the mere passing of the elections, even
by the political victory of those responsible for their preparation. This vital issue is still
very much in dispute in Civil Case No. 241-B, and the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch VII, should be given all the opportunity to seek out the truth about those
documents,
.
.
."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and the temporary restraining order issued
by us on November 2, 1966 is hereby made permanent, with costs against respondents.

[G.R.

No.

L-62038.

September

25,

1985.]

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION (NEA) AND ORIENTAL

MINDORO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE I (ORMECO), Petitioners, v. HON.

FILEMON MENDOZA IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF

FIRST INSTANCE OF ORIENTAL MINDORO, BRANCH I and the INTEGRATED

BAR

OF

THE

CHAPTER, Respondents.

PHILIPPINES

(IBP),

ORIENTAL

MINDORO

FACTS:
petitioner Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative I or (ORMECO) I, sent notices
to the electric consumers in Oriental Mindoro informing them that effective March 1,
1981, it will charge increased rates of electricity authorized by the National
Electrification
Administration
(NEA)
.
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Oriental Mindoro Chapter, thru its officers,
opposing the increase of electric rates, filed a petition for injunction, in the Court of First
Instance of Oriental Mindoro, to prevent the implementation of the said increases.
respondent Judge issued a restraining order directing ORMECO I to refrain from
enforcing the increase in its electric rates.chanrobles law library : red
petitioner ORMECO I filed its Answer praying that the petition be dismissed for
insufficient cause of action and/or want of jurisdiction and praying therein that the
restraining order earlier issued by the court below be lifted or dissolved.
respondent Judge lifted the restraining order and dismissed the petition. However, upon
Motion for Reconsideration filed by private respondent IBP, respondent Judge reinstated
the
restraining
order
previously
issued.
petitioner NEA filed its Motion for Intervention which was granted. NEA filed a Motion
to Dismiss the injunction suit on the ground that respondent Court has no jurisdiction
over the subject case which pertains to the electricity rates that are being charged by a
cooperative, which matter is submitted to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NEA.
an order was issued denying Petitioner NEAs Motion to Dismiss. Respondent court
declared that it can restrain the implementation of said rates inasmuch as there was no
public hearing on the proposed rates to be collected by the cooperative from its
consumers.
Upon motion of the private respondent IBP, the respondent Judge, also issued two
Orders, (1) directing the Provincial Auditor to assist the IBP in examining the records of
petitioner ORMECO I to determine whether said entity is losing or not, and to submit its
findings to the court and (2) fixing the rate of P1.72/kwh. These ultimately led to the
filing
of
the
present
Petition
before
this
Court.
Petitioner contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction to act at all on the case. On
the other hand, private respondents maintain that the respondent Court of First
Instance, has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action which it filed because the
consumers were denied due process of law due to the absence of any public hearing
conducted regarding the reasonableness of the proposed increases in the electric light
rates.

ISSUE:
whether or not the court may interefere by with an order of regulatory
commission?
HELD:
It is undisputed that NEA was the creditor of the electric cooperative which had obtained
a huge loan from the NEA on March 27, 1973. It has been stipulated between the NEA
and the ORMECO I that the rates and charges affecting the cooperative, shall be subject
to the approval by the Board of Administrators of the NEA. Consequently, the Court of
First Instance now Regional Trial Court cannot usurp for itself the power, as it did, to
review the power rates charged by the ORMECO I and approved by NEA. This
competence has been lodged by law to the NEA and to no other. In Pineda v. Lantin, 6
SCRA 757, 763, We ruled that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with an

order of regulatory Commission because it cannot substitute its judgment for

that of the Commission on what should be or should not be done as the

legislature had not intended that. In Philippine Pacific Fishing Company, Inc.
versus Luna 112 SCRA 604 (1982), it was ruled that "nowhere does the law
empower any Court of First Instance to interfere with the orders of the

Commission, not even on grounds of due process and jurisdiction." The

petitioner Commission, in the instant case is in the very least a co-equal body
with the Court of First Instance and co-equal bodies have no power to control

the other. Furthermore, the power of judicial review of NEAs order and
decision pertains to the Supreme Court as decreed in Section 59 of P.D. No. 269

which vests specifically on the Supreme Court the jurisdiction to review any
order, ruling or decision of the NEA and to modify or set aside such orders,
rulings

or

decisions.chanrobles

law

library

WHEREFORE, for certiorari in this case is hereby granted, and the questioned orders of
respondent Judge dated December 17, 1981, and March 3 and March 10, 1982 are hereby
set aside for being null and void and issued in excess of its jurisdiction. Respondent
Judge is further directed to dismiss the stated Civil Case NO. R-3326 for lack of
jurisdiction over the same. No pronouncement is here made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.