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MODERNIZATION
Theories
and Facts
Introduction
T
JL
V V
racies
as a consequence
of economic
development?
destabilize
democracies?
Is there some
growth
emerge
rapid economic
Does
level of
history unique
countries?
or is it
repeating
itself
in contemporary
less de
two theories
is to distinguish
that relate economic
de
purpose
some facts in
to examine
and
and
these
of
velopment
democracy
light
concern
theories. While
the interesting
the mech
ultimately
questions
anisms that mediate
between
economic
and
the
dynamics
development
we must nevertheless
of political
the facts to be ex
regimes,
identify
we
before
into
stick as close as
Hence,
plained
plunging
explanations.
nar
to
pose the question
patterns. We
possible
elementary
descriptive
the impact of development,
rather than
rowly, examining
exclusively
seeking
to
broadly
deliberately
the world
explain
ignore factors
income
system,
to influence
by others
that our question
answers,
vergent
well understood.
found
In Section
we
the dynamic
of political
regimes. Hence,
such as religion,
in
colonial
legacy, position
or diffusion,
which
have been
distribution,
the incidence
of democracy
We
believe
to di
in its own
is important
it
that
lends
itself
right,
are
not
and that it raises methodological
issues that
I, we
reconstruct
two alternative
views
of the relation
be
the cases
In Section
II we
examine
the vulnerabil
*
We
Cheibub, Fernando Cort?s, Larry Dia
appreciate comments by Mike Alvarez, Jos? Antonio
mond, John H. Kautsky, Seymour Martin
Lipset, Alejandro
Lopez, Jos? Maria Maravall, Guillermo
and Susan Stokes. This work was supported in part by a grant from the National
Science
O'Donnell,
no. SES-9022605.
Foundation
1
of Democracy:
Economic Development
and Po
Seymour Martin
Lipset, "Some Social Requisites
litical Legitimacy,'' American Political Science Review 53 (March 1959); and idem, Political Man:
Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore: Johns
Press, 1981).
Hopkins University
The
WORLD POLITICS
156
to economic
crises. In Section
the
III we consider
ity of democracies
most
in
criticisms
and
Section
substantive
of
's
views,
important
Lipset
IV we study methodological
reflections
close
criticisms. Methodological
the paper.
Appendix
1 explains
and political
our classification
of
Development
and Democracy
observation
that democracy
is related to economic
develop
Lipset's
in 1959, has generated
the largest body of research
ment, first advanced
on any
and con
It has been supported
topic in comparative
politics.
while
several
revised
and
buried
and
And
resuscitated.
tested,
extended,
to
in the recent Festschrift
neither
conclusions,
Lipset proclaim
the theory nor the facts are clear.2
Even a glance at the aggregate
such as Figure
1, shows that
patterns,
the relation between
levels of development
and the incidence of demo
articles
a
of regimes
is strong.3 Indeed,
condi
regimes
probit analysis
as
on the per
we
to
refer
which
throughout
only
capita income,
77
of
annual
the level of development,
4,126
percent
correctly classifies
cratic
tional
observations.4
The probability
is
chance
greater than 0.99.
by
Yet there are two distinct
democracies
nomically,
may
or
that
this classification
is not generated
reasons
be more
they may
2
in Gary Marks
and
"Economic Development
and Democracy
Reconsidered,"
Larry Diamond,
eds., Reexamining
Larry Diamond,
Lipset (Newbury
Democracy: Essays inHonor of Seymour Martin
Park, Calif: Sage Publications,
1992).
3
lead to somewhat divergent results, the
While
different data sets and different estimation methods
most
finds that
careful statistical study of the aggregate patterns thus far, by Burkhart and Lewis-Beck,
causes democracy. Ross E. Burkhart and Michael
economic
S. Lewis-Beck,
Granger
development
Thesis," American Political Science Review 88
"Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development
(December
1994), 903-10.
4
and democ
the relation between development
A fair amount of ink has been spilled over whether
to Democratic
of Economic Development
racy is linear. See Robert W. Jackman, "On the Relation
and Zehra F. Arat,
Science 17 (August 1973), 611-21;
American Journal of Political
Performance,"
Modernization
Theory Revisited," Comparative Politics 21
"Democracy and Economic Development:
is a qualitative or a lim
however measured,
(October 1988), 21-36. We now know better. Democracy,
it ranges from 2 to 14 on the Freedom
ited variable: it assumes values of 0 or 1 under our measurement;
House Scale created by R. D. Gastil, Freedom in theWorld: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1987-88
(New York: Freedom House,
1988); from 0 to 100 on the scale of Kenneth A. Bollen, "Issues in the
American Sociological Review 45 (June 1980),
of Political Democracy,"
Measurement
Comparative
can become negative as the level of de
no
and so on. Hence,
index of democracy
370-90,
predicted
can exceed whatever
is the maximum
index of democracy
tends to zero, and no predicted
velopment
value of a particular scale as the level gets very large. Only a nonlinear function, such as the normal or
as
can satisfy these constraints. See Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven:
logistic,
suggested by Robert A. Dahl
iswhy we use probit or logit models
Yale University
Press, 1971). This
throughout.
157
1.00000
0.94737
0.88421
0.82105
0.75789
0.69474
0.63158
0.56842
0.50526
0.44211
*
*
0.37895
0.31579
0.25263
0.18947
0.12632
0.06315
2,0000
4,000
Level:
Probability
that
a Regime
parities
6,000 8,000
GNP/cap
in 1985
1
Figure
is Democratic,
inU.S.
PPP USD*
by Per Capita
Income
dollars.
to survive in
but may be more
countries.
velopment
likely
developed
We
call the first explanation
and
the
second
"endogenous"
"exogenous."
two
Since we are dealing with
democracies
emerge
only
regimes,
to assert that democracies
whenever
die.5 Hence,
emerge
dictatorships
as a result of economic
is the same as to say that dictator
development
as countries
ruled by them become
ships die
economically
developed.
out of
is
then
secreted
Democracy
by economic
develop
dictatorships
ment. A story told about country after country
is that as they develop,
to
social structure becomes
labor processes
require the
begin
complex,
of employees,
and new groups emerge and organize.
cooperation
a result, the
can
no
run
system
longer be effectively
by command:
too
the society is
the direct pro
complex,
technological
change endows
some autonomy
ducers with
and private
civil society
information,
and
control
dictatorial
of
forms
lose
their
effectiveness.
Vari
emerges,
ous groups, whether
or
the bourgeoisie,
workers,
just the amorphous
"civil society," rise against the dictatorial
and
it falls.
regime,
a "modernization"
The
is
endogenous
theory. The basic
explanation
of
in
this
its
is
of
that
there is one gen
versions,
any
assumption
theory,
active
As
5
is not quite true of our data set, since different countries enter and exit the sample at differ
This
ent moments.
For now, we consider the population of countries as fixed, but see Section IV.
WORLD POLITICS
158
structures
consist
chains
and makes
a
society
ready
Modernization
lated
impute
paraphrases
urbanization,
educa
among
incorporation,
that
of social changes
accumulation
progressive
to
to its culmination,
democratization.
proceed
is re
of democracy
may be one reason the incidence
to economic
tators
democracy
of industrialization,
and political
mobilization,
of sequences
tion, communication,
others:
innumerable
of social
and specialization
structures
from
of political
causal
The
specific
possible.
to
commen
and this is the reading most
most
influential
critic, O'Donnell,
as
as
countries
become
other
that
"if
saying
development,
His
Lipset.6
s thesis
Lipset
democracies."7
then, is endoge
Democracy,
they will become
political
Ac
since it results from development
under authoritarianism.
nous,
one
one
to this
events
is
the
of
would
sequence
expect
theory,
cording
democratic
countries
and
of poor authoritarian
becoming
developing
a "threshold."
some level of
once
they reach
development,
are
to die and democra
that dictatorships
equally likely
so many
cies to emerge at any level of development.
They may die for
conse
reasons
with
all its modernizing
that development,
different
as
no
Therborn
role.
After
all,
quences,
emphasized,
plays
privileged
not
because of
of
countries
because
democratized
wars,
many European
a
in
the Malv
defeat
the
"modernization,"
story repeated by
Argentine
of the
fell in the aftermath
inas and elsewhere.8
Some dictatorships
Yet
suppose
for instance?who
had been
dictator?a
of a founding
Franco,
order.
Some
dictatorial
of
the
collapsed
maintaining
capable
uniquely
crises. Some because of foreign pressures.
because of economic
to
die and democracies
If dictatorships
emerge randomly with
regard
more
be
democracies
is it still possible
that there would
development,
one
is to take
ones?
If
countries
than
among
poor
among wealthy
a nation,
more well-to-do
at his own word?"The
the greater
Lipset
even if the emergence
of
the chances
itwill sustain democracy"9?then
death
1977).
(fh. 1,1959),
56.
159
country. We
thus expect
would
to observe
democracies
to appear
in the wealthier
and survive
patterns.
The
facts we
report
concern
135 countries between roughly 1950 and 1990. "Entry" year refers to
or to the first
country became
independent,
are
and "exit" year refers to
data
available,
year
the data are available. All the regimes that
1990 or to the last year when
or dictator
as democracies
occurred during
this period were classified
use
term
with
"authoritarian
latter
the
(we
interchangeably
ships
we observed
101 democratic
224 regimes,
and
regimes").10 Altogether,
1950,
123 authoritarian.
rates are
power
The
expressed
and expressed
parities
to levels of
and growth
development
at
dollars computed
purchasing
in 1985 prices.
refer
(Thus all $ numbers
references
in constant
U.S.
Mike
WORLD POLITICS
160
survive,
ships
or at least succeed
one another,12
in the
invariably
are somewhat
less stable
almost
and even
less so
it is 0.0333.
it seems, was
Huntington,
correct with
regard
to
test whether
estimate
the nonlinearity
The results are
of the observed
inTable
presented
dictatorships
They
increase
survived
until
for years
the $5,001-$6,000
in countries
range
that were
wealthy. Whatever
the grave
for authoritarian
it in
health.
land, Italy,Netherlands, and Norway did not have by 1950. Table 3 lists
the dictatorships that survived even though the probability that the
was above
regime is democratic
predicted
by the level of development
to
income
of
which
$4,115.
0.50,
per capita
corresponds
Yet this may not be a fair test of modernization
theory. The hypoth
over a
esis implied by this theory is that ifa country develops
longer pe
so that all the
have
riod under dictatorship,
consequences
modernizing
most
dic
But for
time to accumulate,
then itwill embrace democracy.
this premise
is vacuous:
only 19 dictatorships?to
tatorships
over
out of 123?did
of time and
longer periods
develop
us
more
these
examine
thus
countries,
closely
"modernity." Let
that developed
under
authoritarianism
and became
"modern,"
remind,
reached
the ones
which
12
If President Viola succeeds President
successive dictatorships.
that we do not distinguish
Note
Videla or even if ayatollahs succeed a shah, we treat it as one continuous
spell of dictatorship.
13
Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University
Samuel P. Huntington,
Press,
1968), 43.
Table
by Lagged
Transitions
Per Capita
(annual
Income
(Level)"
data)
TRD
TA
PDA
TRA
TD
0.0066
0.0248
0.0276
0.0161
0.0492
0.0641
0.0625
0.0333
6
18
8
3
6
5
2
1
915
727
290
186
0.1250
0.0571
0.0380
0.0333
0.0187
0.0088
0.0083
0.0000
9
14
7
5
2
1
1
0
72
245
184
150
107
113
121
619
3991
0.0206
49
2380
0.0242
39
1611
3004
2032
1558
1222
993
802
649
0.0294
0.0339
0.0379
0.0534
0.0571
0.0484
0.0333
43
25
17
14
8
3
1
1465
738
448
262
140
62
30
0.0195
0.0124
0.0081
0.0042
0.0023
0.0014
0.0000
30
16
9
1539
1294
1110
960
853
740
619
PJK
TTR
TOT
PAD
-1000
1001-2000
2001-3000
3001-4000
4001-5000
5001-6000
6001-7000
7001
0.0152
0.0329
0.0316
0.0238
0.0349
0.0314
0.0196
0.0015
15
32
15
987
972
474
336
229
191
153
649
AU
0.0221
88
0.0243
0.0202
0.0167
0.0147
0.0101
0.0050
0.0015
73
41
26
18
10
4
1
Low-High
161
122
78
32
30
Above
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
is lagged, we
PAD is the
probability
TRD is their number
TA is the total number
PDA is the
probability
TRA is their number
TD is the total number
we will
particular
following
year
level
take arbitrarily
to mean
that at some
time
a per
they had
capita
and eighteen
remained
under
likely regime, and, having
experi
dictatorships,
a series of economic
are the two
crises.
and Malaysia
Singapore
over a
countries
that
became wealthy,
and re
long period,
developed
now.
mained
In East
until
USSR, Spain,
Taiwan,
dictatorships
Germany,
and
but
fell,
Bulgaria,
dictatorships
eventually
only many
Hungary
enced
WORLD POLITICS
162
Table
Regime
Transition
_Per
Level
Probabilities
Capita
Income
by Lagged
Predicted
and
Its
Square3_
PM N
PD*
PDA
0.098
PAD
0.010
PDD
0.902
0.990
0.092
987
(0.125)
0.072
(0.007)
0.017
(0.875)
0.928
(0.993)
0.983
(0.053)
0.191
972
(0.057)
(0.025)
(0.943)
(0.975)
(0.304)
2001-3000
0.044
0.028
0.956
0.972
0.388
474
3001-4000
(0.038)
0.026
(0.028)
0.039
(0.962)
0.974
(0.972)
0.961
(0.424)
0.600
336
4001-5000
(0.033)
0.015
(0.016)
0.047
(0.967)
0.985
(0.984)
0.953
(0.326)
0.758
229
5001-6000
(0.019)
0.008
(0.049)
0.050
(0.981)
0.992
(0.951)
0.950
(0.720)
0.862
191
6001-7000
(0.009)
0.004
(0.064)
0.047
(0.991)
0.996
(0.936)
0.953
(0.876)
0.921
153
7001-
(0.008)
0.0006
(0.063)
0.017
(0.992)
0.999
(0.937)
0.983
(0.887)
0.965
649
(0.000)
(0.033)
(1.000)
(0.967)
(1.000)
<1000
1001-2000
All
0.051
0.028
0.959
0.977
0.354
(0.024)
(0.021)
(0.976)
(0.979)
(0.466)
3991
*
Based on a dynamic probit model. See Appendix
2. The probabilities pv j=A,D, k=A,D
sitions and survival.
is the equilibrium proportion of democracies. Observed
transition
p*D
Table 1) are in parentheses.
are of tran
rates (from
years after they had reached the critical level of income. Given its 1974
income
level, Uruguay
should
never
have been
dictatorship.
The
eco
The
the threshold
Czechoslovakia,
are the dream
and perhaps
Portugal,
cases of a modernization
that developed
under a dictatorship,
off more or less at the same
threw dictatorships
are few.
countries
This
is not
did not
even
South
Korea
and
theorist.
These
are
wealthy,
levels. But
and
became
income
sometimes
emerge
they
be
MODERNIZATION:
Highest
163
3
Table
of Per Capita
Income
(Level) under Which
in different
dictatorships
survived
countries
Highest Level
11698
10433
8598
8067
7744
7390
6969
6939
6866
6505
6463
6434
5815
5674
Year
1990
1988
1979
1990
1989
1976
1976
1957
1988
1980
1981
1976
1972
1979
1987
1973
1981
1990
1978
1987
1981
1974
1962
1957
1981
Singapore
East Germany
Iraq
Taiwan
USSR
Spain
Gabon
Venezuela
Bulgaria
Argentina
Mexico
Iran
Argentina
Yugoslavia
Hungary
Greece
Uruguay
Malaysia
Poland
Korea
Syria
Portugal
Argentina
Argentina
Suriname
*
The
& FACTS
Levels
Country
South
THEORIES
prob(reg=dem)?
0.992
0.977
0.923
0.895
0.875
0.851
0.818
0.815
0.809
0.776
0.772
0.769
0.705
0.690
0.687
0.637
0.630
0.625
0.623
0.620
0.569
0.568
0.553
0.530
0.513
5650
5218
5162
5117
5102
5080
4668
4657
4541
4355
4220
l-F(a+?*LEVEL),
mal distribution.
cause
do not
modern;
put otherwise,
dictatorships
fall for the same reasons in all countries. Thus moderniza
countries
necessarily
tion may
became
"explain" why
democracy
was
established
in countries
that de
advent
for
tion
off the dictatorship. One is hard put to find this level, however: among
the countries
that
satisfy
the premise
of the modernization
theory,
the
range of levels atwhich dictatorships survived is very wide (see the list
inTable 4).
WORLD POLITICS
164
Countries
That
4
Table
over Long
Developed
and Reached
Incomes
Entry
Country
Gabon
Brazil
Chile
Uruguay
South Korea
Malaysia
Singapore
Syria
Taiwan
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
East
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Poland
Portugal
Spain
USSR
Yugoslavia
under
Periods
above
$4,115a
Peak
Passes
Year
Level
1961
1965
1974
1969
1864
3561
1974
1961
1957
1965
1961
1952
1981
1964
1971
1967
1971
1971
4148
911
1282
1845
1607
968
4216
1654
4995
3308
3657
3109
1951
1951
1961
1961
1314
2205
2536
2073
Dictatorship
PROB=0.50
1973
1980
1981
1989
1974
1985
1982
1972
1978
1979
?
1989
?
1970
1974
1974
1985
1973
1964
1971
1974
Transition
Year
PROB
1976
1980
1981
1989
1981
1988
1990
1990
1981
1990
1989
1989
1988
1974
1987
1978
1988
1974
1976
1989
1979
0.82
never
0.52
0.47
0.53
1978
no
1989
0.63
1985
0.48
0.68
0.50
at PROB
Year
0.68
1988
0.63
never
0.99
never
0.53
0.57
never
0.90
post 1990
1989
1989
1990
1974
1989
no
1989
0.80
0.51
0.98
0.61
0.69
0.62
0.55
0.57
0.85
0.88
0.69
1975
0.80
0.51
}
0.61
0.68
0.55
0.52
0.85
1976
collapsed
collapsed
that grew over the period of at least seven years and at some time reached
income
of
$4,115.
per capita
Entry is 1951 or the year after the country became independent or the
year after economic data became available. Passes PROB=0.50 is the year when the country reached per
capita income of $4,115. Peak gives the time when the country reached the highest income level under
aThis table lists countries
Moreover,
even
if to
predict
is not
the same
as to
explain,
"explain
elected
its president
in contested
elections
time.
Sup
pose that every year during all this time, the Taiwanese dictatorship
faced a probability of 0.02 of dying for reasons not related to develop
ment.
It thus had
about
a 50 percent
chance
of not
being
around
by
what
may
have
been
just
a culmination
of random
haz
165
for
of modernization
premise
theory;
in bringing
dicta
regimes
satisfy the
over a
that is, few developed
long pe
riod. And even ifmost of those that did develop eventually became
no level of income
occur.
that would
democracies,
predicts when
of the level of development,
In turn, per capita income, our measure
is
The
has a strong impact on the survival of democracies.
simple fact
that during the period under our scrutiny or ever before, no democracy
ever fell,
else, in a country with a per capita in
regardless of everything
democracies
collapsed,
countries
incomes
above $6,055
years with
spent
out
of
democracies
while
sixty-nine
thirty-nine
that were poorer.
736
did
fall
in
survives increases
1 shows, the probability
that democracy
In countries with per capita
with per capita income.16
As Table
monotonically
income under $1,000, the probability that a democracy would die dur
ing
was
life
year was 0.125, which
implies that their expected
was
this
Between
and
$2,000,
$1,001
probability
years.17
particular
eight
of about
duration
for an expected
0.0571,
years. Above
eighteen
could expect to last forever. Statistical
$6,055, democracies
analysis, the
results of which
is a good predictor
of the stability of democracies.
capita
an
out
himself
for
These
cry
thought
Lipset
explanation.
findings
is that wealth
survive in affluent countries
that the reason democracies
income
moderates
is a plausible
in various ways
explanation
the intensity
but not easy
of distributional
to prove
conflicts.
This
The
intu
rigorously.18
itive story is this: Suppose that the political forces competing over the
14
An analogy may be useful. Suppose that someone runs the risk of 0.01 of dying from accidental
at the age of seventy-eight
causes
she gets hit by a falling brick. To
during each year of her life and that
is to conclude that she died of old age.
attribute this death to development
15
The claim about the prewar period is based on rather heroic backward extrapolation of 1950 in
lower: we guess
fell in Europe were an order of magnitude
comes, but the levels at which democracies
in 1933, and
in 1930, $1,474 inGermany
it to have been $1,825 inAustria in 1934, $1,974 in Finland
$1,814 in Italy in 1922.
16
and Keith T. Poole, "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive
John B. Londregan
and Poole found a similar pattern with regard to
Power," World Politics 42 (January 1990). Londregan
times more
1950 and 1982 coups were twenty-one
coups. In their sample of 121 countries between
to
occur
wealthiest
countries.
than
the
the
among
among
poorest
likely
17
life in any state is the inverse of the probability of transition away from this state.
18Expected
at the
Survive in Affluent Countries?"
Adam Przeworski,
(Paper presented
"Why Democracies
annual meeting
of the American
Political
Science Association,
1996).
28-September
1,
WORLD POLITICS
166
of income
distribution
democratic
share
of
choose
in which
competition,
total income,
or
the verdicts of
with
complying
some
case each can
to
expect
get
a
over
is
which
fight
dictatorship,
between
risking
costly but which gives the victor all of the income. Now
suppose that
the marginal
is lower at higher
levels of con
utility of consumption
is
the
Thus
the
from
for
sumption.
gain
winning
struggle
dictatorship
cost of
countries,
destroying
capital stock is lower. In wealthy
a
income
the
from
rather
than
of
total
all
contrast,
part
by
gain
getting
is smaller
is slower. Hence,
and the recuperation
from destruction
is more attractive
in poorer countries.
struggle for dictatorship
mulated
for ex
there are always alternative
One,
interpretations.
Obviously,
a proxy for education
more educated
is
is
income
that
and
just
ample,
are more
to embrace democratic
the ac
values. But while
likely
people
an
cumulated
of
of the labor
years of education
average member
measure
stocks we have?does
increase the
force?the
of educational
probability
of income
stronger.
These
of survival
of democracies
survives when
education
the
confirm
strongly
is
Once
established,
theory.
democracy
the more
likely that itwill survive.
reason we observe
the relation between
observations
Lipset
nation,
The
once
democracy
of
a
well-to-do
levels of development
are almost certain
is that democracies
of democracy
are established
in
countries.
rich
True, dictator
they
ships
But what
version
exogenous
the more
they
reach
the pattern we
generates
is terribly fragile in poor
it is impregnable
in the
rich ones. The probability that a democracy will die during any partic
an income above
ular year in a country with
two in a thousand
since at such
years. And
zero:
is practically
$4,000
die at
levels dictatorships
that independently
of the
one would
percent,
expect
in the long run democracies
initial distribution,
in such wealthy
countries.19
percent of regimes
the rate of 5.7
torships
died
at a double,
triple,
or whatever
constitute
would
Even
times
if wealthy
higher
96.1
dicta
rate, that
is,
*
19
where p stands for tran
In the long run the proportion of democracies
equals p^/
PDA)>
(p^
2. The
sition probabilities, A for dictatorship
and D for democracy. See Appendix
("authoritarianism"),
numbers in the text are derived from Table 1.
to
much more
democracy
likely,
is 3.9 percent.
could make
to believe
that economic
develop
if development
made
transitions
all the difference
endogenous
theory
there are no grounds
To conclude,
ment
breeds
democracies:
Lipset's
167
"optimistic
equation,"
as O'Donnell
and Nel
in
to
II.Ups or Downs?
to
irony
Lipset
why democracies
cited several
theory. While
Lipset
and
factors
Olson22
survive, anticipating
explain
were more
to be
he
that
democracies
likely
thought
Huntington,23
s view, this threat to
countries grew rapidly. In
when
destabilized
Lipset
and com
democracy
originated with "extremist movements"?fascism
was a
as he saw it, extremism
of rapid de
munism?because,
product
occurred
"Wherever
industrialization
velopment.
rapidly, introducing
There
is yet another
to
between
the pre-industrial
sharp discontinuities
more
rather than less extremist working-class
Here
and company
Lipset
could
not have
and industrial
movements
been more
situation,
emerged."24
wrong.
Rapid
democracies
the
in
life
the
rate of less than 5 percent per annum, die at the rate of 0.0173, while
those that grow at a rate faster than 5 percent die at the rate of 0.0132.
(SeeTable 5.)
ismost
What
of economic
poor democracies
those with
per
income
twelve
democracy
democracies
under
such
fell
the following
is about
conditions
life of
year: the expected
nine years. Even
among
20O,Donnell(fn.7),4.
21
inDeveloping
and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation
Samuel P. Huntington
Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976) 19.
22
as aDestabilizing
Mancur Olson Jr., "Rapid Growth
Voice? Journal ofEconomic History 23 (De
cember 1963).
23
(fn. 13).
24Huntington
54.
(fn. 1,1981),
25Lipset
and Poole (fn. 16) with regard to coups,
This finding parallels again the results of Londregan
which
they found to be less likely when the economy grows.
Observed
Rates
Table
5
of Transitions,
by Lagged
Rate of Economic
Lagged
All
Growth
Level
0-1000
1001-2000
2001-3000
3001-4000
4001-5000
5001-6000
6001-7000
7001
Total
PJK
TOT
PAD
15
987
420
567
0.66
1.01
0.39
972
299
673
Total
1.52
2.14
G> 0
1.06
3.29
32
G<=0
Total
4.68
14
G> 0
2.67
18
15
TRD
6
4
2
915
397
518
12.50
21.74
23
8.16
49
2.48
3.26
2.15
18
7
11
727
215
512
5.71
8
3
5
290
80
210
186
3.33
52
4.88
134
4.55
245
84
161
7
3
4
184
41
143
2.75
5
2
3
150
41
109
1.87
107
22
85
4.35
3.16
474
121
2.76
G> 0
2.55
353
2.38
Total
2.38
8
3
5
336
93
243
1.61
1.92
1.49
229
54
175
4.92
6.25
4.44
122
32
90
191
35
156
6.41
10.53
5.08
78
19
59
0.88
0.83
2.06
Total
3.49
G<=0
5.56
G> 0
2.86
Total
3.14
G<=0
5.71
G> 0
2.56
Total
1.96
G<=0
8.82
G> 0
0.00
Total
0.15
G<=0
0.00
G> 0
0.19
Total
2.21
G<=0
3.43
G>0
1.70
a
Since per capita income
are used:
abbreviations
88
40
48
is lagged, we
3.75
PDA is the
probability
TRA is their number
TD is the total number
7.32
2.80
1.18
113
16
97
0.00
1.03
32
27
0.00
121
29
92
649
110
539
3.33
0.00
3.70
1
0
1
30
3
27
0.00
0.00
0
0
619
107
0.00
512
3991
1166
2825
2.06
2.61
1.78
49
21
28
2380
803
1577
2.42
39
19
20
3.80
153
6.25
34 40.00
119
0.00
72
14
7
7
8.33
4.96
G> 0
TD
PDA
Total
3.23
TRA
TA
G<=0
G<=0
and
Democracies
Dictatorships
TTR
G<=0
Income
Per Capita
Growth3
3.44
5.23
1.60
particular
year
level
1611
363
1248
following
169
Table
ticularly
poor
are
democracies,
vulnerable
extremely
to bad
economic
performance.
theoretical
Huntington
Theory
and even
and O'Donnell,
both
Revisited
sharper political differ
a
argued that there is
substitution,"
was concerned
Huntington
were
whether
they
distinction
political
form
of government
democratic
at some intermediate
level.
again
with stability of regimes and did not care
or authoritarian.
"The most
important
countries,"
among
but their degree
he
not
their
Hence,
the
of government."27
United States, theUnited Kingdom, and the Soviet Union were all sys
tems in which
it is the
"the government
governs." Whether
politburo,
he insisted,
little. "The problem,"
the cabinet, or the president matters
"was not to hold elections but to create organizations."
Indeed, we were
told, "The primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legiti
26
in Latin Amer
and Juan J. Linz. "Introduction: Politics, Society, and Democracy
Larry Diamond
Countries: Latin Amer
ica," in L. Diamond,
J. J. Linz, and S.M. Lipset, eds., Democracy inDeveloping
ica (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 17.
27
(fn. 13), 1.
Huntington
WORLD POLITICS
170
never
to
While
public order."28
explicitly
referring
Lipset, Hunt
some of the tendencies
encom
"in
that
observed
ington
actuality, only
in the concept
of
the
modernization'
characterized
political
passed
areas. Instead
a trend toward
of
and
modernizing'
competitiveness
was an erosion of
a
to auto
there
and
democracy,
democracy'
tendency
cratic military
and
of
Instead
,
one-party
regimes
regimes.
stability
there were repeated coups and revolts."29
mate
methodological
he observed
nant?testimony
it is no
is finished:
series
on his criticisms
transgressions.
Reflecting
rem
that "Chapter I is now an archeological
of data
longer necessary
to demonstrate
that
not foster
and/or
through
tedious
development'
"30
What
the data
does
show,
'democracy
stability.'
political
is that in contemporary
South America,
the higher
asserted,
are associated with non-demo
and the lower levels of modernization
are found at inter
democracies
cratic political
while
systems,
political
at
least
within
the range
mediate
levels of modernization."
Hence,
we should observe
fall as
that democracies
observed
by O'Donnell,
O'Donnell
economies
Is there
develop.
some level of
development
relating
beyond
which
democracies
are
the equilibrium
proportion
to
of democracies
per capita income has a kink at levels between $3,001 and $4,000: the
observed
values
are 42.4
percent
between
$2,001
and $3,000,32.6
per
cent between $3,001 and $4,000, and 72.0 percent between $4,001 and
$5,000. But this kink is due to the fact that dictatorships
ally stable in this range, rather than that democracies
are
exception
are less stable.
against Lipset,
is not a com
Ibid., 7.
Ibid., 35-36.
30
Studies in South American Politics, 2d
and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism:
O'Donnell, Modernization
ed. (Berkeley: Institute of International
of California,
1979), 204.
Studies, University
31
was careful about not
was to
O'Donnell
making general claims: his purpose
explain the downfall
of democracies
in the Southern Cone. But his theory of "bureaucratic authoritarianism"
captured the
imagination of scholars around the world, who treated it as applicable almost everywhere.
171
cies fell in countries with incomes between $4,000 and $5,000: again
one of them inArgentina, and the other inUruguay. Five democracies
fell between $3,000 and $4,000: one of them inArgentina. Indeed,
only five democracies
outside Argentina,
fell in countries
with
incomes
country
likely
it is to sustain
IV.Does History
democracy,
Repeat
except
inArgentina.
Itself?
came
in 1950, the regimes we observed
or the en
of two effects: their dynamic
into being
or at least into our
trance of new countries
into the world,
sample.
inde
in our sample that were
countries
the seventy-three
Consider
of them had democratic
in 1950, when
regimes. By
thirty-five
pendent
to
increased
these countries
of democracies
1960 the number
among
was still
in
to fall to
1968.
It
thirty-one
by
only
thirty-one
thirty-nine,
Since
our observations
begin
as a result of either
1978, afterwhich
our count
to the "old" countries,
with
regard
by 1990. Hence,
to which
oceanic
with
analysis, according
Huntingtons32
roughly agrees
eight
that became
independent
after
1950
is entirely
were
democracies
out of forty-two
(14.3
in 1960;
percent)
(16.6 percent) in 1978, and twelve out of sixty-eight in 1990 (17.6 per
of democracies
the proportion
among these "new" coun
cent). Hence,
or up. In turn, the
no waves
tries grew slightly with
rolling down
in the world during
of democracies
of the aggregate
decline
proportion
new
rather than
countries
of
the 1960s is largely due to the emergence
to transformations
of old ones.
WORLD POLITICS
172
Followers
claiming
not to be
of Moore33
that
contest
theWestern
repeated.
Cross-sectional
the validity
of such inferences,
however,
was
route to
democracy
unique,
European
observations
can be used
to infer historical
processes
on some ex
that regimes
survive or die conditional
are the same across
(in our case per capita income)
cross sections,
so that the
a country has a par
different
that
probability
on the realized values of these
ticular regime at any time depends
only
or the time when
the
rather than the period,
the region,
variables,
if the probabilities
variables
ogenous
income; and
cratic regime
(3) as a result,
increases with
those
with
after
the prewar period are not comparable
those at our disposal
we
to guess the
made heroic assumptions
levels at
1950,
approximate
which
democracies were established
and fell in some of the present OECD
are
inTable 6.
countries. The results of these calculations
presented
are
not
that
these
the
democracies
that existed
however,
Note,
only
as
as
War
II. Southern
well
before World
several Latin
European
American
while
countries
in Eastern
experienced
relatively
long spells of democracy,
most of the democratic
regimes that emerged
Europe
while
and
in 1950,
while
the average
income
in Eastern
Europe
was
only
33
and Democracy
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1965).
Jr., Social Origins ofDictatorship
Barrington Moore
34
in office between parties occurred
is Czechoslovakia,
The exception
but note that no alternation
in the history of Eastern Eu
during this period. Indeed, the first alternation resulting from elections
rope occurred in Poland in 1991.
MODERNIZATION:
Approximate
THEORIES
6
Table
at
the
Per Capita
Income
Time of Democratization
in Some of the Present
oecd Countries3
First Democratization
Date
Australia (1901)
Austria
Belgium
Canada (1920)
Denmark
Finland (1917)
France
Germany
Italy
Norway (1905)
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
173
& FACTS
1901
1918b
1919b
1920
1901
1919
1875c
1919
1919
1884
1918
1870d
1911e
1830f
Reversal
Level
Date
Level
3733
1545
2960
3838
2213
1184
1748
1072
1920
1228
1919
2226
3016
1119
Present
none
1934
1825
none
none
none
1930
none
1933
1922
1974
(?)
1474
1814
none
none
none
none
none
Democracy
Date
1901
1951
1919
1920
1901
1944
1875
1949
1946
1884
1918
1870
1911
1830
Level
3733
2535
2960
3838
2213
2636
1748
2567
1708
1228
1919
2226
3016
1119
"Levels are GDP/cap expressed in 1985 USD. They are calculated by extrapolating backward the 1951
for per capita GDP expressed in 1985 PPP USD, using the index numbers for GDP and the pop
in the Twentieth Century (Paris:
ulation figures provided by Angus Maddison,
The World Economy
is dated by (1) the presence of contested elections or
OECD, 1992), Appendixes
I, II. Democratization
on a partisan basis and (2) legislative
sovereignty of the house elected by broadest suffrage
ganized
came later, but not
to the crown or a nonelective
(rather than responsibility
upper chamber), whichever
numbers
or
For countries that became independent after 1871, dates in
participation.
by the extent of franchise
are for the year of
independence.
parentheses
b1920 figures were used.
in France to 1884, while John D. Stephens, "Democratic Transi
cTherborn (fn. 8) dates democracy
in Europe, 1870-1939:
A Test of theMoore Thesis," American Journal of Sociol
tion and Breakdown
as one of consolidation.
The question mark for France
ogy 94 (1989), refers to the period 1875-84
refers to the Vichy regime.
and Stephens
dBothTherborn
electoral register was established.
date democracy
in Switzerland
male
slightly higher.35All this is not much to stand on, but perhaps enough
to believe that (1) the levels at which democracies emerged before
World War IIwere highly scattered; (2) they did not differ between
and (3) once established,
and other parts of the world;
Europe
were more
to fall in the poorer countries.
democracies
likely
Western
35
World
Table 1.1.
Report
1991
(Washington,
D.C.: World
Bank,
1991),
WORLD POLITICS
174
are on firmer
the old ones. And, asTable 7 shows, the level of development again has
powerful effects. The probabilities of a democracy falling decline dra
matically with level in both groups of countries: indeed, this probabil
ity is the
same
once
countries
reach
an
income
$2,000. The
level among the
above
to
increases with
of a transition
democracy
probability
after
But among the countries
that became
old countries.
independent
are
as
are
are
as
when
when
stable
1950, dictatorships
they
they
wealthy
in new countries with
incomes above
fifteen dictatorships
poor. Among
$2,000, only one fell during their 185 years until 1990, in Suriname in
at $2,888,
in the Seychelles,
after 1990.
and only one more,
coun
the effect of levels at which
We may be confusing,
however,
tries were first observed
and the effect of development
they experienced
the
the new countries were much
under
scrutiny. And
during
period
the old ones?which
average income was $1,103?than
poorer?their
were
an
first observed. To
had
average income of $2,613?when
they
1988
of the tran
8 the derivatives
these effects, we show inTable
distinguish
to the entry levels and to the
with
sition
regard
separately
probabilities
since then.37 The
effects of the entry level are about the
development
are more
same for the two groups of countries. Democracies
stable and
more brittle in countries
either when
that were wealthier,
dictatorships
But the
in 1950 or whenever
first observed
they became
independent.
between
since the time of entry differ greatly
effects of development
increases much
the two groups of countries. The
stability of democracy
36
A
third question has also been posed: when D. A. Rustow, pointed out that the levels of develop
atwhich different countries permanendy
institutions vary widely, Lipset s
established democratic
was that the thresholds at which democracy was established were lower for the
(fn. 1,1981)
rejoinder
to Democracy,"
see Rustow,
A
"Transitions
Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970).
early democracies;
war indicates
at
the levels at which democracies
emerged before and after the
rough guess
comparing
that levels at which democracy was established before the war must have been on the average lower.
of incomes during the two periods was not the same: it is doubtful that many
But the distribution
countries enjoyed incomes above $4,000 before the war. Hence, we do not know how long the coun
democracies. At most, we can
tries that were poor at the time would have waited before becoming
occurred before the war with the distrib
of levels at which democratization
compare the distribution
inTable 6 we
ution in the postwar period truncated at $4,000. If in addition to the guesses presented
the two distribu
also assume that incomes were lower in Eastern Europe and most of Latin America,
tions will be highly similar. But that is too many guesses to take seriously.
37
to level is Pr[R?GIME(t)=DEMOC
relates regimes
that the function which
Suppose
where F stands for a normal or logistic distribution. Now sub
RACY]=REG(t)=F[a+?LEVEL(t)],
to get REG(t)=F{cc+?LEVEL(0)+
tract and add ?LEVEL(O)
within
the square brackets,
ment
effect of the initial level to differ from the (dynamic) effect of develop
is the model we estimated, by dynamic probit.
INI+?DDEV(t)].This
Table
and Predicted
Observed
Regime
Lagged
Per Capita
Income
(level)
by
Transition
Probabilities,
and by Groups
of Countries51
PAD
PJK
TJK
TOT
0.0124
18
1448
0.0058
2543
(0.0058)
0.0359
Low-High
TRD
PDA
TRA
TD
1211
0.0464
11
237
1169
(0.1183)
0.0204
28
1374
TA
All
New
Old
70
0.0275
7
42
(0.0544)
(0.0340)
-2000
0.0135
New
Old
15
0.0377
32
1111
0.0058
848
(0.0058)
0.0297
6
18
1036
0.1200
75
606
(0.1480)
0.0578
14
242
(0.0279)
(0.0707)
2000
0.0086
New
Old
3
38
0.0225
347
0.0054
1695
(0.0058)
0.0427
1
24
185
0.0123
162
563
(0.0203)
0.0124
14
1132
(0.0676)
are used:
aThe following abbreviations
that either regime dies during
PJK is the probability
TTR is the number of transitions
(0.0156)
a
particular
level
PDA is the
probability
TRA is their number
TD is the total number
New
year
Old
Numbers
in parentheses
that existed
in 1950
are values
predicted
by the dynamic
probit model.
8
Table
of Transition
with
to the
Probabilities
Regard
the
and
Initial
Level
Development
Accumulated
("Entry")
at the Means
by Groups
of Countries51
Evaluated
Derivatives
with Regard to
Initial Level
Derivative
Old
of
-0.0554
Pda
aLevel ismeasured
for countries
in thousands. New
that existed
-0.0191
0.0112
0.0277
in 1950. Derivatives
New
-0.0966
-0.0552
0.0383
Pad
Development
Old
New
-0.0190
probit model;
see
stands
Appendix
2.
176
more
WORLD POLITICS
with
development
in the old
in the new
than
countries.
In turn,
dictatorships:
of per capita
income
and lowered
at least "modernization"
But
of one
thousand
dollars
where most
countries,
including
long-standing
dictatorships,
did in the end fall. Most
of the new countries,
those in Eastern Europe,
of them poor when
the great majority
just
they became
independent,
the old
remained
poor;
and those
remained
authoritarian.
V. Conclusion
Whether
in the language
theories
perspective,
couched
the historical
terministic.
In the modernization
democracy
it is secreted
about;
social
transformations.
corollary
s
Moore
theory, but they operate
class structure of the seventeenth
or
perspective
were
de
of the origins of democracy
no one does
to
bring
theory
anything
and the
by economic
development
of the modernization
Class
actors
at a distance
do move
of centuries:
in
history
the agrarian
settle
determines
on
THEORIES
MODERNIZATION:
Our
& FACTS
177
of
do economic
constraints
are
democ
If they succeed in generating
development,
economically.
racies can survive even in the poorest nations.
de
the vision of the relation between
Viewed
from this perspective,
clines
that dominated
mood
and
the intellectual
and democracy
velopment
war years appears
the
cold
served to orient U.S.
foreign policy during
as exogenous,
treated development
strangely convoluted. While
Lipset
were
is the inevitable
his contemporaries
that dictatorship
persuaded
a
more democratic
"the
of
claimed
that
Galenson
price
development.
. . . the
resources
invest
of
from
the
diversion
is,
greater
government
ment
to
De Schweinitz
argued that if the less devel
consumption."41
must
limit democratic
"are to grow economically,
they
oped countries
and Dominguez:
interest
of
the voters
a
sonal
consumption
a nondemocratic
higher
system.
to
leads parties
the
give
vis-?-vis
investment
than
priority
In the Soviet Union,
for instance,
generally
expansion
itwould
the
of per
in
receive
of
percentage
in 1937.
a revolution
It is unlikely
from above
that
like
competitive
this.43
party
system
would
have
sus
are needed
to generate
and
As Huntington
development.
Dictatorships
tem
at
must
least
be
held
Nelson
"Political
down,
put it,
participation
economic
in order to promote
development.,,44
porarily,
while
devel
in this view dictatorships
Since
generate
development
was
to
to
to
be a
said
the
best
leads
way
democracy
opment
democracy,
circuitous
one. Yet
common
sense would
indicate
that
41
Walter
in order
to
to Galenson,
"Introduction"
(New York:
ed., Labor and Economic Development
Galenson,
1959), 3.
Wiley,
42
Labor Controls
and Democracy," Economic Development
Karl de Schweinitzjr.,
Industrialization,
and Cultural Change 7 (July 1959).
43
in F. I. Greenstein
and
"Political Development,"
and Jorge I. Dominguez,
Samuel P. Huntington
Political Science, vol. 3 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
N. W. Polsby, eds., Handbook
1975), 60.
of
44
and Nelson
(fn. 21), 23.
Huntington
WORLD POLITICS
178
we should
not
democracy,
democracy
strengthen
even
that "common
if G. B. Shaw warned
And,
dictatorships.
strengthen
that
it is the best
time
this
in poor
flourish
that which
guide. With
can
democracy
development,
countries.
1:Classifying
Appendix
Political
Regimes45
some
is a regime inwhich
governmental
Democracy
a consequence
of contested
elections. This definition
fices"
support
sense is
offices
are filled as
and "contestation."
In no regime
elections. What
as a consequence
as democratic
a
regime
are all
offices
governmental
to
is essential
considering
filled
of
is
executive
in the effective
legisla
of winning
we
classify
doubt,
bent parties
office
office
a
was classified
as a
if none of the
democracy
regime
Operationally,
as a dicta
was classified
a
four rules listed below applied. Thus,
regime
at least one of these conditions
held.
torship if
1. Executive
Rule
the chief
selection:
is not
executive
elected.
or
no
parties,
ended up
(2)
there
rules
4.
Rule
Type
was
in the establishment
one
or (3) the
party,
only
or
of a nonparty
one-party
current
rule, or
favor.
II error:
passes
regime
the
previous
three
rules,
the
incumbents
held office in the immediate past by virtue of elections for more than two terms
or without
they
have
and until
elected,
being
not lost an election.
Alternation
where
in office
today
overrides
at one
or the
time when
they
were
overthrown
time held
party
lost an election?was
office having
yet
yielded
subsequently
legislature
as democratic
classified
during the entire period.
are the
We
code the regime that pre
rules
Our
timing
following.
came
even
to
at
if it
vailed
the end of the year,
31,
power on December
single
45
For a full explanation
and historical
details,
see Alvarez
MODERNIZATION:
THEORIES
& FACTS
179
to
in 1983. Transitions
arrived in Nigeria
dictatorship
a
are
etat.
to
democ
Transitions
coup d
signaled by
are
of
the
time
elected
of
dated
the
the
gov
racy
inauguration
newly
by
a democratic
not of the election.
In the few cases where
ernment,
mation
the situation
about
not be considered
de
others, unless offices are contested,
they should
mea
mocratic.
from a practical point of view, alternative
Nonetheless,
sures of
dimensions
similar results. The
generate
highly
democracy
or to what
extent a
is demo
used to assess whether
regime
particular
no
measure
seem
to make
the
is
cratic
little difference.46 Our
exception:
Coppedge-Reinicke47
the Bollen48
1965
scale predicts
85 percent,
the Gurr49
scales
of Au
Appendix
2: Dynamics
of Regimes
in the distinction
be
is entailed
help elucidate what
mechanisms.
and
exogenous
endogenous
has an authoritarian
i= 1,...,N,
that a country,
Let the probability
a
t=
the subscript
1,...,T, be pA(it), where
regime during
particular year,
that it has a demo
and the probability
A stands for "authoritarian,"
Some
algebra may
tween
46
25 (Spring 1990),
Alex Inkeless, "Introduction," Studies in Comparative International Development
3-6. Note, however, that different measures appear to be biased in somewhat different directions. See
Factors in Cross-National
Kenneth A. Bollen, "Liberal Democracy:
Measures,"
Validity and Method
American Journal of Political Science 37 (November
1993).
47
and Wolfgang
H. Reinicke,
Michael
"Measuring Polyarchy," Studies in Comparative
Coppedge
25 (Spring 1990), 51-72.
International Development
48
American Sociologi
of Development,"
and the Timing
Kenneth A. Bollen, "Political Democracy
cal Review 44 (August 1979), 572-87.
49
Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jaggers, andWill H. Moore,
and State Power
The Growth of Democracy,
Autocracy,
tional Development
25 (Spring
50
Gastil (fn. 4).
State:
"The Transformation
of theWestern
since 1800," Studies in Comparative Interna
1990).
WORLD POLITICS
cratic regime be pD(it) = 1
the probability that a dictator
pA(it). Let
ship dies from one year to another be pAD(it), so that the probability
that it survives is p^iit) = 1 pAD(it). Similarly, let the probability that
= 1a democracy dies be
we assume for the time
pDD(it). If
pDA(it)
180
=
are
k = A,D,
that these "transition
being
p.k, j A,D,
probabilities/'
over time and the same for all countries,
constant
then we can describe
Pdd
Pad
Po(t)
pA(t+D
Pda
Paa
PaW
The
of regimes
proportion
therefore on the
that
are democracies
of democracies
next
that survived
year depends
from the cur
proportion
rent year,
that died, that is, be
of dictatorships
pDD, and the proportion
came democracies,
same holds for
The
pAD.
dictatorships.
of regimes that,
Given
the transition
rates, there exists a distribution
disturbances.
if reached, will remain stable in the absence of exogenous
Pad
+
Pda Pad
and
Pda
Pa
Pda
Moreover,
tions will
Pad
whatever
the
over
tend
time
initial
their propor
of regimes,
since the
values. And
equilibrium
distribution
to these
are likely to be
probabilities that regimes die during any particular year
fact they are low?this
convergence
of one type of regime will
the proportion
the other to decline.51
low?in
will
be monotonie;
to increase
continue
that is,
and of
of regimes depends
distribution
time passes,
then, the long-run
on
not
on the relative rates at which
their initial distrib
they die,
only
As
51
is monotonie
Convergence
around the equilibrium.
the proportions
of regimes will
oscillate
>
If Pad
pDA, then
be more
181
democracies
of democracies
crease over
lower
than
this proportion
pD*,
will
continually
in
time.
Now,
to the
are not
probabilities
To keep matters
at stake,
that these transition
imagine
but depend on the level of development.
are
two levels: low (L)
suppose that there
only
issue
constant
simple,
and high (H). At the low level, both regimes have some probability of
dying
that
ismore
than zero
consider
two pos
sibilities.
< 1, once
One is that while p^L)
dictatorships pass the threshold
=
that defines the high level, they are certain to die, so that p^H)
1,
while
democracies
probabilities
die
Level = Low
Pdd
Pda
and while
at the same
rate at either
level. The
transition
are thus
Pad
Paa
the long-run
Level =High
LOO
Pdd
0.00
Pda
proportion
of democracies
=
+
at the high ievel itwill be
pD*(H) 1/(1
Pm/?Pad'PdaX
<
pDA), pD*(L) pD*(H). Thus, the proportion of democracies will be
be pD*(L)
are more
at the
because democracies
high level of development
as a result of
to emerge
is the
This
likely
development.
endogenous?
of the explanation.
modernization?version
higher
at
But suppose alternatively
that authoritarian
exactly the
regimes die
same rate whether
or
so
in poor countries
that
ones,
developed
p^L)
=
=
never die once
in turn democratic
while
they
regimes
pAD,
pAD(H)
are established
so that
in affluent countries,
transition
The
pDA=0.00.
are then
probabilities
Level = Low
Level =High
Pdd
Pad
LOO Pad
Pda
Paa
0.00
Paa
WORLD
182
and we
already
that while
know
POLITICS
the long-run
of democra
proportion
cies at the low levelwin be pD*(L) < 1, at the high level all countries will
we will observe
an
in the long run. Hence,
the level of development
relation
and the incidence
aggregate
are
even
to emerge at
democracies
of democracies
though
equally likely
even
if
under
that
authoritarianism
does not
is,
any level,
development
a
increase the
that
is
democratic.
This
country will become
probability
then the exogenous
version.
have
a democratic
regime
between
to decide
Thus,
which
mechanism
we
and democracy,
development
transition
change
probabilities
we
mate
the impact of level on transition
probabilities,
a first-order
data
Our
Markov
processes;
obey
myia.52
on the
present
regime depends
regimes during
only
are defined
but not beyond.
Such processes
by:
on Ame
rely
that is, the
the previous
year,
=
P(t)Rt.1,
E(R=l|R.1,Rt_2,...)
=
where R
for democracy
stands for regimes, R=D
and R=A for
D,A
the
and
is
matrix
of
transition
with
ele
P(t)
dictatorship,
probabilities,
ments
p k(t). Hence,
R = P(t) R,
Taking
u,
of both
expectations
sides yields
P(R=D
Paa
Pda
p(R,rD
p(R=0)
Pad
Pdd
p(Rt-rO)
sum of columns
where
the
k=0,l.
Hence
of the
transition
matrix,
=
+
p(R=l Rtl)
p^top?R^-l) p^WR^O)
|
=
=
+
PAAttpdVrD PDA(t)[l-p(R,rl)]
=
Now
Pda?
=
?.p.k
1, j=0,l;
[PAA^-PDA^?-rD
of the exogenous
variables.
Assume
that
=
pDA(t) F(XA ?),
=
PAA(t) F[XJcc+?)],
52
Takeshi
chap. 11.
Amemyia,
Advanced
Econometrics
(Cambridge:
Harvard
University
Press,
1985),
183
where F(.) is the CDF of normal distribution. Note that p.k(t) is the
probability of transition from being in state j at time (t-1) to being in
state k at time
regime
t. Given
as the one
that whenever
a transition
installed
that became
during
occurred
this year,
we
code
the
the probabil
we
lag the X
p(R=l
|RJ
s.
Then
=
pDA(t)
[pAA(t)-pDA(t)]p(Rt.1=l)
FCX,.^
FQit_?
{FtX^a+j^-FQi^pCR^l)
=
+
FQ^aMR^l)
?Q?tJ
xt,R,?).
to estimate a and /?, from which
Hence,
and thus pDD = 1 pDA and pAD = 1 -p^,
need
dPpA =
dpAD =-f
+
fQC^?)? and
[XJa ?)](a+?).
dX
dX