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Aris Phil Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.

G.R. No. 90501

August 5, 1991
Respondents, which are employees of herein petitioner Aris Phil Inc. lodged a protest against their
employer for hazardous and detrimental working conditions. Because of this protest they were dismissed on
the ground of violation of company rules and regulations.
These dismissed employees then filed an action for illegal dismissal against their employer. The labor
arbiter ruled in their favor ordering reinstatement. After promulgation of judgment respondent file a motion
for execution based on the provision of Sec 12. of Republic Act 6715 or Art. 223 of the Labor Code which
provide for immediate execution of award of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter. This provision is assailed
by the petitioner for its alleged unconstitutionality.
Whether or not Sec 12. of Republic Act 6715 is unconstitutional.
The Court find the petition lack of merit. As explained, the provision is in the exercise of the police
power of State, given that the employer has power to discharge its employee, the state, in ensuring the
protection of employment and livelihood as it is considered a property of a person as embodied by the
Constitution, may exercise its such power. The execution pending appeal is designed to stop the threat on
the survival of the dismissed employee.
With the foregoing there is it can be seen that the provision havent breach the Constitution.
Laws are presumed constitutional to support its nullification it must be a clear and unequivocal breach,
not a doubtful and argumentative implication. As put by Justice Malcolm, to doubt is to sustain.
Hon. Alfredo Lim vs. Hon. Felipe G. Paquing and Associated Development Corporation
G.R. No. 115044
January 27 1995
Teofisto Guingona Jr. And Dominador Cepeda Jr. Vs. Hon. Vetino Reyes and Associated
Developmeny Corporation
G.R. No. 117263
January 27, 1995
Among the legislative powers of the Municipal Board as provided by the Charters of Manila is to tax,
license, permit and regulate amont others the game of jai-alai. However Executive Order No. 392, vest the
authority to Games and Amusements Board in regulating this jai-alai. Subsequently Congress enacted RA.
954 prohibiting certain activities which includes jai-alai. However, the Municipal Board of Manila pass an
ordinance authorizing the Mayor to allow and permit the Associated Development Corporation to establish
and maintain and operate a jai-alai in the City of Manila. Years after Pres Marcos promulgated Presidential
Decree 771 revoking all powers and authority to the local government in granting franchise to certain
activities which include jai-alai. But in a few months the president issued again another presidential decree,
which is Presidential Decree 810 which allow the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation to
operate jai-alai(basque pelota) in greater Manila. But then Pres. Aquino issued Executive Order 169
expressly repealing Presidential Decree 810 which revoke and cancel the franchise granted to the
Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation. However, on May 1998, the Associated Development
Corporation tried to operate a jai-alai. To which the government through GAB opposed invoking
Presidential Decree 771. ADC question the constitutionality of Presidential Decree 771 saying that it is
violative of equal protection clause and non-impairment clause.
Whether or not Presidential Decree 771 is unconstitutional for violation of equal protection clause and
non-impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution.

The Court says that all laws including Presidential Decree 771 are presumed valid and constitutional
unless otherwise ruled by the Supreme Court. It also emphasizes of Art XVIII Sec 3 of the Constitution.
The petitioners argument must fail because there is nothing on record that shows Presidential Decree
771 being repealed, altered, amended by any subsequent law or presidential decrees. The contention of the
petitioner that in one case in the Court of First Instance, the Presidential Decree has been declared
unconstitutional must fail, for it is only the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, can declare a law
Jovencio Lim and Teresita Lim vs. The People of the Philippines, The Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 217, The City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Wilson Cham
G.R. No. 149276
September 27, 2002
Petitioner is assailing constitutionality Presidential Decree 818 which amended Art 315 of the Revised
Penal Code by increasing the penalties for estafa by means of bouncing checks. He point out that it is
violative of due process clause, the right to bail, and the provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment of the 1987 Constitution.
Whether or not Presidential Decree 818 is unconstitutional in violation of provisions about due process
clause, the right to bail, and the provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment of the 1987
When the law is questioned, presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. The burden of proving
otherwise is in the person who questions it. The breach must be clear and unequivocal not doubtful and
argumentative. The petitioner failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat such presumption.
Karen Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. 94723
August 21, 1997
Petitioner was lured and detained by an American tourist Greg Bartelli for four days. Through out those
days he was also raped by said foreigner. On the fourth day Bartelli was arrested, the police obtain from
him a Dollar check ; COCOBANK Bank book ; Dollar Account in China Banking Corp ; an ID ; Philippine
Money ; six pieces of door keys ; and a stuffed toy he used for luring the said victim.
He was charged for illegal detention and four counts of rape. He was also set to answer a separate civil
case for damages with preliminary attachment for the same offense.
While detained, Bartelli escaped jail. But in the meantime the trial court issued a preliminary
attachment and notice of garnishment to the dollar account of Bartelli in China Banking Corporation.
However the said bank refused to comply invoking Section 113 Central Bank Circular which provides that
dollar accounts are exempt from attachment.
The criminal case for Bartelli was adjudged and rendered a judgment by default against him ordering
him to pay the victim damages. A writ of execution was issued but the same bank still didnt act on it. Even
saying that the provision is aimed to the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit
System and offshore banking.
Whether or not Section 113 of Central Bank Circular can be applied to the present case.

This Court rules that the applicability of laws must depend on the extent of justice. If the Court would
allow the said provision to prevail it would be used as a device for future wrongdoers to escape liability at
the expense of the victim. Surely this could not be the intent the legislative thought of when they passed the
Carlos Alonzo and Casimira Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Tecla Padua
G.R. No. L-72873 May 28, 1987
Brothers and sister inherited in equal pro indiviso a parcel of land from their deceased parents. Twofifths of the said land was sold to herein petitioner. Sometime in 1975, petitioners son, Eduardo decided to
build a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area his parents have bought.
Mariano Padua, one of the co-heirs sought to redeem the are, but his complaint was dismissed for he is
an American citizen. A complaint was then filed by another co-heir, Tecla Padua invoking the same right as
The complaint was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the right has prescribed, saying that
the protest must be filed 30 days from the notice of sales. Although there is no written notice, the trial court
say the actual knowledge or notice may suffice.
The respondent court, Intermediate Appellate Court, reversed the order saying that written notice
although in whatever form must be strictly complied.
Whether or not actual knowledge will be sufficient in compliance with the 30 day notice rule in the
sale of land.
The Court sustained the lower courts order. Saying that it is unaccepted to allow the pretense posed by
the respondent in having no knowledge of the said sale. Allowing their strict contention of written notice
would enable the law to be device for injustice. It is evident what the legislature want in enacting such
provision is to provide redemptioners due notice. The court is satisfied, the parties being brother and sisters,
that these complainant are actually informed and written notice is immaterial.
Achilles Berces Sr. Vs. Hon. Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona Jr., et al.
G.R. No. 112099
February 21, 1995
Mayor Corral is facing two administrative cases file by herein petitioners in the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Albay. The cases were grounded on abuse of authority and oppression and dishonesty. Said
body ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered its suspension.
Mayor Corral appealed to the Office of the President and prayed for stay execution pursuant to Section
6 of Administrative Order No. 18. The Office granted it to avoid undue prejudice to public interest,
respondent being a Mayor.
To this effect petitioners contend that said law has been repealed by Republic Act 7160 which took
effect on January 1, 1991, later than that assailed law which took effect February 12, 1987.
Whether or not Republic Act 7160 impliedly repealed Administrative Order No. 18?
Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 provides for the power of the president to order, as it may deem
just and reasonable, stay execution pending appeal. While Sec. 68 of Republic Act 7160 provides that an

appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory.
Petitioner invokes the repealing close of Republic Act 7160, but the Court found it to be devoid of
merit for it didnt specifically identify Administrative Order No. 18 to be repealed. Nor the case is a case of
implied repeal. Our justice system having presumption against implied repeal, the petitioner must show
there is a substantial conflict between the new and prior laws. It must be an irreconcilable inconsistency
and a repugnancy must exist in the terms of the new and prior law that two cannot stand together.
The two laws not having this conflict must be read together and harmonized.
Antonio Mecano vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 103982
December 11, 1992
Petitioner, a Director II in the NBI was hospitalized for cholecystitis, a service connected illness. He
now claims with the COA reimbursement for his hospitalization for the illness under Sec. 699 of Revised
Administrative Code. However the COA denied his claim saying that the provision where the petitioners
claim is based is already not enforce it being not restated or reenacted by the provision of Administrative
Code of 1987, which respondent treats as a repeal to the Revised Administrative Code.
Respondent assails the repealing clause of said law. However time and again that in order for one to be
an express repeal the particular provision must be specifically indicated in the repealing clause. The nature
of the repealing clause mentioned is on of a general repealing provision, it is a clause which predicates that
under the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The failure to add
the specific law to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist. This situation falls within the ambit of an implied repeal.
Whether or not the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operates to repeal the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917.
Comparing the two codes, the later code does not cover the whole subject of the former, there are
several matters not included therein. And lastly, a well settled rule in statutory construction that repeal by
implication is not favored. For the legislature in enacting laws is presumed to know the existing laws on the
Danilo Paras vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 123169
November 4, 1996
Petitioner an incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula Cabanatuan won during the last regular election of
1994. However, a petition for recall was filed by the registered voters of his barangay. The COMELEC
acting on the petition set the signing of the petition. 29.30% sign the petition, above the 25% requirement
provided by law.
An opposition was filed by the petitioner saying that the recall was not proper. Citing Sec. 74 of
Republic Act 7160 which states that no recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of the officials
assumption of office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. The petitioner saying that
an SK election, is considered as regular local election, is going to happen in a span of four months,
therefore recall is improper.
Whether or not Sangguniang Kabataan Election can be considered a regular local election.

The court did not rule in favor of the petitioner.

An SK election is to be held every three years thereafter, while the provision one year after the
assumption of officials office is to be construed as his 2 nd year of office. If petitioners contention that SK
election is a regular local election then no recall shall ever happen. It would render the recall provision of
LGC inutile. It is a rule in statutory construction that it is presumed that the legislature intended to enact an
effective law and did not include a vain provision in the enactment of the statute.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. and The Court of Tax Appeals
G.R. Nos. 28502-03
April 18, 1989
ESSO, herein respondent overpaid income tax sometime in 1959, it was accordingly granted by the
Commissioner in 1964. However in 1960, he was found to have been short of payment. In 1964 he was
ordered to pay the sum of short payment. He paid the sum under protest saying that the sum of his
excessive tax paid on 1959 should be subtracted from his payment for 1960. ESSO then asked for refund
but was denied by the Commissioner. On appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, the court ordered payment to
ESSO its refund claim.
Whether or not the Commission Internal Revenue should refund the excess payment made by ESSO
Standard Eastern Inc,
The Court upheld that the respondent must be granted its claim.
The Commissioner having been in fact acknowledging the mistake in which the respondent paid excess
tax had the obligation to return the same to ESSO. The contention of the petitioner that the
acknowledgment was made 4 years after the payment negates actuality. The court held that, obligation to
return money mistakenly paid arises from the moment that payment is made and not from the time that the
payee admits the obligation to reimburse.
From the foregoing respondent should not be legally or logically considered a debtor of the
government and whatever obligation ESSO may incur should be reduced to the sum which the government
holds as obligation to ESSO.
Nothing is better settled than that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd
or unreasonable consequences.
Cesario Ursua vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112170
April 10, 1996
Atty. Palmones, lawyer for the petitioner wrote a letter the Office of the Ombudsman to be able to be
furnished with a copy of complaint against petitioner. He asked the petitioner to bring this letter to the
Ombudsman because said lawyers messenger is running some other errands. Petitioner comply, however
he asked said messenger what to to do as he was afraid to go to that office because he is one of the
respondents in the case. The messenger told him that he could just sign his name, Oscar Perez, to avoid
being recognized. And so the petitioner did as told. He obtain the requested complaint from Ms. Loida
Kahulugan. But before leaving the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance. However, this
acquaintance was also known to Loida which enable her to find that the one he gave the complaint was not
Oscar Perez himself.
Petitioner was accordingly charged and was found guilty by the trial court in violation of Sec 1 of CA
No. 142 as amended by RA 6085.. He appealed to the Court of Appeals but it affirmed the decision of the
lower court. Hence this petition.

Whether or not the use of a different name belonging to another in isolated transaction falls within the
prohibition of Court of Appeals No. 142.
The objective of the provision mentioned is to curb the common practice among Chinese of adopting
scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. An alias is
name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business
transaction in addition to his real name registered at birth. Hence the use of fictitious name or a different
name by another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known
by this name is addition to his name does not fall within the prohibition contained in the said provision.
In addition to that a rule in statutory construction is there is a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure. The case being an undesirable consequence
and interpretation of the law must be reversed.