Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
1.0
Introduction
The global financial crisis that started in 2007 has led to renewed interest on Islamic
banking. Lack of stability corresponds with the financial instability situation or
financial crisis (Hussein, 2010). Several research done by (Venardos, 2010; Imam and
Kpaodar, 2010) briefly discuss regarding financial stability. This is as evidenced
during the liquidity crisis and sub-prime mortgage crisis in United States. When the
1
SITI ROHAYA MAT RAHIM, Lecturer, Department of Economics Faculty of Business and
Finance, Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman (Perak Campus), Jalan Universiti,Bandar
aratKampar 31900. Perak, Malaysia. Tel: 6005-4688888 ext 4380 HP: 60012-8355082
Email: rohaya@utar.edu.my
2
ROZA HAZLI ZAKARIA, Senior Lecturer. Department of Economics, Faculty of
Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, 50603 Kuala Lumpur, MALAYSIA
Email: roza@um.edu.my
132
Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, Vol. 9 No. 3, July - Sep 2013
US bank Lehman Brothers went bankrupt on 15 September 2008, banks in the United
States and Europe were equally affected, as well as all financial institutions.
Studies and reports highlight the relatively better performance of the Islamic and
conventional banks. More recently, Alaro and Hakeem (2011) provide some evidence
that Islamic banking is more stable than conventional banks in term of risk
management. In addition to that, Financial Stability Report 2011 documents that
countries that practice Islamic banking is more stable than others that rely on
conventional banking, where Saudi Arabia (rank 1) ranked as the most stable as
opposed to United States (rank 41) and United Kingdom (rank 42).
The observation that Islamic banks were relatively unaffected by the crisis as
compared to their conventional counter parts highlight the strength of the Islamic
banking system as a possible alternative to replace the existing interest based
financial system. However, this requires more researches in breadth and depth to
examine issues surrounding Islamic banks stability as esxiting available researches is
rather limited. This is what motivate us to undertake this study. It aims to fill in the
gap by providing some sound evidence the stability issues of Islamic and
conventional banks during recent crisis. Besides, our study will also examine factors
that underlie bank stability in order to get some insight on the differences, if there is
any. Malaysia provides a good avenue for case study given that both types of banks,
Islamic and conventional work hand in hand in the economy under the dual banking
system. Hence, they are subjected to similar macroeconomic conditions.
The following of this paper is structured as follows; 2.0 details literature reviews on
banking stability, 3.0 discuss the methodology, followed by 4.0 in which the
empirical results are described. Finally, 5.0 conclude this paper along with policy
implications.
2.0
Islamic banks are unique or different from their conventional counterparts in terms of
their underlying modus operandi. Guarded with the belief that interest or riba is
totally unacceptable, Islamic banks operation is based on Shariah compliance
principles such as profit sharing basis, real asset transactions and strict adherence to
no speculative element. With these differences on the three basic principles, Islamic
banks portray different response during the recent financial meltdown.
A review of past studies related to the issue of banking sector stability show that there
are at least three explanations on the relative stability. Firstly, banks operates under
Islamic possess greater liquidity holdings relative to conventional ones. Partly, this is
due to the relatively limited availability of investment avenues that are Shariah
133
compliance. This is in accordance with Hadeel Abu Loghod (2010), who found
attractiveness of Islamic banks products such as Mudaraba, Musharakah, Murabahah,
Ijarah, and profit and loss investment was the main reason behind the greater liquidity
holdings.
Secondly, Islamic banks focused on profit sharing investment and financing, in which
there is mutual risk sharing. For instance, Rahman (2011) details that Islamic banks in
Bangladesh currently adopt sophisticated qualitative and quantitative techniques to
overcome the credit risk problems.
In addition to that, Islamic banks are different in their business model as well as
financing or equity participation.. This led them to channel their investment more in
less risky investment sectors. For instance, Hasan and Dridi (2010), reports that
Islamic banks successfullly maintained stronger credit growth. His research proved
Islamic asset growth and bank credit was double than those conventional banks
during 2007-2009.
Thirdly, Islamic banks are less affected with many conventional banks because
Islamic banks were prohibited in any speculative practices and excessive leveraging,
which were root causes of the recent global financial crisis.
3.0
Methodology
3.1
Model Specification
134
Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, Vol. 9 No. 3, July - Sep 2013
Internal factors such as loan asset ratio (LAR),cost income ratio (CIR), log total
assets (LTA), and Herfindahl Index (HI). Bank liquidity is measured as loan assets
ratio, (LAR). Higher value of this ratio indicate that high risky a bank bear since it
shows a bank is loaned up to much and its liquidity is quite low. This is supported by
(Agusman et al., 2008). In our model, we hypothesize that loan-to-asset ratios are
negatively related to bank stability. According to Hassan (2010), higher loan-to-asset
ratio negatively impacts bank stability.
Efficiency element measured by cost income ratio (CIR). The ratio gives investors a
clear view of how efficiently the bank is being run; the lower it is, the more profitable
the bank will be. The hypotheses assume that higher cost income ratios negatively
related with Z-scores. Several studies claim that less efficient banks may tempt to
take on additional risk to increase their financial performance, similar finding also
noticed by (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997).
Bank size (LTA) measured log of total assets. We assume that as the bank size
becomes larger, bank would be more stable. Herfindahl Index (HI) measure of
concentration index.
Therefore, estimated model could be written as:
BankStability
1 LARit
6 SHARE it
3.2
2 CIRit
7 INFit
3 LTAit
8 GDPit
4 IDit
5 HI it
it
Variables Description
135
Where:
Dependent Variables
ZSCORE
NPL
Definition
Z = (ROA+CAP)/ (ROA)
NPL = mon-performing loans/ total loans
Independent ariables
Definition
LAR
CIR
LTA
In(Assets)
ID
Income Diversity
HI
Herfindahl Index
Herfindahl Index =
(market share n) 2
INF
Inflation
GDP
Real GDP
Error term
it
136
Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, Vol. 9 No. 3, July - Sep 2013
4.0
Findings
4.1
Normality Test
4.2
Correlation Coefficient
To check whether multicollinearity appears or not in the model the simple correlation
coefficients in Table 3.0 between the explanatory variables have been examined. The
pairwise correlations among the explanatory variables (LAR, CAR, LTA, ID, HI,
SHARE, INF and GDP) are particularly strong (r < 0.50 in each case). This shows
that the variables are not correlated among each other. As a conclusion multi-co
linearity problem does not appear in this study.
4.3
The p-values reported in Table 4.0, each of data series suggest that we fail to reject a
unit root test at least at the 1 % level and 5 % level at 1 st differences. As can be
readily seen, all time series at level contain unit roots according to ADF unit root test
and Levin, Lin & Chu (2002) at level except for cost income ratio, In (total assets),
income diversity and Herfindahl Index. We conclude that ADF unit root tests in first
differences show all variables are stationary.
137
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
ZSCORE
NPL
LAR
CIR
In(TA)
ID
HI
SHARE
INF
GDP
Mean
0.722368
0.690204
0.432368
1.076924
14.41387
0.536328
6.160500
5.108904
2.726667
4.616667
Median
0.330000
0.286812
0.510000
0.290000
16.27373
0.550000
0.870000
0.930000
2.530000
5.600000
Maximum
23.67000
39.05209
0.940000
22.80000
21.45330
1.630000
74.20190
73.50000
5.400000
7.200000
Minimum
1.960000
1.501443
0.780000
1.420000
1.540000
0.470000
0.780000
0.670000
0.600000
-1.700000
Std. Dev.
2.029177
2.657692
0.256597
10.38575
6.015925
0.384194
1143.691
13.44865
1.537723
2.936986
Skewness
8.331474
3.156460
-0.580081
14.94308
-1.820843
0.387167
6.518537
5.279181
0.402549
-1.507184
Kurtosis
84.20247
10.83223
2.098793
224.8461
4.757063
2.760985
44.08796
32.54685
2.210679
3.722992
Jarque-Bera
45.03935
20.50241
1279.605
155.3169
6.238846
1762.77
88.99084
12.07650
91.28674
Prob
0.000000
0.029174
0.000035
0.000000
0.000000
0.044183
0.000000
0.000000
0.002386
0.000000
Sum
164.7000
348.8842
98.57982
245.5386
3286.362
122.2829
117.0459
116.4830
621.6800
1052.600
934.6861
503.4312
14.94613
24485.09
8215.436
33.50639
212.6785
169.5040
536.7627
1958.077
228
228
228
228
228
228
228
228
228
228
No of banks
CORRELATION MATRIX
Correlation
ZSCORE
NPL
LAR
CIR
LTA
ID
HI
SHARE
INF
GDP
ZSCORE
1.000000
NPL
0.260348
1.000000
LAR
-0.131501
0.039276
1.000000
CIR
0.280227
0.024748
-0.098776
1.000000
LTA
0.075817
0.042823
0.672384
0.070399
1.000000
ID
-0.065527
0.084176
0.273420
-0.090543
0.051834
HI
0.247156
-0.004028
-0.132856
0.423686
0.183455 -0.076547
1.000000
SHARE
0.202214
0.112992
-0.032567
0.403106
0.298628 -0.033122
0.175314
1.000000
INF
0.039093
0.059654
-0.041761
0.037241
-0.053387
0.029037 -0.002152
-0.002136
1.000000
GDP
0.041271
0.016871
-0.137644
0.029387
-0.003305
0.049644 1.000000
1.000000
138
Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, Vol. 9 No. 3, July - Sep 2013
UNIT ROOT TESTS (LEVIN, LIN & CHU) AND (ADF TEST)
1ST DIFFERENCES
LEVEL
Variables
Levin, Lin & Chu
ADF
ADF
statistics
Probabilit
y
statistics
Probability
statistics
Probability
statistics
Probability
(1)Z-score
-5.16530
0.1365
16.0765
0.4034
-1.90110
0.0000***
8.91494
0.0013**
(2)NPL
-9.90068
0.7685
63.3617
0.7008
-9.83040
0.0000***
68.1719
0.0005**
-50.1936
0.0000***
39.5321
0.0000***
-61.5416
0.0000***
28.3889
0.0004**
-1.81761
0.0346**
53.0892
0.0196**
4.59864
0.0000***
3.45482
0.0009**
-1.44237
0.7460
34.1149
0.6422
-1.92920
0.0269**
10.0626
0.0105**
(4)Income diversify
-1.47450
0.0022**
64.4860
0.0012**
-1.17393
0.0120**
40.2925
0.0001**
(5)Herfindahl Index
-1.09632
0.0000***
72.2052
0.0001**
-0.06135
0.0000***
14.4515
0.0272**
(1)Market Share
-2.05664
0.1909
35.3794
0.4029
-1.44358
0.0007**
13.6358
0.0001**
-2.84655
0.7022
28.0980
0.7517
-1.6980
0.0454**
9.31677
0.0232**
(3)Inflation
-4.65016
0.6201*
41.4589
0.1774
-2.76261
0.0029**
14.6326
0.0000***
Dependent
Bank specific
Macroeconomics
4.4
139
Using E-Views 6, we run panel data for several specifications to gather the results.
Test of Generalized Least Square (GLS) was done in order to test bank stability. The
estimation proceeds as follows; firstly, model is estimated via ordinary least squares
(OLS). This estimation methods assumes that all banks have the same behaviour in
which it is assumed that the intercepts for the banks are identical, it= . Since the
initial findings of the data set indicate the non-normality distributions, thus
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimation is likely to produce better estimation
results.
Secondly, this study proceeds with both fixed effect and random effects models. The
result show that the null hypothesis is rejected that is the individual effect associated
with the independent variables. The result of Hausman test statistics suggests that
fixed effects model (FEM) is the appropriate panel data estimator for this study. By
looking at chi-square statistic, Z-scores of the conventional banks sample with (117, 8
degree of freedom) were ( 2=6.970100) and having a low-p-value (0.0000), lead to
suggestion that the corresponding effect are statistically significant at 1 %
significance level. In summary, based on the result of specification test; the fixed
effects model (FEM) appears to be the best model based on the Likelihood Ratio and
Hausman test.
Dependent Variables: Z-score
Chi-Square
df
Probability
2.891050
(93, 8)
0.0000
6.970100
(117, 8)
0.0000
Chi-Square
df
Probability
2.890808
(93, 8)
0.0000
7.998643
(117, 8)
0.0000
140
Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, Vol. 9 No. 3, July - Sep 2013
(1)
(2)
(2)
POOL OLS
Select
Fixed Effect
STEP 2: FE vs. RE
(FE)
(2)
Fixed Effect
(3)
Random Effect (RE)
(FE)
Select
Fixed Effect (FE)
Constant
Z-score (Panel A)
141
NPL (Panel B)
Islamic
Conventional
Islamic
Conventional
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.680897
0.133812
0.908503
-1.611173
(0.0000)***
(0.0000)***
(0.0000)****
(0.0273)**
Bank Specific
-0.147068
-0.098306
1.476797
-1.314981
(1) LAR
(0.0195)**
(0.0634)*
(0.0000)***
(0.0842)*
(2) CIR
0.038518
0.011706
-0.013158
0.214108
(0.0000)***
(0.2011)
(0.0579)*
(0.7478)
0.022055
0.022765
0.022248
0.020201
(0.0003)**
(0.0000)***
(0.0000)***
(0.0002)***
-0.102110
0.040185
0.208662
0.854856
(0.3095)
(0.0000)***
(0.5209)
(0.0001)**
0.000500
0.000453
-0.000534
-0.000778
(0.0113)**
(0.1723)
(0.0336)**
(0.9221)
Macroeconomics
-0.011792
-0.021459
0.059340
0.705656
(1) SHARE
(0.1479)
(0.0000)***
(0.2800)
(0.0066)**
(2) INF
0.004880
0.002287
-0.053276
0.075542
(0.0433)**
(0.1802)
(0.0000)***
(0.3739)
0.004544
0.000799
0.042137
0.042138
(0.0002)***
(0.0430)**
(0.0000)***
(0.0177)**
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
R-squared
0.300331
0.331482
0.287459
0.209929
Adjusted R-squared
0.223093
0.211926
0.237426
0.206712
S.E.of Regression
1.414270
0.107905
1.863612
2.108415
F-statistic
15.79718***
14.68524***
10.61011***
10.28964***
154.0123
140.1772
267.4247
431.2051
Durbin-Watson stat
1.992206
1.872072
2.009188
1.995492
Observations
102
126
102
126
(3) LTA
(4) ID
(5) HI
(3) GDP
Fixed Effect:
Chow-Test (p-value)
142
Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, Vol. 9 No. 3, July - Sep 2013
The regression results of Z-score and NPL have been identified as the dependent
variable as a proxy of measuring risk shown in Table 6.0. The diagnostics test
statistics show no evidence of misspecification, no serial correlation, no
multicollinearity and no heterokedasticity. Table 6.0 reported that for the first set of
regressions, the R-squared for Islamic banks were 30.03% while 33.14% for the
conventional banks. These results identify that factors that are significant in
determining Z-score for conventional banks are loan asset ratio, cost income ratio,
total asset, income diversity, Herfindahl Index, market share and real GDP.
Meanwhile, factors that influence Z-score for Islamic banks are cost income ratio,
total assets, Herfindahl Index, market share, inflation and real GDP. To ensure
robustness, we used another proxy for bank stability that is NPL. The results shows,
independent variables that are significant in determining NPL for conventional banks
are loan asset ratio, cost income ratio, total asset, income diversity, Herfindahl Index,
market share and real GDP.
Findings that contradict our initial assumptions are the relationship between size of
the bank and bank stability for conventional banks. The positive relationship implies
that a larger bank is linked with higher NPL, lower bank stability. This findings deny
the too big to fail hypothesis, and is consistent with previous work such as by
Ebrahim (2008) and Berger et al., (1997). Nevertheless, for the Islamic banks, our
result seems to be consistent with the previous findings, which indicate total assets,
confirm positive and significant effect on NPL at 1% significant level. It indicates
that 1% increase in total assets will increase NPL by 0.022%. This positive
relationship between bank size and bank stability indicate that solvency risks obtain
from impairment of assets.
Finally, looking at the macroeconomics perspectives for the Islamic banks, the result
of economic growth has a positive and significant effect on Z-score at 5% significant
level. It indicates that one percent increase in economic growth will increase Z-score
by 0.0045%. According to Shayegani and Arani (2012) real GDP is one of
macroeconomic variable contributing to financial stability. Our result is in line with
the previous research which claims, during economic boom, higher real GDP lead to
higher Z-score and a more stable Islamic bank.
4.5
0.82
0.44
0.34
2005
2006
0.64
0.42
0.38
2007
2008
0.62
0.45
0.60
0.49
2009
2010
2.67
2.10
1.89
1.73
1.54
2.02
1.57
1.24
1.43
Islamic Bank
Conventional Bank
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
143
144
Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, Vol. 9 No. 3, July - Sep 2013
Higher Z-score obtained for Islamic banks is mainly due to higher return and equity
of Islamic banks as compared to those of conventional banks. Higher Z-score
indicates that Islamic banks are less risky (lower probability to defaults) than
conventional banks. During the year of 2006-2007, the trend shows that Islamic banks
are more resistant during crisis compared to conventional banks.
On examination of NPL, conventional banks have higher NPL than Islamic banks
which indicate that conventional banks have higher risk (higher probability to default)
as compared to Islamic banks. During the year of 2005-2006, the trend shows that
conventional banks are less resistant during crisis due to the higher NPL compared to
Islamic banks. The same results also appears during the crisis 2007-2010, which also
shows that conventional banks have higher NPL (higher probability to default) as
compared to Islamic banks.
5.0
Conclusion
This study examines stability between Islamic and conventional banks from banks
specific and macroeconomics perspectives by focusing on Malaysia scenario. The
findings of the study show that variables that have been identified as the significant
factors towards risk (probability to defaults) for Islamic banks were cost income ratio,
total assets, Herfindahl Index, market share, inflation and real GDP while
conventional bank stability were influence by loan asset ratio, cost income ratio, total
assets, income diversity, Herfindahl Index, market share and real GDP.
In future more comprehensive and effective research on relationships among
variables for both banks needs to be conducted to study the stability of Islamic and
conventional banks from Malaysia banking landscape after financial crisis 2008.
Large pools of secondary data should be collected from all Islamic and conventional
banks in Malaysia in order to have a better representative of our conclusions.
145
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Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, Vol. 9 No. 3, July - Sep 2013
APPENDIX
1.0
No
Name
Ownership
Local
2.
Local
3.
Local
4.
Local (Full-fledged)
5.
Local (Full-fledged)
6.
Local
7.
Local
8.
Local
9.
Local
10.
Local
11.
Local
Foreign
(Malaysia) Berhad
2.
Foreign
3.
Foreign
4.
Foreign
5.
Foreign
6.
Foreign
2.0
No
Name
Ownership
1.
Local
2.
Local
3.
Local
4.
Local
5.
Local
6.
Local
7.
Local
8.
Local
9.
Local
1.
Foreign
2.
Foreign
3.
Foreign
4.
Citibank Berhad
Foreign
5.
Foreign
6.
Foreign
7.
Industrial
and
Commercial
Bank
of
China
Foreign
(Malaysia) Berhad
8.
Foreign
9.
Foreign
Foreign
Foreign
Foreign
149