Constitutional Construction and Interpretation

- Not the same as statutory construction and interpretation

Subject
CC
SC

Constitution only
statutes, ordinance and their implementing
rules and regulations
NOTE: intended not merely

Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank of the Philippines G.R. L8888 (1957)
Court Ruling:
Strict construction of statutes apply in exemption on
taxations.
Principles of strict construction of statutes apply in exemption
on taxations. Hence, the exemption for chocolate in the
above section 2 does not include cocoa beans. The one is
raw material, the other manufactured consumer product; the
latter is ready for human consumption, the former is not.
Enrolled bill vs. Journal, Committee Hearings. Enrolled
bill prevails.
Despite the committee hearing regarding Republic Act 1197
amending sec. 2 substituting cocoa beans for chocolate;
Courts, however do not give decisive weight to one
legislators opinion expressed in Congressional debates
concerning application of existing laws. Moreover, in
approving Republic Act 1197, Congress agreed to exempt
cocoa beans instead of chocolate.
Prospectivity of laws.
Despite the proclamation no. 62 on September 1954
specifying that exemption of cocoa beans from foreign
exchange tax shall operate from and after the date only, it is
also a general rule that statutes operate prospectively.

V. Terms with Multiple Meaning

1) Malanyaon vs. Lising (G.R. No. 56028, July 30, 1981)

Malanyaon v. Lising

No. It is obvious that the statute speaks of the suspended

officer being "acquitted". It means that after due hearing and
consideration of the evidence against him the court is of the
opinion that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. Dismissal of the case against the suspended officer
will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to
acquittal.

IV. Terms with Legal Meaning

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION AND CBC PROPERTIES AND

COMPUTER
CENTER
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, HOME
DEVELOPENT MUTUAL FUND (HDMF); HDMF PRESIDENT;
AND THE HOME MUTUAL DEVELOPMENT FUND, respondent.

Ruling:
1. Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to question the validity
of the challenged issuances of the HDMF which are alleged
to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Although certiorari
should not substitute an appeal, especially for a lost
appeal, the petition should still be accepted because it
is generally meritorious.
2. Respondent acted in excess HDMF was in excess of
jurisdiction. There is no question that the HDMF Board has
rule-making powers. Section 5 of R.A. No. 7742 states that
the said Board shall promulgate the rules and regulations
necessary for the effective implementation of said Act. Its
rule-making power is also provided in Section 13 of P.D. No.
1752 which states insofar as pertinent that the Board is
authorized to make and change needful rules and

regulations to provide for, among others, a. the effective

administration, custody, development, utilization and
disposition of the Fund or parts thereof including payment of
amounts credited to members or to their beneficiaries or
states; b. Extension of Fund coverage to other working
groups and waiver or suspension of coverage or its
enforcement for reasons therein stated. It is well settled that
the rules and regulations which are the product of a
delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions
that have effect of law, should be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. Administrative regulations adopted
under legislative authority by a particular department must
be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself
cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot
amend as act of Congress .The rule making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power
cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned.

3. The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words

"and/or". In the instant case, the legal meaning of the words
"and/or" should be taken in its ordinary signification. It is
according ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature
in using the term "and/or" is that word "and" and the word
"or" are to be used interchangeably. It is clear from the
language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No.
1752, intended that an employer with a provident plan or an
employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may
obtain exemption from coverage. If the law had intended
that the employee should have both a superior provident
plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it
would have used the words "and instead of "and/or.

Bernardo, et al., v. Bernardo et al

Held:
No, Enrique does not come under the description of bona fide
tenant or occupant employed in the statute. The term "bona
fide occupant" (admittedly petitioner is not a tenant) has
been defined as "one who supposes he has a good title and
knows of no adverse claim" (Philips vs. Stroup, 17 Atl.
220,221); "one who not only honestly supposes himself to be
vested with true title but is ignorant that the title is contested
by any other person claiming a superior right to it" (Gresham
vs. Ware to that of a possessor in good faith in our Civil Law
(Civil Code of 1889, art. 433; new Civil Code, art. 526). The
essence of the bona fides or good faith, therefore, lies in
honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a
superior claim, and absence of intention to over each
another.
It is also in contrary that the words "bona fide occupants"
employed in the Commonwealth Acts are equivalent to
"actual" occupants. The first reason is that Section 7 of Act
1170 of the old Philippine Legislature, employs the terms
"actual bona fide settlers and occupants", plainly indicating
that "actual" and "bona fide" are not synonymous, while the
Commonwealth acts deleted the term "actual" and solely
used the words "bona fide occupant", thereby emphasizing
the requirement that the prospective beneficiaries of the acts
should be endowed with legitimate tenure. The second
reason is that in carrying out its social readjustment policies,
the government could not simply lay aside moral standards,
and aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders,
unmindful of the lawful or unlawful origin and character of
their occupancy. Such a policy would perpetuate conflicts
instead of attaining their just solution. It is safe to say that
the term "bona fide occupants" was not designed to cloak
and protect violence, strategy, double dealing, or breach of
trust.
The SC ruled that a person who, at the time of the acquisition
of the Tambobong Estate by the Government, has been
gratuitously occupying a lot therein by mere tolerance of its
lessee, and who does not own the house erected on such lot,

is not a "bona fide occupant" entitled to its acquisition, as the

term is used in Commonwealth Act. No. 539.
Tan et. Al vs. People
Held:
(1) Section 68 deals with penalizing the "cutting, gathering and/or collecting
timber or other forest products without license.". One of the essential
requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law is
the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal
rights susceptible of judicial determination. As Respondent Court of Appeals
correctly pointed out, petitioners were not charged with the [unlawful]
possession of firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, the
associated water or fish; thus, the inclusion of any of these enumerated
items in EO 277 is absolutely of no concern to petitioners. They are not
asserting a legal right for which they are entitled to a judicial determination at
this time. Besides, they did not present any convincing evidence of a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution that would justify the nullification
of said provision. A statute is always presumed to be constitutional, and one
who attacks it on the ground of unconstitutionality must convincingly prove its
invalidity.
(2) In Mustang Lumber Inc v. CA, Supreme Court held that lumber is included
in the term timber. Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw
material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common
usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Websters Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being
prepared for the market. Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. To
exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Section 68 would
emasculate the law itself.

decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court
without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of
the same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.[13]
It is true that the foregoing doctrine admits of exceptions, such that in Lacap,
we also held:
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public
policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many
accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the
party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make
the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely
legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where
judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i)
when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo
warrantoproceedings. x x x.[14]

I. Verba Legis: where the statue is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation.

Bolos vs. Bolos

REPUBLIC VS. LACAP

Held: No. the court ruled that AM 02-11-10-SC is strict in its

scope wherein section 1 of the rule reads:

In the case of Republic v. Lacap,[12] we expounded on the doctrine of

exhaustion of administrative remedies and the related doctrine of primary
jurisdiction in this wise:
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court,
he should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative
processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to

(G.R. No. 186400, Oct. 20, 2010)

Section 1. Scope This rule shall govern petitions for

declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the

Philippines. Applying the rule verba legis, the said section

leaves no room for interpretation and is very clear that it would
only cover marriages under the Family Code. Also it would only
be applied to marriages not to petitions.
EXPRESSIO UNIUS

Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. de Carungcong v. People and

Sato
G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010
1. No. Relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of
the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse,
regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not.
2. No. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only
applies to the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the
said provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in
cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State
waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the
private offended party with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies
mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the
provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes
mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft
through falsification or estafa through falsification.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold
the offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right to property
committed by the offender against certain family members as a private matter
and therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the
violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably
intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed

authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is

no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a paramount public
interest.
COA OF THE PROVINCE OF CEBU VS ROY URSAL PROVINCIAL AUDITOR
G.R. 141386
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. CEB24422, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION applying the Doctrine of Casus Ommisus (Casus
omissus pro omisso habendus es). A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a
statute must be held to have been omitted intentionally. It is not for this Court to supply such
grant of scholarship where the legislature has omitted it.
The salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed by the provincial school
board of Cebu in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes are
declared chargeable against the Special Education Fund of the province.
However, the expenses incurred by the provincial government for the college scholarship
grants should not be charged against the Special Education Fund, but against the General
Funds of the province of Cebu. Since salaries, personnel-related benefits and scholarship
grants are not among those authorized as lawful expenditures of the SEF under the Local
Government Code, they should be deemed excluded there from.
It should be noted that Section 100 of the Local Government Code substantially reproduced
Section 1, of R.A. No. 5447. But, unlike payment of salaries of teachers which falls within the
ambit of establishment and maintenance of extension classes and operation and maintenance
of public schools, the granting of government scholarship to poor but deserving students was
omitted.
Mapa v. Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation
G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989)
No. Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause 7 of the said
contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of default payment from Mapa. P.D. 957 does
not apply because it was enacted long after the execution of the contracts involved, and, other
than those provided in Clause 20, no further written commitment was made by the developer.
The words which are offered and indicated in the subdivision or condominium plans refer not
only to other forms of development but also to facilities, improvements, and
infrastructures. The word and is not meant to separate words, but is a conjunction used to
denote a joinder or a union.
Pilar vs. Comelec [G.R. No. 115245. July 11, 1995]
Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish, ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the
candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term every candidate must be
deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who

withdrew his candidacy. Also, under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or
the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that [t]he filing or withdrawal of
certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which
a candidate may have incurred. Petitioners withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his
liability for the administrative fine.

Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in
the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass.
The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA and
lower courts because they were not able to give reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for
the term "justices of peace".

CASUS OMISSUS

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS RULE

People v. Manantan

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos
G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

Held:
Yes, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449
of the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e.,
judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no
necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature
had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge.", which includes all kinds of
judges.
A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is
clothed with judicial authority. This term includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated
questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is
said, who are judges of facts.
From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of the peace"
was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as
averred by defendant-appellee. Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of
the First Instance', the words "justice of the peace" were omitted. It follows that when the
legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in RA 180, it did not intend to exempt the
said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already
comprehended in the broader term "judge".
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendantappellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be
held to have been omitted intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the omission has been
clearly established. In the case at bar, the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the
peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities.
In Section 54, justices of the peace were just called "judges". Also, the application of this rule
does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a
reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws.
Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of

The 1987 Constitution and other statutes treat the words charitable and religious
separately and independently of each other.
In P.D. 1564, it merely stated charitable or public welfare purposes which means that it was
not the intention of the framers of the law to include solicitations for religious purposes. The
world religious purpose is not interchangeable with the expression charitable purpose.
The acts of the petitioners cannot be punished under the said law because the law does not
contemplate solicitation for religious purposes.
The solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the
exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended
for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.
The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and petitioner Martin Centeno is
acquitted of the offense charged.
MANABAT VS. DE AQUINO