The inferential step in the Sorites paradox:

Logical or Human?

M.R.Pinheiro

I.R., Mathematics

PO BOX 12396, A'Beckett st, Melbourne, VIC, AU, 3000

mrpprofessional@yahoo.com

Abstract: In this paper, we produce an ERRATA to our previously

published paper with Semiotica, A Solution to the Sorites (2006).

We also address, finally, some of the major objective queries

generated by our Solution presentation to the general public, namely:

*Have we stated that Logic does apply to the Sorites or not?

*Have we finally solved the puzzle that has been astonishing

humanity for millennia now with no doubts? * Is the Solution

something logically useful or not?

As a plus, we offer a well-posedness theory for philosophical

problems of any sort, with full justification.

Key-words: Sorites, paradox, solution, errata, logic, human, well-

posedness, Logic, Language, discourse, dictionary, linguists, problem.

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1.Introduction

The Sorites Paradox is presented in several ways in the literature available

nowadays. In our last paper with Semiotica, [1], we chose to misrepresent it

mathematically first, in order to generate doubts in the good researcher's mind as

well as to make it simple for the audience of just Mathematics-literate people, once

we do embrace Casti's concept (Note 1), on popularizing Science as much as possible

in order to allow the intuitionist reader to have their insights into the problem and

enjoy it as much as we do. In that sense, anything is useful: from jokes to real-life

examples. Further on, however, in the own paper, we explain the confusion, or think

that we did anyway, and finally tell the mathematical truth behind it, if any.

The underlying reasoning for those who studied Science is obvious: by raising

philosophers, we create a World where there is less inequality because the way

people create consciousness is via understanding feelings and different views of the

World. But it is not that simple for a person who is still an outsider. How to

motivate them into Science? How to pass the message onwards? Why is it good

to study, what is the gain? Why is it not enough just to get the Diploma, the degree,

why can't one just cheat on exams and forget about learning, why are principles

important and morally relevant? Why can't one just think of own happiness and

exclude everyone else from the scope of those who deserve human rights, or rights

in general? X holds rights, everyone else does not, X may easily think. And if they do

not think the way X does, then X always wins...(Devil's rules). Why does X need to

change at all? These are some good reasons for stimulating the general public to

come to Science and Logic. What is the Bible about and the laws about, if not

Logic? What does Logic and Mathematics bring to the World that is really

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meaningful and highly relevant plus useful? We believe the answer is:

Perfection, God's image, or the closest we can get to it. If and only if there is full

understanding - by everyone else - that this is the way it should be, and that beauty

and perfection are worth respecting, the World can play God's rules. This is a

way of showing that talking is useful, that it is worth it exchanging ideas, rather than

imposing them upon others. That is the result of analyzing and going at least one

step higher in the Taxonomy of Bloom [3]. The best part of it is that with more

people involved, more original insights might be triggered. Philosophy and Logic

are the most basic requirements for a life to be seen as human. Therefore, a

solution to such an old problem might be reached by someone who was a total

outsider of Philosophy before that particular time when they came to understand the

problem well, in very simple terms, once the paradigms are just not there, or the

habit. Why making scientific thoughts, related to some very very popular reasoning

sciences, so exclusive for the few who acquire specific degrees? It might be true we

are publishing in a media that is very restricted in terms of audience. But that does

not prevent an outsider from accessing it by chance. That is the importance of giving

them a chance.

In this sense, we understand, given the insistence of the logicians involved ( Note 2),

that writing in wrong Mathematics (apparently - Note 3) is worth it. It is not a

Mathematics paper, at last, so that it might be shocking for mathematicians, but if

the logicians feel the need of seeing things the way they cannot formally be, once

Language is far beyond any logical control, so, there we go, trying to do the

impossible for them all to be happy once we also need to publish. We just took it for

granted: that it was a needed description, or trial of such. So this paragraph is just

to convince those who were mathematicians, or had a strong basis in Mathematics,

such as Dr Greg Restall, from Melbourne University at the moment, who immediately

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felt repulsion for it, that that was a fulfillment of someone else's request, whose

knowledge and present status in Science we must strongly respect.

Basically, Language is a human factor, and we believe that at least this point got

fully explained to the reader in our last paper. A very reduced scope of language

seems to bear more effective communication in any language, the bit which gets

classified as technical translation, when translators are the people to assess it.

However, once we are also experts in Translation (Note 4), we can testify that, even in

technical translations, there is not a single truth, or a definite truth. Simple evidence,

for the general public, is that it is impossible to use a translation software and get it

all accurate, or totally acceptable by both ends of the line (target and source). Even

with the silliest sort of translation piece, which exceeds one word. Therefore, there is

absolutely no way that a single sentence could be totally logically translated, once it

is formed by all human nuances such as emotion, expression, etc. Soritical steps

are totally inside of the solely human scope of the Language, once they

depend upon observation. It is also very illustrative for us, mathematicians, to

notice how philosophers seem to grasp so little of the classical laws of Logic, still

getting it all wrong. If normal mental processes were ever machine orientated, or

machine translatable, why would we ever need a human being? One must

understand that there are a few words with absolute meaning, and Frege, or Russell

[4], could not be that unskilled not to choose those: `Not the case', `Belongs to

the class', etc. Their words are quite absolute, so that there is no doubt. Notice the

cleverness of the ancient people and how less-clever society has become with time.

The father of Medicine, many centuries ago, for instance, Hippocrates, was able to

tell a disease by the secretions and excretions of a human body only (see, for

instance, [5]), no other instruments being ever applied. He was also able to

prescribe medicines which could be made at home. What have we progressed

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(progressed?) to? X-rays that go from doctor to doctor during ten years and whilst

the patient (victim) is being prescribed `Aspirin’, over and over, a tumor develops

(Note 5)? In Logic, unfortunately, we have progressed also from Frege and Russell,

with a highly useful tool to develop any strictly logical/mathematical problem, or to

write it, to confusing non-classical systems, with no application at all. Basically, the

first idea was not that bad: someone comes up and says let's pervert one of the

rules of the classical logical system and imagine what could happen (Note 6)...this is

OK, it is playing a bit to see what comes up. Really…no harm. But then a second

comes, and does the same procedure, names it differently, and a third...and they call

it Non-Classical Logic, and everyone thinks it is really important, or should be. At the

end of the day, however, the novelty is gone, once the process applied was always

the same. So, unless there is some use for that specific new logic created, using the

same `new procedure' devised by the one who should be the genius involved, the

precursor; it is obviously nonsensical to allow people to publish their `new systems'.

Scientific journals always state they will only publish ORIGINAL works that have got

IMPACT. This is obviously a further confirmation of our previous assertion, that

Science has `regressed', not `progressed', in the last few years, unfortunately. Frege

and Russell have solved problems: practical problems. Let's be sincere, why would

any person invest their money or assets in something useless? For people's vanity?

To increase the number of useless or meaningless human beings? To make it look as

if they are useful?

It is definitely not the case that it must not have an application; We do believe on the

veracity of stating that Non-Classical Logic might be

useful. We just do not believe on the veracity of the assertion that Non-Classical

Logic, as it stands, IS USEFUL for human beings. Even

if considered as a human reasoning extensor, it is not doing a good job if one is

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remaining only in the lowest level of Bloom's taxonomy all the time, just on the

understanding level, once learning how a new non-classical system is born and

making a new one, in what regards

Priest's book [7], is pretty much just understanding that and proving you have done

it.

Some are quite happy to state that Fuzzy Logic was applied, at least in the Fuzzy

controllers, or even Paraconsistency. We disagree. It was not the logic that was ever

applied. It was part of the underlying reasoning of the logic, or a single aspect of it.

Therefore, the new logic, itself, is not useful at all, so far. The useful factor was the

engineer who, probably bored with Zadeh's extensive talk [8], had the insight that

that particular part of Zadeh's ideas development could, indeed, lead him to develop

a better machine reasoning/application. Interesting enough, as mentioned in [9],

only the translation from natural language into machine language was what was

useful to the engineer, that is, the same issue addressed by our solution for the

Sorites `paradox’!!!

The greatest part of our findings is that one, of the top World problems, is not

communication between human beings, but between human beings

and machines, that is: most of the problems in Science nowadays, in what

regards possible applications, are related to how machines and human beings

interact, or should interact.

Why? Because there is no more artificial creation than a computer!!! Who could

think of a so limited human being as to do whatever we tell them to, or even an

animal? A machine is basically an employee that never gets paid, has got no

needs, asks for nothing, never interacts with humans in an unexpected way, is

always there for humans, irrespective of what they do to it, and is fully replaceable

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by another one, which is able to do precisely the same things, the same way the

previous machine used to. A stranger can blow up one's home-computer and, next

day, the victim can get another one which is precisely like the previous one,

delivered to their house immediately!!! (It is an actual truth that, with cloning, they

also try to get human beings to be like that, unfortunately: we can imagine the day

in which an Afghanistan husband will burn his wife in full, grab a piece of remaining

flesh, go to the cloning department, and demand another one. We do not even know

why people think cloning could possibly be a good thing to the World... There are

several human beings with problems just because the husband, for instance, in a

couple, has got a computer, and will prefer sex with it than with his wife!!!) Either it

is the case that this is a true wonder, or the most demoniac device ever invented on

Earth for people who cannot actually relate to others, or respect the most basic

equity laws of this World regarding human interaction: one speaks for an amount X

of time, the other listens for an amount X of time; one makes an aggression, one

expects to get it back; one makes a violence, one expects to get it back; one

demands love in X amount, one must then provide love in X amount; action and

reaction, one of the most basic principles in Physics, as well as in God's rules.

Always alluring to remember that Mathematics and Physics were both born in

Philosophy, but the machine was not. Mathematics and Physics must be,

therefore, God's creations, once Jesus was a philosopher, named The Son of God

(at least Him). This way, Mathematics and Physics should be perfect and

good to human race, in every possible sense. Machines, however, are created by

those who are too lazy to accept the most basic laws of God and, therefore, can only

be harmful, if not very well policed, watched over, in all their applications. Whilst

philosophers must think a long time and take very careful and World-improving

decisions, if ever doing what they should, machines act the other way around: they

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are clearly opposite and distinct forces, so that if one falls to the side of God's

rules, the other must lie on the side of the Devil's rules…and there is no other way to

see it. If Jesus was God, then machines are not. If Jesus is denied, we are left

with no Philosophy, just orders being obeyed. In this case, we are pretty much the

same as the computers, so that `computers should be human beings' is the only

possible inference. That all because in the Old Testament there is authority which is

never given up, totally held by God, the almighty, who would punish anyone who

disrespected Him in any of His orders, with horrible things and plagues...Once we

really do not think it is plausible that a human being, who is able to make

independent decisions, is equal or might ever equate a machine, Jesus is the actual

God, and Mathematics plays God's rules, which match, therefore, adoration for

perfection, perfection emanated from God: perfection in human constructions,

human actions, human performances...perfection per se!

Interesting how things converge to an universal understanding… Some Sciences are

there to make people think on things that they usually would not, that is, to shift

paradigms, that is, to create and raise revolution, change...that is the actual aim of

Philosophy, or should, obviously, be. Confusion happens when someone tries to

make what is useful to trigger reasoning in others look like Computer Science: an

actual application of highest order reasoning, never the reasoning itself (therefore,

an application of a logical system, never the system itself, in full. Basically, Gödel’s

golden rule must be true here as well, as much for Mathematics as for Logic,

incompleteness – see [13], for instance).

Nobody can say they are philosophers if they are working on the scope of

Computer Science, which is pretty much the scope of [7]. However, in our yet to

be published paper, we also came up with a solution to increase governmental belief

in the sort of scope of [7], that is, to make it also relevant to humanity: the paper is

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mentioned in our references list as [10].

In any hypothesis, we need now producing an ERRATA to our previously published

paper containing the actual solution to the Sorites `paradox’

in order to explain it all (not to be taken to be lazy mathematicians, and to be fully

understood by all). We must state that we never expected

mathematicians to react so strongly about it, once it was a philosophical paper...

With this further excuse-me for our why, there we go: The ERRATA follows this.

We then proceed to address the issue of what we actually stated in clear English and

Philosophical terms only, not mathematical, or technical

lingo, anymore, so that everyone understands it, or is able to assess it. That is our

third section in this paper. Following the third section, it comes the

addressing/defense of the statement `Yes, we hold a definite solution for the

`paradox’, or the what should not be called a paradox' and finally, but not least

important, comes the addressing of our own issue criticizing our own work: what is

this piece of logical reasoning, for the solution, good for?

2. ERRATA FOR THE ARTICLE PUBLISHED AT SEMIOTICA IN

2006:

a) Page 308(2=20); l:21: There should be a footnote, or remark, included in the

text, referring to the x-tilde and the next members of C. We must state that: `One

must consider that any color classification is always vague. If one may take the idea

of a precise color, which could be mechanically defined in terms of brightness and

etc, then x-tilde would be that color and the symbol should be `belong'. However,

because we speak about Philosophical Logic and, therefore, about reality of human

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reasoning, x-tilde must be regarded as the symbol of a set, a subset of C, which will

then include all similarities to that specific color regarding the eyes of the people

involved in that particular evaluation. It is acceptable that we refer, then, to the

union of subsets as a `plus', once it is supposed to be an element only, but, due to

the nature of our speech, is going to be a set encompassing all similarities (eye),

attached to the particular group of observers that the word said/judgment stated

represents. The color is just one and, in that sense, the object has got a particular

color x. However, speech and language complicate it all because it assigns a single

name to a particular range of possibilities. In this sense, x is both an element and a

set, depending on what we refer to: the actual color, which is unique, or the speech,

which fails to translate that idea perfectly well. On the trial of being too simple for

the reader, we use both senses, so that we had to choose a single symbol, and we

chose to use a shocking one to make it clear, once our background is Mathematics,

that there was a possible conflict there to be observed. Rigorously, were it a paper in

Mathematics, there would be two descriptions, as we later on mention. One would be

for the speech function, with subsets, and another would be for the actual ontology

of the object, which would be elements. One must notice, however, that this is what

precisely gets developed in the paper, so that it is explained up to this detail later. In

any hypothesis, the idea was making it popular: as simple as we could.' We beg the

reader to understand us.

b) Page 316(10=20); l:11: end of number 3-item): it is missing an inverted

comma over the f and stating `meaningful to the solver but not to the listener".

c) Page 316(10=20); l:29=30: wrong reference position. Priest should have been

mentioned soon after non-heap.

d) Page 322(16=20); l:26: typo, it should be `but is coincidental' instead of `but

it..'

e) Conclusion 324(18=20); l:22: adding a last paragraph: `Our statements are

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that there is a solution for each different logic ( Note 8 ) involved in the

`Sorites paradox' problem: Discourse (Discourse Logic, Philosophy of Language),

Human Reasoning (Philosophy of Science), Machine Reasoning (Computer

Science), Human senses system (Medicine). In what regards a single person's

speech (Discourse), the solution is found by translating that speech into

logical entries the way we propose, and entering that into a machine, so that the

issues of the problem are fully addressed. Therefore, from an individual's

perspective, from our example, color-blind or not, there is always a very well defined

solution. From a mathematical point of view, we have to choose to be with the

machines (Computer Science). In this case, the machine needs to be fed by a

reasonable observer, someone with no problems in the eyes, or with unusual

reasoning, or with reasoning which matches the average person in what regards

observational qualities as well as definitions of colors. The machine points out the

range of variations it allows and the person feeding the machine will choose which

element is, in our chosen example, of color X, or not. When the person gets

confused, the machine chooses to state `it is not' of color X, as we propose. This

way, the problem also holds a machine solution with no vagueness. From a

human perspective (Human Reasoning), there is no problem. Purely Human

reasoning is of no use to machine lingo or logic (when regarded as computational

logic, not its complementary set in relation to the Philosophy behind it), or

Mathematics. What counts is what can be proved, stated logically, suitable for

inferences. If purely human reasoning could be mechanized, ever, then human and

machines would be equal, at least in expression and actions/reactions, and, as stated

here, and proved with evidence, there is no way they are going to be, unless the

human is `made' a machine by disease or fault. A machine will never be human.

A normal human being, with no impairments or faults, will never be a

machine either. The speech has to be attached to a single speaker/evaluator/judge

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( Human Senses System ), so that, in what regards speech, the problem was

solved by us as well. We actually believe this is the proposed problem. The problem

is like a philosophical matter, in which each listener will have their own point of view

and they are all allowed by the system. Why? Because language is philosophical

and personal, irrespective of our trial of precise definitions, and despite of all its

rules. Remember here that society also has got countably many rules and those rules

cannot, ever, express the behavior of everyone in society, or justify them. One must

understand that almost all accounts mentioned in [11] fall into the same mistaken

category: they all seem to think that language is computational, or the same as

Mathematics, and, therefore, it is all precise and very computer-friendly. We

actually think, to the best of the World, that schools should really worry about

teaching people how to be purely human sometimes, as weird as it may sound. It

seems that even in the highest level of Bloom's taxonomy in place in the World

research, people are looking for `how to make all which is human become

machine-friendly’ as if this were always possible. That is a bit scary...if the human

factor looses importance at that level, why not kill everyone or just make masses be

totally uniform in their expression/thought/life like Hitler wished for, and so many

other dictators/brain-washers? In this sense, Philosophy has been going through

an involution, in terms of its human character, in such a way that people nowadays

considered `great philosophers', occupying positions of philosophers, are actually the

opposite that one of our most remarkable philosophers told us to do: (Descartes)

Cogito Ergo Sum. Basically, thinking above the machine level (and, in that sense,

Bloom's taxonomy could not help us better) is human and, therefore, should be the

aim of Philosophy as much as teaching/learning. If the Sorites paradox is

misinterpreted, however, it looks like someone tries to make a mathematical

induction and change discourse into Mathematics, what is certainly impossible. This

way, there cannot ever be any paradox on the scope of both human senses and

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human reasoning, once the inferential step is mathematical, machine friendly, not

natural for a purely Human Reasoning, so that it would never show up from a person

who was never presented the pre-manufactured problem. The premise `adding one

grain does not make any difference, therefore I can do it an infinite number of times,

and it will not' simply cannot, ever, appear in a mind that has not learned

mathematical reasoning, so that it is not purely human, it is machine orientated and

dictated, what is worse. From what regards Discourse and Machine Reasoning, or

their interface, which, ultimately, seems to be the problem, it suffices inventing an

obvious translation, or one that may be accepted. We do believe we have created

such. There is not a single universal way of going about language interpretation.

Were there such a way, translators of technical words would never differ in their

translations from one language into another, if having the same document, plus the

same language pair, to deal with. Were there such an universal approach as well,

documents would always use the same lingo (most objective scope of language,

intended to be written in top objective lingo), but that is always false, the number of

universal glossaries, or dictionaries, available being totally irrelevant for the actual

conclusion (false).

f) Page 324(18=20); l:30: adding, at the end of the acknowledgments section

`Also, not less importantly, actually even more relevantly, the author would like to

thank Dr Carnielly, from Unicamp, for his advice on what journal would be the most

adequate one for the article'.

3. WHAT WAS STATED IN LOGICAL/PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS ON

OUR PREVIOUS PAPER:

We have actually written:

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A) Logic does apply to the reduced scope of human

actions where the Sorites problem lies.

We have also stated that

B) What looks like an implication might as well not be

one!

More clearly, what looks like a mathematical implication is not one of that sort ( Note

12 ).

It is interesting to understand that people usually like one discipline from school

better than the other or are limited to a single profession. We don't. We were lucky

enough to love Language, Mathematics, Philosophy, Logic, with the same passion as

we love Arts in general, or people. This way, we get to understand things in full, as

the greatest modern thinkers state: holistic education, integration of

disciplines, multi-valued degrees - why graduating only in Mathematics, if one

can do one more, two more, three more, four more majors??? Make people know

more, and understand totally different ways of viewing the World, and they are going

to bring us break-through in every area… Make people limited to a single area, and

they are going to create problems, publish, but the problems were never really

problems to start with (well-posedness theory never applied, the problem was not a

scientific problem ever, or could be)…However, they are going to remain unsolved for

millennia...how many useless thinkers do we want? As simple as it may seem,

words in English bear far more meanings than the words in Mathematics

(and that is the difference between Language which is not philosophical,

Philosophy of Language, which is part of Logic, and Computer Language),

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derived from Logic, Russell and Frege. Implication in English might not be as simple

as an `If ...then'. But it is true that an `If...then', in Mathematics, are definitely the

ones stated by Russell and Frege, and totally well translated into symbols that are,

at the end of the day, for the happiness and pleasure of computer scientists,

machine-friendly! This is basically, if you can tell, the same reasoning used to go

from human logic to machine logic. Can go one way but not backwards. Basically, the

word `then' might bear other meanings, and the specific meaning in use might not

be translated, with 100% accuracy, into the machine-friendly-entry, logical

implication.

When someone states `then', they usually mean many more things, called

enthymemes, usually omitted from the Discourse-Language, once they assume

the receptor takes them for granted as well. Machines, however, are as dumb

as one can tell, and will always take it literally, with the only set of translations

allowed by the person who actually fed them. If they are going to do so, you'd better

feed them accurately and, sometimes - most of the time - you are not going to be

able to feed human sentences precisely into a machine because they involve

emotions, hidden sentences/propositions, etc. Each English word actually

corresponds to a set of possible meanings, and whoever works with translations

knows that sometimes it is impossible to find the right meaning in any dictionary,

and we have to make it up, by using many more words, to produce an almost

equivalence in the so-called target-language, that is, we are actually trying to state

that the translation of human reasoning into the language discourse works similar to

the translation from one language into another (easy to understand, cultural

differences represent communication patterns and that has to do with usual thinking

of a population), just worse (far much worse). As a practical example, consider the

word `COMER' in Portuguese. If it were ever machine-friendly, it would give us

15
a precise meaning as soon as we hit enter in our computers, or dictionaries. What

happens, however, is that literal translation, according to usual dictionaries,

leads us to `EAT'. A sentence such as`EU A COMI' goes like `I ATE HER'.

Cannibalism!! Brazilians are cannibals... (Apparently, this could be the same

mistaken conclusion going on with enlarging the scope of the enthymemes

in the Sorites): Obviously acceptable logical conclusions (inferences,

implications). However, if language were ever as objective as machines, or

Logic, all the time, only, is when Brazilians would be taken as cannibals, and that

inference would be accurate as to logical deduction from given premises. This is a

horrible mistake, and might lead people to never visit Brazil fearing being eaten

(especially if they have not heard of Brazil before and might believe films a lot...). It

happens that the most accurate translation of `EU A COMI' is `I had a one-off sex

with her', most of the time, in most contexts it appears. What is the problem here?

The problem is the allowance, or God's gift to Human Language: the chance of

extrapolating in human discourse. Notice that, even in this suggested translation, we

are careful enough to remind the reader that it is actually possible, as well, that

there is cannibalism in Brazil somehow, such as the recent news on a guy who

actually `ate another'. This way, without knowing all details involved, a problem

cannot ever be well stated regarding human observation/feelings/situations, in its

purely human scope, unless plenty of words are used, and that is why philosophical

papers tend to be so boring: it is all about making what is said totally and uniquely

understood by every audience.

How many words are necessary to express a single idea? You tell us!!! For us, this

solution was so clear-cut that we just stated two sentences at the beginning and

thought we were over with it. But the problem, as someone already stated is

obviously `the others'...Anyway, `EU A COMI' is just three words formed by one very

16
standardly known entry from the dictionary (COMI), which contains no double

meaning (not in the dictionary, or not yet, also nice to remember that it does get

updated, but always later than what was created in speech), and two other ones,

with a single meaning, but both being attached either to the speaker or to the object

being referred to ( EU A ), the first entry having being expanded by speakers of the

Country to mean far much more (also interesting to notice that this unusual

application of the word is not natural, it does demand work over the basic levels of

Bloom’s taxonomy, it is something a machine would only be able to do by mistake).

Basically, were we to consider logical entries, `Eu' could easily be part of the

mathematical logic and be machine-friendly nowadays (because it may also change

with time) but `A' and `COMI' could never, ever, be expressed in an unique way

because they will always depend on what comes next or before in the text, that is,

we are in the same situation we were before with the name of God and the color red

(please refer to [1] and our other preprints at www.geocities.com/mrpprofessional

for this matter). Ramy (UQ, 2000) actually points out that problem very well, we just

do not hold a reference for his present work yet. We speak about things the words

refer to. Basically, the obvious conclusion is that, so far, only the words which have a

single meaning in every language dictionary, considering all languages in the World,

could possibly be used for Mathematics/Logic (in the computer sense). Easy to see

that adjectives (soritical expressions), or nouns, which have functional value as

adjectives, or may have (heaps/non-heaps), have no way of being included in the

same case as `Eu'. They hold not only several words in the dictionary to explain their

meaning in every possible language, but they also hold more than one application

(Red zone, Red car, Heaps of money, Heap of grass, worked heaps).

Notice then here, once more, the ability to create new applications for an old word

that society has got, and the absence of precision in a single word, as to fully

17
address, or point, with no confusion, to a single object. Therefore, there are at least

two moves which make it impossible for a human being to be equated to a machine,

remembering it is always the same problem, being able to program the machine so

that labels, or signs, refer uniquely to what is intended: one is that of the person

creating the word originally, a person who, like me (in what regards the solution to

the Sorites), has everything uniquely pointed out in their minds. They call it W, and it

is something nobody has noticed before, in any possible sense. It all works if the

universe is formed by that sole person, once they do all to the top understanding

they have of their own systems (and remember that if Mathematics is one of the

smallest scopes of human life, and, in it, incompleteness is verified, it is obviously

impossible to fully describe human systems). So, it is not that it is perfectly, and

uniquely, singled out by the person, it is just that the own person is unable to cope

with all their own information when seeing that particular problem: it is only

outside of the system, that one may evaluate it. Once the person communicates

(hell is the others), there is the observer, outsider, of their systems. By the time that

happens, not only there is more than one set of systems involved, but there is the

`external eye’ over the own person. It is obviously the case that only a second party

would ever be able to describe the systems of someone, if ever possible, but then

they would not be able to describe their own systems with perfection. Taking into

consideration that the first person fails in judging their own systems, considering

that they were able to judge someone else’s with perfection, would lead us to think

that a couple of people could describe their systems in full. But then, we are tired of

knowing that if we add a single other person, they will find mistakes, or missing

elements, so that it never stops, and there is no human being (another justification

for the need of the existence of God) who would be able to have their systems fully

described by any amount of others, unless they are faulty human beings (retards,

etc), if ever possible in that case as well.

18
The whole point of this paragraph is then stating that we have named `implication’

(here, in this paper) what would be a mathematical, or logical (machine-friendly),

`object’.

However, if we prove that the Sorites language never contained such a thing, we will

also have proven that it cannot, ever, be perfectly addressed inside of logical systems

(which include mathematical systems). That will then mean that there could never be

any confusion between the language of the Sorites and Mathematics or logical

systems.

We have also stated:

C) The beauty of the Sorites lies in paying forced

attention to, via a shocking example, the fact that

there are actually at least three different human

categories to be dealt with/possibly translated into

logical (in the sense of reasoning, of any possible

origin which is included in Philosophy, that is,

reasoning with clear foundation, which might, or not,

be passive of translation into purely logical systems,

or computer-friendly lingo) systems involved in any

sort of combination encompassing human

discourse/writing, human thinking/elaboration, and

19
mathematical lingo or trials of expressing that in

mathematical lingo.

On the top of the previous assertion, we also state that

D) Human thinking/elaboration is never fully logical

(in the computers sense)

or, otherwise, computers and humans would be pretty much the same. We do not

need to go practical to prove that, but there is a practical `proof' ( Note 10 ): Turing

contest ( mentioned in [2]). Coming into scientific terms, however, the proof is

quite evident and trivial. See:

D1) Only a reduced scope of human interactions/speech may be

translated into logical lingo, even exclusively philosophical (not

computational);

D2) Only a reduced scope, again, of the philosophical lingo may be

translated into computers lingo;

D3) Only a reduced scope of the computers lingo involves

Mathematics, which is the Classical Logic one;

D4) By a simple set of inclusions, which can never be contained or equal

to, only strictly contained, we easily see that it is simply impossible to

state that human expressions would ever be fully mathematical;

D5) For the Sorites to be totally mathematical, all its writing, and solution,

20
should belong to the most reduced scope of Classical Logic. However, it is

easy to see it has to involve human reasoning, above the three first

levels in Bloom's taxonomy, so that it cannot ever be fully contained in the

Classical Logic set (it is also true that human reasoning matches its language,

and there is no chance more complicated levels of human assessment, for

instance involving senses, pure reasoning, abstraction, would ever be passive

of description via same symbolic logic used for lowest levels, with perfection,

and because perfection is the aim of Science, there is no point in even

thinking of doing that. If reduction is proven to be inadequate, it should

simply be forgotten forever, otherwise there is no progress). This is actually

the so-pointed-out problem of higher-order vagueness. Higher-order

vagueness, that they refer to, is simply our large scope of observation,

sentiment, feeling, perception, etc, involved in the judgment of the speech

function Fx(A,O), as to it being equal to 0 (false), or 1 (true), that is, as to it

determining an inclusion of the object of sight `O’ in the class of the attribute

`A’, or not. This is simply stating that the `solution’ to the problem lies in the

complementary set of what progresses from D1 to D2 in the above inclusions.

Notice that mathematical reasoning is in those levels of Bloom’s Taxonomy,

but the solution to the problem in Mathematics will always lie in the Classical

Logic scope. However, the mathematical problem is also there, in its

formulation, with no enthymemes or hidden things. Rather the opposite, well-

posedness theory for Mathematics demands absolutely any literate reader to

be able to identify all premises involved and a clear question, as well as type

of answer demanded. Notice that the same applies to computer friendly

problems: both the problem and its solution will always belong to the reduced

world of the computers in full, otherwise made impossible to be dealt with by

the computer. Minimum requisite then is writing the Sorites problem in full

21
 inside of the world one wishes it to be addressed. If one tries to reduce it to

smallest set of discourse, Classical Logic, and that is not possible, that can

only mean the problem does not belong to Classical Logic; it is simply not

boxed there. Therefore, we go one step larger. When going for the computer

logic, if, once more, we prove the language demanded for the description of

the problem is not entirely contained in the computer world, then it does not

belong there and, therefore, cannot be solved there either, no matter what.

No confusion must be made between levels of sets, once the largest will

always encompass the expressions of the smallest (just to reassure the

reader on the answer being yes or no not posing a problem for the

subtraction of the problem from the Classical Logic set).

So far, we believe to have proved, with clear evidence, that the Sorites paradox

cannot be totally formulated, well posed, or solved, in the scope of the

Classical Logic, which is the only one affected, or touched, by Mathematics.

Therefore, the problem cannot be addressed, either, inside of Mathematics,

ever. Mathematics lingo, or Classical Logic lingo, are simply wrongly applied, if ever

applied to the statement, or solution, of the problem. With this, we now need to

prove that the problem belongs, or can only belong, to the complementary set of all

possible logical sets, of logical accounts, that scape purely human reasoning, only

well addressed by Pure Philosophy of Language, if totally contained in Philosophy,

that is, it is all reasoning with clear foundation, but not machine-friendly. This

obviously has to do with the theory of well-posedeness problems, besides being

blatantly obvious. Nobody can teach a subject and give students a problem that

cannot be fully addressed inside of their subject, or by one of its pre-requisites, that

is, the problem is not well-made unless it is all described in terms of the subject area

it belongs to. On the other hand, the problem cannot, ever, be well-addressed,

22
unless it speaks the same language in which it was proposed: Basic principles.

To resume, the `if…then’ used in the problem posed as Sorites must not be

mathematical, or logical. The reason is because it is involving senses (human senses)

and judgment of highly personal order (what cannot, ever, happen in Science per

se).

Were it ever encompassing things which do point to single objects (a number on the

board is called `five’, but one first draws the number to then state `five’: if ever

starting from the statement, `five’ –per se, there is no way the mathematician could

deal with that. It is always necessary to single out the object first for a

mathematician, or logician, to be able to develop their reasoning), any

mathematician, or logician, no matter of what sort, would be a qualified candidate to

solve the problem well. Because once the problem is written in their terms, and only

once so is done, they are top qualified to address it. If such task is proven

impossible, they must be forgotten with their theories.

Interesting enough, infinity does the trick only at boundaries which are of, at most,

irrational order. However, one never knows, precisely, what the irrational is, unless it

is repetitive in what comes after the decimal point. Otherwise, it is chaotic, or

imprecise, with the mathematician fully aware it is something they can only deal up

to an order of mistake, or precision, that is, they actually are not dealing with the

whole entity, they are dealing with the part they are able to limit by force, only.

And that regards numbers, figures, which are very solid entities, with totally precise

definition in the dictionary. So, to start with, there is no doubt about the

mathematical concept, the definition. Therefore, these are all sorts of objects a pure

mathematician can deal with (the own concept does not bear confusion, is not

23
passive of updating, in its initial definition).

This certainly excludes all elements from the Sorites, once colors cannot be made

unique by simply drawing. Basically, any drawing may lead different mathematicians

to see different things and, therefore, due to the uniformity principle of the language

of Science, it cannot belong to Mathematics. Mathematical symbols do not demand

judgment: they are absolute in their interpretation. And this is the only reason why

Mathematics is the only possible universal language: once the symbols are learned,

since they all hold unique application, or definition scope, nobody will ever be

mistaken when seeing them. However, nobody can teach all color nuances, for

instance, in a repetitive manner, like Mathematics, without forcing others to their

own point of view, which is certainly going to conflict with the point of view of

someone else in another classroom, even neighbor to theirs. For that reason, colors,

per se, do not belong to Science. Therefore, their ontology cannot be spoken about

in the scope of Science. Mathematicians do solve problems involving the word `color’

sometimes. But what matters is the `name’ only, not the nuance. If a single word is

out, as said before, it cannot belong to Science at all.

Question then comes: where does it belong to?

Obviously, the adjectives, in general, belong to human discourse and human mind,

only. With this, they may be object of logical reasoning, but cannot, ever, be the end

of the problem (to tell what red is for everyone in the World, for instance). What may

belong to Science is a decision theory, at most, once that is purely technical. That is

just trivial. Decision theory could belong to Computer Science, of course. And that

we shall discuss below.

Computer Science works with logical systems. The main characteristic of any system

24
is the predictability of the response. If a response cannot be predicted, there is no

possible logical system which can deal with it.

Another point to be observed regarding Computer Science is that it is a mistaken

label for what is not, by any means, a Science. Computer Science is simply a tool, a

tool for any scientist. Basically, what computers can do, at most, is reproducing the

reasoning of the programmer. It is even possible to create a machine who has

autonomy, but that autonomy is always going to be bounded by the own logical

system of the programmer, and it will suffice someone else, who has got an action

which is not in the system of the programmer, to make the computer crash, or be

unable to respond. It is also possible to prepare a computer to perform a single, or

even a number of, action(s), at a time, given response to unexpected action is

demanded. However, that set of possible actions must also be programmed, so that

it is all boxed in the own logic allowed by the system of the programmer. Basically,

Computer Science is not a Science at all, it is a tool to translate someone’s mind, and

never in full, once the own mind of a person cannot be fully known by the own

person or even by someone else.

This way, whatever may be written in a computer system, may always be written in

language first, that is, without any symbols which are not usually contained in a

lexicon.

Therefore, it could never make sense to think of the logical system first, or of its

symbols. What must be thought first is the description of that system in the

language.

With this, it is possible that something lies outside of Mathematics and inside of

Computer logical systems, but such can only be proven if the expression of the

25
reasoning demanded lies entirely in the logical systems world, what means

prediction, and generalization of some sort.

It is obviously impossible that a problem like the Sorites would fit in a computer

logical system entirely, once the question can always contain one more element

(between any two real numbers there is always another one, well pointed out by

Fuzzy Logic: between any two members of the soritical sequence, there is always

another one, which could easily be inserted). The response to it (judgment) could

only be contained in it after a decision theory is applied, once it demands translation

from the mental/oral human processes into Classical Logic.

However, the problem which remains is obvious: precisely the translation between

mind/expression of it and Classical Logic, so that all we need is creating that

interface between humans and machines (how to interpret, or receive, the language

statement from the listener).

Any decision theory could belong to the scope of computer systems. But such can

only occur if that decision theory is well generalized. However, with the Sorites, any

generalization leads to the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness, as pointed out

by almost everyone in the literature. This is to clear prove it is impossible to

generalize, in terms of inputs from the listeners. Such is obvious, because you can

have a normal person, a group of people, even, who sees something and always says

the same, let’s say: `yes’ or `no’.

However, all of a sudden, there is a non-officially classified schizoid, or retard, for

instance, in the audience. They then have absolutely unpredictable oral behavior.

Once the problem is about what is orally expressed, and they may easily simply

destroy the computer, utter something like `uh’, and leave, for instance, there is no

26
way their particular answer could be accounted for in all its possibilities.

It is clearly the case that human speech/reaction escapes, by large, any chance of a

computer system containing them in full.

If it is such, it is certainly the case that it will all get truncated at D1, as named

above.

Therefore, the problem can only lie on the purest language scope, without any Logic

to it.

This is the same scope linguists work with: the chaos of human expression.

And they are the only people who worry about settling definitions that were,

otherwise, impossible to be common to everyone in the World.

Basically, every linguist deals with the problem of forcing a match between human

expression and human understanding, that is, of making communication possible and

decisions possible, in a formal way, when there is generalized chaos.

From another point of view, the ontology singled out by the Sorites is of human

nature because it gets extended to the human being questioned (their eyes, their

ears, etc) and, therefore, way out of what a mathematician (purely, if that was ever

possible), or a logician, could cope with (just like the description of one’s own

systems). That is basically stating that if something cannot be fully reduced (or

locked in) to the language of those supposed to deal with it, those supposed to deal

with it are not qualified candidates (or their theories, no matter how innovative).

One could then come up with intervals and the human apparent ability to deal with

any of its members (intervals of numbers). However, one must remember that the

27
nature of the ontology predicate involved is never questioned, that is fully

understood by mathematicians and logicians, the figures. What is questioned is the

excess of them, so that a human being is not able to cope with all of them, pointing

at them individually, at the same time (remember that if no human being is able to

deal with that, and yet it exists and it is an object of reference, no computer would

be able to do it either, no matter which computer: a human being will program it. By

the time the human being is able to program a computer to do such, the human

being has imagined, in their own heads, how a machine system would be able to do

it, what means that at least human reasoning is able to deal with it). However, one

must remember that suffices choosing a stopping point and one is back to the same

situation as the one with interval boundaries, with no confusion. The nature of the

objects under observation in between (quantity) is the same as the boundaries.

However, the `red’, in the middle of a soritical sequence, is not of the same nature of

that at the end. For Mathematics or logical systems to be used, it is necessary that

generalization takes place, what includes same ontological nature (only numbers, for

instance). However, with the Sorites, both object ontology and predicate are

involved, it is what could easily be seen as a `complex entity’. It is, indeed, possible

to program a computer to deal with a number of them, but, as said before, once a

new one may be generated, at any time, by simply intercalating two members with

the average of brightness of the color, for instance, the computer cannot, ever, deal

with that. Once more, those programming the eyes of a computer hold limitations in

their own sight (as well as imagination)…

Remember then the piece of wood which is not measured by a rule with perfection,

with a human being being unable to tell whether the piece is precisely at 0.9 or 0.99

of the ruler. This is a case in which only engineers could solve the problem, so that

things work for a house, for instance, but it obviously escapes the scope of

28
Mathematics and the problem cannot, ever, be addressed by a mathematician. It is

addressed by a more human sort of `Science’ (once more, it is not a Science, once in

Science things will never fail, it is all totally logically boxed), in which mistakes are

allowed (several buildings fell over people soon after finished, for instance. There is

always risk, indeterminacy, vagueness of results as to them being precise or not, and

that happens with any sort of situation which escapes human abilities).

E) Machines are not able to decide on their own and

never will be.

Why? Because it is always necessary to have a human being programming it

first, even if this machine is supposed to program others, so that the initial

machine will always be built from what makes logical sense for the person

building it. Nobody would be able to include all their judgements inside of a

machine’s head because they do not even know those judgements until there is an

actual real-life situation. Due to abstraction, easy to see that new problems can

always be built by joining two other ones – any couple of them - so that there is an

infinite number of variations in problems-posedness and there is no way any human

being would ever be able to predict every single one of them before they occur in

real life. What we have stated before is obviously not totally convincing, we have to

add that there is not a moment in history in which a new problem was not raised, so

that we now hold a complete proof of what we stated. A very commonly used

sentence is: I have never seen that before/that astonishes me. Why? Unexpected.

World problems, actual problems. With this, one easily understands that

judgement/analysis is always out of the machine scope, in its totality.

29
Here, we prove that a human being must always be more than a machine if

this human being is a normal, healthy, human being, so that there is more

to human reasoning than Computer `Science’. Therefore, it is an absolute truth

that one can write about a Pure Philosophy of Language, without any

Computer/mathematical logic involved.

F) The Sorites is precisely on that level, the one above

machine and mathematical logic (not reasoning, but

expression of reasoning), in what regards the

observer who is always judging and making decisions.

Well, if a single part of the problem cannot be

perfectly translated into the lingo of Mathematics,

then it simply cannot have its solution entirely inside

of it, so that there is really no point in insisting that

the Sorites was ever a classical problem. It might hold

a reduced part of it - the final decision, at most – in

the classical (or passive of expression via such) logic,

once all human reasoning is demanded to decide

between No and Yes, classical options. It is then

obvious that:

All we need is an adequate interface of translation

30
between human reasoning/judgement and the final

resolution, in terms of a response to the query of the

presenter of the Sorites, if we ever want to solve the

problem the way the presenter demands.

Here, some difficulty in written expression is raised: there is the brains, which works

always in the full scope of Bloom’s taxonomy, and there is the written expression,

which may, or not, lie in what we are calling `logic’1, that is, the written

expression, or symbolic expression - which is standard, pre-defined, and

classified under some specific name we make use of.

F1) We would now need to prove that the demands of the expression of the solution

to the Sorites cannot possibly lie in any other logical scope that is not purely

philosophical, inside of the Philosophy of Language, with a hint of decision theory,

that is, there is Logic to it, but there is also a `forceful’ external element, lying

outside of the logical scope, to make it all fit there. It is not, however, an element

which creates higher order vagueness, simply because everyone in the World seems

to be happy enough with the way lexicons are built, since they appeared. To take this

last, very costy, step, we need to further remind the reader that judgement is

required, demanded, and this judgement may only be obtained via personal

interaction, individual interaction, depending only on human’s senses. This

way, every possible answer is correct, once it all depends on the judgement of

the person who is watching and nobody is able to convince a normal person that

what they see is `red’ if they claim it to be, for instance, `rouge’. One easily sees

that, with the Sorites, the presenter demands and expects an expression of an area
1
Notice we are always trying to use `logic’ to point to logical systems and `Logic’ to point to Philosophy in
its purest scope, that of the logical reasoning, which may, or may not, be passive of description by symbols.

31
of a human body that scapes any sort of `unique’ correct decision about it. It is easy

to see that, with the so few restrictions made on the observers (in the case of color,

for instance, that they are not blind), anyone may answer whatever they think to be

correct - or more accurate. Oh, well, it is obvious then that unless we had a theory

about how eyes and jugement would relate to each other, along with other factors,

and it is also obvious that such a theory is impossible to be attained in the next

thousand years, the problem demands expression of what cannot be of any other

nature that is not pure Philosophy of Language, that is, most accurate expression of

what is purely human - classified as ilogical by some - but still possible to be

expressed via Language: Language in its piece which is fully non-reduceable to

logical systems.

We have then proved that the Sorites belongs exclusively to the Philosophy

of Language, in its complementary set in relation to every possible logic contained

in it, if belonging to Logic at all, that is, the Sorites can only be written and

solved inside of the purest Philosophy of Language, at most - no other logical

system, contained in it, can do. With this, we have actually proved that it is not of

the well-posedness theory, for Philosophy problems, that the Sorites

problem is presented via any other symbols rather than the ones adopted in

the dictionaries, at most. On the other hand, its solution demands observation

and judgement, both belonging to the purely human scope of occurences in this

World, what makes its solution also not possible to be well described in terms

of any other symbols that are not those, at most, inherited from the

dictionary. This is a fundamental stone for any reader to accept that

G) The Sorites cannot, ever, be addressed with any

logical system that makes use of symbols that are not

32
present in the lexicon of the specific Language in

which it was proposed/is intended to be solved.

G1) The solution to the Sorites is located in the area that belongs exclusively to the

Philosophy of Language, at most, but not to any computer-friendly system of logic.

The answer demanded by the person proposing the problem, however, is one of the

sort `yes’ or `no’, which are answers from the Classical Logic system. Therefore,

there must be a `forced’ situation of translation of one system, which is purely

human, into another, which is purely mechanized – all very simple and well

determined, once it is actually true that communication ends up happening between

people and the intended message is eventually passed from one person to the other

(this is another fundamental point: the decision always occurs, once there is always

communication and understanding by both parties).

G2) The problem seen in the Sorites is actually the same problem faced by every

lexicon expert: the trial of making speech and thought something with a common,

generically accepted, symbolic expression of generalized use (lexicon symbols).

G3) Therefore, one must proceed like the linguist, and simply apply their techniques

to solve the Soritical problem. The same way the dictionary-writers do, we should

do, in order to make something very large, different for each person, converge to

something everyone will accept as true. Notice, as well, that the factors involved in

the Sorites, or entities, are precisely the same ones involved in lexicon creation

(human beings expression, human beings mental reference, forced judgment,

imposed by linguist, over the symbolic pieces of the language).

G4) The issues raised by the Sorites presenter are actually about the own definition

of the predicates involved (where they start/where they end, `bounds of the

33
definitions’, or `scope of the definitions’, or even limits of the `object (Russel)'). As

the linguist chooses, we shall choose: if there is any chance the classification, or

word, does not fit description X, it will simply not fit until everyone changes their

point of view and it is universally accepted as fitting. Easy to infer, whatever

generates doubts gets a `it does not apply’ answer, a `No’. Doubts are assertion of

`Yes’ and `No’ at the same time, or anything, of any sort, which is different from

either `Yes’ or `No’, exclusively.

4. What a solution to a philosophical problem actually is

One could easily think that there is no need to even think of what a solution is for a

philosophical problem. However, we could not find any clear-cut, step-by-step

recipe, on how to check on whether a specific solution proposal to a philosophical

problem is, in fact, an actual solution. With this, we have decided to actually write it

ourselves.

Basically, before departing to facing solutions, one must make sure the own

proposed problem is clear enough as it is necessary for it to be well addressed:

4A) before checking on whether a proposed solution is a solution for a particular

philosophical problem, one must check on whether the proposed problem is

written in an acceptable manner; that is, agreeing with the well-posedness

theory for philosophical problems, which we believe to already have addressed in

this very piece of work, somehow.

Specifically related to the Sorites problem, for it to be considered as well posed, it

should present, in a very clear way, all possible enthymemes contained in it.

Therefore, in a well-posed philosophical problem (or of any other scientific nature),

34
no enthymemes should ever exist, unless they are clearly irrelevant for the

understanding of the problem or the needed addressing of it.

4B) the language-terms used to describe the problem should be as objective

as they can be. Any extra non-objective complication is going to easily exclude free

thinkers to address the problem well. The intention of Science cannot, ever, be

preventing any possible public from proposing a solution. It is actually true that

people who are brand-new to a field tend to present far many more innovative

solutions than the others. This proves that a new point of view, without paradigms,

always helps the solution to come quicker. Therefore, the language in which the

problem is described should be as objective as it can, as simple as it can be. Several

thinkers studied clarity in language; Russel and Frege are just a few of those. They

can certainly be read to make sure a very long standing problem is well-posed before

giving it international status.

4C) The area of knowledge where the problem is located should also be

explicitly mentioned in the problem proposal, so that people know what to

study before trying to address it. That saves time both of those addressing the

problem and of those proposing it or checking its proposed solutions, what is,

obviously, an intentional quality in Science: saving time, optimization in every

possible way.

On having the issue of the well-posedness problem solved, one may then check the

possible solution for it.

On the Sorites and well-posedness:

It is very clear to us that the Sorites problem is generally presented in a very

35
poor manner in terms of scientific standing. Several improvements are

necessary to make the problem both understandable and easily addressable by a

broad audience, or by the broadest audience as possible, which should always be the

aim of Science: make it simpler, if it can ever be.

In the Sorites problem, it is clear that there are several enthymemes that should be

clearly stated so that the possible problem solvers save their time. All the presenter

should ever intend, if ever scientific, is being fully understood in terms of what the

problem itself actually is. Nobody is able to address a problem that is not well

understood. Yet, many will try and will go wrong, as it happened with the Sorites.

Seen from the most basic and objective point of view, the Sorites problem is not

even a paradox, or ever was. Therefore, to start cleaning it or making it scientific,

the word paradox should never be contained in its description. Why?

Basically, if the premise `adding one grain of sand does not make any difference' can

only be generalized for very small pieces of the soritical sequence, what is blatantly

obvious, only where there are absolutely no shocking sights (something like a clear

non-heap and a clear heap at the other end would be a shocking sight), we are left

with two objects contained in the same scope of definition (either a clear `heap’, or a

clear `non-heap’, or a clear `confusion area’). If the small sequence of objects that

vary by one grain, and are indiscernible for the eyes, is entirely contained in a

specific definition scope of some standard dictionary word (heap, for instance), it is

true that there is no contradiction between the starting and the final object.

Therefore, it could not ever be said to be a paradox of sight. But that is how it

is currently presented!

36
The reason why the Sorites problem has been presented wrongly, so many times, is

because it was intended for general entertainment, not for Science, but scientists of

Language, or Philosophy, never bothered fixing its presentation to the standards

demanded by Science to accept it as a scientific problem.

A paradox in communication would demand that one starts with one piece of

information but the audience understands it precisely the opposite as to what was

originally intended by the presenter. It cannot be a paradox in communication either

then, because one may assume that the audience always understands the problem

the way it is posed, not the opposite.

It could be a `logical’ system paradox of the sort `false’ and `true’, for instance,

such as the liar paradox (If I told you I always lie, would you believe me?), but there

is no truth values involved. Even to make the presentation of the Sorites problem be

scientific, there is no need to assign any truth values to each one of its parts; it is all

about language in its purest human part!

It cannot be a paradox in language either because it is precisely the same as asking

the audience how linguists work, in terms of deciding on a certain scope of definition

for a word, that is, the actual question contained in the Sorites, or its scientific

question (the simplest way to propose the problem, already explained why this would

be the scientific way) is: what is the most precise definition for the word X – does it

apply to this object, Y, as well as that object, Z?

The linguists, therefore, are the only people who would really be entitled to address

this question, or judge its addressing, in the best scientific way, once that is what

they live for.

37
But if that is what they usually do, how can that possibly be a paradox? Do they

really find it hard to decide about it, or a new dictionary comes up updated every

year, with not a single issue directed to the general public about how `in doubt’ or

`confused’ they were when deciding on the word `X’’s scope?

Basically, it is widely known that if there is any doubt to whether a predicate

(which is also a lexicon word) applies or not to a situation, then it does not!

Conclusion that is obvious is that if there are any doubts as to the application of the

word `heap’ to a certain amount of sand, in any possible way (confused speech in

any possible way that is not `yes’ or `no’, exclusively), then it does not apply to that

object ever, until there is no confusion anymore for everyone involved. Therefore,

`heap’ means all situations in which everyone in the audience said only `Yes, it is a

heap’; `Non-heap’ then means everything else, until the linguists accept another

word called `non-heap’ in the dictionary, which they have not done so far. What gets

defined is what a `heap’ is, the words `non-heap’ not appearing in the dictionary at

all. Therefore, if `non-heap’ gets to be the opposition to `heap’, `non-heap’ is

everything that could be a heap but is not, even a shirt… Basically, if tomorrow the

whole World or the majority of it wishes to say that a `heap’ is not a bunch of

something anymore, and it is, instead, the absence of anything, that is what the

linguists will take it to be, so that references are not immutable, or even the

referents, and one may easily find several theories on that (Frege, Russel,

Wittgenstein, etc.).

It is then not a paradox in language, not a paradox in sight, not a paradox in

communication, or of any other sort: absolutely not a paradox!

38
It is more an allurement, to prove how interesting the work of the linguist actually is.

Because Science is not there to `trick' people, as a commoner would be doing when

presenting something in a very similar situation to a `busker', in Australia, to attract

attention, the problem must be well-posed. One may easily notice that just by

clearing it from any possible distraction that is not scientific, it gets as simple as to

coincide with a very well-known and old professional area: Linguistics.

In this case, unfortunately, there was never a `new’ striking problem, just an

unskilled writing, of a `busker’s' presentation, of something that could not ever be

seen as scientific, or skilled.

This way, one could be stating that `adding one grain of sand to the previous

amount of sand does not make a difference', but one would also have to state that

`adding this x amounts of grains of sand to the first bunch of sand does make a

difference' (when the area of no clear distinction – named as blurred – is over, one

may pick the next element already, to compare with the first one, or any of the

others in the blurred area, where it all seems to fit in the same scope of language

wording/eye sight) at some stage, because we see clearly a `heap’ and a `non-heap’

there, in those two randomly chosen elements. The two previously mentioned

premises are our enthymemes that should be clearly stated in the problem

description so that nobody will ever get confused. It is not a novelty we mention

them, other people have done such. However, we actually made it clear that the

solution can only be (and proved it) in the scope of the purest Philosophy of

Language, if in anywhere logical, that there is, in terms of it being totally human,

and can only be addressed by a linguistic point of view (the experts in actually

39
writing dictionaries). The issue on whether the predicate starts here or there is then

addressed with the linguists solution: if there is confusion by any person in the

audience, in terms of uttering `it is’ and `it is not’, or she/he does not know

(considering an audience of suitable people for the predicate under observation, as

mentioned earlier on in this paper), then it does not apply: that is it! This is precisely

how we described our solution in the precursor paper with `Semiotica’. However,

here, we actually exhibit more developed argumentation as to defend its standing as

a full solution, much harder to be objected to, or, hopefully, impossible.

Therefore, the Sorites problem, if ever presented correctly, is neither a new problem,

nor a paradox (Note 11): only the same problem faced by centuries now, that the

linguists writing our lexicons face everyday at work, with very solid theories about its

solution.

If any problem might emerge there, it is the same problem the linguists would be

studying right now in their theories, which will not relate to computers logic or

Mathematics, and the question is a much more generic one: how can we define a

word, with precision, in a dictionary, so that everyone accepts it as such?

With this, the problem created or raised, if any, because it would be no novelty as

well, would be a standard problem, related to a very specific and old profession, so

that the Sorites could never be seen as a scientific problem at all, in an isolated

manner: at most an example, an allurement, as we have already stated. Or, if the

linguists wish, a very nice name for what they must do in their work when writing

lexicons each and everyday.

Proposed step-by-step guide to judging a possible solution to a

40
philosophical problem:

1) Is the problem well posed in the rigors of Science?

If the answer is yes, go to number 2. If the answer is No, re-write it first, following

our previously proposed guidelines for scientific problems, to then analyse its

possible solution in terms of 2.

2) What scope does the problem belong to?

2.1) if it does not belong to Philosophy, forget it! If it is inside of Philosophy, it should

bear some rational grounds in all its description/sequence of steps.

2.2) if the scope is, indeed, Philosophy, and the problem was not dropped at number

2, what part of Philosophy should it belong to?

First of all, one tries the top possible reduction, the most objective way of describing

it, once that should be the objective of Science. In the case of Philosophy, the top

possible reduction would be into Classical Logic terms.

Next step is checking on the possibility that another logical system, more complex -

a Non-Classical Logic system - is able to describe the whole problem in scientific

terms. Still Computer `Science’. Why? Because any logic has got a system of

reasoning assigned to it, and any system of reasoning, fully described in natural

language, in precise rules of inference, may be inserted in a machine.

41
If ever decided that the problem cannot, ever, be totally reduced to the Computer

`Science’ level, then it might belong to some specific area of Philosophy: Language,

Science, etc…, which one?

3) If it belongs to Philosophy of Language, for instance, and it cannot be

reduced to the most objective lingo of language, to any computer-friendly

logical systems, then it must be in the purest scope of Philosophy of

Language, the Philosophy properly stated as such, purest: totally human.

In this case, the problem can only be well-addressed if referring purely to theories in

that particular area, so that a solution must be, first of all, checked against this

criterion: is the solution using tools inside of the most reduced area to which the

problem belongs in Philosophy?

If it is not, the solution is discarded immediately; if it is, number 5 applies.

4) Now, in being inside of the right area, is the solution something based on

really accepted theories, or the theories used have suffered many objections

in their trials of general acceptance by the public involved?

If there were many objections to any of the theories involved, the same objections

are going to be objections to the proposed solution. The solver must have then

explicitly addressed those for his/her solution to be ever refereed.

If there was never any strong objection to the theories of the solution, or the

theories have been popularly applied for many years in practice (for instance, lexicon

theories), then it is a definite solution if it addresses the issues of the problem with

42
perfection.

5. Further considerations and re-inforcements of what was

stated before:

Apparently, the presenter of a Sorites problem has never deserved to be

listened to by a scientifically educated audience at all. Blame those who did not

identify a confused speaker and did accept the Sorites as a paradox, creating

problems for us to think of!!!!

If one takes it to be a paradox for the eyes, it is not suitable, once Parallax ( Note 12 )

is a paradox for the eyes but we can actually prove it is with our own good eyes.

Same will never happen with the Sorites: It is not our observation that is faulty at

all, or our judgement. If one takes it to be a paradox in Language, it is again not

suitable, once, in language, there is no confusion: It is not the case that we then

start doubting the concept of `heap’ and `non-heap’ at all, taking the original

proposal.

What could then be taken into account, in Language, as paradox, in the sense of

implying contradictory conclusions, would be the if..then. We could easily start

doubting the if...then from Mathematics, and challenge the whole World of

Mathematics/Classical Logic that way. But we then understand that the reduced

scope of meaning, attached to the Maths lingo, is not all that if...then may mean in

language by just visiting the simplest dictionary, or book, on writing. Therefore,

where could a paradox in language possibly lie?

Is it actually possible to find a single paradox in language at all? We actually

challenge you to think about this. The so-called liar paradox, for instance, seems to

43
be a logical paradox once more, not a language paradox. It is also the case that, if

re-written properly, it will generate the same sort of reasoning, or very similar one

for its solution. And we, here, even suggest that as possible extension of results.

Basically, there is one possible enthymeme involved in the liar paradox: `but

in this previous assertion, I did not (lie)'. If that is correct, then everything uttered

by that speaker should always be false, apart from the particular time he/she has

uttered that they always lied. Therefore, there is absolutely no problem involved in

believing them at all. The issue about believing, however, is, once more, a personal

issue, and depends on a possibly dettached reasoning from whatever happens in

reality. This way, there is no point in even analyzing that logically, unless we also

know the mental attitude, as for a recipe, for that particular person who is the object

of the speech of the first one. If they also lie when they say they always lie, then

they do say the truth sometimes. In this case, whatever follows is useless for any

logical purposes, or inferences, unless we know all enthymemes involved, and they

may reassure us of when he/she lies, or not. Basically, in dropping the logical use of

the assertion, we are still following the `lexicon reasoning', that of not accepting

whatever is contradictory in the positive way of the definition. Interesting enough,

the lexicon reasoning, as we have decided to name it, seems to be the recipe, or

underlying reasoning, to make every possible paradox solved in Logic, when they do

not belong to the most objective scope of it (logic, Computer `Science’). That is a

hint on what we could possibly be developing in the future.

Well, if the paradox is not in language, is not in our observation, or judgement,

where would it possibly be? Perhaps in the own ontology of the object, or in the

conflict between a premise, which states that adding a single grain does not make

any difference, and the conclusion. All we can say is that the premise does vary, but

there are enthymemes because, by the time of the third step, it is already two

44
grains, and not one anymore, if you regard the first step. Therefore, the premise is

always being rebuilt, in what regards the first step, but remains the same in what

regards the previous one so that there is no paradox at all, just like Physics,

referential. It is all true and fine. If you think it is the ontology that is paradoxical, it

then is missing pointing out which. Is it the ontology of the `heap’, or the `non-

heap’? Do you actually have doubts about those? It actually seems true that nobody

doubts the first and the last step in the Sorites so that nobody, in the whole

Universe, has ever challenged what a `heap’ and a `non-heap’ is, in the most

astonishing conclusion of all: we do have a universal concept of those in an Universe

where even blind people inhabit!!!

Via the simplest observation of human->machine communication differences, we

get to understand what is what. Learning that a computer and a normal human being

cannot, ever, be thought to be the same, or a normal human being be thought as

reduceable to a machine [2, Turing contest], makes us understand why there is

far much more than what is contained in a logical system in the World of

consistent theories, which may be expressed by us somehow. And that extra is

certainly contained in Philosophy, but not in what could possibly be encompassed in

any logical system rules. If mental processes were fully, and accurately, transmitted

to others, that is, Communication/Language could ever be machine-friendly, why

would couples ever divorce? Where there is full understanding and will to be married,

why would people ever fail, once they know precisely what the other wants, or

expects, and how to do it right? We are sorry to think that there are a lot of

superficial thinkers out there doing Philosophy, and publishing, to keep people

occupied with this sort of thing for so many years now. It is certainly true that

Psychiatry and Psychology will explain it all: the need that the whole World gets

presented in the way they can possibly understand it logically. Why? Well...drugs,

45
dettachment from others and reality, shortage of interest in things that are purely

human, too much wrong Army oriented formation (war, strategy, more strategy )...

shortage of being charged on being socially useful...

This way, we have managed to provide people with the desired output: `Yes, it is a

heap/I agree' or `No, it is not a heap/I disagree'. This is the outcome for each

single observer, once if it ever happens that he/she states both or neither, or

something with the same effect as neither, we choose the second option, a `No, it is

not', decision provided by themselves based on the best dictionary writers' decisions,

that is, linguists: people working on the scope of the Philosophy of Language, as we

stated to be a requirement for the actual solution, once we have decided the problem

belongs there.

`One grain of sand does not make any difference' is/is not a fixed premise valid for

all propositions' - we have decided that this is not the case. This sentence can only

be regarded as premise if the other premises involved are neighbor utterances (face

neighborhood as that in Mathematics) by the presenter. Otherwise, we have to re-

build the premise to account for as many intermediary grains as the ones added to

go from the initial premise to the last considered, taking into consideration the

presenter always works with only three basic premises in his/her inferences for the

problem. Easy to see that, this way, there is absolutely no paradox in what regards

the truth-values of two of the premises, once the grain step is always true. It is just

a natural thing to judge and see, not a paradox anymore, that is, presented

correctly, with no enthymemes, it is really not a shock. `I am also confused at the

end of the presentation as much as you, presenter, seems to be/I am not, you are an

idiot'. Sorry to state we have decided to state that the presenter was an actual

idiot, that is, a very - and intolerable - confused speaker.

46
YES, WE DO HOLD A DEFINITE SOLUTION FOR THE SORITES PARADOX. AND

WE ALSO DARE PROVING THAT IT WAS NEVER A PARADOX IN ANY

POSSIBLE SENSE!

We seem to hold an actual solution to the problem in every possible sense: no

higher-order vagueness, no shortage of acceptance by the general public in terms of

their own reasoning, there is a definite line where the predicate should stop being

applied, or start, there is no doubt to where the line lies for each person being

submitted to the Sorites paradox, there is allowance for each person to have their

own solution for each predicate, and each object, that is, each soritical sequence

presentation, so that it is not an imposition to the general public and even people

with problems in the judgement (meaning unusual thinking) could express

themselves correctly in logical entries. There are also no gluts or gaps of truth-

values, once it is either the case that a soritical sentence is TRUE, or it is FALSE, that

is, the truth-values accepted, and always possible to be assigned, by both the utterer

and our translation system, are the classical ones and, in Classical Logic, there are

no gaps, or gluts.

We also do not commit the same mistakes made by Epistemicists, or

Epistemologists, because we never say there is a universal line, in any possible

sense, and we actually believe this is the most serious mistake of all. There

is no way a person can believe they are ever receiving what any utterer intended

were to be received. No wonder there is so much available in the literature about

communication not being effective and, just by luck, someone speaking to their own

race, closest person, same language, as well as cultural background, that is, with top

similarities and things in common, will ever know, for sure, and with certainty, that

47
they have got the idea intended by the utterer, just like in the kids' game: cordless

telephone!!! - You think it is not good enough to make use of kids' games to explain?

Talk about that with the greatest philosophers of all, and also our best logician ever:

Jesus Christ, son of God, That who knows it all...even what you think nobody else

knows, or sees!!! - Apart from that, we know some people might write that the other

account actually states that the object itself has got an ontology and, therefore, a

very precise color, for instance. We do not ever deny something like that, that is

probably totally true. However, it is never accessible by human beings at all, once

Language is not enough, and this is the broadest thing we have nowadays, in terms

of describing objects. A picture is also not good enough because of us - who are

humans - and, therefore, not unique in our observations. That just means that the

ontology of the object is something such as talking about God: totally perfect but

unaccessible to human beings in any possible way. To be totally sincere, even the

name of God is doubted until nowadays. God Himself, in the own Bible, states that

we should refer to Him as `God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob’ (Matthew 22:32), that

is, God, Himself, feels the need of presenting Himself as someone attached to other

people. One must understand, then, that it

is only possible to refer to the ontology of an object, even humans considered as

such (for a quick thing such as beauty contests), by associating that object to

something else - a reference - just like in Physics. What is actually meant is that

Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, actually know who God is, and what He is precisely like, but

we are just going to dream about it, and always state that that is the `God of

Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob'. With colors, or predicates in language, there is only a

dream we can actually express the ontology of the object perfectly well. But we can

easily say that that object is of the `red' stated by `Carla, Marcia, Pedro’, for

instance.

48
The color has to be attached to an observer, just like our God from the Bible. No

book could be wiser, or bring more enlightenment to life, or Science, than the Bible,

trust us. With this development, all we meant is that the solution must be personal,

attached to the observer, always. And we could come up with an argumentation on

the lines of Semantics, another part of the Philosophy of Language, but we actually

did, only without mentioning it. We have a sort of walked through Wittgenstein,

Russel, and all the best researchers in the field, skipping their technical lingo. We are

basically writing about referent and object of reference, or designation and

designated, etc.

Here, the issue that makes philosophers think the most is the higher-order

vagueness issue. Basically, the best criticism that could be done, in what regards

that and our solution, is that the choice of No and Yes would bear some lack of

naturality, or precise definition/scope. However, we believe to fully have solved both

cases of higher-order vagueness.

One, we justify our choice with the own Philosophy of Language, Semiotics, and the

best researchers in the field, who all support our choice: when in doubt, do not

assign that signifier to this signified, that is, if there is any doubt/confusion, choose it

is not the case that. Also, the further point, things are defined always in the positive

way, on what `they actually are', not on what `they actually are not', lexicon logic.

On the other hand, as soon as linguists come up with another decision theory, as for

the lexicon words, our solution is accordingly updated, so that it is always a solution.

As explained before, because we solve the problem of higher-order vagueness with

full justification in the own field the problem belongs, we do hold an actual solution.

49
IS THE SOLUTION TO THE SORITES PARADOX SOMETHING LOGICALLY

USEFUL? IF SO, IN WHAT SENSE?

The solution to the Sorites paradox is something logically useful in the sense that

any progress in human reasoning, or understanding, may be said to be of

broad logical future use. However, there is absolutely nothing extra gained in

Logic, with the specific solution to the Sorites paradox, besides progression in

reasoning. The simple fact that we tell people the problem was generated because

people understood it wrong helps Logic progressing, once it helps logicians and

researchers to observe things better next time. However, our solution does not bring

a new logic, simply explains all the different logical systems involved, and talks about

one, which must be purely philosophical - human reasoning - not bearing any formal

logical system.

Pure Human Reasoning (P.H.R.) is that part of reasoning in which there are

feelings, emotions, or any sort of unreasonable (for instantaneous

observers)/individualized deductions, inferences, premises that, of course, cannot,

ever, be translated into computational logical systems (so far, up to our current

knowledge on how the mind works in conjunction with what is deduced/felt/observed

by an individual). The rest is also human reasoning, but may be said computable, or

machine-friendly, like the Classical Logic one is. All that falls into the latter scope is

machine-friendly, in principle. In that sense, the final/verbal, or written,

response to a proposition of a specific Sorites paradox, itself, is machine-

friendly.

It is annoying to understand that, at the end of the day, there is absolutely no

paradox at all, it all derives from wrong observation and wrong premises-

50
understanding, that is, actual premises in language, but faulty logical premises due

to the overlooking of the fact that language is far more than the logical

systems in place, and not all of it may be translated into logical lingo/is not literally

expressed, whilst the opposite is always true, and verifiable. That is obvious, once a

word in English, one of the most objective languages in the World, bears several

meanings, even in an English-English dictionary. More than that, different linguists

may hold different interpretations, for any dictionary word (from an individual’s

perspective). That just means that we can only hope communication is successful,

and this is obviously why people tend to have extensive courses on how to write,

read, spell: just to have more chances of communicating what they actually want to

the broadest audience as possible. It is obvious then that, even if one has two native

English speakers speaking, there is still the need of understanding their feelings,

when they speak, to grasp the whole meaning behind it, so that even English-English

communication is almost impossible, in terms of full effectiveness.

One may state they are communicating with others, but all a Logician, or a

Science person, would be able to state is that they are making efforts to.

There are even books, and books, written on the subject on how effective

communication happens. This way, it is actually very easy to understand that

language is also symbols, and so is a logical system, just a far more reduced scope

of symbols. If a logical system has got less symbols available than the natural

language, it is just scientific that it is impossible to even think of translating language

into a logical system, as a whole, because the only possible way would be an

overlapping of ideas converging into the same symbol, so that translation cannot,

possibly, be accurate, ever, and, as such, it cannot be considered a translation: It is

obviously humanly impossible. On the top of that, there are the enthymemes,

sentences usually omitted in communication when it happens between people who

51
know each other. That makes it all absurd to be translated effectively, even if it is

written. And it is obviously the case that there lies the beauty of cinema, or plays:

the much variety of interpretation a single action of an actor, a single word,

generates. Everyone knows that `To be or not to be' has been giving way to an

infinite number of texts around the World and it is just six words...

It is really unacceptable that anything different from what we described was ever

imagined before regarding what was wrongly named `Sorites paradox'. The Sorites

is obviously not a paradox in Logic, or Mathematics, not even in Language. It is

simply a fallacy the way it has been interpreted and described. The utterer wished

it were a paradox, the audience takes it to be a paradox. But it is definitely

not a paradox.

This way, the paradox in Language could be seen as a paradox with the own word

`paradox', but we think that there is no doubt about the meaning of the word

`paradox'. Therefore, if one really wants to classify it as a paradox then it is

obviously a `marketing-made’ paradox. The intended message is X. X is false. The

recipient of the message, however, gets X, even being false, and accepts it - re-

defining, consequently, a dictionary word to be something it is not. Because the

dictionary must be right, it can only be the case that the receptor was induced to

think wrongly and, therefore, there was some sort of apparent logic in the utterer's

speech, which is not really a logic, but pretends to be such. This way, it is a paradox

in communication because we, contrary to the rest of the Universe so far, got the

opposite message, so that there is conflict, and paradox, in the scope of

communication: It looks correct, it is the intended message, but our conclusion is the

opposite to the utterer's conclusion.

Conflict between receptor and transmitter, paradox, once communication is

52
supposed to occur the way it was intended by the transmitter.

Paradox, in Human Communication, still belongs to the Philosophy of Language, so

that we are still correct. And it is again not possible to label it as `Sorites paradox'

because if it belongs to the scope of Communication then it should be the `problem

proposer's paradox' (in Communication) to which an example is the Sorites problem.

The obvious mistake then is having logicians, who are not from the scope of the

Philosophy of Language, thinking they have a say there: They don't. Unless they are

keen on writing in terms of the Philosophy of Language, that is, with all the

background it demands, logicians really have no say in the Sorites problem.

The Sorites paradox, as our conclusion tells, is basically a motivation for the

listener to think of the beauty of the work developed by the linguists. The

basic question is: how hard is it to translate thoughts, as well as their expression,

into something accepted by everyone as a lexicon? How to do it?

Subtracting the Sorites from Logic, and Mathematics, leads us to a full understanding

of its beauty. It is as interesting as `to be or not to be'. One could write a whole

library of books with just that inspirational thought: That is basically it.

We believe the solution to the Sorites paradox is there to make logicians, and

mathematicians, see the limitation of their work, and accept that Language is far

more than Logic and Mathematics, not the other way around. One could easily say

that Mathematics is the most reduced scope of Logic, and logic is the most reduced

scope of Language. Mathematics applies Russell and Frege's logic, the most objective

way of communicating that there ever existed. So much so, there are several

mathematicians who are well understood if they give a talk in, for instance,

Romanian, but write good self-explanatory Mathematics lingo on the board, or print

53
it. That is a clear example to show that Mathematics is the Universal Language,

that Language in which communication is always possible, and effective. Logic is the

third choice, following logical systems, or computer-friendly systems. Pure Language

is the messiest one in which only by means of luck one understands each other. And

thought...don't even think about it! We have proposed that logicians worry about

things they can do, and are actually useful to humanity. For that end, we advise the

reader to check on [9].

That is because there are several things in this World: it is obvious that calculations

would not be the only ones where Logic does apply. The problem, of course, is

finding out what, amongst all this Universe, is truly relevant, so that if person X, as a

Logician, worries about it, the whole World is going to be thankful, and willing to pay

loads of money for any result X ever gets. Basically, mental diseases seem a

wonderful way to go, even if to prove that, with some mental labels, it is better that

they only exist in theory, and are never applied to a subject (lexicon logical decision,

when there is doubt). Medicine should be a logical thing. If it is not, there is no point.

It is time to interfere, yeah, but not with language, which is so well structured, as a

Science, and so wonderfully explained, as well as founded. It is time to interfere with

what lacks perfection, as we write in [9]: Whatever is perfect, like God, we should

just bow for it, and respect… Let go.

Notes

Note 1 It is not that Dr Casti has declared that this is his intention, literally. We

simply infer that from the way he is able to deal with higher-order mathematical

54
concepts in a popular way. See, for instance, [2]

Note 2 Odd enough, we had this really well known Philosopher, whose specialization

is Logic, with more than one hundred published papers nowadays, demanding we

presented the problem in mathematical terms. Sometimes, one must just do it, given

that those who truly matter, in terms of being convinced we hold a solution, seem to

need us to do it. In the World of Science, as we see it, there is very little which is

really scientific. Science seems to have regressed in its power and scope, not to say

understanding. Whilst a single paper which contained striking results was enough for

a person to be considered a Doctor of Philosophy in the past, we regressed to a

whole thesis of sometimes very ordinary results. Apart from that, people do not

seem to have not even the smallest admiration or respect for beauty and perfection,

for God's rules, what should be the most basic requirement for someone to be even

accepted as candidate to become part of Science. Why? Simply because God's

intention, and that must be the best intentions ever, is preserving what is perfect and

beautiful and making more perfect and more beautiful what is not. If someone does

not respect beauty and perfection, God's rules are not played and the Devil wins,

what makes the World worse, not better, what cannot possibly be the intentions of

Science. How many Hiroshimas does the World hopes for, really? It is only the true

passion for the laws that makes human beings respect it. It is not repetition, but the

full understanding that they are the only means to get a perfectly harmonious

society, with top allowed-in-the-system equity between the social members.

Note 3 The Mathematics used by us is not wrong, but it is simply the case that the

problem escapes its scope completely and any trial of representation of it in

mathematical terms is doomed to failure, as it is easily proven by all easy and strong

objections presented to all the solutions which have made use of mathematical tools

to describe the own problem. It is easy to understand that a problem lying in a larger

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set with elements in the complementary set of the smaller one, cannot possibly be

fully described and should not be even partially described in terms of the symbols for

the smaller set. The explanation is very easy to be understood, but we must spend a

few works doing such in order to convince those who could possibly doubt it, as our

so illustrious Philosopher/Logician, mentioned before, because, once more, that is

how modern scientific publications are achieved/settled.

Note 4 see www.geocities.com/trmsorfiap

Note 5 the name of the person will remain confidential, might be disclosed for

prevention of suit over false statements, but it is a real case, occurred in Brazil, Rio

de Janeiro, more than 20 years ago.

Note 6 The first non-classical system ever created was created apparently by Nicolai

A. Vasiliev, in 1910. For more on Vasilev, please refer to [6].

Note 7 Zadeh's introduced his idea on Fuzzy logic in 1965, as mentioned in [7].

Note 8 Notice the difference, for us, between the set of all possible logical events,

Logic, and a particular reasoning that bears logical characteristics, logic. For

example, Fuzzy logic is part of the Sub-philosophical-Science, Logic.

Note 9 Enthymemes involved in the previous utterances, always. The Sorites does

not state, but assumes that a proposition was understood in the middle of each

further progression: If I add one grain of sand to the `previous amount of existing

sand', that is, it is not that it does not make any difference if added to another

member of the sequence, only in that particular step, when one result is next to the

other in the sequence, that is, uttering `a single grain of sand, therefore, being

added to the previous amount of sand does not make any difference' is a correct

56
deduction, but `a single grain of sand added to any amount of sand does not make

any difference' is a wrong deduction from what was stated or, at least, a wrong

`enunciation' of what was stated. If we propose a problem the wrong way, and that

is basic scientific reasoning, the solution is not achievable, once only very well

defined, refined in all possibilities, scientific problems, may be solved the way a

lecturer or proposer or presenter ever intended them to be solved. Otherwise, a new

problem might have been created and it might not even be a well formulated

problem so that it is just dropped from an exam, for instance. The Sorites is

proposed the same way lecturers would propose problems to students so that the

same principles of full clarity of presentation should apply. Otherwise, just drop it for

another better defined problem. If it is ever to have its solutions judged or

appreciated, it is more than necessary that it is correctly stated. At this stage, one

could easily think of why we simply did not forget about the problem. So it is not a

problem at all. However, if a small group of members of the Sorites paradox is

considered, `A grain of sand does not make any difference' would still be a possible

proposition. It is obvious, as well, that the Logic from Language would never allow us

to encompass every stated proposition along the way, stated as `a single grain of

sand added will not make any difference if it is added on the top of the previous

amount', in the only, supposed to be, resulting global assertion `a single grain of

sand added will not make any difference if it is added on the top of any amount of

sand. If there is a Language mistake, there is a logical mistake of some sort, all

encompassed in the Philosophy of Logic which is part of Philosophy. Therefore,

cannot be accepted as a well proposed or defined problem this way.

This way, unfortunately, we are limited by the only two possible problem

formulations: it is either the case that we hold a small amount of elements in the

sequence to which the generalized proposition could be added and, in this case, we

would never face heap and non-heap in the same sequence, or there is no problem

57
worth thinking of it. At this stage, once more, all we and others did might sound

useless. However, if one forgets about the `heap' and `non-heap' situation, and

considers the only valid one, all the reasoning used by us is still valid, so that we are

still the only ones to hold an actual solution it does not matter what, for the problem,

if ever stated correctly.

In any hyp., in this note, all we needed to clarify is that there is no chance the

Sorites implication is mathematical, ever. And it cannot be purely logical

either (Machine Reasoning), simply because it depends on human observation

and judgment, which falls inside of the scope of purely human reasoning. It is,

therefore, a Language implication only, in the complementary set of

Mathematics and Computer Science, never inside. As a Language implication,

and being the whole problem proposed in the scope of purely human reasoning, only

purely human reasoning theories should address it well. We do believe that

this is what we do when we decide there must be a `translation interface', just

like there is with literary translation from one Language to another (purely

human scope).

Note 10 it is more an evidence of possible proof, once, as mathematicians, we would

never accept any practical proof to be like that, unless it were possible to guarantee

that every possible case is dealt with by that specific procedure.

Note 11

In [12], one will find the word paradox defined with the wording below:

Main Entry: par·a·dox javascript:popWin('/cgi-

bin/audio.pl?parado02.wav=paradox')Pronunciation: \ˈper-ə-ˌdäks, ˈpa-rə-\ Function:

noun Etymology: Latin paradoxum, from Greek paradoxon, from neuter of paradoxos

58
contrary to expectation, from para- + dokein to think, seem — more at decent Date: 1540

1: a tenet contrary to received opinion2 a: a statement that is seemingly contradictory or

opposed to common sense and yet is perhaps true b: a self-contradictory statement that at

first seems true c: an argument that apparently derives self-contradictory conclusions by

valid deduction from acceptable premises3: one (as a person, situation, or action) having

seemingly contradictory qualities or phases

Note 12

Parallax mistake, as mentioned in [12]

Main Entry: par·al·lax javascript:popWin('/cgi-

bin/audio.pl?parall02.wav=parallax')Pronunciation: \ˈpa-rə-ˌlaks\ Function: noun

Etymology: Middle French parallaxe, from Greek parallaxis, from parallassein to

change, from para- + allassein to change, from allos other Date: 1580

: The apparent displacement or the difference in apparent direction of an object as seen

from two different points not on a straight line with the object; especially : the angular

difference in direction of a celestial body as measured from two points on the earth's orbit

References

[1] Pinheiro, M.R. A Solution to the Sorites. Semiotica, 160(1/4), 2006.

[2] Casti, J. Five Golden Rules. John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 1997.

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[3] Bloom, B.S. Ed. 1956. Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The

Classification of Educational Goals. Handbook 1: Cognitive Domain .

Longman, White Plains, NY, 2006.

[4] Wolenski, J. Maccoll on modalities. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic, 3(1):

133-140, 1998.

[5] Hippocrates. On Ancient Medicine.

http://classics.mit.edu/Hippocrates/ancimed.18.18.html, acc. Feb, 2007

[6] Bazhanov, V.A. Ocerki sotsialnoj istorii logiki v Rossii [Sketches of the

Social History of Logic in Russia] Review author[s]: Werner Stelzner The Bulletin

of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Sep., 2004), pp. 421-423

[7] Priest, G. An introduction to Non-Classical Logic. Cambridge University

Press, 2001.

[8] Blair, B. Interview with Lotfi Zadeh. Azerbaijan International, Winter 1994

(2.4)

[9] Schmid, C. Course on Dynamics of multidisciplinary and controlled

systems. Die Ruhr-Universität Bochum, http://www.ruhr-uni-

bochum.de/profil/index.htm, 2005.

[10] Pinheiro, M.R. Exploring the concept of Non-Classical Logic, preprint

located at www.geocities.com/mrpprofessional, submitted, 2006.

[11] Read, S. Thinking about Logic: an introduction to the philosophy of logic.

Oxford University Press. 1995. Oxford.

[12] Merriam-Webster dictionary online, ` http://www.m-w.com/’, as accessed in Feb.

2007.

[13] Weisstein, Eric W. "Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem." From MathWorld--A

Wolfram Web Resource. Accessed on the 20th of December of 2007.

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61