MARGARET MAXEY assisted by Santiago Magbanua; FLORENCE MAXEY assisted by Ofrecinio

Santos; and LUCILLE MAXEY, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE
SPOUSES BEATO C. MACAYRA and ALACOPUE MONDAY, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for review involves the rights of a woman over properties acquired in 1912 principally through
the efforts of the man she was living with and at a time when the two were not yet legally married.
The facts of the case are briefly stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
The record reveals that Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both deceased) lived
together as husband and wife in Banganga, Davao; that out of said union were born six (6)
children, among them are the herein plaintiffs, namely: John or Carlos, Lucille, Margaret,
Florence, Fred and George, all surnamed Maxey; that during the period of their (Melbourne
and Regina) cohabitation, or in 1911 and 1912, respectively, the late Melbourne Maxey
acquired the parcels of land described under Par. 4 of the com;plaint as evidenced by the
documents of sale marked as Exhibits 4-a and 5-1 (same as Exhibits Facts), Melbourne
Maxey, through his attorney-in-fact Julia Pamatluan Maxey, sold in favor of the defendantsspouses in 1953 the parcels of land under litigation which fact of sale was not controverted
by the perties (Par. 1, /stipulation of Facts); that since thereof, the defendants-spouses have
taken immediate possession thereof continuously up to the present.
Plaintiffs instituted the present case on January 26, 1962, before the Court of First Instance
of Davao, praying for the annulment of the documents of sale covering the subject parcels of
land and to recover possession thereof with damages from the herein defendants-spouses,
alleging, among others, that the aforesaid realties were common properties of their parents,
having been acquired during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital; and that
the sales of the of the said lands in favor of the defendants-spouses in 1953, after the death
of their mother, Regina Morales, was executed by their father, Melbourne Maxey, without
their knowledge and consent; and that they came to know of the above mentioned sales
only in 1961.
On the other hand, defendants-spouses deny the material allegations of the complaint and
assert by way of affirmative defenses that they are the true and lawful owners and
possessors of the properties 'm question having purchased the same in good faith and for
value from Melbourne Maxey during his lifetime in 1953, based upon the reasonable belief
that the latter is the me and exclusive owner of the said parcels of land and that since then,
they have been in possession thereof openly, exclusively and continuously in concept of
owners. Defendants - spouses further counter for damages and attorney's fees and in the
alternative, for the value of the improvements they have introduced in the premises.
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903. Their children claim that their
parents were united in 1903 in a marriage performed "in the military fashion". Both the trial court and the
appellate court rejected this claim of a "military fashion" marriage.
The couple had several children. John Carlos was born in 1903, followed by Lucille, Margaret, Florence,
Fred, and George. Except for the youngest son, all the children were born before the disputed properties
were acquired. The father, Melbourne Maxey, was a member of the 1899 American occupation forces who
afterwards held high positions in the provincial government and in the Philippine public schools system.
As earlier mentioned in the cited statement of facts, the disputed properties were acquired in 1911 and
1912 before the 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the church
wedding. The husband remarried and in 1953, his second wife Julia Pamatluan Maxey, using a power of
attorney, sold the properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato C. Macayra.
The trial court applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.

The court stated that "when a man and a woman lived together as husband and wife, justice demands that
the woman should be entitled to the share of the property. Certainly she cannot be considered mere
adornment or only for man's comfort and passion." The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Evidence, testimonial and document considered the Court hereby rendered judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs and against defendant declaring that:
1. Declaring the abovementioned sales as null and void;
2. Ordering defendant-spouses to return the said lands, and to pay for the value of the use
of the same at the rate of P1,000.00 a year from 1953 until delivered, together with interests
corresponding thereto at the legal rate;
3. Ordering defendant-spouses to pay to plaintiff actual damages in the sum of P500.00 and
attorney fees in the sum of P3,000.00.
Defendants counterclaim is hereby ordered dismissed.
The Court of Appeals, however, found the parcels of, land to be exclusive properties of the late Melbourne
Maxey. It set aside the decision of the trial court, decease valid the deeds of sale, and ruled that the
appellants are the absolute owners of the properties in question.
The appellate decision sustained the following arguments of the respondent spouses:
Plaintiffs' evidence is completely devoid of any showing that these properties in question
were acquired through the joint efforts of Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales. Indeed, if at
all, plaintiffs' evidence tend to establish the fact that Melbourne Maxey by virtue of his
positions as Deputy Governor of Zamboanga (p. 36, t.s.n. de la Victoria) School Supervisor in
the East Coast of Davao (p. 36, t.s.n., Id.) was more than in a position to purchase these
properties by his own efforts, his own earnings and without the help of Regina Morales. On
the other hand, we have the declaration of Juana A. Morales, a widow of 68 years of age
when she testified, the sister-in-law of Regina Morales Juana A. Morales confirmed the fact
that Melbourne Maxey held the positions of teacher, provincial treasurer, deputy governor,
district supervisor and lastly superintendent of schools, respectively (p. 203, t.s.n., de la
Victoria). But more important is her declaration that her sister-in-law Regina Morales had no
property of her own whence she could have derived any income nor was Regina gainfully
employed. (pp. 203-204, t.s.n., Id.) It must be remembered that the showing must be CLEAR
that Regina Morales contributed to the acquisition of these properties. Here the evidence is
not only NOT CLEAR, indeed, there is no evidence at all that Regina Morales contributed to
the acquisition of the properties in question. In the case of Aznar, et al vs. Garcia, et al,
supra, the Supreme Court had before it the common-law wife's own testimony claiming
that the properties in controversy were the product of their joint industry. Her assertions
however, were completely brushed aside because aside from her claim that she took a hand
in the management and/or acquisition of the same, "there appears no evidence to prove her
alleged contribution or participation in the, acquisition of the properties involved therein."
(Id. p. 1069). In the case at bar, besides the absence of any evidence showing that Regina
Morales contributed by her efforts to the acquisition of these properties in controversy, both
plaintiffs and defendants' evidence show that it was through Melbourne Maxey's efforts
alone that these properties were acquired. Indeed, that Regina Morales had no means at all
to have contributed in any manner to all its acquisition.
The petitioners raise the following issues in this petition:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE LATE SPOUSES MELBOURNE
MAXEY AND REGINA MORALES WERE MARRIED ONLY IN 1919, BECAUSE THE TRUTH IS THAT
THEY MARRIED AS EARLY AS 1903.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS, LIKEWISE, ERRED IN DECLARING THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION
AS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF THE LATE MELBOURNE MAXEY, TO THE EXCLUSION OF
HIS WIFE REGINA MORALES, BECAUSE THE MENTIONED PROPERTIES WERE ACTUALLY
ACQUIRED BY THE JOINT EFFORTS AND INDUSTRY OF BOTH OF THEM AND THEREFORE,
THESE PROPERTIES ARE COMMON PROPERTIES.

3. THE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN UNREASONABLY GIVING THE TERM "JOINT
EFFORTS" NOT ONLY A VERY, VERY LIMITED MEANING BUT A CONCEPT WHICH IS ENTIRELY
ABSURD AND UNREALISTIC BECAUSE IN CONSTRUING THE TERM, THE COURT OF APPEALS
HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT AN INTERPRETATION WHICH IS MOST CONSISTENT WITH COMMON
PRACTICE AND CUSTOMS AS WELL AS IN ACCORD WITH THE BEST TRADITION OF THE
FILIPINO WAY OF LIFE.
The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the argument that Act No. 3613, the
Revised Marriage Law, recognized "military fashion" marriages as legal. Maxey and Morales were legally
married at a church wedding solemnized on February 16, 1919. Since Act No. 3613 was approved on
December 4, 1929 and took effect six months thereafter, it could not have applied to a relationship
commenced in 1903 and legitimized in 1919 through a marriage performed according to law. The marriage
law in 1903 was General Order No. 70. There is no provision in General Order No. 68 as amended nor in Act
No. 3613 which would recognize as an exception to the general rule on valid marriages, a so called
"Military fashion" ceremony or arrangement.
The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals both ruled that Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales
were married only in 1919. This is a finding of fact which we do not disturb at this stage of the case. There
is no showing that this factual finding is totally devoid of or unsupported by evidentiary basis or that it is
inconsistent with the evidence of record.
The other issue raised in this Petition questions the Court of Appeals' finding that the parcels of land in
question were exclusive properties of the late Melbourne Maxey.
The petitioners argue that even assuming that the marriage of Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales took
place only in February 17, 1919, still the properties legally and rightfully belonged in equal share to the
two because the acquisition of the said properties was through their joint efforts and industry. The second
and third errors mentioned by the petitioners are grounded on the alleged wrong interpretation given by
the Court of Appeals to the phrase "joint efforts". The petitioners suggest that their mother's efforts in
performing her role as mother to them and as wife to their father were more than sufficient contribution to
constitute the parcels of land in question as common properties acquired through the joint efforts to their
parents.
The Court of Appeals, however, was of the opinion that Article 144 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the
properties in question citing the case of Aznar et al. v. Garcia (102 Phil. 1055) on non-retroactivity of codal
provisions where vested rights may be prejudiced or impaired. And, assuming that Article 144 of the Civil
Code is applicable, the Court of Appeals held that the disputed properties were exclusively those of the
petitioner's father because these were not acquired through the joint efforts of their parents. This
conclusion stems from the interpretation given by the Court of Appeals to the phrase "joint efforts" to
mean "monetary contribution". According to the Court
... This view with which this ponente personally wholeheartedly agrees for some time now
has been advocated by sympathizers of equal rights for women, notably in the Commission
on the Status of Women of the United Nations. In our very own country there is strong
advocacy for the passage of a presidential decree providing that "the labors of a spouse in
managing the affairs of the household shall be credited with compensation." Unfortunately,
until the happy day when such a proposal shall have materialized into law, Courts are bound
by existing statutes and jurisprudence, which rigidly interpret the phrase "joint efforts"
as monetary contributions of the man and woman living together without benefit of
marriage, and to date, the drudgery of a woman's lifetime dedication to the management of
the household goes unremunerated, and has no monetary value. Thus, in the case of Aznar
vs. Garcia (supra) the Supreme Court held that the man and the woman have an equal
interest in the properties acquired during the union and each would be entitled to participate
therein if said properties were the product of their joint effort. In the same case it was stated
that aside` from the observation of the trial court that the appellee was an illiterate woman,
there appears no evidence to prove appellee's contribution (in terms of pesos and centavos)
or participation in the acquisition of the properties involved; therefore, following the
aforecited ruling of the Court, appellee's claim for one-half (1/2) of the properties cannot be
granted.
In so concluding, the respondent Court of Appeals accepted the private respondents' argument that it was
unlikely for the petitioners' mother to have materially contributed in the acquisition of the questioned
properties since she had no property of her own nor was she gainfully engaged in any business or

profession from which she could derive income unlike their father who held the positions of teacher deputy
governor, district supervisor, and superintendent of schools.
We are constrained to adopt a contrary view. Considerations of justice dictate the retroactive application of
Article 144 of the Civil Code to the case at bar. Commenting on Article 2252 of the Civil Code which
provides that changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by the Code which may prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation shall have no retroactive effect, the
Code Commission stated:
Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. The question of how
far the new Civil Code should be made applicable to past acts and events is attended with
the utmost difficulty. It is easy enough to understand the abstract principle that laws
have no retroactive effect because vested or acquired rights should be respected. But what
are vested or acquired rights? The Commission did not venture to formulate a definition of a
vested or acquired right seeing that the problem is extremely committed.
What constitutes a vested or acquired right well be determined by the courts as each
particular issue is submitted to them, by applying the transitional provisions set forth, and in
case of doubt, by observing Art. 9 governing the silence or obscurity of the law. In this
manner, the Commission is confident that the judiciary with its and high sense of justice will
be able to decide in what cases the old Civil Code would apply and in what cases the new
one should be binding This course has been preferred by the Commission, which
did not presume to be able to foresee and adequately provide for each and every question
that may arise. (Report of the Code Commission, pp. 165-166).
Similarly, with respect to Article 2253 which provides inter alia that if a right should be declared for the
first tune in the Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto
may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not
prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin, the Code Commission commented:
... But the second sentence gives a retroactive effect to newly created rights provided they
do not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right. The retroactive character of the new
right is the result of the exercise of the sovereign power of legislation, when the lawmaking
body is persuaded that the new right is called for by considerations of justice and public
policy. But such new right most not encroach upon a vested right. (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 167).
The requirement of non-impairment of vested rights is clear. It is the opinion of the Court of Appeals that
vested rights were prejudiced. We do not think so.
Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the formation of an informal civil
partnership between a man and wife not legally married and their corresponding right to an equal share in
properties acquired through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation was recognized through
decisions of this Court. (Aznar et al. vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055; Flores vs. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, 94 Phil. 451; Marata vs. Dionio, L-24449, December 31, 1925; Lesaca v. Lesaca, 91 Phil. 135.)
With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article 144 codified the law established through judicial
precedents but with the modification that the property governed by the rules on co-ownership may be
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry. Even if it is only the man who works, the
property acquired during the man and wife relationship belongs through a fifty-fifty sharing to the two of
them.
This new article in the Civil Code recognizes that it would be unjust and abnormal if a woman who is a wife
in all aspects of the relationship except for the requirement of a valid marriage must abandon her home
and children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in business
before the rules on co-ownership would apply. This article is particularly relevant in this case where the
"common-law" relationship was legitimated through a valid marriage 34 years before the properties were
sold.
The provisions of the Civil Code are premised on the traditional and existing, the normal and customary
gender roles of Filipino men and women. No matter how large the income of a working wife compared to
that of her husband, the major, if not the full responsibility of running the household remains with the
woman. She is the administrator of the household. The fact that the two involved in this case were not
legally married at the time does not change the nature of their respective roles. It is the woman who

traditionally holds the family purse even if she does not contribute to filling that purse with funds. As
pointed out by Dean Irene R. Cortes of the University of the Philippines, "in the Filipino family, the wife
holds the purse, husbands hand over their pay checks and get an allowance in return and the wife
manages the affairs of the household. . . . And the famous statement attributed to Governor General
Leonard Wood is repeated: In the Philippines, the best man is the woman." (Cortes, "Womens Rights Under
the New Constitution". WOMAN AND THE LAW, U.P. Law Center, p. 10.)
The "real contribution" to the acquisition of property mentioned in Yaptinchay vs. Torres (28 SCRA 489)
must include not only the earnings of a woman from a profession, occupation, or business but also her
contribution to the family's material and spiritual goods through caring for the children, administering the
household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her husband from household tasks, and otherwise
performing the traditional duties of a housewife.
Should Article 144 of the Civil Code be applied in this case? Our answer is "Yes" because there is no
showing that vested rights would be impaired or prejudiced through its application.
A vested right is defined by this Court as property which has become fixed and established, and is no
longer open to doubt or controversy; an immediately fixed right of present or future enjoyment as
distinguished from an expectant or contingent right (Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil.
711; Balbao vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). This cannot be said of the "exclusive" right of Melbourne Maxey
over the properties in question when the present Civil Code became effective for standing against it was
the concurrent right of Regina Morales or her heirs to a share thereof. The properties were sold in 1953
when the new Civil Code was already in full force and effect. Neither can this be said of the rights of the
private respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the questioned properties are concerned as this was
still open to controversy on account of the legitimate claim of Regina Morales to a share under the
applicable law.
The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of his late wife,
Regina Morales, when they were sold. Technically speaking, the petitioners should return one-half of the
P1,300.00 purchase price of the land while the private respondents should pay some form of rentals for
their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable considerations, however, lead us to rule out rentals on one
hand and return of P650.00 on the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
is reversed and set aside insofar as one-half of the disputed properties are concerned. The private
respondents are ordered to return one-half of said properties to the heirs of Regina Morales. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and
CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:

The petition for review bewails, purely on a question of law, an alleged error committed by the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quohas failed to apply
the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is
declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both of the parties to
the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by and large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage
were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court,
[1]
in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition; viz:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
"(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes is hereby declared
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to
comply with their essential marital obligations;
"(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose which
parent they would want to stay with.
"Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent Consuelo
Gomez-Valdes.
"The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody of the
other.
"(3) The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles50, 51
and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
"Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper
recording in the registry of marriages."[2] (Italics ours)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles
50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the
hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father,
Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner.
In an Order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property
acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have
been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff
and defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal shares.
"In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the
provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply." [3] (Italics supplied)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court said:
"Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as null
and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
"The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102 refers to
the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the
procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property."[4]
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October 1995.

In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should
be held controlling; he argues that:
"I
"Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated.
"II
"Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the
family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by
reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
"III
"Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
"IV
"It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay." [5]
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article
147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of
the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; [6] it provides:
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
"In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
"Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
"When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or
all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases,
the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation."
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to
the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or
upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" [7] of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall
be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's
"efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." [8] Unlike the conjugal partnership
of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the
Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that

(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or her share in co-ownership property,
without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the coownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common
children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof,
to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation [9] or
declaration of nullity of the marriage.[10]
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife ),only the property acquired by both of them through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion
to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima
facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party
who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner already heretofore expressed.[11]
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property,
the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the
marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and consequential
matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the
"family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the
liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under
the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, [12] of the Family Code, should
aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case
until the contract is annulled ),are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2 ),(3 ),(4)
and (5) of Article 43, [13] relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally,
to void marriages under Article 40[14] of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage
contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a
special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent
from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring
forpurposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void
marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second
marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 [15] and 42,[16] of the
Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence
of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that
the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid
and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of
void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the
provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it
may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the
provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the
property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES

FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who are not legally capacitated to marry each
other, but who nonetheless live together conjugally, may be deemed co-owners of a property acquired
during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual contribution to its acquisition. Hence,
mere cohabitation without proof of contribution will not result in a co-ownership.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the November 19, 1998
Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 (CA), which reversed the October 7, 1997 Order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). 2The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the questioned orders of the court a quo dated
October 7, 1997 and November 11, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of
the court a quo dated June 5, 1997 is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents. 3
The assailed Order of the RTC disposed as follows:

Wherefore, the decision of this Court rendered on June 5, 1997 affirming in toto the appealed
judgment of the [MTC] is hereby reconsidered and a new one is entered reversing said decision of
the [MTC] and dismissing the complaint in the above-entitled case. 4
Petitioner also assails the February 14, 1999 CA Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts as follows:
[Herein respondents] were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6756, an action for ejectment filed before
Branch 82 of the MTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila against [herein Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos, Toto
Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint dated July 5, 1996, the said spouses alleged that they
are the absolute owners of an apartment building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-private
respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last seven (7) years, since 1989, without the
payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos
will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as
rental, which agreement was not complied with by the said defendants; that they have demanded
several times [that] the defendants . . . vacate the premises, as they are in need of the property for
the construction of a new building; and that they have also demanded payment of P84,000.00 from
Toto and Gina Tumlos representing rentals for seven (7) years and payment of P143,600.00 from
Guillerma Tumlos as unpaid rentals for seven (7) years, but the said demands went unheeded. They
then prayed that the defendants be ordered to vacate the property in question and to pay the
stated unpaid rentals, as well as to jointly pay P30,000.00 in attorneys fees.
[Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. She averred
therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of
the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a covendee of the property in question together with [Respondent] Mario Fernandez. She then asked for
the dismissal of the complaint.
After an unfruitful preliminary conference on November 15, 1996, the MTC required the parties to
submit their affidavits and other evidence on the factual issues defined in their pleadings within ten
(10) days from receipt of such order, pursuant to section 9 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. [Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos submitted her affidavit/position paper on November 29,
1996, while the [respondents] filed their position paper on December 5, 1996, attaching thereto
their marriage contract, letters of demand to the defendants, and the Contract to Sell over the
disputed property. The MTC thereafter promulgated its judgment on January 22, 1997[.]
Upon appeal to the [RTC], [petitioner and the two other] defendants alleged in their memorandum
on appeal that [Respondent] Mario Fernandez and [Petitioner] Guillerma had an amorous
relationship, and that they acquired the property in question as their "love nest." It was further
alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their two (2) children for around
ten (10) years, and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees
of the other apartments, until she discovered that [Respondent Mario] deceived her as to the
annulment of his marriage. It was also during the early part of 1996 when [Respondent Mario]
accused her of being unfaithful and demonstrated his baseless [jealousy].
In the same memorandum, [petitioner and the two other] defendants further averred that it was
only recently that Toto Tumlos was temporarily accommodated in one of the rooms of the subject
premises while Gina Tumlos acted as a nanny for the children. In short, their presence there [was]
only transient and they [were] not tenants of the Fernandez spouses.
On June 5, 1997, the [RTC] rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of the MTC.
The [petitioner and the two other defendants] seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration on July
3, 1997, alleging that the decision of affirmance by the RTC was constitutionally flawed for failing to
point out distinctly and clearly the findings of facts and law on which it was based vis--vis the
statements of issues they have raised in their memorandum on appeal. They also averred that the
Contract to Sell presented by the plaintiffs which named the buyer as "Mario P. Fernandez, of legal
age, married to Lourdes P. Fernandez," should not be given credence as it was falsified to appear
that way. According to them, the Contract to Sell originally named "Guillerma Fernandez" as the
spouse of [Respondent Mario]. As found by the [RTC] in its judgment, a new Contract to Sell was

issued by the sellers naming the [respondents] as the buyers after the latter presented their
marriage contract and requested a change in the name of the vendee-wife. Such facts necessitate
the conclusion that Guillerma was really a co-owner thereof, and that the [respondents]
manipulated the evidence in order to deprive her of her rights to enjoy and use the property as
recognized by law.
The [RTC], in determining the question of ownership in order to resolve the issue of possession,
ruled therein that the Contract to Sell submitted by the Fernandez spouses appeared not to be
authentic, as there was an alteration in the name of the wife of [Respondent] Mario Fernandez.
Hence, the contract presented by the [respondents] cannot be given any weight. The court further
ruled that Guillerma and [Respondent Mario] acquired the property during their cohabitation as
husband and wife, although without the benefit of marriage. From such findings, the court
concluded that [Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was a co-owner of the subject property and could not
be ejected therefrom.
The [respondents] then filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of reversal, but the same was
denied by the [RTC]. 5
As earlier stated, the CA reversed the RTC. Hence, this Petition filed by Guillerma Tumlos only.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA rejected petitioner's claim that she and Respondent Mario Fernandez were co-owners of the
disputed property. The CA ruled:
From the inception of the instant case, the only defense presented by private respondent Guillerma is her
right as a co-owner of the subject property[.]
This claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma, as correctly held by the trial court.
No other evidence was presented to validate such claim, except for the said affidavit/position paper. As
previously stated, it was only on appeal that Guillerma alleged that she cohabited with the petitionerhusband without the benefit of marriage, and that she bore him two (2) children. Attached to her
memorandum on appeal are the birth certificates of the said children. Such contentions and documents
should not have been considered by the . . . (RTC), as they were not presented in her affidavit/position
paper before the trial court (MTC).
However, even if the said allegations and documents could be considered, the claim of co-ownership must
still fail. As [herein Respondent] Mario Fernandez is validly married to [Respondent] Lourdes Fernandez (as
per Marriage Contract dated April 27, 1968, p. 45, Original Record), Guillerma and Mario are not
capacitated to marry each other. Thus, the property relations governing their supposed cohabitation is that
found in Article 148 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the Family Code of the
Philippines[.]
It is clear that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 of the Family Code
which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or
industry (Agapay v. Palang, 276 SCRA 340). The care given by one party [to] the home, children, and
household, or spiritual or moral inspiration provided to the other, is not included in Article 148 (Handbook
on the Family Code of the Philippines by Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, 1988 ed., p. 209). Hence, if actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares
(Agapay, supra at p. 348, citing Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines
Volume I by Arturo M. Tolentino, 1990 ed., p. 500).
In the instant case, no proof of actual contribution by Guillerma Tumlos in the purchase of the subject
property was presented. Her only evidence was her being named in the Contract to Sell as the wife of
[Respondent] Mario Fernandez. Since she failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price
of the subject apartment building, We find no basis to justify her co-ownership with [Respondent Mario].
The said property is thus presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership property of Mario and Lourdes
Fernandez, it being acquired during the subsistence of their marriage and there being no other proof to the
contrary (please see Article 116 of the Family Code).
The court a quo (RTC) also found that [Respondent Mario] has two (2) children with Guillerma who are in
her custody, and that to eject them from the apartment building would be to run counter with the
obligation of the former to give support to his minor illegitimate children, which indispensably includes

dwelling. As previously discussed, such finding has no leg to stand on, it being based on evidence
presented for the first time on appeal.
Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was validly presented, the RTC failed to consider that the
need for support cannot be presumed. Article 203 of the Family Code expressly provides that the obligation
to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it
for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. . . .
1wphi1.nt
In contrast to the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the RTC instead presumed that Guillerma
and her children needed support from [Respondent Mario]. Worse, it relied on evidence not properly
presented before the trial court (MTC).
With regard to the other [defendants], Gina and Toto Tumlos, a close perusal of the records shows that they
did not file any responsive pleading. Hence, judgment may be rendered against them as may be warranted
by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein, as provided for in Section 6
of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. There was no basis for the public respondent to dismiss the
complaint against them. 7 (emphasis in the original)
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the consideration of the Court:
I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion in not outrightly dismissing the
petition for review filed by respondents.
II. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioner is not the co-owner of the property in litis.
III. Corollary thereto, the Court of Appeals erred in applying Art. 148 of the Family Code in the case
at bar.
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the substantive right of support vis--vis the remedy
of ejectment resorted to by respondents. 8
In resolving this case, we shall answer two questions: (a) Is the petitioner a co-owner of the property? (b)
Can the claim for support bar this ejectment suit? We shall also discuss these preliminary matters: (a)
whether the CA was biased in favor of respondents and (b) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the
ejectment suit.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Preliminary Matters
Petitioner submits that the CA exhibited partiality in favor of herein respondents. This bias, she argues, is
manifest in the following:
1. The CA considered the respondents Petition for Review 9 despite their failure to attach several
pleadings as well as the explanation for the proof of service, despite the clear mandate of Section
11 10 of Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court and despite the ruling in Solar Team Entertainment,
Inc. v. Ricafort. 11
2. It allowed respondents to submit the pleadings that were not attached.
3. It considered respondents' Reply dated May 20, 1998, which had allegedly been filed out of time.
4. It declared that the case was submitted for decision without first determining whether to give
due course to the Petition, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. 12
The CA, for its part, succinctly dismissed these arguments in this wise:

It is too late in the day now to question the alleged procedural error after we have rendered the
decision. More importantly, when the private respondent filed their comment to the petition on April
26, 1998, they failed to question such alleged procedural error. Neither have they questioned all the
resolutions issued by the Court after their filing of such comment. They should, therefore, be now
considered in estoppel to question the same. 13
We agree with the appellate court. Petitioner never raised these matters before the CA. She cannot be
allowed now to challenge its Decision on grounds of alleged technicalities being belatedly raised as an
afterthought. In this light, she cannot invoke Solar 14 because she never raised this issue before the CA.
More important, we find it quite sanctimonious indeed on petitioners part to rely, on the one hand, on
these procedural technicalities to overcome the appealed Decision and, on the other hand, assert that the
RTC may consider the new evidence she presented for the first time on appeal. Such posturing only
betrays the futility of petitioner's assertion, if not its absence of merit.
One other preliminary matter. Petitioner implies that the court of origin, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), did
not have jurisdiction over the "nature of the case," alleging that the real question involved is one of
ownership. Since the issue of possession cannot be settled without passing upon that of ownership, she
maintains that the MTC should have dismissed the case.
This contention is erroneous. The issue of ownership may be passed upon by the MTC to settle the issue of
possession. 15 Such disposition, however, is not final insofar as the issue of ownership is
concerned, 16 which may be the subject of another proceeding brought specifically to settle that question.
Having resolved these preliminary matters, we now move on to petitioners substantive contentions.
First Issue:
Petitioner as Co-owner
Petitioners central theory and main defense against respondents' action for ejectment is her claim of coownership over the property with Respondent Mario Fernandez. At the first instance before the MTC, she
presented a Contract to Sell indicating that she was his spouse. The MTC found this document insufficient
to support her claim. The RTC, however, after considering her allegation that she had been cohabiting with
Mario Fernandez as shown by evidence presented before it, 17 ruled in her favor.
On the other hand, the CA held that the pieces of evidence adduced before the RTC could no longer be
considered because they had not been submitted before the MTC. Hence, the appellate court concluded
that "[t]he claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily proven . . ." 18
We agree with the petitioner that the RTC did not err in considering the evidence presented before it.
Nonetheless, we reject her claim that she was a co-owner of the disputed property.
Evidence Presented on
Appeal Before the RTC
In ruling that the RTC erred in considering on appeal the evidence presented by petitioner, the CA relied on
the doctrine that issues not raised during trial could not be considered for the first time during appeal. 19
We disagree. In the first place, there were no new matters or issues belatedly raised during the appeal
before the RTC. The defense invoked by petitioner at the very start was that she was a co-owner. To
support her claim, she presented a Contract to Sell dated November 14, 1986, which stated that Mario
Fernandez was legally married to her. The allegation that she was cohabiting with him was a mere
elaboration of her initial theory.
In the second place, procedural rules are generally premised on considerations of fair play. Respondents
never objected when the assailed evidence was presented before the RTC. Thus, they cannot claim unfair
surprise or prejudice.
Petitioner Not a Co-Owner Under
Article 144 of the Civil Code
Even considering the evidence presented before the MTC and the RTC, we cannot accept petitioner's
submission that she is a co-owner of the disputed property pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code. 20 As

correctly held by the CA, the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the Family
Code which provides:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, 21 only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue
to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Art. 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not
incapacitated to marry each other, 22 or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void 23 from the
beginning. 24 It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be
absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community
between the man and his lawful wife. 25
Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those submitted by petitioner herself before the
RTC, it is clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was legally married
to Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clear that, as readily admitted by petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in a
state of concubinage. Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code is inapplicable.
As stated above, the relationship between petitioner and Respondent Mario Fernandez is governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy points out 26 that "[t]he Family Code has filled
the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating in its Article 148 the property relations of
couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Hence, petitioners argument that the Family Code is inapplicable because the cohabitation and the
acquisition of the property occurred before its effectivity deserves scant consideration. Suffice it to say
that the law itself states that it can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired
rights. 27 In this case, petitioner failed to show any vested right over the property in question. Moreover, to
resolve similar issues, we have applied Article 148 of the Family Code retroactively. 28
No Evidence of Actual Joint
Contribution
Another consideration militates against petitioners claim that she is a co-owner of the property.
In Agapay, 29 the Court ruled:
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. It must be stressed that the actual contribution is required by this
provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the
family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one
who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not
proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. (emphasis ours)
In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to purchase
the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with
Respondent Mario Fernandez.
Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any
event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides
that the administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition.
Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership. The property in question belongs to the
conjugal partnership of respondents. Hence, the MTC and the CA were correct in ordering the ejectment of
petitioner from the premises.

Second Issue:
Support versus Ejectment
Petitioner contends that since Respondent Mario Fernandez failed to repudiate her claim regarding the
filiation of his alleged sons, Mark Gil and Michael Fernandez, his silence on the matter amounts to an
admission. Arguing that Mario is liable for support, she advances the theory that the childrens right to
support, which necessarily includes shelter, prevails over the right of respondents to eject her.
We disagree. It should be emphasized that this is an ejectment suit whereby respondents seek to exercise
their possessory right over their property. It is summary in character and deals solely with the issue of
possession of the property in dispute. Here, it has been shown that they have a better right to possess it
than does the petitioner, whose right to possess is based merely on their tolerance.1wphi1.nt
Moreover, Respondent Mario Fernandez' alleged failure to repudiate petitioner's claim of filiation is not
relevant to the present case.1wphi1 Indeed, it would be highly improper for us to rule on such issue.
Besides, it was not properly taken up below. 30 In any event, Article 298 31 of the Civil Code requires that
there should be an extrajudicial demand. 32 None was made here. The CA was correct when it said:
Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was validly presented, the RTC failed to consider
that the need for support cannot be presumed. Article [298] of the [New Civil Code] expressly
provides that the obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has
a right to receive the same need it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of
judicial and extrajudicial demand. 33
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by the
deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of the controversy between
the two Susans whom he married. 1wphi1.nt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first was on June
20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had
two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with
respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their
almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary
tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his

medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao
was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pagibig, 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial
(SSS). 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against
petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of
the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits
which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite
service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of,
and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she
became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself
as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended
that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized
without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage
certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic)
and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as
requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose it may
serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the
amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S.
Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE
LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT
CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA.
DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY
THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other
than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence
of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11

It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two
marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the
subject death benefits of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence
thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall
within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by
the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record
of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that
they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court,
petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her
pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and
chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed
validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having
been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from
the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. It does not follow from the foregoing
disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the
death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article
40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of
the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without
first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void.
Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses
according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the
applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but
rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of
Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman
are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or
her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual
or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having
been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between
petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation,
Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies
earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it

could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary
benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the
said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal
wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code
governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the
absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party
who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family and of the household. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In
case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share
shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the
cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even
if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the
disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147
creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no
allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good
faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in
the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to
his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao. In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court
of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the
Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to
the second wife, holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership
established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as
putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death
should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such
putative heir she has an interest in the husbands share in the property here in dispute.... And with
respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the
second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable
solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the
property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage. 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior
and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court
determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified
that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only
for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second
marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she
could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies
even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the
validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for
collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial

declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or
documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid.
Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the
marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable
laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that
may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even
if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent
the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE AND GINA S. REY, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership
will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof
of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. 1
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, 2 but separated de facto from her husband, when she met
petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in July 1987. 3 After a brief courtship, the two decided to
cohabit as husband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacintos father. 4 Their cohabitation was not
blessed with any children. Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel "Saguid
Brothers."5 Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan
from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship with Jacintos relatives turned sour. Her periodic absence,
however, did not ebb away the conflict with petitioners relatives. In 1996, the couple decided to separate
and end up their 9-year cohabitation.6
On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property
with Receivership against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque. She alleged that
from her salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the
completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she
was able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total
value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and
that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be
reimbursed to her.
Private respondent testified that she deposited part of her earnings in her savings account with First Allied
Development Bank.7 Her Pass Book shows that as of May 23, 1995, she had a balance of P21,046.08. 8 She
further stated that she had a total of P35,465.009 share in the joint account deposit which she and the
petitioner maintained with the same bank.10 Gina declared that said deposits were spent for the purchase
of construction materials, appliances and other personal properties. 11
In his answer12 to the complaint, petitioner claimed that the expenses for the construction of their house
were defrayed solely from his income as a captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that private
respondents meager income as fish dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of said
house. Besides, selling fish was a mere pastime to her; as such, she was contented with the small quantity
of fish allotted to her from his fishing trips. Petitioner further contended that Gina did not work
continuously in Japan from 1992 to 1994, but only for a 6-month duration each year. When their house was
repaired and improved sometime in 1995-1996, private respondent did not share in the expenses because

her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily needs and business of her parents. From his income in
the fishing business, he claimed to have saved a total of P130,000.00, P75,000.00 of which was placed in a
joint account deposit with private respondent. This savings, according to petitioner was spent in
purchasing the disputed personal properties.
On May 21, 1997, the trial court declared the petitioner as in default for failure to file a pre-trial brief as
required by Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89.13
On May 26, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration14 of the May 21, 1997 order, which was
denied on June 2, 1997, and private respondent was allowed to present evidence ex parte.15 Petitioner filed
another motion for reconsideration but the same was also denied on October 8, 1997.
On July 15, 1998, a decision16 was rendered in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Gina
S. Rey against defendant Jacinto Saguid:
a) Ordering the partition of the house identified as plaintiffs Exhibit C and D and directing the
defendant to return and/or reimburse to the plaintiff the amount of seventy thousand pesos
(P70,000,00) which the latter actually contributed to its construction and completion;
b) Declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive owner of the personal properties listed on Exhibit M;
c) Ordering the defendant, and/or anyone in possession of the aforesaid personal properties, to
return and/or deliver the same to the plaintiff; and
d) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages in the sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.17
On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; however, the award of P50,000.00 as moral
damages was deleted for lack of basis.18 The appellate court ruled that the propriety of the order which
declared the petitioner as in default became moot and academic in view of the effectivity of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. It explained that the new rules now require the filing of a pre-trial brief and the
defendants non-compliance therewith entitles the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.
Both parties filed motions for reconsideration which were denied; hence, petitioner filed the instant petition
based on the following assigned errors:
A.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING RETROACTIVELY
THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE PRESENT CASE AND HOLDING THE FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR
THEREIN MOOT AND ACADEMIC THUS, FAILED TO RULE ON THE PROPRIETY OF THE TRIAL COURTS
REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF DEFAULT DUE TO MISTAKE AND/OR EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE
COMMITTED BY PETITIONER.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RELYING ON THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH RECEIVED THE EVIDENCE OF HEREIN RESPONDENT ONLY EX
PARTE.19
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not the trial court erred in allowing private respondent to
present evidence ex parte; and (2) whether or not the trial courts decision is supported by evidence.
Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial
brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present his
evidence ex parteand the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof.20 The remedy of the defendant
is to file a motion for reconsideration21 showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable neglect.22 The motion need not really stress the fact that the defendant has
a valid and meritorious defense because his answer which contains his defenses is already on record. 23
In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is justified because he was not
represented by counsel. This justification is not, however, sufficient to set aside the order directing private
respondent to present evidence ex parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his own risk not to be

represented by counsel. Even without the assistance of a lawyer, petitioner was able to file a motion for
extension to file answer,24 the required answer stating therein the special and affirmative defenses, 25 and
several other motions.26 If it were true that petitioner did not understand the import of the April 23, 1997
order directing him to file a pre-trial brief, he could have inquired from the court or filed a motion for
extension of time to file the brief. Instead, he waited until May 26, 1997, or 14 days from his alleged
receipt of the April 23, 1997 order before he filed a motion asking the court to excuse his failure to file a
brief. Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may result in
prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with
the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a persuasive reason to relax
the application of the rules. There is nothing in the Constitution which mandates that a party in a noncriminal proceeding be represented by counsel and that the absence of such representation amounts to a
denial of due process. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession
is not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members the safeguard
is deemed ignored or violated.
However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
specifically, Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, rendered moot and academic the issue of whether or not the
plaintiff may be allowed to present evidence ex parte for failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief.
While the rules may indeed be applied retroactively, the same is not called for in the case at bar. Even
before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on July 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was
required under Circular No. 1-89 which became effective on February 1, 1989. Pursuant to the said circular,
"[f]ailure to file pre-trial briefs may be given the same effect as the failure to appear at the pre-trial," that
is, the party may be declared non-suited or considered as in default.
Coming now to the substantive issue, it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry
each other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the
latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 30 of the Family Code, which applies to
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where
both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man.
Under this regime, "only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions ..."31 Proof of actual contribution is required.
In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987, which is before
the date of the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this
provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. 33 Before Article 148 of
the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a
state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property
occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 34
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang,35 and Tumlos v. Fernandez,36 which involved the issue of co-ownership of
properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we
ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of coownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is without
basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of
the disputed properties. Also inAdriano v. Court of Appeals,37 we ruled that the fact that the controverted
property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the
nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and
reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponents defense.38 This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed
to present evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law
gives the defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the
plaintiff warrant such relief.39 Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence.40
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private
respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house.

However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the
record are receipts41in her name for the purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995 and
December 23, 1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00.
On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed personal properties
came partly from their joint account with First Allied Development Bank. While there is no question that
both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact
amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of
proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the
disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not
questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the decision of the trial court which granted the reliefs prayed
for by private respondent. On the basis of the evidence established, the extent of private respondents coownership over the disputed house is only up to the amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution in the
construction thereof. Anent the personal properties, her participation therein should be limited only to the
amount of P55,687.50.
As regards the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as moral damages, the Court of Appeals correctly deleted
the same for lack of basis.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64166
isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Private respondent Gina S. Rey is declared co-owner of petitioner
Jacinto Saguid in the controverted house to the extent of P11,413.00 and personal properties to the extent
of P55,687.50. Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the amount of P67,100.50 to private respondent, failing
which the house shall be sold at public auction to satisfy private respondents claim.
SO ORDERED.

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, Petitioner, vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59986 rendered on June 3, 2002, which affirmed
with modification the October 18, 1997 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City,
Laguna in Civil Case No. SP-4748 (97).
The following factual antecedents are undisputed.
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During their
marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San Francisco, San Pablo City from
a certain Sandra Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes under
Assessment of Real Property No. 94-051-2802. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in
favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife. 3
On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one
Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan
Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo
obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00 from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on
the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The
abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without
the knowledge and consent of respondent.4
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued
in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property being
redeemed, petitioner, through its vice-president, consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on June
6, 1996 an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale. 5
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died on December 20, 1995. In one of her visits to the subject
property, respondent learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean its
premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the
premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was
conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City, Civil Case
No. SP-2222 (97) for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against
petitioner. In the latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision on October 18, 1997. The dispositive portion
thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having proved by the preponderance of evidence the allegations of the
Complaint, the Court finds for the plaintiff and hereby orders:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. The declaration of the following documents as null and void:
(a) The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated December 1, 1993 executed before Notary Public Romulo
Urrea and his notarial register entered as Doc. No. 212; Page No. 44, Book No. XXI, Series of 1993.
(b) The Certificate of Sale executed by Notary Public Reynaldo Alcantara on April 20, 1995.
(c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant
(c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant over the residential lot located
at Brgy. San Francisco, San Pablo City, covered by ARP No. 95-091-1236 entered as Doc. No. 406; Page No.
83, Book No. III, Series of 1996 of Notary Public Octavio M. Zayas.
(d) The assessment of real property No. 95-051-1236.
2. The defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the plaintiff.

ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P40,000.00 representing the value of the car which was
burned.
ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION
1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P25,000.00 as attorneys fees;
2. The defendant to pay plaintiff P25,000.00 as moral damages;
3. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. To pay the cost of the suit.
The counterclaim is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.6
Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts finding
that the subject property was conjugal in nature, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebut
the presumption that the subject property acquired during the marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to their
conjugal partnership.7The appellate court declared as void the mortgage on the subject property because
it was constituted without the knowledge and consent of respondent, in accordance with Article 124 of the
Family Code. Thus, it upheld the trial courts order to reconvey the subject property to respondent. 8 With
respect to the damage to respondents car, the appellate court found petitioner to be liable therefor
because it is responsible for the consequences of the acts or omissions of the person it hired to accomplish
the assigned task.9 All told, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision, but deleted the award
for damages and attorneys fees for lack of basis.10
Hence, this petition, raising the following issues for this Courts consideration:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED
BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY. 11
First, petitioner takes issue with the legal provision applicable to the factual milieu of this case. It contends
that Article 124 of the Family Code should be construed in relation to Article 493 of the Civil Code, which
states:
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. . . .
Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code requires the consent of the other spouse to
the mortgage of conjugal properties, the framers of the law could not have intended to curtail the right of a
spouse from exercising full ownership over the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to him under the

concept of co-ownership.12 Thus, petitioner would have this Court uphold the validity of the mortgage to
the extent of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.s share in the conjugal partnership.
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals,13 it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both
the husband and wife.14 In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of
the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. The same principle in Guiang squarely applies to the
instant case. As shall be discussed next, there is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as
an exception to Article 124 of the Family Code.
Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage
settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property
relations between respondent and her late husband. 15 With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal
partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been
acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.16
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of
partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and
income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or
by chance.17 Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a
suppletory manner,18 the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in
all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains)
or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.19 Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late
husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code
and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails
because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife,
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their
conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court)
authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property
shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the
disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the
Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. 20 Thus, both the trial
court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject
property for lack of respondents consent.
Second, petitioner imposes the liability for the payment of the principal obligation obtained by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the conjugal partnership to the extent that it redounded to the benefit of the family. 21
Under Article 121 of the Family Code, "[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and
obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may
have been benefited; . . . ." For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the
requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly,
to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to
defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the
solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.22
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies
with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such.23 Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who
asserts, not he who denies, must prove).24 Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the
late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the
benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than
petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed,
the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the
conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted
that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer

filed with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family.
Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a
party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal,
for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.25 A party may change his legal theory on appeal only when
the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in
order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory. 26
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

JOHN ABING, petitioner, vs. JULIET WAEYAN, respondent.

DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this appeal by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner John Abing
(John, hereafter) seeks to set aside the Decision1 dated October 24, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 48675, reversing that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet, Branch 64, which
affirmed an earlier decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mankayan, Benguet in an ejectment suit
thereat commenced by the petitioner against the respondent.
In the main, the controversy is between a man and a woman who, during the good old days, lived together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, they acquired properties.
Later, they parted ways, and with it this litigation between them involving one of their common properties.
The facts:
Sometime in 1986, John and respondent Juliet Waeyan (Juliet, for short) met and fell in love with each
other. In time, the duo cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, the
couple bought a 2-storey residential house from one Benjamin Macua which was erected on a lot owned by
a certain Alejandro Dio on Aurora Street, Mankayan, Benguet. Consequent to the purchase, the tax
declaration of the 2-storey house was transferred in the name of Juliet.
On December 2, 1991, Juliet left for overseas employment in Korea. She would send money to John who
deposited the same in their joint bank account.
In 1992, the original 2-storey residential house underwent renovation. To it was annexed a new structure
which housed a sari-sari store. This new structure and the sari-sari store thereat are the properties
involved in this case.
In 1994, Juliet returned from Korea and continued to live with John. She managed the sari-sari store while
John worked as a mine employee of the Lepanto Consolidated Mining, Inc.

In 1995, the relationship between the two turned from bad to worse. Hence, they decided to partition their
properties. For the purpose, they executed on October 7, 1995 a Memorandum of Agreement.
Unfortunately, the document was left unsigned by the parties although signed by the witnesses thereto.
Under their unsigned agreement, John shall leave the couples' dwelling with Juliet paying him the amount
of P428,870.00 representing John's share in all their properties. On the same date October 7, 1995 Juliet
paid John the sum ofP232,397.66 by way of partial payment of his share, with the balance of P196,472.34
to be paid by Juliet in twelve monthly installment beginning November 1995.
Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. On account thereof, John demanded of her to vacate the
annex structure housing the sari-sari store. Juliet refused, prompting John to file an ejectment suit against
her before the MTC of Mankayan, Benguet.
In his complaint, John alleged that he alone spent for the construction of the annex structure with his own
funds and thru money he borrowed from his relatives. In fact, he added that the tax declaration for the
structure was under his name. On this premise, John claimed exclusive ownership of the subject structure,
which thereby gave him the right to eject Juliet therefrom upon the latter's failure to pay the agreed
balance due him under the aforementioned Memorandum of Agreement.
In her answer, Juliet countered that their original house was renovated thru their common funds and that
the subject structure annexed thereto was merely an attachment or an extension of their original
residential house, hence the same pertained to the two of them in common.
In a decision2 dated March 15, 1997, the MTC, on its finding that the money used in the construction of the
structure in question solely came from John, ruled that the same exclusively pertained to the latter, and
accordingly ordered Juliet's eviction therefrom, including the sari-sari store thereat, and required her to
surrender possession thereof to John, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff (John) and against the defendant (Juliet).
Defendant is hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the store in litigation covered by Tax
Declaration No. 96-001-00445 in the name of the Plaintiff and turn over possession thereof to the
latter.
Defendant is hereby further ordered to pay the Plaintiff the sum of P2,500.00 a month from the
time she withheld possession of the store in litigation in June 1996 until she vacates the same and
turn over possession thereof to the Plaintiff.
Defendant is finally ordered, to pay the sum of P5,000.00 to the Plaintiff by way of Attorney's fees;
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
On Juliet's appeal to the RTC, the latter, in its decision of July 29, 1995, affirmed that of the MTC.
Undaunted, Juliet then went to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 48675.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its Decision of October 24, 2000, 3 reversed that of the RTC, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
reversed and set aside. Petitioner, Juliet Waeyan is entitled to possess the property and maintain
therein her business.
SO ORDERED.
Partly says the CA in its reversal disposition:
It is undisputed that the parties lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
from 1986 to 1995 and that they acquired certain properties which must be divided between them
upon the termination of their common law relationship.
. . . their property relations cannot be governed by the provision of the Civil Code on conjugal
partnership... but by the rule on co-ownership.

. . . the parties' share in respect of the properties they have accumulated during their cohabitation
shall be equal unless there is proof to the contrary.
To the CA, John's evidence failed to establish that he alone spent for the construction of the annex
structure. Hence, the same pertained to both, and being a co-owner herself, Juliet cannot be evicted
therefrom, adding that if ever, John's cause of action should have been for a sum of money "because he
claims that Juliet still owes him the payment for the extension." According to the CA, ejectment cannot lie
against Juliet because Juliet's possession of the premises in dispute was not by virtue of a contract, express
or implied, nor did she obtain such possession thru force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
Hence, John's present recourse, submitting that the CA erred in
1. not giving effect to the parties' Memorandum of Agreement which should have been binding
between them albeit unsigned by both;
2. in holding that the subject premises (annex structure housing the sari-sari store) is owned by the
two of them in common;
3. in ruling that the parties should settle their common properties in a separate action for partition
even as the community character of the subject premises has not been proven.
We AFFIRM with modification.
Essentially, the issues raised center on the core question of whether or not the property subject of the suit
pertains to the exclusive ownership of petitioner, John. Departing from the factual findings of the two
courts before it, the CA found that the premises in dispute is owned in common by Juliet and John, the
latter having failed to establish by the required quantum of proof that the money spent for the
construction thereof solely came from him. Being a co-owner of the same structure, Juliet may not be
ejected there from.
While the question raised is essentially one of fact, of which the Court normally eschews from, yet, given
the conflicting factual findings of the three courts below, the Court shall go by the exception 4 to the
general rule and proceed to make its own assessment of the evidence.
First and foremost, it is undisputed that the parties hereto lived together as husband and wife from 1986 to
1995 without the benefit of marriage. Neither is it disputed that sometime in December 1991, Juliet left for
Korea and worked thereat, sending money to John which the latter deposited in their joint account. In fact,
Juliet was still in Korea when the annex structure was constructed in 1992.
Other than John's bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and money he borrowed from his
relatives, spent for the construction of the annex structure, evidence is wanting to support such naked
claim. For sure, John even failed to reveal how much he spent therefor. Neither did he divulge the names of
the alleged relatives from whom he made his borrowings, let alone the amount of money he borrowed from
them. All that petitioner could offer by way of reinforcing his claim of spending his own funds and borrowed
money in putting up the subject structure was the affidavit executed by a certain Manuel Macaraeg to the
effect that petitioner borrowedP30,000.00 from him. Even then, Macaraeg stated in his affidavit that it was
sometime in 1990 when John borrowed said amount from him. With the petitioner's own admission that the
subject structure was constructed only in 1992, or two years after he borrowed P30,000.00 from Macaraeg,
it is even doubtful whether the amount he allegedly borrowed from the latter went into the construction of
the structure in dispute. More, it is noted that while petitioner was able to present in evidence the
Macaraeg affidavit, he failed to introduce similar affidavits, if any, of his close relatives from whom he
claimed to have made similar borrowings. For sure, not a single relative came forward to confirm
petitioner's tale. In short, there is a paucity of evidence, testimonial or documentary, to support
petitioner's self-serving allegation that the annex structure which housed the sari-sari store was put up
thru his own funds and/or money borrowed by him. Sure, petitioner has in his favor the tax declaration
covering the subject structure. We have, however, ruled time and again that tax declarations do not prove
ownership but at best an indicia of claims of ownership.5 Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership, any
more than indicating possession in the concept of an owner.6 Neither tax receipts nor declaration of
ownership for taxation purposes are evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty when not
supported by other effective proofs.7
In this connection, Article 147 of the Family Code is instructive. It reads:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof
if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by common-law
spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and
is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership.
And under this regime, they owned their properties in common "in equal shares." Being herself a co-owner
of the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.
True it is that under Article 4878 of the Civil Code, a co-owner may bring an action for ejectment against a
co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of a common property. It bears
stressing, however, that in this case, evidence is totally wanting to establish John's or Juliet's exclusive
ownership of the property in question. Neither did Juliet obtain possession thereof by virtue of a contract,
express or implied, or thru intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. As borne by the record, Juliet was in
possession of the subject structure and the sari-sari store thereat by virtue of her being a co-owner
thereof. As such, she is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as John.
We, however, disagree with the ruling of the CA that the subject Memorandum of Agreement, being
unsigned by Juliet and John, has no binding effect between them.
It is a matter of record that pursuant to said Agreement, Juliet did pay John the amount of P232,397.66, as
initial payment for John's share in their common properties, with the balance of P196,472.34 payable in
twelve monthly installments beginning November 1995. It is also a matter of record that the Agreement
was signed by the witnesses thereto. Hence, the irrelevant circumstances that the Agreement was left
unsigned by Juliet and John cannot adversely affect its binding force or effect between them, as evidently,
Juliet's initial payment ofP232,397.66 to John was in fulfillment of what the parties had agreed upon
thereunder. However, and as correctly held by the CA, Juliet's failure to pay John the balance of the latter's
share in their common properties could at best give rise to an action for a sum of money against Juliet, or
for rescission of the said agreement and not for ejectment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed CA Decision is AFFIRMED, except that portion
thereof denying effect to the parties' Memorandum of Agreement for being unsigned by both.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

LUPO ATIENZA, Petitioner, vs. YOLANDA DE CASTRO, Respondent.

DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision 1 dated April 29,
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69797, as reiterated in its Resolution 2 of September
16, 2005, reversing an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 61, in an
action for Judicial Partition of Real Property thereat commenced by the herein petitioner Lupo Atienza
against respondent Yolanda de Castro.
The facts:
Sometime in 1983, petitioner Lupo Atienza, then the President and General Manager of Enrico Shipping
Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired the services of respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as
accountant for the two corporations.
In the course of time, the relationship between Lupo and Yolanda became intimate. Despite Lupo being a
married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived together in consortium beginning the later part of 1983. Out
of their union, two children were born. However, after the birth of their second child, their relationship
turned sour until they parted ways.
On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint against Yolanda for the judicial partition
between them of a parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 147828 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City. In his complaint,
docketed in said court as Civil Case No. 92-1423, Lupo alleged that the subject property was acquired
during his union with Yolanda as common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by them.
Elaborating, Lupo averred in his complaint that the property in question was acquired by Yolanda sometime
in 1987 using his exclusive funds and that the title thereto was transferred by the seller in Yolandas name
without his knowledge and consent. He did not interpose any objection thereto because at the time, their
affair was still thriving. It was only after their separation and his receipt of information that Yolanda allowed
her new live-in partner to live in the disputed property, when he demanded his share thereat as a coowner.
In her answer, Yolanda denied Lupos allegations. According to her, she acquired the same property for Two
Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,600,000.00) using her exclusive funds. She insisted having bought
it thru her own savings and earnings as a businesswoman.
In a decision3 dated December 11, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment for Lupo by declaring the
contested property as owned in common by him and Yolanda and ordering its partition between the two in
equal shares, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 147828 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City to be owned in common by plaintiff LUPO ATIENZA and
the defendant YOLANDA U. DE CASTRO share-and-share alike and ordering the partition of said property
between them. Upon the finality of this Decision, the parties are hereby directed to submit for the
confirmation of the Court a mutually agreed project of partition of said property or, in case the physical
partition of said property is not feasible because of its nature, that either the same be assigned to one of
the parties who shall pay the value corresponding to the share of the other or that the property to be sold
and the proceeds thereof be divided equally between the parties after deducting the expenses incident to
said sale.
The parties shall bear their own attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.
Costs against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.
From the decision of the trial court, Yolanda went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 69797, therein
arguing that the evidence on record preponderate that she purchased the disputed property in her own
name with her own money. She maintained that the documents appertaining to her acquisition thereof are
the best evidence to prove who actually bought it, and refuted the findings of the trial court, as well as
Lupos assertions casting doubt as to her financial capacity to acquire the disputed property.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate court, in its decision4 of April 29, 2005, reversed and set
aside that of the trial court and adjudged the litigated property as exclusively owned by Yolanda, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The
subject property is hereby declared to be exclusively owned by defendant-appellant Yolanda U. De Castro.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
In decreeing the disputed property as exclusively owned by Yolanda, the CA ruled that under the provisions
of Article 148 of the Family Code vis--vis the evidence on record and attending circumstances, Yolandas
claim of sole ownership is meritorious, as it has been substantiated by competent evidence. To the CA,
Lupo failed to overcome the burden of proving his allegation that the subject property was purchased by
Yolanda thru his exclusive funds.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its Resolution of September 16,
2005,5 Lupo is now with this Court via the present recourse arguing that pursuant to Article 144 6 of the
Civil Code, he was in no way burdened to prove that he contributed to the acquisition of the subject
property because with or without the contribution by either partner, he is deemed a co-owner thereof,
adding that under Article 4847 of Civil Code, as long as the property was acquired by either or both of them
during their extramarital union, such property would be legally owned by them in common and governed
by the rules on co-ownership, which apply in default of contracts, or special provisions.
We DENY.
It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because petitioner Lupo
Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with the respondent. Their
property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 1488 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man
and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this
regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions ...9 Proof of actual contribution is required.10
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership
will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof
of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. 11
Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended
precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. 12 Before Article 148 of the Family Code was
enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or
concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family
Code took effect, Article 148 governs.13
The applicable law being settled, we now remind the petitioner that here, as in other civil cases, the
burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had
on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. The
petitioner as plaintiff below is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the
defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint.
Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff
warrant such relief.14 Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is
not evidence.15
It is the petitioners posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to acquire the property in
question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise the amount
needed therefor. Unfortunately for petitioner, his submissions are burdened by the fact that his claim to
the property contradicts duly written instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell dated March 24, 1987, the Deed
of Assignment of Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all
entered into by and between the respondent and the vendor of said property, to the exclusion of the
petitioner. As aptly pointed out by the CA:

Contrary to the disquisition of the trial court, [Lupo] failed to overcome this burden. Perusing the records of
the case, it is evident that the trial court committed errors of judgment in its findings of fact and
appreciation of evidence with regard to the source of the funds used for the purchase of the disputed
property and ultimately the rightful owner thereof. Factual findings of the trial court are indeed entitled to
respect and shall not be disturbed, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked or misinterpreted that would otherwise materially affect the disposition of the case.
In making proof of his case, it is paramount that the best and most complete evidence be formally entered.
Rather than presenting proof of his actual contribution to the purchase money used as consideration for
the disputed property, [Lupo] diverted the burden imposed upon him to [Yolanda] by painting her as a
shrewd and scheming woman without the capacity to purchase any property. Instead of proving his
ownership, or the extent thereof, over the subject property, [Lupo] relegated his complaint to a mere
attack on the financial capacity of [Yolanda]. He presented documents pertaining to the ins and outs of the
dollar accounts of ENRICO and EURASIAN, which unfortunately failed to prove his actual contribution in the
purchase of the said property. The fact that [Yolanda] had a limited access to the funds of the said
corporations and had repeatedly withdrawn money from their bank accounts for their behalf do not prove
that the money she used in buying the disputed property, or any property for that matter, came from said
withdrawals.
As it is, the disquisition of the court a quo heavily rested on the apparent financial capacity of the
parties.1wphi1 On one side, there is [Lupo], a retired sea captain and the President and General Manager
of two corporations and on the other is [Yolanda], a Certified Public Accountant. Surmising that [Lupo] is
financially well heeled than [Yolanda], the court a quo concluded, sans evidence, that [Yolanda] had taken
advantage of [Lupo]. Clearly, the court a quo is in error. (Words in brackets supplied.)
As we see it, petitioners claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only
did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of
documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In
contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find no
relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by
sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is
not evidence.
True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the
certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest
subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already stated, petitioners evidence in
support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial courts finding that the disputed
property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to petitioners dismal failure
to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to present preponderant evidence of her sole ownership.
There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently established that she
derived the funds used to purchase the property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a
businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She presented her
clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her
bank account statements and bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay
the purchase price of the subject property.
All told, the Court finds and so holds that the CA committed no reversible error in rendering the herein
challenged decision and resolution.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed issuances of the CA are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

ALAIN M. DIO , Petitioner, vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, Respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision2 and the 12 March 2007
Order3of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts.
They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and
respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel
Aguilar of Las Pias City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in
her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family,
choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family
assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and
hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the
petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons, respondent
did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that
respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the
Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent
married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.

On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of
collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system
since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondents disorder was long-lasting and by nature,
incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration
of the marriage.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish respondents
psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayags psychological report, the
allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of psychological
incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that respondent committed acts which hurt and
embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity required of her under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that
respondent abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on
January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50
and 51 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the City
Prosecutor, Las Pias City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute community
of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles
50 and 51 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18 October 2006
Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on
January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution
of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Pias City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information and
guidance.5
Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family
Code.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its
cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article
147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or
all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases,
the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void. 9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147
of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases
governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:

Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall
also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment
under Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership shall be
notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance
with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of
the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities,
unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the
judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the value
of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which
are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code.
In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the
properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was
contracted.1avvphilUnder Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
Thus we ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting
a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void. 11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which
are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. 12 In
both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of
property13 or conjugal partnership of gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property
in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate,
partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case
for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the
ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 15 of the Family Code
and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by
petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property
relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should
be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil

Code, "[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is
not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting for
the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner, vs. AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of CoLlli assailing the
October 8, 2009 Decision2 and January 24, 2011 Resolution3 of the court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
01940, which affirmed the February 28, 2007 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental,
Branch 34 in Civil Case No. I 2884. The foregoing rulings dissolved the conjugal partnership of gains of
Willem Beumer (petitioner) and Avelina Amores (respondent) and distributed the properties forming part of
the said property regime.
The Factual Antecedents
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several years, the
RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of their marriage in the Decision 5 dated November
10, 2000 on the basis of the formers psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership 6 dated December 14, 2000
praying for the distribution of the following described properties claimed to have been acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage, to wit:
By Purchase:
a. Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22846, containing an area of 252 square meters
(sq.m.), including a residential house constructed thereon.
b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21974, containing an area of 806
sq.m., including a residential house constructed thereon.
c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21306, containing an area of 756 sq.m.
d. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre,
covered by TCT No. 21307, containing an area of 45 sq.m.
By way of inheritance:
e. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23567, containing an area of
2,635 sq.m. (the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 376.45 sq.m.).
f. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23575, containing an area of
360 sq.m. (the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.). 7
In defense,8 respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and
2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being that
she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots
2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance.9 She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and petitioner
attesting to the fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her own
money.10 Accordingly, respondent sought the dismissal of the petition for dissolution as well as payment for
attorneys fees and litigation expenses.11

During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of
respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his
disability benefit12since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also
claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was
contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid. 13
For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots came exclusively
from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from selling jewelry as well as products from Avon,
Triumph and Tupperware.14 She further asserted that after she filed for annulment of their marriage in
1996, petitioner transferred to their second house and brought along with him certain personal properties,
consisting of drills, a welding machine, grinders, clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools and equipment
have a total cost of P500,000.00.15
The RTC Ruling
On February 28, 2007, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 rendered its Decision, dissolving the parties
conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of land to respondent as her paraphernal properties; the
tools and equipment in favor of petitioner as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on Lots
1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties, the dispositive of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
between petitioner Willem Beumer and respondent Avelina Amores considering the fact that their marriage
was previously annulled by Branch 32 of this Court. The parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Titles Nos. 22846, 21974, 21306, 21307, 23567 and 23575 are hereby declared paraphernal properties of
respondent Avelina Amores due to the fact that while these real properties were acquired by onerous title
during their marital union, Willem Beumer, being a foreigner, is not allowed by law to acquire any private
land in the Philippines, except through inheritance.
The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment mentioned in the complaint which were brought out by
Willem from the conjugal dwelling are hereby declared to be exclusively owned by the petitioner.
The two houses standing on the lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 21974 and 22846 are
hereby declared to be co-owned by the petitioner and the respondent since these were acquired during
their marital union and since there is no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings and residential
units. Petitioner and respondent are, thereby, directed to subject this court for approval their project of
partition on the two houses aforementioned.
The Court finds no sufficient justification to award the counterclaim of respondent for attorneys fees
considering the well settled doctrine that there should be no premium on the right to litigate. The prayer
for moral damages are likewise denied for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.16
It ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4, petitioner
could not have acquired any right whatsoever over these properties as petitioner still attempted to acquire
them notwithstanding his knowledge of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of private
lands.17 This was made evident by the sworn statements petitioner executed purporting to show that the
subject parcels of land were purchased from the exclusive funds of his wife, the herein
respondent.18 Petitioners plea for reimbursement for the amount he had paid to purchase the foregoing
properties on the basis of equity was likewise denied for not having come to court with clean hands.
The CA Ruling
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, contesting only the RTCs award of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 in
favor of respondent. He insisted that the money used to purchase the foregoing properties came from his
own capital funds and that they were registered in the name of his former wife only because of the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of one-half (1/2) of
the value of what he had paid in the purchase of the said properties, waiving the other half in favor of his
estranged ex-wife.19
On October 8, 2009, the CA promulgated a Decision 20 affirming in toto the judgment rendered by the RTC
of Negros Oriental, Branch 34. The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the

constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines." 21 Hence, he cannot invoke equity to
support his claim for reimbursement.
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision due to
the following error:
UNDER THE FACTS ESTABLISHED, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE PETITIONERS ATTEMPT AT
SUBSEQUENTLY ASSERTING OR CLAIMING A RIGHT OF HALF OR WHOLE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE USED IN
THE PURCHASE OF THE REAL PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THIS CASE. 22 (Emphasis supplied)
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena
Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller23 the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the
value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former
Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the
prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land 24 enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional
prohibition"25 and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the
subject properties in the latters name.26 Clearly, petitioners actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt
the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not
apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioners claim for reimbursement.
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he
who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not
be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. 27
In this case, petitioners statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the subject
parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a joint
affidavit that respondents personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1, 28 he likewise claimed that his
personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his
untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded
from seeking any equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given
that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase.
It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly
which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. 29 Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution
and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at
all.30 Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, 31 petitioner cannot have the subject properties
deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not
aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. 32 Indeed, one
cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. 33 As
held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money
spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is
proscribed by the Constitution, to wit:
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return
the same to him.1wphi1

The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No
person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been
paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as
in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It
may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject
properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in
the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the
plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake,
however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the
defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff." 34 (Citations
omitted)
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship. 35 Precisely, it is
the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To
be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to
the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were
properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the
prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony36 and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to
protect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed October 8, 2009 Decision and January 24,
2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR., Petitioner, vs. EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari1 assails the 16 March 2012 Decision2 and the 28 June 2012
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322. The CA affirmed the 26 September 2008
Order4 of the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14 (RTC), in Civil Case No. 787.
The Facts
On 7 September 1985, petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. (Salas) and respondent Eden Villena Aguila (Aguila)
were married. On 7 June 1986, Aguila gave birth to their daughter, Joan Jiselle. Five months later, Salas left
their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or their daughter.
On 7 October 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage (petition) citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they "have no
conjugal properties whatsoever."5 In the Return of Summons dated 13 October 2003, the sheriff narrated
that Salas instructed his mother Luisa Salas to receive the copy of summons and the petition. 6

On 7 May 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision7 declaring the nullity of the marriage of Salas and Aguila (RTC
Decision). The RTC Decision further provides for the "dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, if
any."8
On 10 September 2007, Aguila filed a Manifestation and Motion 9 stating that she discovered: (a) two 200square-meter parcels of land with improvements located in San Bartolome, Quezon City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-259299-A and TCT No. N-255497; and (b) a 108-square-meter
parcel of land with improvement located in Tondo, Manila, covered by TCT No. 243373 (collectively,
"Discovered Properties"). The registered owner of the Discovered Properties is "Juan S.Salas, married to
Rubina C. Salas." The manifestation was set for hearing on 21 September 2007. However, Salas notice of
hearing was returned unserved with the remark, "RTS Refused To Receive."
On 19 September 2007, Salas filed a Manifestation with Entry of Appearance 10 requesting for an Entry of
Judgment of the RTC Decision since no motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed and no conjugal
property was involved.
On 21 September 2007, the hearing for Aguilas manifestation ensued, with Aguila, her counsel and the
state prosecutor present. During the hearing, Aguila testified that on 17 April 2007 someone informed her
of the existence of the Discovered Properties. Thereafter, she verified the information and secured copies
of TCTs of the Discovered Properties. When asked to clarify, Aguila testified that Rubina C. Salas (Rubina) is
Salas common-law wife.11
On 8 February 2008, Salas filed an Opposition to the Manifestation12 alleging that there is no conjugal
property to be partitioned based on Aguilas petition. According to Salas, Aguilas statement was a judicial
admission and was not made through palpable mistake. Salas claimed that Aguila waived her right to the
Discovered Properties. Salas likewise enumerated properties he allegedly waived in favor of Aguila, to wit:
(1) parcels of land with improvements located in Sugar Landing Subdivision, Alangilan, Batangas City; No.
176 Brias Street, Nasugbu, Batangas; P. Samaniego Street, Silangan, Nasugbu, Batangas; and Batangas
City, financed by Filinvest; (2) cash amounting to P200,000.00; and (3) motor vehicles, specifically Honda
City and Toyota Tamaraw FX(collectively, "Waived Properties"). Thus, Salas contended that the conjugal
properties were deemed partitioned.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its 26 September 2008 Order, the RTC ruled in favor of Aguila. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises being considered, the petitioner and the respondent are hereby directed
to partition between themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, the following properties, without
prejudice to the legitime of their legitimate child, Joan Jisselle Aguila Salas:
(1) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S. Salas married to Rubina C. Salas located in San
Bartolome, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. N-259299-A marked as Exhibit "A" and its
improvements;
(2) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S.Salas married to Rubina C. Salas located in San
Bartolome, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. N-255497 marked as Exhibit "B" and its
improvements;
(3) A parcel of land registered in the name of Juan S.Salas married to Rubina Cortez Salas located in
Tondo and covered by TCT No. 243373-Ind. marked as Exhibit "D" and its improvements.
Thereafter, the Court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon bythe parties, and such partition, together
with the Order of the Court confirming the same, shall be recorded in the Registry of Deeds of the place in
which the property is situated.
SO ORDERED.13
The RTC held that pursuant to the Rules,14 even upon entry of judgment granting the annulment of
marriage, the court can proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the conjugal partnership
of gains if it has not been judicially adjudicated upon, as in this case. The RTC found that the Discovered
Properties are among the conjugal properties to be partitioned and distributed between Salas and Aguila.
However, the RTC held that Salas failed to prove the existence of the Waived Properties.

On 11 November 2008, Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, claiming that: (1) she is Rubina Cortez, a
widow and unmarried to Salas; (2) the Discovered Properties are her paraphernal properties; (3) Salas did
not contribute money to purchase the Discovered Properties as he had no permanent job in Japan; (4) the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her as she was not a party in the case; and (5) she authorized her
brother to purchase the Discovered Properties but because he was not well-versed with legal
documentation, he registered the properties in the name of "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas."
In its 16 December 2009 Order, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Salas. The RTC
found that Salas failed to prove his allegation that Aguila transferred the Waived Properties to third
persons. The RTC emphasized that it cannot go beyond the TCTs, which state that Salas is the registered
owner of the Discovered Properties. The RTC further held that Salas and Rubina were at fault for failing to
correct the TCTs, if they were not married as they claimed.
Hence, Salas filed an appeal with the CA.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 16 March 2012, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC.15 The CA ruled that Aguilas statement in her
petition is not a judicial admission. The CA pointed out that the petition was filed on 7 October 2003, but
Aguila found the Discovered Properties only on 17 April 2007 or before the promulgation of the RTC
decision. Thus, the CA concluded that Aguila was palpably mistaken in her petition and it would be unfair
to punish her over a matter that she had no knowledge of at the time she made the admission. The CA
also ruled that Salas was not deprived of the opportunity to refute Aguilas allegations in her
manifestation, even though he was not present in its hearing. The CA likewise held that Rubina cannot
collaterally attack a certificate of title.
In a Resolution dated 28 June 2012,16 the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration17 filed by Salas. Hence,
this petition.
The Issues
Salas seeks a reversal and raises the following issues for resolution:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision ordering the partition of the
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. N-259299-A and N-255497 in Quezon City and as well as the
property in Manila covered by TCT No. 243373 between petitioner and respondent.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision in not allowing Rubina C. Cortez
to intervene in this case18
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Since the original manifestation was an action for partition, this Court cannot order a division of the
property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of a co-ownership. 19 Thus, the
settlement of the issue of ownership is the first stage in this action. 20
Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it by a
preponderance of evidence.21 Salas alleged that contrary to Aguilas petition stating that they had no
conjugal property, they actually acquired the Waived Properties during their marriage. However, the RTC
found, and the CA affirmed, that Salas failed to prove the existence and acquisition of the Waived
Properties during their marriage:
A perusal of the record shows that the documents submitted by [Salas] as the properties allegedly
registered in the name of [Aguila] are merely photocopies and not certified true copies, hence, this Court
cannot admit the same as part of the records of this case. These are the following:
(1) TCT No. T-65876 a parcel of land located at Poblacion, Nasugbu, Batangas, registered in the
name of Eden A. Salas, married to Juan Salas Jr. which is cancelled by TCT No. T-105443 in the name
of Joan Jiselle A. Salas, single;
(2) TCT No. T-68066 a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Landing, Nasugbu, Batangas,
registered in the name of Eden A. Salas, married to Juan S. Salas Jr.

Moreover, [Aguila] submitted original copy of Certification issued by Ms. Erlinda A. Dasal, Municipal
Assessor of Nasugbu, Batangas, certifying that [Aguila] has no real property (land and improvement) listed
in the Assessment Roll for taxation purposes, as of September 17, 2008.
Such evidence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, has the presumption of regularity. x x x.
Suffice it to say that such real properties are existing and registered in the name of [Aguila], certified true
copies thereof should have been the ones submitted to this Court. Moreover, there is also a presumption
that properties registered in the Registry of Deeds are also declared in the Assessment Roll for taxation
purposes.22
On the other hand, Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during their
marriage.1wphi1Both the RTC and the CA agreed that the Discovered Properties registered in Salas name
were acquired during his marriage with Aguila. The TCTs of the Discovered Properties were entered on 2
July 1999 and 29 September 2003, or during the validity of Salas and Aguilas marriage. In Villanueva v.
Court of Appeals,23 we held that the question of whether the properties were acquired during the marriage
is a factual issue. Factual findings of the RTC, particularly if affirmed by the CA, are binding on us, except
under compelling circumstances not present in this case. 24
On Salas allegation that he was not accorded due process for failing to attend the hearing of Aguilas
manifestation, we find the allegation untenable. The essence of due process is opportunity to be heard. We
hold that Salas was given such opportunity when he filed his opposition to the manifestation, submitted
evidence and filed his appeal. On both Salas and Rubinas contention that Rubina owns the Discovered
Properties, we likewise find the contention unmeritorious. The TCTs state that "Juan S. Salas, married to
Rubina C. Salas" is the registered owner of the Discovered Properties. A Torrens title is generally a
conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to, because there is a strong presumption that it
is valid and regularly issued.25 The phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner.26 Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute the ownership of the Discovered Properties
in his opposition to the manifestation. It was only when Rubina intervened that Salas supported Rubinas
statement that she owns the Discovered Properties.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the Discovered Properties, she has
no right to intervene in this case. The Rules of Court provide that only "a person who has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action." 27
In Dio v. Dio,28 we held that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this case. Article147 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or
dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or
all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases,
the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (Emphasis supplied)
Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through the couples joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. 29 In the present
case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where the ground for nullity of marriage was
also psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during the union of the parties, as

found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership. 30 Accordingly, the partition of the
Discovered Properties as ordered by the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but on the basis of coownership and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated16 March 2012 and the Resolution dated
28 June 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322.
SO ORDERED.
GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI,
JUDGE LUIS B. BELLO, JR., PRESIDING, and PEDRO G. HERNANDO, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana 1 against private respondent, this case assumed another
dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brother-in-law
the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise.
Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties exerted earnest towards a compromise and that
the same failed. However, private respondent Pedro G. Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect
since he did not file any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on this ground in his answer. It was
only on 7 December 1992, at the pre-trial conference, that the relationship of petitioner Gaudencio
Guerrero and respondent Hernando was noted by respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., they being married to
half-sisters hence are brothers-in-law, and on the basis thereof respondent Judge gave petitioner five (5)
days "to file his motion and amended complaint" to allege that the parties were very close relatives, their
respective wives being sisters, and that the complaint to be maintained should allege that earnest efforts
towards a compromise were exerted but failed. Apparently, respondent Judge considered this deficiency a
jurisdictional defect.
On 11 December 1992, Guerrero moved to reconsider the 7 December 1992 Order claiming that since
brothers by affinity are not members of the same family, he was not required to exert efforts towards a
compromise. Guerrero likewise argued that Hernando was precluded from raising this issue since he did
not file a motion to dismiss nor assert the same as an affirmative defense in his answer.
On 22 December 1992, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration holding that "[f]ailure to
allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise is jurisdictional such that for failure to allege same the
court would be deprived of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case." He warned that unless the
complaint was amended within five (5) days the case would be dismissed.
On 29 January 1993, the 5-day period having expired without Guerrero amending his complaint,
respondent Judge dismissed the case, declaring the dismissal however to be without prejudice.
Guerrero appeals by way of this petition for review the dismissal by the court a quo. He raises these legal
issues: (a) whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family contemplated in Art.
217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of
Court requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise before a suit between them may be instituted and
maintained; and, (b) whether the absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a
compromise were exerted, which efforts failed, is a ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to strengthen it as a basic autonomous
social institution. 2 This is also embodied in Art. 149, 3 and given flesh in Art. 151, of the Family Code, which
provides:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear
from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same had failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the
case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the
Civil Code.
Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word "No", the requirement is
mandatory 4 that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts

towards a compromise have been made but that the same failed, so that "[i]f it is shown that no such
efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed."
Further, Art. 151 is contemplated by Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court which provides as a
ground for motion to dismiss "(t)hat the suit is between members of the same family and no earnest
efforts towards a compromise have been made."
The Code Commission, which drafted the precursor provision in the Civil Code, explains the reason for the
requirement that earnest efforts at compromise be first exerted before a complaint is given due course
This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle
than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort
should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and
passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper
bitterness than between strangers . . . A litigation in a family is to be lamented far more than
a lawsuit between strangers . . . 5
But the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the
above-quoted provisions. As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon 6 that the
enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as members of the same family does not comprehend "sisters-inlaw". In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-inlaw") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of
the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of "members of the family", we find no reason
to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner
Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts
towards a compromise before filing the present suit.
In his Comment, Hernando argues that ". . . although both wives of the parties were not impleaded, it
remains a truism that being spouses of the contending parties, and the litigation involves ownership of real
property, the spouses' interest and participation in the land in question cannot be denied, making the suit
still a suit between half-sisters . . ." 7
Finding this argument preposterous, Guerrero counters in his Reply that his "wife has no actual interest and
participation in the land subject of the . . . suit, which the petitioner bought, according to his complaint,
before he married his wife." 8 This factual controversy however may be best left to the court a quo to
resolve when it resumes hearing the case.
As regards the second issue, we need only reiterate our ruling in
O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit, 9 citing Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 10 that the attempt to compromise as well as
the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same
family, the absence of such allegation in the complaint being assailable at any stage of the proceeding,
even on appeal, for lack of cause of action.
It is not therefore correct, as petitioner contends, that private respondent may be deemed to have waived
the aforesaid defect in failing to move or dismiss or raise the same in the Answer. On the other hand, we
cannot sustain the proposition of private respondent that the case was, after all, also dismissed pursuant
to Sec. 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court 11 for failure of petitioner to comply with the court's order to amend
his complaint.
A review of the assailed orders does not show any directive which Guerrero supposedly defied. The Order
of 7 December 1992 merely gave Guerrero five (5) days to file his motion and amended complaint with a
reminder that the complaint failed to allege that earnest efforts were exerted towards a compromise. The
Order of 22 December 1992, which denied Guerrero's motion for reconsideration, simply stated that
"Plaintiff if it (sic) so desire must
amend the complaint otherwise, the court will have to dismiss the case (emphasis supplied) . . ." The Order
of 29 January 1993 dismissing the case without prejudice only made reference to an earlier order
"admonishing" counsel for Guerrero to amend the complaint, and an "admonition" is not synonymous with
"order". Moreover, since the assailed orders do not find support in our jurisprudence but, on the other
hand, are based on an erroneous interpretation and application of the law, petitioner could not be bound to
comply with them. 12
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders of
7 December 1992, 22 December 1992 and 29 January 1993 are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City, Branch 16, or whichever branch of the court the case may now be assigned, is directed to

continue with Civil Case

No. 10084-16 with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.