Intentions matter.

Kantian ethics is seen as one of the best examples of a robust deontological ethical
system. I will argue that his attempts to explain moral motivation are difficult to uphold if not entirely
impossible.

What do we mean by moral motivation and is this different from other motivation?

It seems a common analysis of morality to suggest that it is a motivating factor in our everyday lives. It
certainly seems so in the majority of cases, where people we could consider normal adults judge
something to be wrong or bad they will endeavour to avoid that behaviour or even thought.

In using the specific term “moral motivation” we imply there is some other form of motivation,
otherwise we would merely say “motivation”. We should now find ourselves asking what other forms of
motivation exist and how they might differ from moral motivation.

It doesn't require much philosophy to imagine what other things we might consider as motivation. Most
people will openly admit to being motivated by their own interests, desires and what Kant would call
impulsion. Some people argue that we are motivated solely from our own desires.

What does Kant attribute moral motivation to?

Kant acknowledges standard conceptions of motivation, motivators like self interest and other desires
may even correlate with what would be morally correct, but these other motivators are not moral
motivators, that is they do not posses moral worth.

Kant attributes moral worthiness to actions motivated by duty. Duty is the concept used to demonstrate
or help explain what it is when we are acting from a good will and in accordance with the moral law in
the face of contradictory impulses or desires. Even when we find ourselves and our desires with no great
contradiction to duty, our actions may yet be amoral. We might want to help victims of disasters such as
those in Haiti and Chile. We may act in this way because giving money to charity can be deducted from
our taxes and we would rather give it to a charity than the government – this would not be moral
motivation but some kind of normative motivation. But we can act morally in our recognition of and our
agreement with the moral law, giving what we do to charity because we find it to be required by the
categorical imperative in all its formulations.

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As Paton explains, a person with a perfectly good will would not have contradictory impulses or desires
with which to contend and so the concept of duty would not apply1. Because people are not perfect,
however, acting from duty is used as a way of exemplifying instances of the good will overcoming an
agent’s desire – or rather exemplifying an instance where an agent disregards their impulses
(contradictory or not) out of reverence for the moral law.

To be morally motivated then, is to be motivated by a sense of duty as opposed to impulsion. But can we
really be motivated by duty at all?

Is this source of motivation forceful; that is, does it motivate?

It seems that to be morally motivated in any Kantian sense we must be motivated strictly by belief. The
argument seems to suggest we can attribute moral worth to our actions and motivation when we use
reason to formulate a maxim in accordance with the categorical imperative. We use prior beliefs to
formulate a new belief and upon realising our belief to be true we are motivated to act in such a way as
we now believe to be right. This view is not without its problems, however. While Kant does not ignore
desire as a motivator, he provides no argument to support the idea of belief as a motivator.

It is worth summarising, quickly, what we mean by beliefs and desires. They are both representations;
beliefs represent the way the world is and can be either true or false, upon discovery that the belief is
false it dissipates. The role of desires on the other hand are to represent the way the world would have
to be in order to dissipate said desire.

On the face of it, desires seem to provide a goal while beliefs tell you if the goal has been achieved. I
desire to drink water, I believe the desire to be unfulfilled. Upon drinking the water I am learning the
status of the world has changed to match that of the desire. The desire is now dispersed while the belief
I have drunk water is acquired and persists.

I will argue that the Kantian must accept one of two positions. Either the first position, that we can never
be morally motivated or second (and simply) that he is wrong. If we are only motivated by desire then
we can never be motivated by duty other than by desiring to be dutiful. If this is the case we will never

1 Paton p.?

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be motivated by duty and so never morally motivated. Otherwise, by placing moral importance on duty,
Kant has made a mistake and is wrong. So, I must provide evidence which will suggest we are motivated
only by desire or that we must have some other factor to accompany belief in order to be motivated.

Humean motivation

While David Hume was an obvious empiricist and would have subsequently valued the use of reason as a
tool for investigation, philosophy and science, reason was just that – a tool. Kant of course believed we
could be motivated by reason and the beliefs they formulated (duty), but Hume saw the role of reason
solely in formulating beliefs.

Hume suggested we are only ever motivated by our desires. He hypothesised an agent was only ever
motivated to act in a certain way when the agent had an appropriate desire and a means-end belief that
acting in that certain way would satisfy such an appropriate desire. Reason, for Hume, is a slave to the
passions2.

It certainly seems like desire might be at the heart of any motivation we feel. If I go to the shop it is
because I desire to buy something or check the price of something I desire before assessing the value of
my desire for the item versus the desire for the money it would cost. My studying philosophy is a result
of several desires; my desire for a degree, my desire to acquire knowledge and an interest in philosophy.
A Humean would suggest my desire for a degree is the basic desire, and my belief that I need to study to
acquire the degree leads me to desire to studying. This gives rise to the question of how we can clearly
say it is my desire for a degree that is the foundational desire, how do we know it is not some other
desire – or even a belief.

Motivated Desire

Which is the foundational desire is irrelevant for now, for the sake of this argument we are merely
concerned with the investigation of the foundations of our desire. This line of enquiry may offer the
Kantian theory of motivation a possible explanation; perhaps we are motivated directly by desire, but
perhaps our desires are extensions of deeper desires and perhaps even of beliefs.

2 Hume p.462

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Consider that you come home from work one day, and decide to have dinner. This is quite an ordinary
example. Its easy to imagine a desire for food, we so often desire food especially after a long day at
work. It is also easy to imagine we just notice this hunger where there was none before. This would be
an example of an unmotivated desire.

Reconsider my previous example, that I desire a degree. The actual degree may be unimportant to me,
quite like what I have for breakfast is unimportant, so long as I have something. I may be motivated to
get a degree because I desire better pay once in employment. My desire for a degree is motivated then.

This is all very straightforward, but not directly in support of the Kantian position on motivation.
However, Consider I decide to get a degree simply because I believe it is prudential. It seems that in this
case I am motivated by a belief. However, the Humean could reply that I have a desire to be prudential
and so will opt for whichever option I deem most prudential. It seems this is a weak example then and I
suggest a better example would be that of hunger. If I am hungry and there is no food I will go and buy
food or otherwise find a way to satisfy my hunger, this is uncontroversial.

It also seems uncontroversial to say that I may buy food, even if I am not hungry, in anticipation of a
future hunger. This example is what leads me to suggest the next case, which is perhaps the most likely
to give the Kantian theory hope. In this case it seems very much like I am motivated to buy food based
on the belief I will later be hungry.

I would expect a simple Humean response here. The Humean might be tempted to say that we are
merely being prudential and we are expressing some form of latent or default desire to be prudential.
However this is easily countered. There are times I have been in a shop and chosen not to buy food, in
the knowledge I would need it for that evening or the next morning. We can't really claim there are
latent or default desires, much less ones specifically concerned with being prudential. It is empirically
untestable claim, and would give rise to accusations of question begging.

Claims of latent or default desires are easily disregarded, but there are other ways a Humean could
respond. The Humean can still maintain that desire is the cause of the motivation, and not belief. The
Humean could argue that we are making a choice between conflicting desires. There will be some
purpose to my being in the shop when I never bought the food I knew I ought to, perhaps that purpose

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negated my buying food. For example, I may have needed food but had a conflicting desire not to carry it
around with me all day. Alternately, I could have had some conflicting desire to save money, or to eat
less. The Kantian has a response.

I will acknowledge that in these examples it seems like reason is acting as a motivating force. Reason is
telling us to act upon one desire and not the other. If reason is what is telling us to act here, then it
seems reason and thus duty can motivate. I think this would be a misconception.

To show how reason is actually being used in this case I will offer an example. In electronics, devices
often make use of logic gates. These components are designed to take one of more inputs and give an
appropriate output. The logic gates function only if there is current. I think this is comparable with the
role of desire and reason. Reason functions like these logic gates, taking one or more inputs and deciding
an output. However, it would seem absurd to suggest that the logic gate is solely responsible in creating
the output. The logic gate cannot function without a current any more than reason can function without
comparable desires. Reason cannot be the sole creator of motivation and requires either a fundamental
or parallel desire with which to form any motivating force.

Conclusion

What I hope to have established here is that reason cannot motivate by itself. As opposed to being
dependant upon desire, reason might work with desire to create motivation in some cases, perhaps it is
the case that desire can motivate either alone or in association with reason. If this is true, the Kantian
has to admit we can never be truly motivated by reason alone which implies we can never be motivated
strictly by duty and that means our motivation and subsequent actions would lack moral worth. If the
Kantian does not want to recognise this, and assuming I am correct, they must be wrong.

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 Bibliography

– Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, 1739 (republished 1985), London: Penguin

– Kant, I. & Paton, H. J, Kant – The Moral Law and Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals,
Trans. H. J. Paton, 1991, New York: Routledge

– Stratton-Lake, P., Kant, Duty and Moral Worth, 2000, New York: Routledge

– Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

– “Hume's Moral Philosophy”, available online at

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/, last accessed 15/03/2010

– “Kant's Moral Philosophy”, available online at

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/, last accessed 15/03/2010

– “Moral Motivation”, available online at

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-motivation/ , last accessed 15/03/2010

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