Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,
vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J:
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a judge."
The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of
Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case was referred on October 28, 1968 for investigation,
thus:
Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R. Bales,
Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita
R. Macariola, defendant, concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of the
plaintiff and defendant.
In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among other things that; a) plaintiff Sinforosa R.
Bales was not a daughter of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the deceased were defendant
Macariola, she being the only offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and the
remaining plaintiffs who were the children of the deceased by his second marriage with Irene Ondez; c) the properties
left by the deceased were all the conjugal properties of the latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties
were acquired by the deceased during his second marriage; d) if there was any partition to be made, those conjugal
properties should first be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated solely to defendant it being the
share of the latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other half which is the share of the deceased Francisco
Reyes was to be divided equally among his children by his two marriages.
On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a preponderance of
evidence, finds and so holds, and hereby renders judgment (1) Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only children
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Ondez; (2) Declaring the
plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring
Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as belonging to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot
No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene
Ondez in common partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to
the deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being
the only legal and forced heir of her mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner of one-half of
each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of
each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth
(1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene
Ondez to be the exclusive owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth
(1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of
one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing
the division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a manner as to give or grant
to Irene Ondez, as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditary share of. one-twelfth
(1/12) of the whole estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil
Code), and the remaining portion of the estate to be divided among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R.
Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the total share of plaintiff
Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the
total share of any or each of the other plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each
of the latter to receive equal shares from the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528;
Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing the parties, within thirty days after
this judgment shall have become final to submit to this court, for approval a project of partition of
the hereditary estate in the proportion above indicated, and in such manner as the parties may, by
agreement, deemed convenient and equitable to them taking into consideration the location, kind,
quality, nature and value of the properties involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales
and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-third
(1/3) by the first named and two-thirds (2/3) by the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other
claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].

The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a project of partition was
submitted to Judge Asuncion which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project of partition was not
signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion
approved it in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is quoted hereunder in full:
The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court for approval the following
project of partition:
COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case, to this Honorable Court
respectfully submit the following Project of Partition:
l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to Bernardita Reyes
Macariola;
2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along the eastern part of the lot
shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R. Macariola;
3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;
4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along the western part of the lot
shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;
5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita
Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares;
6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking the portions awarded under
item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares, provided, however that the remaining
portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively to Priscilla Reyes.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition indicated above which is made
in accordance with the decision of the Honorable Court be approved.
Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City
(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City
While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have signed this Project of Partition,
nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of the respective parties to this Court that the
Project of Partition, as above- quoted, had been made after a conference and agreement of the
plaintiffs and the defendant approving the above Project of Partition, and that both lawyers had
represented to the Court that they are given full authority to sign by themselves the Project of
Partition, the Court, therefore, finding the above-quoted Project of Partition to be in accordance with
law, hereby approves the same. The parties, therefore, are directed to execute such papers,
documents or instrument sufficient in form and substance for the vesting of the rights, interests and
participations which were adjudicated to the respective parties, as outlined in the Project of
Partition and the delivery of the respective properties adjudicated to each one in view of said
Project of Partition, and to perform such other acts as are legal and necessary to effectuate the
said Project of Partition.
SO ORDERED.
Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.
(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge
EXH. B.
The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, 1963, only for the purpose of giving authority
to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer certificates of title to the
respective adjudicatees in conformity with the project of partition (see Exh. U).
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof with an area of
15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased Francisco
Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all
surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and when the project of partition was approved by the trial court the adjudicatees
caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).
Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1 and V-1),
while Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh.
2) who was issued transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12).

On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of around 1,306 sq.
meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion was declared by the
latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest in Lot
1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the time of said sale the
stockholders of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge
Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs. Asuncion as the
secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation of "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc."
which we shall henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].
Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging four causes of action,
to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion
of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise violated Article
14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself
with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely
fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and
in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable
defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).
Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on October 16, 1968 by herein
complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals,
for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated May 27, 1971
recommending that respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause of action alleged in the
complaint, and for the second cause of action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited under the law to
engage in business. On the third and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be exonerated.
The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant herein instituted an action before the
Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No.
3010 and the two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent
conveyances with damages. It appears, however, that some defendants were dropped from the civil case. For one, the case against Dr.
Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he was no longer a real party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was filed, having already
conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case against defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that
she was no longer a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by
her and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was already sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador
Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her
counsel.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was directed and authorized on June 2,
1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil
Case No. 4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION
(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the issue
of the legality and validity of the Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C- 3"]
approving the partition;
(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;
(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B. Asuncion,
(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral damages;
(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.001 for exemplary damages;
(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and
(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.
B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR HERSELF AND FOR
THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN
(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the deceased Gerardo Villasin;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the cost of the suit.

C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL., WHO WERE
PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010
(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R. Solis, Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes.
D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO
(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]
It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals upon perfection of the appeal on
February 22, 1971.
I
WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of action, that respondent
Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E
which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in person or
through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the
court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of
any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession [emphasis supplied].
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the
persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must
take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519
[1979], Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No.
3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary
period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965,
respondent's order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project
of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but
from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela
Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more
specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and
Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As
aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for taxation
purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and
interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and his wife
was the secretary, took place long after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders
therein approving the project of partition.
While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte
docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition and the two orders approving the same, as well as the
partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances, the same, however, is of no moment.
The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after
the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated October 23,
1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer subject of litigation.
The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid facts
that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was effected and consummated long after the finality of
the aforesaid decision or orders.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision
in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there
was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.

It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela
Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a
consideration for the approval of the project of partition. In this connection, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:
And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or not the acquisition by respondent of a
portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer of the whole lot to "TRADERS" of which respondent was the
President and his wife the Secretary, was intimately related to the Order of respondent approving the project of
partition, Exh. A.
Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the transactions between the Reyeses and the
Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no evidence whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon had
acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him and his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's Memorandum).
xxx xxx xxx
On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted
as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to this
investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, and I believe him when he testified that he bought Lot
1184-E in good faith and for valuable consideration from the Reyeses without any intervention of, or previous
understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp. 391- 394, rec.).
On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project of partition although it was not
signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the Investigating Justice, as follows:
1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the parties more particularly that of
Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition submitted to him for approval; however, whatever error was committed by
respondent in that respect was done in good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio
Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, That he was authorized by his client to submit said project of partition,
(See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969). While it is true that such written authority if there was any, was not
presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of respondent, his
affidavit being the only one that was presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this
investigator to believe that she knew the contents of the project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her conformity
thereto. I refer to the following documents:
1) Exh. 9 Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral Survey in which the
deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of title the Order dated November 11,
1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of partition was duly entered and registered on November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);
2) Exh. 7 Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola onOctober 22, 1963,
conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of
sale the vendee stated that she was the absolute owner of said one-fourth share, the same having been adjudicated
to her as her share in the estate of her father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was duly registered and annotated at the back of OCT
19520 on December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).
In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the project of partition dated October 16,
1963, which was approved by respondent on October 23, 1963, followed by an amending Order on November 11,
1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which
complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22, 1963, several days after the preparation of the project of partition.
Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her one-fourth share in Lot 1154 by virtue of
the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not because of the project of partition, Exh. A. Such contention is absurd because
from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half of one- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of Francisco Reyes
Diaz while the other half of said one-fourth was the share of complainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words, the
decision did not adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4).
Complainant became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of the project of partition, Exh. A.
Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other reason than that she was wen
aware of the distribution of the properties of her deceased father as per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at this
point to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted during the cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in connection
with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which we can deduce that she could not
have been kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to the project of partition.
Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her the properties adjudicated to her were
insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant, however, did not present any direct and positive evidence to
prove the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and distribution of the real properties when she could have easily
done so by presenting evidence on the area, location, kind, the assessed and market value of said properties.
Without such evidence there is nothing in the record to show that there were inequalities in the distribution of the
properties of complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be
reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
everyday life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on the
part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his court and
caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. One who

occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts
of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in
the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular case of respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184E are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no
longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it from a third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he should
nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a corporation in which he and his wife were financially
involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way or another to his official actuations in civil case 3010.
The conduct of respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and the public in general to
doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).
II
With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of
the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a
ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:
Article 14 The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold any office or
have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the
districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in active service. This
provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those who
by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a determinate territory.
It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the
commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the
government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs
of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may
be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public
officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it
regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence.
It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made
by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of
August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines,
Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the
political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless
they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a conquest or
otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former government
immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new sovereign continue in
force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap.
34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or
institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the
commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S.
220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542,
7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants
with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and
new relations are created between them and the government which has acquired their territory. The
same act which transfers their country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the
law which may be denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the
intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the newly- created
power of the State.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law that on
acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after
the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the

Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which
he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest.
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that respondent participated or
intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at
bar, the business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The
business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance. As was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on
public officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene,
"(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in said
contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot
commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p.
1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).
It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in its business operations by
reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in one way or another in any case filed by or against
it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the
corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus
Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.," wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid corporation. It must be
noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge
Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer connected with the corporation, having disposed of his interest therein on
January 31, 1967.
Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any
lawful business.
It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any prohibition
to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not involving
the practice of law after office hours but with the permission of the district judge concerned.
Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed
abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is political in nature.
Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by judges of a property in litigation
before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to respondent Judge because the sale of the lot in
question to him took place after the finality of his decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of
partition; hence, the property was no longer subject of litigation.
In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer
or employee in the civil service from engaging in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial,
credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of department, the same, however, may not fall
within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because the last portion of said paragraph
speaks of a prohibition by the Constitution or law on any public officer from having any interest in any business and not by a mere
administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in
private business without a written permission from the Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the
Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do
not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission
from the Head of Department ..."
It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as
amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the
Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of
the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to
conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the
discipline of judges.

And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as well
as other personnel of the Judiciary.
It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ... violation of the existing Civil Service Law
and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer or employee from the
service, demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than one year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six months'
salary." Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action against civil service officers and employees.
However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department to which they belong. The
Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the
Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only other or second branch of
the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for
disciplinary action against judges because to recognize the same as applicable to them, would be adding another ground for the
discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their removal, namely, serious
misconduct and inefficiency.
Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive
jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after submission to it, all administrative cases against permanent officers and
employees in the competitive service, and, except as provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon their removal, separation,
and suspension and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees; and prescribe
standards, guidelines and regulations governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis supplied). There is no question that a judge
belong to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered by the
aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled that "... in interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only
permanent officers and employees who belong to the classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of
Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).
Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by joining the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of the provissions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce and
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated
pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because Canon 25 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:
A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in
his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not retain such investments previously made, longer than a
period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as
reasonably possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations
warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. ...
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid
corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties, and it appears also that the aforesaid corporation did not in anyway benefit
in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from
the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967,
and the eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such disposal or sale by respondent and his
wife of their shares in the corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent realized that
early that their interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the
commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and before it became involved in any court litigation
III
With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted
in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with
the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid causes of action are
groundless, and WE quote the pertinent portion of her report which reads as follows:
The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that respondent associated and closely fraternized with
Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J)
when in truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of Attorneys and is not a member of
the Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K.
The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and claims that all the time he
believed that the latter was a bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason for disbelieving this assertion of
respondent. It has been shown by complainant that Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an
attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up a signboard with his name and the words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I and 11) to indicate his office, and it was but natural for respondent and any person for that matter to have accepted that
statement on its face value. "Now with respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent is guilty of fraternizing
with Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M
& M-1), that fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his
friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and family did not influence his official actuations as a judge where said
persons were concerned. There is no tangible convincing proof that herein respondent gave any undue privileges in
his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter benefitted in his practice of law from his personal relations with
respondent, or that he used his influence, if he had any, on the Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor
said Dominador Tan.
Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as possible from maintaining close
friendly relations with practising attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his social or business

relations or friendship constitute an element in determining his judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics),
but if a Judge does have social relations, that in itself would not constitute a ground for disciplinary action unless it be
clearly shown that his social relations be clouded his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his friends
(pp. 403-405, rec.).
In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in acquiring by
purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private corporation during his
incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business
activities, because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with propriety but must always be above
suspicion.
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE
DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
Fernando, C.J., Abad Santos and Esolin JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding
members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA),respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN
NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except
perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the original
proponent 1 and the main sponsor2 of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as
"innovative". 3 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision
of, the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional
convention. 4 For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter,
COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin
Petition) 5 wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution,
in newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in
establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, 6 a group of citizens desirous to avail
of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to
exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the
exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election
registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather

signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the
COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as
well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the
control and supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, 7Section 4 of Article
VII, 8 and Section 8 of Article X 9 of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions
concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF
ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of
the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its
Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of
hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the
case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of
the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two
other lawyers, and representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day,
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin
filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be
passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and
Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November
1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on
statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in
the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission
indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator
Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There
is not a single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative].
Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This indicates that the
Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not
after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative on the
Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar asinitiative on amendments
to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise
of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of
term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other
government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event the COMELEC grants the
Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration
of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the
conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues raised demands that this
petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a
taxpayer's and legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of ten days
from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public
respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting
a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.

On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment 15 on the petition. They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR GENERAL
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION
(P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE
COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS
THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR
THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND
EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE
SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY
DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY
LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION"
UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE
OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE POWER
OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSORSANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT
NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735
WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE
OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE
HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND
JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN
IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING
TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE
NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX
E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT.
"AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO
DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL.
CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment 16 which starts off with an assertion that the instant
petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What he filed
on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to
amend the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and function. On the substantive
allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct ofinitiative to
amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not
requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend the Constitution
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers
the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks
to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does
not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180 million as unreliable, for only the
COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In
any event, fund requirements for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign
power of the people.
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement of
Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which enumerates the three
systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentionsinitiative on the Constitution.

(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being national in
scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator
Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that nothing therein was provided
for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal with initiative on
the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a revision
thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the Omnibus
Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact
upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the aforementioned Comments
and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's
Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for
the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his
Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity
and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later
replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution because, in the
words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure
to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other
provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. 19 A revisioncannot be done by initiative which, by
express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and local elective
officials are based on the philosophy of governance, "to open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos
qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic powers in the
hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the
common good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest
situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they are dissatisfied
with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium for good performance. 20
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements the
people'sinitiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file the petition,
(b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d) the publication of
the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district,
(f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the
verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I)
the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such people's initiative. Accordingly, there being no
enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the
COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for a people's initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal
basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's right to initiate constitutional amendments.
This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a
sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative
on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which is signedby the required number of registered voters. He also submits
that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources of the COMELEC to assist them is
securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of
the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on the initiative to amend the
Constitution.

(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by Congress or a
constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and by the
IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI,
and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of
five days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in
Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible
period of five days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which the Court formulated in light of
the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating
Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the
Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of
Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the
conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an
order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's
movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia,
the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before
the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within twenty days and
requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and arguments in the main Petition. It
further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the
Commission's failure or refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record of the House of Representatives
relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the
Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate
Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco,
DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which appears to pose a prejudicial
procedural question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this
Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an
affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This being
so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65,
Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to
an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not
legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive
and adverse environmental consequences on the body politic of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent
climate of legal confusion and political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.

30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the
Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. 26 The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after
having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five
days their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due course to the
Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature
form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its
insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether
exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the said
petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light
of these claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside
in view of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this
technicality because the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT
IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall
be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is
a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional
action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative would
remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while
the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not
provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee
on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution
No. 332). 30 That section reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section ___of the Constitution. 31
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a new formulation of the concept
of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the Members of
the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of
initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission
of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. 32
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are no
details in the provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving
this matter to the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature does not
pass the necessary implementing law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially with respect
to the budget appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be
called. We deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any
event, as envisioned, no amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after five
years from the date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could
be proposed through the exercise of this initiative power would be after five years. It is reasonably
expected that within that five-year period, the National Assembly can come up with the appropriate
rules governing the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature the details on how this is to be carried
out is it possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for ratification is the work of
the legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself as a body
could propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the threefourths vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that proposal to the
people for ratification through the process of an initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to vest
constituent power in the people to amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of institutionalizing
popular participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would
have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor
agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other
legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal values, the
Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of
circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we have a
separate article in the constitution that would specifically cover the process and the modes of
amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to again
concede to the legislature the process or the requirement of determining the mechanics of
amending the Constitution by people's initiative?

MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands of the
National Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would
adequately cover all the conceivable situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND not to REVISE
the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which
came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members
felt that this system of initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we
removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. 34
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a
separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of
setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of
initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the
Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes
(a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to
amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee. 35
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the Committee
accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with the
following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking into
account the modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners
Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in
substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now read as follows: "SECTION 2. AMENDMENTS
TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE
THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL
NUMBER Of REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF.
NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE
EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective of the
sense contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed
amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a legislative act which
must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the legislature to set
forth certain procedures to carry out the initiative. . .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the legislature from asking
another body to set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this particular
right would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the
percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for submission
to the people, may be subject to legislation.

MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of
the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded
here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have discussed be
legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to NOT REVISION
of the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers
to "amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he
made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section
1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments through initiative must be more rigorous and
difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is an
amendment to the Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the
National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would require a
higher number. Moreover, just to submit the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority
of the National Assembly is required, the import being that the process of amendment must be
made more rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to
a law proposed by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the
requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it would require another voting
by the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I
might present such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the Commission shall take up the
Article on the Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary sessions. 39
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version, which the Commission approved
by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as follows:
"AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE
PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE
TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT
MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS
THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE
YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN
ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9 July 1986.41 Thereafter, upon
his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which,
nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August
1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing "percent" to "per centum" and
"thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress 43 shall
provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second
paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like the
private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or
legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last
paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:
The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
with

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules implementing the exercise of
the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be carried out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act
is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which
dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No.
497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of
Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of
local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft
bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50 and by the House of Representatives. 51 This approved bill is
now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of the
right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to
the Constitution. The said section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
(Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said
section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions.
That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined
only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole
or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely
referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and appropriately used the phrases "propose and enact," "approve or
reject" and "in whole or in part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as
one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage
of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide
for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of
the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among
the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said
paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the
case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or
printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" only strengthens the
conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the
main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the
order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III
(Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but
on its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only
Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the
legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This
classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer
understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms
xxx xxx xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or
barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. 53
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall
become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose
shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local governments; thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for
indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of
the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both national and localinitiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is misplaced, 54 since the
provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and
void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local
legislative body to enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the implementation of initiative and
referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power of initiative as a consequence
thereof;

(d) The formulation of the proposition;

(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit concerned as to whether the
required number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters for their approval, which must
be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a)
mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three
systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution
may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign
the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered
a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be
cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
[the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari
potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of
delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that
the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out,
or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both
requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF
INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No.
6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and
regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a
law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN
PETITION.

Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate
constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin
Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be
signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he
has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures.
Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing
before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the
filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; 63 (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a
certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the
establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of
voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained
or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the
actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the
petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more
than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December
1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and local
officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should
be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to
provide for the implementation of the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to
provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is
LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-409

January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed by
Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort
during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently,
the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over
these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which
consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent
allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or
sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which
consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of
State Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their
legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the
occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government
(which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the
exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be
suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the
possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights
of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that
the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy
during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of
international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in
articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not
suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or
sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric
of the petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in
the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the question, not of
sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de factotherein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied
territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military
occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word
"sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains
vested in the legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of
existence or divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to
the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and
therefore it can not be applied to the present case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as
descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government
established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner
owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives as above
described, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country
owes to his own government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for
and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military
forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of
the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is
nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who
resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public
order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose
his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and
would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;

Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government in
the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the
hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and
obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan
Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are
inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as
treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against
public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion
because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are
also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter
(Peralta vs.Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate
government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also
inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the
occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national
security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to
the latter during the enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the
circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has,
nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new
ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for
the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague
Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience
(Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of
the military occupant dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey
them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in
force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding
upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his
government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering
to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to
repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants
to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such
action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the
safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their
allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled
illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully
resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small
and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it
would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own
government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not aid them
in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and
thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing
the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and
independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide;
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the
Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign
people of the United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the United
States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the
Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1,
Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that
"All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in
such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but subject to
certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was
recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law
above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United
States; that the late President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on August 12,
1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent
nations in fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173);
and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of
Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely political question,
the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as
well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides that pending the final and
complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United
States", was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these
limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of the
Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that

just as to reason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason
may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the
sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic
does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is
an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that
"The government established by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and
complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines";
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby
denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion
therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate
opinion.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

THE HOLY SEE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT
SALES ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
Padilla Law Office for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the Orders dated June 20, 1991
and September 19, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 90-183.
The Order dated June 20, 1991 denied the motion of petitioner to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183, while the Order dated
September 19, 1991 denied the motion for reconsideration of the June 20,1991 Order.
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the
Papal Nuncio.
Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters (Lot 5-A, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
390440) located in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner.
Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 271108 and 265388 respectively
and registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his
rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the
responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A
to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
I
On January 23, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment
of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio,
and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana (Civil Case No.
90-183).
The complaint alleged that: (1) on April 17, 1988, Msgr. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf of petitioner and the PRC, agreed to sell to Ramon Licup
Lots 5-A, 5-B and 5-D at the price of P1,240.00 per square meters; (2) the agreement to sell was made on the condition that earnest
money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup to the sellers, and that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters who were then occupying the

same; (3) Licup paid the earnest money to Msgr. Cirilos; (4) in the same month, Licup assigned his rights over the property to private
respondent and informed the sellers of the said assignment; (5) thereafter, private respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos that the
sellers fulfill their undertaking and clear the property of squatters; however, Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent of the squatters'
refusal to vacate the lots, proposing instead either that private respondent undertake the eviction or that the earnest money be returned
to the latter; (6) private respondent counterproposed that if it would undertake the eviction of the squatters, the purchase price of the
lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per square meter; (7) Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100,000.00
and wrote private respondent giving it seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the original purchase price in cash; (8) private
respondent sent the earnest money back to the sellers, but later discovered that on March 30, 1989, petitioner and the PRC, without
notice to private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana, as evidenced by two separate Deeds of Sale, one over Lot 5-A, and another
over Lots 5-B and 5-D; and that the sellers' transfer certificate of title over the lots were cancelled, transferred and registered in the
name of Tropicana; (9) Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to sell the lots to it and thus enriched itself at the expense of private
respondent; (10) private respondent demanded the rescission of the sale to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots, to no avail;
and (11) private respondent is willing and able to comply with the terms of the contract to sell and has actually made plans to develop
the lots into a townhouse project, but in view of the sellers' breach, it lost profits of not less than P30,000.000.00.
Private respondent thus prayed for: (1) the annulment of the Deeds of Sale between petitioner and the PRC on the one hand, and
Tropicana on the other; (2) the reconveyance of the lots in question; (3) specific performance of the agreement to sell between it and
the owners of the lots; and (4) damages.
On June 8, 1990, petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on
sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.
On June 20, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner's motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner "shed
off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question" (Rollo, pp. 20-21).
On July 12, 1991, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. On August 30, 1991, petitioner filed a "Motion for a Hearing for the
Sole Purpose of Establishing Factual Allegation for claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional Defense." So as to facilitate the determination
of its defense of sovereign immunity, petitioner prayed that a hearing be conducted to allow it to establish certain facts upon which the
said defense is based. Private respondent opposed this motion as well as the motion for reconsideration.
On October 1, 1991, the trial court issued an order deferring the resolution on the motion for reconsideration until after trial on the
merits and directing petitioner to file its answer (Rollo, p. 22).
Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf
and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.
On December 9, 1991, a Motion for Intervention was filed before us by the Department of Foreign Affairs, claiming that it has a legal
interest in the outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of petitioner, and that it "adopts by reference, the allegations
contained in the petition of the Holy See insofar as they refer to arguments relative to its claim of sovereign immunity from suit" (Rollo,
p. 87).
Private respondent opposed the intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. In compliance with the resolution of this Court, both
parties and the Department of Foreign Affairs submitted their respective memoranda.
II
A preliminary matter to be threshed out is the procedural issue of whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court can be availed of to question the order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. The general rule is that an order denying a
motion to dismiss is not reviewable by the appellate courts, the remedy of the movant being to file his answer and to proceed with the
hearing before the trial court. But the general rule admits of exceptions, and one of these is when it is very clear in the records that the
trial court has no alternative but to dismiss the complaint (Philippine National Bank v. Florendo, 206 SCRA 582 [1992]; Zagada v. Civil
Service Commission, 216 SCRA 114 [1992]. In such a case, it would be a sheer waste of time and energy to require the parties to
undergo the rigors of a trial.
The other procedural question raised by private respondent is the personality or legal interest of the Department of Foreign Affairs to
intervene in the case in behalf of the Holy See (Rollo, pp. 186-190).
In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it
requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the foreign state or the international organization
sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the
Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a
"suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues a
certification to that effect instead of submitting a "suggestion" (O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit of
Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]).
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive endorsement
of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies.
In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter
directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it
enjoyed diplomatic immunity. InWorld Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial
court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request
the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a "suggestion"
to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae.

In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to
intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of
sovereign immunity.
In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents through their private
counsels (Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945]; Miquiabas v. Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80 Phil. 262 [1948]; United States of
America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990] and companion cases). In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the
courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved.
III
The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over petitioner, being a foreign state enjoying sovereign
immunity. On the other hand, private respondent insists that the doctrine of non-suability is not anymore absolute and that petitioner has
divested itself of such a cloak when, of its own free will, it entered into a commercial transaction for the sale of a parcel of land located
in the Philippines.
A. The Holy See
Before we determine the issue of petitioner's non-suability, a brief look into its status as a sovereign state is in order.
Before the annexation of the Papal States by Italy in 1870, the Pope was the monarch and he, as the Holy See, was considered a
subject of International Law. With the loss of the Papal States and the limitation of the territory under the Holy See to an area of 108.7
acres, the position of the Holy See in International Law became controversial (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law 36-37 [1992]).
In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign
jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City. It also recognized the right of the Holy See to receive foreign diplomats, to send its
own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter into treaties according to International Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems In
International Law, Public and Private 81 [1948]).
The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible
independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international relations" (O'Connell, I International
Law 311 [1965]).
In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether the statehood is vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican
City. Some writers even suggested that the treaty created two international persons the Holy See and Vatican City (Salonga and
Yap, supra, 37).
The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution to it of "sovereignty" must be made in a sense
different from that in which it is applied to other states (Fenwick, International Law 124-125 [1948]; Cruz, International Law 37 [1991]).
In a community of national states, the Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and
international objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also
head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission
in the world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an "international state"
(Fenwick, supra., 125; Kelsen, Principles of International Law 160 [1956]).
One authority wrote that the recognition of the Vatican City as a state has significant implication that it is possible for any entity
pursuing objects essentially different from those pursued by states to be invested with international personality (Kunz, The Status of the
Holy See in International Law, 46 The American Journal of International Law 308 [1952]).
Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions as the Holy See and not in the name of the
Vatican City, one can conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is the Holy See that is the international person.
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador,
the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the
universal practice in international relations.
B. Sovereign Immunity
As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law.
Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition
and consequence of our admission in the society of nations (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]).
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or
absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the
newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but
not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
(United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law 194 [1984]).
Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the executive or judicial determination when an act may be considered as jure
gestionis. The United States passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which defines a commercial activity as "either a
regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act." Furthermore, the law declared that the
"commercial character of the activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or
act, rather than by reference to its purpose." The Canadian Parliament enacted in 1982 an Act to Provide For State Immunity in
Canadian Courts. The Act defines a "commercial activity" as any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of conduct
that by reason of its nature, is of a "commercial character."

The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the host of problems involving the issue of sovereign immunity, has created
problems of its own. Legal treatises and the decisions in countries which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty in characterizing
whether a contract of a sovereign state with a private party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure imperii.
The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely commercial activities remotely connected with
the discharge of governmental functions. This is particularly true with respect to the Communist states which took control of nationalized
business activities and international trading.
This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign
government of apartment buildings for use of its military officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949]; (2) the conduct of public bidding
for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station (United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.); and (3) the change of employment
status of base employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]).
On the other hand, this Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure gestionis: (1)
the hiring of a cook in the recreation center, consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop
at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to cater to American servicemen and the general public (United States of America v. Rodrigo,
182 SCRA 644 [1990]); and (2) the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City (United States of America
v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). The operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for
profit as a commercial and not a governmental activity. By entering into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its
proprietary function, the United States government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered "commercial" and as constituting acts jure
gestionis, we have to come out with our own guidelines, tentative they may be.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be
the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If
the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the
act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain
or profit.
As held in United States of America v. Guinto, (supra):
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived
its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract
involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction
can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A
were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.
Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose,
but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to
acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is
recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate
and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving
state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on
behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason
should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner
did not sell Lot
5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for
petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they
stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint (Rollo, pp. 26, 27).
The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the trial court without going to trial in the light of the pleadings, particularly
the admission of private respondent. Besides, the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the
Memorandum and Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As the department tasked with the conduct of the Philippines'
foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title I, Sec. 3), the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this
case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines
exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country
(Rollo, pp. 156-157). The determination of the executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or
diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja,
190 SCRA 130 [1990]). Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to
accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the country's foreign relations (World
Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]). As in International Catholic Migration Commission and in World Health
Organization, we abide by the certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Ordinarily, the procedure would be to remand the case and order the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish the facts alleged by
petitioner in its motion. In view of said certification, such procedure would however be pointless and unduly circuitous (Ortigas & Co.
Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Tirso Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, July 25, 1994).
IV

Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public International Law and
Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause
through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first
task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall
first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See
(Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign
Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the forerunner of the International Court of Justice:
By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by reporting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings
on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect
for the rules of international law (The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1 Hudson, World Court Reports 293, 302
[1924]).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT, Court of First
Instance of Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioner.
Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenges the validity of an order issued by respondent
Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, 1 declaring a decision final and executory and of an
alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines subsequently issued in pursuance thereof, the
alleged ground being excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse of discretion. As thus simply and tersely put, with the facts
being undisputed and the principle of law that calls for application indisputable, the outcome is predictable. The Republic of the
Philippines is entitled to the writs prayed for. Respondent Judge ought not to have acted thus. The order thus impugned and the alias
writ of execution must be nullified.
In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 1969, a summary of facts was set forth thus: "7. On July 3, 1961, a
decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and

International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of
P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. 8. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order
declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City [as well as]
Manila to execute the said decision. 9. Pursuant to the said Order dated June 24, 1969, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution [was
issued] dated June 26, 1969, .... 10. On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution dated June 26, 1969, the Provincial
Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks, specially on the "monies
due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution";
the Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969 .... 11. The funds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their
branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and
civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per Certification dated July 3, 1969 by
the AFP Controller,..." 2. The paragraph immediately succeeding in such petition then alleged: "12. Respondent Judge, Honorable
Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the
issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution
and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void." 3 In the answer filed by respondents, through counsel Andres T.
Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan, the facts set forth were admitted with the only qualification being that the total award was in the amount
of P2,372,331.40. 4
The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What was done
by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. .
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government
is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." 5 Sociological jurisprudence
supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the
Philippines, 6 with its affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the
inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its
multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not
thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and
energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could
very well be imagined." 7
This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the revised charter. It is therein expressly provided:
"The State may not be sued without its consent." 8 A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic concept is that
public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the
state liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, 9 such a well-settled doctrine was
restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee: "The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution' and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects, as appropriated by law." 10 Such a principle applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in
favor of an employee. Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion, 11 speaks to that effect. Justice Malcolm as ponente left no
doubt on that score. Thus: "A rule which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it
may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that
the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to
subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be
garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant
in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every
consideration of public policy forbids it." 12
In the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why the Republic of the Philippines could rightfully allege a legitimate grievance.
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and setting aside both the order of June 24, 1969 declaring
executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued thereunder. The preliminary injunction issued by this
Court on July 12, 1969 is hereby made permanent.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J, took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988
DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, petitioners,
vs.

HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Zambales, Olongapo City, ANTHONY
M. ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts
for which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents. Once this question is decided, the other answers will fall into
place and this petition need not detain us any longer than it already has.
Petitioner Sanders was, at the time the incident in question occurred, the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA)
in Olongapo City. 1 Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which includes the said station. 2 Private
respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines, 3 as so was private respondent Wyer, who died
two years ago. 4 They were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA, the former
having been hired in 1971 and the latter in 1969. 5
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to
permanent part-time, effective October 18, 1975. 6 Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings
conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The result was a recommendation from the
hearing officer who conducted the proceedings for the reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus
backwages. The report on the hearing contained the observation that "Special Services management practices an autocratic form of
supervision." 7
In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau on May 17, 1976 (Annex "A" of the complaint), Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's
report and asked for the rejection of the abovestated recommendation. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to
alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be
difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed
the records in public places where others not involved in the case could hear."
On November 7, 1975, before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter (Annex "B" of the complaint) purportedly corning from
petitioner Moreau as the commanding general of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel
explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status and requesting concurrence therewith. The letter did not carry his
signature but was signed by W.B. Moore, Jr. "by direction," presumably of Moreau.
On the basis of these antecedent facts, the private respondent filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a for damages
against the herein petitioners on November 8, 1976. 8 The plaintiffs claimed that the letters contained libelous imputations that had
exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of
their personal and proprietary rights.
The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or personal capacity. However, in a motion to
dismiss filed under a special appearance, the petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge
of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.
After extensive written arguments between the parties, the motion was denied in an order dated March 8, 1977, 9on the main ground
that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature and not personal torts, moreover, the allegation
in the complaint was that the defendants had acted maliciously and in bad faith. The same order issued a writ of preliminary
attachment, conditioned upon the filing of a P10,000.00 bond by the plaintiffs, against the properties of petitioner Moreau, who allegedly
was then about to leave the Philippines. Subsequently, to make matters worse for the defendants, petitioner Moreau was declared in a
default by the trial court in its order dated August 9, 1977. The motion to lift the default order on the ground that Moreau's failure to
appear at the pre-trial conference was the result of some misunderstanding, and the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the
motion to dismiss, which was filed by the petitioner's new lawyers, were denied by the respondent court on September 7, 1977.
This petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction was thereafter filed before this Court, on the contention that the abovenarrated acts of the respondent court are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
We return now to the basic question of whether the petitioners were acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the
acts for which the private respondents have sued them for damages.
It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not
automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the
same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him
as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of
the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.
The respondent judge, apparently finding that the complained acts were prima facie personal and tortious, decided to proceed to trial to
determine inter alia their precise character on the strength of the evidence to be submitted by the parties. The petitioners have
objected, arguing that no such evidence was needed to substantiate their claim of jurisdictional immunity. Pending resolution of this
question, we issued a temporary restraining order on September 26, 1977, that has since then suspended the proceedings in this case
in the courta quo.
In past cases, this Court has held that where the character of the act complained of can be determined from the pleadings exchanged
between the parties before the trial, it is not necessary for the court to require them to belabor the point at a trial still to be conducted.
Such a proceeding would be superfluous, not to say unfair to the defendant who is subjected to unnecessary and avoidable
inconvenience.

Thus, in Baer v. Tizon, 10 we held that a motion to dismiss a complaint against the commanding general of the Olongapo Naval Base
should not have been denied because it had been sufficiently shown that the act for which he was being sued was done in his official
capacity on behalf of the American government. The United States had not given its consent to be sued. It was the reverse situation
in Syquia v. Almeda Lopez," where we sustained the order of the lower court granting a where we motion to dismiss a complaint against
certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown to be acting officially in the name of the American government. The United States
had also not waived its immunity from suit. Only three years ago, in United States of America v. Ruiz, 12 we set aside the denial by the
lower court of a motion to dismiss a complaint for damages filed against the United States and several of its officials, it appearing that
the act complained of was governmental rather than proprietary, and certainly not personal. In these and several other cases 13 the
Court found it redundant to prolong the other case proceedings after it had become clear that the suit could not prosper because the
acts complained of were covered by the doctrine of state immunity.
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in
the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision
over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and
other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he had written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other
petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the private respondents. 14 Moreover, even in the absence of such request, he still
was within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer's criticismin effect a direct attack against him-that Special Services was
practicing "an autocratic form of supervision."
As for Moreau,what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the
private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced. Disregarding for the nonce the
question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly
answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA In fact, the letter dealt with the financial
and budgetary problems of the department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the re-designation of the private
respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it.
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued
as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it
is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is
proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their
personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit
against that government without its consent.
There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has
given its consent to' be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer but in many other decisions where we upheld the doctrine of state
immunity as applicable not only to our own government but also to foreign states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our
courts. 15
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law
on which the right depends. 16 In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states
which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of
nations." 17 Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our
previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be sued as such without the previous consent of the state. To be sure, there are
a number of well-recognized exceptions. It is clear that a public officer may be sued as such to compel him to do an act required by law,
as where, say, a register of deeds refuses to record a deed of sale; 18or to restrain a Cabinet member, for example, from enforcing a law
claimed to be unconstitutional; 19 or to compel the national treasurer to pay damages from an already appropriated assurance fund; 20 or
the commissioner of internal revenue to refund tax over-payments from a fund already available for the purpose; 21 or, in general, to
secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by himself without the government itself having to do a positive act to assist
him. We have also held that where the government itself has violated its own laws, the aggrieved party may directly implead the
government even without first filing his claim with the Commission on Audit as normally required, as the doctrine of state immunity
"cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice." 22
This case must also be distinguished from such decisions as Festejo v. Fernando, 23 where the Court held that a bureau director could
be sued for damages on a personal tort committed by him when he acted without or in excess of authority in forcibly taking private
property without paying just compensation therefor although he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was not necessary to
secure the previous consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party defendant, as it was not responsible for the
defendant's unauthorized act.
The case at bar, to repeat, comes under the rule and not under any of the recognized exceptions. The government of the United States
has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered
against them. As it is the American government itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of appropriating the amount that may
be adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith,
which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes concededly committed by such public officers are not
actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 24 This, to, is well
settled . 25 Furthermore, applying now our own penal laws, the letters come under the concept of privileged communications and are not
punishable, 26 let alone the fact that the resented remarks are not defamatory by our standards. It seems the private respondents have
overstated their case.
A final consideration is that since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in the performance of
their official duties and the private respondents are themselves American citizens, it would seem only proper for the courts of this
country to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and to treat it as coming under the internal administration of the said base.

The petitioners' counsel have submitted a memorandum replete with citations of American cases, as if they were arguing before a court
of the United States. The Court is bemused by such attitude. While these decisions do have persuasive effect upon us, they can at best
be invoked only to support our own jurisprudence, which we have developed and enriched on the basis of our own persuasions as a
people, particularly since we became independent in 1946.
We appreciate the assistance foreign decisions offer us, and not only from the United States but also from Spain and other countries
from which we have derived some if not most of our own laws. But we should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and
regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own
endowments We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our
qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice.
The private respondents must, if they are still sominded, pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the
United States, of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed. Even assuming that our
own laws are applicable, the United States government has not decided to give its consent to be sued in our courts, which therefore
has not acquired the competence to act on the said claim,.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated March 8,1977, August 9,1977, and September 7, 1977, are SET
ASIDE. The respondent court is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 2077-O. Our Temporary restraining order of September 26,1977, is
made PERMANENT. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Grino-Aquio and Medialdea, JJ., Concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15751

January 28, 1961

BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR and MARIANO LEDESMA, petitioners,

vs.
THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NLU), PACIFICO ADVINCULA, ROBERTO MENDOZA, PONCIANO
ARGANDA and TEODULO TOLERAN, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Eulogio R. Lerum for respondents.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul Certain orders of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations and to restrain it from further proceeding in the action for unfair labor practice pending before it on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Giving due course to the petition, this Court ordered the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for without
bond.
The action in question was upon complaint of the respondents Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU) Pacifico Advincula,
Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran filed by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein
petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma the
Director of the Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in unfair
labor practices by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing particularly the members of the complaining
association petition, in the exercise of their right to self-organization an discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment
in order to discourage them from pursuing the union activities.
Answering the complaint, the petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor
practices attributed to the and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents Pacifico Advincula,
Roberto Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending result of an administrative investigation against
them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be
sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic
performing government functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, before the case
could be heard, petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion" asking for a preliminary hearing on the question of jurisdiction raised by them in
their answer and for suspension of the trial of the case on the merits pending the determination of such jurisdictional question. The
motion was granted, but after hearing, the trial judge of the Industrial Court in an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the
jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature," and,
consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal. Reconsideration of this order having been also denied by the court in banc, the
petitioners brought the case to this Court through the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such
instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is
"charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National
Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive

Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (See. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code). It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are
provided for in the General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service bureau
and obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit.
It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of Printing receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid
for overtime work on regular working days and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions are
"exclusively proprietary in nature." Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the interest of the service so requires
(sec. 566, Rev. Adm. Code). As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is
discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the
functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. Anent the additional work it executes for private persons, we find that such
work is done upon request, as distinguished from those solicited, and only "as the requirements of Government work will permit" (sec.
1654, Rev. Adm. Code), and "upon terms fixed by the Director of Printing, with the approval of the Department Head" (sec. 1655, id.).
As shown by the uncontradicted evidence of the petitioners, most of these works consist of orders for greeting cards during Christmas
from government officials, and for printing of checks of private banking institutions. On those greeting cards, the Government seal, of
which only the Bureau of Printing is authorized to use, is embossed, and on the bank cheeks, only the Bureau of Printing can print the
reproduction of the official documentary stamps appearing thereon. The volume of private jobs done, in comparison with government
jobs, is only one-half of 1 per cent, and in computing the costs for work done for private parties, the Bureau does not include profit
because it is not allowed to make any. Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be
pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to
its function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing said
proprietary function are separate and distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions.
From what has been stated, it is obvious that the Court of Industrial Relations did not acquire jurisdiction over the respondent Bureau of
Printing, and is thus devoid of any authority to take cognizance of the case. This Court has already held in a long line of decisions that
the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint for unfair labor practice filed against institutions or
corporations not organized for profit and, consequently, not an industrial or business organization. This is so because the Industrial
Peace Act was intended to apply only to industrial employment, and to govern the relations between employers engaged in industry
and occupations for purposes of gain, and their industrial employees. (University of the Philippines, et al. vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L15416, April 28, 1960; University of Sto. Tomas vs. Villanueva, et al., G.R. No. L-13748, October 30, 1959; La Consolacion College vs.
CIR, G.R. No. L-13282, April 22, 1960; See also the cases cited therein.) .
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1,
Rule 3, Rules of Court). Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or
proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less
over its objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz. 2835; Angat River Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers' Union, et.
al., G.R. Nos. L-10943-44, December 28, 1957).
The record also discloses that the instant case arose from the filing of administrative charges against some officers of the respondent
Bureau of Printing Employees' Association by the Acting Secretary of General Services. Said administrative charges are for
insubordination, grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to public service committed by inciting the employees, of the Bureau of Printing
to walk out of their jobs against the order of the duly constituted officials. Under the law, the Heads of Departments and Bureaus are
authorized to institute and investigate administrative charges against erring subordinates. For the Industrial Court now to take
cognizance of the case filed before it, which is in effect a review of the acts of executive officials having to do with the discipline of
government employees under them, would be to interfere with the discharge of such functions by said officials. WHEREFORE, the
petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice against the
petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the respondent court.
Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 204819

April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS
IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria Concepcion S.
Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez &
Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio
Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their
minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo
Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on

behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C.
Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C.
Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V.
Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho,
Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child
Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion
M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of
Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic
Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson,
Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo
Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF
CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato Marcos,Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal
capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in
his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC,
EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS
II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG
SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo,
and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap,
Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno
and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN,
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic
and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on
Women,Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADOLUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS

ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as
Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and the rest
of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal
capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES,
RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS
II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA,
ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA
EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE
BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N.
RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as
his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with
the common good."1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in
a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the
economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member of
society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the
Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative
government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully
implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the
judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it
is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to
interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the
Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in
every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various
media. From television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by
members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals
has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on
December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the
doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting
impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2)
petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their
personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming
Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria
Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn
(ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a
domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the
Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in
their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity
as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella
Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as citizens
(Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others,31in their capacities
as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against
abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices
and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.35
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the
RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other
health problems.36

 The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional
guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners,
the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate
ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors;
and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs
and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health
professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical
specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged
with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an
affront to their religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the
"clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and
the right to free speech.42
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects
medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to
provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and
other forms of punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to
render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer
be able to avail of the practitioners services.44
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it
makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather
than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively
reduce the number of the poor.45
The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of
imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as
"violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the people) the
right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer."47 It
ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own
discretion and judgment.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly
to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is
granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare
facility willing to perform the service or procedure.48
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law
providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in
accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any
real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being
of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental
authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives.50
The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the
delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the
Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52
The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level
and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No.
9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the constitutionality of
the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the
respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie GalvezTan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa"
Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On
June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the
principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2]
some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining
the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent
issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23,
2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended
until further orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed
several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and
devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold,
dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company
and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anticonceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable
of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any
person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population problem
should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy
and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971,
entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The
law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to
couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December
8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a
part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens
desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave
priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments
made in the International Conference on Population and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710
or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and
programs for women, including family planning and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry
number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92
million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH
Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem
family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it
more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning
methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes
certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women's
health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the
government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity
of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the
passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and
Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a
physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire
bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the
implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder
and provider of all forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of,
and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the following
principal issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural
impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom
of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic
process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."76The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social
legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and
positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in
Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to
assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be
enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It
claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought
that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the
principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the
executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the
allotment of powers among the three branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the courts
proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts
of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the
Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time,
allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and
the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied
in the Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction
as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is
simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive
branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their
respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional
violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of
the Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as
there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v.
COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty
(to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or
interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is
bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance and
enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the
definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only,
medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim
of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz
: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet
to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one
has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely
affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and
concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and
not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come
into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the
act complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an
unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has
no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and
the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not
negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law
have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary
to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to
assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.106 These include

religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but
component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications.
While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes
not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for
this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the
Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with
its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and
religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take
cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions
on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government,
acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge"
lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them,111 and the government
has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in
establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he
asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of
the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional
questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct
injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in
common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has
time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise
directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is
invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or
relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest,
albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR: 119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the
issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised
must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and
health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no
doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly,
considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be
taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to
be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and
prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a
population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure,124and that the concepts of
"responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The
corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women
and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide
Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and
methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however,
covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and
quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact,
the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its
very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and
post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the
Magna Carta for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on
Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of
such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with
if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases
supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood"
are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section
2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality
and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive
health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it
would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to
or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the
real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of
achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally
sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that
prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that
take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the
fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that
contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive
use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or
supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also
considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and supplies to
prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes. 133
Position of the Respondents

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of
abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient"
reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH
Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization
(WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and
pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that various
studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is
constitutional since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are
allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or
dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the
enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male
vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to
promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years,
however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management,
to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of the family's
well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise
known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population
program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will
be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional
protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that
should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that
the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is no
unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life
begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that
conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male
sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in
the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As
held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction
that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to
the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that
the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but
essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable
and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization
that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon
resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon.
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the
womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect
equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered,
qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human life at
all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision,
the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the
following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum
alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it
processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it
multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there
is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum
and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of
46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as
night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not because of
doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized
ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception." 152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the
moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to
Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be
very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it.
So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise
during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today are
abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If
fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens
with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision
as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional
and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are
abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal
protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from
enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In
fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the
determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on
based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.
Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action
prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the life
of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured
of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of
these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question
again for a categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no,"
not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or
does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which
actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception,"
what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral arguments.
There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.

Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor,
yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary
defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable
zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that
human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a
new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male and female
gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the
contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the
sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid
cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process,
fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby
formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid
number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible
Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is
sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception,
and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human
embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human
embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this
objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences
at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and
independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos. 164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of
the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They
are not identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the
fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected." 167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life
but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and
46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt
it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the implantation
of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to
prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise.
This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed
by the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to
make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from
the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to
protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction
or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to
reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of
which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have
children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination,
coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive
health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order,
letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic
Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines
an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word " or," the
RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the
fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law,
first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces
the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an
abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests.
It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it
recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected
the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and
afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or
destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion.
To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine
wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the
RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to be included
in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be
used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be
used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be
used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that
the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be
included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it
cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section
that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills,
abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning
of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or health product,
whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from
being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the
word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section
4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the
way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be
considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the
fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients
because of their fail-safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this,
together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the
undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not
have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be construed in a
manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting
abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section
3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively
"open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in
violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the
regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals.176 Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners
posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to
women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is
contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a
twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the definition of
"reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed
legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the
administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that
contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting
and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of
the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health,
manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance,
and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary,
the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these selfexecuting provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now
is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is
clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per
se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are
not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no
intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with
the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives
since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician.
With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made
available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices"
and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the
Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH
Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No. 4729
which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or without
consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing
fertilization of the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the
primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than five
hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind
or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public except through a
prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners
that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and
baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the
usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan
and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the
current levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall provisions of
this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still
in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected
by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in
supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental
to their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves
the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that
food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack
on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional
yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are
safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by
using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The
FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and nonabortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning
supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and
other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not
mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, nonabortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription, there are
those who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are
evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also
the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is

gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses;
it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on
contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions for a
conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious
objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide
for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he
refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because
although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and
information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive
health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health
facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers
in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to another health
care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to
do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they
tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education,
mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are
required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive health care
services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the
commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts
prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it
mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, nondiscrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions according to
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as
to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and responsible
parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the
implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs.195As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine
and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide,
support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used,
be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the
public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line
with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are
those acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to
guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going against
the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words,
by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic
Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom,
it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but
is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the health care
professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3)
is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and
impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an
opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant
nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are not
compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics
and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church
on contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning
their families.
The Church and The State

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and
religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various
religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards
all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity,
whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the
preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a
Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure
to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a
people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with
respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the
contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards
religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and
vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1wphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the
internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate
against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It
cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited
provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God
which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular
objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987
Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution,
or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions.
It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the
use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.207 Under this part of
religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and
faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect,
thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88
L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said
that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others
and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to
discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law
which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d.
563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote
freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two
parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of
Education:211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief,
including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable
the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the
freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. 212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the
rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This
has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutralityaccommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the
same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed,
not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance.
"The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion."216 "What is
sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its
application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper.218Underlying the compelling
state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict
scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause,
American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued
to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious
freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave
danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least
restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After
Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the
Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican
Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test
involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the
Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona,
however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate danger"
test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test
was inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present
danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona
and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate
in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state
interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests:
some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state
in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would
suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of
rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free
Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an
acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane
society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this
fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate.
Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to
carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones
until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the
guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the
paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the
end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without
which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in
the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong
according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil
courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the
case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority
to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes
the guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with
assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will.
Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these
rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of
the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood."
[Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective
natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and
marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the
State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation
Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire with due
consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing
laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their religious
convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based
organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development
policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It
is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their
children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and
economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners,
however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs
should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects
can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to
a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program through
the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded
to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his
taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto
Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the
Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions
commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the
law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling state
interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the
conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective.
Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor,
there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the
abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an
illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his
beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect
for the inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health
providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly
what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an externalization of one's
thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the
protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his
mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of
the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the
other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to
determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of
health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from

compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be
violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater
Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's
Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in
abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or '
indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist abortions
if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and
health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply
with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the
freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of
information regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health
care service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as
his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for
either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an
effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment
of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health
procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot
allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses,
supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of
the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of
the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the
mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without
distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the
protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free
to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media
and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are
freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative of
the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH
Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in
upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read,
I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health
professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others,
who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot
be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:

In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled health
professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the
religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail. 230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1]
demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge
the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the establishment
of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action
contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of
the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a
conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation
involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the
relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors,
however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify
the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one
believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's
belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject
provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is
contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she
even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is
immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the
respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's
fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the
means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring
would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative
of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its
objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other
practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person
who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering
other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines"
and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services
and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive,
culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses
the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect
shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices,
interventions, and substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the primary
right and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and
AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other
gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be provided with
comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and
assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy
lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of
diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete,
and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in government education and training
programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of moral
character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and
strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per
day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by
concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48
percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that
such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be
solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service
providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an
exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right
to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of
service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban,
representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not
contemplate an emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives.
If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of
double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a
conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives.
However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct
harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and,
therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child
because both their lives are equally valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is
against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in
this case would have been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to
be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious
freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family
planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar,
whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the
required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find
unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into
marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity
and total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article
XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as
a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making process regarding their common
future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or
had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of
consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the
procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should
require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a
family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One
person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would
undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and
wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would
be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any
decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly
matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive
unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown
any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women,"
provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the
number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility
between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health
procedure.242

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would
encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in
Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the
ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its
amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy
rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will
not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the
minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the
parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated,
the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State
cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer
relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government."247 In this
regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is
superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to
mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life,
would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino
tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract
of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or
not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their
parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the
consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to information
about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods
themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of
information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care
of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the
life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in
the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this
situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise
parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not
be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care
urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of
parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is
involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in
the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny
them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom

It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and DevelopmentAppropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom .
According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if
they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and
statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-ofwedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging
of society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only
speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will
contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973
Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing
the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of
their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of
the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the
Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation building.253 Considering that
Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the development of
knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms
of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's
rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the
RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical
and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements,
rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed in conjunction
with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line
with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that
Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive health education
program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution.
According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does
not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes
reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering
reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving
reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same time
fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in
determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone,
but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be made to
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted
primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of
individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2)
public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of
health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO
and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having been accredited to function as such by the
local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service provider,"
should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and
modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from
being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are
broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who intentionally withhold,
restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed
provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate,
faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the
word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they
connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and correct medical
information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from
expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with
the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against the
poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather
than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of
the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding
principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by
the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis
of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut
it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments
of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the
laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred
and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of
the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all
those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other
members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in
the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must
not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address
the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of
the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their
number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1)
explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples
who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children
only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply
provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program under
Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions
does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests
between public educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the
academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity
towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary
servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care service providers to
render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires
medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous
to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services.
Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with
PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of
the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine
is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes
the power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the
public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of
revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other
similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and
non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no
penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also
enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it
all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the
rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an
unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from
this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or
otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is
to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate,
register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and highly
proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with
what is ordinarily understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in
the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions,
powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend
standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate
authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters,
distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure
safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and nonconsumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused or
contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not registered with
the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be
extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death, serious
illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly
deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the
appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the
mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the
public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary
implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe
includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given
only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidencebased medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of
Justice,267 as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with
the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated
problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest
and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local
government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and
functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the
duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national
agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other
powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and
effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been
devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective
jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded
projects, facilities, programs and services.268Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities,
programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws,
pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section,
except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such
projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the
annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A
complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the
Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities,271 the hiring of
skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the
funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national
priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the
wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it
cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the
local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law
does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM,
alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy
statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers
that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its
power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the
Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between
the national and the regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress
cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general
concern or common interest.275

11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal
basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is
perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with,
it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused
by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than
in the actual law of the past or present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to
strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not dutybound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be
used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form.
It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient
contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, nonabortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier
pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to
achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher
than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the
rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and
open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of
rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but
the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in
the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries, which
embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is
dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped
them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling.
For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an
ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and
the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down
below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions
of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a
law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking
body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the
province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the
business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to
enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the
Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of
settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the
law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and
reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still
be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna
Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion"
and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and nonmaternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and
b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent
only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a
reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service
in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED,
insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7995

May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by
Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila,respondents.
Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.
LABRADOR, J.:
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental and
far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also
poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist.
Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the
alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic
independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible
measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be
free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main
provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail
trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are
allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary
retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical
persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of
licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other
laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the
retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business
to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the
nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing
the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of
liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin
the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions.
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title
thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against
the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a

corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article
XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the
police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has
only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only
the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
a. The police power.
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner claims that its exercise in this instance
is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to
the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind certain basic and fundamental, albeit
preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process
and equal protection of the laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal protection clauses related
to it? What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts? These consideration must be
clearly and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly
resolved.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be coextensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most
essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of
nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as
the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise
stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world,
so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve
interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set
forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power.
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens
alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)
c. The, equal protection clause.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory
within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
d. The due process clause.
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public
interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's
purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved;
or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not
merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent
than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever
exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State
can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.
And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review.
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must not be overlooked, in the first place,
that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the
State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated
in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the other
hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the
exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and
unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never
inquire into the wisdom of the law.

V. Economic problems sought to be remedied

With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved. If the disputed legislation were
merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it
goes further and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes more complex because its
subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself, which from the immemorial has always been open to residents,
irrespective of race, color or citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation.
In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they produce, the dealer, of course, is
unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live in communities producing more than what they consume and needing an
infinite number of things they do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into big communities and
specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under modern conditions and standards of living, in which
man's needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer,
because thru him the infinite variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail
dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to members
of the communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community. He ministers to the resident's daily
needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his
customers around his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to
sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the
owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department store or, a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait.
The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of population (Time there was when he was
unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and
big centers of population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life appear, ministering to the daily
needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities
the alien has replaced the native retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a slave.
Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred and insolent neighbors and customers
are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be
harmless and extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance.
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the controlling and dominant position that the
alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents
mostly through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent control over
distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other
goods and articles. And were it not for some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control
over principal foods and products would easily become full and complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it is said that the fear is unfounded and
the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism.
Alienage, it is said, is not an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make control virtually
impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious consideration. The others are matters of opinion within
the exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and white. Between the constitutional
convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with
fears and misgivings, and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics unmistakably
point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade, as witness the following tables:

Assets

Year and Retailers

Nationality

No.Establishment
s

Pesos

Gross Sales

Per cent
Distributio
n

Pesos

Per cent
Distribution

1941:

Filipino ..........

106,671

200,323,138

55.82

174,181,924

51.74

Chinese ...........

15,356

118,348,692

32.98

148,813,239

44.21

Others ............

1,646

40,187,090

11.20

13,630,239

4.05

1947:

Filipino ..........

111,107

208,658,946

65.05

279,583,333

57.03

13,774

106,156,218

33.56

205,701,134

41.96

354

8,761,260

.49

4,927,168

1.01

Filipino ..........

113,631

213,342,264

67.30

467,161,667

60.51

Chinese ..........

12,087

93,155,459

29.38

294,894,227

38.20

Others ..........

422

10,514,675

3.32

9,995,402

1.29

Filipino ..........

113,659

213,451,602

60.89

462,532,901

53.47

Chinese ..........

16,248

125,223,336

35.72

392,414,875

45.36

Others ..........

486

12,056,365

3.39

10,078,364

1.17

Filipino .........

119,352

224,053,620

61.09

466,058,052

53.07

17,429

134,325,303

36.60

404,481,384

46.06

347

8,614,025

2.31

7,645,327

87

Chinese ...........

Others ...........

1948: (Census)

1949:

1951:

Chinese ..........

Others ..........

AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT

Year and Retailer's

Nationality

1941:

Item
Assets
(Pesos)

Gross
Sales
(Pesos)

Filipino .............................................

1,878

1,633

Chinese ..............................................

7,707

9,691

Others ...............................................

24,415

8,281

Filipino .............................................

1,878

2,516

Chinese ...........................................

7,707

14,934

Others ..............................................

24,749

13,919

Filipino .............................................

1,878

4,111

Chinese .............................................

7,707

24,398

Others ..............................................

24,916

23,686

Filipino .............................................

1,878

4,069

Chinese ..............................................

7,707

24,152

Others ..............................................

24,807

20,737

Filipino .............................................

1,877

3,905

Chinese .............................................

7,707

33,207

Others ...............................................

24,824

22,033

1947:

1948:

(Census)

1949:

1951:

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census,
issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino establishments already include mere
market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien participation has steadily increased during the
years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap
through their assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very many Filipino retailers. Numbers in
retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more.
The same official report, pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino
retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native investment is thinly spread, and the
Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention.
It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the legislature's target in the enactment of
the disputed nationalization would never have been adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien
dominance and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it is the sense of the
Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either
pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of the
Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from
alien interests that had already brought under their control the commercial and other economic activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil.
Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the constitutional convention for the economic life of the
citizens, in connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:
But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the country is not desirable and that if
such a situation should remain, political independence alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private
capital is not big enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but of recent formation
and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the
national will, has to step in and assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of the
nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it (the Constitution) envisages an
organized movement for the protection of the nation not only against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its
economic subjugation by alien interests in the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino businessmen, manufacturers and producers
believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto
is Resolution No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a similar resolution,
approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes,
and fears, alien predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to alien
stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all the
sections and groups that compose the Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail.
But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance alone; there is a prevailing
feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough
organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the
determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they
would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of
national economy and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and consumers alike can be placed
completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the
producer or importer does not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger profits for its introduction.
All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute.
Hence, the producers or importers of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its
consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise correspondingly
suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien domination. Grave abuses have
characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook
or ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien participation in the
retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the mention of a few of which would suffice for our purposes;
that at some time or other they have cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to
justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice of
the consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public
from their continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control laws, especially on foods and essential
commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic
deportation for price control convictions; that they have secret combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation
of the law of supply and demand; that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their
demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled
goods and money into and out of the land, violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of
lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the
prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the
Government and by their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence
of many of the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the future. The present dominance of the
alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other
calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are
well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of
population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While
the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential
enemy of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security.

We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is not the product of racial hostility,
prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized
representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its
disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of
police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. The next question that now poses solution is, Does the law deny the equal
protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and
the national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for
personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor
immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his
living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of
their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his
beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers
and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth.
He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the
country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient and temporary, it would
indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above, their secret manipulations of stocks of
commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation
of which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals,
show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the
legislative classification adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the
national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a
legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction.
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient
grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's
classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that the classification is
actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently
unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not
declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the
equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the
constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier cited, we
can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the
application of equal protection clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:
. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the state the power to classify in the
adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only
when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis
does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in
some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived
that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails
the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is
essentially arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification.
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has already been affirmatively decided in this
jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the
validity of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the ownership of vessels
engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to
aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The
legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands
from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its
constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the
Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering
said decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as
follows:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming houses, retailers
of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the
object of which is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations.
Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in
favor of American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the
vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment.
But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contra distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud
by foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue
in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected."
The rule in general is as follows:
Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the
limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a
class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between
citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)

In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of hawkers and peddlers, which provided
that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for
the following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to have regard for the welfare,
good order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N.
E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found
not to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien
cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular business
to our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926),
the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and
billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and
allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted
classification, and that it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the legislative
appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs.
Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the
business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest, and limiting it to citizens is within the scope of
police power. A similar statute denying aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P.
151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are judicially known to
have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the
business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan
State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the
reason for the decision was the court's findings that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals,
the health, or even the convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a
California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible to citizenship was held void, because the law
conflicts with Federal power over immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters and
the fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further added that the law was the outgrowth of
antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been
treated traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which
imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was declared void because the
court found that there was no reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained.
It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold that the distinction between aliens
and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in this decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary,
unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of public interest
involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine
law making unlawful the keeping of books of account in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the
main reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other system of distribution, and
(2) that the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of their right to be advised of their business
and to direct its conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public benefit would be derived from the
operations of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring powers on officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries both
as to persons and place, was declared invalid, but the court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the
discrimination which attended the administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof was mere racial hostility.
In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void,
because the discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification was proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens do not naturally possess the
sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster
the nation's economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the land.
These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis
and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and
significance of the distinction between the alien and the national, thus:
. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without the intimate knowledge of our laws,
customs, and usages that our own people have. So it is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different
psychology from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born, whose
allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental environment and control have been engendered and
formed under entirely different regimes and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as
well disposed toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of the government itself. Further enlargement,
is unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was
without plausible reason for making the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens as it relates to
the subject of legislation. . . . .
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive.
We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been stated by the highest authority in the
United States that:
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to
adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by
legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the
legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect
renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:

. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the scope of the police power in a
constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire
whether the restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it
imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the persons whom it affects, must not be
for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:
. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . .
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of constitutionality:
In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police power to regulate the operation of a
business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised
has a sufficient foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use
of that power, without substantial relation to the health, safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public.
b. Petitioner's argument considered.
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges long ago recognized as essential to
the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the
legislature to prohibit and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e.,
that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest
creditable and unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace,
tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly
abused by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of the
occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and
emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but this,
Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and
pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law
in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien
control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.)
The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its
purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be
considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill, which later was enacted into law:
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from
having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who
owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have no permanent stake
in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at
the mercy of other people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who are not citizens of the Philippines
of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines
a power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national security it respects existing
rights.
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none the less legitimate. Freedom and
liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own
race or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one of the noblest motives
that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the
constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of
legislative authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action.
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of due process on the attainment of
such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the
Constitution must have given to the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the supreme happiness
of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a
resolution expressing their belief that the legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the their
Resolution:
That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of retail trade; but it abstain from
approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is
convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and American citizens the
privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of
the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a
principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines
the exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that "no franchise,

certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of the public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines."
The nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the
Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is
unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the approval of the radical measures is,
therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the
nationals with the complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of public interest and
national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and
meet, through adequate measures, the danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is
made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest
of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied to those
only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege
should not have been denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself,
its aims and purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well settled that the Court will
not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily the
judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court
may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power.
Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness,
and we find the provisions are not unreasonable. These principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law, some of
which are: that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of employment; that prices will
increase because of the elimination of competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical;
that there may be general breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are directed
against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it
conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The
constitutional provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:
No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the legislators or the public of the nature,
scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of
the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not and may not
readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and
objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included
within the term regulation.
Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may prohibit the sale of intoxicating
liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of Answer.)
Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the
title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such
liquors to minors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly included within the subject of
regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and prohibition of acts usually done in
connection with the thing to be regulated. While word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no
absolute reason why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in connection with a thing the
best or only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42
of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the title need not be an index to the entire
contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question
adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains other rules for the
regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from
"regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have
made the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of statutes, under
which a simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions found in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the
purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action
and study of the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have been appraised of the
nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition provisions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion of
the law, and a great many of the persons affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be
claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and
of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter
imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations,
1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common standard
of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of
Human Rights can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit
foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are
adopted.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated
by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the
nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other countries, except
those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But
even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent
law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State
(plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to
national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and
control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because
sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of
law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and
reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident
as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the
prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the
segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty
has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made less harsh in its impact on the
aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time
comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority and
does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness
of the law should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents
ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA
SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO
and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II
and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN
ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her
parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by
his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE
GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY
ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE
KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR
and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO
and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents
MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented
by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT,
minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and
FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE
PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch
66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the
issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests
and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI),
a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the
protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the
Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million
(30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and
fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in
order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent
(54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water
shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)
salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the
island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural
productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size
of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the
disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of
rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds
which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the
absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for
the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of
global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their
intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting
roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or
four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of
the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to
various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this
ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of
deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a
matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and
suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work
great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may never
see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in
trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by
the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs
served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme
prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs,
especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in
the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D.
1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural
resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs'
right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds,
namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited
by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning
their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law.
Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not
apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said
clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of
whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby
before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of
law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the
same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms
of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without
the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit.
The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil
case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens
of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of
them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection
of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments
adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For
although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking
to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a
matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right
involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on
unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance
the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the
debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution air, water
and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment
of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related
provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands,
mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom
for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and
other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable
access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources,
not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and
apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1
thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration
and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with
the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment
and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably
accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental
cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes
particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to
the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and
P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop,
maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to
fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each
generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh
to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty
under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a
cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are
legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the
question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should
be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment
in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should
"exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants
or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as
the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation
of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that
insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are
indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the
executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a
right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question
doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive
and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court,
says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting
rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the
courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even
the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of
discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the
Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so,
he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which
provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property
right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting
of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.
7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid
that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are
not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an
executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as
yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same
cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law
could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be
subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In
other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and
not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property
rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the

detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private
right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal,
no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a
matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of
18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-38025 August 20, 1979
DANTE O. CASIBANG, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE NARCISO A. AQUINO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, and REMEGIO P.
YU, respondents.
Nicanor & Bautista and Agaton D. Yaranon for petitioner.
Bince, Sevilleja, Agsalud & Associates for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:
Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local
elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who seasonably filed on November 24, 1971 a protest against
the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the
appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting
or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code.
Respondent Yu filed on November 29, 1971 his answer and counter-protest which petitioner answered on December 10, 1971.
However, respondent Yu withdrew his counter-protest after waiving the opening and revision of the ballot boxes specified therein.
Proceedings therein continued with respect to the election protest of petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch
XIV, presided by respondent Judge, who initially took cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a justiciable controversy.
In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081,
placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two months thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971
Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same was thereafter
overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, this
Court declared that "there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect" (Javellana vs.
Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 [1973]).
Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had rested his
case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the
same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions]
and Section 2 of Article XI a political question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended that "... the provisions in the
1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government
should adhere to our parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI." He further submitted
that local elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the
appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII.

Petitioner vigorously opposed the motion to dismiss, and, relying mainly on Sections 7 and 8 of Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) of
the New Constitution and G.O. No. 3, contended that the New Constitution did not divest the Court of First Instance of its jurisdiction to
hear and decide election protests pending before them at the time of its ratification and effectivity; that the ratification of the New
Constitution and its effectivity did not automatically abolish the office and position of municipal mayor nor has it automatically cut short
the tenure of the office, so as to render the issue as to who is the lawfully elected candidate to said office or position moot and
academic; that election protests involve public interest such that the same must be heard until terminated and may not be dismissed on
mere speculation that the office involved may have been abolished, modified or reorganized; and that the motion to dismiss was filed
manifestly for delay.
Respondent Yu replied pointing out, among others, that petitioner failed to refute the issue of political question; and reiterated his stand,
expanding his arguments on the political question, thus:
It is an undeniable fact that this case has its source from the 1971 elections for municipal mayoralty. Unsatisfied with
the counting of votes held by the Board of Canvassers, the herein protestant filed this present case. And before the
termination of the same and pending trial, the Filipino people in the exercise of their free will and sovereign capacity
approved a NEW CONSTITUTION, thus a NEW FORM OF GOVERNMENT-PARLIAMENTARY IN FORM was
enforced. We find this provision under Article XI of the New Constitution, which provides:
SEC. 2. The National Assembly shall enact a local government code which may not thereafter be
amended except by a majority vote of all its members, defining a more responsive and accountable
local government structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications,
election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials, and all other
matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. However, any change in the
existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite called for the purpose.
It is respectfully submitted that the contention of the protestant to the effect that the New Constitution "shows that the
office of the Municipal Mayor has not been abolished ... ," is not ACCURATE. Otherwise, the provisions of Section 9
of Article XVII, is meaningless.
All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President of the Philippines, ...
In the above-quoted provision is the protection of the officials and employees working in our government, otherwise,
by the force of the New Constitution they are all out of the government offices. In fact, in the case above-cited
(Javellana) we are all performing our duties in accordance with the New Constitution.
Therefore, election cases of the 1935 Constitution being interwoven in the political complexion of our new
Constitution should be dismissed because only those incumbent official and employees existing in the new
government are protected by the transitional provisions of the New Fundamental Law of the Land. The protestant, we
respectfully submit, is not covered by the provisions of Section 9 Article XVII of the Constitution. And in case he will
win in this present case he has no right to hold the position of mayor of the town of Rosales, Pangasinan, because he
was not then an official of the government at the time the New Constitution was approved by the Filipino People. His
right if proclaimed a winner is derived from the 1935 Constitution which is changed by the Filipino people.
On December 18, 1973, the trial court, presided by respondent Judge, sustained the political question theory of respondent Yu and
ordered the dismissal of the electoral protest. Thus:
There is no dispute that the Filipino people have accepted and submitted to a new Constitution to replace the 1935
Constitution, and that we are now living under its aegis and protection. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the new Constitution, above-quoted, only those officials and employees of the
existing Government of the Republic of the Philippines like the protestee herein, are given protection and are
authorized to continue in office at the pleasure of the incumbent President of the Philippines, while under Section 2 of
Article XI of the new Constitution, also above-quoted, the intention of completely revamp the whole local government
structure, providing for different qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties, is
very clear. These present questions of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial
review. With respect to the fate of incumbent oficials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, as well as to the qualifications, election and removal, term of office, salaries, and powers of all local
officials under the parliamentary form of government these have been entrusted or delegated by the sovereign
people or has reserved it to be settled by the incumbent Chief Executive or by the National Assembly with full
discretionary authority therefor. As if to supplement these delegated powers, the people have also decreed in a
referendum the suspension of all elections. Thus, in the United States, questions relating to what persons or
organizations constituted the lawful government of a state of the Union (Luther vs. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12, L. Ed 58),
and those relating to the political status of a state (Highland Farms Dairy vs. Agnew, 57 S. et 549, 300 U.S. 608, 81
L.ed 835), have been held to be political and for the judiciary to determine.
To the mind of the Court, therefore, the ratification and effectivity of the new Constitution has tainted this case with a
political complexion above and beyond the power of judicial review. As fittingly commented by Mr. Justice Antonio in a
separate opinion in the Javellana, et al. cases, 69 0. G. No. 36, September 3, 1973, p. 8008:
The essentially political nature of the question is at once manifest by understanding that in the final
analysis, what is assailed is not merely the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the President,

which is merely declaratory of the fact of the approval or ratification, but the legitimacy of the
government. It is addressed more to the frame-work and political character of this government
which now functions under the new Charter. It seeks to nullify a Constitution that is already
effective. In other words, where a complete change in the fundamental law has been effected
through political action, the Court whose existence is affected by such a change is, in the words of
Mr. Meville Fuller Weston "precluded from passing upon the fact of change by a logical difficulty
which is not to be surmounted as the change relates to the existence of a prior point in the Court's
"chain of title" to its authority and "does not relate merely to a question of the horizontal distribution
of powers." It involves a matter which 'the sovereign has entrusted to the so-called political
departments or has reserved to be settled by its own extra-governmental action." The present
Government functions under the new Constitution which has become effective through political
action. Judicial power presupposes an established government and an effective constitution. If it
decides at all as a court, it necessarily affirms the existence and authority of the Government under
which it is exercising judicial power.
The Court is not unaware of provisions of the new Constitution, particularly Sections 7 and 8, Article XVII (Transitory
Provisions) decreeing that all existing laws not inconsistent with the new Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and that all courts existing at the time of the ratification of
the said new Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance
with the new Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws
then in force. Again, to the mind of the Court, these refer to matters raised in the enforcement of existing laws or in
the invocation of a court's jurisdiction which have not been "entrusted to the so-called political department or has
reserved to be settled by its own extra governmental action.
Hence, this petition.
We reverse.
The thrust of the aforesaid political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of Article XVII
thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to
continue in office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same has been entrusted or committed
to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the
National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure by the enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a
question of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to
still continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a question or policy "in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the government."
I
There is an imperative need to re-state pronouncements of this Court on the new Constitution which are decisive in the resolution of the
political question theory of respondent Yu.
WE ruled:
1. That Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending election protest cases (Santos vs.
Castaeda, 65 SCRA 114 [1975]; Euipilag vs. Araula, 60 SCRA 211 [1974]; Nunez vs. Averia, 57 SCRA 726 [1974]; Parades vs. Abad,
L-36927, Sunga vs. Mosueda, L-37715, Valley vs. Caro, L-38331, 56 SCRA 522, [1974]).
2. That "the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were
incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as
indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under
protest or contest" and that "subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it
neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory
right of a condidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings
beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect's right to the contested office."' (Santos
vs. Castaeda, supra); and We rationalized that "the Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as in fact it .did not intend, to
shielf or protect those who had been unduly elected. To hold that the right of the herein private respondents to the respective offices
which they are now holding, may no longer be subject to question, would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could
have been an election victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by the
Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of the ballot." (Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).
3. That "the right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Article
XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the
November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions and consequently,
have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be
allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision" (Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).
4. That "until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent (protestee) to continue as mayor rests
on the legality of his election which has been protested by herein petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral
protest, respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his tenure of office
pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution" (Euipilag, supra).
5. That "there is a difference between the 'term' of office and the 'right' to hold an office. A 'term' of office is the period during winch an
elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A 'right' to hold a
public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. In other words, the 'term' refers to
the period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or

indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose
any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the 'right' of the private respondents to continue holding their
respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the 'term' to the office, although the 'right' of the
incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the 'term' thereof," and that "it is erroneous to conclude that under
Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their
respective offices under a new term. We are of the opinion that they hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have
been elected, although the same is now indefinite" (Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).
6. That the New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and decide election protests:
"Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that 'all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, modified or repealed by the National Assembly. 'And there has been no amendment, modification or repeal of
Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file an election contest against those proclaimed
elected," and "according to Section 8, Article XVII of the New Constitution 'all courts existing at the time of the ratification of this
Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all
cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force.' Consequently, the Courts of First
Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should continue and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election
protests filed by herein petitioners" (Santos, Euipilag, Nunez, Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).
While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as elective provincial and city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of
the 1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal elective positions.
7. That General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his powers under Section 9 of Article XVII of
the New Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to modify the aforesaid constitutional provision (Euipilag, supra).
General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include electoral contests of municipal elective
positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; for said General Order, after affirming the jurisdiction of the
Judiciary to decide in accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil cases, simply removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court certain crimes specified therein as well as the validity, legality or constitutionality of any decree, order or acts issued by the
President or his duly designated representative or by public servants pursuant to his decrees and orders issued under Proclamation
No. 1081.
8. That General Order No. 3 may not be invoked by the courts to avoid exercise of their jurisdiction because to do co "is nothing short of
unwarranted abdication of judicial', authority, which no judge duly imbued with the implications of the paramount principle of
independence of the judiciary should ever think of doing. It is unfortunate indeed that respondent Judge is apparently unaware that it is
a matter of highly significant historical fact that this Court has always deemed General Order No. 3 including its amendment by General
Order No. 3-A as practically inoperative even in the light of Proclamation No. 1081 of September 21, 1972 and Proclamation No. 1104
of January 17, 1973, placing the whole Philippines under martial law. While the members of the Court are not agreed on whether or not
particular instances of attack against the validity of certain Presidential decrees raise political questions which the Judiciary would not
interfere with, there is unanimity among Us in the view that it is for the Court rather than the Executive to determine whether or not We
may take cognizance of any given case involving the validity of acts of the Executive Department purportedly under the authority of the
martial law proclamations" (Lina vs. Purisima, 3 PHILAJUR 605, 610-611, 82 SCRA 344 [1978]).
II
1. In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, We hold that the electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable
controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the
Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term
"political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure" (Taada vs. Cuenco, L-1052, Feb. 28, 1957). A broader definition was advanced by U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Brennan in Baker vs. Carr (369 U.S. 186 [1962]): "Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect
due coordinate branches of the government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question" (p. 217). And Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando, then an Associate Justice, of this Court fixed the limits of the term, thus: "The term has been made
applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue involved in a case appropriately
subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a prior legislative or executive determination to which deference must be paid (Cf.
Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]; Lopez vs. Roxas, L-25716, July 28, 1966, 17 SCRA 756; Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections,
L-28196, Nov. 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774). It 'has likewise been employed loosely to characterize a suit where the party proceeded against
is the President or Congress, or any branch thereof (Cf. Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 [1937]; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]). If to be
delimited with accuracy; 'political questions' should refer to such as would under the Constitution be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested either in the President or Congress. It is thus beyond the
competence of the judiciary to pass upon. ..." (Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, 504-505 [1971]).
2. The only issue in the electoral protest case dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground of political question is who between
protestant herein petitioner and protestee herein respondent Yu was the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan, and
legally entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges and emoluments appurtenant thereto and to discharge the functions, duties and obligations
of the position. If the protestee's election is upheld by the respondent Judge, then he continues in office; otherwise, it is the protestant,
herein petitioner. That is the only consequence of a resolution of the issue therein involved a purely justiciable question or
controversy as it implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or ommission violative of said right, and a remedy,
granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right (Tan vs. Republic, 107 Phil. 632-633 [1960]). Before and after the ratification and
effectivity of the New Constitution, the nature of the aforesaid issue as well as the consequences of its resolution by the Court, remains
the same as above-stated.

3. Any judgment to be made on that issue will not in any way collide or interfere with the mandate of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New
Constitution, as it will merely resolve who as between protestant and protestee is the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan;
hence, entitled to enjoy the extended term as mandated by said provision of the New Constitution. As construed by this Court, the
elective officials referred to in Section 9 of Article XVII are limited to those duly elected as the right to said extended term was not
personal to whosoever was incumbent at the time of the ratification and effectivity of the New Constitution. Nor would such judgment
preempt, collide or interfere with the power or discretion entrusted by the New Constitution to the incumbent President or the Legislative
Department, with respect to the extended term of the duly elected incumbents; because whoever between protestant and protestee is
declared the duly elected mayor will be subject always to whatever action the President or the Legislative Department will take pursuant
thereto.
4. Neither does Section 2 of Article XI stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color. For simply, that section
allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local government code "which may not thereafter be amended except by a
majority of all its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government allocating among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for their qualifications, election and removal, term,
salaries, powers, functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units"
but "... any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose." It is apparent at once that such power committed by the New Constitution to the National Assembly
will not be usurped or preempted by whatever ruling or judgment the respondent Judge will render in the electoral protest case.
Whoever will prevail in that contest will enjoy the indefinite term of the disputed office of mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the existing
set-up of local government in this country; subject always to whatever change or modification the National Assembly will introduce when
it will enact the local government code.
III
The construction made by respondent Judge of Sections 7 and 8 of Article XVII of the New Constitution "... that these refer to matters
raised in the enforcement of existing laws or in the invocation of a court's jurisdiction which have not been 'entrusted to the so-called
political department or reserved to be settled by its own extra-governmental action,"' strained as it is, cannot be sustained in view of the
result herein reached on the issue of political question as well as Our previous pronouncements as above restated on the same
Sections 7 and 8 of the New Constitution.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE RESPONDENT COURT IS
DIRECTED TO IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE TRIAL AND DETERMINATION OF THE ELECTION PROTEST BEFORE IT ON
THE MERITS. THIS DECISION SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY UPON PROMULGATION HEREOF. NO COSTS.
Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ,, concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
February 2, 1953
G.R. No. L-6266
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., ETC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE GELLA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., Lorenzo M. Taada, Claro M. Recto, Jose P. Laurel, Jesus Barrera and Leon Ma. Guerrero for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for respondents.
PARAS, C.J.:
As a fitting foreword, it may be recalled that on a previous occasion, on August 26, 1949 to be exact, this court had already passed
upon the status of Commonwealth Act No. 671, approved on December 16, 1941, "declaring a state of total emergency as a result of
war involving the Philippines and authorizing the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency." Five
members held that the Act ceased to be operative in its totality, on May 25, 1946 (when the Congress convened in special session)
according to Chief Justice Moran. Justice Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres in effect concluded that the powers
delegated to the President had been withdrawn as to matters already legislated upon by the Congress or on which the latter had
demonstrated its readiness or ability to act. Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192
(dated December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation of
the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for election expenses in November 1949,
were therefore declared null and void for having been issued after Commonwealth Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress
had enacted legislation on the same subjects.[[1]]
More or less the same considerations that influenced our pronouncement of August 26, 1949 are and should be controlling in the case
now before us, wherein the petitioners seek to invalidate Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952, the first
appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for
relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities.

Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to
carry out a declared national policy." Accordingly the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1)
the national policy that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the
Philippines makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in
section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem
necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1."
As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be
only for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a cessation of the
emergency powers delegated to the President, the result would be obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the
Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto. This eventuality has in fact taken place when the
President disapproved House Bill No. 727, repealing all Emergency Powers Acts. The situation will make the Congress and the
President or either as the principal authority to determine the indefinite duration of the delegation of legislative powers, in palpable
repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grant thereunder must be for a limited period, necessarily to be fixed in the law itself
and not dependent upon the arbitrary or elastic will of either the Congress or the President.
Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and did not thereby become a regular statute, it may at least be
considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To contend that the
Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect, would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while Congress
might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be
easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law." [[2]]
Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he
cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will
of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.
The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that the powers lasted only during the emergency resulting from the last world
war which factually involved the Philippines when Commonwealth Act No. 671 was passed on December 16, 1941. That emergency,
which naturally terminated upon the ending of the last world war, was contemplated by the members of the National Assembly on the
foresight that the actual state of war could prevent it from holding its next regular session. This is confirmed by the following statement
of President Quezon: "When it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack and that it was most unlikely the
Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942, the National Assembly passed into
history approving a resolution which reaffirmed the abiding faith of the Filipino people in, and their loyalty to, the United States. The
Assembly also enacted a law granting the President of the Philippines all the powers that under the Philippine Constitution may be
delegated to him in time of war."[[3]] When President Quezon said "in time of war", he an doubtedly meant such factual war as that then
raging.
As early as July 26, 1948, the Congress categorically declared that "since liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal, but
not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war and who have not received any relief for the loss and destruction
resulting therefrom," and that "the emergency created by the last war as regards these war sufferers being still existent, it is the
declared policy of the state that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in force in a modified form."[[4]] It is important to
remember that Republic Act No. 342 in which this declaration was made bore the approval of the President. Indeed, the latter in his
speech delivered on July 4, 1949, plainly proclaimed that "what emergencies it (the Republic) faces today are incidental passing rains
artificially created by seasonal partisanship, very common among democracies but will disappear with the rains that follow the
thunderclaps not later than November 8 of this year," an admission, that such emergencies not only are not total but are not the
result of the last war as envisaged in Act No. 671.
If more is necessary to demonstrate the unmistakable stand of the legislative department on the alleged existence of emergency,
reference may be had to House Bill No. 727, hereinbefore referred to, repealing all Emergency Powers Acts.
Moreover, section 26 of Article VI of the constitution, in virtue of which Act No. 671was passed, authorizes the delegation of powers by
the Congress (1) in times of war or (2) other national emergency. The emergency expressly spoken of in the title and in section 1 of the
Act is one "in time of war," as distinguished from "other national emergency" that may arise as an after-effect of war or from natural
causes such as widespread earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and the like. Certainly the typhoons that hit some provinces and cities in
1952 not only did not result from the last world war but were and could not have been contemplated by the legislators. At any rate, the
Congress is available for necessary special sessions, and it cannot let the people down without somehow being answerable thereover.
As a matter of fact, the President, in returning to the Congress without his signature House Bill No. 727, did not invoke any emergency
resulting from the last world war, but only called attention to an impending emergency that may be brought about by present
complicated and troubled world conditions, and to the fact that our own soldiers are fighting and dying in Korea in defense of
democracy and freedom and for the preservation of our Republic. The emergency thus feared cannot, however, be attributed to the war
mentioned in Act No. 671 and fought between Germany and Japan on one side and the Allied Powers on the other; and indications are
that in the next world war, if any, the communist countries will be aligned against the democracies. No departure can be made from the
national policy declared in section 1 of Act No. 671. New powers may be granted as often as emergencies contemplated in the
Constitution arise.
There is no point in the argument that the Philippines is still technically at war with Japan pending the ratification of the peace treaty. In
the first place, Act No. 671referred to a factual war. In the second place, the last world war was between the United States and Japan,
the Philippines being involved only because it was then under American sovereignty. In the third place, the United States had already
signed the peace treaty with Japan, and the Philippines has become an independent country since July 4, 1946.
It is pointed out that the passage of House Bill No. 727 is inconsistent with the claim that the emergency powers are non-existent. But,
from the debates in the House, it is patent that the Bill had to be approved merely to remove all doubts, especially because this Court
had heretofore failed, for lack of necessary majority, to declare Act No. 671entirely inoperative.

Reliance is placed on the petition of about seventy Congressmen and Senators and on House Resolution No. 99, urging the President
to release and appropriate funds for essential and urgent public works and for relief in the typhoon-stricken areas. It is enough to state,
in reply, that the said petition and resolution cannot prevail over the force and effect of House Bill No. 727 formally passed by two
chambers of the Congress. If faith can be accorded to the resolution of one house, there is more reason for accepting the solemn
declarations of two houses.
Even under the theory of some members of this court that insofar as the Congress had shown its readiness or ability to act on a given
matter, the emergency powers delegated to the President had been pro tanto withdrawn, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 must be
declared as having no legal anchorage. We can take judicial notice of the fact that the Congress has since liberation repeatedly been
approving acts appropriating funds for the operation of the Government, public works, and many others purposes, with the result that as
to such legislative task the Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume the corresponding power itself and to withdraw
the same from the President. If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general appropriations, none can remain in
respect of special appropriations; otherwise he may accomplish indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is significant that Act
No. 671 expressly limited the power of the President to that continuing "in force" appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative, so that, even assuming that the Act is still effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by executive orders make new
appropriations. The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative" is
a limitation on the general power "to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its
responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that although the Congress has, for about seven years since
liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President still has any residuary powers under the
Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.
Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the President should be allowed to exercise emergency powers for the sake of speed
and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the people, because we have the Constitution, designed to establish a government
under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy. In line with such primordial objective, our Government is democratic in form and
based on the system of separation of powers. Unless and until changed or amended, we shall have to abide by the letter and spirit of
the Constitution and be prepared to accept the consequences resulting from or inherent in disagreements between, inaction or even
refusal of the legislative and executive departments. Much as it is imperative in some cases to have prompt official action, deadlocks in
and slowness of democratic processes must be preferred to concentration of powers in any one man or group of men for obvious
reasons. The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation of legislative powers to the
President for a limited period "in times of war or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the
Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency
in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish
patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the Constitution.
Wherefore, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are hereby declared null and void, and the respondents are ordered to desist from
appropriating, releasing, allotting, and expending the public funds set aside therein. So ordered, without costs.
Feria, Pablo and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J., concur in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO,
ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike but hear me first!" It is this cry that
the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering
of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition
against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the
disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or
carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by
the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by
the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the
merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack
of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before
us in this petition for review on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according
the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure
should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the
legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question raised there was
the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed
the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General,
impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have
jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may
provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain
measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be
rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the
hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least
resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more
deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss
of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of
merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully
executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his
judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act
adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders
or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that
extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the
determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted
discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we
confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language to avoid
controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule
was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was
submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the
Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because
due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for

all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant
to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a
legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead,
they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of
inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme
Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process and in so doing sums it all up as nothing more and nothing
less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed
against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby
won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow
that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent
or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his
cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is
formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also
be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable
that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem
not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a
hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the
insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because
they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence
of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We
have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel
Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be
secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn
and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The
conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human
experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are
instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per
se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the
people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The
passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has
fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public
morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the
property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due
process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the
general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least
limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual,
as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is
dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous
and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation
under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est
suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater
number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order
No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as
expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of
the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the
worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have
been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of
large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for
having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed.
The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by
farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in
agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the
consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and
branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as
follows:
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. ...

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration
was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the
prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work
or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the
loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary
gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community
may be measurably and dangerously affected.
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a
direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is
also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the
above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if
male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm
work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with
equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original
measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on theslaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing
that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought
to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering
that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one
province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As
for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply
killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be
prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that
the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to
be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged
measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after
he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to
produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner
without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the
usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in
administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however.
there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected
and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties
involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited
by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in
nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had
the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned
executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions
as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commissionmay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industrymay see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an
extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even
corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers
must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and
they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission,"
a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation
of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable
in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was

his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the
President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court,
in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we now
annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never have
reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become afait accompli despite its invalidity. We
commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another
violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the
limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are
ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as
weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they
are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla Bidin Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23825

December 24, 1965

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities
enumerated in the margin.1 Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice
President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction,
against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by
Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that
the present action is premature and that not all proper parties referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question
have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive orders
because the latter have taken away from the former the barrios composing the new political subdivisions intervened in the case.
Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did appear as amici curiae.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by
Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the name of an existing one may
be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in
which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution
approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be
created if its population is less than five hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters

in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality
which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?"
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be created without creating new barrios, such as,
by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's
argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to
create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of this argument is too obvious to be denied or
even questioned. Founded upon logic and experience, it cannot be offset except by a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to
the contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act No. 2379, has been brought to our attention.
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any
province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the
territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a
province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new
subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public
welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be
obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or
more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes
necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (GovernorGeneral) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive
control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so
formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an equitable distribution of the
funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the (Insular
Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not amount to an undue delegation
of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it.
Such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from
an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said
transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binagonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) in
consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between
adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into
effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the
language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" (State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425, January 2, 1959) or "solely
and exclusively the exercise oflegislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29, 1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349). As the Supreme Court of
Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart, February 13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, 409), "municipal corporations are purely the
creatures of statutes."
Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate2 and (b) fix a standard the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.2a Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power,
not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be
attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and,
consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix
the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does
it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that,
under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare may require" qualified, not the clauses
preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the government may be transferred. This fact becomes more
apparent when we consider that said Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748,3 which provided that, "whenever in the
judgment of the Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by executive order," effect the changes enumerated therein (as
in said section 68), including the change of the seat of the government "to such place ... as the public interest requires." The opening
statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748 which was not included in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code governed
the time at which, or the conditions under which, the powers therein conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first
sentence of said section referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government was to be transferred.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as the
public welfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true that inCalalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726)
and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient
standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial

pronouncements must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not
constitute precedents and have no binding effect.4 The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public Works,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to promote safe
transit upon national roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer,
under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved grants
to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions
of fact.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the creation of municipalities, is not
an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in character. The question of whether or not "public
interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a legislativequestion "(Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway
vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or apolitical question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, "the question as to whether incorporation is for the best interest of the
community in any case is emphatically a question of public policy and statecraft" (In re Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 10351037).
For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of legislative powers, state laws granting the judicial
department, the power to determine whether certain territories should be annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs. Severn, supra,
258-359); or vesting in a Commission the right to determine the plan and frame of government of proposed villages and what functions
shall be exercised by the same, although the powers and functions of the village are specifically limited by statute (In re Municipal
Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or conferring upon courts the authority to declare a given town or village incorporated, and designate its
metes and bounds, upon petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof, setting forth the area desired to be included in such
village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart, 23 Pac. 405-409); or authorizing the territory of a town, containing a given area and population,
to be incorporated as a town, on certain steps being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on certain determination by a court and
subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the court is allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the
petition "ought justly" to be included in the village, and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation,
and to enlarge and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may require" (In re Villages of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W.
1035-1037); or creating a Municipal Board of Control which shall determine whether or not the laying out, construction or operation of a
toll road is in the "public interest" and whether the requirements of the law had been complied with, in which case the board shall enter
an order creating a municipal corporation and fixing the name of the same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike
Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310).
Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is concerned, the case of Schechter Poultry Corporation
vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the one at bar. The Schechter case involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the
National Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the President of the United States to approve "codes of fair competition" submitted to him
by one or more trade or industrial associations or corporations which "impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to membership
therein and are truly representative," provided that such codes are not designed "to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress
small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy" of said Act. The Federal
Supreme Court held:
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies no standards for any
trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact
determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes
to prescribe them. For that legislative undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general aims
of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature
of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting
laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the code making
authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is "virtually unfettered." and, consequently,
tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that "public welfare," which has even a broader connotation, leads to the
same result. In fact, if the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal
impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or
public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would
bring about a total collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this
Court to uphold.
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative bills for the creation of the
municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the fact that the issuance of said executive orders
entails the exercise of purely legislative functions can hardly be given.
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all
local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be
vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of
such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to
the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the
officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments,
so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council
has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the
corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance
passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an
elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the
corresponding provincial board.5

Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new
municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus,
by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to
submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices implies no morethan the authority to
assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include
the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the
President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of
control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local
governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact
opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments,
bureaus or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised
Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935,
which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.7
There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely, respondent's claim (a) that "not all the proper parties" referring to
the officers of the newly created municipalities "have been impleaded in this case," and (b) that "the present petition is premature."
As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties do not claim, that the officers of any of said
municipalities have been appointed or elected and assumed office. At any rate, the Solicitor General, who has appeared on behalf of
respondent Auditor General, is the officer authorized by law "to act and represent the Government of the Philippines, its offices and
agents, in any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer" (Section 1661, Revised Administrative
Code), and, in connection with the creation of the aforementioned municipalities, which involves a political, not proprietary, function,
said local officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives of the national government. Their interest in the case at bar has,
accordingly, been, in effect, duly represented.8
With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on any of the executive order & in question and has
not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It is, however, a matter of common, public knowledge, subject to judicial
cognizance, that the President has, for many years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations and that the same have
been organized and in actual operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that the expenditures incidental thereto have
been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the General Auditing Office and its officials. There is no reason to believe, therefore,
that respondent would adopt a different policy as regards the new municipalities involved in this case, in the absence of an allegation to
such effect, and none has been made by him.
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained
from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the
municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.