G.R. No. L-23623. June 30, 1977.

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner, vs. MANILA

ELECTRIC COMPANY and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
It was previously determined by "then Acting Commissioner of Customs, the late Norberto
Romualdez, Jr., that private respondent Manila Electric Company was not exempt from the payment
of the special import tax under Republic Act No. 1394 1 for shipment to it of insulating oil." The
respondent Court of Tax Appeals reversed this determination, leading to this petition for review.
Manila Electric Co. "claims that it is exempt from the special import tax not
only by virtue of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394, which exempts from said tax equipment and
spare parts for use in industries; but also under Paragraph 9, Part Two, of its franchise, which
expressly exempts is insulators from all taxes of whatever kind and nature." Petitioner "then made
reference to the franchise of private respondent Manila Electric Co.: "Par. 9. The grantee shall be
liable to pay the same taxes upon its real estate, buildings, plant (not including poles, wires,
transformers, and insulators), machinery and personal property as other persons are or may be
hereafter required by law to pay. In consideration of Part Two of the franchise herein granted, to wit,
the right to build and maintain in the City of Manila and its suburbs a plant for the conveying and
furnishing of electric current for light, heat, and power, and to charge for the same, the grantee shall
pay to the City of Manila two and one-half per centum of the gross earnings received from the
business under this franchise in the city and its suburbs: . . . and shall be in lieu of all taxes and
assessments of whatsoever nature, and by whatsoever authority upon the privileges, earnings, income,
franchise, and poles, wires, transformers, and insulators of the grantee, from which taxes and
assessments the grantee is hereby expressly exempted."
This Court determined that "There is no question that insulating oils of the type imported by
petitioner are 'used for cooling as well as for insulating,' and when used in oil circuit breakers, they
are 'required to maintain insulation between the contacts inside the tank and the tank itself' and ruled
that "Respondent is ordered to refund to petitioner the sum of P995.00 within thirty days from the
date this decision becomes final, without pronouncement as to costs." Citing L-25602, February 18,
1970 31 SCRA 520. the leading case of Republic Flour Mills v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
13 this Court speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes. "It is true that in the construction of tax statutes
tax exemptions (and deductions are of this nature) are not favored in the law, and are construed
strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. However, it is equally a recognized principle that where the
provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court's seeking the
legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. In this case,
we find the provision of Section 186-A 'whenever a tax free product is utilized, . . . all
encompassing to comprehend taxfree raw materials, even if imported. Where the law provided no
qualification for the granting of the privilege, the court is not at liberty to supply any."

G.R. No. L-18566. September 30, 1963.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF ELIZABETH MIRA.
GILBERT R. BREHM and ESTER MIRA BREHM, petitioners-appellees, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant
"Gilbert R. Brehm is an American citizen, serving the U.S. Navy with temporary assignment at Subic
Bay. On October 9, 1958, he married Ester Mira, a Filipina citizen, who had a daughter Elizabeth, by
another man. On January 28, 1959, the spouses filed a Joint Petition with the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court for the adoption of the minor Elizabeth.
They prayed that after the proper proceedings, judgment be entered, freeing the child Elizabeth Mira
from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural father, and be, for
all legal intents and purposes, the child of the petitioners, with all the rights pertinent thereto."
An opposition to the petition with respect to Gilbert R. Brehm was registered by the Republic of the
Philippines, it appearing that Brehm testified that his residence in the Philippines was merely
temporary same being effective only for purposes of his tour of duty with the Navy, thus
disqualifying him from making an adoption (Art. 335[4], New Civil Code; Sec. 2, Rule 100, Rules of
Court), and that being a nonresident alien, the Court has no jurisdiction over him. Petitioners claimed
"claim that Art. 335 does not apply in the case, reasoning out that it covers only adoptions for the
purpose of establishing a relationship of paternity and filiation, where none existed, but not where the
adopting parents are not total strangers to said child; that there is already a relation between the child
and Brehm, created by affinity and that Art. 338 of the New Civil Code, expressly authorizes the
adoption of a step-child by a step-father, in which category petitioner Brehm falls."
Citing Article 335 of the Civil Code as mandatory, stating "The following cannot adopt : . . . (4) Nonresident aliens". It is, therefore, mandatory, because it contains words of positive prohibition and is
couched in the negative terms importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than
designated (50 Am. Jur. 51)", while further clarifying that Article 338 was merely directory, and could
only be given operation if it does not conflict with the provisions of Article 35, this Court denied the
Gilbert R. Brehm's petition to adopt the child Elizabeth Mira.
SYLLABUS
1. ADOPTION; NON-RESIDENT ALIEN CANNOT ADOPT. An American citizen serving the
U.S. Navy with temporary assignment at Subic Bay, is a non-resident alien and cannot adopt anybody
in the Philippines.
2. ID.; WHEN STEP-FATHER CANNOT ADOPT STEP-CHILD. The step father of the minor is
disqualified to adopt said step-child when said step- father is a nonresident alien.
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; MANDATORY PROVISIONS PREVAIL OVER DIRECTORY
ONES. Article 335 No. 4, of the Civil Code is mandatory because it contains words of positive
prohibition and is couched in negative terms importing that the act required shall not be done
otherwise than designated. On the other hand, Article 338, No. 3, of the same Code is merely
directory, and can only be given operation if the same does not conflict with the mandatory provisions
of said article 335.
G.R. No. L-14406. June 30, 1961.

MARCELINO BUYCO, petitioner-appellee , v s . PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, ILOILO

BRANCH, ILOILO CITY , respondent-appellant.
"On April 24, 1966, petitioner Marcelino Buyco was indebted to respondent in the amount of
P5,102.90 plus interest thereon, which represented petitioner's deficit on his 1952-53 crop loan with
respondent bank. The said loan was secured by a mortgage of real property. Petitioner is a holder of
Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate No. 4801, dated July 9, 1955, under Rep. Act No. 897 in the
amount of P22,227.69 payable in thirty (30) years. On April 24, 1956, petitioner offered to pay
respondent bank the deficit of his crop loan for the above mentioned crop year 1952-53 with his said
backpay acknowledgment certificate, but on July 18, 1956." Respondent bank said "that since
respondent's motion for reconsideration in the case of Marcelino B. Florentino vs. Philippine National
Bank L-8782 (52 O.G. 2522) was still under consideration by this Court (S. C.), respondent "cannot
yet grant" petitioner's request (Annex A, amended petition)." In an opinion rendered by the bank's
Legal Department on April 23, 1957, it "expressed the view that notwithstanding the decision of this
Court, the respondent could not accept the certificate because of the amendment of its Charter
heretofore mentioned." "The Court of First Instance of Iloilo, on July 24, 1958, granted the petition
and ordered the respondent bank "to give due course of the vested right of the petitioner acquired
previous to the enactment of Republic Act No. 1576 by accepting his backpay acknowledgment
certificate as payment of the obligation of the petitioner with respondent Bank with costs of the
proceedings against respondent".
The findings of Court of First Instance of Iloilo were alleged to have been errors committed by the
trial court:
(1) That in the letter Annex A, dated July 18, 1956, the respondent has
impliedly admitted the right of petitioner to apply or offer his certificate in payment of his obligation
to respondent.
(2) That the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of the Florentino case filed by respondentappellant, did not affect the petitioner's vested right already created and acquired at the time he
offered to pay his
obligation with his certificate on April 24, 1956, and before the passage of
Rep. Act No. 1576.
(3) That Rep. Act No. 1576 does not nullify the right of the petitioner to
pay his obligation with his backpay certificate.
(4) That the writ of mandamus would lie against the appellant.
"Although the Florentino case was promulgated on April 28, 1956, four (4) days after April 24, 1956,
the date the appellee offered to pay with his backpay acknowledgment certificate, it is nevertheless
obvious that on or before said April 24, 1956, the right to have his certificate applied for the payment
of his obligation with the appellant already existed by virtue of Republic Act No. 897, which was
merely construed and clarified by this Court in the said Florentino case."
"A vested right or a vested interest may be held to mean some right or interest in property that has
become fixed or established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy (Graham vs. Great Falls
Water Power & Town Site Co. [Mont] 76 Pac. 808, 810, citing Evan-Snider-Buel Co. vs. Mc Fadden,
10 Fed. 293, 44 CCA, 464 L.R.A. 900)."
"Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided" (Art. 4, New Civil Code).
These principles also apply to amendments of statutes. Republic Act No. 1576 does not contain any
provision regarding its retroactive nor such may be implied from its language. The judgment appealed
from was affirmed with costs against the respondent-appellant.

SYLLABUS
1. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; PAYMENT; BACKPAY CERTIFICATE; PNB REFUSE TO
ACCEPT CERTIFICATE; MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS. Following the ruling of
this Court in Florentino vs. Philippine National Bank, 98 Phil., 959 Off. Gaz., [5] 2522 the latter can
be compelled by mandamus to accept acknowledgment of backpay certificate in payment of
petitioner's obligation with the bank.
2. WORDS AND PHRASES; VESTED RIGHT OR VESTED INTEREST DEFINED. A
vested right or a vested interest may be held to mean some right or interest in property that has
become fixed or established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy (Graham vs. Great Falls
Water Power & Town Site Co. [Mont] 76 Pac. 808, 810, citing Evans-Snider- Buel Co. vs. McFadden
10 Fed. 293, 44 CCA, 464 L. R. A. 900).
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; LAWS SHALL GENERALLY HAVE NO RETROACTIVE
EFFECT. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided (art 4, NCC), for it
is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may
have formally given that effect to some legal provisions (Lopez, et al. vs. Crow, 40 Phil. 997), and
that statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the purpose and
intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily
implied from the language used, and that in case of doubt the same must be resolved against
retrospective effect (Montilla vs. Augustinian Corp., 24
Phil. 220).
4. STATUTES; EFFECT OF AMENDMENT ON ACCRUED RIGHTS. After an act is amended,
the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such
amendment (Fairchild vs. G. S. 91 Fed. 297; Hathaway vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. 99 F. 534).

G.R. No. L-19650. September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) INC. , petitioner-appellee , v s . ENRICO
PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL ,
respondent-appellant .
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived and laid
the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products.
Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants therein to estimate the actual
number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.
Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate
families excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or
licensed drivers". "Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for
publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto,
representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in
advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative
Code." "The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31,
1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify
its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law.
Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of
the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance." After issues were
joined upon the respective memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
"In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed 'Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest' announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the rules marked as Annex B of the
petition do (sic) not violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the public
distribution of said rules by the mails."
"Two basic issues:
first , whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief;
and, second, whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law.
"By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the applicable legal
basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available to any person "whose
rights are affected by a statute . . . to determine any question of construction or validity arising under
the . . . statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64,
Revised Rules of Court)." "The appellee's insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its
proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege
demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the dispute cannot be
gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on
the other, concerning a real not a mere theoretical question or issue.""Doubt, if any there was,
has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive
claim of right which is actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp.
132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Coast
Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350)."
The judgment appealed from is affirmed. "The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative
Code, using almost identical terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra,
condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders

against, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning
"any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal
property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind"." The proposed contest did not exhibit the element of
consideration on the side of those who may want to participate, precluding it from being considered
as a form of lottery or gift enterprise.
SYLLABUS
1. DECLARATORY RELIEF; CONDITIONS SINE QUA NON BEFORE RELIEF CAN BE
AVAILED OF. In order that a declaratory relief may be available, the following conditions must be
present: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The
Board of Accountancy, et al., G. R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of
the Philippines, 50 Off. Gaz., No. 2, pp. 578, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G. R. No. L-8964,
July 31, 1956).
2. ID.; ELEMENT OF JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY; CASE AT BAR. The appellee's insistent
assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and
consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live
controversy. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on the part of the appellee and a
denial thereof on the part of appellant concerning a real question or issue. With the appellee's bent to
hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders
are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless their
differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of
the Philippines, G. R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a
justiciable controversy when it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually
contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs.
Fox West Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTRUCTION DEFINED; CASE AT BAR.
Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered
doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the
law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). In the present case, the question of whether or not the
scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal
Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. This is as
much a question of construction or interpretation as any other.
4. ID.; WEIGHT OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS. In this jurisdiction, judicial decisions assume the
same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the
extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called
upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.
5. LOTTERY; ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS. The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the
distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at
fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: first,
consideration; second, prize; and third, chance ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284,
citing Horner vs. United States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194
U.S. 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker
[1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs.
Carmona,p. 233, ante).
6. ID.; GRATUITOUS DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY BY CHANCE; ELEMENT OF
CONSIDERATION NOT PRESENT; CASE AT BAR. In respect to the element of consideration,

the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is
derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal
schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to
draw a prize ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra). Under the rules of the proposed contest there is no
requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value
whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex
station, request for the entry form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same
for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible
consideration which would brand it as a lottery. The scheme is but a gratuitous distribution of
property by chance.
7. ID.; TEST TO DETERMINE PRESENCE OF CONSIDERATION. The element of
consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the contest. The true test is
whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether those
conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of the prize (People
vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. [Supp.] 788). The standpoint of the contestant, not that of the
sponsor, is all that matters.
8. ID.; MEANING OF TERM "GIFT ENTERPRISE"; PROPOSED SCHEME NOT EMBRACED
BY THE TERM. The term "gift enterprise" is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which
goods are sold for their market value, but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to
win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed. 817; Ballantine, Law
Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of
Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E.. 605, 56 Ga. App.,
705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot
embrace the scheme at bar, where there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached
as an inducement to the purchaser, and where the contest is open to all qualified contestants
irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.
9. POSTAL LAW; TERM "GIFT ENTERPRISE" IS USED IN ASSOCIATION WITH WORD
"LOTTERY". In the Postal Law the term "gift enterprise" is used in association with the word
"lottery". Consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis, it is only
logical that the term be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the
word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also
must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not the slightest indicium in the
law of any intent to eliminate the element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.
10. ID.; MAIL FRAUD ORDERS, PURPOSE OF. Mail fraud orders are designed to prevent the
use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are
declared non- mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies
in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt
public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent
that something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that
where no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can hardly
be said to obtain.
11. ID.; WHEN GIFT ENTERPRISES ARE CONDEMNABLE; CASE AT BAR. Under the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated
are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Because there is
none in the contest herein in question, the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for
purposes thereof.

G.R. No. L-17915. January 31, 1967.

TEODORO M. CASTRO, petitioner-appellant , vs. AMADO DEL ROSARIO, as Commissioner
of Civil Service, DOMINADOR AYTONA, as Secretary of Finance, MELECIO R. DOMINGO,
as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and TOMAS C. TOLEDO, respondents-appellants.
"This is a proceeding in quo warranto, certiorari and mandamus originally filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. The controverted position is that of Assistant Regional Revenue Director II,
Manila, which became vacant on August 24, 1959, upon the promotion of its occupant, Alfredo
Jimenez. Respondent Tomas C. Toledo was appointed in his place, and it is this appointment that is
being questioned by petitioner Teodoro M. Castro in this proceeding. The Court a quo annulled
Toledo's appointment, but did not grant Castro's prayer that respondent officials be ordered to appoint
him. Toledo's appointment by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, was made on November 24, 1959, effective as of October 1, 1959." "The
appointment was protested by Castro in a letter he wrote the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on
January 19, 1960, wherein he alleged that in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 2260, otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, he was the one who
should have been considered for the position." "On February 8, 1960 the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, in a first endorsement, informed Castro that "the position of Assistant Revenue Regional
Director II, R-53, at P6,000.00 adjusted to P6,597.60 per annum, is for Regional District No. 3,
Manila, and the appointment thereto had to be issued to the person actually performing the functions
of the position," namely, respondent Toledo, who was then acting as Assistant Revenue Regional
Officer II, Manila." "The trial court rejected Castro's claim, but at the same time annulled Toledo's
appointment this last on the ground that his previous appointment as Chief Revenue Examiner was
illegal."
Both sides appealed from the decision. Respondents claim that the lower court should not have
nullified Toledo's appointment. They contend (1) that the question as to the legality of his previous
appointment as Chief Revenue Examiner was neither raised in the pleadings nor proven at the trial
with the consent of the parties; (2) that petitioner was precluded by laches from questioning said
appointment; and (3) that the same was not contrary to the Revised Administrative Code.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that the lower court should have ordered respondents
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Secretary of Finance to appoint him to the controverted
position because (1) he was senior in rank to Toledo and was the competent and qualified employee
next in line for the position; and (2) the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors I had
waived their rights to the position.
Castro claims the position by virtue of Section 23, paragraph 3, Republic Act 2260, which provides:
"Whenever a vacancy occurs in any competitive or classified position in the government or in any
government-owned or controlled corporation or entity, the officer or employee next in rank who is
competent and qualified to hold the position and who possesses an appropriate civil service eligibility
shall be promoted thereto: Provided, That should there be two or more persons under equal
circumstances, seniority shall be given preference: And provided, however, that should there be any
special reason or reasons why such officer or employee should not be promoted, such special reason
or reasons shall be stated in writing by the appointing official and the officer or employee concerned
shall be informed thereof and be given opportunity to be heard by the Commissioner of Civil Service,
whose decision in such case shall be final. If the vacancy is not filled by promotion as provided
herein, then the same shall be filled by transfer of present employees in the government service, by
reinstatement, by re-employment of persons separated through reduction in force, or by certification

from appropriate registers of eligibles in accordance with rules promulgated in pursuance of this Act."
"Judgment appealed from is modified by eliminating therefrom that
portion annulling respondent Toledo's appointment to the position in dispute, and is affirmed in other
respects." Whether or not Toledo's previous appointment as Chief Revenue Officer was illegal is not
the issue, and any questions raised were done beyond the time limit prescribed by law. Castro, on the
other hand, failed to prove "either seniority in rank among the nine Assistant Revenue Regional
Directors outside the Manila District or waiver on the part of those who were senior to him Castro has
failed to establish". "Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. The silence of the
eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors does not amount to a waiver on their part."
SYLLABUS
1. QUO WARRANTO; NATURE OF. A quo warranto proceeding is one to determine the right to
the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is
not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.
2. ID.; WHO MAY BRING THE ACTION. The action may be commenced for the Government by
the Solicitor general or by a fiscal; or by a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. Where a private person files the action, he must
prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise respondent has a right to the
undisturbed possession of his office. (Acosta vs. Flor, 5 Phil., 18).
3. ID.; RIGHT TO AN OFFICE; WAIVER; CASE AT BAR. Waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right. The silence of the 8 other assistant revenue regional directors does
not amount to a waiver on their part. Waiver must be predicated on more concrete grounds. The
evidence must be sufficient and clear to warrant a finding that the intent or waive is unmistakable.
4. ID.; PERIOD TO BRING ACTION. The action of quo warranto involving right to an office,
must be instituted within the period of one year. This provision is an expression of policy on the part
of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should
immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year,
they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment.

G.R. No. 137873. April 20, 2001

D.M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO,
respondents.
"At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc.,
fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death." "Investigation disclosed that at
the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso
Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14th floor
of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel)
measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its
four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely
inserted to connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose . . . causing the whole [p]latform
assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the building
under construction thereby crushing the victim to death, save his two (2) companions who luckily
jumped out for safety."
"On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego's widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a
complaint for damages against the deceased's employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised,
among other defenses, the widow's prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.
3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego's earning capacity.
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.
5. P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 2
On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto."
D.M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITOR [sic] IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED
NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT
PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule, 9 among which are entries
in official records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides: Entries in official records made in the performance
of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. "Petitioner contends that the last
requisite (that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.) is not present."
Petitioner's contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res

ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the
mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent.
As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided
under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased's employer
damages under the Civil Code. Court ruled that respondent's case fell under the exception, and that
the claiming of benefits under the Labor Code was done due to a mistake in fact, because at the time
when the respondent applied for benefits, she was not aware that she had the right (neither mandatory
or prohibitory) to sue for damages due to negligence of the petitioner causing her husband's death,
and not necessarily a waiver of her right to choose between the two remedies available in such cases.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine
whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by
the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent
pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

A.M. No. 53-MJ. January 31, 1974

LOURDES CORPUS, complainant , vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE CIPRIANO P. CABALUNA, JR.,
ALIMODIAN, ILOILO, respondent .
"On August 26, 1953, Lourdes Corpus and several others filed with the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo a complaint against Tiburcia Brabanco and Felix Amijana docketed as civil case No. 2843
concerning the ownership of two parcels of land located in barrio Bugang, municipality of Alimodian,
province of Iloilo. In a decision dated September 5, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
rendered judgment declaring the plaintiffs true owners of the parcels of land described in the
complaint and ordering the defendants to vacate the same. These case was appealed to the Court of
Appeals by the defendants and on February 26, 1963, a judgment was rendered which affirmed the
decision of the trial court."
"Municipal Judge of Alimodian, Iloilo, Mr. Cipriano P. Cabaluna, Jr., acting as Cadastral Judge, heard
several cadastral cases, one of which was Cadastral Case No. N-11, L.R.C. Cadastral Record No. N387 of the Alimodian Cadastre, which involved a parcel of land described as cadastral lot 1762, with
Adriano Camarista as claimant. In the course of the hearing of the case, Adriano Camarista executed a
deed of sale in favor of Procopio Cabalfin and the document was ratified by Judge Cabaluna. Jr. After
the hearing, cadastral lot 1762 was adjudicated to spouses Procopio and Cleofe Cabalfin on July 30,
1963."
"On March 4, 1964, Lourdes Corpus and her co-plaintiffs in civil case 2843 filed in the cadastral case
a petition to set aside the decision rendered therein and to order another hearing on the ground that
cadastral lot 1762 is the same parcel of land litigated in civil case 2843 which was awarded to them
by final judgment of the Court of Appeals." "Lourdes Corpus likewise filed on April 26, 1966, a
complaint with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against spouses Procopio and Cleofe Cabalfin for
annulment of the aforementioned decision rendered in the cadastral case 4 and there the trial court
found that cadastral lot 1762 and the land litigated in civil case 2843 were indeed one and the same."
"Lourdes Corpus charged Judge Cabaluna, Jr. before the Secretary of Justice with having committed
"gross fraud" in that knowing of the pendency of the above-mentioned civil case before the Court of
Appeals, said Judge nonetheless ratified a deed of sale of cadastral lot 1762 in favor of Procopio
Cabalfin and awarded said lot to the latter."
"For the charge of "gross fraud" to prosper there is need of clear and convincing evidence that
respondent knew that one of the parcels involved in civil case 2843 and adjudicated to complainant
was the same property which he awarded to spouses Cabalfin in the cadastral proceeding; such
evidence is, however, wanting in the record of this case." "Fraud is serious charge which cannot be
lightly inferred from allegations or circumstances surrounding a particular situation, but must be
supported by clear and convincing proof."
Respondent was exonerated and the charge dismissed.

G.R. No. L-32743. February 15, 1974

PRIMITIVO ESPIRITU and LEONORA A. DE ESPIRITU, petitioners,
vs. RICARDO CIPRIANO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE,
RIZAL, BRANCH XV, respondents.
"In this petition for certiorari, petitioners seek the review and nullification of two orders of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, the first, dated August 4, 1970, sustaining private respondent
Ricardo Cipriano's motion to dismiss "on the authority of Republic Act 6126", and the second, dated
October 16, 1970, denying the motion for reconsideration of the first order."
The case originated as one for unlawful detainer instituted on May 30, 1969, by plaintiffs, now
petitioners, in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, against private respondent Ricardo Cipriano for
the latter's alleged failure to pay rentals.
"The question before Us involves the retroactive application of the provisions of Republic Act 6126,
otherwise known as the Rental Law ("An Act To Regulate Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On
Which Another's Dwelling Is Located For One Year And Penalizing Violations Thereof")." Thrust
upon Us, therefore, for resolution is the problem of whether Republic Act 6126 may be held
applicable to the case at bar. Private respondent, however, puts forward the argument that there was
no perfected contract covering the increased rate of rentals and conversion thereof into monthly
payments of P30.00 effective January 1969, as he did not give his consent thereto.
"It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case at bar is covered
by the aforecited law. We rule otherwise. Established and undisputed is the fact that the increase in
the rental of the lot involved was effected in January, 1969, 1 while the law in question took effect on
June 17, 1970, or after a period of one year and a half after the increase in rentals had been effected."
There is nothing in the stipulation of facts to show that his consent to the increase in rentals and
change in the manner of payment was essential to its validity. A close study of the provisions
discloses that far from being remedial, the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and
prospective construction thereof is in order. Article 4 of the New
Civil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that
where the law is clear, Our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. 2 The law
being a "temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation", 3 it had a limited period of
operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that "No lessor of a dwelling
unit or land . . . shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970 , increase the monthly rental
agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this Act."
"We, therefore, rule that Republic Act 6126 is not applicable to the case at bar." "WHEREFORE, the
assailed orders of August 4 and October 16, 1970, are hereby nullified and set aside. The court a quo
shall proceed with the prompt disposition of Civil Case No. 338-M (12285) on the merits in
accordance with Republic Act 6031 if applicable, otherwise under the prevailing procedure prescribed
by the Rules of Court."

G.R. No. L-30642. April 30, 1985

PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and
NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA,
JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN
S. FLORESCA... petitioners, vs. PHILEX MINING
CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First
Instance of Manila, respondents.
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred
to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on
June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically,
the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and
deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working
underground.
"A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of
petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance has
no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the said motion to
dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of actual, moral and
exemplary damages, particularly:" Art. 2176, Art. 2178, Art. 2231. "After a reply and a rejoinder
thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27, 1968 dismissing the case on the
ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission."
The issues to be resolved are the following allegations of the petitioners:
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS'
COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
II
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION
BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS FOR
COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT."
"WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case. It should be
underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's
Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of
eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00) pesos." "Settled is the rule that in
ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a
claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or
allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100)."
Because of the contractual relationship between Philex and the deceased employees, "the alleged
gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of Philex,
constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held liable for damages." (Art. 2232. In contracts
and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. And Art.2201. In contracts and quasicontracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are
the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have

foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. "In cases of
fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation.)
"Although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act", it
does not preclude them from bringing an action before regular courts and seeking payment for
damages; "The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies
the choice as it was not an intelligent choice."
"The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should
the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the
Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their
favor." "The Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice
then secured by Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and
now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178,
1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950."
"Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (before it was amended by R. A. No. 772 on June 20,
1952 ), predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor Code, has been superseded by the
aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took effect on August 30,
1950, which obey the constitutional mandates of social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the
workers as against their employers."
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND
THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE
PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; CAUSE OF ACTION
ASCERTAINED FROM AVERMENTS IN THE COMPLAINT; CASE AT BAR. It should be
underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's
Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of
eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation
appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of
their employments. The complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure
on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a
consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death of the employees working
underground. Settled is the rule that in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature
of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil
Code, the test is the averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co.,
Inc., 97 Phil. 100). In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a
contractual relationship. The alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount
to bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held liable for
damages.

2. CIVIL LAW; AWARD OF COMPENSATION BENEFITS UNDER WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION ACT; RATIONALE DIFFERS FROM AWARD OF DAMAGES UNDER
THE CIVIL CODE. The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act differs from that in giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a
theory of compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under the acts being
made as compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the
harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is
liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. Recovery under the Act is not
based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 C.J.S. 36). In other words,
under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of income,
as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or
injury is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand,
damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity
recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person, property or relative rights,
through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).
3. ID.; ID.; CLAIM FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE N.C.C.; BURDEN OF PROOF. The
claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation between the
defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered. While under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee
that the death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated; and the employer has the burden to
prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Cario vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER UNDER THE WORKMEN'S ACT AND THE
CIVIL CODE. Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should
be paid to an employee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the
industry of his employer but caused by factors outside the industrial plant of his employer. Under the
Civil Code, the liability of the employer, depends on breach of contract or tort. The Workmen's
Compensation Act was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. It is a
social legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident
causing his death or ailment or injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA
379).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLAIMANTS NOT PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING ACTION BEFORE
THE REGULAR COURTS; RATIONALE. We hold that although the other petitioners had
received the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from
bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has
been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation
under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by
Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation
Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was
based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice.
The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should
the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the
Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their
favor.

6. ID.; NEGLIGENCE; RECOVERY OF DAMAGES UNDER THE NEW CIVIL CODE;

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FORM PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND. Recovery under
the New Civil Code for damages arising from negligence, is not barred by Article 173 of the New
Labor Code. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered by the
System provided for by the New Labor Code, which defines the "System" as referring to the
Government Service Insurance System or the Social Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e] of the
New Labor Code). Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme
Court form part of the law of the land. WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume
the same authority as the statute itself (Caltex vs. Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SOCIAL JUSTICE GUARANTEE; EMPLOYER NOT
RELIEVED FROM LIABILITY FOR DEATH OF HIS WORKERS. The right to life is
guaranteed specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. To relieve the employer from
liability for the death of his workers arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide safety
devices for the protection of his employees or workers against the dangers which are inherent in
underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to recover indemnity
for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent loss to his family without due process of law.
The dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such gross
or wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety
measures for the protection of the life, limb and health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint
alone, such attitude is un-Christian. It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice
guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an
exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the
fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.
8. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; LABOR LAW; NO-FAULT LIABILITY OF
EMPLOYER UNDER SEC. 5 OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT AND ART. 173, NEW
LABOR CODE. It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or
injury caused by the nature of the work, without any fault on the part of the employers. It is correctly
termed no-fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or Article 173
of the New Labor Code, does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault
or culpable negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for the protection
of the life, limb and health of the workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173, the employer
remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the
employee, whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected, even if the employer has faithfully and
diligently furnished all the safety measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the
employee.
MELENCIO-HERERA, J., dissenting:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTION FOR DAMAGES; DEATH COMPENSATION OF WORKMEN;
COMPLAINT REGULATED BY THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW.
This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of PHILEX Mining
Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself, however, provides
for its non-applicability to the complaint. It is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code,
found in Title XVIII Damages, that: "Compensation for Workmen and other employees in case of
death, injury or illness is regulated by special laws." By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a
"special law", not the Code itself, which has to apply to the complaint involved in the instant case.

That "special law", in reference to the complaint, can be no other than the Workmen's Compensation
Law.
2. ID.; ID.; OPTION TO SUE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE, FORECLOSED; CASE AT BAR.
There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to exercise
the option to sue under the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings under the Workmen's
Compensation Act have already become the law in regards to the "election of remedies", because
those proceedings had become a "finished transaction." In the second place, it should be plainly
equitable that, if a person entitled to an "election of remedies" makes a first election and accepts the
benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At the very
least, if he wants to make a second election, in disregard of the first election he has made, when he
makes the second election he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first election.
This was not done in the case before the court.
3. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT; REMEDY
UNDER THE ACT, EXCLUSIVE. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our
Workmen's Compensation Act, the Philippine Legislature worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of
the Act as follows: "Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and remedies granted by
this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all
other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or
nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other
laws because of said injury." (Paragraphing and underscoring supplied) There should be no question
but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, formulated in
1927, provided that an injured worker or employee, or his heirs, if entitled to compensation under the
Act , cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code nor to any other law relative to the
liability of the employer. After 1927, there were occasions when the legislator had the opportunity to
amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the remedies
under the Act would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows the
legislative's continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5
unless otherwise provided in the Act itself.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT; REMOVAL
OF EXCLUSORY PROVISION, A LEGISLATIVE CONCERN. To grant the petition and allow
the victims of industrial accidents to file damages suits based on torts would be a radical innovation
not only contrary to the express provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from
the principles evolved in the long history of workmen's compensation. At the very least, it should be
the legislature and not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the present Labor Code on employees' compensation.
Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the early years
of the industrial revolution when
injured workingmen had to rely on damage suits to get recompense.

2. ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER PREDETERMINED; RIGHT OF INJURED

WORKER TO FILE TORT SUIT, GIVEN UP. Workmen's compensation represents a compromise.
In return for the near certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured worker gives up
the right to subject the employer to a tort suit for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only
disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre-determined amount based on the wages of the
injured worker and in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not receive the
total damages for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer
is required to act swiftly on compensation claims. An administrative agency supervises the program.
And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system,
individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of
their entire working class.

G.R. No. L-24421. April 30, 1970

MATIAS GONGON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE SPOUSES AMADA AQUINO
and RUFINO RIVERA, THE OFFICE OF THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, and
THE OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal by
the Court of First Instance of Manila of Matias Gongon's complaint to set aside the decision of the
Land Tenure Administration as affirmed by the Office of the President awarding Lot 18-B,
Block 23 of the Tambobong Estate, to herein private respondent Amada Aquino, wife of her corespondent Rufino Rivera. Lot 18-B, Block 23, with an area of 274 square meters, is a portion of the
Tambobong Estate in Malabon, Rizal, which used to belong in its entirety to the
Roman Catholic Church. The lot was originally leased to Amada Aquino. who in turn sublet it in
1934 to Matias Gongon for a term of 15 years at a nominal monthly rental of P6.00. The sublessee
constructed his residential house on the property and since then has been living there, together with
his family. Meanwhile, the Tambobong Estate was purchased by the Government from the Roman
Catholic Church on December 31, 1947 under the provisions of Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 539. Matias Gongon filed an application with the defunct Rural Progress
Administration for the purchase of Lot 18-B, Block 23, claiming preferential right as bona fide
occupant.the Director of Lands the Bureau of Lands having then taken over the functions of the
Rural Progress Administration rendered a decision on May 31, 1965 approving Gongon's
application, he being the actual occupant. On appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, this official set aside the order of the Director of Lands and gave due course to Amada
Aquino's application.
Accordingly, on February 24, 1961 the Land Tenure Administration executed a deed of sale of Lot
18-B in favor of Amada Aquino, as a result of which she obtained, on March 10, 19761, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 84738 in her name. On April 24, 1961 Matias Gongon filed the instant case in
the Court of First Instance of Manila to annul the decisions of the Land Tenure Administration and of
not in question to him; to cancel its registration in the name of Amada Aquino and to have it
registered in his name instead.
The two issues posed in this appeal are (1) whether or not petitioner has the preferential right to
purchase the lot in question; and (2) if he has, whether or not the alleged waiver of whatever right he
might have had over said lot is valid.
The first issue involves a conflict of claims between a lessee and a sublesee insofar as the right to
purchase the property is concerned. Several decisions of this Court have been cited and discussed by
the parties. Parenthetically, it may be noted that in those cases the concept of possession by a
sublessee under the Civil Code, which according to the Court of Appeals in its decision under review
was in effect possession by the lessee sublessor, was not considered by this Court applicable at all in
construing the term "occupant" under Commonwealth Act No. 539.
Justice and equity command that petitioner be given the preferential right to purchase in order to
carry out the avowed policy of the law to give land to the landless. Being contrary to public policy,
the alleged waiver of his right made by herein petitioner should be considered null and void.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. The award of the lot in question to
respondent Amada Aquino is set aside; transfer certificate of title No. 84738 of the Registry of Deeds
of Rizal is ordered cancelled; and petitioner is declared to have the preferential right to purchase the
said lot.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REFORM; LANDED ESTATES; POLICY GOVERNING DISPOSITION OF
LANDED ESTATES; CASE AT BAR. The intendment of Commonwealth Act No. 539,
governing the acquisition and disposition of landed estates is to award lots to those who may apply,
the first choice to the bona fide "tenants," the second to the "occupants," and the last, to "private
individuals," if the parties affected thereby stand on equal footing or under equal circumstances.
Where the parties cannot be said to be in equal footing respondent spouses have their house on
another lot they already own which is bigger than that where petitioner constructed his house
justice and equity command that petitioner be given the preferential right to purchase the lot in
question to carry out the avowed policy of the law to give land to the landless.
2. ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF PREFERENTIAL RIGHT, CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY.
Petitioner's waiver of his preferential right over the lot being contrary to the avowed policy laid down
in Commonwealth Act No. 539, such waiver is null and void.

G.R. No. 8243. December 24, 1915

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE
MUNICIPALITY OF BINALONAN , objector-appellee, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP
OF NUEVA SEGOVIA, objector-appellant .
This is a registration proceeding instituted by the Director of Lands under the provisions of section 61
of Act No. 926, seeking to compel the registration of all private property within a prescribed area in
the municipality of Binalonan, Province of Pangasinan.
A question has arisen in the discussion of this case as to whether section 61 of Act No. 926 authorizes
the institution of compulsory registration proceedings against private owners or whether it is not
confined exclusively to public lands. Reference is made to the Cadastral Act (No. 2259), which
specifically authorizes the Director of Lands to institute compulsory registration proceedings against
all owners and claimants of property within any area which has been regularly surveyed and platted
under the procedure prescribed in the Act. No reference is made in Act No. 2259 to the repeal or
amendment of section 61 of Act No. 926, and the inference to be drawn from this is that, in the view
of the Legislature, the latter did not concern the subject-matter of the new Act. Thus, we have
arguments based upon the supposed exclusive subject-matter of the Public Land Act, upon the failure
of the title of that Act to indicate that it contains anything relating to compulsory registration, and
upon a subsequent statute providing for compulsory registration of privately owned lands without
expressly referring to any previous legislation relating thereto, all of which point to the absence in Act
No. 926 of any provision for the compulsory registration of such privately owned lands.
Act No. 2334 provides that certain provisions of the Cadastral Act shall apply to the compulsory
registration proceedings theretofore instituted under the provisions of section 61 of Act No. 926, of
which this case is one. This act is what is called a curative statute. It does not pretend to confer
jurisdiction upon the courts to entertain compulsory registration proceedings. On the contrary, it
assumes jurisdiction to have been granted under section 61 of Act No. 926 and merely provides that
certain incidental matters arising in those proceedings shall be settled in accordance with the
provisions of the Cadastral Act.
Chapter VI of the Public Land Act, wherein is included section 61, is the only chapter of the Act
containing provisions for the compulsory registration of titles by means of judicial proceedings.
Section 61 reads: "It shall be lawful for the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, whenever in the
opinion of the Chief Executive the public interests shall require it, to cause to be filed in the Court of
Land Registration, through the Attorney-General, a petition against the holder, claimant, possessor, or
occupant of any land in the Philippine Islands who shall not have voluntarily come in under the
provisions of this chapter or the Land Registration Act... We therefore conclude that section 61
applied to all land in the Philippine Islands, whether public or private. Upon the merits we must
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SYLLABUS
1. REGISTRATION OF LAND; COMPULSORY REGISTRATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY.
Section 61 of the Public Land Act (No. 926) authorizes the institution of compulsory registration
proceedings against private landowners.
2. STATUTES; CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION; STATUTES IN PARI MATERIA. The
fact that no reference is made in an Act to a prior one, does not necessarily mean that the two are not
in pari materia.

3. ID.; EXPRESSION IN TITLE OF SUBJECT OF ACT. The Legislature is not required to make
the title of a public or general Act a complete index of its contents. The title of such an Act is only
used as guide to ascertain the legislative will when the language of the Act does not clearly express its
purpose.
4. ID.; EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION. The interpretation of a law by the executive department
over a considerable period of time is entitled to some weight in the construction and interpretation of
a law, especially in this country, where the executive heads of the various Departments are also
members of the Upper House of the Legislature.
5. ID.; VALIDITY OF ENACTMENT; CURATIVE STATUTES. A legislature has no power to
make a decree or judgment rendered without jurisdiction a valid and binding decree or judgment. But
the curing of incidental defects or omissions in the procedure whereby the jurisdiction is exercised is
not within that category.
G.R. No. L-28089. October 25, 1967
BARA LIDASAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent .
The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections 1 is this: Is Republic Act 4790,
which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,"
but which includes barrios located in another province - Cotabato - to be spared from attack planted
upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill? " Comelec's answer is in the affirmative.
Offshoot is the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition. On June 18, 1966, the Chief
Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as
Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its
resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent portions of which are:
"For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes, the
Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to R.A. 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del
Sur shall comprise the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung,
Losain, Matimos and Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the
barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of
Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato."
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the
Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be
suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation." Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967,
stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute "should be implemented unless declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."
The Court is tasked to ascertain whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional
requirement. "Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to
the nine barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere
nullification of the portion thereof which took away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon
and Parang in the other province of Cotabato." "Respondent's pose is that petitioner is not the real
party in interest."
"The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading." "In determining sufficiency of
particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered, and the purpose of the

constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the
court." "The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del
Sur" 8 projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation
of Dianaton." "The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion,
makes the title misleading, deceptive." "We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void."
"The general rule is that where part of the statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But
in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to
presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not
constitutionally enact the other . . . . Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid
statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . . The language used in the invalid part of the statute
can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and
what remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no
power to legislate. . ." "Republic Act 4790 is thus inseparable, and it is accordingly null and void in
its totality."
The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town
to ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of residence "in accordance with the
Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction. "For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic
Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit respondent Commission from implementing the same for
electoral purposes."
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILLS MUST NOT EMBRACE MORE THAN ONE
SUBJECT EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE This constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon
legislative power: (1) Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects;
(2) the title to the bills is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the . . . and those concerned of the
import of the single subject thereof.
2. ID.; BILLS, SUBJECT MUST BE EXPRESSED IN TITLE OF. This constitution requirement breathes
the spirit of command. Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of
Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House
Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in
the House where the same, being of local application, originated.
3. ID.; ID.; MISLEADING AND DECEPTIVE TITLE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Where the title of the
statute reads "An Act Creating The Municipality of Dianaton, in The Province of Lanao del Sur" which
projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by such creation although, in fact,
the two-pronged purpose is to create such municipality purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of
Butig and Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, and to dismember at the same time two municipalities in Cotabato,
different from the province of Lanao del Sur, such title is misleading and deceptive, because (1) it did not
inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; (2) it did not apprise the people in the
towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory was
being taken away from their towns and province and being added to the adjacent province of Lanao del Sur;
and (3) it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These
are the pressures which weigh heavily against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
4. ID.; ID; SIZEABLE TERRITORIAL TRANSFER MUST BE REFLECTED IN TITLE.
Respondent's stance that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in the substantial diminution
of the territorial limits of Cotabato province is merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the
boundary of the municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to said diminution need not be
expressed in the title of the law, such posture but emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in writing
down the title of the bill, as transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of necessity
involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the
other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality; yet, the title failed to reflect this fact.

5. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE IN FELWA VS'. SALAS NOT APPLICABLE; GERMANE

MATTERS NEED NOT BE REFLECTED IN TITLE OF BILL. (64 Off. Gaz. [35] 8822) where the
constitutionality of the statute reading "An Act Creating The Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao,
and Kalinga-Apayao" has been upheld by the Court despite the fact that no reference had been made as to the
elective officials of the provinces thus created, is not in focus, "for surely, an Act creating said provinces must
be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" which is "manifestly germane to the
subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute at bar stands altogether on a different footing. The
lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor
logical consequence of the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton, for a change of boundaries of the two
provinces may be made without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa.
6. ID.; STATUTES; RULE OF SEPARABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PORTIONS. Although the general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as
repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may
stand and be enforced; yet, where parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the
residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent,
conditional or connected, must fall with them.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Where the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now Republic Act 4790
states that the twenty-one barrios (only 9 in Lanao del Sur and 12 in Cotabato, with the seat of government in
Togaig, Cotabato) comprising the new municipality of Dianaton "is now a progressive community; the
aggregate population is large; and the collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality"
and that "if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the
blessings of municipal autonomy," unquestionably the totality of 21 barrios was in the mind of the proponent
thereof,
and the Court may not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine out of twenty-one
barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured, for this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of
congressional intent beyond credibility point, and to do so indeed, is to pass the line which circumscribes the
judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditional separation of powers, the
Court may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally
intended twenty-one barrios, and if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of
Congress, not the Court's, to spell out that congressional will. Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible and it is
accordingly null and void in its totality.
8. ID.; A QUALIFIED VOTER AS PARTY IN INTEREST. Where the Commission on Elections has
resolved to implement Republic Act 4790 unless declared unconstitutional despite recommendation until
"clarified by correcting legislation," and where the right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community
affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of
residence has been recognized in this jurisdiction, a qualified voter who expects to vote in the elections in his
own barrio before its annexation to the newly created town, is an affected party, as he may not want to vote in a
town different from his actual residence; may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different
communities which are formed into the new town; may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was
constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired therein; may not even know the
candidates of the new town; may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them; may feel that his vote
should be cast for the officials in the town before dismemberment, and it stands to reason to say that when the
constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to
challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress. cdasia
FERNANDO, J ., dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; NO BILL SHOULD EMBRACE MORE THAN
ONE SUBJECT WHICH SHALL BE EXPRESSED IN ITS TITLE. The constitutional requirement is that
no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill. This provision is similar to those found in the Constitution of many American States. It is

aimed against the evil of the so-called omnibus bills, and log-rolling legislation, and against surreptitious or
unconsidered enactments. Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the members of the
legislature as well as the people should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This
constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not
germane to the subject matter of the bill.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT SATISFIED IF ALL PARTS OF THE ACT WHICH RELATES TO THE
SUBJECT FINDS EXPRESSION IN ITS TITLE. It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or
impede proper legislation. The construction must be reasonable and not technical. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without
expressing each and every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of that object. Mere details need
not be set forth. The legislative is not required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. The
constitutional provision is satisfied if all parts of all act which relates to its subject find expression in its title.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTRUCTION TO BE GIVEN TO REPUBLIC ACT 4790. To avoid any doubt as to
the validity of such statute, it must be construed as to exclude from Dianaton all of such barrios mentioned in
Republic Act No. 4790 found in municipalities outside Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can meet
the test of the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to the legislative intent. What was created was a
new municipality from barrios named as found in Lanao del Sur. This construction assures precisely that.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ADOPTION OF INTERPRETATION TO SUPPORT THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
LEGISLATION. Both Philippine and American decisions unite in the view that a legislative measure, in the
language of Van Devanter "should not be given a construction which will imperil its validity where it is
reasonably open to construction free from such peril." (Chippewa Indians v. United States (1937) 301 US. 358,
376). Republic Act No. 4790 as above construed incurs no such risk and is free from the peril of nullity.

[G.R. No. L-30061. February 27, 1974.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees, v s . JOSE
JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant .
"That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion, Municipality
of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG-8 German made
with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary permit or
license to possess the same."
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial
was accordingly held. The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the
revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He,
however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had
an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas (December 10, 1962) and
an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments
expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question. His

appointment from Gov. Leviste reads: "...In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1969, you will have the right to bear a firearm, particularly
described below, for use in connection with the performance of your duties."
"On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas
as Confidential Agent... in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess an
ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the performance of
official duties."
"The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the
prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decisions in People v.
Macarandang 2 and People v. Lucero."
The trial court "held the accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal
possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the
cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People v. Mapa, supra." This
raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of the Court's ruling in
People v. Mapa.
"In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction against the accused because it
was shown that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license
or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the
said firearm and ammunition. We there held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to
issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code
provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license
to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of
peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently
placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police
who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the requirements
relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that under the
circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a
necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the battalion commander and must be deemed
incident to or necessarily included in the duty and power of said military commander to effect the
capture of a Huk leader." Mapa was convicted in 1967, on the following ground: ""The law is explicit
that except as thereafter specifically allowed, 'it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any
firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition. (Sec. 878, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section provides that
'firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the
Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers,
municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails,' are not covered
'when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance
of their official duties.' (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.) 'The law cannot be any clearer. No
provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. . . ."
"Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws
mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying

or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . ." The
interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law
was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretatio
legis vim obtinet " the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence,
hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found by possession of the firearm in question
and when he was arraigned by the trial court.""Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act
which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed
from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio."

G.R. No. L-39990. July 22, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAFAEL LICERA, defendantappellant.

"On December 3, 1965 the Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint,
subscribed and sworn to by him, with the municipal court of the said municipality, charging Rafael
Licera with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle, Model 55, Caliber .30. On August 13, 1966 the
municipal court rendered judgment finding Licera guilty of the crime charged, sentencing him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging five years and one day to six years and eight months of
imprisonment. Licera appealed to the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro.
In the Court of First Instance, the parties agreed to the joint trial of the case for illegal possession of
firearm and another case, likewise filed against Licera with the municipal court but already forwarded
to the said Court of First Instance, for assault upon an agent of a person in authority, the two offenses
having arisen from the same occasion: apprehension of Licera by the Chief of Police and a patrolman
of Abra de Ilog on December 2, 1965 for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite
license or permit therefor."
"On August 14, 1968 the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Licera of the charge of assault
upon an agent of a person in authority, but convicting him of illegal possession of firearm..."
"Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the Winschester rifle his appointment as
secret agent on December 11, 1961 by Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas." "The principal
question thus posed calls for a determination of the rule that should be applied to the case at bar
that enunciated in Macarandang or that in Mapa."
"Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate prospectively
only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon
and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more especially true in the application or interpretation of
statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this area, more than in any other, it is imperative that the
punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance
of society." "The judgment a quo is reversed, and Rafael Licera is hereby acquitted."
SYLLABUS
1. COURT DECISIONS; PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS . Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system.
These decisions, although in themselves are not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean.
The application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports
to carry into effect.
2. ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; DOCTRINE EXEMPTING SECRET AGENTS FROM THE FIREARM
LICENSE REQUIREMENT, ABANDONED. The rule enunciated in Macarandang (106 Phil. 713) to the effect that
the appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a 'peace officer' equivalent to a member of
the municipal police" whom Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to
firearms licenses, had been revoked by the rule in Mapa (L-22301, August 30, 1967)
which held that said section provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents by provincial governors from
the firearm license requirement.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EX POST FACTO LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AGAINST EX POST
FACTO LAW APPLIED TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINES. Where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine
should operate prospectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially those who
relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more especially true in the application or interpretation of statutes
in the field of penal law, for, in this area, more than in any other it is imperative that the punishability of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
4. ID.; ID.; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; DOCTRINE OBTAINING AT THE TIME OF POSSESSION OF

FIREARM BY SECRET AGENT APPLIES. Where the rule obtaining not only at the time of his appointment as secret
agent, but as well as at the time of his apprehension, accused as such secret agent was exempt from the firearm license
requirements under Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code and therefore incurred no criminal liability for
possession of the firearm, a subsequent rule holding that said law does not exempt a secret agent from the firearm license
requirement shall not adversely affect said accused who was favored
by the abandoned doctrine.

G.R. No. L-14683. May 30, 1961

JOAQUIN QUIMSING, petitioner-appellant , v s . CAPT. ALFREDO LACHICA, Officer-inCharge of the PC Controlled-Police Dept., Iloilo City; LT. NARCISO ALIO, JR., Actg. Chief
of Police of the City of Iloilo; and MAJ. CESAR LUCERO, PC Provincial Commander of the
Province of Iloilo, respondents-appellees.
"Petitioner Joaquin Quimsing is the owner and manager of a duly licensed cockpit, located in the
District of Molo, City of Iloilo. On February 13, 1958, the cockpit was raided by members of the city
police force and the Constabulary, under the command of Capt. Alfredo Lachica and Lt. Narciso
Alio Jr., upon the ground that it was being illegally operated on that day, which was Thursday, not a
legal holiday. Quimsing claimed that the cockpit was authorized to operate on
Thursdays by an ordinance of the City Council of Iloilo, approved on October 31, 1956. This
notwithstanding, Capt. Lachica allegedly threatened to raid the cockpit should cockfighting be held
therein, thereafter, on Thursday. Moreover, Quimsing and nine (9) other persons were arrested and
then charged in the Municipal Court of Iloilo with a violation of Article 199 and 2286 of the Revised
Administrative Code."
"In his petition, Quimsing set up two (2) causes of action; one for the recovery from respondents, in
their private capacity, of compensatory damages, as well as moral and exemplary damages allegedly
sustained in consequence of the raid and arrest effected on February 13, 1958, upon the ground that
the same were made illegally and in bad faith, because cockfighting on Thursdays
was, it is claimed, authorized by Ordinances Nos. 5 and 58 of the City of Iloilo, in relation to
Republic Act No. 938, and because Quimsing was at odds with the city mayor of Iloilo; and another
for a writ of preliminary injunction, and, after trial, a permanent injunction, restraining respondents,
in their official capacity, and/or their agents, from stopping the operation of said cockpit on Thursdays
and making any arrest in connection therewith."
"Hence this appeal by petitioner herein, who maintains that:
"1. The lower court erred in not disqualifying the city fiscal from representing the respondentsappellees in the first cause of action of the petition where they are sued in their personal capacity;
"2. The lower court erred in not disqualifying the city fiscal from asking the invalidity of an
ordinance of the City of Iloilo;
"3. The lower court erred in declaring Ordinance No. 5, series of 1954, as amended by Ordinance No.
58, series of 1956, of the City of Iloilo as illegal;
"4. The lower court erred in not awarding damages to the petitioner."
"The question for determination is whether the power of the Municipal Board of Iloilo, under section
21 of its charter, to "regulate . . . places of amusement", as broadened by Republic Act No. 938, as
amended, to include "the power to regulate . . . by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and
operation of . . . cockpits", carries with it the authority to fix the dates on which
"cockfighting" may be held. " "Thus, the issue boils down to whether Republic Act No. 938, as
amended, gives local governments a blanket authority as said governments may wish it."
"Upon mature deliberation, we hold that the answers must be in the negative. To begin with, repeals

and even amendments by implication are not favored, whereas an affirmative answer would entail a
vital amendment, amounting, for all practical purposes, to a repeal, of sections 2285 and 2286 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Secondly, grants of power to local governments are to be construed
strictly, and doubts in the interpretation thereof should be
resolved in favor of the national government and against the political subdivisions concerned. Thirdly,
it is a matter of common knowledge that cockfighting is one of the most widespread vices of our
population, and that the government has always shown a grave concern over the need of effectively
curbing its evil effects." "In short, we are of the opinion that the city rdinances relied upon by
petitioner herein, authorizing cockfighting on Thursdays, are invalid.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement as to
costs."
G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners, vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA. in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
"Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law."
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the following questions:
1.What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2.Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3.What is meant by "publication"?
4.Where is the publication to be made?
5.When is the publication to be made?
"The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows: "ART. 2.Laws shall
take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette ,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.""
"Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating
the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and
come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or
authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil
Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists.
If it does, it obviously has not yet been published."
"After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original
petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted." "Consequently, we have no choice but to
pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official

Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided by the legislature."
"WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature,
in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code."
SYLLABUS
FERNAN, J., concurring:
1.CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS; ARTICLE 2, CIVIL CODE;
PUBLICATION OF LAWS MADE TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
AND TO INFORMATION. The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication
before any law be made effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part if the lawmakers and, at the
time, ensure to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matter of
public concern.

G.R. No. L-16704. March 17, 1962

VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC. , petitioner-appellant , vs. SOCIAL SECURITY
COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.
"On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following
tenor. "Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due
the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and
overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the
Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2- 1/2% contributions will be
based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month."
Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote
the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous
Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the
computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions..."
"The single issue involved in this appeal is whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as
contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to
adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act.""
"There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an
administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body.
When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the
force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it
merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law,
p. 194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred

upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of

a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law."
"Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the
amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" contained
in Section 8(f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as follows:
"(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration
paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration in excess of P500
received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all other
payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do so."
Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to:
"(f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration
paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00
received during the month."
It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay
given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded or exempted from the definition
of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law. It thus
became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or
elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or
understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce."
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellant."
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; DISTINCTION BETWEEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE
RULE AND AN ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF LAW; NATURE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS. When an administrative agency
promulgates rules and regulations, it makes "makes" a new law with the force and
effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy,
it merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Admihnistrative Law, p. 197; Davis,
Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance
of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law,
partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a
penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched
in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and
sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out
the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its
enforcement.
2. ID.; ID.; BINDING EFFECT OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES ON COURTS;
REQUISITES. A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its
promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by
the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated
therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit., pp. 195-197). On the other hand,
administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the
courts that finally determine what the law means.
3. ID.; ID.; CIRCULAR NO. 22 OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION MERELY
AN ADVISORY OPINION AND NEED NOT BE APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT.
Circular No. 22 of the Social Security Commission purports merely to advise
employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the

law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their

employees upon which the social security contributions should be based. It did not
add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated
and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be
construed. Such circular, therefore, did not require presidential approval and
publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.
4. ID.; INTERPRETATION OF TERMS OR WORDS; RULE WHEN A TERM OR WORD
IS SPECIFICALLY DEFINED IN A STATUTE. While the rule is that terms or words
are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law,
nevertheless, when such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such
interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be
gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose
and another meaning for some other purpose.