Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Kinjal Shah
I.
Secret
key
INTRODUCTION
III.
EARLY ATTEMPTS
BASIC SCHEMES
II.
DEFINATION
FKey(input) = GKey(input)
Where F and G are functions. Function is holomorphic
i.e.
Gb(K1 + K2) = Gb(K1) Gb(K2)
Where b is aforementioned input and K1; K2 belong
to key space.
Consider the ElGamal encryption scheme: Public key is
(g; y; p), where g is large enough order, p is large enough
a
prime, Y = g modpand a is secret key.The cipher text is
B(2)
ak
= c1
=G
c2 G
ak
t2;1
modp = 9
G
B(1)
13
B(2)modp
mod17 = 15
= 9 15mod17 = 16
= 12 16mod17 = 5 = M
2)
k k a
D(a;p)(c1; c2) = c2 c1 (modp) = My (g ) (modp) =
ak
k a
ak
ak
M (g ) (g )
M (modp)
(modp) = M g
Reliability
(modp) =
Security Enhancement
No trusted dealer:
By using this scheme trusted dealer can
be avoided.
Proactive security and its generalization: What
happen when an outsider collects more share
than the threshold? I.e. share is stolen The
solution that has been proposed to address
this problem is to get new guaranteed correct
shares without relying on trusted dealer and
keep the old public key as long as reasonable
possible. The old shares should be destroyed
and the update frequently should be done
enough, taken the power of the enemy who
may collect shares into account.
Insiders Anonymity:
EXAMPLE:
y = g modp = 13
VI.
t =7
1)
1;2
t2;1 = a t1;2mod (P ) = 3 = 13
k
c1 = g modp = 9
a
2
c2 = My modp = 5 13 mod17 = 12
2)
3)
B(2) = t2;1 = 13
B(1)
= c1
t1;2
modp = 9
mod17 = 9
SOME PROBLEMS
VII.
CONCLUSION
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
http://www.cs.cornell.edu/Courses/cs513/2000SP/SecretSharingCA.html
[2]