Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 177066

September 11, 2009

JOSELITO MUSNI PUNO (as heir of the late Carlos Puno), Petitioner,
vs.
PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by JESUSA PUNO, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Upon the death of a stockholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the
corporation; neither are they mandatorily entitled to the rights and privileges of a
stockholder. This, we declare in this petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision1 dated October 11, 2006 and Resolution dated March 6, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86137.
The facts of the case follow:
Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno
Enterprises, Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of
Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint for specific performance against respondent. Petitioner
averred that he is the son of the deceased with the latters common-law wife, Amelia Puno.
As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges of his late father as
stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus prayed that respondent allow petitioner to
inspect its corporate book, render an accounting of all the transactions it entered into from
1962, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or income pertaining to the
shares of Carlos L. Puno.2
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not have the legal
personality to sue because his birth certificate names him as "Joselito Musni Muno." Apropos,
there was yet a need for a judicial declaration that "Joselito Musni Puno" and "Joselito Musni
Muno" were one and the same.
The court ordered that the proceedings be held in abeyance, ratiocinating that petitioners
certificate of live birth was no proof of his paternity and relation to Carlos L. Puno.
Petitioner submitted the corrected birth certificate with the name "Joselito M. Puno," certified
by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila, and the Certificate of Finality thereof. To hasten
the disposition of the case, the court conditionally admitted the corrected birth certificate as
genuine and authentic and ordered respondent to file its answer within fifteen days from the
order and set the case for pretrial.3

On October 11, 2005, the court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Jesusa Puno and/or Felicidad Fermin to
allow the plaintiff to inspect the corporate books and records of the company from 1962 up
to the present including the financial statements of the corporation.
The costs of copying shall be shouldered by the plaintiff. Any expenses to be incurred by the
defendant to be able to comply with this order shall be the subject of a bill of costs.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint in its Decision dated October 11,
2006. According to the CA, petitioner was not able to establish the paternity of and his
filiation to Carlos L. Puno since his birth certificate was prepared without the intervention of
and the participatory acknowledgment of paternity by Carlos L. Puno. Accordingly, the CA
said that petitioner had no right to demand that he be allowed to examine respondents
books. Moreover, petitioner was not a stockholder of the corporation but was merely
claiming rights as an heir of Carlos L. Puno, an incorporator of the corporation. His action for
specific performance therefore appeared to be premature; the proper action to be taken was
to prove the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno in a petition for the settlement of
the estate of the latter.5
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution 6 dated March
6, 2007.
In this petition, petitioner raises the following issues:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE JOSELITO PUNO IS
ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS DEMANDED HE BEING THE HEIR OF THE LATE CARLOS PUNO, ONE
OF THE INCORPORATORS [OF] RESPONDENT CORPORATION.
II. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT FILIATION OF JOSELITO PUNO,
THE PETITIONER[,] IS NOT DULY PROVEN OR ESTABLISHED.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT JOSELITO MUNO AND JOSELITO
PUNO REFERS TO THE ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT WHAT RESPONDENT
MERELY DISPUTES IS THE SURNAME OF THE PETITIONER WHICH WAS MISSPELLED AND THE
FACTUAL ALLEGATION E.G. RIGHTS OF PETITIONER AS HEIR OF CARLOS PUNO ARE DEEMED
ADMITTED HYPOTHETICALLY IN THE RESPONDENT[S] MOTION TO DISMISS.
V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THEREFORE ERRED I[N] DECREEING THAT
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO INSPECT THE CORPORATE BOOKS OF DEFENDANT
CORPORATION.7
The petition is without merit. Petitioner failed to establish the right to inspect respondent
corporations books and receive dividends on the stocks owned by Carlos L. Puno.

Petitioner anchors his claim on his being an heir of the deceased stockholder. However, we
agree with the appellate court that petitioner was not able to prove satisfactorily his filiation
to the deceased stockholder; thus, the former cannot claim to be an heir of the latter.
Incessantly, we have declared that factual findings of the CA supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive and binding.8 In an appeal via certiorari, the Court may not review
the factual findings of the CA. It is not the Courts function under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence
presented.9
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity
of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person. 10 As correctly observed by the
CA, only petitioners mother supplied the data in the birth certificate and signed the same.
There was no evidence that Carlos L. Puno acknowledged petitioner as his son.
As for the baptismal certificate, we have already decreed that it can only serve as evidence
of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not of the veracity of the
entries with respect to the childs paternity. 11
In any case, Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code enumerate the persons who are
entitled to the inspection of corporate books, thus
Sec. 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer agent. x x x.
The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any meeting
shall be open to the inspection of any director, trustee, stockholder or member of the
corporation at reasonable hours on business days and he may demand, in writing, for a copy
of excerpts from said records or minutes, at his expense.
xxxx
Sec. 75. Right to financial statements. Within ten (10) days from receipt of a written
request of any stockholder or member, the corporation shall furnish to him its most recent
financial statement, which shall include a balance sheet as of the end of the last taxable
year and a profit or loss of statement for said taxable year, showing in reasonable detail its
assets and liabilities and the result of its operations.12
The stockholders right of inspection of the corporations books and records is based upon
his ownership of shares in the corporation and the necessity for self-protection. After all, a
shareholder has the right to be intelligently informed about corporate affairs. 13 Such right
rests upon the stockholders underlying ownership of the corporations assets and property. 14
Similarly, only stockholders of record are entitled to receive dividends declared by the
corporation, a right inherent in the ownership of the shares.151avvphi1

Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the
corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the
corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the
transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the
Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties,
until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation. 16 During such interim period,
the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly
appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the stock. 17 Until a settlement and
division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the administrator or
executor.18 Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor who is entitled
to exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder.
Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is the
son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect respondents books and be
entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent any showing in its transfer book that
some of the shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would only be
possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has participated in the settlement
of the estate of the deceased.
Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming
proprietary rights over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased must be
ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of settling the estate
of the latter. The status of an illegitimate child who claims to be an heir to a decedents
estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action, as in a case for the recovery of
property.19 The doctrine applies to the instant case, which is one for specific performance
to direct respondent corporation to allow petitioner to exercise rights that pertain only to the
deceased and his representatives.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated October 11, 2006 and Resolution dated March 6, 2007 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16763 December 22, 1921
PASCUAL COSO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
FERMINA FERNANDEZ DEZA, ET AL., objectors-appellees.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide & Felix Socias for appellant.
Jose Varela Calderon & Benito Jimenez Zoboli for appellees.

OSTRAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila setting aside a will
on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of a testator
by one Rosario Lopez. The will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to an illegitimate son had
by the testator with said Rosario Lopez, and also provides for the payment to her of nineteen
hundred Spanish duros by way the reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in taking
care of the testator in Barcelona during the years 1909 to 1916, when he is alleged to have
suffered from a severe illness.
The evidence shows that the testator, a married man and resident of the Philippine Islands,
became acquainted with Rosario Lopez in Spain in 1898 and that he had illicit returns with
her for many years thereafter. After his return to the Philippines she followed him, arriving in
Manila in February, 1918, and remained in close communication with him until his death in
February, 1919. There is no doubt that she exercised some influence over him and the only
question for our determination is whether this influence was of such a character as to vitiate
the will.
The English and American rule in regard to undue influence is thus stated in 40 Cyc., 11441149.
Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a
will; to have that effect the influence must be "undue." The rule as to what
constitutes "undue influence" has been variously stated, but the substance of the
different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted
must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to
destroy his free agency and make his express the will of another, rather than his
own.1awphil.net
. . . such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to
the execution of the will in question, either at time of the execution of the will, or so

near thereto as to be still operative, with the object of procuring a will in favor of
particular parties, and it must result in the making of testamentary dispositions which
the testator would not otherwise have made. . . .
. . . and while the same amount of influence may become "undue" when exercised by
one occupying an improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that
some influence is exercised by a person sustaining that relation does not invalidate a
will, unless it is further shown that the influence destroys the testator's free agency.
The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence, in the
sense above expressed, existed at the time of its execution and we do not think that this
burden has been carried in the present case. While it is shown that the testator entertained
strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her influence so overpowered
and subjugated his mind as to "destroy his free agency and make him express the will of
another rather than his own." He was an intelligent man, a lawyer by profession, appears to
have known his own mind, and may well have been actuated only by a legitimate sense of
duty in making provisions for the welfare of his illegitimate son and by a proper feeling of
gratitude in repaying Rosario Lopez for the sacrifices she had made for him. Mere affection,
even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will. No imposition or
fraud has been shown in the present case.
Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as `undue,' if no
imposition or fraud be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an
unequal and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who have contributed
to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made.
(Mackall vs. Mackall, 135 U. S., 1677.)
It may be further observed that under the Civil Law the right of a person with legal heirs to
dispose of his property by will is limited to only a portion of his estate, and that under the
law in force in these Islands before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the only
outside influences affecting the validity of a will were duress, deceit, and fraud. The present
doctrine of undue influence originated in a legal system where the right of the testator to
dispose of his property by will was nearly unlimited. Manifestly, greater safeguards in regard
to execution of wills may be warranted when the right to so dispose of property is unlimited
than when it is restricted to the extent it is in this jurisdiction. There is, therefore, certainly
no reason for giving the doctrine of undue influence a wider scope here than it enjoys in the
United States.
For the reasons stated, the decision of the lower court disallowing the will of Federico
Gimenez Zoboli is hereby reversed and it is ordered that the will be admitted to probate. No
costs will be allowed. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch
XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS
PAGUIA, respondents.
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and allowed the
probate of the last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte
presentation of evidence by herein private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes
Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and
Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory
heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court
whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased
Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the
reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the
United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased
testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her
death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with
her sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her
last wig and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix death, her
last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of
Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator
who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as executor

in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, there is
an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and eventually
distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner
alleging among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a
forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent
American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as
they would work injustice and injury to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed
a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been
able to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the
probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-partepresentation of evidence for the
reprobate of the questioned will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C.
Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America with a
permanent residence at 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit
D) that when alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a Last Will and Testament
in the county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws
thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b) that while in temporary sojourn in the
Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving
property both in the Philippines and in the United States of America; that the
Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and
granted probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas,
the probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in favor of
Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign
country on procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the
petitioner is not suffering from any disqualification which would render her
unfit as administratrix of the estate in the Philippines of the late Adoracion C.
Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is
hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita
Campos Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of said
decedent; let Letters of Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of
said Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00
conditioned under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the
withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order
allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the

same was secured through fraudulent means. According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss
Opposition" was inserted among the papers which he signed in connection with two Deeds
of Conditional Sales which he executed with the Construction and Development Corporation
of the Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the
opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the special proceedings case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He made
several motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside
the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this motion,
the notice of hearing provided:
Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at
8:30 in the morning for submission for reconsideration and resolution of the
Honorable Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may I also request for the future
setting of the case for hearing on the Oppositor's motion to set aside
previously filed.
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the case was
called for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate
instead of adducing evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge
issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support
thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same
order, respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which,
incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its
face, patently null and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of
his last will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as
petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the court on September 13, 1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes
Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only
remaining children and forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without or
in excess of his jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right to
Notice (sic) upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of
rights or interests against the estate of deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus,
paving the way for the hearing ex-parte of the petition for the probate of
decedent will.
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not made in a
public or authenticated instrument), or by way of a petition presented to the

court but by way of a motion presented prior to an order for the distribution of
the estate-the law especially providing that repudiation of an inheritance must
be presented, within 30 days after it has issued an order for the distribution of
the estate in accordance with the rules of Court.
3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a
decree admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced
heir in complete disregard of Law of Succession
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no evidence
was adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing was
set to afford petitioner to prove the merit of his petition a denial of the due
process and a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the Testator
at the time of death was a usual resident of Dasmarias, Cavite, consequently
Cavite Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja
vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July 1955).
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of
the petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof was
adduced to support petitioner's contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through
fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records
show that after the firing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a
manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary
act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the petitioner's former counsel,
Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and had been substituted by Atty.
Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore,
maintain that the old man's attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the
motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing
the probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule,
the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due
execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes
only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the
reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was
reserved by the law for him.

This contention is without merit.

Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the
respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have
sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen
and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16
par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not
provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a
complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be
contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific
provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as
provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent
must apply. This was squarely applied in the case ofBellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we
ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State
of Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will
and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,

the Philippine Law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G.

Bellis.
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records wig
bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June
19, 1980 was the petitioner's petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order of
January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe
otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his
petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due process. The
fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for hearing . . ." did not mean that
at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given preference in lieu of the
petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and not in a
mere notice of hearing.
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of
merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided
at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven
that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by
the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs.
Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., (Chairman), took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145545

June 30, 2008

PAZ SAMANIEGO-CELADA, petitioner,

vs.
LUCIA D. ABENA, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to
reverse the Decision1dated October 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
41756, which affirmed the Decision2 dated March 2, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 66, Makati City. The RTC had declared the last will and testament of Margarita S.
Mayores probated and designated respondent Lucia D. Abena as the executor of her will. It
also ordered the issuance of letters testamentary in favor of respondent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent Margarita S. Mayores
(Margarita) while respondent was the decedents lifelong companion since 1929.
On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor descending heirs as
her parents, grandparents and siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first
cousins Catalina Samaniego-Bombay, Manuelita Samaniego Sajonia, Feliza Samaniego, and
petitioner.
Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament 3 on February 2, 1987 where
she bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real property located at Singalong
Manila, consisting of 209.8 square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 1343 to respondent, Norma A. Pahingalo, and Florentino M. Abena in equal shares or
one-third portion each. She likewise bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real
property located at San Antonio Village, Makati, consisting of 225 square meters, and
covered by TCT No. 68920 to respondent, Isabelo M. Abena, and Amanda M. Abena in equal
shares or one-third portion each. Margarita also left all her personal properties to respondent
whom she likewise designated as sole executor of her will.
On August 11, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Margarita before the RTC of Makati. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-1531.

On October 27, 1987, respondent filed a petition for probate of the will of Margarita before
the RTC of Makati. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-1607 and consolidated with SP
Proc. No. M-1531.
On March 2, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of
Margarita probated and respondent as the executor of the will. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) declaring the will as probated;
2) declaring Lucia Abena as the executor of the will who will serve as such without a
bond as stated in paragraph VI of the probated will;
3) ordering the issuance of letters testamentary in favor of Lucia Abena.
So ordered.4
Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. But the Court of Appeals, in a
decision dated October 13, 2000, affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The dispositive portion of
the Court of Appeals decision states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal having no merit in fact and
in law, is herebyORDERED DISMISSED and the appealed Decision of the trial
court AFFIRMED IN TOTO, with cost to oppositors-appellants.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, the instant petition citing the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT INVALIDATING THE WILL SINCE IT DID NOT CONFORM TO THE FORMALITIES
REQUIRED BY LAW;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT INVALIDATING
THE WILL BECAUSE IT WAS PROCURED THROUGH UNDUE INFLUENCE AND
PRESSURE[;] AND
III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING

PETITIONER, HER SIBLINGS AND COUSIN AS THE LEGAL HEIRS OF MARGARITA S.
MAYORES AND IN NOT ISSUING LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION TO HER. 6
Briefly stated, the issues are (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the will
invalid for failure to comply with the formalities required by law, (2) whether said court erred
in not declaring the will invalid because it was procured through undue influence and
pressure, and (3) whether it erred in not declaring petitioner and her siblings as the legal
heirs of Margarita, and in not issuing letters of administration to petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum,7 argues that Margaritas will failed to comply with the
formalities required under Article 8058 of the Civil Code because the will was not signed by
the testator in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and in the presence of one
another. She also argues that the signatures of the testator on pages A, B, and C of the will
are not the same or similar, indicating that they were not signed on the same day. She
further argues that the will was procured through undue influence and pressure because at
the time of execution of the will, Margarita was weak, sickly, jobless and entirely dependent
upon respondent and her nephews for support, and these alleged handicaps allegedly
affected her freedom and willpower to decide on her own. Petitioner thus concludes that
Margaritas total dependence on respondent and her nephews compelled her to sign the will.
Petitioner likewise argues that the Court of Appeals should have declared her and her
siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita since they are her only living collateral relatives in
accordance with Articles 10099 and 101010 of the Civil Code.
Respondent, for her part, argues in her Memorandum11 that the petition for review raises
questions of fact, not of law and as a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final
and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court. She also points out
that although the Court of Appeals at the outset opined there was no compelling reason to
review the petition, the Court of Appeals proceeded to tackle the assigned errors and rule
that the will was validly executed, sustaining the findings of the trial court that the
formalities required by law were duly complied with. The Court of Appeals also concurred
with the findings of the trial court that the testator, Margarita, was of sound mind when she
executed the will.
After careful consideration of the parties contentions, we rule in favor of respondent.
We find that the issues raised by petitioner concern pure questions of fact, which may not be
the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The issues that petitioner is raising now i.e., whether or not the will was signed by the
testator in the presence of the witnesses and of one another, whether or not the signatures
of the witnesses on the pages of the will were signed on the same day, and whether or not
undue influence was exerted upon the testator which compelled her to sign the will, are all
questions of fact.
This Court does not resolve questions of fact in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 112 of Rule 45 limits this Courts review to questions of
law only.

Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. When supported by
substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding
on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the
following recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 13
We find that this case does not involve any of the abovementioned exceptions.
Nonetheless, a review of the findings of the RTC as upheld by the Court of Appeals, reveal
that petitioners arguments lack basis. The RTC correctly held:
With [regard] to the contention of the oppositors [Paz Samaniego-Celada, et al.] that
the testator [Margarita Mayores] was not mentally capable of making a will at the
time of the execution thereof, the same is without merit. The oppositors failed to
establish, by preponderance of evidence, said allegation and contradict the
presumption that the testator was of sound mind (See Article 800 of the Civil Code).
In fact, witness for the oppositors, Dr. Ramon Lamberte, who, in some occasions,
attended to the testator months before her death, testified that Margarita Mayores
could engage in a normal conversation and he even stated that the illness of the
testator does not warrant hospitalization. Not one of the oppositors witnesses has
mentioned any instance that they observed act/s of the testator during her lifetime
that could be construed as a manifestation of mental incapacity. The testator may be
admitted to be physically weak but it does not necessarily follow that she was not of
sound mind. [The] testimonies of contestant witnesses are pure aforethought.

Anent the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that
its attestation clause states that the will is composed of three (3) pages while in truth
and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only because the attestation is not a
part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that the attestation
clause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining the totality of the will, is of
the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the
attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that
the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a
sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The
error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole
instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the "doctrine of
liberal interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads:
"In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and]
improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the
form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render
the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and
attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of
Article 805."
The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors that the signatures of the
testator were affixed on different occasions based on their observation that the
signature on the first page is allegedly different in size, texture and appearance as
compared with the signatures in the succeeding pages. After examination of the
signatures, the court does not share the same observation as the oppositors. The
picture (Exhibit "H-3") shows that the testator was affixing her signature in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses and the notary. There is no evidence to show
that the first signature was procured earlier than February 2, 1987.
Finally, the court finds that no pressure nor undue influence was exerted on the
testator to execute the subject will. In fact, the picture reveals that the testator was
in a good mood and smiling with the other witnesses while executing the subject will
(See Exhibit "H").
In fine, the court finds that the testator was mentally capable of making the will at
the time of its execution, that the notarial will presented to the court is the same
notarial will that was executed and that all the formal requirements (See Article 805
of the Civil Code) in the execution of a will have been substantially complied with in
the subject notarial will.14 (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, we find no reason to disturb the abovementioned findings of the RTC. Since, petitioner
and her siblings are not compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article 88715 of the Civil
Code and as the decedent validly disposed of her properties in a will duly executed and
probated, petitioner has no legal right to claim any part of the decedents estate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October 13, 2000 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41756 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO, respondents.
Francisco D. Rilloraza, Jr. for petitioners.
Angel A. Sison for private respondent.

GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, First
Division, 1 promulgated on May 4, 1973 in CA G.R. No. 36523-R which reversed the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated December 15, 1964 and allowed the probate of
the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel. *
It appears that on June 24, 1961, herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3617,
for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and
designating therein petitioner as the principal beneficiary and executrix.
There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a widow and
without issue in the municipality of Navotas, province of Rizal her place of residence, on June
7, 1961 at the age of eighty-five (85), having been born in 1876. It is likewise not
controverted that herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago and petitioner Rizalina
Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that private respondent, with her husband
and children, lived with the deceased at the latters residence prior an- d up to the time of
her death.
The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog, appears to
have been executed in Manila on the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely two (2) months prior
to the death of Isabel Gabriel. It consists of five (5) pages, including the pages whereon the
attestation clause and the acknowledgment of the notary public were written. The
signatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the end of the will on page four and at
the left margin of all the pages. The attestation clause, which is found on page four, reads as
follows:
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI

Kaming mga nakalagdang mga saksi o testigo na ang aming mga tinitirahan
ay nakasulat sa gawing kanan at kahilira ng aming mga pangalan sa ibaba
nito, ay pagpapatutuo na ipinakilala ipinaalam at ipinahayag sa amin ni Isabel
Gabriel na ang kasulatang ito na binubuo ng Limang Dahon (Five Pages) pati
na ang dahong ito, na siya niyang TESTAMENTO AT HULING HABILIN, ngayong
ika 15 ng Abril, 1961, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing testadora na si Isabel Gabriel
ang nasabing testamento sa ibaba o ilalim ng kasulatan na nasa ika apat na
dahon (page four) at nasa itaas ng patunay naming ito, at sa kaliwang panig
ng lahat at bawat dahon (and on the left hand margin of each and every
page), sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay
lumagda sa harap ng nasabing testadora, at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa
amin, sa ilalim ng patunay ng mga saksi at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at
bawa't dahon ng testamentong ito.
At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the signatures of Matilde
D. Orobia, Celso D. Gimpaya and Maria R. Gimpaya, and opposite the same, under the
heading "Tirahan", are their respective places of residence, 961 Highway 54, Philamlife, for
Miss Orobia, and 12 Dagala St., Navotas, Rizal, for the two Gimpayas. Their signatures also
appear on the left margin of all the other pages. The WW is paged by typewritten words as
follows: "Unang Dahon" and underneath "(Page One)", "Ikalawang Dahon" and underneath
"(Page Two)", etc., appearing at the top of each page.
The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the Catholic Cemetery of
Navotas, Rizal in accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, all expenses to be
paid from her estate; that all her obligations, if any, be paid; that legacies in specified
amounts be given to her sister, Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago, her brother Santiago
Gabriel, and her nephews and nieces, Benjamin, Salud, Rizalina (herein petitioner), Victoria,
Ester, Andres, all surnamed Gabriel, and Evangeline, Rudyardo Rosa, Andrea, Marcial,
Numancia, Verena an surnamed Santiago. To herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago,
who was described in the will by the testatrix as "aking mahal na pamangkin na aking
pinalaki, inalagaan at minahal na katulad ng isang tunay na anak" and named as universal
heir and executor, were bequeathed all properties and estate, real or personal already
acquired, or to be acquired, in her testatrix name, after satisfying the expenses, debts and
legacies as aforementioned.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein petitioner, assailing the
document purporting to be the will of the deceased on the following grounds:
1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative
2. that the same was not executed and attested as required by law;
3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported wilt the decedent
lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness; and in the second
alternative

4. That the purported WW was procured through undue and improper pressure
and influence on the part of the principal beneficiary, and/or of some other
person for her benefit.
Lutgarda Santiago filed her Answer to the Opposition on February 1, 1962. After trial, the
court a quo rendered judgment, the summary and dispositive portions of which read:
Passing in summary upon the grounds advanced by the oppositor, this Court
finds:
1. That there is no iota of evidence to support the contentio that the purported
will of the deceased was procured through undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the petitioner, or of some other person for her benefit;
2. That there is insufficient evidence to sustain the contention that at the time
of the alleged execution of the purported will, the deceased lacked
testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness;
3. That sufficient and abundant evidence warrants conclusively the fact that
the purported will of the deceased was not executed and attested as required
by law;
4. That the evidence is likewise conclusive that the document presented for
probate, Exhibit 'F' is not the purported win allegedly dictated by the
deceased, executed and signed by her, and attested by her three attesting
witnesses on April 15, 1961.
WHEREFORE, Exhibit "F", the document presented for probate as the last wig
and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel is here by DISALLOWED.
From this judgment of disallowance, Lutgarda Santiago appealed to respondent Court,
hence, the only issue decided on appeal was whether or not the will in question was
executed and attested as required by law. The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the
evidence adduced by both parties, rendered the decision now under review, holding that the
will in question was signed and executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961 in
the presence of the three attesting witnesses, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the document in the presence of the deceased and of each
other as required by law, hence allow ed probate.
Oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales moved for reconsideration 3 of the aforesaid decision
and such motion was opposed 4 by petitioner-appellant Lutgarda Santiago. Thereafter.
parties submitted their respective Memoranda, 5 and on August 28, 1973, respondent Court,
Former Special First Division, by Resolution 6 denied the motion for reconsideration stating
that:
The oppositor-appellee contends that the preponderance of evidence shows
that the supposed last wig and testament of Isabel Gabriel was not executed
in accordance with law because the same was signed on several occasions,

that the testatrix did not sign the will in the presence of all the instrumental
witnesses did not sign the will in the presence of each other.
The resolution of the factual issue raised in the motion for reconsideration
hinges on the appreciation of the evidence. We have carefully re-examined
the oral and documentary evidence of record, There is no reason to alter the
findings of fact in the decision of this Court sought to be set aside. 7
In her petition before this Court, oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales contends that
respondent Court abused its discretion and/or acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
reverssing the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court. The Court, after deliberating
on the petition but without giving due course resolved, in the Resolution dated Oct. 11, 1973
to require the respondents to comment thereon, which comment was filed on Nov. 14, 1973.
Upon consideration of the allegations, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the
petition, as well as the Comment 8 of private respondent thereon, We denied the petition by
Resolution on November 26, 1973, 9 the question raised being factual and for insufficient
showing that the findings of fact by respondent Court were unsupported by substantial
evidence.
Subsequently, or on December 17, 1973, petitioner Rim Gabriel Goes fried a Motion for
Reconsideration 10 which private respondent answered by way of her Comment or
Opposition 11 filed on January 15, 1974. A Reply and Rejoinder to Reply followed. Finally, on
March 27, 1974, We resolved to give due course to the petition.
The petitioner in her brief makes the following assignment of errors:
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F" was
executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the three
instrumental witnesses were credible witness
II. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the lower court that the preparation
and execution of the win Exhibit "F", was unexpected and coincidental.
III. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that Atty, Paraiso was not previously furnished with
the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data
into the document Exhibit "F".
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under
the typewritten words "Pangalan" and "Tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that
the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion.
V. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's finding that it was incredible that
Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the wilt Exhibit "F , without any note or document, to Atty.
Paraiso.
VI. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the trial court that Matilde Orobia
was not physically present when the Will Exhibit "F" was allegedly signed on April 15, 1961
by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya.

VII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the
picture takings as proof that the win was improperly executed.
VIII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the grave contradictions, evasions, and
misrepresentations of witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had
been explained away, and that the trial court erred in rejecting said testimonies.
IX. The Court of Appeals acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction or has so far departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, as to call for an exercise of the
power of supervision.
X. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to
probate Exhibit "F", the alleged last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
It will be noted from the above assignments of errors that the same are substantially factual
in character and content. Hence, at the very outset, We must again state the oft-repeated
and well-established rule that in this jurisdiction, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are not reviewable, the same being binding and conclusive on this Court. This rule has been
stated and reiterated in a long line of cases enumerated in Chan vs. CA (L-27488, June 30,
1970, 33 SCRA 737, 743) 12 and Tapas vs. CA (L-22202, February 27; 1976, 69 SCRA
393), 13 and in the more recent cases of Baptisia vs. Carillo and CA (L32192, July 30, 1976,
72 SCRA 214, 217) and Vda. de Catindig vs. Heirs of Catalina Roque (L-25777, November 26,
1976, 74 SCRA 83, 88). In the case of Chan vs. CA, this Court said:
... from Guico v. Mayuga, a 1936 decision, the opinion being penned by the then Justice
Recto, it has been well-settled that the jurisdiction of tills Court in cases brought to us from
the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its
findings of fact being conclusive. More specifically, in a decision exactly a month later, this
Court, speaking through the then Justice Laurel, it was held that the same principle is
applicable, even if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with the lower court as to the
weight of the evidence with a consequent reversal of its findings of fact ...
Stated otherwise, findings of facts by the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantive
evidence are not reviewable on appeal by certiorari. Said findings of the appellate court are
final and cannot be disturbed by Us particularly because its premises are borne out by the
record or based upon substantial evidence and what is more, when such findings are correct.
Assignments of errors involving factual issues cannot be ventilated in a review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals because only legal questions may be raised. The Supreme
Court is not at liberty to alter or modify the facts as set forth in the decision of the Court of
Appeals sought to be reversed. Where the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court, a minute scrutiny by the Supreme Court is in order, and resort to
duly-proven evidence becomes necessary. The general rule We have thus stated above is
not without some recognized exceptions.
Having laid down the above legal precepts as Our foundation, We now proceed to consider
petitioner's assignments of errors.

Petitioner, in her first assignment, contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the document, Exhibit "F", was executed and attested as required by law when
there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible witnesses.
She argues that the require. ment in Article 806, Civil Code, that the witnesses must be
credible is an absolute requirement which must be complied with before an alleged last will
and testament may be admitted to probate and that to be a credible witness, there must be
evidence on record that the witness has a good standing in his community, or that he is
honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. According to petitioner, unless
the qualifications of the witness are first established, his testimony may not be favorably
considered. Petitioner contends that the term "credible" is not synonymous with
"competent" for a witness may be competent under Article 820 and 821 of the Civil Code
and still not be credible as required by Article 805 of the same Code. It is further urged that
the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should receive the same settled and wellknown meaning it has under the Naturalization Law, the latter being a kindred legislation
with the Civil Code provisions on wigs with respect to the qualifications of witnesses.
We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820 of the Civil Code
provides the qualifications of a witness to the execution of wills while Article 821 sets forth
the disqualification from being a witness to a win. These Articles state:
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more,
and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to
the execution of a will mentioned in article 806 of this Code. "Art. 821. The
following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or
false testimony.
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any
time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for
trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony
may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications
enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of
his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him,
that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently
proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to
read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications
under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We reject petitioner's contention that it must first be
established in the record the good standing of the witness in the community, his reputation
for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because such attributes
are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party.
We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the term "credible" as used in the
Civil Code should be given the same meaning it has under the Naturalization Law where the
law is mandatory that the petition for naturalization must be supported by two character
witnesses who must prove their good standing in the community, reputation for

trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and uprightness. The two witnesses in a
petition for naturalization are character witnesses in that being citizens of the Philippines,
they personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time
required by the Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable and that said
petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the
Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of the Naturalization Law
(Section 7, Commonwealth Act No. 473 as amended).
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they
merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to
said execution. And We agree with the respondent that the rulings laid down in the cases
cited by petitioner concerning character witnesses in naturalization proceedings are not
applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills executed under the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses,
namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is
satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, which
findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not
pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been shown
that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot
read or write.
It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will, other than a holographic
will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another, While the petitioner submits that Article 820 and 821 of the New Civil Code speak
of the competency of a witness due to his qualifications under the first Article and none of
the disqualifications under the second Article, whereas Article 805 requires the attestation of
three or more credible witnesses, petitioner concludes that the term credible requires
something more than just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to
being competent under Articles 820 and 821 must also be a credible witness under Article
805.
Petitioner cites American authorities that competency and credibility of a witness are not
synonymous terms and one may be a competent witness and yet not a credible one. She
exacerbates that there is no evidence on record to show that the instrumental witnesses are
credible in themselves, that is, that they are of good standing in the community since one
was a family driver by profession and the second the wife of the driver, a housekeeper. It is
true that Celso Gimpaya was the driver of the testatrix and his wife Maria Gimpaya, merely a
housekeeper, and that Matilde Orobia was a piano teacher to a grandchild of the testatrix
But the relation of employer and employee much less the humble or financial position of a
person do not disqualify him to be a competent testamentary witness. (Molo Pekson and
Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344; Testate Estate of Raymundo, Off. Gaz., March
18,1941, p. 788).

Private respondent maintains that the qualifications of the three or more credible witnesses
mentioned in Article 805 of the Civil Code are those mentioned in Article 820 of the same
Code, this being obvious from that portion of Article 820 which says "may be Q witness to
the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code," and cites authorities that the
word "credible" insofar as witnesses to a will are concerned simply means " competent."
Thus, in the case of Suntay vs. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500, the Supreme Court held that "Granting
that a will was duly executed and that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked
before, the death of the testator, still the provisions of the lost wig must be clearly and
distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. 'Credible witnesses' mean competent
witnesses and not those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay. " emphasissupplied).
In Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344, the Supreme Court held
that "Section 620 of the same Code of Civil Procedure provides that any person of sound
mind, and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf, or dumb and able to
read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will. This same provision is
reproduced in our New Civil Code of 1950, under Art. 820. The relation of employer and
employee, or being a relative to the beneficiary in a win, does not disqualify one to be a
witness to a will. The main qualification of a witness in the attestation of wills, if other
qualifications as to age, mental capacity and literacy are present, is that said witness must
be credible, that is to say, his testimony may be entitled to credence. There is a long line of
authorities on this point, a few of which we may cite:
A 'credible witness is one who is not is not to testify by mental incapacity,
crime, or other cause. Historical Soc of Dauphin County vs. Kelker 74 A. 619,
226 Pix 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 340).
As construed by the common law, a 'credible witness' to a will means a
'competent witness.' Appeal of Clark, 95 A. 517, 114 Me. 105, Ann. Cas.
1917A, 837. (lbid, p. 341).
Expression 'credible witness' in relation to attestation of wins means
'competent witness that is, one competent under the law to testify to fact of
execution of will. Vernon's Ann. Civ St. art. 8283. Moos vs. First State Bank of
Uvalde, Tex . Civ. App. 60 S.W. 2nd 888, 889. (Ibid, p. 342)
The term 'credible', used in the statute of wills requiring that a will shall be
attested by two credible witnesses means competent; witnesses who, at the
time of attesting the will, are legally competent to testify, in a court of justice,
to the facts attested by subscribing the will, the competency being
determined as of the date of the execution of the will and not of the timr it is
offered for probate,Smith vs. Goodell 101 N.E. 255, 256, 258 111. 145. (Ibid.)
Credible witnesses as used in the statute relating to wills, means competent
witnesses that is, such persons as are not legally disqualified from testifying
in courts of justice, by reason of mental incapacity, interest, or the
commission of crimes, or other cause excluding them from testifying
generally, or rendering them incompetent in respect of the particular subject

matter or in the particular suit. Hill vs. Chicago Title & Trust co 152 N.E. 545,
546, 322 111. 42. (Ibid. p, 343)
In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is
determined by the statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility
depends On the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of
the Court that said witness is telling the truth. Thus, in the case ofVda. de Aroyo v. El
Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held
and ruled that: "Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible
witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a
person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may
thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony." In fine, We state the
rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown to have the
qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under
Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to
credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on record that the witnesses
have a good standing in the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is
established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent and
their testimonies must be credible before the court allows the probate of the will they have
attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's position that it was fatal for respondent not to
have introduced prior and independent proof of the fact that the witnesses were "credible
witnesses that is, that they have a good standing in the community and reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable.
Under the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth assignments of errors,
petitioner disputes the findings of fact of the respondent court in finding that the preparation
and execution of the will was expected and not coincidental, in finding that Atty. Paraiso was
not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to
enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit "F", in holding that the fact that the
three typewritten lines under the typewritten words "pangalan" and "tinitirahan" were left
blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same
occasion, in holding credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will without note or
document to Atty. Paraiso, in holding that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the
will was signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses
Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to
the picture takings as proof that the will was improperly executed, and in holding that the
grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of the witnesses (subscribing and
notary) presented by the petitioner had been explained away.
Since the above errors are factual We must repeat what We have previously laid down that
the findings of fact of the appellate court are binding and controlling which We cannot
review, subject to certain exceptions which We win consider and discuss hereinafter. We are
convinced that the appellate court's findings are sufficiently justified and supported by the
evidence on record. Thus, the alleged unnaturalness characterizing the trip of the testatrix
to the office of Atty. Paraiso and bringing all the witnesses without previous appointment for
the preparation and execution of the win and that it was coincidental that Atty. Paraiso was
available at the moment impugns the finding of the Court of Appeals that although Atty.

Paraiso admitted the visit of Isabel Gabriel and of her companions to his office on April 15,
1961 was unexpected as there was no prior appointment with him, but he explained that he
was available for any business transaction on that day and that Isabel Gabriel had earlier
requested him to help her prepare her will. The finding of the appellate court is amply based
on the testimony of Celso Gimpaya that he was not only informed on the morning of the day
that he witnessed the will but that it was the third time when Isabel Gabriel told him that he
was going to witness the making of her will, as well as the testimony of Maria Gimpaya that
she was called by her husband Celso Gimpaya to proceed to Isabel Gabriel's house which
was nearby and from said house, they left in a car to the lawyer's office, which testimonies
are recited in the respondent Court's decision.
The respondent Court further found the following facts: that Celso Gimpaya and his wife
Maria Gimpaya obtained residence certificates a few days before Exhibit "F" was executed.
Celso Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114942 was issued at Navotas, Rizal on April
13, 1961 while Maria Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114974 was issued also at
Navotas, Rizal on April 14, 1961. The respondent Court correctly observed that there was
nothing surprising in these facts and that the securing of these residence certificates two
days and one day, respectively, before the execution of the will on April 15, 1961, far from
showing an amazing coincidence, reveals that the spouses were earlier notified that they
would be witnesses to the execution of Isabel Gabriel's will.
We also agree with the respondent Court's conclusion that the excursion to the office of Atty.
Paraiso was planned by the deceased, which conclusion was correctly drawn from the
testimony of the Gimpaya spouses that they started from the Navotas residence of the
deceased with a photographer and Isabel Gabriel herself, then they proceeded by car to
Matilde Orobia's house in Philamlife, Quezon City to fetch her and from there, all the three
witnesses (the Gimpayas and Orobia) passed by a place where Isabel Gabriel stayed for
about ten to fifteen minutes at the clinic of Dr. Chikiamco before they proceeded to Atty.
Cipriano Paraiso's office.
It is also evident from the records, as testified to by Atty. Paraiso, that previous to the day
that. the will was executed on April 15, 1961, Isabel Gabriel had requested him to help her in
the execution of her will and that he told her that if she really wanted to execute her will,
she should bring with her at least the Mayor of Navotas, Rizal and a Councilor to be her
witnesses and that he (Atty. Paraiso) wanted a medical certificate from a physician
notwithstanding the fact that he believed her to be of sound and disposition mind. From this
evidence, the appellate court rightly concluded, thus: "It is, therefore, clear that the
presence of Isabel Gabriel and her witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya including the photographer in the law office of Atty. Paraiso was not coincidental as
their gathering was pre-arranged by Isabel Gabriel herself."
As to the appellate court's finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the
names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into
the document Exhibit ' L which the petitioner assails as contradictory and irreconcilable with
the statement of the Court that Atty. Paraiso was handed a list (containing the names of the
witnesses and their respective residence certificates) immediately upon their arrival in the
law office by Isabel Gabriel and this was corroborated by Atty. Paraiso himself who testified
that it was only on said occasion that he received such list from Isabel Gabriel, We cannot

agree with petitioner's contention. We find no contradiction for the, respondent Court held
that on the occasion of the will making on April 15, 1961, the list was given immediately to
Atty. Paraiso and that no such list was given the lawyer in any previous occasion or date
prior to April 15, 1961.
But whether Atty. Paraiso was previously furnished with the names and residence certificates
of the witnesses on a prior occasion or on the very occasion and date in April 15, 1961 when
the will was executed, is of no moment for such data appear in the notarial acknowledgment
of Notary Public Cipriano Paraiso, subscribed and sworn to by the witnesses on April 15,
1961 following the attestation clause duly executed and signed on the same occasion, April
15, 1961. And since Exhibit "F" is a notarial will duly acknowledged by the testatrix and the
witnesses before a notary public, the same is a public document executed and attested
through the intervention of the notary public and as such public document is evidence of the
facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of
regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more
than merely preponderant. (Yturalde vs. Azurin, 28 SCRA 407). We find no such evidence
pointed by petitioner in the case at bar.
Likewise, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in holding that the fact that the three
typewritten lines under the typewritten words "pangalan ' and "tinitirahan" were left blank
shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion
merits Our approval because tills conclusion is supported and borne out by the evidence
found by the appellate court, thus: "On page 5 of Exhibit "F", beneath the typewritten words
"names", "Res. Tax Cert. date issued" and place issued the only name of Isabel Gabriel with
Residence Tax certificate No. A-5113274 issued on February 24, 1961 at Navotas Rizal
appears to be in typewritten form while the names, residence tax certificate numbers, dates
and places of issuance of said certificates pertaining to the three (3) witnesses were
personally handwritten by Atty. Paraiso. Again, this coincides with Atty. Paraiso's even the
sale must be made to close relatives; and the seventh was the appointment of the appellant
Santiago as executrix of the will without bond. The technical description of the properties in
paragraph 5 of Exhibit F was not given and the numbers of the certificates of title were only
supplied by Atty. Paraiso. "
It is true that in one disposition, the numbers of the Torrens titles of the properties disposed
and the docket number of a special proceeding are indicated which Atty. Paraiso candidly
admitted were supplied by him, whereupon petitioner contends that it was incredible that
Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will Exhibit "F" without any note or document to Atty.
Paraiso, considering that Isabel Gabriel was an old and sickly woman more than eighty-one
years old and had been suffering from a brain injury caused by two severe blows at her head
and died of terminal cancer a few weeks after the execution of Exhibit "F". While we can rule
that this is a finding of fact which is within the competency of the respondent appellate court
in determining the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and is, therefore, beyond Our
power to revise and review, We nevertheless hold that the conclusion reached by the Court
of Appeals that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum appears to
be fully supported by the following facts or evidence appearing on record. Thus, Isabel
Gabriel, despite her age, was particularly active in her business affairs as she actively
managed the affairs of the movie business ISABELITA Theater, paying the aparatistas herself
until June 4, 1961, 3 days before her death. She was the widow of the late Eligio Naval,

former Governor of Rizal Province and acted as coadministratrix in the Intestate Estate of
her deceased husband Eligio Naval. The text of the win was in Tagalog, a dialect known and
understood by her and in the light of all the circumstances, We agree with the respondent
Court that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum, a fact
unanimously testified to by the three attesting witnesses and the notary public himself.
Petitioner's sixth assignment of error is also bereft of merit. The evidence, both testimonial
and documentary is, according to the respondent court, overwhelming that Matilde Orobia
was physically present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by the testatrix and the
other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. Such factual finding of the
appellate court is very clear, thus: "On the contrary, the record is replete with proof that
Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed by Isabel Gabriel on April
'15, 1961 along with her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. The trial court's
conclusion that Orobia's admission that she gave piano lessons to the child of the appellant
on Wednesdays and Saturdays and that April 15, 1961 happened to be a Saturday for which
reason Orobia could not have been present to witness the will on that day is purely
conjectural. Witness Orobia did not admit having given piano lessons to the appellant's child
every Wednesday and Saturday without fail. It is highly probable that even if April 15, 1961
were a Saturday, she gave no piano lessons on that day for which reason she could have
witnessed the execution of the will. Orobia spoke of occasions when she missed giving piano
lessons and had to make up for the same. Anyway, her presence at the law office of Atty.
Paraiso was in the morning of April 15, 1961 and there was nothing to preclude her from
giving piano lessons on the afternoon of the same day in Navotas, Rizal."
In addition to the testimony of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya that
Matilde was present on April 15, 1961 and that she signed the attestation clause to the will
and on the left-hand margin of each of the pages of the will, the documentary evidence
which is the will itself, the attestation clause and the notarial acknowledgment
overwhelmingly and convincingly prove such fact that Matilde Orobia was present on that
day of April 15, 1961 and that she witnessed the will by signing her name thereon and
acknowledged the same before the notary public, Atty. Cipriano P. Paraiso. The attestation
clause which Matilde Orobia signed is the best evidence as to the date of signing because it
preserves in permanent form a recital of all the material facts attending the execution of the
will. This is the very purpose of the attestation clause which is made for the purpose of
preserving in permanent form a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so
that in case of failure in the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty they
may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2nd ed., Sec. 132; Leynez vs. Leynez, 68 Phil. 745).
As to the seventh error assigned by petitioner faulting the Court of Appeals in holding that
the trial court gave undue importance to the picture-takings as proof that the win was
improperly executed, We agree with the reasoning of the respondent court that: "Matilde
Orobia's Identification of the photographer as "Cesar Mendoza", contrary to what the other
two witnesses (Celso and Maria Gimpaya) and Atty. Paraiso said that the photographer was
Benjamin Cifra, Jr., is at worst a minor mistake attributable to lapse of time. The law does not
require a photographer for the execution and attestation of the will. The fact that Miss
Orobia mistakenly Identified the photographer as Cesar Mendoza scarcely detracts from her
testimony that she was present when the will was signed because what matters here is not
the photographer but the photograph taken which clearly portrays Matilde Orobia herself,

her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya. " Further, the respondent Court correctly held: "The trial
court gave undue importance to the picture takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion
that the will was improperly executed. The evidence however, heavily points to only one
occasion of the execution of the will on April 15, 1961 which was witnessed by Matilde
Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. These witnesses were quite emphatic and
positive when they spoke of this occasion. Hence, their Identification of some photographs
wherein they all appeared along with Isabel Gabriel and Atty. Paraiso was superfluous."
Continuing, the respondent Court declared: "It is true that the second picture-taking was
disclosed at the cross examination of Celso Gimpaya. But this was explained by Atty. Paraiso
as a reenactment of the first incident upon the insistence of Isabel Gabriel. Such
reenactment where Matilde Orobia was admittedly no longer present was wholly
unnecessary if not pointless. What was important was that the will was duly executed and
witnessed on the first occasion on April 15, 1961 , " and We agree with the Court's
rationalization in conformity with logic, law and jurisprudence which do not require picturetaking as one of the legal requisites for the execution or probate of a will.
Petitioner points to alleged grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of
witnesses in their respective testimonies before the trial court. On the other hand, the
respondent Court of Appeals held that said contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations
had been explained away. Such discrepancies as in the description of the typewriter used by
Atty. Paraiso which he described as "elite" which to him meant big letters which are of the
type in which the will was typewritten but which was Identified by witness Jolly Bugarin of
the N.B.I. as pica the mistake in mentioning the name of the photographer by Matilde Orobia
to be Cesar Mendoza when actually it was Benjamin Cifra, Jr. these are indeed unimportant
details which could have been affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human
memory such that by themselves would not alter the probative value of their testimonies on
the true execution of the will, (Pascual vs. dela Cruz, 28 SCRA 421, 424) for it cannot be
expected that the testimony of every person win be Identical and coinciding with each other
with regard to details of an incident and that witnesses are not expected to remember all
details. Human experience teach us "that contradictions of witnesses generally occur in the
details of certain incidents, after a long series of questionings, and far from being an
evidence of falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith. In as much as not all those
who witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is but natural that in relating their
impressions, they should not agree in the minor details; hence the contradictions in their
testimony." (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429).
It is urged of Us by the petitioner that the findings of the trial court should not have been
disturbed by the respondent appellate court because the trial court was in a better position
to weigh and evaluate the evidence presented in the course of the trial. As a general rule,
petitioner is correct but it is subject to well-established exceptions. The right of the Court of
Appeals to review, alter and reverse the findings of the trial court where the appellate court,
in reviewing the evidence has found that facts and circumstances of weight and influence
have been ignored and overlooked and the significance of which have been misinterpreted
by the trial court, cannot be disputed. Findings of facts made by trial courts particularly
when they are based on conflicting evidence whose evaluation hinges on questions of
credibility of contending witnesses hes peculiarly within the province of trial courts and
generally, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. In the instant case,

however, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court had overlooked and misinterpreted
the facts and circumstances established in the record. Whereas the appellate court said that
"Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will
without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso;" that the trial court's conclusion that Matilde
Orobia could not have witnessed anybody signing the alleged will or that she could not have
witnessed Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sign the same or that she witnessed only the
deceased signing it, is a conclusion based not on facts but on inferences; that the trial court
gave undue importance to the picture-takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the
will was improperly executed and that there is nothing in the entire record to support the
conclusion of the court a quo that the will signing occasion was a mere coincidence and that
Isabel Gabriel made an appointment only with Matilde Orobia to witness the signing of her
will, then it becomes the duty of the appellate court to reverse findings of fact of the trial
court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the lower courts.
Still the petitioner insists that the case at bar is an exception to the rule that the judgment
of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme
Court. Again We agree with the petitioner that among the exceptions are: (1) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when
the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse
of discretion; (4) when the presence of each other as required by law. " Specifically, We
affirm that on April 15, 1961 the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, together with Matilde Orobia, Celso
Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya, and a photographer proceeded in a car to the office of
Atty. Cipriano Paraiso at the Bank of P.I. Building, Manila in the morning of that day; that on
the way, Isabel Gabriel obtained a medical certificate from one Dr. Chikiamko which she
gave to Atty. Paraiso upon arriving at the latter's office and told the lawyer that she wanted
her will to be made; that Atty. Paraiso asked Isabel Gabriel to dictate what she wanted to be
written in the will and the attorney wrote down the dictation of Isabel Gabriel in Tagalog, a
language known to and spoken by her; that Atty. Paraiso read back to her what he wrote as
dictated and she affirmed their correctness; the lawyer then typed the will and after finishing
the document, he read it to her and she told him that it was alright; that thereafter, Isabel
Gabriel signed her name at the end of the will in the presence of the three witnesses Matilde
Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya and also at the left-hand margin of each and
every page of the document in the presence also of the said three witnesses; that thereafter
Matilde Orobia attested the will by signing her name at the end of the attestation clause and
at the left-hand margin of pages 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the document in the presence of Isabel
Gabriel and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya; then, Celso
Gimpaya signed also the will at the bottom of the attestation clause and at the left-hand
margin of the other pages of the document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia
and Maria Gimpaya; that Maria Gimpaya followed suit, signing her name at the foot of the
attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of every page in the presence of Isabel
Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Celso Gimpaya; that thereafter, Atty. Paraiso notarized the will as
Page No. 94, Book No. IV, Series of 1961, in his Notarial Register. On the occasion of the
execution and attestation of the will, a photographer took pictures, one Exhibit "G",
depicting Matilde Orobia, the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya, Maria Gimpaya and
Atty. Paraiso, taken on said occasion of the signing of the will, and another, Exhibit "H",
showing Matilde Orobia signing testimony that he had earlier advised Isabel Gabriel to bring
with her at least the Mayor and a Councilor of Navotas, Rizal to be her witnesses for he did
not know beforehand the Identities of the three attesting witnesses until the latter showed

up at his law office with Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961. Atty. Paraiso's claim which was not
controverted that he wrote down in his own hand the date appearing on page 5 of Exhibit
"F" dissipates any lingering doubt that he prepared and ratified the will on the date in
question."
It is also a factual finding of the Court of Appeals in holding that it was credible that Isabel
Gabriel could have dictated the will, Exhibit "F", without any note or document to Atty.
Paraiso as against the contention of petitioner that it was incredible. This ruling of the
respondent court is fully supported by the evidence on record as stated in the decision
under review, thus: "Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel
Gabriel dictated her will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso. On the contrary, all
the three attesting witnesses uniformly testified that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will to Atty.
Paraiso and that other than the piece of paper that she handed to said lawyer she had no
note or document. This fact jibes with the evidence which the trial court itself believed
was unshaken that Isabel Gabriel was of sound disposing memory when she executed her
will.
Exhibit "F" reveals only seven (7) dispositions which are not complicated but quite simple.
The first was Isabel Gabriel's wish to be interred according to Catholic rites the second was a
general directive to pay her debts if any; the third provided for P1,000.00 for her sister
Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago and P2,000.00 for her brother Santiago Gabriel; the fourth
was a listing of her 13 nephews and nieces including oppositor-appellee Rizalina Gabriel and
the amount for each legatee the fifth was the institution of the petitioner-appellant, Lutgarda
Santiago as the principal heir mentioning in general terms seven (7) types of properties; the
sixth disposed of the remainder of her estate which she willed in favor of appellant Lutgarda
Santiago but prohibiting the sale of such properties to anyone except in extreme situations
in which judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting, (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. (Roque
vs. Buan, et al., G.R. No. L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., G.R. No.
L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967; Hilarion Jr. vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570; Sept. 14, 1967).
Petitioner's insistence is without merit. We hold that the case at bar does not fall within any
of the exceptions enumerated above. We likewise hold that the findings of fact of the
respondent appellate court are fully supported by the evidence on record. The conclusions
are fully sustained by substantial evidence. We find no abuse of discretion and We discern
no misapprehension of facts. The respondent Court's findings of fact are not conflicting.
Hence, the well-established rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its findings of
fact are binding and conclusive and should not be disturbed by this Tribunal and it must be
applied in the case at bar in its full force and effect, without qualification or reservation. The
above holding simply synthesize the resolutions we have heretofore made in respect ' to
petitioner's previous assignments of error and to which We have disagreed and, therefore,
rejected.
The last assignments of error of petitioner must necessarily be rejected by Us as We find the
respondent Court acted properly and correctly and has not departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision by
the Supreme Court, and as We find that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the

decision of the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the last will and testament of
the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
We rule that the respondent Court's factual findings upon its summation and evaluation of
the evidence on record is unassailable that: "From the welter of evidence presented, we are
convinced that the will in question was executed on April 15, 1961 in the presence of Matilde
Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya signing and witnessing the same in the the will
on a table with Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sitting around the table.
Atty. Paraiso, after finishing the notarial act, then delivered the original to Isabel Gabriel and
retained the other copies for his file and notarial register. A few days following the signing of
the will, Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and another photographer arrived at the office of
Atty. Paraiso and told the lawyer that she wanted another picture taken because the first
picture did not turn out good. The lawyer told her that this cannot be done because the will
was already signed but Isabel Gabriel insisted that a picture be taken, so a simulated signing
was performed during which incident Matilde Orobia was not present.
Petitioner's exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of the testimonies of the
witnesses for the proponent of the will, their alleged evasions, inconsistencies and
contradictions. But in the case at bar, the three instrumental witnesses who constitute the
best evidence of the will making have testified in favor of the probate of the will. So has the
lawyer who prepared it, one learned in the law and long in the practice thereof, who
thereafter notarized it. All of them are disinterested witnesses who stand to receive no
benefit from the testament. The signatures of the witnesses and the testatrix have been
identified on the will and there is no claim whatsoever and by anyone, much less the
petitioner, that they were not genuine. In the last and final analysis, the herein conflict is
factual and we go back to the rule that the Supreme Court cannot review and revise the
findings of facts of the respondent Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Makasiar, De Castro and Herrera, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26317

January 29, 1927

Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased.

FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CORNELIO MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA,
FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees.
Nicanor Tavora for appellant.
Jose Rivera for appellees.
JOHNSON, J.:
The purpose of this action was to obtain the probation of a last will and testament of Miguel
Mamuyac, who died on the 2d day of January, 1922, in the municipality of Agoo of the
Province of La Union. It appears from the record that on or about the 27th day of July, 1918,
the said Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament (Exhibit A). In the month of
January, 1922, the said Francisco Gago presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of
the Province of La Union for the probation of that will. The probation of the same was
opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac
(civil cause No. 1144, Province of La Union). After hearing all of the parties the petition for
the probation of said will was denied by the Honorable C. M. Villareal on the 2d day of
November, 1923, upon the ground that the deceased had on the 16th day of April, 1919,
executed a new will and testament.
On the 21st day of February, 1925, the present action was commenced. Its purpose was to
secure the probation of the said will of the 16th day of April, 1919 (Exhibit 1). To said petition
Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac presented
their oppositions, alleging (a) that the said will is a copy of the second will and testament
executed by the said Miguel Mamuyac; (b) that the same had been cancelled and revoked
during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac and (c) that the said will was not the last will and
testament of the deceased Miguel Mamuyac.
Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable Anastacio R. Teodoro, judge, after hearing the
respective parties, denied the probation of said will of April 16, 1919, upon the ground that
the same had been cancelled and revoked in the year 1920. Judge Teodoro, after examining
the evidence adduced, found that the following facts had been satisfactorily proved:
That Exhibit A is a mere carbon of its original which remained in the possession of the
deceased testator Miguel Mamuyac, who revoked it before his death as per testimony
of witness Jose Fenoy, who typed the will of the testator on April 16, 1919, and Carlos
Bejar, who saw on December 30, 1920, the original Exhibit A (will of 1919) actually

cancelled by the testator Miguel Mamuyac, who assured Carlos Bejar that inasmuch
as he had sold him a house and the land where the house was built, he had to cancel
it (the will of 1919), executing thereby a new testament. Narcisa Gago in a way
corroborates the testimony of Jose Fenoy, admitting that the will executed by the
deceased (Miguel Mamuyac) in 1919 was found in the possession of father Miguel
Mamuyac. The opponents have successfully established the fact that father Miguel
Mamuyac had executed in 1920 another will. The same Narcisa Gago, the sister of
the deceased, who was living in the house with him, when cross-examined by
attorney for the opponents, testified that the original Exhibit A could not be found.
For the foregoing consideration and for the reason that the original of Exhibit A has
been cancelled by the deceased father Miguel Mamuyac, the court disallows the
probate of Exhibit A for the applicant." From that order the petitioner appealed.
The appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in not finding from the
evidence that the will in question had been executed with all the formalities required by the
law; that the same had been revoked and cancelled in 1920 before his death; that the said
will was a mere carbon copy and that the oppositors were not estopped from alleging that
fact.
With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof, not
denied, which was accepted by the lower court, that will in question had been cancelled in
1920. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be
preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of
wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain
unproved of be inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot
be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the
testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence,
that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown
that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will
not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the
knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or
revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the
circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not
destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.
In view of the fat that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the
testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same had been
cancelled, we are forced to the conclusion that the conclusions of the lower court are in
accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of
proofs is upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its existence.
Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant to show that
it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed for the
purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all
evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be admitted by
the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will
was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with all the formalities and
requirements of the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to

appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator.
(Borromeo vs. Casquijo, G.R. No. L-26063.)1
After a careful examination of the entire record, we are fully persuaded that the will
presented for probate had been cancelled by the testator in 1920. Therefore the judgment
appealed from is hereby affirmed. And without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 169144

January 26, 2011

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA

PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR,
MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a
foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution.
The Facts and the Case
On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized
United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she
executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the
executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of
Rupertas will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. 1 On October
15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio
Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that
Rupertas will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed
it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Rupertas will could be probated in the
Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the
testators full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also
not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on
separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with
the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC
directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Rupertas
U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippines.
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:2 (a) admitting to probate Rupertas last will; (b)
appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-

based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to
Ernesto.
Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA),3arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in
the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision, 4 affirming the assailed order of the
RTC,5 holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent
Ernestos submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order
and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution,
before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from
reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is
governed by different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and
Benjamin came to this Court.
The Issue Presented
The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad
may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed
in the country where it was executed.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad must
first be probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be probated here.
This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of the country of its
execution. They insist that local courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent
proves that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the
will has been admitted to probate there under its laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction
over the proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of
compliance with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.
But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the
same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A
foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states
that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.6
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the
decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an
estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76
further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person
interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court
having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or
is lost or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as
known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of
the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and
character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are
prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having
custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at
the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. 7 The rules do not require
proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its
execution.
In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of
California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the
reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already
probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is
presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by
Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies
only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the
local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its
jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically.1wphi1 If the instituted heirs do not
have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them
outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court. 8
Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial ruling that
the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Rupertas will and that, in the
meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special administrator of the estate. The parties
have yet to present evidence of the due execution of the will, i.e. the testators state of mind
at the time of the execution and compliance with the formalities required of wills by the laws
of California. This explains the trial courts directive for Ernesto to submit the duly
authenticated copy of Rupertas will and the certified copies of the Laws of Succession and
Probate of Will of California.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals decision in
CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4963

January 29, 1953

MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR
NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants.
Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.
Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land
situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against
Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and
Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the
lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria
Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law
wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their
possession and enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson
and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they
agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria
Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to
inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered
decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of
the lands in dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the
present appeal.
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda,
former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no
dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law
wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now codefendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the
effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino
Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the

moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As
this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the
same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment,
therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in
question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband
may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on
February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance
cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition;
Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate
children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any
successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950,
they are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional
rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and
because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they
shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have
occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights
which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event
which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only
when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus,
said article provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall
be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been
done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not
prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin." As already stated in the
early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question
became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the
imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right
recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot,
therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in
dispute.
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a
gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children
for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and
Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be
said; apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said
assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property, inasmuch as it
involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a
public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one
(Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it
results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 189776

December 15, 2010

AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P.

ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings, namely:
petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters 1 Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes)
and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. 2
In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of
Administration," docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034, filed by respondents on
April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, respondents alleged, inter alia,
that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by
Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation
respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance legitime" of petitioner.
Respondents nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as Administrator of the
estate by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC.3
Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati, which respondents
assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it "may be considered as an advance
legitime" to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate court, held that it was precluded
from determining the validity of the donation.
Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated property only for
the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedents estate,4 the probate
court found the Deed of Donation valid in light of the presumption of validity of notarized
documents. It thus went on to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the
New Civil Code which reads:5
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass
of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during
the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may
be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.

The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate estate. Thus it
disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that:
1. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati as part
of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;
2. The property covered by TCT No. 181889 to be subject to collation;
3. 1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at the mezzanine and the 3rd
floor of Unit 1110 Tanay St., Makati City form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;
4. The following properties form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual:
a. 1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110 Tanay St., Rizal Village Makati TCT
No. 348341 and 1/3 share in the rental income thereon;
b. 1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of 271 square meters located at
Tanay St., Rizal Village, Makati City, TCT No. 119063;
c. Agricultural land with an area of 3.8 hectares located at Puerta Galera
Mindoro covered by OCT No. P-2159;
d. Shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation covered by the following
Certificate Numbers: A0011036, A006144, A082906, A006087, A065796,
A11979, A049521, C86950, C63096, C55316, C54824, C120328, A011026,
C12865, A10439, A021401, A007218, A0371, S29239, S40128, S58308,
S69309;
e. Shares of stocks in Paper Industries Corp. covered by the following
Certificate Numbers: S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309, A006708, 07680,
A020786, S18539, S14649;
f. share in Eduardo Pascuals shares in Baguio Gold Mining Co.;
g. Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No. 2 014 12292 4 in the name of
Nona Arellano;
i. Property previously covered by TCT No. 119053 now covered by TCT No.
181889, Register of Deeds of Makati City;
j. Rental receivables from Raul Arellano per Order issued by Branch 64 of the
Court on November 17, 1995.
5. AND the properties are partitioned as follows:

a. To heir Amelia P. Arellano-the property covered by TCT No. 181889;

b. To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual-the real properties
covered by TCT Nos. 348341 and 119063 of the Register of Deeds of Makati
City and the property covered by OCT No. 2159, to be divided equally
between them up to the extent that each of their share have been equalized
with the actual value of the property in 5(a) at the time of donation, the value
of which shall be determined by an independent appraiser to be designated
by Amelia P. Arellano, Miguel N. Pascual and Francisco N. Pascual. If the real
properties are not sufficient to equalize the shares, then Franciscos and
Miguels shares may be satisfied from either in cash property or shares of
stocks, at the rate of quotation. The remaining properties shall be divided
equally among Francisco, Miguel and Amelia. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding that
I
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF THE
ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR.
II
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE
1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF DECEASED ANGEL N. PASCUAL
JR. AS HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
xxxx
and
V
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. EQUALLY AMONG HIS LEGAL
OR INTESTATE HEIRS.6 (underscoring supplied)
By Decision7 of July 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals found petitioners appeal "partly
meritorious." It sustained the probate courts ruling that the property donated to petitioner is
subject to collation in this wise:
Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule on equality of division,
We hold that theproperty subject of donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to

collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor of the decedent and we believe that under
the circumstances, the value of such immovable though not strictly in the concept of
advance legitime, should be deducted from her share in the net hereditary estate. The trial
court therefore committed no reversible error when it included the said property as forming
part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual.8 (citation omitted; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)1avvph!1
The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the probate court, herein
petitioner "was able to submit prima facie evidence of shares of stocks owned by the
[decedent] which have not been included in the inventory submitted by the administrator."
Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated January 29, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135 in
Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the order
of inclusion of properties of the Intestate Estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as well as
the partition and distribution of the same to the co-heirs are concerned.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings in accordance with
the disquisitions herein.9 (underscoring supplied)
Petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration10 having been denied by the appellate court by
Resolution11 of October 7, 2009, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed,
ascribing as errors of the appellate court its ruling
I
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. TO PETITIONER AMELIA
PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS ESTATE AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH.
II
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO COLLATION UNDER
ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR DECEASED BROTHER ANGEL N.
PASCUAL JR. AND ARE ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
IV
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. EQUALLY AMONG
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS, AS HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS. 12 (underscoring
supplied)

Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to petitioner is subject to
collation; and whether the property of the estate should have been ordered equally
distributed among the parties.
On the first issue:
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical operation by
the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary
estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by
lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime.13
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is
possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious
donations may be reduced.14
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to
determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no
legitime to be safeguarded.15
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring
compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and,
therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of the testators property which he
cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs. 16
The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3) concurring.
The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and exclude other
compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The
secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs;
the legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring
compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary
compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring
compulsory heirs.17
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at
liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives
to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, 18 is deemed as donation
made to a "stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the estate. 19 There being no
compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.
On the second issue:
The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirssiblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of
the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles. (underscoring supplied)

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they
shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision ordering the
collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate of the
deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is set aside.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch 135 of the Makati
Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the case for the
purpose of determining what finally forms part of the estate, and thereafter to divide
whatever remains of it equally among the parties.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12957

March 24, 1961

CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees.
DIZON, J.:
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and void the
sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel Esparcia
and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to reconvey to appellants Lot 3368 of
the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental Negros; and (3) ordering all the
appellees to pay, jointly and severally, to appellants the sum of P500.00 as damages, plus
the costs of suit. In their answer appellees disclaimed any knowledge or information
regarding the sale allegedly made on April 20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants
and alleged that, if such sale was made, the same was void on the ground that Andrea
Gutang had no right to dispose of the property subject matter thereof. They further alleged
that said property had never been in possession of appellants, the truth being that
appellees, as owners, had been in continuous possession thereof since the death of
Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and counterclaim, they further alleged that
on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso, as the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso,
executed a public instrument of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
Sienes, the said sale having been registered together with an affidavit of adjudication
executed by Paulina and Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid
deceased; that since then the Esparcias had been in possession of the property as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (1) that the
sale of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff spouses Constancio
Sienes and Genoveva Silay is void, and the reconveyance prayed for by them is
denied; (2) that the sale made by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of defendants
Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes involving the same lot is also void, and they have
no valid title thereto; and (3) that the reservable property in question is part of and
must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and heir
of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea Gutang as of December 13, 1951. No
pronouncement as to the costs.

From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal, their principal
contentions being, firstly, that the lower court erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral
Survey of Ayuquitan was a reservable property; secondly, in annulling the sale of said lot
executed by Andrea Gutang in their favor; and lastly, in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as
reservee, was entitled to inherit said land.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had
four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife,
Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral records of
Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon his death the date of which does not
clearly appear of record were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367
to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368
(western portion) to Francisco. As a result of the cadastral proceedings, Original Certificate
of Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco. Because Francisco
was a minor at the time, his mother administered the property for him, declared it in her
name for taxation purposes (Exhs A & A-1), and paid the taxes due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1
& C-2). When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any
descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument Exhibit F entitled
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other things, for and in
consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in question to appellants. When
thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the
surrender of Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 which was in their possession the
latter refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the cadastral
record No. 507. The same, however, was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving
half-sisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared the property in their name, on
January 1, 1951 executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in turn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and thereafter
secured the issuance in their name of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141 (Exhs. 5 & 5-A).
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question
was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father
Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, it was inherited,
in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve
it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said
property came, if any survived her. The record discloses in this connection that Andrea
Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso
who died only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two
resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the
survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which the property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court has
held in connection with this matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the
reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of

the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said
alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the
rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios
at the time of the death of the reservista (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega,
46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil.
279).
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the
condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation,
only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable
property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the
conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of
appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof
passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana
Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar
resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third
degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a real
right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition
being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the
reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of
the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus
the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death.
While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to this event, became
effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not now in a position
to reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property in
question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees the Esparcia spouses did
not appeal therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision as above modified is affirmed, with costs, and
without prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the
Estate of Cipriana Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.
Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera
and Paredes, JJ.,concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23638

October 12, 1967

DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners,

vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
---------------------------------------G.R. No. L-23662

October 12, 1967

MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES and PACIENCIA REYES, petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
Jose D. Villena for petitioners.
Antonio Barredo and Exequiel M. Zaballero for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
The heirs intestate of the late Benedicta de los Reyes have petitioned for a review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals (in CA-G. R. No. 31221-R) affirming that of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, in Special Proceeding No. 831 of said Court, admitting to probate the
alleged last will and testament of the deceased, and overruling the opposition to the
probate.
It appears from the record that on January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent,
submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the purported will of the
late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The
will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was
set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one
month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be
heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds advanced for
the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the
proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the
estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which
conveyances were finally set aside by this Supreme Court in a decision promulgated on
August 3, 1954, in cases G.R. Nos. L-5618 and L-5620 (unpublished).
After trial on the formulated issues, the Court of First Instance, by decision of June 20, 1958,
found that the will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred resolution on the
questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic

validity of the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the properties is
opportunely presented."
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting
that the issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved; whereupon, on July
27, 1959, the Court overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the
probate of the will, but "reserving unto the parties the right to raise the issue of implied
revocation at the opportune time."
On January 11, 1960, the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for
the sole purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate, and this was done on February 9,
1960.
On February 27, 1962, after receiving further evidence on the issue whether the execution
by the testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger portion of her estate in favor of the
testamentary heir, made in 1943 and 1944, subsequent to the execution of her 1930
testament, had revoked the latter under Article 957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code (Art. 869 of the
Civil Code of 1889), the trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held the will of the
late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale." Whereupon,
the oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the will to probate, had
become final for lack of opportune appeal; that the same was appealable independently of
the issue of implied revocation; that contrary to the claim of oppositors-appellants, there
had been no legal revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because
the latter had been made in favor of the legatee herself, and affirmed the decision of the
Court of First Instance.
Oppositors then appealed to this Court.
In this instance, both sets of oppositors-appellants pose three main issues: (a) whether or
not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate had become final for
lack of appeal; (b) whether or not the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959,
overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become final; and (c)
whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her
execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3,
1944.
As to the first point, oppositors-appellants contend that the order allowing the will to probate
should be considered interlocutory, because it fails to resolve the issues of estoppel and
revocation propounded in their opposition. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
appellant's stand is untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively
settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and
witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and
enforceable or otherwise. (Montaano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676; Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil.
215; Trillana vs. Crisostomo, 89 Phil. 710). As such, the probate order is final and appealable;
and it is so recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically

prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or
judgment . . . where such order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."
Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's resolution on the other
grounds of their opposition before taking an appeal, as otherwise there would be a
multiplicity of recourses to the higher Courts. This contention is without weight, since Rule
109, section 1, expressly enumerates six different instances when appeal may be taken in
special proceedings.
There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed on
time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer
revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal
belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly dismissed.
The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the
testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the
testament was duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is
denied, all questions of revocation become superfluous in law, there is no such will and
hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the
oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the
testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or
devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but
merely the particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absoluterevocation can preclude
probate of the revoked testament (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, supra.).
As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249, that
the presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily
designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a
consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits.
Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the Court,
and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be
a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not
the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is
patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.
The last issue, that of revocation, is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article 957 of the Civil
Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code of 1889), which recites:
Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:
(1) . . . .
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any
part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be
without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the
thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the
contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition
shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase;

xxx

xxx

xxx

It is well to note that, unlike in the French and Italian Codes, the basis of the quoted
provision is a presumed change of intention on the part of the testator. As pointed out by
Manresa in his Commentaries on Article 869 of the Civil Code (Vol. 6, 7th Ed., p. 743)
Este caso se funda en la presunta voluntad del testador. Si este, despues de legar, se
desprende de la cosa por titulo lucrativo u oneroso, hace desaparecer su derecho
sobra ella, dando lugar a la presuncion de que ha cambiado de voluntad, y no quiere
que el legado se cumpla. Mas para que pueda presumirse esa voluntad, es necesario
que medien actos del testador que la indiquen. Si la perdida del derecho sobre la
cosa ha sido independiente de la voluntad del testador, el legado podraquedar sin
efecto, mas no en virtud del numero 2 del articulo 869, que exige siempre actos
voluntarios de enajenacion por parte del mismo testador.
As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or departure from
the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by
the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor
of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its
decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that point by this Supreme Court in Reyes
vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620, promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no
consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers,
thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee,
the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her
testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom.1Revocation being an exception,
we believe, with the Courts below, that in the circumstances of the particular case, Article
957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.
Not only that, but even if it were applicable, the annulment of the conveyances would not
necessarily result in the revocation of the legacies, if we bear in mind that the findings made
in the decision decreeing the annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale
were also that
it was the moral influence, originating from their confidential relationship, which was
the only cause for the execution of Exhs. A and B (the 1943 and 1944 conveyances).
(Decision, L-5618 and L-5620).
If the annulment was due to undue influence, as the quoted passage implies, then the
transferor was not expressing her own free will and intent in making the conveyances.
Hence, it can not be concluded, either, that such conveyances established a decision on her
part to abandon the original legacy.
True it is that the legal provision quoted prescribes that the recovery of the alienated
property "even if it be by reason of the nullity of the contract" does not revive the legacy;
but as pointed out by Scaevola (Codigo Civil, Vol. XV, 4th Ed., pp. 324-325) the "nullity of the
contract" can not be taken in an absolute sense.2 Certainly, it could not be maintained, for
example, that if a testator's subsequent alienation were avoided because the testator was
mentally deranged at the time, the revocatory effect ordained by the article should still

ensue. And the same thing could be said if the alienation (posterior to the will) were avoided
on account of physical or mental duress. Yet, an alienation through undue influence in no
way differs from one made through violence or intimidation. In either case, the transferor is
not expressing his real intent,3 and it can not be held that there was in fact an alienation that
could produce a revocation of the anterior bequest.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby affirmed. Costs against appellants Reyes and Fernandez. So ordered.
Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Bengzon, J.P., J., are on leave, took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19996

April 30, 1965

WENCESLA CACHO, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
JOHN G. UDAN, and RUSTICO G. UDAN, oppositors-appellants.
Gregorio Dolojan for petitioner-appellee.
Benjamin A. G. Vega and Abad Santos and Pablo for oppositors-appellants.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on questions of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zambales
(Hon. Lucas Lacson presiding), issued on 20 February 1962, in its Special Proceeding No.
2230, wherein the court disallowed the opposition of John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan to
the probate of the alleged will of their sister Silvina Udan.
From the records it can be gleaned that on 13 December 1959 one Silvina G. Udan, single,
and a resident of San Marcelino, Zambales, died leaving a purported will naming her son,
Francisco G. Udan, and one Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs, share and share alike.
Wencesla Cacho, filed a petition to probate said Will in the Court of First Instance of
Zambales on 14 January 1960 (RA. pp. 1-16). On 15 February 1960 Rustico G. Udan,
legitimate brother of the testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate (RA. pp. 16-18). On 16
February 1960 Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., filed his Appearance and Urgent Motion for
Postponement for and in behalf of his client Francisco G. Udan, the appointed heir in the Will
(RA. pp. 18-22). On 9 June 1960 Francisco G. Udan, through counsel, filed his opposition to
the probate of this will (RA. pp. 33-35). On 15 September 1960 oppositor Rustico G. Udan,
through counsel, verbally moved to withdraw his opposition, dated 13 February 1960, due to
the appearance of Francisco G. Udan, the named heir in the will and said opposition was
ordered withdrawn (RA. pp. 55-56). After one witness, the Notary Public who made and
notarize the will, had testified in court, oppositor Francisco G. Udan died on June 1961 in San
Marcelino, Zambales, Philippines (RA. pp. 63-66).
After the death of Francisco G. Udan, John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan, both legitimate
brothers of the testatrix Silvina G. Udan, filed their respective oppositions on the ground that
the will was not attested and executed as required by law, that the testatrix was
incapacitated to execute it; and that it was procured by fraud or undue influence (RA. pp. 6366; 67-71). On 20 January 1962 proponent-appellee, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Dismiss Oppositions filed by the Oppositors (RA. pp. 73-80), and on 20 February 1962 the
Honorable Court of First Instance of Zambales issued an Order disallowing these two
oppositions for lack of interest in the estate and directing the Fiscal to study the advisability
of filing escheat proceedings (RA. pp. 97-99). On 26 and 30 March 1962 both oppositors filed
their Motions for Reconsideration, through their respective counsels, and these motions were

both denied by the lower court on 25 April 1962 (RA. pp. 99-122; pp. 131-132). On 7 May
1962 oppositors filed their joint Notice of Appeal (RA. pp. 132-135).
The first issue tendered by appellants is whether the oppositor brothers, John and Rustico
Udan, may claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, the late Silvina Udan. We find
that the court below correctly held that they were not, for at the time of her death Silvina's
illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, was her heir intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers. This
is clear from Articles 988 and 1003 of the governing Civil Code of the Philippines, in force at
the time of the death of the testatrix:
ART. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate
children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.
These legal provisions decree that collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only
in the absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and
sisters can concur with the widow or widower under Article 1101, they do, not concur, but
are excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate (Art. 1003).
That Francisco Udan was the illegitimate son of the late Silvina is not denied by the
oppositor; and he is so acknowledged to be in the testament, where said Francisco is termed
"son" by the testatrix. As the latter was admittedly single, the son must be necessarily
illegitimate (presumptively natural under Article 277).
The trial court, therefore, committed no error in holding that John and Rustico Udan had no
standing to oppose the probate of the will. For if the will is ultimately probated John and
Rustico are excluded by its terms from participation in the estate; and if probate be denied,
both oppositors-appellants will be excluded by the illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, as sole
intestate heir, by operation of law.
The death of Francisco two years after his mother's demise does not improve the situation of
appellants. The rights acquired by the former are only transmitted by his death to his own
heirs at law not to the appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his mother, for the reason
that, as correctly decided by the court below, the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot
succeed her illegitimate child. This is clear from Article 992 of the Civil Code.
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
For the oppositors-appellants it is argued that while Francisco Udan did survive his mother,
and acquired the rights to the succession from the moment of her death (Art. 777, Civ.
Code), still he did not acquire the inheritance until he accepted it. This argument fails to take
into account that the Code presumes acceptance of an inheritance if the latter is not
repudiated in due time (Civ. Code, Art. 1057, par. 2), and that repudiation, to be valid, must

appear in a public or authentic instrument, or petition to the court. There is no document or

pleading in the records showing repudiation of the inheritance by Francisco Udan. The
latter's own opposition (RA. p. 61) to the probate of the alleged will is perfectly compatible
with the intention to exclude the proponent Cacho as testamentary coheir, and to claim the
entire inheritance as heir ab intestato.
Finally, it is urged that as probate is only concerned with the due execution of a testament,
any ruling on the successional rights of oppositors-appellants is at present premature.
Inquiry into the hereditary rights of the appellants is not premature, if the purpose is to
determine whether their opposition should be excluded in order to simplify and accelerate
the proceedings. If, as already shown, appellants cannot gain any hereditary interest in the
estate whether the will is probated or not, their intervention would merely result in
unnecessary complication.
It may not be amiss to note, however, that the hearing on the probate must still proceed to
ascertain the rights of the proponent Cacho as testamentary heir.
It is urged for the applicant that no opposition has been registered against his petition on the
issues above-discussed. Absence of opposition, however, does not preclude the scanning of
the whole record by the appellate court, with a view to preventing the conferment of
citizenship to persons not fully qualified therefor (Lee Ng Len vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20151,
March 31, 1965). The applicant's complaint of unfairness could have some weight if the
objections on appeal had been on points not previously passed upon. But the deficiencies
here in question are not new but well-known, having been ruled upon repeatedly by this
Court, and we see no excuse for failing to take them into account.1wph1.t
WHEREFORE, the order under appeal is affirmed, without prejudice to further proceedings in
the case, conformably to this opinion. Costs against appellants John G. Udan and Rustico G.
Udan.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-36083 September 5, 1975

Spouses RAMON DOROMAL, SR., and ROSARIO SALAS, and Spouses RAMON
DOROMAL, JR., and GAUDELIA VEGA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENA JAVELLANA, respondents.
Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Parlade and Associates and Marvin J. Mirasol for petitioners. Arturo
H. Villanueva, Jr. for private respondent.

BARREDO, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
47945-R entitled Filomena Javellana vs. Spouses Ramon Doromal, Sr., et al. which reversed
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo that had in turn dismissed herein private
respondent Filomena Javellana's action for redemption of a certain property sold by her coowners to herein petitioners for having been made out of time.
The factual background found by the Court of Appeals and which is binding on this Court,
the same not being assailed by petitioners as being capricious, is as follows:
IT RESULTING: That the facts are quite simple; Lot 3504 of the cadastral
survey of Iloilo, situated in the poblacion of La Paz, one of its districts, with an
area of a little more than 2- hectares was originally decreed in the name of
the late Justice Antonio Horilleno, in 1916, under Original Certificate of Title
No. 1314, Exh. A; but before he died, on a date not particularized in the
record, he executed a last will and testament attesting to the fact that it was a
co-ownership between himself and his brothers and sisters, Exh. C; so that the
truth was that the owners or better stated, the co-owners were; beside Justice
Horilleno,
"Luis, Soledad, Fe, Rosita, Carlos and Esperanza,"
all surnamed Horilleno, and since Esperanza had already died, she was
succeeded by her only daughter and heir herein plaintiff. Filomena Javellana,
in the proportion of 1/7 undivided ownership each; now then, even though
their right had not as yet been annotated in the title, the co-owners led by
Carlos, and as to deceased Justice Antonio Horilleno, his daughter Mary,

sometime since early 1967, had wanted to sell their shares, or if possible if
Filomena Javellana were agreeable, to sell the entire property, and they hired
an acquaintance Cresencia Harder, to look for buyers, and the latter came to
interest defendants, the father and son, named Ramon Doromal, Sr. and Jr.,
and in preparation for the execution of the sale, since the brothers and sisters
Horilleno were scattered in various parts of the country, Carlos in Ilocos Sur,
Mary in Baguio, Soledad and Fe, in Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Rosita in Basilan
City, they all executed various powers of attorney in favor of their niece, Mary
H. Jimenez Exh. 1-8, they also caused preparation of a power of attorney of
identical tenor for signature by plaintiff, Filomena Javellana, Exh. M, and sent it
with a letter of Carlos, Exh. 7 dated 18 January, 1968 unto her thru Mrs.
Harder, and here, Carlos informed her that the price was P4.00 a square
meter, although it now turns out according to Exh. 3 that as early as 22
October, 1967, Carlos had received in check as earnest money from
defendant Ramon Doromal, Jr., the sum of P5,000.00 and the price therein
agreed upon was five (P5.00) pesos a square meter as indeed in another letter
also of Carlos to Plaintiff in 5 November, 1967, Exh. 6, he had told her that the
Doromals had given the earnest money of P5,000.00 at P5.00 a square meter,
at any rate, plaintiff not being agreeable, did not sign the power of
attorney, and the rest of the co-owners went ahead with their sale of their 6/7,
Carlos first seeing to it that the deed of sale by their common attorney in fact,
Mary H. Jimenez be signed and ratified as it was signed and ratified in Candon,
Ilocos Sur, on 15 January, 1968, Exh. 2, then brought to Iloilo by Carlos in the
same month, and because the Register of Deeds of Iloilo refused to register
right away, since the original registered owner, Justice Antonio Horilleno was
already dead, Carlos had to ask as he did, hire Atty. Teotimo Arandela to file a
petition within the cadastral case, on 26 February, 1968, for the purpose, Exh.
C, after which Carlos returned to Luzon, and after compliance with the
requisites of publication, hearing and notice, the petition was approved, and
we now see that on 29 April, 1968, Carlos already back in Iloilo went to the
Register of Deeds and caused the registration of the order of the cadastral
court approving the issuance of a new title in the name of the co-owners, as
well as of the deed of sale to the Doromals, as a result of which on that same
date, a new title was issued TCT No. 23152, in the name of the Horillenos to
6/7 and plaintiff Filomena Javellana to 1/7, Exh. D, only to be cancelled on the
same day under TCT No. 23153, Exh. 2, already in the names of the vendees
Doromals for 6/7 and to herein plaintiff, Filomena Javellana, 1/7, and the next
day 30 April, 1968, the Doromals paid unto Carlos by check, the sum of
P97,000.00 Exh. 1, of Chartered Bank which was later substituted by check of
Phil. National Bank, because there was no Chartered Bank Branch in Ilocos
Sur, but besides this amount paid in check, the Doromals according to their
evidence still paid an additional amount in cash of P18,250.00 since the
agreed price was P5.00 a square meter; and thus was consummated the
transaction, but it is here where complications set in,
On 10 June, 1968, there came to the residence of the Doromals in Dumangas, Iloilo,
plaintiff's lawyer, Atty. Arturo H. Villanueva, bringing with him her letter of that date, reading,

"P.O.
Box
189,
Bacolo
d City
June
10,
1968
Mr. & Mrs. Ramon Doromal, Sr.
and Mr. and Mrs. Ramon Doromal, Jr.
"Dumangas Iloilo
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Doromal:
The bearer of this letter is my nephew, Atty. Arturo H.
Villanueva, Jr., of this City. Through him, I am making a formal
offer to repurchase or redeem from you the 6/7 undivided share
in Lot No. 3504, of the Iloilo Cadastre, which you bought from
my erstwhile co-owners, the Horillenos, for the sum of
P30,000.00, Atty. Villanueva has with him the sum of
P30,000.00 in cash, which he will deliver to you as soon as you
execute the contract of sale in my favor.
Thank you very much for whatever favorable consideration you can give this
request.
Very truly yours,
(SIGNE
D)
Mrs.
FILOM
ENA
JAVELL
ANA"
p. 26, Exh. "J", Manual of Exhibits.
and then and there said lawyer manifested to the Doromals that he had the
P30,000.00 with him in cash, and tendered it to them, for the exercise of the
legal redemption, the Doromals were aghast, and refused. and the very next
day as has been said. 11 June, 1968, plaintiff filed this case, and in the trial,
thru oral and documentary proofs sought to show that as co-owner, she had
the right to redeem at the price stated in the deed of sale, Exh. 2, namely
P30,000.00 of the but defendants in answer, and in their evidence, oral and
documentary sought to show that plaintiff had no more right to redeem and

that if ever she should have, that it should be at the true and real price by
them paid, namely, the total sum of P115,250.00, and trial judge, after
hearing the evidence, believed defendants, that plaintiff had no more right, to
redeem, because,
"Plaintiff was informed of the intended sale of the 6/7 share
belonging to the Horillenos."
and that,
"The plaintiff have every reason to be grateful to Atty. Carlos Horilleno
because in the petition for declaration of heirs of her late uncle Antonio
Horilleno in whose name only the Original Certificate of Title covering the Lot
in question was issued, her uncle Atty. Carlos Horilleno included her as one of
the heirs of said Antonio Horilleno. Instead, she filed this case to redeem the
6/7 share sold to the Doromals for the simple reason that the consideration in
the deed of sale is the sum of P30,000.00 only instead of P115,250.00
approximately which was actually paid by the defendants to her co-owners,
thus she wants to enrich herself at the expense of her own blood relatives who
are her aunts, uncles and cousins. The consideration of P30,000.00 only was
placed in the deed of sale to minimize the payment of the registration fees,
stamps, and sales tax. pp. 77-78, R.A.,
and dismiss and further condemned plaintiff to pay attorney's fees, and moral
and exemplary damages as set forth in few pages back, it is because of this
that plaintiff has come here and contends, that Lower Court erred:
"I. ... in denying plaintiff-appellant, as a co-owner of Lot No. 3504, of the Iloilo
Cadastre, the right of legal redemption under Art. 1620, of the Civil Code:
"II. ... as a consequence of the above error, in refusing to order the
defendants-appellees, the vendees of a portion of the aforesaid Lot No. 3504
which they bought from the co-owners of the plaintiff-appellant, to reconvey
the portion they purchased to the herein plaintiff-appellant..
"III. ... in admitting extrinsic evidence in the determination of the
consideration of the sale, instead of simply adhering to the purchase price of
P30,000.00, set forth in the pertinent Deed of Sale executed by the vendors
and owners of the plaintiff-appellant in favor of the defendants-appellees.
"IV. ... in dismissing the complaint filed in this case." pp. 1-3, Appellant's Brief,.
which can be reduced to the simple question of whether or not on tile basis of
the evidence and the law, the judgment appealed from should be maintained;
(Pp. 16-22, Record.) .
Upon these facts, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and held that
although respondent Javellana was informed of her co-owners' proposal to sell the land in

question to petitioners she was, however, "never notified ... least of all, in writing", of the
actual execution and registration of the corresponding deed of sale, hence, said
respondent's right to redeem had not yet expired at the time she made her offer for that
purpose thru her letter of June 10, 1968 delivered to petitioners on even date. The
intermediate court further held that the redemption price to be paid by respondent should
be that stated in the deed of sale which is P30,000 notwithstanding that the preponderance
of the evidence proves that the actual price paid by petitioners was P115,250. Thus, in their
brief, petitioners assign the following alleged errors:
I
IT IS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO HOLD THAT THE NOTICE IN
WRITING OF THE SALE CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 1623 OF THE CIVIL CODE
REFERS TO A NOTICE IN WRITING AFTER THE EXECUTION AND REGISTRATION
OF THE INSTRUMENT OF SALE, HENCE, OF THE DOCUMENT OF SALE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE INSCRIPTION OF
THE SALE IN THE REGISTRY OF PROPERTY TAKES EFFECT AS AGAINST THIRD
PERSONS INCLUDING CLAIMS OF POSSIBLE REDEMPTIONERS.
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS THE RIGHT TO
REDEEM, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REDEMPTION
PRICE SHOULD BE THAT STATED IN THE DEED OF SALE. (Pp. 1-2, Brief for
Petitioner, page 74-Rec.)
We cannot agree with petitioners.
Petitioners do not question respondent's right to redeem, she being admittedly a 1/7 coowner of the property in dispute. The thrust of their first assignment of error is that for
purposes of Article 1623 of the Civil Code which provides that:
ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor,
or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded
in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.
the letters sent by Carlos Horilleno to respondent and dated January 18, 1968, Exhibit 7, and
November 5, 1967, Exhibit 6, constituted the required notice in writing from which the 30day period fixed in said provision should be computed. But to start with, there is no showing
that said letters were in fact received by respondent and when they were actually received.
Besides, petitioners do not pinpoint which of these two letters, their dates being more than
two months apart, is the required notice. In any event, as found by the appellate court,
neither of said letters referred to a consummated sale. As may be observed, it was Carlos

Horilleno alone who signed them, and as of January 18, 1968, powers of attorney from the
various co-owners were still to be secured. Indeed, the later letter of January 18, 1968
mentioned that the price was P4.00 per square meter whereas in the earlier letter of
November 5, 1967 it was P5.00, as in fact, on that basis, as early as October 27, 1967,
Carlos had already received P5,000 from petitioners supposedly as earnest money, of which,
however, mention was made by him to his niece only in the later letter of January 18, 1968,
the explanation being that "at later negotiation it was increased to P5.00 per square meter."
(p. 4 of petitioners' brief as appellees in the Court of Appeals quoting from the decision of
the trial court.) In other words, while the letters relied upon by petitioners could convey the
idea that more or less some kind of consensus had been arrived at among the other coowners to sell the property in dispute to petitioners, it cannot be said definitely that such a
sale had even been actually perfected. The fact alone that in the later letter of January 18,
1968 the price indicated was P4.00 per square meter while in that of November 5, 1967,
what was stated was P5.00 per square meter negatives the possibility that a "price definite"
had already been agreed upon. While P5,000 might have indeed been paid to Carlos in
October, 1967, there is nothing to show that the same was in the concept of the earnest
money contemplated in Article 1482 of the Civil Code, invoked by petitioner, as signifying
perfection of the sale. Viewed in the backdrop of the factual milieu thereof extant in the
record, We are more inclined to believe that the said P5,000 were paid in the concept of
earnest money as the term was understood under the Old Civil Code, that is, as a guarantee
that the buyer would not back out, considering that it is not clear that there was already a
definite agreement as to the price then and that petitioners were decided to buy 6/7 only of
the property should respondent Javellana refuse to agree to part with her 1/7 share.
In the light of these considerations, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the letters aforementioned sufficed to comply with the requirement of notice of
a sale by co-owners under Article 1623 of the Civil Code. We are of the considered opinion
and so hold that for purposes of the co-owner's right of redemption granted by Article 1620
of the Civil Code, the notice in writing which Article 1623 requires to be made to the other
co-owners and from receipt of which the 30-day period to redeem should be counted is a
notice not only of a perfected sale but of the actual execution and delivery of the deed of
sale. This is implied from the latter portion of Article 1623 which requires that before a
register of deeds can record a sale by a co-owner, there must be presented to him, an
affidavit to the effect that the notice of the sale had been sent in writing to the other coowners. A sale may not be presented to the register of deeds for registration unless it be in
the form of a duly executed public instrument. Moreover, the law prefers that all the terms
and conditions of the sale should be definite and in writing. As aptly observed by Justice
Gatmaitan in the decision under review, Article 1619 of the Civil Code bestows unto a coowner the right to redeem and "to be subrogated under the same terms and conditions
stipulated in the contract", and to avoid any controversy as to the terms and conditions
under which the right to redeem may be exercised, it is best that the period therefor should
not be deemed to have commenced unless the notice of the disposition is made after the
formal deed of disposal has been duly executed. And it being beyond dispute that
respondent herein has never been notified in writing of the execution of the deed of sale by
which petitioners acquired the subject property, it necessarily follows that her tender to
redeem the same made on June 10, 1968 was well within the period prescribed by law.
Indeed, it is immaterial when she might have actually come to know about said deed, it
appearing she has never been shown a copy thereof through a written communication by

either any of the petitioners-purchasers or any of her co-owners-vendees. (Cornejo et

al. vs.CA et al., 16 SCRA 775.)
The only other pivotal issue raised by petitioners relates to the price which respondent
offered for the redemption in question. In this connection, from the decision of the Court of
Appeals, We gather that there is "decisive preponderance of evidence" establishing "that the
price paid by defendants was not that stated in the document, Exhibit 2, of P30,000 but
much more, at least P97,000, according to the check, Exhibit 1, if not a total of P115,250.00
because another amount in cash of P18,250 was paid afterwards."
It is, therefore, the contention of petitioners here that considering said finding of fact of the
intermediate court, it erred in holding nevertheless that "the redemption price should be
that stated in the deed of sale."
Again, petitioners' contention cannot be sustained. As stated in the decision under review,
the trial court found that "the consideration of P30,000 only was placed in the deed of sale
to minimize the payment of the registration fees, stamps and sales tax." With this
undisputed fact in mind, it is impossible for the Supreme Court to sanction petitioners'
pragmatic but immoral posture. Being patently violative of public policy and injurious to
public interest, the seemingly wide practice of understating considerations of transactions
for the purpose of evading taxes and fees due to the government must be condemned and
all parties guilty thereof must be made to suffer the consequences of their ill-advised
agreement to defraud the state. Verily, the trial court fell short of its devotion and loyalty to
the Republic in officially giving its stamp of approval to the stand of petitioners and even
berating respondent Javellana as wanting to enrich herself "at the expense of her own blood
relatives who are her aunts, uncles and cousins." On the contrary, said "blood relatives"
should have been sternly told, as We here hold, that they are in pari-delicto with petitioners
in committing tax evasion and should not receive any consideration from any court in
respect to the money paid for the sale in dispute. Their situation is similar to that of parties
to an illegal contract. 1
Of course, the Court of Appeals was also eminently correct in its considerations supporting
the conclusion that the redemption in controversy should be only for the price stipulated in
the deed, regardless of what might have been actually paid by petitioners that style
inimitable and all his own, Justice Gatmaitan states those considerations thus:
CONSIDERING: As to this that the evidence has established with decisive
preponderance that the price paid by defendants was not that stated in the
document, Exh. 2 of P30,000.00 but much more, at least P97,000.00
according to the check, Exh. 1 if not a total of P115,250.00 because another
amount in cash of P18,250.00 was paid afterwards, perhaps it would be
neither correct nor just that plaintiff should be permitted to redeem at only
P30,000.00, that at first glance would practically enrich her by the difference,
on the other hand, after some reflection, this Court can not but have to bear in
mind certain definite points.
1st According to Art. 1619

"Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same terms and
conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who acquires a thing
by purchase or dation in payment, or by any other transaction whereby
ownership is transmitted by onerous title." pp. 471-472, New Civil Code,
and note that redemptioner right is to be subrogated
"upon the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract."
and here, the stipulation in the public evidence of the contract, made public
by both vendors and vendees is that the price was P30,000.00;
2nd According to Art. 1620,
"A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the share of all the other
co-owners or any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly
excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. p. 472, New Civil Code, .
from which it is seen that if the price paid is 'grossly excessive' redemptioner
is required to pay only a reasonable one; not that actually paid by the vendee,
going to show that the law seeks to protect redemptioner and converts his
position into one not that of a contractually but of a legally subrogated
creditor as to the right of redemption, if the price is not 'grossly excessive',
what the law had intended redemptioner to pay can be read in Art. 1623.
The right of a legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty (30) days from the notice in
writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor as the case
may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry
of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof of all possible
redemptioners.' p. 473, New Civil Code,
if that be so that affidavit must have been intended by the lawmakers for a
definite purpose, to argue that this affidavit has no purpose is to go against all
canons of statutory construction, no law mandatory in character and worse,
prohibitive should be understood to have no purpose at all, that would be an
absurdity, that purpose could not but have been to give a clear and
unmistakable guide to redemptioner, on how much he should pay and when
he should redeem; from this must follow that that notice must have been
intended to state the truth and if vendor and vendee should have instead,
decided to state an untruth therein, it is they who should bear the
consequences of having thereby misled the redemptioner who had the right to
rely and act thereon and on nothing else; stated otherwise, all the elements of
equitable estoppel are here since the requirement of the law is to submit the
affidavit of notice to all possible redemptioners, that affidavit to be a condition
precedent to registration of the sale therefore, the law must have intended
that it be by the parties understood that they were there asking a solemn

representation to all possible redemptioners, who upon faith of that are thus
induced to act, and here worse for the parties to the sale, they sought to avoid
compliance with the law and certainly refusal to comply cannot be rewarded
with exception and acceptance of the plea that they cannot be now estopped
by their own representation, and this Court notes that in the trial and to this
appeal, plaintiff earnestly insisted and insists on their estoppel;
3rd If therefore, here vendors had only attempted to comply with the law,
they would have been obligated to send a copy of the deed of sale unto
Filomena Javellana and from that copy, Filomena would have been notified
that she should if she had wanted to redeem, offered no more, no less, that
P30,000.00, within 30 days, it would have been impossible for vendors and
vendees to have inserted in the affidavit that the price was truly P97,000.00
plus P18,250.00 or a total of P115,250.00; in other words, if defendants had
only complied with the law, they would have been obligated to accept the
redemption money of only P30,000.00;
4th If it be argued that foregoing solution would mean unjust enrichment
for plaintiff, it need only be remembered that plaintiff's right is not
contractual, but a mere legal one, the exercise of a right granted by the law,
and the law is definite that she can subrogate herself in place of the buyer,
"upon the same terms and conditions stipulated in the contract,"
in the words of Art. 1619, and here the price
"stipulated in the contract"
was P30,000.00, in other words, if this be possible enrichment on the part of
Filomena, it was not unjust but just enrichment because permitted by the law;
if it still be argued that plaintiff would thus be enabled to abuse her right, the
answer simply is that what she is seeking to enforce is not an abuse but a
mere exercise of a right; if it be stated that just the same, the effect of
sustaining plaintiff would be to promote not justice but injustice, the answer
again simply is that this solution is not unjust because it only binds the parties
to make good their solemn representation to possible redemptioners on the
price of the sale, to what they had solemnly averred in a public document
required by the law to be the only basis for that exercise of redemption; (Pp.
24-27, Record.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs against petitioners..
Fernando, Makasiar, Esguerra, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, CJ., took no part.
Muoz Palma, J., took no part.

Antonio and Concepcion Jr., JJ., are on leave.