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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
FIRSTDIVISION
G.R.No.85215July7,1989
THEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,petitioner,
vs.
HON.JUDGERUBENAYSON,PresidingoverBranch6,RegionalTrialCourt,FirstJudicialRegion,Baguio
City,andFELIPERAMOS,respondents.
NelsonLiduaforprivaterespondent.

NARVASA,J.:
WhathasgivenrisetothecontroversyatbaristheequationbytherespondentJudgeoftherightofanindividual
notto"becompelledtobeawitnessagainsthimself"accordedbySection20,ArticleIIIoftheConstitution,with
therightofanyperson"underinvestigationforthecommissionofanoffense...toremainsilentandtocounsel,
andtobeinformedofsuchright,"grantedbythesameprovision.Therelevantfactsarenotdisputed.
PrivaterespondentFelipeRamoswasaticketfreightclerkofthePhilippineAirlines(PAL),assignedatitsBaguio
Citystation.Ithavingallegedlycometolightthathewasinvolvedinirregularitiesinthesalesofplanetickets,1 the
PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986. That investigation
wasscheduledinaccordancewithPAL'sCodeofConductandDiscipline,andtheCollectiveBargainingAgreementsigned
byitwiththePhilippineAirlinesEmployees'Association(PALEA)towhichRamospertained.2

Onthedaybeforetheinvestigation,February8,1986,Ramosgavetohissuperiorsahandwrittennotes 3 reading
asfollows:

2886
TOWHOMITMAYCONCERN:
THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS WILLING TO SETTLE
IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF P 76,000 (APPROX.)
SUBJECTTOCONDITIONSASMAYBEIMPOSEDBYPALONORBEFORE1700/9FEB86.
(s)FelipeRamos
(Printed)F.Ramos
AttheinvestigationofFebruary9,1986,conductedbythePALBranchManagerinBaguioCity,EdgardoR.Cruz,
in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop
Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team." Thereafter, his
answersinresponsetoquestionsbyCruz,weretakendowninwriting.Ramos'answersweretotheeffectinter
alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the
proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been
prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a
"compromisexxtopayonstaggeredbasis,(and)theamountwouldbeknowninthenextinvestigation"thathe
desiredthenextinvestigationtobeatthesameplace,"BaguioCTO,"andthatheshouldberepresentedtherein
by"ShopstewardeesITRNievesBlanco"andthathewaswillingtosignhisstatement(asheinfactafterwards
did).4Howtheinvestigationturnedoutisnotdealtwiththepartiesatallbutitwouldseemthatnocompromiseagreement
wasreachedmuchlessconsummated.

Abouttwo(2)monthslater,aninformationwasfiledagainstFelipeRamoscharginghimwiththecrimeofestafa
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allegedlycommittedinBaguioCityduringtheperiodfromMarch12,1986toJanuary29,1987.Inthatplaceand
duringthattime,accordingtotheindictment,5he(Ramos)
..withunfaithfulnessand/orabuseofconfidence,didthenandtherewillfully...defraudthePhilippine
Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, ... in the following manner, to wit: said accused ... having been
entrustedwithandreceivedintrustfareticketsofpassengersforonewaytripandroundtripinthe
totalamountofP76,700.65,withtheexpressobligationtoremitalltheproceedsofthesale,account
foritand/ortoreturnthoseunsold,...onceinpossessionthereofandinsteadofcomplyingwithhis
obligation, with intent to defraud, did then and there ... misappropriate, misapply and convert the
valueoftheticketsinthesumofP76,700.65andinspiteofrepeateddemands,...failedandrefused
tomakegoodhisobligation,tothedamageandprejudiceoftheoffendedparty...
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial thereafter ensued. The
prosecutionofthecasewasundertakenbylawyersofPALunderthedirectionandsupervisionoftheFiscal.
Atthecloseofthepeople'scase,theprivateprosecutorsmadeawrittenofferofevidencedatedJune21,1988,6
which included "the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio
City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten admission x x given on February 8,
1986,"alsoabovereferredto,whichhadbeenmarkedasExhibitK.

Thedefendant'sattorneysfiled"Objections/CommentstoPlaintiffsEvidence."7 Particularly as regards the peoples'


ExhibitA,theobjectionwasthat"saiddocument,whichappearstobeaconfession,wastakenwithouttheaccusedbeing
representedbyalawyer."ExhibitKwasobjectedto"forthesamereasonsinterposedunderExhibits'A'and'J.'

By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge admitted all the exhibits "as part of the testimony of the
witnesseswhotestifiedinconnectiontherewithandforwhatevertheyareworth,"exceptExhibitsAandK,whichitrejected.
HisHonordeclaredExhibitA"inadmissibleinevidence,itappearingthatitisthestatementofaccusedFelipeRamostaken
on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in an investigation conducted by the Branch Manager x x since it
doesnotappearthattheaccusedwasremindedofthisconstitutionalrightstoremainsilentandtohavecounsel,andthat
when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel." He also declared
inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 x x for
the same reason stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that the accused was assisted by counsel
whenhemadesaidadmission."

Theprivateprosecutorsfiledamotionforreconsideration. 9Itwasdenied,byOrderdatedSeptember14,1988. 10 In
justification of said Order, respondent Judge invoked this Court's rulings in Morales, Jr. v. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 121
SCRA 538, People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 467, People. v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219, and People v. Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496,
amongothers,totheeffectthat"incustodialinvestigationstherighttocounselmaybewaivedbutthewaivershallnotbe
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel," and the explicit precept in the present Constitution that the rights in
custodial investigation "cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." He pointed out that the
investigationofFelipeRamosatthePALBaguioStationwasone"fortheoffenseofallegedlymisappropriatingtheproceeds
oftheticketsissuedtohim'andthereforeclearlyfell"withinthecoverageoftheconstitutionalprovisions"andthefactthat
Ramos was not detained at the time, or the investigation was administrative in character could not operate to except the
case"fromtheambitoftheconstitutionalprovisioncited."

These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now assailed in the petition for certiorari and
prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private prosecutors in the name of the People of the Philippines. By
Resolution dated October 26, 1988, the Court required Judge Ayson and Felipe Ramos to comment on the
petition,anddirectedissuanceofa"TEMPORARYRESTRAININGORDER...ENJOININGtherespondentsfrom
proceeding further with the trial and/or hearing of Criminal Case No. 3488R (People ... vs. Felipe Ramos),
includingtheissuanceofanyorder,decisionorjudgmentintheaforesaidcaseoronanymatterinrelationtothe
samecase,nowpendingbeforetheRegionalTrialCourtofBaguioCity,Br.6,FirstJudicialRegion."TheCourt
also subsequently required the Solicitor General to comment on the petition. The comments of Judge Ayson,
FelipeRamos,andtheSolicitorGeneralhaveallbeenfiled.TheSolicitorGeneralhasmadecommoncausewith
thepetitionerandprays"thatthepetitionbegivenduecourseandthereafterjudgmentberenderedsettingaside
respondent Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him to admit Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the prosecution." The Solicitor
Generalhastherebyremovedwhateverimproprietymighthaveattendedtheinstitutionoftheinstantactioninthe
nameofthePeopleofthePhilippinesbylawyersdeparteoftheoffendedpartyinthecriminalactioninquestion.
The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue of whether or not it was grave abuse of
discretionforrespondentJudgetohaveexcludedthePeople'sExhibitsAandK.Itwillnowproceedtoresolveit.
AtthecoreofthecontroversyisSection20,ArticleIVofthe1973Constitution, 11 to which respondent Judge has
givenaconstructionthatisdisputedbythePeople.Thesectionreadsasfollows:

SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel,
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andtobeinformedofsuchright.Noforce,violence,threat,intimidation,oranyothermeanswhich
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shallbeinadmissibleinevidence.
Itshouldatoncebeapparentthattherearetwo(2)rights,orsetsofrights,dealtwithinthesection,namely:
1)therightagainstselfincriminationi.e.,therightofapersonnottobecompelledtobeawitness
againsthimselfsetoutinthefirstsentence,whichisaverbatimreproductionofSection18,Article
IIIofthe1935Constitution,andissimilartothataccordedbytheFifthAmendmentoftheAmerican
Constitution,12and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect "under
investigationforthecommissionofanoffense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and disparateness of these
rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against self incrimination, "No person shall be
compelledtobeawitnessagainsthimself,"isnowembodiedinSection17,ArticleIIIofthe1987Constitution.The
lightsofapersonincustodialinterrogation,whichhavebeenmademoreexplicit,arenowcontainedinSection12
ofthesameArticleIII.13
RightAgainstSelfIncrimination
Thefirstright,againstselfincrimination,mentionedinSection20,ArticleIVofthe1973Constitution,isaccorded
toeverypersonwhogivesevidence,whethervoluntarilyorundercompulsionofsubpoena,inanycivil,criminal,
oradministrativeproceeding.14TherightisNOTto"becompelledtobeawitnessagainsthimself"
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. 15 It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminatingquestionsandnotaprohibitionofinquiry." 16Itsimplysecurestoawitness,whetherhebeapartyornot,the
righttorefuetoansweranyparticularincriminatoryquestion,i.e.,onetheanswertowhichhasatendencytoincriminatehim
for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually
puttothewitness.Itcannotbeclaimedatanyothertime.Itdoesnotgiveawitnesstherighttodisregardasubpoena,to
declinetoappearbeforethecourtatthetimeappointed,ortorefusetotestifyaltogether.Thewitnessreceivingasubpoena
must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is
addressedtohim,theanswertowhichmayincriminatehimforsomeoffense,thathemayrefusetoansweronthestrength
oftheconstitutionalguaranty.

ThatfirstsentenceofSection20,ArticleIVofthe1973Constitutiondoesnotimposeonthejudge,orotherofficer
presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right against
selfincrimination.Itisarightthatawitnessknowsorshouldknow,inaccordancewiththewellknownaxiomthat
every one is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very
natureofthings,neitherthejudgenorthewitnesscanbeexpectedtoknowinadvancethecharacteroreffectof
aquestiontobeputtothelatter.17
The right against selfincrimination is not self executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not
claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be
waived,expressly,orimpliedly,asbyafailuretoclaimitattheappropriatetime.18
RightsinCustodialInterrogation
Section20,ArticleIVofthe1973Constitutionalsotreatsofasecondright,orbettersaid,groupofrights.These
rightsapplytopersons"underinvestigationforthecommissionofanoffense,"i.e.,"suspects"underinvestigation
bypoliceauthoritiesandthisiswhatmakestheserightsdifferentfromthatembodiedinthefirstsentence,that
against selfincrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any
proceeding,civil,criminal,oradministrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense was not in the 1935
Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 19 a
decisiondescribedasan"earthquakeintheworldoflawenforcement."20

Section20statesthatwheneveranypersonis"underinvestigationforthecommissionofanoffense"
1)heshallhavetherighttoremainsilentandtocounsel,andtobeinformedofsuchright,21
2)norforce,violence,threat,intimidation,oranyothermeanswhichvitiatesthefreewillshallbeusedagainst
him22and
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3)anyconfessionobtainedinviolationofxx(theserightsshallbeinadmissibleinevidence.23
InMiranda,ChiefJusticeWarrensummarizedtheproceduralsafeguardslaiddownforapersoninpolicecustody,
"incustodyinterrogation"beingregardedasthecommencementofanadversaryproceedingagainstthesuspect.
24

Hemustbewarnedpriortoanyquestioningthathehastherighttoremainsilent,thatanythinghesayscanbe
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
affordanattorneyonewillbeappointedforhimpriortoanyquestioningifhesodesires.Opportunitytoexercise
those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such
opportunityaffordedhim,theindividualmayknowinglyandintelligentlywaivetheserightsandagreetoansweror
makeastatement.Butunlessanduntilsuchwarningsandwaiversaredemonstratedbytheprosecutionatthe
trial,noevidenceobtainedasaresultofinterrogationcanbeusedagainsthim.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a policedominated atmosphere,
resultinginselfincriminatingstatementwithoutfullwarningsofconstitutionalrights."25
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "incustody interrogation of
accusedpersons." 26 And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significantway."27ThesituationcontemplatedhasalsobeenmorepreciselydescribedbythisCourt."28

.. . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises which at
bestmaybetannedunequal.Thedetaineeisbroughttoanarmycamporpoliceheadquartersand
there questioned and "crossexamined" not only by one but as many investigators as may be
necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and
everypersonhemeetsheconsidershostiletohim.Theinvestigatorsarewelltrainedandseasoned
intheirwork.Theyemployallthemethodsandmeansthatexperienceandstudyhavetaughtthem
toextractthetruth,orwhatmaypassforit,outofthedetainee.Mostdetaineesareunletteredand
are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive
presenceoftheofficersofthelawinsuchanatmosphereoverwhelmsthemintosilence.Section20
oftheBillofRightsseekstoremedythisimbalance.
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the
constitutionalprotection.Ifnotmade"undercustodialinterrogation,"or"underinvestigationforthecommissionof
anoffense,"thestatementisnotprotected.Thus,inonecase,29whereapersonwenttoapoliceprecinctandbefore
anysortofinvestigationcouldbeinitiated,declaredthathewasgivinghimselfupforthekillingofanoldwomanbecause
shewasthreateningtokillhimbybarang,orwitchcraft,thisCourtruledthatsuchastatementwasadmissible,compliance
withtheconstitutionalprocedureoncustodialinterrogationnotbeingexigibleunderthecircumstances.

RightsofDefendantinCriminalCase
AsRegardsGivingofTestimony
Itispertinentatthispointtoinquirewhethertherightsjustdiscussed,i.e.,(1)thatagainstselfincriminationand
(2) those during custodial interrogation apply to persons under preliminary investigation or already charged in
courtforacrime.
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial
interrogation.Hisinterrogationbythepolice,ifanytherehadbeenwouldalreadyhavebeenendedatthetimeof
thefilingofthecriminalcaseincourt(orthepublicprosecutors'office).Hence,withrespecttoadefendantina
criminalcasealreadypendingincourt(orthepublicprosecutor'soffice),thereisnooccasiontospeakofhisright
whileunder"custodialinterrogation"laiddownbythesecondandsubsequentsentencesofSection20,ArticleIV
ofthe1973Constitution,fortheobviousreasonthatheisnolongerunder"custodialinterrogation."
Butunquestionably,theaccusedincourt(orundergoingpreliminaryinvestigationbeforethepublicprosecutor),in
common with all other persons, possesses the right against self incrimination set out in the first sentence of
Section20ArticleIVofthe1973Constitution,i.e.,therighttorefusetoansweraspecificincriminatoryquestionat
thetimethatitisputtohim.30
Additionally,theaccusedinacriminalcaseincourthasotherrightsinthematterofgivingtestimonyorrefusingto
doso.Anaccused"occupiesadifferenttierofprotectionfromanordinarywitness."UndertheRulesofCourt,in
allcriminalprosecutionsthedefendantisentitledamongothers
1)tobeexemptfrombeingawitnessagainsthimself, 31and2)totestifyaswitnessinhisownbehalfbutifheoffers
himselfasawitnesshemaybecrossexaminedasanyotherwitnesshowever,hisneglectorrefusaltobeawitnessshall
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notinanymannerprejudiceorbeusedagainsthim.32

Therightofthedefendantinacriminalcase"tobeexemptfrombeingawitnessagainsthimself'signifiesthathe
cannotbecompelledtotestifyorproduceevidenceinthecriminalcaseinwhichheistheaccused,oroneofthe
accused.HecannotbecompelledtodosoevenbysubpoenaorotherprocessororderoftheCourt.Hecannot
berequiredtobeawitnesseitherfortheprosecution,orforacoaccused,orevenforhimself.33Inotherwords
unlikeanordinarywitness(orapartyinacivilaction)whomaybecompelledtotestifybysubpoena,havingonlytherightto
refusetoansweraparticularincriminatoryquestionatthetimeitisputtohimthedefendantinacriminalactioncanrefuse
to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. 34 And, as the law
categoricallystates,"hisneglectorrefusaltobeawitnessshallnotinanymannerprejudiceorbeusedagainsthim."35

Ifheshouldwishtotestifyinhisownbehalf,however,hemaydoso.Thisishisright.Butifhedoestestify,then
he"maybecrossexaminedasanyotherwitness."Hemaybecrossexaminedastoanymattersstatedinhis
directexamination,orconnectedtherewith. 36Hemaynotoncrossexaminationrefusetoansweranyquestiononthe
groundthattheanswerthathewillgive,ortheevidencehewillproduce,wouldhaveatendencytoincriminatehimforthe
crimewithwhichheischarged.

It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a question which might
incriminatehim,notforthecrimewithwhichheischarged,butforsomeothercrime,distinctfromthatofwhichhe
isaccused,hemaydeclinetoanswerthatspecificquestion,onthestrengthoftherightagainstselfincrimination
granted by the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution).Thus,assumingthatinaprosecutionformurder,theaccusedshouldtestifyinhisbehalf,hemay
notoncrossexaminationrefusetoansweranyquestiononthegroundthathemightbeimplicatedinthatcrime
of murder but he may decline to answer any particular question which might implicate him for a different and
distinctoffense,say,estafa.
Infine,apersonsuspectedofhavingcommittedacrimeandsubsequentlychargedwithitscommissionincourt,
hasthefollowingrightsinthematterofhistestifyingorproducingevidence,towit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary
investigation),butafterhavingbeentakenintocustodyorotherwisedeprivedofhislibertyinsome
significantway,andonbeinginterrogatedbythepolice:thecontinuingrighttoremainsilentandto
counsel,andtobeinformedthereof,nottobesubjectedtoforce,violence,threat,intimidationorany
other means which vitiates the free will and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights
rejectedand
2)AFTERTHECASEISFILEDINCOURT37
a)torefusetobeawitness
b)nottohaveanyprejudicewhatsoeverresulttohimbysuchrefusal
c)totestifyinhisownbehalf,subjecttocrossexaminationbytheprosecution
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to
incriminatehimforsomecrimeotherthanthatforwhichheisthenprosecuted.
ItshouldbynowbeabundantlyapparentthatrespondentJudgehasmisapprehendedthenatureandimportof
thedisparaterightssetforthinSection20,ArticleIVofthe1973Constitution.Hehastakenthemasapplyingto
thesamejuridicalsituation,equatingonewiththeother.Insodoing,hehasgrosslyerred.Tobesure,HisHonor
soughttosubstantiatehisthesisbyargumentshetooktobecogentandlogical.Thethesiswashoweversofar
divorcedfromtheactualandcorrectstateoftheconstitutionalandlegalprinciplesinvolvedastomakeapplication
ofsaidthesistothecasebeforehimtantamounttototallyunfounded,whimsicalorcapriciousexerciseofpower.
HisOrderswerethusrenderedwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.Theyshouldbeastheyarehereby,annulledand
setaside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a
personundercustodialinterrogationunderSection20,ArticleIVofthe1973Constitutiondidnotthereforecome
intoplay,wereofnorelevancetotheinquiry.Itisalsoclear,too,thatRamoshadvoluntarilyansweredquestions
posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the
proceedingsshouldberecorded,therecordhavingthereafterbeenmarkedduringthetrialofthecriminalaction
subsequentlyfiledagainsthimasExhibitA,justasitisobviousthatthenote(latermarkedasExhibitK)thathe
senttohissuperiorsonFebruary8,1986,thedaybeforetheinvestigation,offeringtocompromisehisliabilityin
the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the
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groundthatthesocalled"Mirandarights"hadnotbeenaccordedtoRamos.
HisHonoradvertstowhatheperceivestobethe"greaterdangerxx(of)theviolationoftherightofanyperson
againstselfincriminationwhentheinvestigationisconductedbythecomplainingparties,complainingcompanies,
orcomplainingemployersbecausebeinginterestedparties,unlikethepoliceagencieswhohavenoproprietyor
pecuniary interest to protect, they may in their overeagerness or zealousness bear heavily on their hapless
suspects, whether employees or not, to give statements under an atmosphere of moral coercion, undue
ascendancyandundueinfluence."Itsufficestodrawattentiontothespecificandperemptoryrequirementofthe
law that disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless the
employee has been accorded due process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed of the offenses
ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his side. The requirement entails the
makingofstatements,oralorwritten,bytheemployeeundersuchadministrativeinvestigationinhisdefense,with
opportunity to solicit the assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of course,
refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his
defensetotheaccusationagainsthim,itwouldbeabsurdtorejecthisstatements,whetherattheadministrative
investigation,oratasubsequentcriminalactionbroughtagainsthim,becausehehadnotbeenaccorded,priorto
hismakingandpresentingthem,his"Mirandarights"(tosilenceandtocounselandtobeinformedthereof,etc.)
which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is selfevident that the employee's
statements, whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely so that they may be
admittedanddulyconsideredbytheinvestigatingofficerorcommittee,innegationormitigationofhisliability.
Ofcoursethepossibilitycannotbediscountedthatincertaininstancesthejudge'sexpressedapprehensionsmay
berealized,thatviolenceorintimidation,unduepressureorinfluencebebroughttobearonanemployeeunder
investigationorforthatmatter,onapersonbeinginterrogatedbyanotherwhomhehassupposedlyoffended.
Insuchanevent,anyadmissionorconfessionwrungfromthepersonunderinterrogationwouldbeinadmissible
inevidence,onproofoftheviceordefectvitiatingconsent,notbecauseofaviolationofSection20,ArticleIVof
the1973Constitution,butsimplyonthegeneral,incontestablepropositionthatinvoluntaryorcoercedstatements
may not in justice be received against the makers thereof, and really should not be accorded any evidentiary
valueatall.
WHEREFORE,thewritofcertiorariisgrantedannullingandsettingasidetheOrdersoftherespondentJudgein
CriminalCaseNo.3488R,datedAugust9,1988andSeptember14,1988,andheisherebyorderedtoadmitin
evidenceExhibits"A"and"K"oftheprosecutioninsaidCriminalCaseNo.3488R,andthereafterproceedwith
the trial and adjudgment thereof. The temporary restraining order of October 26, 1988 having become functus
officio,isnowdeclaredofnofurtherforceandeffect.
Cruz,Gancayco,GrioAquinoandMedialdea,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes
1Rollo,P.21,34.
2Id.,p.13.
3Id.,p,29.
4Rollopp.6,28.
5Id.,p.19.
6Rollo,pp.8,2127.
7Id.,pp.3032.
8Id.,pp.89,33.
9Id.,pp.3444.
10Id.,pp.4855.
11TheadmissionswereallegedlymadeonFebruary8and9,1986,atwhichtimethe1987
Constitutionwasnotyetineffect,indeedhadnotyetbeenconceivedordrafted.
12SEE,e.g.,Tanada&Fernando,ConstitutionofthePhil.,Anno.,2ded.,pp.378379.
13Theprovisionreadsasfollows:
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SEC.12.(1)Anypersonunderinvestigationforthecommissionofanoffenseshallhavetherightto
beinformedofhisrighttoremainsilentandtohavecompetentandindependentcounselpreferably
ofhisownchoice.Ifthepersoncannotaffordtheservicesofcounsel,hemustbeprovidedwithone.
Theserightscannotbewaivedexceptinwritingandinthepresenceofcounsel.(2)Notorture,force,
violence,threat,intimidation,oranyothermeanswhichvitiatethefreewillshallbeusedagainsthim.
Secretdetentionplaces,solitary,incommunicado,orothersimilarformsofdetentionareprohibited.
(3)Anyconfessionoradmissionobtainedinviolationofthisortheprecedingsectionshallbe
inadmissibleinevidenceagainsthim.(4)Thelawshallprovideforpenalandcivilsanctionsfor
violationsofthissectionaswellascompensationtoandrehabilitationofvictimsoftortureorsimilar
practices,andtheirfamilies.
14Bermudezv.Castillo,64Phil.483Gonzalesv.SecretaryofLabor,94Phil.325Suarezv.
Tengco,2SCRA71Pascualv.BoardofMedicalExaminers,28SCRA344.
15SEEChavezv.C.A.,24SCRA663Suarezv.Tengco,supra,2SCRA71Gonzalesv.Secretary
ofLabor,supra,94Phil.325,citingJonesonEvidence,Vol.6,pp.49267.
16Suarezv.Tengco,supra,atp.73.
17SEECruz,I.A.,ConstitutionalLaw,1987ed.,p.275.
18U.S.v.Molina,317U.S.,424U.S.v.Binayoh,35Phil.23SEEalsoTanada&Fernando,op.cit.,
p.379.
19384U.S.436,16L.Ed.694.10A.L.R.3d974.
20Peo.v.Duero,104SCRA379.
21The1987Constitution(Sec.12,ART.III)makesclearthattheperson'srightto"counsel"refersto
"competentandindependentcounselpreferablyofhisownchoice,"thatif"thepersoncannotafford
theservicesof(such)counsel,hemustbeprovidedwithone,"and,assuggestedinPeo.v.Galit,
135SCRA465,thattherightstosilenceandtocounsel"cannotbewaivedexceptinwritingandin
thepresenceofcounsel'(SEECruz,op.cit.,p.282).
22The1987Constitutionaddsthat"Secretdetentionplaces,solitary,incommunicado,orother
similarformsofdetentionareprohibited."
23Theproviso,asnowfoundinthe1987Constitution,makesinadmissibleinevidenceany
confessionoradmissionobtainednotonlyininfringementoftherightsmentioned(tosilence,to
counsel,etc.)butalsoinviolationofSec.11,Art.III,totheeffectthat"Freeaccesstothecourtsand
quasijudicialbodiesandadequatelegalassistanceshallnotbedeniedtoanypersonbyreasonof
poverty."Thenewcharteralsorequiresthat"Thelawshallprovideforpenalandcivilsanctionsfor
violationsofthissectionaswellascompensationtoandrehabilitationofvictimsoftortureorsimilar
practices,andtheirfamilies."
24SEEPeo.v.Duero,supra,104SCRA379Peo.v.Jimenez,71SCRA186Peo.v.Robles,104
SCRA450Peo.v.Caguioa,95SCRA2.
25Peo.v.Duero,supra,atp.388.
26Peo.v.Duero,supra,atp.386.
TheSolicitorGeneral'sComment,rollo,pp.95,102103,statesthatthe1971Constitutional
Conventiondefined"investigation"as"investigationconductedbythepoliceauthoritieswhichwill
includeinvestigationsconductedbythemunicipalpolice,thePCandtheNBIandsuchotherpolice
agenciesinourgovernment(Session,November25,1972)."
27Peo.V.Caguioa,95SCRA2,9,quotingMiranda.
TheSolicitorGeneral'sComment(rollo,p.103)statesthataccordingtoEscobedov.Illinois,378U.S.
478,whichprecededMiranda,384U.S.436,"therighttocounselattacheswhen'theinvestigationis
nolongerageneralinquiryintoanunsolvedcrimebuthasbeguntofocusonaparticularsuspect.
thesuspecthasbeentakenintopolicecustody,thepolicecarryoutaprocessofinterrogationsthat
lendsitselftoelicitingincriminatingstatements."'TheComment(rollo,p.108)alsodrawsattentionto
Gamboav.CruzG.R.No.56292,June27,1988wherethisCourtdeclaredthat"Therighttocounsel
attachesonlyuponthestartofaninvestigation,whenthepoliceofficerstartstoaskquestions
designedtoelicitinformationand/orconfessionsoradmissionsfromtheaccused."
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28Moralesv.Enrile,etalMoncupa,Jr.v.Enrile,etal.,121SCRA538,553.
29Peo.v.Taylaran108SCRA373.Inthisconnection,theSolicitorGeneralopinesthatsocalled
"onthescenequestioning"ofcitizensbypoliceofficersinthefactfindingprocessare"undoubtedly
admissible,"for,as"distinguishedfromallquestioningofasuspect,inxx(sucha)situationthe
compellingatmosphereinherentintheprocessofincustodyinterrogationisnotnecessarilypresent."
Accordingtohim,"wheninvestigatingcrimes,anofficermayinquireofpersonsnotunderrestraint
(ConstitutionalLaw,Klotter/Kanovitz,4thed.,1984)xxxandsuchgeneralonthescenequestions
arenotthoughttobeaccusatorybecausetheylackthecompellingatmosphereinherentinthe
processofincustodyinterrogation'(CivilRightsandLiberties,A.L.Bonnicksen,1982ed.).'
30Seefootnotes2to5andrelatedtext,atp.5,supra.
31Sec.1(e),Rule115ofthe1964RulesofCourt.The1985RulesonCriminalProcedurehave
amendedtheprovisiontoread,'tobeexemptfrombeingcompelledtobeawitnessagainsthimself.'
32Sec.1(d),Rule115.The1985RulesonCriminalProcedureamendedtheprovisiontoread:"To
testifyasawitnessinhisownbehalfbutsubjecttocrossexaminationonmatterscoveredbydirect
examination.Hissilenceinsteadofmerelyhis'neglectorrefusaltobeawitnessshallnotinany
mannerprejudicehim."
33Chavezv.C.A.,supra,24SCRA663.
34Id.,atpp.677678,citingCabalv.Kapunan,L19052,Dec.29,196221Am.Jur.2d.,p.38398
C.J.S.,p.265Wigmore,Evidence,1961ed.,p.4063Wharton'sCriminalEvidence,llthed.,pp.
19591960,allcitedinGupit,Jr.,RulesofCriminalProcedure,1986ed.,p.240.
35SeePeoplev.Gargoles,83SCRA282.
36However,asalreadypointedout,therulenowlimitscrossexaminationofanaccusedonlyto
"matterscoveredbydirectexamination."
37OrduringpreliminaryinvestigationbeforeaJudgeorpublicprosecutor.
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