G.R. Nos.

152613 & 152628

APEX MINING CO., INC., vs. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp.,(SEM) et. al
G.R. No. 152619-20
BALITE COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE vs. southeast
mindanao gold mining corp.
G.R. No. 152870-71
THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD AND ITS MEMBERS, THE HON.
VICTOR O. RAMOS (Chairman), UNDERSECRETARY VIRGILIO MARCELO
(Member) and DIRECTOR HORACIO RAMOS (Member) vs. southeast mindanao
gold mining corporation
FACTS:
A motion for reconsideration was filed by SEM. The Assailed Decision held that
the assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated one of the
conditions stipulated in the permit. It also ruled that the transfer of EP 133 violated
Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires that the assignment of a mining right be
made with the prior approval of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). Moreover, the Assailed Decision pointed out that EP 133
expired by non-renewal since it was not renewed before or after its expiration. It likewise
upheld the validity of Proclamation No. 297 absent any question against its validity. In
view of this, and considering that under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise
known as the Mining Act of 1995, mining operations in mineral reservations may be
undertaken directly by the State or through a contractor, the Court deemed the issue of
ownership of priority right over the contested Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as having been
overtaken by the said proclamation. Thus, it was held in the Assailed Decision that it is
now within the prerogative of the Executive Department to undertake directly the mining
operations of the disputed area or to award the operations to private entities including
petitioners Apex and Balite, subject to applicable laws, rules and regulations, and
provided that these private entities are qualified.
Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the Assailed Decision, praying
that the Court elucidate on the Decisions pronouncement that mining operations, are
now, therefore within the full control of the State through the executive branch.
Moreover, Apex asks this Court to order the Mines and Geosciences Board (MGB) to
accept its application for an exploration permit.
1

Balite echoes the same concern as that of Apex on the actual takeover by the State
of the mining industry in the disputed area to the exclusion of the private sector. In
addition, Balite prays for this Court to direct MGB to accept its application for an
exploration permit.
CamiloBanad, et al., likewise filed a motion for reconsideration and prayed that the
disputed area be awarded to them.
In the Resolution, the Court En Banc resolved to accept the instant cases.
ISSUES:
1.

Whether the transfer or assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 by MMC to

SEM was validly made without violating any of the terms and conditions set forth
in Presidential Decree No. 463 and EP 133 itself.

2.

Whether Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. acquired a vested right over the
disputed area, which constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution.

3.

Whether the assailed Decision dated 23 June 2006 of the Third Division in this
case is contrary to and overturns the earlier Decision of this Court in Apex v.
Garcia (G.R. No. 92605, 16 July 1991, 199 SCRA 278).

4.

Whether the issuance of Proclamation No. 297 declaring the disputed area as
mineral reservation outweighs the claims of SEM, Apex Mining Co. Inc. and
Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative over the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.

5.

Whether the issue of the legality/constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297 was

belatedly raised.

HELD:
1.
The assailed Decision did not overturn the 16 July 1991 Decision in Apex Mining
Co., Inc. v. Garcia. The former was decided on facts and issues that were not attendant in
the latter, such as the expiration of EP 133, the violation of the condition embodied in EP
133 prohibiting its assignment, and the unauthorized and invalid assignment of EP 133 by
MMC to SEM, since this assignment was effected without the approval of the Secretary
of DENR;
2

2.
SEM did not acquire vested right over the disputed area because its supposed right
was extinguished by the expiration of its exploration permit and by its violation of the
condition prohibiting the assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM. In addition, even
assuming that SEM has a valid exploration permit, such is a mere license that can be
withdrawn by the State. In fact, the same has been withdrawn by the issuance of
Proclamation No. 297, which places the disputed area under the full control of the State
through the Executive Department;
3.
The approval requirement under Section 97 of Presidential Decree No. 463 applies
to the assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM, since the exploration permit is an interest
in a mining lease contract;
4.
The issue of the constitutionality and the legality of Proclamation No. 297 was
raised belatedly, as SEM questions the same for the first time in its Motion for
Reconsideration. Even if the issue were to be entertained, the said proclamation is found
to be in harmony with the Constitution and other existing statutes;
5.
The motion for reconsideration of CamiloBanad, et al. cannot be passed upon
because they are not parties to the instant cases;
6.
The prayers of Apex and Balite asking the Court to direct the MGB to accept their
applications for exploration permits cannot be granted, since it is the Executive
Department that has the prerogative to accept such applications, if ever it decides to
award the mining operations in the disputed area to a private entity;

G.R. No. 163101

BENGUET CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES-MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD and J.G. REALTY
AND MINING CORPORATION
FACTS:
Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with Option to
Purchase (RAWOP) , wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four mining
claims with a total area of 288.8656 hectares. The parties also executed a Supplemental
Agreement.The mining claims were covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSA) Application No. APSA-V-0009 jointly filed by J.G. Realty as claim-owner and
Benguet as operator.
After some time, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet, Antonio N.
Tachuling, issued a letter informing J.G. Realty of its intention to develop the mining
claims. However, J.G. Realty, through its President, Johnny L. Tan, then sent a letter to
the President of Benguet informing the latter that it was terminating the RAWOP. The
latter alleged that petitioner violated some of the provisions of the RAWOP, specifically
on non-payment of royalties and non-fulfillment of obligations stipulated therein.
J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the
RAWOP. POA issued a Decision, cancelling the RAWOP and its Supplemental
Agreement. BENGUET was subsequently excluded from the joint MPSA Application
over the mineral claims. Subsequent MR was denied. Said decision was upheld by
DENR-MAB.
Hence this instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or no the filing of the petition with the Supreme Court is proper.
HELD:
No. the instant petition can be denied outright as Benguet resorted to an
improper Remedy.

The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 states, A petition for review by certiorari and question
of law may be filed by the aggrieved party with the Supreme Court within thirty (30)
days from receipt of the order or decision of the [MAB].
The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and final orders are
now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review. A quasi-judicial agency or body
has been defined as an organ of government, other than a court or legislature, which affects the rights of
private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under this definition; hence, it is
no different from the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory
words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91among these agencies areindicate that the enumeration is
not exclusive or conclusive and acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which,
though not expressly listed, should be deemed included therein.
The judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort from
administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

Thus Benguet should have filed the appeal with the CA.
Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the
decision of the MAB has become final and executory. On this ground alone, the instant
petition must be denied.

[G.R. No. 148267. August 8, 2002]

ARMANDO C. CARPIO, petitioner, vs. SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
FACTS:
A petition filed by respondent for Mines Production Sharing Agreement(MPSA) No. MPSA-IV-131,
covering certain areas in Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioner filed an opposition/adverse claim thereto, alleging that his
landholdings in Cupang and Antipolo, Rizal will be covered by respondents claim, thus he enjoys a preferential right to

explore and extract the quarry resources on his properties. The Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-Sciences
Bureau of the DENR rendered a Resolution upholding petitioners opposition/adverse claim.
Respondent appealed. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss appeal on the ground of
respondents failure to comply with the requirements of the New Mining Acts Implementing Rules and Regulations.
On June 20, 1997, the Mines Adjudication Board rendered the assailed Order dismissing petitioners
opposition/adverse claim. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order which was denied by the Board. A
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43, seeking a reversal of the MAB Decision was filed. Citing Section 79 of
Chapter XIII of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942), the CA ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review
the Decision of the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). The adjudication of conflicting mining claims is completely
administrative in nature.Under Section 79 of RA 7942, the findings of fact by the MAB as well as its decision or order
shall be final and executory.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the Mines Adjudication Board should be made
directly to the Supreme Court as contended by the respondent and the Court of Appeals, or such appeals be first made to the
Court of Appeals as contended by herein petitioner.

HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
We clarify. Factual controversies are usually involved in administrative actions; and the CA is prepared to
handle such issues because, unlike this Court, it is mandated to rule on questions of fact. 1 In Metro Construction, we observed
that not only did the CA have appellate jurisdiction over CIAC decisions and orders, but the review of such decisions
included questions of fact and law.2 At the very least when factual findings of the MAB are challenged or alleged to have
been made in grave abuse of discretion as in the present case, the CA may review them, consistent with the constitutional
duty3 of the judiciary.
To summarize, there are sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of the MAB Decision under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. First, Section 30 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that [n]o law shall be passed increasing
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent. On the other
hand, Section 79 of RA No. 7942 provides that decisions of the MAB may be reviewed by this Court on a petition for
review by certiorari. This provision is obviously an expansion of the Courts appellate jurisdiction, an expansion to which
this Court has not consented. Indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of this Court would
unnecessarily burden it.4
Second, when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, transfers to the CA pending cases
involving a review of a quasi-judicial bodys decisions, such transfer relates only to procedure; hence, it does not impair the
substantive and vested rights of the parties. The aggrieved partys right to appeal is preserved; what is changed is only the
procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided. 5 The parties still have a remedy and a competent tribunal to grant
this remedy.
Third, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on appeals from quasijudicial agencies.6 Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and final orders are now required to be brought to the CA on
a verified petition for review.7 A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of government, other than a court
or legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. 8 MAB falls under this
definition; hence, it is no different from the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory
words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91 -- among these agencies are -- indicate that the enumeration is not exclusive or

conclusive and acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not expressly listed, should be
deemed included therein.9
Fourth, the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 12910 as amended by RA No. 7902,11 factual
controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-judicial bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve
questions of fact, has more elbow room to resolve them. By including questions of fact 12 among the issues that may be raised
in an appeal from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA, Section 3 of Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and Section 3 of
Rule 43 explicitly expanded the list of such issues.
According to Section 3 of Rule 43, [a]n appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within
the period and in the manner herein provided whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact
and law. Hence, appeals from quasi-judicial agencies even only on questions of law may be brought to the CA.
Fifth, the judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort from administrative
agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be obtained from the appropriate lower
tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the
exercise of our primary jurisdiction.13
In brief, appeals from decisions of the MAB shall be taken to the CA through petitions for review in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 169080

CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION,
vs. MACROASIA CORPORATION(formerly INFANTA MINERAL AND
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION),
BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION, and LEBACH MINING
CORPORATION,
FACTS:
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta Mineral and
Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered into a Mining Lease Contract V-1050.
7

Infantas corporate name was then changed to Cobertson Holdings Corporation and
subsequently to its present name, Macroasia Corporation.
After sometime, Celestial filed a Petition to Cancel the subject mining lease
contracts and other mining claims of Macroasia including those covered by Mining Lease
Contract No. V-1050, before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the Mines and GeoSciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR.
Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-petition, also wrote the Director of Mines to seek
cancellation of mining lease contracts and other mining rights of Macroasia and another
entity, Lebach Mining Corporation (Lebach), in mining areas in Brookes Point.
Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering such areas contiguous to
Infantas (now Macroasia) mining lode claims. Celestial also holds an MPSA with the
government which covers 2,835 hectares located at Ipilan/Maasin, Brookes Point,
Palawan and two pending applications covering another 4,040 hectares in Barangay
Mainit also in Brookes Point.
Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasias lease contracts.
Macroasia refuted the grounds for cancellation invoked by Celestial.
Based on the records of the Bureau of Mines and findings of the field
investigations, the POA granted the petition of Celestial to cancel the Mining Lease
Contracts of Macroasia; and found the claims of the others indubitably meritorious. It
gave Celestial the preferential right to Macroasias mining areas. 1 It upheld Blue Ridges
petition, but only as against the Mining Lease Contract areas of Lebach, and the said
leased areas were declared automatically abandoned. It gave Blue Ridge priority right to
the aforesaid Lebachs areas/mining claims. Blue Ridge and Macroasia appealed before
the MAB.
Lebach did not file any notice of appeal with the required memorandum of appeal;
thus, with respect to Lebach, the above resolution became final and executory.
The MAB made a decision upholding the Decision of the POA to cancel the
Mining Lode/Lease Contracts of Macroasia.

However, the MAB, subsequently issued a resolution vacating its previous

decision, holding that neither the POA nor the MAB had the power to revoke a mineral
agreement duly entered into by the DENR Secretary. The MAB further held that the
power to cancel or revoke a mineral agreement was exclusively lodged with the DENR
Secretary.
Celestial and Blue Ridge made an appeal.
The CA Special12thDivision affirmed the MAB Resolution which upheld the
exclusive authority of the DENR Secretary to approve, cancel, and revoke mineral
agreements. The CA also denied Celestials Motion for Reconsideration.
While the CA Special 10th Division granted Blue Ridges petition; reversed and set
aside the Resolutions of the MAB; and treated the cancellation of a mining lease
agreement as a mining dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA under Sec. 77
of RA 7942, explaining that the power to resolve mining disputes, which is the greater
power, necessarily includes the lesser power to cancel mining agreements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR who has the jurisdiction to
cancel mining contracts and privileges?
HELD:
YES. It is only the Secretary of the DENR who has jurisdiction to cancel mining
contracts and privileges.
After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO 279, RA 7942 and its
implementing rules and regulations, executive issuances, and case law, we rule that the
DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease
contracts or mineral agreements based on the following reasons:
The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreements emanates from his
administrative authority, supervision, management, and control over mineral resources
under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that manages, supervises, and regulates the
use and development of all mineral resources of the country. It has exclusive jurisdiction
over the management of all lands of public domain, which covers mineral resources and
9

deposits from said lands. It has the power to oversee, supervise, and police our natural
resources which include mineral resources. Derived from the broad and explicit powers
of the DENR and its Secretary under the Administrative Code of 1987 is the power to
approve mineral agreements and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said agreements.
Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR Secretary over
the MGB to cancel or recommend cancellation of mineral rights clearly demonstrates the
authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approve the cancellation of mineral
agreements.
The DENR Secretarys power to cancel mining rights or agreements through the
MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on cancellation,
revocation, and termination of a permit/mineral agreement/FTAA.

G.R. No. 157882 March 30, 2006

Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc. (DESAMA) Et al. vs.
Eliseagozun, et al.
FACTS:
A petition for mandamus and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, together with the IRR issued by the DENR Administrative
Order No. 96-40, s. 1996(DAO 96-40) and of the Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) entered into on20 June 1994 by the Republic of the Philippines and
Arimco
Mining Corporation (AMC),
a
corporation established
under
the
laws
of Australia and owned by its nationals. After several unsuccessful actions to cancel the
FTAA agreement with the government, the petitioners finally submitted a petition to the
court. In their memorandum petitioners pose whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 and
the CAMC FTAA are void because they allow theunjust and unlawful taking of property
without payment of just compensation , in violation of Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution issues, among others issues.
10

ISSUE:
Whether there has been an actual controversy or issue with respect to the unlawful
and unjust taking of property without payment of just compensation.
HELD:
Public respondents are of the view that petitioners eminent domain claim is not ripe
for adjudication as they fail to allege that CAMC has actually taken their properties nor do
they allege that their property rights have been endangered or are in danger on account
of CAMCs FTAA. In effect, public respondents insist that the issue of eminent domain is not
a justiciable controversy which this Court can take cognizance of. A question is considered
ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it. However, the court cannot await the adverse consequences
of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial intervention.
Actual eviction of the land owners and occupants need not happen for this Court to
intervene. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged
act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other
overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty. Nevertheless, the petition was still dismissed due to the baseless
contention of the issues submitted. The FTAA was in full compliance with the
necessary requirements of the law and Constitution. The allegation of the lack of payment
of just compensation was dismissed since the court has had authority in eminent domain
cases to make sure the proper amount was established regardless of the fact that there
would be an intervention from an executive department or legislature to make any initial
determination of the amount.

11

G.R. No 127882
January 27, 2004
La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Assn vs. Ramos
FACTS:
On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from
foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the
President may execute with the foreign proponent.
On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern
the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No.
7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the
procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes
their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements.
On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and
Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly
before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President
entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.
On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing
12

Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996
which was adopted on December 20, 1996.
On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary
demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40,
giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to
respond or act on petitioners' letter.
Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
They pray that the Court issue an order:
(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or
Technical Assistance Agreements;
(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as
unconstitutional and null and void;
(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act
contained in DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative
issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and
(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining
Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution and hereby declares unconstitutional and void:
(1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit:
Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified
person for purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance
agreement or mineral processing permit.
(2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration
permittee, insofar as said section applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement,
(3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or
technical assistance agreement;
(4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or
technical assistance agreement;
(5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance
agreement to convert the same into a mineral production-sharing agreement;
13

(6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a
contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement;
The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on
the foregoing provisions and cannot stand on their own:
(1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a
financial or technical assistance agreement.
Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical
assistance agreements;
Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance
agreements;
Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or
technical assistance agreement proposals;
Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements;
Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical
assistance agreements;
Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA;
The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the Government's share
in a financial and technical assistance agreement; and
Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies
to said contractors;
When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a
belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried
into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts
are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or
connected, must fall with them.

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO.,vs.

WMC RESOURCES INTL. PTY. LTD., WMC PHILIPPINES, INC. and
SAGITTARIUS MINES, INC.,
FACTS:

14

Philippine Government and WMC Philippines, the local wholly-owned subsidiary

of WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (WMC Resources) executed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement, denominated as the Columbio FTAA No. 02-95-XI
(Columbio FTAA) for the purpose of large scale exploration, development, and
commercial exploration of possible mineral resources in an initial contract area of 99,387
hectares located in the provinces of South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and
North Cotabato in accordance with Executive Order No. 279 and Department
Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991.
The Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156 mining claims held under various
Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) by Southcot Mining Corporation,
Tampakan Mining Corporation, and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (collectively called the
Tampakan Companies), in accordance with the Tampakan Option Agreement entered into
by WMC Philippines and the Tampakan Companies on 25 April 1991, as amended by
Amendatory Agreement dated 15 July 1994, for purposes of exploration of the mining
claims in Tampakan, South Cotabato. The Option Agreement, among other things,
provides for the grant of the right of first refusal to the Tampakan Companies in case
WMC Philippines desires to dispose of its rights and interests in the mining claims
covering the area subject of the agreement.
WMC Resources subsequently divested itself of its rights and interests in the
ColumbioFTAA, and on 12 July 2000 executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement with
petitioner Lepanto over its entire shareholdings in WMC Philippines, subject to the
exercise of the Tampakan Companies exercise of their right of first refusal to purchase
the subject shares. On 28 August 2000, petitioner sought the approval of the 12 July
2000 Agreement from the DENR Secretary.
In the interim, on 10 January 2001, contending that the 12 July Agreement between
petitioner and WMC Philippines had expired due to failure to meet the necessary
preconditions for its validity, WMC Resources and the Tampakan Companies executed
another Sale and Purchase Agreement, where Sagittarius Mines, Inc. was designated
assignee and corporate vehicle which would acquire the shareholdings and undertake the
Columbio FTAA activities. On 15 January 2001, Sagittarius Mines, Inc. increased its
authorized capitalization to P250 million. Subsequently, WMC Resources and Sagittarius
Mines, Inc. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Shares of Stocks on 23 January 2001.
After due consideration and evaluation of the financial and technical qualifications
of Sagittarius Mines, Inc., the DENR Secretary approved the transfer of the Columbio
FTAA from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. in the assailed Order. According
to said Order, pursuant to Section 66 of Department Administrative Order No. 96-40, as
15

amended, Sagittarius Mines, Inc. meets the qualification requirements as ContractorTransferee of FTAA No. 02-95-XI, and that the application for transfer of said FTAA
went thru the procedure and other requirements set forth under the law.
Aggrieved by the transfer of the Columbio FTAA in favor of Sagittarius Mines,
Inc., petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the Order of the DENR Secretary with the
Office of the President. Petitioner assails the validity of the 18 December 2001 Order of
the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
approving the application for and the consequent registration of FTAA No. 02-95-XI
from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc.on the ground that: 1) it violates the
constitutional right of Lepanto to due process; 2) it preempts the resolution of very
crucial legal issues pending with the regular courts; and 3) it blatantly violates Section 40
of the Mining Act.
In a Decision dated 23 July 2002, the Office of the President dismissed the petition
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, particularly Section 40
thereof requiring the approval of the President of the assignment or transfer of financial
or technical assistance agreements should have a retroactive application to the Columbio
FTAA.
HELD:
NO. Applying the above-cited law retroactively would contradict the established
legal doctrine that statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation
unless the contrary is expressly stated or necessarily implied from the language used in
the law.
In the case at bar, there is an absence of either an express declaration or an
implication in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 that the provisions of said law shall be
made to apply retroactively, therefore, any section of said law must be made to apply
only prospectively, in view of the rule that a statute ought not to receive a construction
making it act retroactively, unless the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that
no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot
be otherwise satisfied.

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G.R. No. 152644

JOHN ERIC LONEY,STEVEN PAUL REID andPEDRO B. HERNANDEZ,

Vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

FACTS:

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Petitioners are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and
Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining
Corporation (Marcopper), a corporation engaged in mining in the province of
Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing tailings2 from its operations in a pit in Mt.
Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels
end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days,
the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the
Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque (MTC) with violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067), the National
Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984), the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA
7942), and Article 365 of the RPC for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property.
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations.
The MTC is convinced that as far as the three (3) aforesaid laws are concerned,
only the Information for violation of Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942) should be
maintained and the Information for violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
should also be maintained and heard in a full blown trial because the common accusation
therein is reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property. It is the damage to
property which the law punishes not the negligent act of polluting the water system. The
prosecution for the [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the prosecution for
reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property.3
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial
Court. For its part, public respondent filed an ordinary appeal with the same court
assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for violation
of PD 1067 and PD 984.
RTC granted public respondents appeal but denied petitioners petition.

2
3

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Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that RTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion and contends that they should only be prosecuted for violation
of Article 365 of the RPC.4
Court of Appeals affirmed RTCs ruling. The appellate court held:
The doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the
case at Bench since the Informations filed against the petitioners are for violation of four
separate and distinct laws which are national in character.
This Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that
would give rise to any suspicion that public respondent acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial
Courts quashal of the Informations against the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and
P.D. 984. This Court equally finds no error in the trial courts denial of the petitioners
motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.5
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their
motion.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the decision of the CA contravenes People v. Relova.
HELD:
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
1. The contention has no merit.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be
established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to
abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate,
particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the containment of run-off and silt
materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or
neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had done
4
5

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everything to ensure containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be
liable. It does not follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted under the Water
Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised Penal Code because violation of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an essential element of these laws.
People v. Relova not in Point
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their
prosecution contravenes this Courts ruling in People v. Relova. In particular, petitioners
cite the Courts statement in Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the
accused by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another
are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical
elements.
This contention is also without merit
The issue in Relovais whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in
charging one Manuel Opulencia (Opulencia) with theft of electric power under the
RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the
unauthorized installation of electrical wiring, violated Opulencias right against double
jeopardy. We held that it did, not because the offenses punished by those two laws were
the same but because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and
a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for
the same act under the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,
now Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. We held:
The petitioner concludes that:
The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of
Batangas City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised
Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or
a frustration thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily included
in the offense charged in the first information.
The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct.
This is clear both from the express terms of the constitutional provision
involved which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
20

acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act. x xx
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioners
position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence
of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second
sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth
the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not
available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from
the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first
and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The
second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general
proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available
although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the
offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised
Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of
acts. x xx6 (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
Thus, Relovais no authority for petitioners claim against multiple prosecutions
based on a single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not at issue
here, but also because, as theCourt of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for
an act or incident punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a
national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence of Section 21,
Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense,and not, as in
Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident.

G.R. No. 139548. December 22, 2000

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION vs. ALBERTO G. BUMOLO et al.,
FACTS:
6

21

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION registered its mining claims in Pao,

Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya with the DENR from February 02,1982 to October 12, 1982.
Private respondents Alberto G. Bumolo and others registered their mining claims in the
same area from 28 July 1981 to 22 September 1988, which claims were subsequently
converted into Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA).
On March 12, 1982 petitioner entered into Option Agreements over the mining.
Under the Agreements, petitioner was granted the exclusive and irrevocable right to
explore the mining claims for three (3) years with provision for extension.
On December 23, 1982 and March 26, 1987 petitioner filed Prospecting Permit
Applications (PPA) with the Bureau of Forest Development, DENR, on the alleged
ground that a portion of the area covered by the mining claims was within the Magat
River Forest Reservation under Proc. 573 of June 26, 1969 and with DAR on account of
alleged coverage of the other portion within the Nueva Vizcaya-Quirino Civil
Reservation under Proc. 1498 of 11 September 1975.
On 15 July 1991 Executive Director Leonardo A. Paat rejected petitioners
Prospecting Permit Application (PPA) on the ground that the Memorandum of July 08,
1991 endorsed by the Regional Technical Director for Mines revealed that the area
covered was outside government reservation; that the prospect claim was in conflict with
existing claims; and, that the area had been extensively explored in the early 1980's.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Regional Executive Director Samuel
Paragas recommended to the DENR Secretary that petitioner's request for reconsideration
be denied; that the existing rights of mining claim holders be respected; and, that the
prior legal rights of MPSA/Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement applicants over
subject area be recognized.
As regards petitioner's PPA filed with the DAR, it appeared that it was issued a
clearance to prospect for six (6) months from December 11, 1995.
On August 15, 1997 petitioner appealed to public respondent Mines Adjudication Board
(MAB). Petitioner maintained that subject area was within the Magat River Forest
Reservation. On June 11, 1998 the rejection of the PPA was affirmed whereas the mining
claims of respondents Alberto G.
Bumolo et al. that had been converted into a
MPSA, subject to compliance with R.A. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, were given due
course.
22

Petitioner moved for reconsideration.

motion .

Respondent MAB denied petitioners

ISSUE:
Whether respondent MAB erred in finding that the area subject of the PPA was
outside the Magat River Forest Reservation.
HELD:
Respondent MAB correctly upheld the ratiocination of Regional Executive Director Paragas in denying petitioner's
PPA.
The disapproval of Marcoppers PPA moreover, did not emanate from a single recommendation of the RTD for
Mines. Records would show that as early as May 31, 1989 x xx the Bumolo group of PD 463 claims which Marcopper
has eventually surrounded by filing its own PAO 1-30 group of claims x xxx was confirmed by the Forest Engineering
Section of the region to be outside proclaimed watershed areas, wilderness, national parks and existing government
reforestation projects x xxx
In other words, the circumstance that the area covered by petitioner's PPA is outside the Magat River Forest
Reservation has been adequately established by the following evidence: (a) confirmation as early as 31 May 1989 by the
Forest Engineering Section of Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (b) the 8 July 1991 Memorandum Report of Regional Technical
Director Punsal Jr.; and, (c) plotting provided by the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority per its 2 June
1995 indorsement of the maps to the office of the Regional Executive Director. Petitioner contests the exclusion of the area
subject of its PPA within the Magat River Forest Reservation based merely on the alleged "typographical error committed by
somebody in the Engineering Section of the DENR." Aside from the fact that the allegation does not have anything to support
it, the aforementioned documents which the Regional Executive Directors relied upon in denying the PPA had already settled
the issue.
Furthermore, respondent MAB even fortified the bases for the rejection of petitioner's PPA. As plotted by the Lands
Management Sector of DENR Region 2 contained in the sketch plan of 11 November 1996 and as shown in the Land Use
map of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Dupax, Nueva Vizcaya, the area covered under the
PPA is indeed outside any government reservation.

23

G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995

Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran
FACTS:
Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 were issued by the then Pres. Aquino. EO No. 211
prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the
exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and
conclude joint-venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the
exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources.
The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative
Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were
granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitutionshall be converted into productionsharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. and
Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and
Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the
Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining,
quarry, and sand and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the
Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining
prospectors and claim owners and claim holders, to file the instant petition assailing their
24

validity and constitutionality before this Court.

ISSUE:
Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location
and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of
mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree
No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has
been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said
constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which
superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or
lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other
existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the
governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and management of
mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other
existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining
laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect.
Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining
leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive
Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable
exercise of the police power of the State.
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be
precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering,
modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being coextensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to
all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded
Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect
the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

25

OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,

PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION, Respondent.
CITINICKEL MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,Petitioner,
- versus HON. JUDGE BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR, in his capacity as the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 95, Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan, and PLATINUM GROUP METAL CORPORATION,
Respondents
PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- versus CITINICKEL MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, acting for its
own interest and on behalf of OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Respondent.
PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- versus COURT OF APPEALS and POLLY C. DY,
Respondents
FACTS:

26

In 1971 and 1980, Olympic was granted Mining Lease Contracts by the
Secretary of the DENR covering mining areas located in the municipalities of Narra and
Espanola, Palawan.
On July 18, 2003, Olympic entered into an Operating Agreement with Platinum,
by virtue of which Platinum was given the exclusive right to control, possess,
manage/operate, and conduct mining operations, and to market or dispose mining
products on the Toronto Nickel Mine in the Municipality of Narra. In return, Platinum
would pay Olympic a royalty fee of 2% of the gross revenues.
Olympic and Platinum applied for, and were subsequently granted the necessary
government permits and environmental compliance certificates.
On April 24, 2006, Olympic sent a letter to Platinum, informing the latter of the
immediate termination of the Operating Agreement on account of Platinums gross
violations of its terms, and directing Platinum to immediately surrender possession of the
subject mining areas under the Operating Agreement.
Olympic instituted an action for the issuance of an injunctive writ before the RTC
of Puerto Princesa against Platinum. In its prayer, Olympic sought to enjoin Platinum
from conducting mining operations on the subject mining areas, and also to recover
possession thereof. The RTC dismissed Olympics complaint.
Olympic then filed two cases with the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board
(PMRB) for the revocation of the SSMPs of Platinum, on the ground of Olympics
termination of the Operating Agreement because of the alleged gross violations thereof
by Platinum. This was dismissed and POA for the cancellation of the Operating
Agreement and the revocation of the SSMPs of Platinum. This case was subsequently
withdrawn by .
While these two administrative cases were pending, Olympic transferred its
applications for mineral agreements, including its rights under the Operating Agreement,
to Citinickelvia a Deed of , without the knowledge or consent of Platinum. This
assignment was thereafter approved by the Regional Director of the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau (MGB).
After the assignment, Citinickel filed Civil Case No. 06-0185 before the RTC of
Paraaque, on June 21, 2006, seeking to invalidate the Operating Agreement based on
Platinums alleged violation of its terms. This action was also dismissed by the trial
27

court, citing forum shopping and improper venue as among the grounds for dismissal.
Citinickel did not bother to appeal this dismissal, opting instead to find other remedies.
Citinickel thereafter filed three administrative cases: PMRB Case No. 002-06,
DENR Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) Case No. 8253, and POA Case No.
2006-02-B.
Civil Case No. 4199 involved a complaint for quieting of title, damages, breach of
contract, and specific performance filed by Platinum against Olympic before the RTC of
Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Branch 95 on June 14, 2006.
Olympic sought the dismissal of Platinums Civil Case No. 4199 through a motion
to dismiss where Olympic alleged that the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on
the issues raised in the case. Olympic contended that the case involved a mining dispute
requiring the technical expertise of the POA; accordingly, jurisdiction should be with the
PO
ISSUE:
Which body has the authority to hear and decide the dispute between
Olympic/Citinickel and Platinum, as parties to the operating agreement.
HELD:
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint. It is thus obvious that the complaint falls
within the ambit of the RTCs original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other judicial or
quasi-judicial bodies.
Although Section 77 (d) of the Mining Act has transferred to the POA jurisdiction
over disputes pending before the Bureau of Mines and the DENR, Section 77 (b) did not
adopt the wording of Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (c) of PD No. 1281 so as to include all
other forms of contracts public or private involving mining rights; Section 77 (b) in
relation to Section 3 (ab) of the Mining Act did not include a general catch-all phrase to
cover other agreements involving mining rights similar to those in Section 7, paragraphs
(a) and (c) of PD No. 1281. Instead, the Mining Act, through the above-quoted Sections
3 (ab) and 26, has limited the jurisdiction of the POA, as successor of the adjudicatory
functions of the Bureau of Mines, to mineral agreements between the government and the
private contractor. Otherwise stated, while disputes between parties to any mining
28

contract (including operating agreements) may previously fall within the Bureau of
Mines jurisdiction under Section 7 (a) or (c) of PD No. 1281, it can no longer be so
placed now within the authority of the POA to settle under Section 77 (b) of the Mining
Law because its jurisdiction has been limited to the resolution of disputes involving
public mineral agreements.
The controlling factor in determining venue for cases is the primary objective for
which said cases are filed. Platinums primary objective in filing the complaint is to
protect its interest in the subject mining areas, although it joined its claims of breach of
contract, damages, and specific performance in the case. In any event, the Rules of Court
allow joinder of causes of action in the RTC, provided one of the causes of action (in this
case, the cause of action for quieting of title or interest in real property located in
Palawan) falls within the jurisdiction of said court and venue lies therein. In fine, there
is absolutely no reason to disturb the CAs findings that venue was properly laid in
the Palawan court.

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