Philosophy of mind: Grand Summary

Substance Dualism (Descartes)

The mental mind and the physical body are separate things.

For: The Doubt and indubitability argument

Response: Doubting is not a valid property (Arnauld).
For: Indivisibility
Response: The mind is divisible; both physically, and mentally (subconscious
etc).
For: the properties of mental states vs. the properties of the body.
For: Free will: A physical mind would be governed by processes: hence no free
will.
Response: Prove we have free will!
Against: The Mind-body problem (sailor on a ship).
Response: cause and effect do not have to be the same thing.
Response: Leibnitz, God provides the interaction.
Problems: We cannot confirm Gods existence, and this connects God to evil
acts in an unpleasant way.
Against: Violates conservation of energy (Puts in new energy)
Response: It doesnt create new energy, it just guides it.

Epiphenomenalism (property dualism)

Our biological processes create a non physical consciousness. We are automata.

Problems: Seems unreasonable to suggest.

Reductionist theories: Materialism: Everything is Physical

Behaviourism

All mental states are is our behaviour.

Problem: category mistake. We are trying to call the product the cause.
For: the meaning of any physiological statement can be explained in terms of
the physical.
Against: We can have mental states with no outward expression of behaviour.
Against: We could pretend to be in pain, even though we are not.
Against: How do we have knowledge of our own mental states? We would have
to ask someone!
Against: Too vague when specifying behaviour.
Against: Our actions do not cause our desires: its the other way around.
Against: Behaviourism ignores our subjective experience.

Eliminative materialism
We should eliminate our folk language for mental states with scientific
language, just as we have eliminated other concepts like witches or demons.
Against: its counter intuitive: Folk concepts work, why should we change?
Against: If beliefs are folk concept, then how can one believe in Eliminative
materialism? :P
Folk psychology isnt a theory, so we cant treat it as such.

Identity theory
Each mental state is identical to some physical state. How this is interpreted
depends on the type of identity theory: Either Type or token Identity theory.
Are states identical to particular physical processes? Identity theory generally is
a theory that rejects that anything can lie outside science. This is an empirical
theory.
How many letters are used in the word Follow? Either 6 or 4. If we say six, then
we are referring to each letter as a token word. If we say four, we are referring
to each letter as a type of word.
Type theory: If ten people have pain in their tooth, then the same particular
part of the brain is firing: be it C-Fibre 46G556 or whatever you want to call it.
Token theory: If ten people have pain, a particular part of the brain is firing for
each one: Be it C-fibre R43366 for the first person, and C-fibre ET55667.
Type is more specific, and thus more accepted, although token is harder to
disprove.

Criticism: We can have no knowledge of our brain states, but total knowledge of
mental states: We cannot have total knowledge of one and no knowledge of the
other and them still being the same thing.
Response: We can talk about light, even if we do not understand photons.
Criticism: mental states can have properties that physical states do not: I can
have a coloured after image, but my brain cells are not changing colour.
Response: Our mental states are not really coloured, they just give us the
impression of what it would be like if we were to see something of that colour.
Criticism: If my brain functions are being observed by a scanner, two people are
observing my mental states (both me and the person operating the scanner), so
surely this means that two people are having an individuals experiences.
Response: There is a translation of the data given by the individuals mind.
Currently, we do not have the technology to decode this.

Type specific criticisms

If all processes in the mind were type, then wouldnt we all be the same?
If the brain is damaged, it has been observed to reroute certain pathways. If
type was true, then this wouldnt be possible.
Also, this means that we cannot claim that something is in pain if it has a
different neural network from us. A dog is clearly in pain if you kick it, but as it
has a totally different type of brain it cannot be in pain. This is speciesist.
Functionalism
What is important is what the mental state does: its function. Thus, the role of a
mental state can be described not in terms of its physical constitution, but in
terms of its function. Two different physical systems can nevertheless perform
the same function: they are described as functionally isomorphic.
Types of functionalism
Analytic functionalism

The attempt to develop an analysis of mental concepts in functionalist terms. If

we can do this than then it will avoid the identity criticism of having separate
ways in which we identify our thoughts.
Machine functionalism
This compares the human mind to a computer: mental states are like programs
running on a single piece of hardware (the brain). The same software can be run
on different hardware. This means that pain, or any other mental state, could be
replicated in a system totally different to the way our brain works.
Teleological-functionalism
The physical components of the function have organically evolved for that
purpose. This is to avoid the problem that anything could be minded.
The strengths of functionalism
Less species-chauvinist than earlier accounts.
Avoids the problems associated with behaviourism.
Has strong ties with ongoing research programs
Weaknesses of functionalism

We could use this to call things that obviously dont have minds, like cars or
computers, sentient. This is the Chinese mind criticism: it would be ridiculous to
say that if we arranged the entire population of China (a population roughly the
same as the number of neurones in the human brain) in the same way that the
human brain communicates, that this setup could then have mental states. It
seems that a mind could spontaneously and accidently be created out of
environmental conditions.
The problem of qualia: we may perceive things differently, but call them the
same. The problem here is that a functionalist would have to claim that there is
no difference, as they are functionally the same, but there obviously is a
difference.
There could be zombies that have functionally identical processes to us, but
have no qualia.
Chinese room: A man in a room with an incredibly complex and detailed guide
to Chinese could respond in Chinese to messages sent to him in Chinese: but
the catch is that he does not understand a word of Chinese himself; the book
just tells him what to write. A functionalist would have to accept that the man
understands Chinese; but this is obviously not the case.
A response to this could say that we a focusing on the wrong agent: we are
looking at the man in the room, not the whole system. The whole system has
the function of understanding Chinese.

Anomalous monism: Donald Davidson

Each mental event is the same as a physical event (in a token-token way),
but mental events cannot be explained or reduced to the purely physical.
There are no strict laws connecting our mental events and physical states.
Criticism: This isnt really reductive: we need the mental to have its role in
explaining action. AM seems to suggest that physical states do all the
work, and mental states are just products of that, almost in the style of
epiphenomenalism.

Biological Naturalism: John Searle

Both Dualists and Materialists say something that is true, and something that is
false. Anything can be described on levels: each level is greater than the sum of
the parts of the previous level, and cannot be reduced purely to lower levels.
This means that mental states are just a much part of our physical or mental
states as any other biological process. E.G.
1. A rock
2. A combination of compounds
3. A combination of elements
4. A combination of atoms
5. A combination of quarks and electrons.
A rock is still just as much of a rock: it is not just quarks and electrons:
everything is. In a similar way:
1. Consciousness
2. Mental states
3. Complex brain processes
4. Minor brain processes
5. Neurones reacting
6. Atoms etc
In the same way, consciousness is not just neurones firing, and cannot be
described purely in terms of the physical.
This is a very different theory to understand, but has implications that are vast.
Criticism: Searle wants it both ways.
Criticism: This account is contradictory: it seems both non-reductive & reductive.
Criticism: This is a form of property dualism. Is he not saying that the physical
processes create the mental states we have?
Double causation argument.
Responses: Dualism Vs Materialism may not be the only way. It is not property
dualism, as it is not saying that the mental is different to the physical, and the double
causation critic does not understand the argument.