Republic vs.

Toledano
Facts:
On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen and Evelyn Clouse, a former Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen,
filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, a minor who is Evelyn's youngest brother. The trial court granted the petition. Republic, through the Office of
the Solicitor General appealed contending that the lower court erred in granting the petition for the spouses are not qualified to adopt under
Philippine Law.
Issue:
Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt
Held:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents
spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative byconsanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided
by law.
There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases
in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the
second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private
respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse
was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a
former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without
violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184.

Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the
child, which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses
to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
Note:
The alien husband can now adopt under Sec. 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998). The Supreme Court has held in several cases
that when husband and wife are required to adopt jointly, each one of them must be qualified to adopt in his or her own right. However, the American
husband must comply with the requirements of the law including the residency requirement of 3 years. Otherwise, the adoption will not be allowed.

REPUBLIC VS CA, MOLINA

Posted by kaye lee on 9:45 AM
G.R. No. 108763, February 13 1997 [Article 36- Psychological Incapacity]
FACTS:
Roridel and Reynaldo got married in 1985 in Manila. During the early years of their marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandered money with them, his dependency from his parents for
financial aid and dishonesty in matters involving finances. Roridel became the sole breadwinner of the family. She then resigned her job in Manila
and went to Baguio. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is separated in fact for more than 3 years.
Roridel filed a petition to have their marriage void under Article 36, citing Reynaldo's psychological incapacity. She presented evidence consisted of
her own testimony, of her two friends, a social worker and a psychiatrist. Reynaldo did not present any evidence and appeared only during the pretrial. The RTC granted the petition, declaring the marriage void. Solicitor General appealed to the CA. CA denied the appeals and ruled in favor of the
trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not opposing or conflicting personalities constitute psychological incapacity.
RULING:
No. There is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright
refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code: 1) The burden of proof to show
the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff; 2) the root cause of PI must be (a) medically or clinically identified (b) alleged in the complaint (c)
sufficiently proven by experts (d) clearly explained in the decision; 3) it must be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage; 4) it must be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable; 5) it must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the marital obligations of
marriage; 6) the marital obligations must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71, and Articles 220, 221 and 225 in regard of parents and their children; 7)
interpretation by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of Catholic of Church of the Philippines, although not binding, should be given great
respect; and 8) the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General must appear as counsel for the State.