China: Military Modernization in Xi Jinping

Era- Implications for Foreign Policy

By D. S. Rajan-Dated 12=Oct-2015
Nations like Russia and China have been pursuing military modernization
programs to close the technology gap with the United States. Theyre
developing platforms designed to thwart our traditional advantages of
power projection and freedom of movement.- US Defence Secretary
Ashton Carter (Washington, September 16, 2015).
Coming soon after the September 3, 2015 military parade in Beijing when

China exhibited advanced missiles and fighter aircraft and prior to the start
of the first state visit to the US by the President of the Peoples Republic of
China (PRC) Xi Jinping, the statement above made by Ashton Carter, brings
the ongoing military modernization drive in China into sharp focus.
Indicating a fresh momentum to that drive has been Xi Jinpings
announcement while addressing that parade, held to mark the 70th
anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against
Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, of a cut of 300,000
from the present estimated PLA strength of 2.3 million. Xi stressed on the
cuts upholding peace purpose; so did his governments Defence
Ministry spokesman Col. Yang Yujun who listed other purposes of the cut
as well achieving common development and sharing prosperity with
other nations and pushing forward the international arms control and
disarmament.
In the past, there had been a debate in China on Men Vs Weapons, with
Maos Peoples War Strategy emphasizing the manpower aspect.
Importance to weapons in the interest of modern warfare steadily grew in
the country in subsequent stages and the latest cut symbolizes the same.
The latest troop reduction is not new; military reforms in the PRC had been
happening in intervals since 1949 depending on the nature of the needed
military strategy at each stage. The total PLA strength in 1949 was around
6 million. The military reforms in the 1949-78 period were meant to build
armed forces capable of countering a foreign invasion. The subsequent cut
by one million troops took place in mid-80s, a period which saw the veteran
leader Deng Xiaoping assessing that the probability of a major or nuclear
war has become low. This resulted in the need to make the military capable
of waging local wars under hi-tech conditions. The consequence was
reduction in the number of MRs from 11 to 7, and in the number of the
then existing field armies from 37 to 24, along with their conversion as
corps level organizations called Group Army. [1] A further reduction by
400,000 (from 3.23 to 3.19 million) occurred by 1990. From mid-90s till
now, taking into account the end of the Cold War and the progress in
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), a stress on the militarys winning local
wars under information conditions is being seen; the 500,000-troop
reduction in 1997, another 200,000 troops cut between 2003 and 2005
reducing the PLA strength from 2.5 to 2.3 million and the latest one, need
to be understood in this angle.
The display of armaments in the September 3, 2015 parade symbolized Xi
regimes importance to the aspect of weapon systems, rather than to

manpower. The PRCs state media (Xinhua, September 3, 2015),

highlighted the exhibition during the parade of intercontinental ballistic
missiles (Dong Feng-5B carrying nuclear warheads and the Dong Feng-21D
carrier killer anti-ship ballistic missiles), DF-26 intermediate-range
ballistic missiles, medium-long range bomber aircraft (H-6K bombers) and
carrier-based fighter jets (J-15). The State media linked the display with the
nations military strategy of "Active Defense", which as being seen in the
PRC serves the purposes of "defense, self-defense and post-emptive
strikes", in contrast to the pre-emptive strategies of other countries[2].
The latest cut would naturally result in reduction of Chinas military
personnel to the figure of two million; even then Chinas military will remain
as the world's largest. No doubt the PRCs effort is towards overemphasizing
the cuts significance for protecting world peace, but from what Chinese
military officials said, it looks beyond doubt that the real purpose is
something else, i.e to accelerate the PLAs modernisation. The cut indeed
marks the beginning of a new round of military reforms in the PRC to
achieve that purpose. It does not mean a fall in the militarys fighting
capabilities and there will be adequate budget allocations to support
military modernization process. Worth noting is that process is now to
progress under a new situation; as perceived by the Xi administration
(Chinas Military Strategy, May 2015), the new situation is one in which
China is already in an important period of strategic opportunities for its
development, the countrys comprehensive national strength, core
competitiveness and risk-resistance capacity have increased and the
PRCs international standing and influence have grown.
Retired Major General Xu Guangyu, now a senior army arms control
advisor, rationalized the cut by observing that "our country's military needs
to take the path of modernization ... These force reductions are an effort to
stay on this path and increase quality not numbers[3]." Col.Yang (see
above) on his part was more specific by identifying the troops to be
disbanded as those equipped with outdated armaments and office staff
and personnel of non-combat organizations. On future plans, what Xi
himself said has been notable. As he puts it, the reforms will have four
main objectives - adjust Chinas military leadership and command system;
optimize structure and function, reform policies and systems; and promote
deeper civil-military integration[4]. Col.Yang has been more articulate by
telling that in the next step, we will roll out new reform measures one after
another, actively and steadily advancing reform of national defense and the
military. China's defense budget will be kept on a proper level to meet

various needs including expenditure on new armaments, information

technology and soldiers' salaries. The PLA would further adjust and
optimize its scale and structure and improve the quality of informatization
construction leading to the establishment of a modern military force system
with Chinese characteristics. Yang with no ambiguity felt that a
modernized PLA can fulfill its assigned charter of duties - safeguarding
national unity and territorial integrity, undertaking non-military missions
such as disaster relief, peacekeeping and international rescue and coping
up with the threat of terrorism, separatism and extremism.
The fresh round of military cut is to be completed by 2017, the deadline
officially set. The military reforms are to continue beyond that year to meet
the officially declared targets - accomplishment of mechanization and
making major progress toward informationization by 2020 and building a
modern armed force by mid-century[5].
Chinas fundamental policy direction is that national defence building in the
country should be in the service of and subordinated to the countrys
overall development. Against such interlocking of development and defence
building, it would be important to note the PRCs declared overall strategic
vision, say the Chinese dream, as Xi puts it. That vision demands doubling
the 2010 GDP and per capita income of the Chinese and completing the
building of a moderately prosperous society by 2020, the year marking
100thanniversary of the founding of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and to
build a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious
modern socialist country and realize the great renewal of the Chinese
nation by 2050, the year signifying the 100th anniversary of establishment
of the PRC.
Specific official details on how the fresh round of military reforms will affect
the PLA organizationally are still lacking. However, from reports appearing
in the knowledgeable overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Taiwanese media,
the PLA restructuring can be expected to happen as follows:
Replacing the present 7 Military Regions (MRs) with 4 Theater
Commands ( a Northeast theater command including Shenyang and
Beijing MRs ; a Northwest theater command based on Lanzhou MR; a
Southwest theater command based on Chengdu MR and a Southeast
theater command formed from the Guangzhou, Nanjing and Jinan
MRs).

 Reorganizing the four PLA General Departments and the Ministry of

National Defense. A decision has already reportedly been taken to
merge the General Logistics Department and General Armaments
Department into one body- the Logistics Department. The General
Staff Headquarters is to be upgraded and modeled on the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff, including in it high-ranking officers from all service
branches of the military. It will provide planning and consulting to the
Chairman of the Central Military Commission.
Reducing the services strength- the ground forces to 360,000
personnel.
Transforming the Peoples Armed Police into a National Guard.
Cutting down the present 150 military academies to 29.
Demobilizing some existing corps-level organizations, i.e Group
Armies (GAs) in MRs (27th GA of Beijing MR, 40th GA of Shenyang MR,
47th GA of Lanzhou MR, 20th GA of Jinan MR, and 14th GA of Chengdu
MR). The troop strengths in South West facing India, Southeast facing
Taiwan, the South China Sea and areas facing Vietnam may not
undergo major cuts.
Increasing the Navy and Air Force strengths.
China seems to be aware that there could be challenges as the fresh round
of military reforms progresses further. A Liberation Army Daily
article[6] cautioned that the troop cuts and other military reforms Xi
wished to undertake would require an assault on fortified positions to
change mindsets and root out vested interests, and that the difficulties
expected would be unprecedented. If these reforms failed, measures still to
come would be nothing more than an empty sheet of paper. Another write
up in the same daily[7]contributed by an official of the Academy of Military
Sciences (AMS), warned remarked that as the reform advances, there
could be significant structural contradictions and an accumulation of
institutional obstacles. Quoting Xi, it said that to realize its strong military
dream, China must exploit a rare window of opportunity to seize the
strategic high ground in the ocean depths, outer and cyber space, the poles
and other emerging areas. This requires overcoming entrenched obstacles
to achieving major reforms, most importantly modernizing Chinas form of
military organization.
From the rationale for the latest military cut being provided by Chinese
leaders, officials and policy documents, it can clearly be seen that from now
on the PLAs Navy and Air Force rather than the ground forces, will play a
greater role in Chinas defence. The PRCs Military Strategy document (May

2015) has already hinted at an enhanced role for the Chinese Navy; it has
envisaged gradual shift of Chinas naval focus from offshore waters
defense to the combination of offshore waters defense with open seas
protection and laid stress on building a modern maritime military
force structure commensurate with its national security and development
interests and preparing for Maritime Military Struggle (Maritime PMS).
According to Major General Xu Guangyu (see above), troop reduction could
help pave the way for a rebalancing in Chinas military, allowing for Chinas
air force and navy to be proportionately larger parts of the overall
PLA[8] and adjusting the ratio of ground, air and naval forces to better cope
with modern warfare, as 2:1:1, as against the current estimate of about
4:2:1[9].
In a nutshell, it would be right to reiterate that the latest cut is a part of
ongoing military reforms in the PRC which aim at completing military
modernization in the country by the stipulated time schedule of mid
century. At this juncture, the savings from the cut are certain to get
diverted to meet the costs of modernizing the Navy, Air Force and missile
forces. Secondly, the reforms may not affect the PRCs defence budgets.
Confirming this is the Chinese comment (see above) that the defence
budgets will be kept on a proper level to meet various needs. As such, the
steady increase being seen in China in the levels of defence allocations is
likely to continue; the budget for 2015 showed a rise by 10.1%, lowest in
last 5 years, reaching more than US$ 144.2 billion, making China the
second largest military spender in the world (The US defence budget in
2013 was to the tune of US$ 600.4 billion).[10] Chinas defense budget was
around $10 billion in 1997.
There can be no doubt about the implications of Chinas latest military
modernization drive for the countrys foreign policy which underwent a shift
in focus in 2009. Admitting a recalibration in that year of strategic focus in
diplomacy to core interests, on which China will make no compromises
and protect them even by military means, experts in China provided the
rationale[11] China is going global and its international influence is
becoming more visible and assertive and the international environment and
domestic conditions are changing. Evolving multi-polarity and
multilateralism as well as global challenges including climate change and
energy security, marked the changes in the external conditions, according
to the then Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi. Identifying Chinas core
interests, Dai Bingguo, who played a major role in the countrys foreign
policy making, identifying core interests, said in end July 2009 that the

PRCs first core interest is maintaining its fundamental system and state
security, second is state sovereignty and territorial integrity and the third is
the continued stable development of the economy and society. In specific
terms, Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan and South China Sea Islands as well as
strategic resources and trade routes were listed under the core interest
category.[12] On his part, the Chinese Foreign Minister explained his
countrys new foreign policy direction by saying (Beijing, 8.3.2014) that the
PRC will play the international role of a responsible, big country. This
signaled a firm shift in the direction so far existed of the PRCs external
course - hiding one's capacities and biding one's time (veteran leader
Deng Xiaopings famous 24-character maxim of tao guang yang hui).
The post-2009 core interests-based foreign policy continues till today,
resulting in assertive international behavior of China , for which a variety
of factors can be traced as given below: (i) Chinas confidence gained
through its ability to achieve a sustained growth leading to a build-up of the
countrys comprehensive national strength, (ii) Chinas feeling that an
opportunity has arisen for itself to increase its influence globally as the
world balance of power shifts from the West to East and a multi-polar world
gradually emerges, (iii) the PRCs growing need to protect land and sea
trade routes in the interest of the much needed import of resources from
abroad , (iv) deepening Chinese fears concerning sovereignty over Tibet
and Xinjiang and (v) rising suspicions on the purpose of the US Asia-Pacific
strategy.
Interestingly, of late, the core interests identified with respect to Chinas
foreign policy have also figured in the evolved national security guideline
of the country; this has been , particularly so after the ruling CCP set up a
new body known as National Security Commission (NSC) as per the
decision taken in the 18th Party Congress in November 2012 . The guideline,
based on the concept of Integrated National Security provides for
integration of national security in a wide range of aspects political,
territorial, military, economic, cultural, societal, scientific, information,
ecological, resource, and nuclear. It describes the concepts principles as
(i) fundamentally guaranteeing the long-term governing position of CCP
and the enduring peace and stability of the country, with the CCP
absolutely commanding Chinas armed forces, (ii) in matters of
guaranteeing security during development of the country, taking political
security as core, economic security as its basis, military, cultural, and
societal security as an important guarantee, and the furthering of global
security as foundation and (iii) widen security management to include new

fields like marine, space, and cyber security. The concept at the same time
has a rider - Chinas adherence to the path of peaceful development, in
absolutely no way, means that it will give up its legitimate rights and
interests or sacrifice its core national interests. No country should entertain
the fantasy that China will allow its sovereignty, security, and development
interests to be infringed. Should Chinas sovereignty and territorial integrity
be challenged, we will mount a head-on struggle and fight for every last
inch. Now that China is strong, we have no reason to submit to such
external pressure. We must safeguard Chinas core and key interests.[13]
Significant is that the protection of core national interests has emerged as
a common element to both foreign and national security policies; this
establishes that China has started the work for policy coordination in the
field of external relations between the NSC and the foreign ministry. As a
consequence, a trend towards the foreign ministry using a strong and
modernized military for further sharpening its assertiveness whenever
necessary in matters of protecting the countrys core interests abroad, can
be expected. The implications of military reforms in progress for Chinas
foreign policy thus become clear.
The countries in the neighborhood having territorial disputes with China in
particular, will therefore have reasons to view the progressing Chinas
naval modernization with worry ; especially, the South China Sea and East
China Sea littorals contesting Chinas maritime claims may feel the need to
be cautious. So may be the case with the US as it pursues its Asia-Pivot
policy in an atmosphere of increasing challenges emanating from China.
On its part, Beijing appears keen on doing some image building
externally; symbolizing the same are its efforts diplomatically to balance
the use of its hard and soft powers. Beijings building of artificial islands in
South China Sea and declaration of Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in
East China Sea, can be considered as examples of hard power use ; its Belt
and Road initiative emphasizing economic interests and the external line
such as New Type of Major Powers Relationship can be viewed as Chinas
soft course intended to create a favorable image to it internationally as a
peace loving nation ( Such approach is visible in Xi Jinpings speech given
at Seattle, on September 23,2015, during his first state visit to the US; it
focused on the need for countries to accommodate each other's core
interests, seek common ground while reserving differences, show mutual
respect and avoid strategic miscalculation). Interesting however will be

how the outside world will view Chinas such hard-soft mix in diplomacy.
Worth mentioning are the opinions of Chinas authoritative
scholars[14] that China's foreign policy has been undergoing some positive
changes. They have admitted that the countrys use of hard power allows
it to assert itself on its sovereignty and maritime rights and interests
particularly in the Asia-Pacific but at the same time felt that China should
accord equal importance to its soft power, i.e the economic and financial
power as a tough posture could leave China with little maneuvering room
and increase the risk of confrontation with countries like the US and Japan.
In the coming years, China should therefore accord equal importance to its
"economic strategy" based on its economic and financial powers, as well as
extensive diplomacy to balance its global image.
India needs to carefully watch the ongoing military reforms in China. They
are certain to lead to increase in capabilities of the PLA, especially the Navy
which has now been assigned with an expanded role i.e carrying out the
task of open seas protection. It should recognize that tensions in the
contentious South China Sea and East China Sea are certain to rise, which
may have negative implications of its Act East policy. New Delhi should also
address the question as to how the open seas protection role of the
Chinese Navy will impact on the situation in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
Reasons look obvious. The IOR already figures prominently in the Chinas
Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative; this is forcing it to actively woo nations
in Indias neighborhood through extending economic and military aid.
Examples are Chinas infrastructure projects in Myanmar, Sri Lanka and
Bangladesh and the proposal for China-Pakistan Economic corridor, passing
through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. As China copes up with demands with
respect to energy security and regional integration under the MSR initiative,
its attention is going to be increasingly towards securing of the Indian
Ocean sea lanes. It may thus view operation of its naval vessels including
submarines in that region legitimate and desirable. The debate on the
subject of having overseas naval bases has not died down in China, in spite
of official denials. Potentials for an India-China competition in the IOR look
therefore high.
(The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Distinguished Fellow, Chennai Centre for China
Studies, Chennai, India. Contributing date October 11, 2015.
Email:dsrajan@gmail.com)

Posted by Thavam